III. The Sufis, who call themselves the elect of God and possessors of
intuition and knowledge of the truth by means of ecstasy.
"The truth," I said to myself, "must be found among these three classes
of men who devote themselves to the search for it. If it escapes them,
one must give up all hope of attaining it. Having once surrendered
blind belief, it is impossible to return to it, for the essence of such
belief is to be unconscious of itself. As soon as this unconsciousness
ceases it is shattered like a glass whose fragments can not be again
reunited except by being cast again into the furnace and refashioned."
Determined to follow these paths and to search out these systems to
the bottom, I proceeded with my investigations in the following order:
Scholastic theology; philosophical systems; and, finally Sufism.
_The Aim of Scholastic Theology and Its Results_
Commencing with theological science, I carefully studied and meditated
upon it. I read the writings of the authorities in this department and
myself composed several treatises. I recognized that this science,
while sufficing its own requirements, could not assist me in arriving
at the desired goal. In short, its object is to preserve the purity
of orthodox beliefs from all heretical innovation. God, by means of
his apostle, has revealed to his creatures a belief which is true as
regards their temporal and eternal interests; the chief articles of it
are laid down in the Koran and in the traditions. Subsequently, Satan
suggested to innovators principles contrary to those of orthodoxy; they
listened greedily to his suggestions, and the purity of the faith was
menaced. God then raised up a school of theologians and inspired them
with the desire to defend orthodoxy by means of a system of proofs
adapted to unveil the devices of the heretics and to foil the attacks
which they made on the doctrines established by tradition.
Such is the origin of scholastic theology. Many of its adepts, worthy
of their high calling, valiantly defended the orthodox faith by proving
the reality of prophecy and the falsity of heretical innovations.
But, in order to do so, they had to rely upon a certain number of
premises, which they accepted in common with their adversaries, and
which authority and universal consent or simply the Koran and the
traditions obliged them to accept. Their principal effort was to expose
the self-contradictions of their opponents and to confute them by
means of the premises which they had professed to accept. Now a method
of argumentation like this has little value for one who only admits
self-evident truths. Scholastic theology could not consequently satisfy
me nor heal the malady from which I suffered.
It is true that in its later development theology was not content to
defend dogma; it betook itself to the study of first principles, of
substances, accidents and the laws which govern them; but through
want of a thoroughly scientific basis, it could not advance far in
its researches, nor succeed in dispelling entirely the overhanging
obscurity which springs from diversities of belief.
I do not, however, deny that it has had a more satisfactory result for
others; on the contrary, I admit that it has; but it is by introducing
the principle of authority in matters which are not self-evident.
Moreover, my object is to explain my own mental attitude and not to
dispute with those who have found healing for themselves. Remedies vary
according to the nature of the disease; those which benefit some may
injure others.
PHILOSOPHY.—How far it is open to censure or not—On what points its
adherents may be considered believers or unbelievers, orthodox or
heretical—What they have borrowed from the true doctrine to render
their chimerical theories acceptable—Why the minds of men swerve from
the truth—What criteria are available wherewith to separate the pure
gold from the alloy in their systems.
I proceeded from the study of scholastic theology to that of
philosophy. It was plain to me that, in order to discover where the
professors of any branch of knowledge have erred, one must make a
profound study of that science; must equal, nay surpass, those who
know most of it, so as to penetrate into secrets of it unknown to
them. Only by this method can they be completely answered, and of this
method I can find no trace in the theologians of Islam. In theological
writings devoted to the refutation of philosophy I have only found
a tangled mass of phrases full of contradictions and mistakes, and
incapable of deceiving, I will not say a critical mind, but even the
common crowd. Convinced that to dream of refuting a doctrine before
having thoroughly comprehended it was like shooting at an object in the
dark, I devoted myself zealously to the study of philosophy; but in
books only and without the aid of a teacher. I gave up to this work all
the leisure remaining from teaching and from composing works on law.
There were then attending my lectures three hundred of the students of
Bagdad. With the help of God, these studies, carried on in secret, so
to speak, put me in a condition to thoroughly comprehend philosophical
systems within a space of two years. I then spent about a year in
meditating on these systems after having thoroughly understood them. I
turned them over and over in my mind till they were thoroughly clear
of all obscurity. In this manner I acquired a complete knowledge of
all their subterfuges and subtleties, of what was truth and what was
illusion in them.
I now proceed to give a _résumé_ of these doctrines. I ascertained that
they were divided into different varieties, and that their adherents
might be ranged under diverse heads. All, in spite of their diversity,
are marked with the stamp of infidelity and irreligion, although there
is a considerable difference between the ancient and modern, between
the first and last of these philosophers, according as they have missed
or approximated to the truth in a greater or less degree.
_Concerning the Philosophical Sects and the Stigma of Infidelity Which
Attaches to Them All_
The philosophical systems, in spite of their number and variety, may be
reduced to three: (1) the Materialists; (2) the Naturalists; (3) the
Theists.
(1) _The Materialists._ They reject an intelligent and omnipotent
Creator and disposer of the universe. In their view the world exists
from all eternity and had no author. The animal comes from semen and
semen from the animal; so it had always been and will always be; those
who maintain this doctrine are atheists.
(2) _The Naturalists._ These devote themselves to the study of nature
and of the marvelous phenomena of the animal and vegetable world.
Having carefully analyzed animal organs with the help of anatomy,
struck with the wonders of God's work and with the wisdom therein
revealed, they are forced to admit the existence of a wise Creator
who knows the end and purpose of everything. And certainly no one can
study anatomy and the wonderful mechanism of living things without
being obliged to confess the profound wisdom of him who has framed
the bodies of animals and especially of man. But carried away by
their natural researches they believed that the existence of a being
absolutely depended upon the proper equilibrium of its organism.
According to them, as the latter perishes and is destroyed, so is the
thinking faculty which is bound up with it; and as they assert that the
restoration of a thing once destroyed to existence is unthinkable, they
deny the immortality of the soul. Consequently they deny heaven, hell,
resurrection, and judgment. Acknowledging neither a recompense for good
deeds nor a punishment for evil ones, they fling off all authority and
plunge into sensual pleasures with the avidity of brutes. These also
ought to be called atheists, for the true faith depends not only on the
acknowledgment of God, but of his Apostle and of the day of judgment.
And although they acknowledge God and his attributes, they deny a
judgment to come.
(3) Next come the _Theists_. Among them should be reckoned Socrates,
who was the teacher of Plato as Plato was of Aristotle. This latter
drew up for his disciples the rules of logic, organized the sciences,
elucidated what was formerly obscure, and expounded what had not been
understood. This school refuted the systems of the two others, _i.e._,
the Materialists and Naturalists; but in exposing their mistaken and
perverse beliefs, they made use of arguments which they should not.
"God suffices to protect the faithful in war" (Koran, xxxiii. 25).
Aristotle also contended with success against the theories of Plato,
Socrates, and the theists who had preceded him, and separated himself
entirely from them; but he could not eliminate from his doctrine the
stains of infidelity and heresy which disfigure the teaching of his
predecessors. We should therefore consider them all as unbelievers,
as well as the so-called Mussulman philosophers, such as Ibn Sina
(Avicenna) and Farabi, who have adopted their systems.
Let us, however, acknowledge that among Mussulman philosophers none
has better interpreted the doctrine of Aristotle than the latter. What
others have handed down as his teaching is full of error, confusion,
and obscurity adapted to disconcert the reader. The unintelligible
can neither be accepted nor rejected. The philosophy of Aristotle,
all serious knowledge of which we owe to the translation of these two
learned men, may be divided into three portions: the first contains
matter justly chargeable with impiety, the second is tainted with
heresy, and the third we are obliged to reject absolutely. We proceed
to details:
_Divisions of the Philosophic Sciences_
These sciences, in relation to the aim we have set before us, may be
divided into six sections: (1) Mathematics; (2) Logic; (3) Physics; (4)
Metaphysics; (5) Politics; (6) Moral Philosophy.
(1) _Mathematics._ Mathematics comprises the knowledge of calculation,
geometry, and cosmography: it has no connection with the religious
sciences, and proves nothing for or against religion; it rests on a
foundation of proofs which, once known and understood, can not be
refuted. Mathematics tend, however, to produce two bad results.
The first is this: Whoever studies this science admires the subtlety
and clearness of its proofs. His confidence in philosophy increases,
and he thinks that all its departments are capable of the same
clearness and solidity of proof as mathematics. But when he hears
people speak of the unbelief and impiety of mathematicians, of their
professed disregard for the Divine Law, which is notorious, it is true
that, out of regard for authority, he echoes these accusations, but he
says to himself at the same time that, if there was truth in religion,
it would not have escaped those who have displayed so much keenness of
intellect in the study of mathematics.
Next, when he becomes aware of the unbelief and rejection of religion
on the part of these learned men, he concludes that to reject religion
is reasonable. How many of such men gone astray I have met whose sole
argument was that just mentioned. And supposing one puts to them
the following objection: "It does not follow that a man who excels
in one branch of knowledge excels in all others, nor that he should
be equally versed in jurisprudence, theology, and medicine. It is
possible to be entirely ignorant of metaphysics, and yet to be an
excellent grammarian. There are past masters in every science who are
entirely ignorant of other branches of knowledge. The arguments of the
ancient philosophers are rigidly demonstrative in mathematics and only
conjectural in religious questions. In order to ascertain this one must
proceed to a thorough examination of the matter." Supposing, I say, one
makes the above objection to these "apes of unbelief," they find it
distasteful. Falling a prey to their passions, to a besotted vanity,
and the wish to pass for learned men, they persist in maintaining the
pre-eminence of mathematicians in all branches of knowledge. This is a
serious evil, and for this reason those who study mathematics should be
checked from going too far in their researches. For though far removed
as it may be from the things of religion, this study, serving as it
does as an introduction to the philosophic systems, casts over religion
its malign influence. It is rarely that a man devotes himself to it
without robbing himself of his faith and casting off the restraints of
religion.
The second evil comes from the sincere but ignorant Mussulman who
thinks the best way to defend religion is by rejecting all the exact
sciences. Accusing their professors of being astray, he rejects their
theories of the eclipses of the sun and moon, and condemns them in
the name of religion. These accusations are carried far and wide, they
reach the ears of the philosopher who knows that these theories rest
on infallible proofs; far from losing confidence in them, he believes,
on the contrary, that Islam has ignorance and the denial of scientific
proofs for its basis, and his devotion to philosophy increases with his
hatred to religion.
It is therefore a great injury to religion to suppose that the defense
of Islam involves the condemnation of the exact sciences. The religious
law contains nothing which approves them or condemns them, and in
their turn they make no attack on religion. The words of the Prophet,
"The sun and the moon are two signs of the power of God; they are not
eclipsed for the birth or the death of any one; when you see these
signs take refuge in prayer and invoke the name of God"—these words,
I say, do not in any way condemn the astronomical calculations which
define the orbits of these two bodies, their conjunction and opposition
according to particular laws. But as for the so-called tradition,
"When God reveals himself in anything, he abases himself thereto," it
is unauthentic, and not found in any trustworthy collection of the
traditions.
Such is the bearing and the possible danger of mathematics.
(2) _Logic._ This science, in the same manner, contains nothing for
or against religion. Its object is the study of different kinds of
proofs and syllogisms, the conditions which should hold between the
premises of a proposition, the way to combine them, the rules of a
good definition, and the art of formulating it. For knowledge consists
of conceptions which spring from a definition or of convictions which
arise from proofs. There is therefore nothing censurable in this
science, and it is laid under contribution by theologians as well as by
philosophers. The only difference is that the latter use a particular
set of technical formulæ and that they push their divisions and
subdivisions further.
It may be asked, What, then, this has to do with the grave questions
of religion, and on what ground opposition should be offered to the
methods of logic? The objector, it will be said, can only inspire the
logician with an unfavorable opinion of the intelligence and faith of
his adversary, since the latter's faith seems to be based upon such
objections. But, it must be admitted, logic _is_ liable to abuse.
Logicians demand in reasoning certain conditions which lead to absolute
certainty, but when they touch on religious questions they can no
longer postulate these conditions, and ought therefore to relax their
habitual rigor. It happens, accordingly, that a student who is enamored
of the evidential methods of logic, hearing his teachers accused of
irreligion, believes that this irreligion reposes on proofs as strong
as those of logic, and immediately, without attempting the study of
metaphysics, shares their mistake. This is a serious disadvantage
arising from the study of logic.
(3) _Physics._ The object of this science is the study of the bodies
which compose the universe: the sky and the stars, and, here below,
simple elements such as air, earth, water, fire, and compound
bodies—animals, plants, and minerals; the reasons of their changes,
developments, and intermixture. By the nature of its researches it is
closely connected with the study of medicine, the object of which is
the human body, its principal and secondary organs, and the law which
governs their changes. Religion having no fault to find with medical
science, can not justly do so with physical, except on some special,
matters which we have mentioned in the work entitled, "The Destruction
of the Philosophers." Besides these primary questions, there are some
subordinate ones depending on them, on which physical science is open
to objection. But all physical science rests, as we believe, on the
following principle: Nature is entirely subject to God; incapable of
acting by itself, it is an instrument in the hand of the Creator; sun,
moon, stars, and elements are subject to God and can produce nothing
of themselves. In a word, nothing in nature can act spontaneously and
apart from God.
(4) _Metaphysics._ This is the fruitful breeding-ground of the errors
of philosophers. Here they can no longer satisfy the laws of rigorous
argumentation such as logic demands, and this is what explains the
disputes which arise between them in the study of metaphysics. The
system most closely akin to the system of the Mohammedan doctors is
that of Aristotle as expounded to us by Farabi and Avicenna. The sum
total of their errors can be reduced to twenty propositions: three of
them are irreligious, and the other seventeen heretical. It was in
order to combat their system that we wrote the work, "Destruction of
the Philosophers." The three propositions in which they are opposed to
all the doctrines of Islam are the following:
(_a_) Bodies do not rise again; spirits alone will be rewarded or
punished; future punishments will be therefore spiritual and not
physical. They are right in admitting spiritual punishments, for there
will be such; but they are wrong in rejecting physical punishments, and
contradicting in this manner the assertions of the Divine Law.
(_b_) "God takes cognizance of universals, not of specials." This is
manifestly irreligious. The Koran asserts truly, "Not an atom's weight
in heaven or earth can escape his knowledge" (x. 62).
(_c_) They maintain that the universe exists from all eternity and will
never end.
None of these propositions has ever been admitted by Moslems.
Besides this, they deny that God has attributes, and maintain that
he knows by his essence only and not by means of any attribute
accessory to his essence. In this point they approach the doctrine
of the Mutazilites, doctrines which we are not obliged to condemn
as irreligious. On the contrary, in our work entitled, "Criteria of
the Differences Which Divide Islam from Atheism," we have proved the
wrongness of those who accuse of irreligion everything which is opposed
to their way of looking at things.
(5) _Political Science._ The professors of this confine themselves to
drawing up the rules which regulate temporal matters and the royal
power. They have borrowed their theories on this point from the books
which God has revealed to his prophets and from the sentences of
ancient sages, gathered by tradition.
(6) _Moral Philosophy._ The professors of this occupy themselves with
defining the attributes and qualities of the soul, grouping them
according to genus and species, and pointing out the way to moderate
and control them. They have borrowed this system from the Sufis. These
devout men, who are always engaged in invoking the name of God, in
combating concupiscence and following the way of God by renouncing the
pleasures of this world, have received, while in a state of ecstasy,
revelations regarding the qualities of the soul, its defects and its
evil inclinations. These revelations they have published, and the
philosophers making use of them have introduced them into their own
systems in order to embellish and give currency to their falsehoods. In
the times of the philosophers, as at every other period, there existed
some of these fervent mystics. God does not deprive this world of them,
for they are its sustainers, and they draw down to it the blessings
of heaven according to the tradition: "It is by them that you obtain
rain; it is by them that you receive your subsistence." Such were "the
Companions of the Cave," who lived in ancient times, as related by the
Koran (xviii.). Now this mixture of moral and philosophic doctrine
with the words of the Prophet and those of the Sufis gives rise to two
dangers, one for the upholder of those doctrines, the other for their
opponent.
The danger for their opponent is serious. A narrow-minded man, finding
in their writings moral philosophy mixed with unsupported theories,
believes that he ought to entirely reject them and to condemn those
who profess them. Having only heard them from their mouth he does not
hesitate in his ignorance to declare them false because those who teach
them are in error. It is as if some one was to reject the profession
of faith made by Christians, "There is only one God and Jesus is his
prophet," simply because it proceeds from Christians and without
inquiring whether it is the profession of this creed or the denial of
Mohammed's prophetic mission which makes Christians infidels. Now,
if they are only infidels because of their rejection of our Prophet,
we are not entitled to reject those of their doctrines which do not
wear the stamp of infidelity. In a word, truth does not cease to be
true because it is found among them. Such, however, is the tendency of
weak minds: they judge the truth according to its professors instead
of judging its professors by the standard of the truth. But a liberal
spirit will take as its guide this maxim of the prince of believers,
Ali the son of Abu Talib: "Do not seek for the truth by means of men;
find first the truth and then you will recognize those who follow it."
This is the procedure followed by a wise man. Once in possession of
the truth he examines the basis of various doctrines which come before
him, and when he has found them true, he accepts them without troubling
himself whether the person who teaches them is sincere or a deceiver.
Much rather, remembering how gold is buried in the bowels of the earth,
he endeavors to disengage the truth from the mass of errors in which
it is engulfed. The skilled coin-assayer plunges without hesitation
his hand into the purse of the coiner of false money, and relying on
experience, separates good coins from bad. It is the ignorant rustic,
and not the experienced assayer, who will ask why we should have
anything to do with a false coiner. The unskilled swimmer must be kept
away from the seashore, not the expert in diving. The child, not the
charmer, must be forbidden to handle serpents.
As a matter of fact, men have such a good opinion of themselves,
of their mental superiority and intellectual depth; they believe
themselves so skilled in discerning the true from the false, the path
of safety from those of error, that they should be forbidden as much as
possible the perusal of philosophic writings, for though they sometimes
escape the danger just pointed out, they can not avoid that which we
are about to indicate.
Some of the maxims found in my works regarding the mysteries of
religion have met with objectors of an inferior rank in science, whose
intellectual penetration is insufficient to fathom such depths. They
assert that these maxims are borrowed from the ancient philosophers,
whereas the truth is that they are the fruit of my own meditations,
but as the proverb says, "Sandal follows the impress of sandal."[11]
Some of them are found in our books of religious law, but the greater
part are derived from the writings of the Sufis.
But even if they were borrowed exclusively from the doctrines of the
philosophers, is it right to reject an opinion when it is reasonable
in itself, supported by solid proofs, and contradicting neither the
Koran nor the traditions? If we adopt this method and reject every
truth which has chanced to have been proclaimed by an impostor, how
many truths we should have to reject! How many verses of the Koran
and traditions of the prophets and Sufi discourses and maxims of
sages we must close our ears to because the author of the "Treatise
of the Brothers of Purity" has inserted them in his writings in order
to further his cause, and in order to lead minds gradually astray in
the paths of error! The consequence of this procedure would be that
impostors would snatch truths out of our hands in order to embellish
their own works. The wise man, at least, should not make common cause
with the bigot blinded by ignorance.
Honey does not become impure because it may happen to have been
placed in the glass which the surgeon uses for cupping purposes. The
impurity of blood is due, not to its contact with this glass, but to a
peculiarity inherent in its own nature; this peculiarity, not existing
in honey, can not be communicated to it by its being placed in the
cupping-glass; it is therefore wrong to regard it as impure. Such is,
however, the whimsical way of looking at things found in nearly all
men. Every word proceeding from an authority which they approve is
accepted by them, even were it false; every word proceeding from one
whom they suspect is rejected, even were it true. In every case they
judge of the truth according to its professors and not of men according
to the truth which they profess, a _ne plus ultra_ of error. Such is
the peril in which philosophy involves its opponents.
The second danger threatens those who accept the opinions of the
philosophers. When, for instance, we read the "Treatise of the
Brothers of Purity," and other works of the same kind, we find in
them sentences spoken by the Prophet and quotations from the Sufis.
We approve these works; we give them our confidence; and we finish by
accepting the errors which they contain, because of the good opinion
of them with which they have inspired us at the outset. Thus, by
insensible degrees, we are led astray. In view of this danger the
reading of philosophic writings so full of vain and delusive utopias
should be forbidden, just as the slippery banks of a river are
forbidden to one who knows not how to swim. The perusal of these false
teachings must be prevented just as one prevents children from touching
serpents. A snake-charmer himself will abstain from touching snakes
in the presence of his young child, because he knows that the child,
believing himself as clever as his father, will not fail to imitate
him; and in order to lend more weight to his prohibition the charmer
will not touch a serpent under the eyes of his son.
Such should be the conduct of a learned man who is also wise. But the
snake-charmer, after having taken the serpent and separated the venom
from the antidote, having put the latter on one side and destroyed the
venom, ought not to withhold the antidote from those who need it. In
the same way the skilled coin-assayer, after having put his hand in
the bag of the false coiner, taken out the good coins and thrown away
the bad ones, ought not to refuse the good to those who need and ask
for it. Such should be the conduct of the learned man. If the patient
feels a certain dislike of the antidote because he knows that it is
taken from a snake whose body is the receptacle of poison, he should be
disabused of this fallacy.
If a beggar hesitates to take a piece of gold which he knows comes from
the purse of a false coiner, he should be told that his hesitation is a
pure mistake which would deprive him of the advantage which he seeks.
It should be proved to him that the contact of the good coins with the
bad does not injure the former and does not improve the latter. In the
same way the contact of truth with falsehood does not change truth into
falsehood, any more than it changes falsehood into truth.
Thus much, then, we have to say regarding the inconveniences and
dangers which spring from the study of philosophy.
_Sufism_
When I had finished my examination of these doctrines I applied myself
to the study of Sufism. I saw that in order to understand it thoroughly
one must combine theory with practise. The aim which the Sufis set
before them is as follows: To free the soul from the tyrannical yoke
of the passions, to deliver it from its wrong inclinations and evil
instincts, in order that in the purified heart there should only remain
room for God and for the invocation of his holy name.
As it was more easy to learn their doctrine than to practise it, I
studied first of all those of their books which contain it: "The
Nourishment of Hearts," by Abu Talib of Mecca, the works of Hareth el
Muhasibi, and the fragments which still remain of Junaid, Shibli, Abu
Yezid Bustami, and other leaders (whose souls may God sanctify). I
acquired a thorough knowledge of their researches, and I learned all
that was possible to learn of their methods by study and oral teaching.
It became clear to me that the last stage could not be reached by mere
instruction, but only by transport, ecstasy, and the transformation of
the moral being.
To define health and satiety, to penetrate their causes and conditions,
is quite another thing from being well and satisfied. To define
drunkenness, to know that it is caused by vapors which rise from the
stomach and cloud the seat of intelligence, is quite a different
thing to being drunk. The drunken man has no idea of the nature of
drunkenness, just because he is drunk and not in a condition to
understand anything, while the doctor, not being under the influence of
drunkenness, knows its character and laws. Or if the doctor fall ill,
he has a theoretical knowledge of the health of which he is deprived.
In the same way there is a considerable difference between knowing
renouncement, comprehending its conditions and causes, and practising
renouncement and detachment from the things of this world. I saw that
Sufism consists in experiences rather than in definitions, and that
what I was lacking belonged to the domain, not of instruction, but of
ecstasy and initiation.
The researches to which I had devoted myself, the path which I had
traversed in studying religious and speculative branches of knowledge,
had given me a firm faith in three things—God, Inspiration, and
the Last Judgment. These three fundamental articles of belief were
confirmed in me, not merely by definite arguments, but by a chain of
causes, circumstances, and proofs which it is impossible to recount. I
saw that one can only hope for salvation by devotion and the conquest
of one's passions, a procedure which presupposes renouncement and
detachment from this world of falsehood in order to turn toward
eternity and meditation on God. Finally, I saw that the only condition
of success was to sacrifice honors and riches and to sever the ties and
attachments of worldly life.
Coming seriously to consider my state, I found myself bound down on all
sides by these trammels. Examining my actions, the most fair-seeming
of which were my lecturing and professorial occupations, I found to
my surprise that I was engrossed in several studies of little value,
and profitless as regards my salvation. I probed the motives of my
teaching and found that, in place of being sincerely consecrated to
God, it was only actuated by a vain desire of honor and reputation.
I perceived that I was on the edge of an abyss, and that without an
immediate conversion I should be doomed to eternal fire. In these
reflections I spent a long time. Still a prey to uncertainty, one day I
decided to leave Bagdad and to give up everything; the next day I gave
up my resolution. I advanced one step and immediately relapsed. In the
morning I was sincerely resolved only to occupy myself with the future
life; in the evening a crowd of carnal thoughts assailed and dispersed
my resolutions. On the one side the world kept me bound to my post in
the chains of covetousness, on the other side the voice of religion
cried to me, "Up! Up! Thy life is nearing its end, and thou hast a long
journey to make. All thy pretended knowledge is naught but falsehood
and fantasy. If thou dost not think now of thy salvation, when wilt
thou think of it? If thou dost not break thy chains to-day, when wilt
thou break them?" Then my resolve was strengthened, I wished to give
up all and flee; but the Tempter, returning to the attack, said, "You
are suffering from a transitory feeling; don't give way to it, for it
will soon pass. If you obey it, if you give up this fine position, this
honorable post exempt from trouble and rivalry, this seat of authority
safe from attack, you will regret it later on without being able to
recover it."
Thus I remained, torn asunder by the opposite forces of earthly
passions and religious aspirations, for about six months from the month
Rajab of the year A.D. 1096. At the close of them my will yielded and I
gave myself up to destiny. God caused an impediment to chain my tongue
and prevented me from lecturing. Vainly I desired, in the interest of
my pupils, to go on with my teaching, but my mouth became dumb. The
silence to which I was condemned cast me into a violent despair; my
stomach became weak; I lost all appetite; I could neither swallow a
morsel of bread nor drink a drop of water.
The enfeeblement of my physical powers was such that the doctors,
despairing of saving me, said, "The mischief is in the heart, and has
communicated itself to the whole organism; there is no hope unless the
cause of his grievous sadness be arrested."
Finally, conscious of my weakness and the prostration of my soul,
I took refuge in God as a man at the end of himself and without
resources. "He who hears the wretched when they cry" (Koran, xxvii.
63) deigned to hear me; He made easy to me the sacrifice of honors,
wealth, and family. I gave out publicly that I intended to make the
pilgrimage to Mecca, while I secretly resolved to go to Syria, not
wishing that the Caliph (may God magnify him) or my friends should know
my intention of settling in that country. I made all kinds of clever
excuses for leaving Bagdad with the fixed intention of not returning
thither. The Imams of Irak criticized me with one accord. Not one of
them could admit that this sacrifice had a religious motive, because
they considered my position as the highest attainable in the religious
community. "Behold how far their knowledge goes!" (Koran, liii. 31).
All kinds of explanations of my conduct were forthcoming. Those who
were outside the limits of Irak attributed it to the fear with which
the Government inspired me. Those who were on the spot and saw how the
authorities wished to detain me, their displeasure at my resolution
and my refusal of their request, said to themselves, "It is a calamity
which one can only impute to a fate which has befallen the Faithful and
Learning!"
At last I left Bagdad, giving up all my fortune. Only, as lands and
property in Irak can afford an endowment for pious purposes, I obtained
a legal authorization to preserve as much as was necessary for my
support and that of my children; for there is surely nothing more
lawful in the world than that a learned man should provide sufficient
to support his family. I then betook myself to Syria, where I remained
for two years, which I devoted to retirement, meditation, and devout
exercises. I only thought of self-improvement and discipline and of
purification of the heart by prayer in going through the forms of
devotion which the Sufis had taught me. I used to live a solitary life
in the Mosque of Damascus, and was in the habit of spending my days on
the minaret after closing the door behind me.
From thence I proceeded to Jerusalem, and every day secluded myself in
the Sanctuary of the Rock.[12] After that I felt a desire to accomplish
the pilgrimage, and to receive a full effusion of grace by visiting
Mecca, Medina, and the tomb of the Prophet. After visiting the shrine
of the Friend of God (Abraham), I went to the Hedjaz. Finally, the
longings of my heart and the prayers of my children brought me back to
my country, although I was so firmly resolved at first never to revisit
it. At any rate I meant, if I did return, to live there solitary and
in religious meditation; but events, family cares, and vicissitudes of
life changed my resolutions and troubled my meditative calm. However
irregular the intervals which I could give to devotional ecstasy, my
confidence in it did not diminish; and the more I was diverted by
hindrances, the more steadfastly I returned to it.
Ten years passed in this manner. During my successive periods of
meditation there were revealed to me things impossible to recount. All
that I shall say for the edification of the reader is this: I learned
from a sure source that the Sufis are the true pioneers on the path
of God; that there is nothing more beautiful than their life, nor
more praiseworthy than their rule of conduct, nor purer than their
morality. The intelligence of thinkers, the wisdom of philosophers,
the knowledge of the most learned doctors of the law would in vain
combine their efforts in order to modify or improve their doctrine and
morals; it would be impossible. With the Sufis, repose and movement,
exterior or interior, are illumined with the light which proceeds from
the Central Radiance of Inspiration. And what other light could shine
on the face of the earth? In a word, what can one criticize in them? To
purge the heart of all that does not belong to God is the first step
in their cathartic method. The drawing up of the heart by prayer is
the key-stone of it, as the cry "_Allahu Akbar_" (God is great) is the
key-stone of prayer, and the last stage is the being lost in God. I say
the last stage, with reference to what may be reached by an effort of
will; but, to tell the truth, it is only the first stage in the life of
contemplation, the vestibule by which the initiated enter.
From the time that they set out on this path, revelations commence
for them. They come to see in the waking state angels and souls of
prophets; they hear their voices and wise counsels. By means of this
contemplation of heavenly forms and images they rise by degrees
to heights which human language can not reach, which one can not
even indicate without falling into great and inevitable errors. The
degree of proximity to Deity which they attain is regarded by some
as intermixture of being (_haloul_), by others as identification
(_ittihad_), by others as intimate union (_wasl_). But all these
expressions are wrong, as we have explained in our work entitled, "The
Chief Aim." Those who have reached that stage should confine themselves
to repeating the verse—
What I experience I shall not try to say;
Call me happy, but ask me no more.
In short, he who does not arrive at the intuition of these truths by
means of ecstasy, knows only the _name_ of inspiration. The miracles
wrought by the saints are, in fact, merely the earliest forms of
prophetic manifestation. Such was the state of the Apostle of God,
when, before receiving his commission, he retired to Mount Hira to give
himself up to such intensity of prayer and meditation that the Arabs
said: "Mohammed is become enamored of God."
This state, then, can be revealed to the initiated in ecstasy, and
to him who is incapable of ecstasy, by obedience and attention, on
condition that he frequents the society of Sufis till he arrives, so
to speak, at an imitative initiation. Such is the faith which one can
obtain by remaining among them, and intercourse with them is never
painful.
But even when we are deprived of the advantage of their society, we
can comprehend the possibility of this state (revelation by means of
ecstasy) by a chain of manifest proofs. We have explained this in the
treatise entitled "Marvels of the Heart," which forms part of our
work, "The Revival of the Religious Sciences." The certitude derived
from proofs is called "knowledge"; passing into the state we describe
is called "transport"; believing the experience of others and oral
transmission is "faith." Such are the three degrees of knowledge, as it
is written, "The Lord will raise to different ranks those among you who
have believed and those who have received knowledge from him" (Koran,
lviii. 12).
But behind those who believe comes a crowd of ignorant people who deny
the reality of Sufism, hear discourses on it with incredulous irony,
and treat as charlatans those who profess it. To this ignorant crowd
the verse applies: "There are those among them who come to listen
to thee, and when they leave thee, ask of those who have received
knowledge, 'What has he just said?' These are they whose hearts God has
sealed up with blindness and who only follow their passions." Among
the number of convictions which I owe to the practise of the Sufi rule
is the knowledge of the true nature of inspiration. This knowledge is
of such great importance that I proceed to expound it in detail.
_The Reality of Inspiration: Its Importance for the Human Race_
The substance of man at the moment of its creation is a simple monad,
devoid of knowledge of the worlds subject to the Creator, worlds whose
infinite number is only known to him, as the Koran says: "Only thy Lord
knoweth the number of his armies."
Man arrives at this knowledge by the aid of his perceptions; each of
his senses is given him that he may comprehend the world of created
things, and by the term "world" we understand the different species
of creatures. The first sense revealed to man is touch, by means of
which he perceives a certain group of qualities—heat, cold, moist, dry.
The sense of touch does not perceive colors and forms, which are for
it as though they did not exist. Next comes the sense of sight, which
makes him acquainted with colors and forms; that is to say, with that
which occupies the highest rank in the world of sensation. The sense of
hearing succeeds, and then the senses of smell and taste.
When the human being can elevate himself above the world of sense,
toward the age of seven, he receives the faculty of discrimination; he
enters then upon a new phase of existence and can experience, thanks to
this faculty, impressions, superior to those of the senses, which do
not occur in the sphere of sensation.
He then passes to another phase and receives reason, by which he
discerns things necessary, possible, and impossible; in a word, all
the notions which he could not combine in the former stages of his
existence. But beyond reason and at a higher level by a new faculty of
vision is bestowed upon him, by which he perceives invisible things,
the secrets of the future and other concepts as inaccessible to reason
as the concepts of reason are inaccessible to mere discrimination
and what is perceived by discrimination to the senses. Just as the
man possessed only of discrimination rejects and denies the notions
acquired by reason, so do certain rationalists reject and deny the
notion of inspiration. It is a proof of their profound ignorance; for,
instead of argument, they merely deny inspiration as a sphere unknown
and possessing no real existence. In the same way, a man blind from
birth, who knows neither by experience nor by information what colors
and forms are, neither knows nor understands them when some one speaks
of them to him for the first time.
God, wishing to render intelligible to men the idea of inspiration, has
given them a kind of glimpse of it in sleep. In fact, man perceives
while asleep the things of the invisible world either clearly manifest
or under the veil of allegory to be subsequently lifted by divination.
If, however, one was to say to a person who had never himself
experienced these dreams that, in a state of lethargy resembling death
and during the complete suspension of sight, hearing, and all the
senses, a man can see the things of the invisible world, this person
would exclaim, and seek to prove the impossibility of these visions
by some such argument as the following: "The sensitive faculties are
the causes of perception. Now, if one can perceive certain things when
one is in full possession of these faculties, how much more is their
perception impossible when these faculties are suspended."
The falsity of such an argument is shown by evidence and experience.
For in the same way as reason constitutes a particular phase of
existence in which intellectual concepts are perceived which are hidden
from the senses, similarly, inspiration is a special state in which the
inner eye discovers, revealed by a celestial light, mysteries out of
the reach of reason. The doubts which are raised regarding inspiration
relate (1) to its possibility, (2) to its real and actual existence,
(3) to its manifestation in this or that person.
To prove the possibility of inspiration is to prove that it belongs
to a category of branches of knowledge which can not be attained by
reason. It is the same with medical science and astronomy. He who
studies them is obliged to recognize that they are derived solely from
the revelation and special grace of God. Some astronomical phenomena
only occur once in a thousand years; how then can we know them by
experience?
We may say the same of inspiration, which is one of the branches of
intuitional knowledge. Further, the perception of things which are
beyond the attainment of reason is only one of the features peculiar
to inspiration, which possesses a great number of others. The
characteristic which we have mentioned is only, as it were, a drop of
water in the ocean, and we have mentioned it because people experience
what is analogous to it in dreams and in the sciences of medicine
and astronomy. These branches of knowledge belong to the domain of
prophetic miracles, and reason can not attain to them.
As to the other characteristics of inspiration, they are only revealed
to adepts in Sufism and in a state of ecstatic transport. The little
that we know of the nature of inspiration we owe to the kind of
likeness to it which we find in sleep; without that we should be
incapable of comprehending it, and consequently of believing in it, for
conviction results from comprehension. The process of initiation into
Sufism exhibits this likeness to inspiration from the first. There is
in it a kind of ecstasy proportioned to the condition of the person
initiated, and a degree of certitude and conviction which can not be
attained by reason. This single fact is sufficient to make us believe
in inspiration.
We now come to deal with doubts relative to the inspiration of a
particular prophet. We shall not arrive at certitude on this point
except by ascertaining, either by ocular evidence or by reliable
tradition, the facts relating to that prophet. When we have ascertained
the real nature of inspiration and proceed to the serious study of the
Koran and the traditions, we shall then know certainly that Mohammed is
the greatest of prophets. After that we should fortify our conviction
by verifying the truth of his preaching and the salutary effect which
it has upon the soul. We should verify in experience the truth of
sentences such as the following: "He who makes his conduct accord with
his knowledge receives from God more knowledge"; or this, "God delivers
to the oppressor him who favors injustice"; or again, "Whosoever when
rising in the morning has only one anxiety (to please God), God will
preserve him from all anxiety in this world and the next."
When we have verified these sayings in experience thousands of times,
we shall be in possession of a certitude on which doubt can obtain no
hold. Such is the path we must traverse in order to realize the truth
of inspiration. It is not a question of finding out whether a rod has
been changed into a serpent, or whether the moon has been split in
two.[13] If we regard miracles in isolation, without their countless
attendant circumstances, we shall be liable to confound them with magic
and falsehood, or to regard them as a means of leading men astray, as
it is written, "God misleads and directs as he chooses" (Koran, xxxv.
9); we shall find ourselves involved in all the difficulties which
the question of miracles raises. If, for instance, we believe that
eloquence of style is a proof of inspiration, it is possible that an
eloquent style composed with this object may inspire us with a false
belief in the inspiration of him who wields it. The supernatural should
be only one of the constituents which go to form our belief, without
our placing too much reliance on this or that detail. We should rather
resemble a person who, learning a fact from a group of people, can
not point to this or that particular man as his informant, and who,
not distinguishing between them, can not explain precisely how his
conviction regarding the fact has been formed.
Such are the characteristics of scientific certitude. As to the
transport which permits men to see the truth and, so to speak, to
handle it, it is only known to the Sufis. What I have just said
regarding the true nature of inspiration is sufficient for the aim
which I have proposed to myself. I may return to the subject later, if
necessary.
I pass now to the causes of the decay of faith and show the means
of bringing back those who have erred and of preserving them from
the dangers which threaten them. To those who doubt because they are
tinctured with the doctrine of the Ta'limites, my treatise entitled,
"The Just Balance," affords a sufficient guide; therefore it is
unnecessary to return to the subject here.
As to the vain theories of the Ibahat, I have grouped them in seven
classes, and explained them in the work entitled, "Alchemy of
Happiness." For those whose faith has been undermined by philosophy,
so far that they deny the reality of inspiration, we have proved the
truth and necessity of it, seeking our proofs in the hidden properties
of medicines and of the heavenly bodies. It is for them that we have
written this treatise, and the reason for our seeking for proofs in the
sciences of medicine and of astronomy is because these sciences belong
to the domain of philosophy. All those branches of knowledge which our
opponents boast of—astronomy, medicine, physics, and divination—provide
us with arguments in favor of the Prophet.
As to those who, professing a lip-faith in the Prophet, adulterate
religion with philosophy, they really deny inspiration, since in their
view the Prophet is only a sage whom a superior destiny has appointed
as guide to men, and this view belies the true nature of inspiration.
To believe in the Prophet is to admit that there is above intelligence
a sphere in which are revealed to the inner vision truths beyond the
grasp of intelligence, just as things seen are not apprehended by
the sense of hearing, nor things understood by that of touch. If our
opponent denies the existence of such a higher region, we can prove to
him, not only its possibility, but its actuality. If, on the contrary,
he admits its existence, he recognizes at the same time that there are
in that sphere things which reason can not grasp; nay, which reason
rejects as false and absurd. Suppose, for instance, that the fact of
dreams occurring in sleep were not so common and notorious as it is,
our wise men would not fail to repudiate the assertion that the secrets
of the invisible world can be revealed while the senses are, so to
speak, suspended.
Again, if it were to be said to one of them, "Is it possible that
there is in the world a thing as small as a grain, which being carried
into a city can destroy it and afterward destroy itself so that
nothing remains either of the city or of itself?" "Certainly," he
would exclaim, "it is impossible and ridiculous." Such, however, is
the effect of fire, which would certainly be disputed by one who had
not witnessed it with his own eyes. Now, the refusal to believe in the
mysteries of the other life is of the same kind.
As to the fourth cause of the spread of unbelief—the decay of faith
owing to the bad example set by learned men—there are three ways of
checking it.
(1) One can answer thus: "The learned man whom you accuse of disobeying
the divine law knows that he disobeys, as you do when you drink wine or
exact usury or allow yourself in evil-speaking, lying, and slander. You
know your sin and yield to it, not through ignorance, but because you
are mastered by concupiscence. The same is the case with the learned
man. How many believe in doctors who do not abstain from fruit and cold
water when strictly forbidden them by a doctor! That does not prove
that those things are not dangerous, or that their faith in the doctor
was not solidly established. Similar errors on the part of learned men
are to be imputed solely to their weakness."
(2) Or again, one may say to a simple and ignorant man: "The learned
man reckons upon his knowledge as a viaticum for the next life. He
believes that his knowledge will save him and plead in his favor, and
that his intellectual superiority will entitle him to indulgence;
lastly, that if his knowledge increases his responsibility, it may also
entitle him to a higher degree of consideration. All that is possible;
and even if the learned man has neglected practise, he can at any rate
produce proofs of his knowledge. But you, poor, witless one, if, like
him, you neglect practise, destitute as you are of knowledge, you will
perish without anything to plead in your favor."
(3) Or one may answer, and this reason is the true one: "The truly
learned man only sins through carelessness, and does not remain in
a state of impenitence. For real knowledge shows sin to be a deadly
poison, and the other world to be superior to this. Convinced of this
truth, man ought not to exchange the precious for the vile. But the
knowledge of which we speak is not derived from sources accessible to
human diligence, and that is why progress in mere worldly knowledge
renders the sinner more hardened in his revolt against God."
True knowledge, on the contrary, inspires in him who is initiate in it
more fear and more reverence, and raises a barrier of defense between
him and sin. He may slip and stumble, it is true, as is inevitable
with one encompassed by human infirmity, but these slips and stumbles
will not weaken his faith. The true Moslem succumbs occasionally to
temptation, but he repents and will not persevere obstinately in the
path of error.
I pray God the Omnipotent to place us in the ranks of his chosen, among
the number of those whom he directs in the path of safety, in whom
he inspires fervor lest they forget him; whom he cleanses from all
defilement, that nothing may remain in them except himself; yea, of
those whom he indwells completely, that they may adore none beside him.