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CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS
By HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GENERAL
FREDERICK VON BERNHARDI
Commander of the Seventh Division of the German Army
Translated by CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN
Author of 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa'
Editor of 'The Empire and the Century'
With an Introduction by
LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH
K.C.M.G., K.C.B., G.C.V.O.
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1909
_First Edition, October, 1906_
_Second Edition, April, 1909_
PREFACE
I ventured to express the opinion in my book, 'With General French and
the Cavalry in South Africa,' that if a high ideal of the duties and
possibilities of Cavalry is set before our officers, and the means of
instruction and training are placed within their reach, we shall
possess in our next great War a force which, if led by men of the
stamp of General Sir John French, will prove to the world that the day
of Cavalry is far indeed from being past.
In other words, I am convinced that, with good leadership and the
right material in men, which the South African War has shown we
possess, all that we need to perfect our system is a proper
recognition of the changed conditions of modern Warfare, and a resolve
to break with the old and adapt ourselves to the new situation.
Reforms such as this would necessitate must affect all arms of the
Service, but no branch more than the Cavalry, whose task in future
will be more difficult, yet whose compensation lies in the
possibilities of successes possessing greater significance than any
hitherto attained.
The South African War has roused the Cavalry into a renewal of
activity, and has caused their leaders to encourage the study of
Cavalry literature likely to develop the capacity of the officer for
writing on these special subjects.
As a step in that direction, I gave whatever little co-operation I
could to the formation of the _Cavalry Journal_, in the hope that it
may be conducive to the creation of a class of literature in which our
Service is peculiarly deficient.
It is of the first importance to realize the conditions that are
revolutionizing the conduct of Modern Warfare.
Such knowledge can alone enable us to appreciate the task which is
given to the Cavalry, and to estimate the increased difficulties of
their function. As their range of activity has become restricted in
certain directions, their sphere of usefulness in others has largely
increased.
The want of an up-to-date work dealing with these facts has, I
believe, been supplied by the recent publication of General von
Bernhardi's book, 'Our Cavalry in Future Wars,' translated in the
following pages with the object of making it more generally known in
this country.
Not only is the contribution valuable as having been written by a
soldier of experience in the field, who has imbued his work with the
dash and fire of the spirit of Cavalry, but it also reveals a profound
insight into the modern conditions of War and the heightened demands
exacted from Cavalry training. The author lays continual emphasis on
the fact that Cavalry trained and organized on his lines should
produce in the early stages of a War effects so decisive as to
influence and even determine the succeeding phases of the campaign.
General von Bernhardi has the gift of close and searching reasoning,
and the ability to present his views in a vivid and trenchant form,
as convincing as the writings of the late Colonel Henderson.
His opening chapter deals with the conception of the conduct of War in
the sense of to-day, and he proceeds to analyze the functions of the
Cavalry as modified by the changes which have occurred.
In lively detail he explains the difficulties which in future will
confront all Cavalry operations, and the sacrifices that will be
exacted from this Arm.
Serious study and untiring perseverance must be claimed from the
individual in order to equip himself mentally and physically for the
task of overcoming these obstacles, while Bernhardi shows in
convincing argument the brilliant opportunities of success.
Although the opportunity of tactical action on the battle-field may
have somewhat suffered, Bernhardi sees in the strategical handling of
the Arm its chief possibilities, and here he includes reconnaissance
and operations against the enemy's rearward communications and pursuit
of a defeated Army.
He considers cohesion and mobility to be essential to insure superior
striking power by shock and fire action at the decisive point, and
emphasizes this principle again and again as the means of attaining a
high fighting efficiency.
In the chapters on Tactical Leading in Mounted Combats and Tactical
Conduct of Dismounted Action, General von Bernhardi deals with the
merits of shock and fire action, and the enhanced importance of the
latter as an accessory to, though never as a substitute for, shock,
and he defines the respective dispositions for dismounted action when
serving an offensive or defensive purpose.
At the same time, he avers that success must depend upon the ability
of the leader to realize the situation, on his qualities of decision,
and on his capacity to maintain a correct balance between the
application respectively of shock and fire action.
The qualifications which General von Bernhardi expects in the Cavalry
leader and those under him go to prove the scientific character of the
profession, which demands a standard of extreme efficiency.
Successful Cavalry leading will only be possible when the machinery of
the instrument employed is technically perfected down to the minutest
detail, and this can only be attained by a very elaborate and thorough
training.
The book should commend itself particularly to those critics who,
drawing conclusions from the South African War, contend that the
united offensive action of man and horse, culminating in the charge,
can no longer avail, and that the future lies with the mounted
riflemen, trained only to dismounted action. General von Bernhardi
makes it clear that the theatre of War in South Africa does not assist
us with any complete object-lessons from which to evolve a change of
tactical principles, inasmuch as the conditions were entirely
abnormal, and in European Warfare are unlikely to recur.
It must be remembered that after the first few weeks of 1900 the
Cavalry in South Africa as an effective force had practically ceased
to exist, and that its offensive action was greatly hampered by the
strategical plan of campaign which we adopted subsequently to the
occupation of Bloemfontein.
All that might be deduced from the defensive tactics of a mounted
force, such as the Boers put into the field, during this period, is
that, possessing greater mobility, they were able to hold up, during
short intervals, Cavalry whose capacity for mounted action was
practically destroyed by the 'want of condition' of their horses.
Acting strategically as they did at Colesberg, in the relief of
Kimberley, and in the operations leading up to Paardeberg, results
were obtained which affected the whole subsequent conduct of the War.
From then onwards, with the Cavalry acting tactically on the enemy's
flank, the Boer Army withdrew practically on Pretoria, and no decisive
tactical result was obtained.
If that was the object which the Superior Command had in view, the
Cavalry carried out that purpose with remarkable distinction.
It is, however, conceivable that their strategical employment in rear
of the Boer Army might have produced a situation compelling the Boers
to fight a pitched battle or to surrender.
If the Cavalry failed to achieve more, it was not from any want of
opportunity which the theatre of War presented, but because their true
rôle was rarely assigned to them.
That the Boers were able at a later period to develop a vigorous
scheme of action was largely owing to our conception of a plan of
campaign which made the occupation of small capitals rather than the
destruction of the enemy's Army the strategic objective.
Had the Boers understood the Art of War and taken advantage of the
openings which their superior mobility gave them, or had they been
possessed of a body of Cavalry capable of mounted action, say at
Magersfontein, they might repeatedly have wrought confusion in our
ranks.
Although the Boer War was of an exceptional nature, and of a character
unlikely to be met with again, it furnishes some useful object-lessons
which exemplify the importance of preparedness in peace for the sudden
outbreak of War, so that the Army may take the field in such force and
so disposed as to compel decisive action on the part of the enemy in
the first stages of the War, and be in a position to inflict a
crushing defeat rather than a series of light blows, which latter tend
to disperse rather than destroy the enemy's forces.
The War further shows how highly mobile forces, such as those of the
Boers, can withdraw from a combat to avoid defeat, and by scattering
to elude pursuit, and then, by reassembling where least expected, can
strike a sudden blow at the enemy's weakest point. That they failed to
accomplish more was due to their ignorance of the higher Art of War.
To this neglect of the strategic advantage which mobility gives we
must add the many lost tactical opportunities of converting a British
reverse into a decisive defeat. The Boers did all that could be
expected of Mounted Infantry, but were powerless to crown victory as
only the dash of Cavalry can do.
If we take into account the many opportunities which the Boers gave
for successful strategic and tactical employment to men trained to
fight on horseback, we arrive at the conclusion that the Boer War may
nevertheless, if studied carefully and intelligently, teach us the
indispensability of Cavalry in the rôle so clearly described in
General von Bernhardi's instructive work.
In conclusion, I must express my thanks to His Excellency General von
Bernhardi for his courtesy towards me in concurring in the idea of an
English translation, and to General Sir John French for his valuable
introductory comments.
I also wish to express to Colonel F. N. Maude my best thanks for his
friendly co-operation, which gave me the advantage of his expert
interpretation of German technicalities.
C. S. GOLDMAN.
34, QUEEN ANNE'S GATE,
WESTMINSTER,
_September, 1906_.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
When, in the Spring of 1899, I published the first edition of this
work, I ventured to express the hope that it might incite others both
to thought and exertion, and might further prove of practical
assistance to many.
I think I may claim without undue immodesty that this wish of mine has
in many directions been fulfilled. Of the demands, however, which I
put forward concerning the organization and equipment of the Cavalry,
none have as yet been put into execution, but much wholesome spade
work has been accomplished, and the necessity of reforms, together
with due recognition of their importance, has everywhere made further
progress. It is to be hoped that the next few years will bring the
fulfilment of some of these our most earnest desires.
The principles of training and of tactics which I have advanced and
endeavoured to establish have found very general acceptance throughout
the Arm, and have helped to clear up difficulties, although, as indeed
was to be expected, they have encountered opposition from several
quarters.
This result of my labours has encouraged me in the preparation of this
new edition to make use of all the latest experience, to bring out
with additional clearness essential points, and to add much new
material.
I trust that in this manner I have materially increased the practical
value of the work, and hope that in its new form it will continue to
exert its silent influence, winning new supporters for my views, and
helping to gain for the splendid Arm to which I belong the place
which, in the interest of the whole Army, it deserves.
THE AUTHOR.
STRAZBURG, IN THE WINTER OF 1902.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
It would be difficult for a layman to form even an approximate
conception of the amount of work annually accomplished in the German
Army.
The very vivid consciousness stirring everywhere as to the magnitude
of the demands the not far distant future may make upon us, and the
knowledge that the means with which we are compelled to work are
certainly not always in agreement with our ideals, incite us to strain
every nerve to make the most of what we have; and I believe I am not
far wrong in asserting that it is the Cavalry Arm which, under
pressure of circumstances, responds to these demands with the greatest
avidity. This is, in fact, but the necessary consequence of the
many-sidedness of our duties.
Whether, however, the end and aim of all our exertions is everywhere
attained must remain an open question.
In every long period of peace there lurks the danger that methods of
training may deviate after false ideals, lose themselves in the cult
of imposing appearances, and in the clash of individual opinions fail
to distinguish the essential--_i.e._, what is really practicable under
the conditions of active service.
This danger is all the more imminent when the characters and forms of
Warfare itself are constantly changing; hence, ever new demands have
to be made upon the troops themselves, and the exact bearing of each
of these is not easily to be appreciated in the humdrum surroundings
of our peace-time duties.
It seems, therefore, a most pressing necessity at the present moment,
when changes in social conditions and constant technical progress are
exerting on the external phenomena and conditions of Warfare a steady
pressure in the direction of modification, that we should compare our
peace training with the requirements likely to be made upon us in time
of War. Thus we can note where further adjustments between the two are
necessary and can be usefully made.
In this process of analysis it will not suffice to take each changing
factor independently, following it out to its utmost ramifications,
but rather we must endeavour to take a general view of the whole, and
balance the variables one against the other.
The man who concentrates his attention only on one detail easily loses
his grasp of relative values, and runs the risk of failing 'to see the
wood for the trees,' and only the mind trained to contemplate each
factor in its relation to the whole, and with a clear idea of the
ultimate purpose for which this whole is intended, will be able to
avoid this pitfall; for only an intellect thus prepared can
successfully harmonize the whole with its part, and, while keeping the
essentials clearly before its eyes, treat the unessential as it
deserves.
It is in order to bring out this point of view that the following
pages have been undertaken.
As I endeavoured to arrive at a thoroughly clear comprehension of the
many conflicting interests involved in the training of men and horses,
as I tried to decide how to apportion both time and means to each
individual branch of their education, and to see how far the
traditions of the past could be harmonized with the requirements of
the future, or where and how they need further development and
simplification, I found myself compelled at every turn to go back and
seek my ideal standard in the demands which War itself must make upon
all Arms.
Thus my work must be considered as an attempt to represent in broad
outlines the conditions of the coming War, and from these to deduce
logically the requirements a rational system of organization and
training must satisfy.
Those who hold different opinions as to the tasks which will be
entrusted to our particular Arm will naturally come to other
conclusions as to the values to be assigned to peace education, and I
do not wish to present my opinions as absolutely final, although I
have done my utmost to treat my subject-matter objectively and without
prejudice.
Meanwhile, the problems I have submitted for investigation are not
only of military interest, but of the utmost military importance, and
it has, therefore, seemed to me well worth while to discuss them from
every point of view.
Further, because these investigations owe their origin to the
practical need I experienced during the course of my service to clear
up the many points I have dwelt on, I have considered it a duty to
make them accessible to all those who have at heart the development in
our Cavalry of a thoroughly sound spirit in full harmony with the
necessities of our present times.
THE AUTHOR.
BERLIN,
_March, 1899_.
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION xxi
PART I
EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP
Chapter
I. THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE
EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY 3
II. DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR 19
III. STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY 38
IV. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION 49
V. THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS 62
VI. TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS 90
VII. STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 104
VIII. PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS 132
PART II
ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
I. NUMBERS 151
II. RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING 184
III. THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT 213
IV. TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING 247
V. FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES 265
VI. THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS 286
CONCLUSION 294
INDEX 298
INTRODUCTION
General von Bernhardi's work, 'Cavalry in Future Wars' (translated
from the German by Mr. C. S. Goldman), is a most valuable addition to
modern Cavalry literature, and appears at an opportune moment to
counteract and dispel some misleading conclusions which have been
drawn by certain writers (both English and foreign) from reported
operations in the late Manchurian War.
One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publicly commented
upon that campaign have said that what is termed the 'Cavalry spirit'
is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. They hold that the
Cavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding the end instead of
the means. They consider that events in the Far East teach us that we
must render our Cavalry less devoted to 'manoeuvres' and to
'tournaments,' in order to enable them to fit themselves to take part
in modern fighting; that the times have come when the methods of
Warfare should be changed; and that the Cavalry must determine to
defeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely.
I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in European
Armies, but as regards the British Cavalry, I am absolutely convinced
that the Cavalry spirit is and may be encouraged to the utmost without
in the least degree prejudicing either training in dismounted duties
or the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the part of leaders
as will enable them to discern when and where to resort to dismounted
methods.
How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its rôle in war until the enemy's
Cavalry is defeated and paralyzed? I challenge any Cavalry officer,
British or foreign, to deny the principle that Cavalry, acting as such
against its own Arm, can never attain complete success unless it is
proficient in shock tactics.
Cavalry soldiers must of course learn to be expert rifle shots, but
the attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer by
ignoring the horse, the sword, or the lance. On the contrary, the
'élan' and dash which perfection in Cavalry manoeuvre imparts to large
bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in their employment as
mounted riflemen when the field is laid open to their enterprise in
this rôle by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry.
That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent War did not distinguish
themselves or their Arm is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quite
apparent. On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, the
riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence
were only enabled to fulfil generally the rôle of Divisional Cavalry,
which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on the
Russian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have been
trained on _exactly the same principles_ which these writers now
advocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought of
nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence they
lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a display
of the highest form of Cavalry spirit.
The author of this book is an eminent soldier, possessing an intimate
knowledge of practical fighting, gained chiefly in one of the greatest
Wars of modern times--the Franco-German Campaign of 1870-1871.
His opinions are entitled to profound respect, and demand close
attention and consideration. The General has treated his subject and
marshalled his arguments and statements in so logical and intelligent
a manner, and the principles he deduces seem so sound and appropriate,
that the conclusions he arrives at appear to me unanswerable.
In the exhaustive and capable summary of the work of Cavalry in War,
General von Bernhardi seems to follow very closely the line of thought
which has in recent years occupied the brains of many practical
Cavalry soldiers in this country. He appeals strongly to our
intellectual sympathy when he first of all discusses the strategical
employment of Cavalry in all its bearings, and afterwards proceeds to
unfold his views as to the rôle of the Cavalry Arm, first when the
enemy's Cavalry has been driven from the field, and secondly in
conjunction with the other Arms. Personally, I have never known the
'Case for the Cavalry' stated more clearly and intelligently.
In recommending the study of the book to all British soldiers, I would
draw particular attention to the author's constant and repeated
references to the necessity of first seeking out and fighting the
hostile Cavalry and driving them from the field--in other words, to
the immediate and complete attainment of the moral superiority.
In support of his opinions, he reminds us forcibly that the important
results gained by the German Cavalry in the 1870-1871 campaign were
due to the absence of opposition on the part of the French Cavalry
more than to anything else, and he contends that in future Wars, where
the Cavalry on either side have been properly trained as such, this
supremacy will have to be fought for, and will involve an enormous
increase in the difficulty with which the Cavalry Arm will carry out
its rôle. He scoffs at the idea held by so many 'amateurs' that
'Cavalry duels' are superfluous.
Only those who have led Cavalry on active service in the field, and
have been charged with their training in peace-time, can realize to
the full the absolute soundness of the conclusions at which General
von Bernhardi has arrived, and it is much to be feared that the
mischievous teaching which scoffs at 'manoeuvres,' 'tournaments,' and
the 'Cavalry spirit,' proceeds almost entirely from the pens and from
the brains of men who have no practical knowledge of the handling of
the Cavalry Arm.
The great value of this book to the British Cavalry officer of to-day
seems to me to lie in the fact that this particular vein of thought
and argument pervades it throughout.
The General tells us, with the soundest arguments and the most
positive proofs, that 'the brilliant field of enterprise which is open
to the Cavalry soldier in his rôle as a mounted rifleman can only be
attained by him when he has overthrown the enemy's Cavalry.'
The author, having unmistakably insisted upon the preliminary
overthrow of the enemy's Cavalry, proceeds to vindicate the idea that
the Cavalry spirit is in any degree opposed to the idea of dismounted
action when necessary. On the contrary, he declares emphatically that
the Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, and that the hostile
Cavalry once disposed of by means of horse and cold steel alone, a
brilliant rôle lies open to that Arm by reason of their possession of
an efficient firearm, in the use of which the cavalryman has received
a thorough training.
The great difficulty, he tells us, lies in the necessity of
discovering a Leader who possesses the 'power of holding the balance
correctly between fire power and shock, and in the training for the
former never to allow troops to lose confidence in the latter.'
'Whether,' says the General, 'it be in the working out of some
strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
by united fire action some common purpose, a balance of judgment and
absence of prejudice is implied which is of the rarest occurrence in
normal natures.'
In dwelling so persistently upon the necessity for Cavalry being
trained to the highest possible pitch to meet the enemy's Cavalry, I
do not wish to be misunderstood. I agree absolutely with the author in
the principle he lays down that the Cavalry fight is only a means to
an end, but it is the most important means, and I have thought it
right to comment upon this because it is a principle which in this
country, since the South African War, we have been very much inclined
to overlook. To place a force of Cavalry in the field in support of a
great Army which is deficient in the power to overcome the opposing
Cavalry is to act like one who would despatch a squadron of
war-vessels badly armed, badly trained, and ill found, to blockade a
distant coast-line defended by a powerful fleet. What is the naval
fight in the open sea but a means to an end? It would be as sensible
to dwell on the inutility and waste of a duel between hostile fleets
as to lay down the principle that the 'Cavalry battle' in no way
affects the mutual situation of hostile armies.
But the 'end' in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laid
down must never be lost sight of.
Whilst the conditions of modern War have rendered the service of
reconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves to
a much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry,
when working with the other Arms, can render valuable service in this
way, and also in bringing rapid support to a main or counter attack.
Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to the
increasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist on
Cavalry at manoeuvres and elsewhere being _ultra-cautious_. They try
to inculcate such a respect for Infantry fire that Cavalry is taught
to shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry come within sight,
squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or dismount and shoot,
regardless of what the 'Cavalry value' of the ground happens to be.
I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the war
efficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregard
altogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be on
our guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there are
many grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitable
consequences of thus placing the weapon above the men.
After the war of 1866 the great von Moltke made the following report
to the King of Prussia:--
'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in
_self-confidence_. All its initiative had been destroyed at manoeuvres,
where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore
shirked independent bold action, and kept far in rear, and as much as
possible out of sight' (Moltke's 'Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze,'
Berlin, 1900).
By like methods in peace training prior to the War with Turkey such
timidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the words
of General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclination
to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which
might bring them in contact with the Turkish Infantry, and so run risk
of suffering loss.
History is full of similar instances of how _not_ to train Cavalry,
and I hold most strongly that the Arm must be educated up to a
readiness _to act_, to come to close quarters in co-operation with the
other Arms, and to risk casualties, as Infantry has often done before
without losing its 'battle' value.
To sum up, training with a view to self-sacrifice during peace
exercises is essential for the success of all Arms in War, but
especially so for Cavalry.
With remarkable perspicuity and telling conviction, General von
Bernhardi has dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subject
demanding a Cavalry soldier's study and thought. I am convinced that
he who thoroughly masters the contents of his book will feel no doubt
and will entertain no misapprehension as to the vast rôle his Arm is
called upon to fulfil in War, and he will realize how, in mastering
the great essentials of which it treats, he will himself be assisting
in the best possible manner to maintain the prestige and glory of the
great Service to which he belongs.
I
EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP
CHAPTER I
THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT
AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY
The Art of War has undergone a momentous change; indeed, it has been
revolutionized since the Franco-German War. Every condition that
affects the conduct of warlike operations seems changed in almost
every particular. Arms of precision have reached a degree of
perfection which compels us to take into account possibilities which
did not exist a few years ago, and for which the experience of the
past can offer no scale of comparison. The all but universal
introduction of Compulsory Service, and the consequent reduction in
length of time spent by the soldier with the colours, have changed the
character of almost all European Armies.
All the most typical factors in the standing Armies of former days
disappear more or less on the issue of the order to mobilize. New
groupings of units are formed from the first outbreak of hostilities,
and the fact that these bodies are put together only on mobilization,
together with the reduction in the period of service which has been
very generally accepted, tend to depreciate the average value of the
troops, whilst at the same time the 'masses' have risen to
unimaginable dimensions. This '_folie des nombres_,' against which
certain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern reality.
Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetrating
year by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must in
future unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continent
come into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which,
from the first, the interests of every individual are involved.
The enormous development of railway communication has changed all
conditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railway
to move masses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development both
in the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armies
themselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasing
degree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probably
make these rearward communications both more necessary and at the same
time more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditions
appear modified. Masses necessitate, even in the richest theatre of
War, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines of
communication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneously
great vulnerability.
On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offers
greater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success in
the direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminished
enormously. The assailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed by
frontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy's
flanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. His
endeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compel
his opponent to fight outside of his chosen position.'
This increased importance of the communications, which in already
exhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will compel
the defenders to take greater measures for their protection.
All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase the
importance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which,
in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. This
final conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we may
struggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sided
experiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty of
all operations due to the increased masses and the more concentrated
susceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisive
factors in the next War must be 'superiority in the strategic
direction of the troops, together with the increased efficiency they
have attained and their endurance.'[1]
[Footnote 1: The contrary view to this was largely held by a
certain school in Germany, whose views the author is here
endeavouring to combat.]
To meet this drastic revolution in all these conditions, the pressure
of which has compelled the artillery into new lines of development and
forced the infantry to change their whole constitution (whether to
their advantage or not may remain an open question), no changes at all
commensurate to their importance have as yet been initiated in the
Cavalry.
Artillery and Infantry now have behind them the nation, from which
they can draw inexhaustible reserves of trained men for their constant
replenishment. The Cavalry alone remains a specialized service,
because, owing to the peculiar circumstances of its existence, it can
scarcely count on having the wastage of War made good by equally
well-trained men and horses; still less is its complete replacement in
case of disaster to be hoped for. In spite of this, we have to
recognise the fact that the proportion the Cavalry bears in all
European Armies to the ever-increasing numerical proportion of the
other Arms has steadily receded. The Peace establishments show this
clearly. Thus, taking the Germans' figures for 1870, we had:
1870.
463 Battalions.
460 Squadrons.
251 Batteries.
15-3/4 Pioneer Battalions.
1902.
625 Battalions (including 18 of 'Rifles').
486 Squadrons (including 16 squadrons of Mounted Rifles).
562 Batteries.
38 Battalions Heavy Artillery.
28 Pioneer Battalions.
This ratio to the disadvantage of the Cavalry is even more apparent on
mobilization for War, owing to the many Reserve and Landwehr
formations of Infantry and Artillery, in comparison with which the few
new units provided by the Cavalry are relatively unimportant.
Considering the mobilized Army as a whole, the Cavalry forms
numerically an almost insignificant factor.
There remains yet another point of view to be considered. Undoubtedly
there has been in the Cavalry a most active spirit of reform. On the
basis of the experience derived from the great Wars of the last forty
years (in the list I include the American War of Secession), changes
in armament and equipment have taken place in every direction, more
particularly with regard to armament. The necessity and possibility
of strategical reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry have
been fully recognised.
The conviction also has been arrived at that only when supplied with a
useful firearm and an adequate allowance of Horse Artillery will such
'masses' prove adequate for the accomplishment of this special task.
With the same object in view, the means have been granted to them with
which to destroy telegraphs and railways, to bridge rivers, and so
forth. The conviction also has been gained that the Cavalry require to
be so familiarized with tactical formations for their employment in
'mass' that they shall have become a second nature to them if they are
to fight with a reasonable prospect of success. But all that has been
done in these directions still remains insufficient. On the one hand,
the improvements introduced have not taken into account the decisive
changes in the general conditions which only the last few years have
brought about. On the other, we must not forget that neither the
Prussian Cavalry in 1870 in France nor the Russians against the Turks
in 1877-1878 had even approximately equal Cavalry to oppose them. Even
the great results achieved alternately by the Cavalry on both sides
during the American Civil War were obtained in general under
conditions which can no longer be anticipated, for at the moment of
collision neither encountered, as a rule, either equal quality or
numbers sufficient to develop their full power of attack.
The very important data obtained during the campaign of 1899-1900 in
South Africa as to the employment of dismounted action by Cavalry were
also not then before us. One could only, therefore, reason from
one-sided experiences, which can no longer be recognised as generally
sufficient for our purpose. In future the mere possibility of results
such as in 1870-1871 we so often gained owing to the absence of any
serious opposition on the part of the opposing Cavalry, will nowadays
have to be obstinately fought for, not without considerable loss; and
it needs no special proof to show what an enormous increase in the
difficulty of our task this involves, and how, as a consequence, all
the conditions of our future action must be modified.
Thus, the Cavalry stands face to face with new conditions, and sees
itself everywhere confronted--on the battle-field and in the wider
field of strategical operations--with new problems, towards the
solution of which the history of the past furnishes only very general
indications.
If we mean to maintain our position as an effective Arm, and satisfy
the demands that of necessity must be made upon us by these new
conditions, _we must break_ with many experiences of the past, and
work out for ourselves principles of action which must be deduced
essentially from the probable requirements of the future.
Each epoch-making War makes new demands upon us and prescribes new
tasks, and he only will reap the palm of success who is able to meet
them, because, with wise prevision, he has prepared himself to solve
their difficulties in peace.
If we wish to make an approximately correct picture of the future that
awaits us, we must first face the question, What will be the influence
that the changed conditions in the Art of War considered as a whole
must exercise on the possible scope of action of our Arm?
From the answer to this we can deduce the demands on the Cavalry in
particular, and these demands give us a means for determining the
limits of its employment, its consequent organization, and the
training best suited to enable it to meet these requirements.
If we summarize all the conditions which have modified the conduct of
War and contrast with them what Cavalry, from the very nature of its
being, is capable of performing, it would appear at first sight as if
every form of action of the mounted Arm has been impeded and rendered
more difficult in the highest degree; more particularly is this the
case when opposed to the increased power of modern arms. Certainly,
the impact of a modern bullet may at times produce less immediate
effect than formerly. Cases have occurred in which serious wounds did
not place the individual out of action immediately, and we may
therefore anticipate that many horses will not be stopped in the
charge, despite severe injuries. But this drawback the Infantry can
meet by opening fire sooner. To the Artillery this does not apply;
and, in any case, this objection is not of such importance as to
neutralize in any way the other advantages conferred by modern
weapons.
Owing to the fact that the extent of the danger zone has been very
considerably increased, and that within these zones the amount of fire
which has to be faced in a given time has been intensified to a degree
which formerly could hardly have been dreamt of, it has ceased to be
possible to ride straight at the front of an unshaken enemy.
Thus, essentially the Cavalry has been driven out of its former place
of honour on the battle-fields of the plains, and has been compelled
to seek the assistance of the cover the ground affords in order to
carry its own power of destruction into immediate contact with its
enemy, and only under most exceptionally favourable conditions will it
still be possible to deliver a charge direct across the open.
Further, as far as the Infantry are concerned, it will be quite the
exception to encounter them in closed bodies; generally we shall have
to ride against extended lines, which offer a most unfavourable target
for our purpose.
The difficulties both of observation and reconnaissance have also been
materially increased, for, on the one hand, the increased range of the
firearm compels one to keep further away from the enemy, thus making
it more difficult to judge with accuracy his strength and positions;
on the other, the use of smokeless powder, which no longer reveals the
position of the firing line, renders a more thorough searching of the
ground even more indispensable than formerly.
The possible participation of the civilian inhabitants of the invaded
Nation in the War will hamper most severely all forms of Cavalry
action other than on the battle-field. In intersected districts it
may, indeed, suffice to paralyze completely the execution of all
patrolling duties; and thus the offensive finds itself confronted by a
new and permanent element of danger and delay, whose gravity we may
estimate by the events which occurred in the latter portion of the
Franco-German War, and we may be quite certain that in future all such
experiences will be very much intensified.
Lastly, the fall in the numerical proportion of the Cavalry to the
other Arms is all to our disadvantage. The greater numbers of the
latter cover larger areas, and whether to cover these or to
reconnoitre them, it will be necessary to embrace far larger spaces,
notwithstanding our relatively smaller numbers--_i.e._, on each square
mile we shall only be able to employ, on an average, a largely reduced
number of patrols, etc.
Tactically this want of numbers again affects us. If the necessity to
intervene arises, not only have we better firearms against us, but
relatively a larger number of troops. Each tactical advantage secured
will thus exercise far less effect than formerly upon our opponent,
since the fraction of the enemy's force ridden down represents a
smaller proportion of his whole Army.
If an Infantry Brigade, one of a force of ten Army Corps, is
annihilated, the effect is not nearly so far-reaching as if this
Brigade formed part of an Army of two or even three Corps.
If in these changed relations there are obviously factors which
materially limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and which must
make the solution of their strategical tasks far more difficult, on
the other side we find opportunities in the probable phenomena of a
future War which, though less obvious, nevertheless on investigation
lead us to the conclusion that the importance of the Arm is even
greater than formerly, opening for it a wider sphere of activity, and
even on the battle-field revealing new chances of success.
Let us consider these opportunities more closely. The greater the
pitch of nervous tension to which men are wrought up in battle, the
greater the pitch of excitement reached, the more decisive will be the
reaction when the flood-tide of defeat overwhelms them.
Now that all European States are straining every nerve to employ
enormous masses of men from the first moment of hostilities, in order
thus to gain an advantage whilst their enemy is still concentrating,
and when we further consider how these exertions must increase the
strain throughout the nation to the very utmost, it must be apparent
that the first great decision of Arms must be of overwhelming
importance. Not only the troops directly concerned, but the 'masses'
behind them, find themselves for the moment involved in the
consequences of victory or defeat. Hence the reaction in either
direction, owing to the lower average quality of the troops, their
greater numbers, the increased difficulties of moving them, and the
susceptibility to congestion of their rearward communications, must be
far greater and far more disastrous than hitherto under similar
tactical conditions.
The more important it is to secure a favourable decision, the more
difficult with growing masses to divert an operation once commenced,
to give it a new direction or assign it a new objective, the less
possible it becomes to alter dispositions which may have been issued
on false premises; hence again _the greater grows the value of
thorough and active reconnoitring_.
If this holds good, more especially for the first great collision, it
remains also a guiding principle for all future operations; for, on
the one side, it is probable that even in its later stages the War
will be conducted with comparatively great masses; on the other, as we
have seen, _the importance of the strategical element has
unquestionably grown_; hence the _value of efficient reconnaissance_
has been proportionably intensified.
In similar measure the importance of screening has also developed. In
proportion as the assailant is compelled to resort to turning
movements and surprises, the defender is obliged to have recourse to
timely changes of front and unexpected counter-attacks; hence for
both timely reconnaissance of the enemy's, as well as for trustworthy
screening of one's own operations, the extended employment of the
mounted Arms has become imperative. In other words, although
reconnaissance and screening for strategical purposes by the Cavalry
have been rendered more difficult by the conditions we must expect to
meet in the future, on the other hand, they have gained enormously in
importance. And it is not in this direction alone that the value of
the Arm has increased, but it has also had a new and important field
of activity thrown open to it owing to the increased susceptibility
the rearward communications of the enemy and his railways have
developed.
As a consequence of the increased liability to interruption of these
communications, and also of the far more serious confusion to which
any such interruption can give rise, it has become far more difficult
than in the past to execute offensive flanking operations, changes of
front, or counter-attacks, all of which are movements which the
practical strategist must bear in mind. On paper and on the map such
undertakings appear to present no more elements of friction than
formerly, but on the ground itself those who have once seen masses of
several corps all huddled together know that things are very
different. All such movements nowadays are tied to the railway-lines,
and these, again, are congested by the flow of food and ammunition,
which must at all costs be maintained. Fresh units also of troops may
be coming up to the front, whose arrival is of the last importance in
the plans of the generalissimo, and a single broken viaduct may throw
confusion into the whole design.
In a densely-populated and fruitful district the resulting failure of
supply may be endured, but it is very different when in a
poverty-stricken district the supply of a whole Army depends on
perhaps a single line of railway.
Thus the Cavalry sees itself confronted by a task in the solution of
which it can achieve results of _decisive importance_ in a new
direction, for the following reasons: The relative importance of the
Arm during actual operations having been materially increased, the
period of concentration preceding actual collision (notwithstanding
the fact that the actual effectiveness of Cavalry in the face of
modern firearms has been decreased) offers opportunities which under
certain conditions promise higher results than formerly.
If every delay in the march which may be caused by the action of
Cavalry against the flanking lines of advance of an Army concentrating
for battle is detrimental, how much greater would be the
disorganization resulting from similar operations after defeat! Very
rarely in such a case would it be possible to retire eccentrically by
the same roads which were used for advance. The beaten troops
generally drift back quite involuntarily in the direction into which
they have been compelled by the results of the tactical decision. The
wider the original front, the greater the masses of the troops
concerned (which are now not only in a demoralized condition, but are
compelled, under pressure of pursuit, to change their communications
into new directions, and for this purpose to disentangle the columns
drawn in for the concentration) and the greater the certainty that
conditions must arise which will give to an active Cavalry an even
richer opportunity of harvest than was formerly open to them.
This will in future be all the more the case when troops of lower
quality, and therefore more liable to become shaken and dispirited,
have to be employed. Reserve formations--Landwehr and the like--which
under favourable conditions might render excellent service, when once
beaten, without officers, weary and hungry, lose all cohesion, when,
with baggage, wounded, and stragglers, they are driven back over
crowded roads; and then, no matter how well they are armed, they are
an easy prey to a pursuing Cavalry.
The man who throws his rifle away or shoots in the air will not find
salvation either in clip-loading or smokeless powder against the lance
in the hands of a relentless pursuing Cavalry.
The same holds good for the fight itself. We cannot attack even
inferior Infantry as long as it only keeps the muzzles of its rifles
down and shoots straight; but once it is morally broken and surprised,
then the greatest results are still to be achieved even on an open
battle-field. That, at least, the campaign of 1870-1871 sufficiently
proved, although the Cavalry were so seldom allowed the opportunity to
reap the ripe harvest our strategy and the action of the other Arms
had so abundantly prepared for them.
A further point in our favour is to be found in the fact that the
increased power of modern Artillery fire has rendered the defence of
villages and woods practically an impossibility. The Infantry are thus
compelled to seek open but rolling ground, and it is precisely such
ground which favours the concealed approach and sudden attack of the
Cavalry; but surprise is the very essence of successful Cavalry
action.
If we bring together all these points of view which have been hitherto
only indicated, we find, on the one hand, the absolute fighting value
of the Cavalry has considerably diminished, and that in modern War the
conditions of Cavalry employment will in every direction be rendered
more difficult; on the other hand, the strategical importance of the
Arm, as well as the scope of the duties which it may be called upon to
fulfil, have increased very decidedly, and very important new
opportunities for successes have been thrown open to it.
We cannot sufficiently insist upon the cumulative effects which all
these general changes in the nature of War have exercised upon the
Cavalry Arm; for not only has public opinion taken up the opposite
view, but even in the Army itself these positive views have not
received the attention they deserve.
The exploits of our Cavalry in 1870-1871 have been universally
admired, without, however, being appreciated at their true relative
value. On the other hand, reasoning from the mechanical perfection of
the firearm, the conclusion has been reached that, as against Infantry
and Artillery, the Cavalry can no longer hope to achieve any results
of importance. It has been shown that in 1870-1871 the German Cavalry
possessed a great numerical superiority over its adversary--that, in
fact, numerous regiments during the whole War either never came into
action at all or at least never had the opportunity to exhibit their
full value in other fields of employment, and hence it has been
concluded that an increase or organic reform of what they are pleased
to consider a somewhat antiquated Cavalry is quite superfluous.
An attempt on the part of the Imperial Government to introduce an
increase of establishments had to give way to more important
considerations. In fact, practically the German Cavalry in number and
organization remains to-day the same as in 1870.
But the duties which in future will fall to the Cavalry are so
wide-reaching, and for the conduct of the War are often of such
decisive importance, that on the manner of their execution the
ultimate results of a campaign must very materially depend.
If the Cavalry is not in a condition to prove equal to these duties,
we shall find ourselves confronted with a situation of the gravest
danger. Hence it becomes unconditionally necessary to apply the
reforming hand where important deficiencies and practical
insufficiencies can be recognised. In order to apply the lever of
reform at once to the best advantage, we must be quite clear in our
own minds in which part of the conduct of War the importance of the
Cavalry will principally be felt. Only from the recognition of the
demands which will there be made upon it can we conclude in what
direction its further evolution can be initiated.
We must, therefore, get a clear conception of the probable demands to
be made upon the Arm in each individual phase of a future War, test
them with a view to their relative importance towards the result as a
whole, and then endeavour to recognise on which factors the success in
each individual phase principally depends.
In the first place stands naturally the demands which will be made on
the Cavalry during the early periods after the declaration of
hostilities--that is, during mobilization and concentration. These
require all the more attention because, as we have seen, it is
particularly these introductory stages of future War which will be of
particular importance, and because it is precisely in these very
points that opinion is as yet not united.
Then we must follow the employment of the Arm in the further course of
operations, and endeavour to determine in what direction the most
important results are to be obtained.