IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD

Quoth the Imam Ghazali:

Glory be to God, whose praise should precede every writing and every

speech! May the blessings of God rest on Mohammed, his Prophet and

his Apostle, on his family and companions, by whose guidance error is

escaped!

You have asked me, O brother in the faith, to expound the aim and

the mysteries of religious sciences, the boundaries and depths

of theological doctrines. You wish to know my experiences while

disentangling truth lost in the medley of sects and divergencies

of thought, and how I have dared to climb from the low levels of

traditional belief to the topmost summit of assurance. You desire to

learn what I have borrowed, first of all from scholastic theology; and

secondly from the method of the Ta'limites, who, in seeking truth, rest

upon the authority of a leader; and why, thirdly, I have been led to

reject philosophic systems; and finally, what I have accepted of the

doctrine of the Sufis, and the sum total of truth which I have gathered

in studying every variety of opinion. You ask me why, after resigning

at Bagdad a teaching post which attracted a number of hearers, I have,

long afterward, accepted a similar one at Nishapur. Convinced as I am

of the sincerity which prompts your inquiries, I proceed to answer

them, invoking the help and protection of God.

Know then, my brothers (may God direct you in the right way), that the

diversity in beliefs and religions, and the variety of doctrines and

sects which divide men, are like a deep ocean strewn with shipwrecks,

from which very few escape safe and sound. Each sect, it is true,

believes itself in possession of the truth and of salvation, "each

party," as the Koran saith, "rejoices in its own creed"; but as the

chief of the apostles, whose word is always truthful, has told us, "My

people will be divided into more than seventy sects, of whom only one

will be saved." This prediction, like all others of the Prophet, must

be fulfilled.

From the period of adolescence, that is to say, previous to reaching

my twentieth year to the present time when I have passed my fiftieth,

I have ventured into this vast ocean; I have fearlessly sounded its

depths, and like a resolute diver, I have penetrated its darkness and

dared its dangers and abysses. I have interrogated the beliefs of

each sect and scrutinized the mysteries of each doctrine, in order

to disentangle truth from error and orthodoxy from heresy. I have

never met one who maintained the hidden meaning of the Koran without

investigating the nature of his belief, nor a partizan of its exterior

sense without inquiring into the results of his doctrine. There is

no philosopher whose system I have not fathomed, nor theologian the

intricacies of whose doctrine I have not followed out.

Sufism has no secrets into which I have not penetrated; the devout

adorer of Deity has revealed to me the aim of his austerities; the

atheist has not been able to conceal from me the real reason of his

unbelief. The thirst for knowledge was innate in me from an early age;

it was like a second nature implanted by God, without any will on my

part. No sooner had I emerged from boyhood than I had already broken

the fetters of tradition and freed myself from hereditary beliefs.

Having noticed how easily the children of Christians become Christians,

and the children of Moslems embrace Islam, and remembering also the

traditional saying ascribed to the Prophet, "Every child has in him

the germ of Islam, then his parents make him Jew, Christian, or

Zoroastrian," I was moved by a keen desire to learn what was this

innate disposition in the child, the nature of the accidental beliefs

imposed on him by the authority of his parents and his masters,

and finally the unreasoned convictions which he derives from their

instructions.

Struck with the contradictions which I encountered in endeavoring to

disentangle the truth and falsehood of these opinions, I was led to

make the following reflection: "The search after truth being the aim

which I propose to myself, I ought in the first place to ascertain

what are the bases of certitude." In the next place I recognized that

certitude is the clear and complete knowledge of things, such knowledge

as leaves no room for doubt nor possibility of error and conjecture, so

that there remains no room in the mind for error to find an entrance.

In such a case it is necessary that the mind, fortified against all

possibility of going astray, should embrace such a strong conviction

that, if, for example, any one possessing the power of changing a stone

into gold, or a stick into a serpent, should seek to shake the bases

of this certitude, it would remain firm and immovable. Suppose, for

instance, a man should come and say to me, who am firmly convinced that

ten is more than three, "No; on the contrary, three is more than ten,

and, to prove it, I change this rod into a serpent," and supposing

that he actually did so, I should remain none the less convinced of

the falsity of his assertion, and although his miracle might arouse my

astonishment, it would not instil any doubt into my belief.

I then understood that all forms of knowledge which do not unite

these conditions (imperviousness to doubt, etc.) do not deserve any

confidence, because they are not beyond the reach of doubt, and what is

not impregnable to doubt can not constitute certitude.

_The Subterfuges of the Sophists_

I then examined what knowledge I possessed, and discovered that in

none of it, with the exception of sense-perceptions and necessary

principles, did I enjoy that degree of certitude which I have just

described. I then sadly reflected as follows: "We can not hope to find

truth except in matters which carry their evidence in themselves—that

is to say, in sense-perceptions and necessary principles; we must

therefore establish these on a firm basis. Is my absolute confidence

in sense-perceptions and on the infallibility of necessary principles

analogous to the confidence which I formerly possessed in matters

believed on the authority of others? Is it only analogous to the

reliance most people place on their organs of vision, or is it

rigorously true without admixture of illusion or doubt?"

I then set myself earnestly to examine the notions we derive from the

evidence of the senses and from sight in order to see if they could be

called in question. The result of a careful examination was that my

confidence in them was shaken. Our sight, for instance, perhaps the

best practised of all our senses, observes a shadow, and finding it

apparently stationary pronounces it devoid of movement. Observation

and experience, however, show subsequently that a shadow moves not

suddenly, it is true, but gradually and imperceptibly, so that it is

never really motionless.

Again, the eye sees a star and believes it as large as a piece of gold,

but mathematical calculations prove, on the contrary, that it is larger

than the earth. These notions, and all others which the senses declare

true, are subsequently contradicted and convicted of falsity in an

irrefragable manner by the verdict of reason.

Then I reflected in myself: "Since I can not trust to the evidence

of my senses, I must rely only on intellectual notions based on

fundamental principles, such as the following axioms: 'Ten is more

than three. Affirmation and negation can not coexist together. A thing

can not both be created and also existent from eternity, living and

annihilated simultaneously, at once necessary and impossible.'" To this

the notions I derived from my senses made the following objections:

"Who can guarantee you that you can trust to the evidence of reason

more than to that of the senses? You believed in our testimony till it

was contradicted by the verdict of reason, otherwise you would have

continued to believe it to this day. Well, perhaps, there is above

reason another judge who, if he appeared, would convict reason of

falsehood, just as reason has confuted us. And if such a third arbiter

is not yet apparent, it does not follow that he does not exist."

To this argument I remained some time without reply; a reflection drawn

from the phenomena of sleep deepened my doubt. "Do you not see," I

reflected, "that while asleep you assume your dreams to be indisputably

real? Once awake, you recognize them for what they are—baseless

chimeras. Who can assure you, then, of the reliability of notions

which, when awake, you derive from the senses and from reason? In

relation to your present state they may be real; but it is possible

also that you may enter upon another state of being which will bear the

same relation to your present state as this does to your condition when

asleep. In that new sphere you will recognize that the conclusions of

reason are only chimeras."

This possible condition is, perhaps, that which the Sufis call

"ecstasy" (_hal_), that is to say, according to them, a state in which,

absorbed in themselves and in the suspension of sense-perceptions, they

have visions beyond the reach of intellect. Perhaps also Death is that

state, according to that saying of the prince of prophets: "Men are

asleep; when they die, they wake." Our present life in relation to the

future is perhaps only a dream, and man, once dead, will see things in

direct opposition to those now before his eyes; he will then understand

that word of the Koran, "To-day we have removed the veil from thine

eyes and thy sight is keen."

Such thoughts as these threatened to shake my reason, and I sought to

find an escape from them. But how? In order to disentangle the knot

of this difficulty, a proof was necessary. Now a proof must be based

on primary assumptions, and it was precisely these of which I was in

doubt. This unhappy state lasted about two months, during which I

was, not, it is true, explicitly or by profession, but morally and

essentially, a thorough-going skeptic.

God at last deigned to heal me of this mental malady; my mind recovered

sanity and equilibrium, the primary assumptions of reason recovered

with me all their stringency and force. I owed my deliverance, not

to a concatenation of proofs and arguments, but to the light which

God caused to penetrate into my heart—the light which illuminates the

threshold of all knowledge. To suppose that certitude can be only based

upon formal arguments is to limit the boundless mercy of God. Some one

asked the Prophet the explanation of this passage in the Divine Book:

"God opens to Islam the heart of him whom he chooses to direct." "That

is spoken," replied the Prophet, "of the light which God sheds in the

heart." "And how can man recognize that light?" he was asked. "By his

detachment from this world of illusion and by a secret drawing toward

the eternal world," the Prophet replied.

On another occasion he said: "God has created his creatures in

darkness, and then has shed upon them his light." It is by the help

of this light that the search for truth must be carried on. As by

his mercy this light descends from time to time among men, we must

ceaselessly be on the watch for it. This is also corroborated by

another saying of the Apostle: "God sends upon you, at certain times,

breathings of his grace; be prepared for them."

My object in this account is to make others understand with what

earnestness we should search for truth, since it leads to results we

never dreamed of. Primary assumptions have not got to be sought for,

since they are always present to our minds; if we engage in such a

search, we only find them persistently elude our grasp. But those who

push their investigation beyond ordinary limits are safe from the

suspicion of negligence in pursuing what is within their reach.

_The Different Kinds of Seekers after Truth_

When God in the abundance of his mercy had healed me of this malady, I

ascertained that those who are engaged in the search for truth may be

divided into three groups.

The Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East, Volume 6 (of 14) Medieval Arabic, Moorish, and Turkish · 第 78 / 288 题