The facts disclosed in this report induced the Massachusetts

Legislature to pass a resolution protesting against the kidnapping

laws of the slave States, "as invading the sacred rights of citizens

of this commonwealth, as contrary to the Constitution of the United

States, and in utter derogation of that great principle of the

common law which presumes every person to be innocent until proved

to be guilty;" and ordered the protest to be forwarded to the

Governors of the several States.

But it is not at the south alone that freemen may be converted into

slaves "according to law." The Act of Congress respecting the

recovery of fugitive slaves, affords most extraordinary facilities

for this process, through official corruption and individual perjury.

By this Act, the claimant is permitted to _select_ a justice of the

peace, before whom he may bring or send his alleged slave, and even

to prove his property by _affidavit_. Indeed, in almost every State

in the Union, a slaveholder may recover at law a human being as his

beast of burden with far less ceremony than he could his pig from

the possession of his neighbor. In only three States is a man,

claimed as a slave, entitled to a trial by jury. At the last session

of the New York Legislature a bill allowing a jury trial in such

cases was passed by the lower House, but rejected by a _democratic_

vote in the Senate, democracy in that State, being avowedly only

_skin_ deep, all its principles of liberty, equality, and human rights

depending on complexion.

Considering the wonderful ease and expedition with which fugitives

may be recovered by law, it would be very strange if mistakes did not

sometimes occur. _How_ often they occur cannot, of course, be known,

and it is only when a claim is _defeated_, that we are made sensible

of the exceedingly precarious tenure by which a poor friendless

negro at the north holds his personal liberty. A few years since, a

girl of the name of Mary Gilmore was arrested in Philadelphia, as a

fugitive slave from Maryland. Testimony was not wanting in support

of the claim; yet it was most conclusively proved that she was the

daughter of poor _Irish_ parents--having not a drop of negro blood

in her veins--that the father had absconded, and that the mother had

died a drunkard in the Philadelphia hospital, and that the infant

had been kindly received and _brought up in a colored family_. Hence

the attempt to make a slave of her. In the spring of 1839, a colored

man was arrested in Philadelphia, on a charge of having absconded

from his owner _twenty-three_ years before. This man had a wife and

family depending upon him, and a home where he enjoyed their society;

and yet, unless he could find witnesses who could prove his freedom

for more than this number of years, he was to be torn from his wife,

his children, his home, and doomed for the remainder of his days to

toil under the lash. _Four_ witnesses for the claimant swore to his

identity, although they had not seen him before for twenty-three years!

By a most extraordinary coincidence, a New England Captain, with

whom this negro had sailed _twenty-nine_ years before, in a sloop

from Nantucket, happened at this very time to be confined for debt

in the same prison with the alleged slave, and the Captain's

testimony, together with that of some other witnesses, who had

known the man previous to his pretended elopement, so fully

established his freedom, that the Court discharged him.

Another mode of legal kidnapping still remains to be described. By

the Federal Constitution, fugitives from _justice_ are to be

delivered up, and under this constitutional provision, a free negro

may be converted into a slave without troubling even a Justice of

the Peace to hear the evidence of the captor's claim. A fugitive

slave is, of course, a felon--he not only steals himself, but also

the rags on his back which belong to his master. It is understood he

has taken refuge in New York, and his master naturally wishes to

recover him with as little noise, trouble, and delay as possible.

The way is simple and easy. Let the Grand Jury indict A.B. for

stealing wearing apparel, and let the indictment, with an affidavit

of the criminal's flight, be forwarded by the Governor of the State,

to his Excellency of New York, with a requisition for the delivery

of A.B., to the agent appointed to receive him. A warrant is, of

course, issued to "any Constable of the State of New York," to

arrest A.B. For what purpose?--to bring him before a magistrate

where his identity may be established?--no, but to deliver him up to

the foreign agent. Hence, the Constable may pick up the first likely

negro he finds in the street, and ship him to the south; and should

it be found, on his arrival on the plantation, that the wrong man

has come, it will also probably be found that the mistake is of no

consequence to the planter. A few years since, the Governor of New

York signed a warrant for the apprehension of 17 Virginia negroes,

as fugitives from justice.[103] Under this warrant, a man who had

lived in the neighborhood for three years, and had a wife and

children, and who claimed to be free, was seized, on a Sunday evening,

in the public highway, in West Chester County, N.Y., and without

being permitted to take leave of his family, was instantly

hand-cuffed, thrown into a carriage, and hurried to New York, and

the next morning was on his voyage to Virginia.

[Footnote 103: There is no evidence that he knew they were negroes;

or that he acted otherwise than in perfect good faith. The alleged

crime was stealing a boat. The _real_ crime, it is said, was

stealing themselves and escaping in a boat. The most horrible abuses

of these warrants can only be prevented by requiring proof of

identity before delivery.]

Free colored men are converted into slaves not only by law, but also

contrary to law. It is, of course, difficult to estimate the extent

to which illegal kidnapping is carried, since a large number of

cases must escape detection. In a work published by Judge Stroud, of

Philadelphia, in 1827, he states, that it had been _ascertained_

that more than _thirty_ free colored persons, mostly children, had

been kidnapped in that city within the last two years.[104]

[Footnote 104: Stroud's Sketch of the Slave Laws, p. 94.]

10. SUBJECTION TO INSULT AND OUTRAGE.

The feeling of the community towards these people, and the contempt

with which they are treated, are indicated by the following notice,

lately published by the proprietors of a menagerie, in New York.

"The proprietors wish it to be understood, that people of color are

not permitted to enter, _except when in attendance upon children and

families_." For two shillings, any white scavenger would be freely

admitted, and so would negroes, provided they came in a capacity

that marked their dependence--their presence is offensive, _only_

when they come as independent spectators, gratifying a laudable

curiosity.

Even death, the great leveller, is not permitted to obliterate, among

Christians, the distinction of caste, or to rescue the lifeless form

of the colored man from the insults of his white brethren. In the

porch of a Presbyterian Church, in Philadelphia, in 1837, was

suspended a card, containing the form of a deed, to be given to

purchasers of lots in a certain burial ground, and to enhance the

value of the property, and to entice buyers, the following clause was

inserted, "No person of _color_, nor any one who has been the

subject of _execution_, shall be interred in said lot."

Our colored fellow-citizens, like others, are occasionally called to

pass from one place to another; and in doing so are compelled to

submit to innumerable hardships and indignities. They are frequently

denied seats in our stage coaches; and although admitted upon the

_decks_ of our steam boats, are almost universally excluded from

the cabins. Even women have been forced, in cold weather, to pass

the night upon deck, and in one instance the wife of a colored

clergyman lost her life in consequence of such an exposure.

The contempt poured upon these people by our laws, our churches, our

seminaries, our professions, naturally invokes upon their heads the

fierce wrath of vulgar malignity. In order to exhibit the actual

condition of this portion of our population, we will here insert

some _samples_ of the outrages to which they are subjected, taken

from the ordinary public journals.

In an account of the New York riots of 1834, the _Commercial

Advertiser_ says--"About twenty poor African (native American)

families, have had their all destroyed, and have neither bed,

clothing, nor food remaining. Their houses are completely eviscerated,

their furniture a wreck, and the ruined and disconsolate tenants of

the devoted houses are reduced to the necessity of applying to the

corporation for bread."

The example set in New York was zealously followed in Philadelphia.

"Some arrangement, it appears, existed between the mob and the white

inhabitants, as the dwelling houses of the latter, contiguous to the

residences of the blacks, were illuminated and left undisturbed,

while the huts of the negroes were singled out with unerring

certainty. The furniture found in these houses was generally broken

up and destroyed--beds ripped open and their contents scattered in

the streets.... The number of houses assailed was not less than

twenty. In one house there was a _corpse, which was thrown from the

coffin, and in another a dead infant was taken out of the bed, and

cast on the floor, the mother being at the same time barbarously

treated_."--_Philadelphia Gazette_.

"No case is reported of an attack having been _invited_ or _provoked_

by the residents of the dwellings assailed or destroyed. The extent

of the depredations committed on the _three_ evenings of riot and

outrage can only be judged of by the number of houses damaged or

destroyed. So far as ascertained, this amounts to FORTY-FIVE. One of

the houses assaulted was occupied by an unfortunate cripple--who,

unable to fly from the fury of the mob, was so beaten by some of the

ruffians, that he has since died in consequence of the bruises and

wounds inflicted ... For the last two days the Jersey steam boats

have been loaded with numbers of the colored population, who,

fearful their lives were not safe in this, determined to seek refuge

in another State. On the Jersey side, tents were erected, and the

negroes have taken up a temporary residence, until a prospect shall

be offered for their perpetual location in some place of security

and liberty."--_National Gazette_.

The facts we have now exhibited, abundantly prove the extreme

cruelty and sinfulness of that prejudice against color which we are

impiously told is an ORDINATION OF PROVIDENCE. Colonizationists,

assuming the prejudice to be natural and invincible, propose to

remove its victims beyond its influence. Abolitionists, on the

contrary, remembering with the Psalmist, that "It is HE that hath

made us, and not we ourselves," believe that the benevolent Father

of us all requires us to treat with justice and kindness every

portion of the human family, notwithstanding any particular

organization he has been pleased to impress upon them. Instead,

therefore, of gratifying and fostering this prejudice, by

continually banishing from our country those against whom it is

directed, Abolitionists are anxious to destroy the prejudice itself;

feeling, to use the language of another, that--"It is time to

recognize in the humblest portions of society, partakers of our

nature with all its high prerogatives and awful destinies--time to

remember that our distinctions are _exterior_ and evanescent, our

resemblance real and permanent--that all is transient but what is

moral and spiritual--that the only graces we can carry with us into

another world, are graces of divine implantation, and that amid the

rude incrustations of poverty and ignorance there lurks an

imperishable jewel--a SOUL, susceptible of the highest spiritual

beauty, destined, perhaps, to adorn the celestial abodes, and to

shine for ever in the mediatorial diadem of the Son of God--_Take

heed that ye despise not one of these little ones_."

No. 13.

THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER.

* * * * *

CAN ABOLITIONISTS VOTE OR TAKE OFFICE UNDER

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

"The preservation, propagation, and perpetuation of slavery

is the vital and animating spirit of the National Government."

NEW YORK:

AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY,

142 NASSAU STREET

1815.

INTRODUCTION.

The American Anti-Slavery Society, at its Annual Meeting in May, 1844,

adopted the following Resolution:

_Resolved_, That secession from the present United States

government is the duty of every abolitionist; since no one can take

office, or throw a vote for another to hold office, under the United

States Constitution, without violating his anti-slavery principles,

and rendering himself an abettor of the slaveholder in his sin.

The passage of this Resolution has caused two charges to be brought

against the Society: _First_, that it is a _no-government_ body,

and that the whole doctrine of non-resistance is endorsed by this

vote:--and _secondly_, that the Society transcended its proper

sphere and constitutional powers by taking such a step.

The logic which infers that because a man thinks the Federal

Government bad, he must necessarily think _all_ government so, has

at least, the merit and the charm of novelty. There is a spice of

arrogance just perceptible, in the conclusion that the Constitution

of these United States is so perfect, that one who dislikes it could

never be satisfied with any form of government whatever!

Were O'Connell and his fellow Catholics non-resistants, because for

two hundred years they submitted to exclusion from the House of

Lords and the House of Commons, rather than qualify themselves for a

seat by an oath abjuring the Pope? Were the _non-juring_ Bishops of

England non-resistants, when they went down to the grave without

taking their seats in the House of Lords, rather than take an oath

denying the Stuarts and to support the House of Hanover? Both might

have purchased power at the price of one annual falsehood. There are

some in this country who do not seem to think that price at all

unreasonable. It were a rare compliment indeed to the non-resistants,

if every exhibition of rigid principle on the part of an individual

is to make the world suspect him of leaning towards their faith.

The Society is not opposed to government, but only to _this_

Government based upon and acting for slavery.

With regard to the second charge, of exceeding its proper limits and

trespassing on the rights of the minority, it is enough to say, that

the object of the American Anti-Slavery Society is the "entire

abolition of slavery in the United States." Of course it is its duty

to find out all the sources of pro-slavery influence in the land. It

is its right, it is its duty to try every institution in the land,

no matter how venerable, or sacred, by the touchstone of

anti-slavery principle; and if it finds any one false, to proclaim

that fact to the world, with more or less of energy, according to

its importance in society. It has tried the Constitution, and

pronounced it unsound.

No member's conscience need be injured--The qualification for

membership remains the same, "the belief that slave-holding is a

heinous crime"--No new test has been set up--But the majority of the

Society, for the time being, faithful to its duty of trying every

institution by the light of the present day--of uttering its opinion

on every passing event that touches the slave's welfare, has seen it

to be duty to sound forth its warning,

NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS.

No one who did not vote for the Resolution is responsible for it. No

one is asked to quit our platform. We, the majority, only ask him to

extend to our opinions the same toleration that we extend to him,

and agreeing to differ on this point, work together where we can. We

proscribe no man for difference of opinion.

It is said, that having refused in 1840, to say that a man _ought to

vote_, on the ground that such a resolution would be tyrannical and

intolerant, the Society is manifestly inconsistent now in taking

upon itself to say that no abolitionist _can_ consistently vote. But

the inconsistency is only apparent and not real.

There may he a thousand reasons why a particular individual ought

not to do an act, though the act be innocent in itself. It would be

tyranny therefore in a society which can properly take notice of but

one subject, slavery, to promulgate the doctrine that all its

members ought to do any particular act, as for instance, to vote, to

give money, to lecture, to petition, or the like. The particular

circumstances and opinions of each one must regulate his actions.

All we have a right to ask is, that he do for the slave's cause as

much as he does for any other of equal importance. But when an act

is wrong, it is no intolerance to say to the whole world that it

ought _not to be done_. After the abolitionist has granted that

slavery is wrong, we have the right to judge him by his own

principles, and arraign him for inconsistency that, so believing, he

helps the slaveholder by his oath.

The following pages have been hastily thrown together in explanation

of the vote above recited. They make no pretension to a full

argument of the topic. I hope that in a short time I shall get

leisure sufficient to present to our opponents, unless some one does

it for me, a full statement of the reasons which have led us to this

step.

I am aware that we non-voters are rather singular. But history, from

the earliest Christians downwards, is full of instances of men who

refused all connection with government, and all the influence which

office could bestow, rather than deny their principles, or aid in

doing wrong. Yet I never heard them called either idiots or

over-scrupulous. Sir Thomas More need never have mounted the scaffold,

had he only consented to take the oath of supremacy. He had only to

tell a lie with solemnity, as we are asked to do, and he might not

only have saved his life, but, as the trimmers of his day would have

told him, doubled his influence. Pitt resigned his place as Prime

Minister of England, rather than break faith with the Catholics of

Ireland. Should I not resign a petty ballot rather than break faith

with the slave? But I was specially glad to find a distinct

recognition of the principle upon which we have acted, applied to a

different point, in the life of that Patriarch of the Anti-Slavery

enterprise, Granville Sharpe. It is in a late number of the

Edinburgh Review. While an underclerk in the War Office, he

sympathized with our fathers in their struggle for independence.

"Orders reached his office to ship munitions of war to the revolted

colonies. If his hand had entered the account of such a cargo, it

would have contracted in his eyes the stain of innocent blood. To

avoid this pollution, he resigned his place and his means of

subsistence at a period of life when be could no longer hope to find

any other lucrative employment." As the thoughtful clerk of the War

Office takes his hat down from the peg where it has used to hang for

twenty years, methinks I hear one of our opponents cry out,

"Friend Sharpe, you are absurdly scrupulous." "You may innocently

aid Government in doing wrong," adds another. While Liberty Party

yelps at his heels, "My dear Sir, you are quite losing your influence!"

And indeed it is melancholy to reflect how, from that moment the

mighty underclerk of the War Office(!) dwindled into the mere

Granville Sharpe of history! the man of whom Mansfield and Hargrave

were content to learn law, and Wilberforce, philanthropy.

One friend proposes to vote for men who shall be pledged not to take

office unless the oath to the Constitution is dispensed with, and

who shall then go on to perform in their offices only such duties as

we, their constituents, approve. He cites, in support of his view,

the election of O'Connell to the House of Commons, in 1828, I believe,

just one year before the "Oath of Supremacy," which was the

objectionable one to the Catholics, was dispensed with. Now, if we

stood in the same circumstances as the Catholics did in 1828, the

example would be in point. When the public mind is thoroughly

revolutionized, and ready for the change, when the billow has

reached its height and begins to crest into foam, then such a

measure may bring matters to a crisis. But let us first go through,

in patience, as O'Connell did, our twenty years of agitation.

Waiving all other objections, this plan seems to me mere playing at

politics, and an entire waste of effort.

It loses our high position as moral reformers; it subjects us to all

that malignant opposition and suspicion of motives which attend the

array of parties; and while thus closing up our access to the

national conscience, it wastes in fruitless caucussing and party

tactics, the time and the effort which should have been directed to

efficient agitation.

The history of our Union is lesson enough, for every candid mind, of

the fatal effects of every, the least, compromise with evil. The

experience of the fifty years passed under it, shows us the slaves

trebling in numbers;--slaveholders monopolizing the offices and

dictating the policy of the Government;--prostituting the strength

and influence of the Nation to the support of slavery here and

elsewhere;--trampling on the rights of the free States, and making

the courts of the country their tools. To continue this disastrous

alliance longer is madness. The trial of fifty years only proves

that it is impossible for free and slave States to unite on any terms,

without all becoming partners in the guilt and responsible for the

sin of slavery. Why prolong the experiment? Let every honest man

join in the outcry of the American Anti-Slavery Society,

NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS.

WENDELL PHILLIPS.

_Boston, Jan_. 15, 1845.

THE NO-VOTING THEORY.

"God never made a CITIZEN, and no one will escape as a man, from the

sins which he commits as a citizen."

Can an abolitionist consistently take office, or vote, under the

Constitution of the United States?

1st. What is an abolitionist?

One who thinks slaveholding a sin in all circumstances, and desires

its abolition. Of course such an one cannot consistently aid another

in holding his slave;--in other words, I cannot innocently aid a man

in doing that which I think wrong. No amount of fancied good will

justify me in joining another in doing wrong, unless I adopt the

principle "of doing evil that good may come."

2d. What do taking office and voting under the Constitution imply?

The President swears "to execute the office of president," and

"to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United

States." The judges "to discharge the duties incumbent upon them

agreeably to the constitution and laws of the United States."

All executive, legislative, and judicial officers, both of the

several States and of the General Government, before entering on the

performance of their official duties, are bound to take an oath or

affirmation, "_to support the Constitution of the United States_."

This is what every office-holder expressly _promises in so many

words_. It is a contract between him and the _whole nation_. The

voter, who, by voting, sends his fellow citizen into office as his

representative, knowing beforehand that the taking of this oath is

the first duty his agent will have to perform, does by his vote,

request and authorize him to take it. He therefore, by voting,

impliedly engages to support the Constitution. What one does by his

agent he does himself. Of course no honest man will authorize and

request another to do an act which he thinks it wrong to do himself!

Every voter, therefore, is bound to see, _before voting_, whether he

could himself honestly swear to _support_ the constitution. Now what

does this oath of office-holders relate to and imply? "It applies,"

says Chief Justice Marshall, "in an especial manner, to their conduct

in their official character." Judge Story, in his Commentaries on the

Constitution, speaks of it as "a solemn obligation to the due

execution of the trusts reposed in them, and to support the

Constitution." It is universally considered throughout the country,

by common men and by the courts, as a promise to do what the

Constitution bids, and to avoid what it forbids. It was in the

spirit of this oath, under which he spake, that Daniel Webster said

in New York, "The Constitution gave it (slavery) SOLEMN GUARANTIES.

To the full extent of these guaranties we are all bound by the

Constitution. All the stipulations contained in the Constitution in

favor of the slaveholding States ought to be fulfilled; and so far

as depends on me, shall be fulfilled, in the fulness of their spirit

and to the exactness of their letter."

It is more than an oath of allegiance; more than a mere promise that

we will not resist the laws. For it is an engagement to "support them";

as an _officer_ of government, to carry them into effect. Without

such a promise on the part of its functionaries, how could

government exist? It is more than the expression of that obligation

which rests on all peaceable citizens to _submit_ to laws, even

though they will not actively _support_ them. For it is the promise

which the judge makes, that he will actually _do_ the business of

the courts; which the sheriff assumes, that he will actually _execute_

the laws.

Let it be remarked, that it is an oath to support _the_

Constitution--that is, _the whole of it_; there are no exceptions.

And let it be remembered, that by it each _one_ makes a contract

with the _whole_ nation, that he will do certain acts.

3d. What is the Constitution which each voter thus engages to support?

It contains the following clauses:

Art. 1, Sect. 2. Representatives and direct taxes shall be

apportioned among the several States, which may be included within

this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be

determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including

those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians

not taxed, _three fifths of all other persons_.

Art. 1, Sect. 8. Congress shall have power ... to suppress

insurrections.

Art. 4, Sec. 2. No person, held to service or labor in one State,

under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence

of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or

labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such

service or labor may be due.

Art. 4, Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in

this Union a republican form of government; and shall protect each

of them against invasion; and, on application of the legislature, or

of the executive, (when the legislature cannot be convened) _against

domestic violence_.

The first of these clauses, relating to representation, gives to

10,000 inhabitants of Carolina equal weight in the government with

40,000 inhabitants of Massachusetts, provided they are rich enough

to hold 50,000 slaves:--and accordingly confers on a slaveholding

community additional political power for every slave held among them,

thus tempting them to continue to uphold the system.

Its result has been, in the language of John Quincy Adams, "to make

the preservation, propagation, and perpetuation of slavery the vital

and animating spirit of the National Government;" and again, to

enable "a knot of slaveholders to give the law and prescribe the

policy of the country." So that "since 1830 slavery, slaveholding,

slavebreeding, and slavetrading have formed the whole foundation of

the policy of the Federal Government." The second and the last

articles relating to insurrection and domestic violence, perfectly

innocent in themselves--yet being made with the fact directly in

view that slavery exists among us, do deliberately pledge the whole

national force against the unhappy slave if he imitate our fathers

and resist oppression--thus making us partners in the guilt of

sustaining slavery: the third is a promise, on the part of the whole

North, to return fugitive slaves to their masters; a deed which

God's law expressly condemns, and which every noble feeling of our

nature repudiates with loathing and contempt.

These are the clauses which the abolitionist, by voting or taking

office, engages to uphold. While he considers slaveholding to be sin,

he still rewards the master with additional political power for

every additional slave that he can purchase. Thinking slaveholding

to be sin, he pledges to the master the aid of the whole army and

navy of the nation to reduce his slave again to chains, should he at

any time succeed a moment in throwing them off. Thinking

slaveholding to be sin, he goes on, year after year, appointing by

his vote judges and marshals to aid in hunting up the fugitives, and

seeing that they are delivered back to those who claim them! How

beautifully consistent are his _principles_ and his _promises_!

OBJECTIONS.

OBJECTION I.

Allowing that the clause relating to representation and that relating

to insurrections are immoral, it is contended that the article which

orders the return of fugitive slaves was not meant to apply to slaves,

but has been misconstrued and misapplied!

ANSWER. The meaning of the other two clauses, settled as it has been

by the unbroken practice and cheerful acquiescence of the Government

and people, no one has attempted to deny. This also has the same

length of practice, and the same acquiescence, to show that it

relates to slaves. No one denies that the Government and Courts have

so construed it, and that the great body of the people have freely

concurred in and supported this construction. And further, "The

Madison Papers" (containing the debates of those who framed the

Constitution, at the time it was made) settle beyond all doubt what

meaning the framers intended to convey.

Look at the following extracts from those Papers:

_Tuesday, August 28th_, 1787.

Mr. Butler and Mr. Pinckney moved to require "fugitive slaves and

servants to be delivered up like criminals."

Mr. Wilson. This would oblige the Executive of the State to do it,

at the public expense.

Mr. Sherman saw no more propriety in the public seizing and

surrendering a slave or servant, than a horse.

Mr. Butler withdrew his proposition, in order that some particular

provision might be made, apart from this article.

Article 15, as amended, was then agreed to, _nem. con._--Madison

papers, pp. 1447-8.

_Wednesday, August_ 29, 1787.

Mr. Butler moved to insert after Article 15, "If any person bound to

service or labor in any of the United States, shall escape into

another State, he or she shall not be discharged from such service

or labor, in consequence of any regulations subsisting in the State

to which they escape, but shall be delivered up to the person justly

claiming their service or labor,"--which was agreed to, _nem.

con._--p. 1456.

And again, after the wording of the above article had been slightly

changed, and the clause newly numbered, as in the present

Constitution, we find another statement most clearly showing to what

subject the whole was intended to refer:

_Saturday, September_ 15, 1787.

Article 4, Section 2, (the third paragraph,) the term "legally" was

struck out; and the words, "under the laws thereof," inserted after

the word "State," in compliance with the wish of some who thought

the term legal equivocal, and favoring the idea that SLAVERY was

_legal_ in a moral view.--p. 1589.

Is it not hence evident that SLAVERY was the subject referred to by

the whole article?

The debates of the Convention held in the several States to ratify

the Constitution, at the same time show clearly what meaning it was

thought the framers had conveyed:--In Virginia Mr. Madison said,

Another clause secures to us that property which we now possess. At

present, if any slave elopes to any of those States where slaves are

free, he becomes emancipated by their laws. For the laws of the

States are uncharitable to one another in this respect. But in this

Constitution, "no person held to service, or labor, in one State,

under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence

of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or

labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such

service or labor may be due." This clause was expressly inserted to

enable owners of slaves to reclaim them. This is a better security

than any that now exists.

Patrick Henry, in reply observed,

The clause which had been adduced by the gentleman was no more than

this--that a runaway negro could be taken up in Maryland or New

York.

Governor Randolph said,

But another clause of the Constitution proves the absurdity of the

supposition. The words of the clause are, "No person held to service

or labor in one State," &c. Every one knows that slaves are held to

service and labor. If a citizen of this State, in consequence of

this clause, can take his runaway slave in Maryland, &c.

General Pinckney in South Carolina Convention observed,

"We have obtained a right to recover our slaves, in whatever part of

America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before."

In North Carolina, Mr. Iredell

Begged leave to explain the reason of this clause. In some of the

Northern States, they have emancipated all their slaves. If any of

our slaves, said he, go there and remain there a certain time, they

would, by the present laws, be entitled to their freedom, so that

their masters could not get them again. This would be extremely

prejudicial to the inhabitants of the Southern States, and to

prevent it, this clause is inserted in the Constitution. Though the

word _slave_ be not mentioned, this is the meaning of it. The

Northern delegates, owing to their particular scruples on the

subject of slavery, did not choose the word _slave_ to be mentioned.

But even if TWO clauses are immoral that is enough for our purpose,

and shews that no honest man should engage to uphold them. Who has

the right to construe and expound the laws? Of course the Courts of

the Nation. The Constitution provides (Article 3, Section 2,) that

the Supreme Court shall be the final and only interpreter of its

meaning. What says the Supreme Court? That this clause does relate

to slaves, and order their return. All the other courts concur in

this opinion. But, say some, the courts are corrupt on this question.

Let us appeal to the people. Nine hundred and ninety-nine out of

every thousand answer, that the courts have construed it rightly,

and almost as many cheerfully support it. If the unanimous,

concurrent, unbroken practice of every department of the Government,

judicial, legislative, and executive, and the acquiescence of the

people for fifty years, do not prove which is the true construction,

then how and where can such a question ever be settled? If the

people and the courts of the land do not know what they themselves

mean, who has authority to settle their meaning for them?

If the Constitution is not what history, unbroken practice, and the

courts prove that our fathers intended to make it, and what too,

their descendants, this nation say they did make it, and agree to

uphold,--who shall decide what the Constitution is?

This is the sense then in which the Nation understand that the

promise is made to them. The Nation _understand_ that the judge

pledges himself to return fugitive slaves. The judge knows this when

he takes the oath. And Paley expresses the opinion of all writers on

morals, as well as the conviction of all honest men, when he says,

"that a promise is binding in that sense in which the promiser

thought at the time that the other party understood it."

OBJECTION II.

A promise to do an immoral act is not binding: therefore an oath to

support the Constitution of the United States, does not bind one to

support any provisions of that instrument which are repugnant to his

ideas of right. And an abolitionist, thinking it wrong to return

slaves, may as an office-holder, innocently and properly take an

oath to support a Constitution which commands such return.

ANSWER. Observe that this objection allows the Constitution to be

pro-slavery, and admits that there are clauses in it which no

abolitionist ought to carry out or support.

And observe, further, that we all agree, that a bad promise is

better broken than kept--that every abolitionist, who has before now

taken the oath to the Constitution, is bound to break it, and

disobey the pro-slavery clauses of that instrument. So far there is

no difference between us. But the point in dispute now is, whether a

man, having found out that certain requirements of the Constitution

are wrong, can, after that, innocently swear to support and obey them,

_all the while meaning not to do so_.

Now I contend that such loose construction of our promises is

contrary alike to honor, to fair dealing, and to truthfulness--that

it tends to destroy utterly that confidence between man and man

which binds society together, and leads, in matters of government,

to absolute tyranny.

The Constitution is a series of contracts made by each individual

with every other of the fourteen millions. A man's oath is evidence

of his assent to this contract. If I offer a man the copy of an

agreement, and he, after reading, swears to perform it, have I not a

right to infer from his oath that he assents to the _rightfulness_

of the articles of that paper? What more solemn form of expressing

his assent could he select? A man's oath expresses his conviction of

the rightfulness of the actions he promises to do, as well as his

determination to do them. If this be not so, I can have no trust in

any man's word. He may take my money, promise to do what I wish in

return, and yet, keeping my money, tell me, on the morrow, that he

shall not keep his promise, and never meant to, because the act, his

conscience tells him, is wrong. Who would trust property to such men,

or such maxims in the common affairs of life? Shall we not be as

honest in the Senate House as on 'Change? The North makes a contract

with the South by which she receives certain benefits, and agrees to

render certain services. The benefits she carefully keeps--but the

services she refuses to render, because immoral contracts are not

binding! Is this fair dealing? It is the rule alike of law and

common sense, that if we are not able, from _any cause_, to furnish

the article we have agreed to, we ought to return the pay we have

received. If power is put into our hands on certain conditions, and

we find ourselves unable to comply with those conditions, we ought

to surrender the power back to those who gave it.

Immoral laws are doubtless void, and should not be obeyed. But the

question is here, whether one knowing a law to be immoral, may

innocently promise to obey it in order to get into office? The

people have settled the conditions on which one may take office. The

first is, that he assent to their Constitution. Is it honest to

accept power with the intention at the time of not keeping the

conditions?--The rightfulness of those conditions is not here the

question.

OBJECTION III.

I swear to support the Constitution, _as I understand it_. Certain

parts of it, in my opinion, contradict others and are therefore void.

ANSWER. Will any one take the title deed of his house and carry it

to the man he bought of, and let him keep the covenants of that

paper as he says "he understands them?" Do we not all recognize the

justice of having some third, disinterested party to judge between

two disputants about the meaning of contracts? Who ever heard of a

contract of which each party was at liberty to keep as much as he

thought proper?

As in all other contracts, so in that of the Constitution, there is

a power provided to affix the proper construction to the instrument,

and that construction both parties are bound to abide by, or

repudiate the _whole_ contract. That power is the Supreme Court of

the United States.

Do we seek the common sense, practical view of this question? Go to

the Exchange and ask any broker how many dollars he will trust any

man with, who avows his right to make promises with the design, at

the time, of breaking some parts, and not feeling called upon to

state which those parts will be?

Do you seek the moral view of the point, which philosophers have

taken? Paley says, "A promise is binding in that sense in which the

promiser thought at the time of making that the other party

understood it." Is there any doubt what meaning the great body of

the American people attach to the Constitution and the official oath?

They are that party to whom the promise is made.

But, say some, our lives are notice to the whole people what meaning

we attach to the oath, and we will protest when we swear, that we do

not include in our oath the pro-slavery clauses. You may as well

utter the protest now, as when you are swearing--or at home, equally

as well as within the State House. For no such protest can be of any

avail. The Chief Justice stands up to administer to me the oath of

some office, no matter which. "Sir," say I, "I must take that oath

with a qualification, excluding certain clauses." His reply will be,

"Sir, I have no discretion in this matter. I am here merely to

administer a prescribed form of oath. If you assent to it, you are

qualified for your station. If you do not, you cannot enter. I have

no authority given me to listen to exceptions. I am a servant--the

people are my masters--here is what they require that you support,

not this or that part of the Constitution, but '_the Constitution_,'

that is, the _whole_."

Baffled here, I turn to the people. I publish my opinions in

newspapers. I proclaim them at conventions, I spread them through

the country on the wings of a thousand presses. Does this avail me?

Yes, says Liberty party, if after this, men choose to vote for you,

it is evident they mean you shall take the oath as you have given

notice that you understand it.

Well, the voters in Boston, with this understanding, elect me to

Congress, and I proceed to Washington. But here arises a

difficulty,--my constituents at home have assented--but when I get

to Congress, I find I am not the representative of Boston only, but

of the whole country. The interests of Carolina are committed to my

hands as well as those of Massachusetts; I find that the contract I

made by my oath was not with Boston, but with the whole nation. It

is the _nation_ that gives me the power to declare war and make

peace--to lay taxes on cotton, and control the commerce of New

Orleans. The nation prescribed the conditions in 1789, when the

Constitution was settled, and though Boston may be willing to accept

me on other terms, Carolina is not willing. Boston has accepted my

protest, and says, "Take office." Carolina says, "The oath you swear

is sworn to me, as well as to the rest--I demand the whole bond."

In other words, when I have made my protest, what evidence is there

that _the nation_, the other party to the contract, assents to it?

There can be none until that nation amends its Constitution.

Massachusetts when she accepted that Constitution, bound herself to

send only such men as could swear to return slaves. If by an underhand

compromise with some of her citizens, she sends persons of other

sentiments, she is perjured, and any one who goes on such an errand

is a partner in the perjury. Massachusetts has no right to assent to

my protest--she has no right to send representatives, except on

certain conditions. She cannot vary those conditions, without

leave from those whose interests are to be affected by the change,

that is, the whole nation. Those conditions are written down in the

Constitution. Do she and South Carolina differ, as to the meaning?

The Court will decide for them.

But, says the objector, do you mean to say that I swear to support

the Constitution, not as I understand it, but as some judge

understands it? Yes, I do--otherwise there is no such thing as law.

This right of private judgment, for which he contends, exists in

religion--but not in Government. Law is a rule _prescribed_. The

party prescribing must have the right to construe his own rule,

otherwise there would be as many laws as there are individual

consciences. Statutes would be but recommendations if every man was

at liberty to understand and obey them as he thought proper. But I

need not argue this. The absurdity of a Government that has no right

to govern--and of laws which have no fixed meaning--but which each

man construes to mean what he pleases and obeys accordingly--must be

evident to every one.

What more power did the most despotic of the English Stuarts ask,

than the right, after having sworn to laws, to break such as their

consciences disapproved? It is the essence of tyranny.

What is the Constitution of the United States? In good old fashioned

times we thought we knew, when we had read it and listened to the

court's exposition. But we have improved upon that. The Liberty

party man says, it is for him "what he understands it." John C.

Calhoun, of course, has the same right, and instead of "Liberty

regulated by law," we have liberty regulated by fourteen millions of

understandings!

The Liberty party man takes office on conditions, which, he says,

are not binding upon him. He gives us notice that he shall use the

power as he thinks right, without any regard to these conditions of

his oath. Well, if this is law, it is good for all. John C. Calhoun

can of course take office with the same broad liberty, and swear to

support the Constitution "as _he_ understands it." He has told us

often what that "understanding" is--"to sustain Slavery." Of course

having made this public, if, after that, Carolina sends him,

according to Liberty party logic, it is evidence that Massachusetts

assents to his "understanding," and accepts his oath with that

meaning! Why I thought I had fathomed the pro-slavery depths of the

Constitution when I read over all its wicked clauses--but that is

skimming only the surface, if the Constitution allows every man, to

whom it commits power to use it, as he chooses to "understand" the

conditions, and not as the nation understands them. If with this

right, Abolitionists may take office and help Liberty, we must

remember that by the same rule, slaveholders may take office and

lawfully use all their power to help Slavery. If this be so, how

absurd to keep crying out of this and the other thing it is

"unconstitutional."

Away with such logic! If we have a Constitution, let us remember

Jefferson's advice, and not make it "waste paper by construction."

The man who tampers thus with the sacred obligation of an

oath,--swears, and Jesuit like, keeps "reserved meanings" in his own

breast,--does more harm to society by loosening the foundations of

morals, than he would do good, did his one falsehood free every

slave from the Potomac to the Del Norte.

OBJECTION IV.

"The oath does not mean that I will positively do what I swear to do,

but only that I will do it, _or submit_ to the penalty the law awards.

If my actions in office don't suit the nation, let them impeach me."

ANSWER. That is, John Tyler may, without consulting Congress, plunge

us into war with Mexico--incur fifty millions of public debt--lose a

hundred thousand lives--and the _sufficient recompense_ to this

nation will be to impeach John Tyler, Esq., and send him home to his

slaves! These are the wise safeguards of Constitutional liberty! He

has faithfully kept it "as he understands it." What is a Russian

slave? One who holds life, property, and all, at the mercy of the

Czar's idea of right. Does not this description of the power every

officer has here, under our Constitution, reduce Americans to the

same condition?

But, is it true that the bearing of the penalty is an excuse for

breach of our official oaths?

The Judge who, in questions of divorce, has trifled with the

sanctity of the marriage tie--who, in matters of property has

decided unjustly, and taken bribes--in capital cases has so dealt

judgment as to send innocent men to the gallows--may cry out,

"If you don't like me, impeach me." But will impeachment restore the

dead to life, or the husband to his defamed wife? Would the community

consider his submission to impeachment as equivalent to the keeping

of his oath of office, and thenceforward view him as an honest,

truth-speaking, unperjured man? It is idle to suppose so. Yet the

interests committed to some of our officeholders' keeping, are more

important often than even those which a Judge controls. And we must

remember that men's ideas of right always differ. To admit such a

principle into the construction of oaths, if it enable one man to do

much good, will enable scoundrels who creep into office to do much

harm, "according to _their_ consciences." But yet the rule, if it be

admitted, must be universal. Liberty becomes, then, matter of

accident.

OBJECTION V.

I shall resign whenever a case occurs that requires me to aid in

returning a fugitive slave.

ANSWER. "The office-holder has promised active obedience to the

Constitution in every exigency which it has contemplated and sought

to provide for. If he promised, not meaning to perform in certain

cases, is he not doubly dishonest? Dishonest to his own conscience

in promising to do wrong, and to his fellow-citizens in purposing

from the first to break his oath, as he knew they understood it? If

he had sworn, not regarding anything as immoral which he bound

himself to do, and afterwards found in the oath something against

his conscience of which he was not at first aware, or if by change

of views he had come to deem sinful what before he thought right,

then doubtless, by promptly resigning, he might escape guilt. But is

not the case different, when among the acts promised are some known

at the time to be morally wrong? 'It is a sin to swear unto sin,'

says the poet, although it be, as he truly adds, 'a greater sin to

keep the sinful oath.'"

The captain has no right to put to sea, and resign when the storm

comes. Besides what supports a wicked government more than good men

taking office under it, even though they secretly determine not to

carry out all its provisions? The slave balancing in his lonely

hovel the chance of escape, knows nothing of your secret reservations,

your future intentions. He sees only the swarming millions at the

North ostensibly sworn to restore him to his master, if he escape a

little way. Perchance it is your false oath, which you don't mean to

keep, that makes him turn from the attempt in despair. He knows you

only--the world knows only by your _actions_, not your _intentions_,

and those side with his master. The prayer which he lifts to Heaven,

in his despair, numbers you rightly among his oppressors.

OBJECTION VI.

I shall only take such an office as brings me into no connection

with slavery.

ANSWER. Government is a whole; unless each in his circle aids his

next neighbor, the machine will stand still. The Senator does not

himself return the fugitive slave, but he appoints the Marshal,

whose duty it is to do so. The State representative does not himself

appoint the Judge who signs the warrant for the slave's recapture,

but he chooses the United States Senator who does appoint that Judge.

The elector does not himself order out the militia to resist

"domestic violence," but he elects the President, whose duty requires,

that a case occurring, he should do so.

To suppose that each of these may do that part of his duty that

suits him, and leave the rest undone, is _practical anarchy_. It is

bringing ourselves precisely to that state which the Hebrew describes.

"In those days there was no king in Israel, but each man did what

was right in his own eyes." This is all consistent in us, who hold

that man is to do right, even if anarchy follows. How absurd to set

up such a scheme, and miscall it a _government_,--where nobody

governs, but everybody does as he pleases.

OBJECTION VII.

As men and all their works are imperfect, we may innocently

"support a Government which, along with many blessings, assists in

the perpetration of some wrong."

ANSWER. As nobody disputes that we may rightly assist the worst

Government in doing good, provided we can do so without at the same

time aiding it in the wrong it perpetrates, this must mean, of course,

that it is right to aid and obey a Government _in doing wrong_, if

we think that, on the whole, the Government effects more good than

harm. Otherwise the whole argument is irrelevant, for this is the

point in dispute; since every office of any consequence under the

United States Constitution has some immediate connection with Slavery.

Let us see to what lengths this principle will carry one. Herod's

servants, then, were right in slaying every child in Bethlehem, from

two years old and under, provided they thought Herod's Government,

on the whole, more a blessing than a curse to Judea! The soldiers of

Charles II. were justified in shooting the Covenanters on the muirs

of Scotland, if they thought his rule was better, on the whole, for

England, than anarchy! According to this theory, the moment the

magic wand of Government touches our vices, they start up into

virtues! But has Government any peculiar character or privilege in

this respect? Oh, no--Government is only an association of

individuals, and the same rules of morality which govern my conduct

in relation to a thousand men, ought to regulate my conduct to any

one. Therefore, I may innocently aid a man in doing wrong, if I

think that, on the whole, he has more virtues than vices. If he

gives bread to the hungry six days in the week, I may rightly help

him, on the seventh, in forging bank notes, or murdering his father!

The principle goes this length, and every length, or it cannot be

proved to exist at all. It ends at last, practically, in the old

maxim, that the subject and the soldier have no right to keep any

conscience, but have only to obey the rulers they serve: for there

are few, if any, Governments this side of Satan's, which could not,

in some sense, be said to do more good than harm. Now I candidly

confess, that I had rather be covered all over with inconsistencies,

in the struggle to keep my hands clean, than settle quietly down on

such a principle as this. It is supposing that we may--

"To do a great right, do a little wrong;"

a rule, which the master poet of human nature has rebuked. It is

doing evil that good may come--a doctrine, of which an Apostle has

pronounced the condemnation.

And let it be remembered that in dealing with the question of slavery,

we are not dealing with extreme cases. Slavery is no minute evil

which lynx-eyed suspicion has ferreted out. Every sixth man is a

slave. The ermine of justice is stained. The national banner clings

to the flag-staff heavy with blood. "The preservation of slavery,"

says our oldest and ablest statesman, "is the vital and animating

_spirit_ of the National Government."

Surely IF it be true that a man may justifiably stand connected with

a government in which he sees some slight evils--still it is also

true, even then, that governments _may_ sin so atrociously, so

enormously, may make evil so much the _purpose_ of their being, as

to render it the duty of honest men to wash their hands of them.

I may give money to a friend whose life has some things in it which

I do not fully approve--but when his nights are passed in the brothel,

and his days in drunkenness, when he uses his talents to seduce

others, and his gold to pave their road to ruin, surely the case is

changed.

I may perhaps sacrifice health by staying awhile in a room rather

overheated, but I shall certainly see it to be my duty to rush out,

when the whole house is in full blaze.

OBJECTION VIII.

God intended that society and governments should exist. We therefore

are bound to support them. He has conferred upon us the rights of

citizenship in this country, and we cannot escape from the

responsibility of exercising them. God made us _citizens_.

ANSWER. This reminds me of an old story I have heard. When the

Legislature were asked to set off a portion of the town of

Dorchester and call it South Boston, the old minister of the town is

said to have objected, saying, "God made it Dorchester, and

Dorchester it ought to be."

God made us social beings, it is true, but _society_ is not

necessarily the Constitution of the United States! Because God meant

some form of government should exist, does not at all prove that we

are justified in supporting a wicked one. Man confers the rights and

regulates the duties of citizenship. God never made a _citizen_, and

no one will escape, as a man, from the sins he commits as a citizen.

This is the first time that it has ever been held an excuse for sin

that we "went with the multitude to do evil!"

Certainly we can be under no _such_ responsibility to become and

remain _citizens_, as will excuse us from the sinful acts which as

such citizens we are called to commit. Does God make obligatory on

his creature the support of institutions which require him to do

acts in themselves wrong? To suppose so, were to confound all the

rules of God's moral kingdom.

President Wayland has lately been illustrating, and giving his

testimony to the principle, that a combination of men cannot change

the moral character of an act, which is in itself sinful--that the

law of morals is binding the same on communities, corporations, &c.

as on individuals.

After describing slavery, and saying that to hold a man in such a

state is wrong--he goes on:

"I will offer but one more supposition. Suppose that any number, for

instance one half of the families in our neighborhood, should by law

enact that the weaker half should be slaves, that we would exercise

over them the authority of masters, prohibit by law their

instruction, and concert among ourselves means for holding them

permanently in their present situation. In what manner would this

alter the moral aspect of the case?"

A law in this case is merely a determination of one party, in which

all unite, to hold the other party in bondage; and a compact by

which the whole party bind themselves to assist every individual of

themselves to subdue all resistance from the other party, and

guaranteeing to each other that exercise of this power over the

weaker party which they now possess.

Now I cannot see that this in any respect changes the nature of the

parties. They remain, as before, human beings, possessing the same

intellectual and moral nature, holding the same relations to each

other and to God, and still under the same unchangeable law, Thou

shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. By the act of holding a man in

bondage, this law is violated. Wrong is done, moral evil is

committed. In the former case it was done by the individual; now it

is done by the individual and the society. Before, the individual

was responsible only for his own wrong; now he is responsible both

for his own, and also, as a member of the society, for all the wrong

which the society binds itself to uphold and render perpetual.

The scriptures frequently allude to the fact, that wrong done by

law, that is by society, is amenable to the same retribution as

wrong done by the individual. Thus, Psalm 94:20-23. 'Shall the

throne of iniquity have fellowship with them which frame mischief by

a law, and gather themselves together against the soul of the

righteous, and condemn the innocent blood? But the Lord is my

defence; and my God is the rock of my refuge. And he shall bring

upon them their own iniquity, and shall cut them off in their own

wickedness; yea, the Lord our God shall cut them off' So also

Isaiah 10:1-4. 'Wo unto them that decree unrighteous decrees, and

that write grievousness which they have prescribed.' &c. Besides,

persecution for the sake of religious opinion is always perpetrated

by law; but this in no manner affects its moral character.

There is, however, one point of difference, which arises from the

fact that this wrong has been established by law. It becomes a

social wrong. The individual, or those who preceded him, may have

surrendered their individual right over it to the society. In this

case it may happen that the individual cannot act as he might act,

if the law had not been made. In this case the evil can only be

eradicated by changing the opinions of the society, and inducing

them to abolish the law. It will however be apparent that this, as I

said before, does not change the relation of the parties either to

each other or to God. The wrong exists as before. The individual act

is wrong. The law which protects it is wrong. The whole society, in

putting the law into execution, is wrong. Before only the

individual, now, the whole society, becomes the wrong doer, and

for that wrong, both the individuals and the society are held

responsible in the sight of God."

If such "individual act is wrong," the man who knowingly does it is

surely a sinner. Does God, through society, require men to sin?

OBJECTION IX.

If not being non-resistants, we concede to mankind the right to

frame Governments, which must, from the very nature of man, be more

or less evil, the right or duty to support them, when framed,

necessarily follows.

ANSWER. I do not think it follows at all. Mankind, that is, any

number of them, have a right to set up such forms of worship as they

see fit, but when they have done so, does it necessarily follow that

I am in duty bound to support any one of them, whether I approve it

or not? Government is precisely like any other voluntary association

of individuals--a temperance or anti-slavery society, a bank or

railroad corporation. I join it, or not, as duty dictates. If a

temperance society exists in the village where I am, that love for

my race which bids me seek its highest good, commands me to join it.

So if a Government is formed in the land where I live, the same

feeling bids me to support it, if I innocently can. This is the

whole length of my duty to Government. From the necessity of the case,

and that constitution of things which God has ordained, it follows

that in any specified district, the majority must rule--hence

results the duty of the minority to submit. But we must carefully

preserve the distinction between _submission_ and _obedience_

--between _submission_ and _support_. If the majority set up an

immoral Government, I obey those laws which seem to me good, because

they are good--and I submit to all the penalties which my

disobedience of the rest brings on me. This is alike the dictate of

common sense, and the command of Christianity. And it must be the

true doctrine, since any other obliges me to obey the majority if

they command me to commit murder, a rule which even the Tory

Blackstone has denied. Of course for me to do anything I deem wrong,

is the same, in quality, as to commit murder.

OBJECTION X.

But it is said, your theory results in good men leaving government

to the dishonest and wicked.

ANSWER. Well, if to sustain government we must sacrifice honesty,

government could not be in a more appropriate place, than in the

hands of dishonest men.

But it by no means follows, that if I go out of government, I leave

nothing but dishonest men behind. An act may be sin to me, which

another may sincerely think right--and if so, let him do it, till he

changes his mind. I leave government in the hands of those whom I do

not think as clear-sighted as myself, but not necessarily in the

hands of the dishonest. Whether it be so in this country now, is not,

at present, the question, but whether it would be so necessarily, in

all cases. The real question is, what is the duty of those who

presume to think that God has given them clearer views of duty than

the bulk of those among whom they live?

Don't think us conceited in supposing ourselves a little more

enlightened than our neighbors. It is no great thing after all to be a

little better than a lynching--mobocratic--slaveholding--debt

repudiating community.

What then is the duty of such men? Doubtless to do all they can to

extend to others the light they enjoy.

Will they best do so by compromising their principles? by letting

their political life give the lie to their life of reform? Who will

have the most influence, he whose life is consistent, or he who says

one thing to-day, and swears another thing to-morrow--who looks one

way and rows another? My object is to let men _understand me_, and I

submit that the body of the Roman people understood better, and felt

more earnestly, the struggle between the people and the princes,

when the little band of democrats _left the city_ and encamped on

_Mons Sacer, outside_, than while they remained mixed up and

voting with their masters, shoulder to shoulder. _Dissolution_ is

our _Mons Sacer_--God grant that it may become equally famous in the

world's history as the spot where the right triumphed.

It is foolish to suppose that the position of such men, divested of

the glare of official distinction, has no weight with the people. If

it were so, I am still bound to remember that I was not sent into

the world _to have influence_, but to do my duty according to my own

conscience. But it is not so. People do know an honest man when they

see him. (I allow that this is so rare an event now-a-days, as

almost to justify one in supposing they might have forgotten how he

looked.) They will give a man credit, when his life is one manly

testimony to the truthfulness of his lips. Even Liberty party, blind

as she is, has light enough to see that "Consistency is the jewel,

the everything of such a cause as ours." The position of a non-voter,

in a land where the ballot is so much idolized, kindles in every

beholder's bosom something of the warm sympathy which waits on the

persecuted, carries with it all the weight of a disinterested

testimony to truth, and pricks each voter's conscience with an

uneasy doubt, whether after all voting _is_ right. There is

constantly a Mordecai in the gate.

I admit that we should strive to have a _political_ influence--for

with politics is bound up much of the welfare of the people. But

this objection supposes that the ballot box is the _only_ means of

political influence. Now it is a good thing that every man should

have the right to vote. But it is by no means necessary that every

man should actually vote, in order to influence his times. We by no

means necessarily desert our social duty when we refuse to take

office, or to confer it. Lafayette did better service to the cause

of French liberty when he retired to Lagrange and refused to

acknowledge Napoleon, than he could have done had he stood, for years,

at the tyrant's right hand. From the silence of that chamber there

went forth a voice--from the darkness of that retreat there burst

forth a light; feeble indeed at first, like the struggling beams of

the morning, but destined like them to brighten into perfect day.

This objection, that we non-voters shall lose all our influence,

confounds the broad distinction between _influence_ and _power_.

_Influence_ every honest man must and will have, in exact

proportion to his honesty and ability. God always annexes influence

to worth. The world, however unwilling, can never get free from the

influence of such a man. This influence the possession of office

cannot give, nor the want of it take away. For the exercise of such

influence as this, man is responsible. _Power_ we buy of our fellow

men at a certain price. Before making the bargain it is our duty to

see that we do not pay "too dear for our whistle." He who buys it at

the price of truth and honor, buys only weakness--and sins beside.

Of those who go to the utmost verge of honesty in order to reach the

seats of worldly power, and barter a pure conscience for a weighty

name, it may be well said with old Fuller, "They need to have steady

heads who can dive into these gulfs of policy, and come out with a

safe conscience."

OBJECTION XI.

This withdrawing from government is pharisaical--"Shall we, 'weak,

sinful men,'" one says, "perhaps even more sinful than the

slaveholder, cry out, No Union with Slaveholders?" Such a course is

wanting in brotherly kindness.

ANSWER. Because we refuse to aid a wrong-doer in his sin, we by no

means proclaim, or assume, that we think our _whole character_

better than his. It is neither pharisaical to have opinions, nor

presumptuous to guide our lives by them. If I have joined with

others in doing wrong, is it either presumptuous or unkind, when my

eyes are opened, to refuse to go any further with them in their

career of guilt? Does love to the thief require me to help him in

stealing? Yet this is all we refuse to do. We will extend to the

slaveholder all the courtesy he will allow. If he is hungry, we will

feed him; if he is in want, both hands shall be stretched out for

his aid. We will give him full credit for all the good that he does,

and our deep sympathy in all the temptations under whose strength he

falls. But to help him in his sin, to remain partners with him in

the slave-trade, is more than he has a right to ask. He would be a

strange preacher who should set out to reform his circle by joining

in all their sins! It is a principle similar to that which the tipsy

Duke of Norfolk acted on, when seeing a drunken friend in the gutter,

he cried out, "My dear fellow, I can't help you out, but I'll do

better, I'll lie down by your side."

OBJECTION XII.

But consider, the abstaining from all share in Government will leave

bad men to have everything their own way--admit Texas--extend

slavery, &c. &c.

ANSWER. That is no matter of mine. God, the great conservative power

of the Universe, when he established the right, saw to it that it

should always be the safest and best. He never laid upon a poor

finite worm the staggering load of following out into infinity the

complex results of his actions. We may rest on the bosom of

Infinite Wisdom, confident that it is enough for us to do justice,

he will see to it that happiness results.

OBJECTION XIII.

But the same conscientious objection against promising your support

to government, ought to lead you to avoid actually giving your

support to it by paying taxes or sueing in the courts.

ANSWER. This is what logicians call a _reductio ad absurdum_: an

attempt to prove our principle unsound by showing that, fairly

carried out, it leads to an absurdity. But granting all it asks, it

does not saddle us with any absurdity at all. It is perfectly

possible to live without petitioning, sueing, or holding stocks.

Thousands in this country have lived, died, and been buried, without

doing either. And does it load us with any absurdity to prove that

we shall be obliged to do from principle, what the majority of our

fellow-citizens do from choice? We lawyers may think it is an

absurdity to say a man can't sue, for, like the Apostle at Ephesus,

it touches our "craft," but that don't go far to prove it. Then, as

to taxes, doubtless many cases might be imagined, when every one

would allow it to be our duty to resist the slightest taxation, did

Christianity allow it, with "war to the hilt." If such cases may

ever arise, why may not this be one?

Until I become an Irishman, no one will ever convince me that I

ought to vote, by proving that I ought not to pay taxes! Suppose

all these difficulties do really encompass us, it will not be

the first time that the doing of one moral duty has revealed a

dozen others which we never thought of. The child has climbed the

hill over his native village, which he thought the end of the world,

and lo! there are mountains beyond! He won't remedy the matter by

creeping back to his cradle and disbelieving in mountains!

But then, is there any such inconsistency in non-voters sueing and

paying taxes?

Look at it. A. and B. have agreed on certain laws, and appointed C.

to execute them. A. owes me, who am no party to the contract, a just

debt, which his laws oblige him to pay. Do I acknowledge the

rightfulness of his relation to B. and C. by asking C. to use the

power given him, in my behalf? It appears to me that I do not. I may

surely ask A. to pay me my debt--why not then ask the keeper, whom

he has appointed over himself, to make him do so?

I am a prisoner among pirates. The mate is abusing me in some way

contrary to their laws. Do I recognize the rightfulness of the

Captain's authority, by asking him to use the power the mate has

consented to give him, to protect me? It seems to me that I do not

necessarily endorse the means by which a man has acquired money or

power, when I ask him to use either in my behalf.

An alien does not recognize the rightfulness of a government by

living under it. It has always been held that an English subject may

swear allegiance to an usurper and yet not be guilty of treason to

the true king. Because he may innocently acknowledge the king

_de facto_ (the king _in deed_,) without assuming him to be king

_de jure_ (king by _right_.) The distinction itself is as old as

the time of Edward the First. The principle is equally applicable to

suits. It has been universally acted on and allowed. The Catholic,

who shrank from acknowledging the heretical Government of England,

always, I believe, sued in her courts.

Who could convince a common man, that by sueing in Constantinople or

Timbuctoo, he does an act which makes him responsible for the

character of those governments?

Then, as for taxes. It is only our voluntary acts for which we are

responsible. And when did government ever trust tax-paying to the

voluntary good will of its subjects? When it does so, I, for one,

will refuse to pay.

When did any sane man conclude that our Saviour's voluntary payment

of a tax acknowledged the rightfulness of Rome's authority over Judea?

"The States," says Chief Justice Marshall, "have only not to elect

Senators, and this government expires without a struggle."

Every November, then, we _create_ the government anew. Now, what

"instinct" will tell a common-sense man, that the act of a

_sovereign_,--voting--which creates a wicked government, is,

_essentially_ the same as the submission of a

_subject_,--tax-paying,--an act done without our consent. It should

be remembered, that we vote as _sovereigns_,--we pay taxes as

_subjects_. Who supposes that the humble tax-payer of Austria, who

does not, perhaps, know in what name the charter of his bondage runs,

is responsible for the doings of Metternich? And what sane man likens

his position to that of the voting sovereign of the United States?

My innocent acts may, through others' malice, result in evil. In that

case, it will be for my best judgment to determine whether to continue

or cease them. They are not thereby rendered essentially sinful. For

instance, I walk out on Sabbath morning. The priest over the way will

exclaim, "Sabbath-breaker," and the infidel will delude his followers,

by telling them I have no regard for Christianity. Still, it will be

for me to settle which, in present circumstances, is best,--to

remain in, and not be misconstrued, or to go out and bear a

testimony against the superstitious keeping of the day. Different

circumstances will dictate different action on such a point.

I may often be the _occasion_ of evil when I am not responsible for

it. Many innocent acts _occasion_ evil, and in such case all I am

bound to ask myself before doing such _innocent act_, is, "Shall I

occasion, on the whole, more harm or good." There are many cases

where doing a duty even, we shall occasion evil and sin in others.

To save a slaveholder from drowning, when we know he has made a will

freeing his slaves, would put off, perhaps forever, their

emancipation, but of course that is not my fault. This making a man

responsible for all the evil his acts, _incidentally_, without his

will, occasion, reminds me of that principle of Turkish law which

Dr. Clarke mentions, in his travels, and which they call "homicide

by an intermediate cause." The case he relates is this: A young man

in love poisoned himself, because the girl's father refused his

consent to the marriage. The Cadi sentenced the father to pay a fine

of $80, saying "if you had not had a daughter, this young man had

not loved; if he had not loved, he had never been disappointed; if

not disappointed, he would never have taken poison." It was the same

Cadi possibly, who sentenced the island of Samos to pay for the

wrecking of a vessel, on the principle that "if the island had not

been in the way, the vessel would never have been wrecked!"

Then of taxes on imports. Buying and selling, and carrying from

country to country, is good and innocent. But government, if I trade

here, will take occasion to squeeze money out of me. Very well. I

shall deliberate whether I will cease trading, and deprive them of

the opportunity, or go on and use my wealth to reform them. 'Tis a

question of expediency, not of right, which my judgment, not my

conscience, must settle. An act of mine, innocent in itself, and

done from right motives, no after act of another's can make a sin.

To import, is rightful. After-taxation, against my consent, cannot

make it wrong. Neither am I obliged to smuggle, in order to avoid it.

I include in these remarks, all taxes, whether on property, or

imports, or railroads.

A chemist, hundreds of years ago, finds out how to temper steel. The

art is useful for making knives, lancets, and machinery. But he

knows that the bad will abuse it by making swords and daggers. Is he

responsible? Certainly not.

Similar to this is trading in America,--knowing government will thus

have an opportunity to increase its revenue.

But suppose the chemist to see two men fighting, one has the other

down,--to the first our chemist presents a finely tempered dagger.

Such is voting under the United States Constitution--appointing an

officer to help the oppressor.

The difference between voting and tax-paying is simply this: I may do

an act right in itself, though I know some evil will result. Paul was

bound to preach the gospel to the Jews, though he knew some of them

would thereby be led to add to their sins by cursing and mobbing him.

So I may locate property in Philadelphia, trade there, and ride on

its railroads, though I know government will, without my consent,

thereby enrich itself. Other things being equal, of course I shall

not allow it the opportunity. But the advantages and good results of

my doing so, _may be_ such as would make it my duty there to live

and trade, even subject to such an evil.

But on the other hand, I may not do an act wrong in itself to secure

any amount of fancied good.

Now, appointing a man by my vote to a pro-slavery office, (and such

is every one under the United States Constitution,) is wrong in

itself, and no other good deeds which such officer may do, will

justify an abolitionist in so appointing him.

Let it not be said, that this reasoning will apply to voting--that

voting is the right of every human being, (which I grant only for

the sake of argument,) and innocent in itself.

Voting _under our_ Constitution is appointing a man to swear to

protect, and actually to protect slavery. Now, appointing agents

generally is the right of every man, and innocent in itself, but

appointing an agent to commit a murder is sin.

I trade, and government taxes me; do I authorize it? No.

I vote, and the marshal whom my agent appoints, returns a slave to

South Carolina. Do I authorize it? _Yes_. I knew it would be his

_sworn duty_, when I voted; and I assented to it, by voting under

the Constitution which makes it his duty. If I trade, it is said, I

may foresee that government will be helped by the taxes I pay,

therefore I ought not to trade. But I do not trade _for the purpose_

of paying taxes! And if I am to be charged with all the foreseen

results of my actions, then Garrison is responsible for the Boston

mob!

The reason why I am responsible for the pro-slavery act of a United

States officer, for whom I have voted, is this: I must be supposed

to have _intended_ that which my agent is _bound_ by his contract

with me (that is, his oath of office) to do.

Allow me to request our opposers to keep distinctly in view the

precise point in debate. This is not whether Massachusetts can

rightfully trade and make treaties with South Carolina, although she

knows that such a course will result in strengthening a wrongdoer.

Such are most of the cases which they consider parallel to ours, and

for permitting which they charge us with inconsistency. But the

question really is, whether Massachusetts can join hands and

strength with South Carolina, for the express and avowed purpose of

sustaining Slavery. This she does in the Constitution. For he who

swears to support an instrument of twelve clauses, swears to support

one as well as another,--and though one only be immoral,--still he

swears to do an immoral act. Now, my conviction is, "which fire will

not burn out of me," that to return fugitive slaves is sin--to

promise so to do, and not do it, is, if possible, baser still; and

that any conjunction of circumstances which makes either necessary,

is of the Devil, and not of God.

OBJECTION XIV.

Duty requires of a non-voter to quit the country, and go where his

taxes will not help to build up slavery.

ANSWER. God gave me my birth here. Because bad men about me

"play such tricks before high Heaven, as make the angels weep," does

it oblige me to quit? I have as good right here as they. If they

choose to leave, let them--I Shall remain. 'Twould be a pretty thing,

indeed, if, as often as I found myself next door to a bad man, who

would bring up his children to steal my apples and break my windows,

I were obliged to take the temptation away by cutting down all my

apple trees and moving my house further west, into the wilderness.

This would be, in good John Wesley's phrase, "giving up all the good

times to the devil," with a witness.

OBJECTION XV.

"Society has the right to prescribe the terms, upon the expressed or

implied agreement to comply with which a person may reside within

its limits."

ANSWER. This principle I utterly deny. All that Society has a right

to demand is peaceful submission to its exactions:--_consent_ they

have neither the power nor the right to exact or to imply. Twenty

men live on a lone island. Nineteen set up a government and say,

every man who lives there shall worship idols. The twentieth submits

to all their laws, but refuses to commit idolatry. Have they the

_right_ to say, "Do so, or quit;" or, to say, "If you stay, we

will consider you as impliedly worshipping idols?" Doubtless they

have the _power_, but the majority have no _rights_, except those

which justice sanctions. Will the objector show me the justice of

his principle? I was born here. I ask no man's permission to remain.

All that any man or body of men have a right to infer from my

staying here, is that, in doing this _innocent act_, I think, that on

the whole, I am effecting more good than harm. Lawyers say, I cannot

find this right laid down in the books. That will not trouble me.

Some old play has a character in it who never ties his neckcloth

without a warrant from Mr. Justice Overdo. I claim no relationship

to that very scrupulous individual.

OBJECTION XVI.

These clauses, to which you refer, are inconsistent with the

Preamble of the Constitution, which describes it as made "to

establish justice" and "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves

and our posterity:" And as, when two clauses of the same instrument

are inconsistent, one must yield and be held void--we hold these

three clauses void.

ANSWER. A _specific_ clause is not to be held void on account of

general terms, such as those of the preamble. It is rather to be

taken as an exception, allowed and admitted at the time, to those

general terms.

Again. You say they are inconsistent. But the Courts and the People

do not think so. Now they, being the majority, settle the law. The

question then is, whether the law being settled,--and according to

your belief settled immorally,--you will _volunteer_ your services

to execute it and carry it into effect? This you do by becoming an

officeholder. It seems to me this question can receive but one

answer from honest men.

LAST OF ALL, THE OBJECTOR CRIES OUT,

The Constitution may be _amended_, and I shall vote to have it

changed.

ANSWER. But at present it is necessary to swear to support it

_as it is_. What the Constitution may become, a century hence, we

know not; we speak of it _as it is_, and repudiate it _as it is_.

How long may one promise to do evil, in hope some time or other to

get the power to do good? We will not brand the Constitution of the

United States as pro-slavery, after--it had ceased to be so! This

objection reminds me of Miss Martineau's story of the little boy,

who hurt himself, and sat crying on the sidewalk. "Don't cry!" said

a friend, "it won't hurt you tomorrow."--"Well then," said the child,

"I won't cry tomorrow."

We come then, it seems to me, back to our original conclusion: that

the man who swears to support the Constitution, swears to support

the whole of it, pro-slavery clauses and all,--that he swears to

support it _as it is_, not as it hereafter may become,--that he

swears to support it in the sense given to it by the Courts and the

Nation, not as he chooses to understand it,--and that the Courts and

the Nation expect such an one in office to do his share toward the

suppression of slave, as well as other, insurrections, and to aid

the return of fugitive slaves. After an _abolitionist_ has taken

such an oath, or by his vote sent another to take it for him, I do

not see how he can look his own principles in the face.

Thou that preachest a man should not steal, dost thou lie?

We who call upon the slaveholder to do right, no matter what the

consequences or the cost, are certainly bound to look well to our

own example. At least we can hardly expect to win the master to do

justice by _setting him an example of perjury_. It is almost an

insult in an abolitionist, while not willing to sacrifice even a

petty ballot for his principles, to demand of the slaveholder that

he give up wealth, home, old prejudices and social position at their

call.

EXTRACTS FROM J.Q. ADAMS.

The benefits of the Constitution of the United States, were the

restoration of credit and reputation, to the country--the revival of

commerce, navigation, and ship building--the acquisition of the

means of discharging the debts of the Revolution, and the protection

and encouragement of the infant and drooping manufactures of the

country. All this, however, as is now well ascertained, was

insufficient to propitiate the rulers of the Southern States to

the adoption of the Constitution. What they specially wanted was

_protection_. Protection from the powerful and savage tribes of

Indians within their borders, and who were harassing them with the

most terrible of wars--and protection from their own

negroes--protection from their insurrections--protection from their

escape--protection even to the trade by which they were brought into

this country--protection, shall I not blush to say, protection to

the very bondage by which they were held. Yes! it cannot be

denied--the slaveholding lords of the South prescribed, as a

condition of their assent to the Constitution, three special

provisions to secure the perpetuity of their dominion over their

slaves. The first was the immunity for twenty years of preserving

the African slave-trade; the second was the stipulation to surrender

fugitive slaves--an engagement positively prohibited by the laws of

God, delivered from Sinai; and thirdly, the exaction, fatal to the

principles of popular representation, of a representation for

slaves--for articles of merchandise, under the name of persons.

In outward show, it is a representation of persons in bondage; in

fact, it is a representation of their masters,--the oppressor

representing the oppressed.--Is it in the compass of human

imagination to devise a more perfect exemplification of the art of

committing the lamb to the tender custody of the wolf?--The

representative is thus constituted, not the friend, agent and trustee

of the person whom he represents, but the most inveterate of his foes.

To call government thus constituted a democracy, is to insult the

understanding of mankind. It is doubly tainted with the infection of

riches and of slavery. _There is no name in the language of national

jurisprudence that can define it_--no model in the records of

ancient history, or in the political theories of Aristotle, with

which it can be likened. Here is one class of men, consisting of not

more than one-fortieth part of the whole people, not more than

one-thirtieth part of the free population, exclusively devoted to

their personal interests identified with their own as slaveholders

of the same associated wealth, and wielding by their votes, upon

every question of government or of public policy, two-fifths of the

whole power of the House. In the Senate of the Union, the proportion

of the slaveholding power is yet greater. Its operation upon the

government of the nation is, to establish an artificial majority in

the slave representation over that of the free people, in the

American Congress, and thereby to make the PRESERVATION, PROPAGATION,

AND PERPETUATION OF SLAVERY THE VITAL AND ANIMATING SPIRIT OF THE

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.--The result is seen in the fact that, at this

day, the President of the United States, the President of the Senate,

the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and five out of nine of

the Judges of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the United States, are

not only citizens of slaveholding States, but individual slaveholders

themselves. So are, and constantly have been, with scarcely an

exception, all the members of both Houses of Congress from the

slaveholding States; and so are, in immensely disproportionate

numbers, the commanding officers of the army and navy; the officers

of the customs; the registers and receivers of the land offices, and

the post-masters throughout the slaveholding States.

Fellow-citizens,--with a body of men thus composed, for legislators

and executors of the laws, what will, what must be, what has been

your legislation? The numbers of freemen constituting your nation

are much greater than those of the slaveholding States, bond and free.

You have at least three-fifths of the whole population of the Union.

Your influence on the legislation and the administration of the

Government ought to be in the proportion of three to two. But how

stands the fact? Besides the legitimate portion of influence

exercised by the slaveholding States by the measure of their numbers,

here is an intrusive influence in every department, by a

representation, nominally of persons, but really of property,

ostensibly of slaves, but effectively of their masters, overbalancing

your superiority of numbers, adding two-fifths of supplementary

power to the two-fifths fairly secured to them by the compact,

CONTROLLING AND OVERRULING THE WHOLE ACTION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND

HOME AND ABROAD, and warping it to the sordid private interest and

oppressive policy of 300,000 owners of slaves.

In the Articles of Confederation, there was no guaranty for the

property of the slaveholder--no double representation of him in the

Federal councils--no power of taxation--no stipulation for the

recovery of fugitive slaves. But when the powers of _government_ came

to be delegated to the Union, the South--that is, South Carolina and

Georgia--refused their subscription to the parchment, till it should

be saturated with the infection of slavery, which no fumigation

could purify, no quarantine could extinguish. The freemen of the

North gave way, and the deadly venom of slavery was infused into the

Constitution of freedom. Its first consequence has been to invert

the first principle of Democracy, that the will of the majority

shall rule the land. By means of the double representation, the

minority command the whole, and a KNOT OF SLAVEHOLDERS GIVE THE LAW

AND PRESCRIBE THE POLICY OF THE COUNTRY.

THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER.

ADDRESS TO THE FRIENDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY,

ON THE VIOLATION BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE RIGHT OF PETITION AT THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY.

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY,

NO. 143 NASSAU STREET.

1840.

This No. contains 1 sheet.--Postage, under 100 miles, 1-1/2 ct.

over 100, 2-1/2 cts. Please Read and circulate.

ADDRESS.

TO THE FRIENDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY:--

There was a time, fellow citizens, when the above address would have

included the PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. But, alas! the freedom of

the press, freedom of speech, and the right of petition, are now

hated and dreaded by our Southern citizens, as hostile to the

perpetuity of human bondage; while, by their political influence in

the Federal Government, they have induced numbers at the North to

unite with them in their sacrilegious crusade against these

inestimable privileges.

On the 28th January last, the House of Representatives, on motion of

Mr. Johnson, from Maryland, made it a standing RULE of the House

that "no petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper, praying the

abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any State or

Territory of the United States, in which it now exists, SHALL BE

RECEIVED BY THE HOUSE, OR ENTERTAINED IN ANY WAY WHATEVER."

Thus has the RIGHT OF PETITION been immolated in the very Temple of

Liberty, and offered up, a propitiatory sacrifice to the demon of

slavery. Never before has an outrage so unblushingly profligate been

perpetrated upon the Federal Constitution. Yet, while we mourn the

degeneracy which this transaction evinces, we behold, in its

attending circumstances, joyful omens of the triumph which awaits

our struggle with the hateful power that now perverts the General

Government into an engine of cruelty and loathsome oppression.

Before we congratulate you on these omens, let us recall to your

recollection the steps by which the enemies of human rights have

advanced to their present rash and insolent defiance of moral and

constitutional obligation.

In 1831, a newspaper was established in Boston, for the purpose of

disseminating facts and arguments in favor of the duty and policy of

immediate emancipation. The Legislature of Georgia, with all the

recklessness of despotism, passed a law, offering a reward of $5000,

for the abduction of the Editor, and his delivery in Georgia. As

there was no law, by which a citizen of Massachusetts could be tried

in Georgia, for expressing his opinions in the capital of his own

State, this reward was intended as the price of BLOOD. Do you start

at the suggestion? Remember the several sums of $25,000, of $50,000,

and of $100,000, offered in Southern papers for kidnapping certain

abolitionists. Remember the horrible inflictions by Southern Lynch

clubs. Remember the declaration, in the United States Senate, by the

brazen-fronted Preston, that, should an abolitionist be caught in

Carolina, he would be HANGED. But, as the Slaveholders could not

destroy the lives of the Abolitionists, they determined to murder

their characters. Hence, the President of the United States was

induced, in his Message of 1835, to Congress, to charge them with

plotting the massacre of the Southern planters; and even to stultify

himself, by affirming that, for this purpose, they were engaged in

sending, by _mail_, inflammatory appeals to the _slaves_--sending

papers to men who could not read them, and by a conveyance through

which they could not receive them! He well knew that the papers

alluded to were appeals on the immorality of converting men, women,

and children, into beasts of burden, and were sent to the masters,

for _their_ consideration. The masters in Charleston, dreading the

moral influence of these appeals on the conscience of the

slaveholding community, forced the Post Office, and made a bonfire

of the papers. The Post Master General, with the sanction of the

President, also hastened to their relief, and, in violation of oaths,

and laws, and the constitution, established ten thousand censors of

the press, each one of whom was authorized to abstract from the mail

every paper which _he_ might think too favorable to the rights of man.

For more than twenty years, petitions have been presented to Congress,

for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. The right

to present them, and the power of Congress to grant their prayer,

were, until recently, unquestioned. But the rapid multiplication of

these petitions alarmed the slaveholders, and, knowing that they

tended to keep alive at the North, an interest in the slave, they

deemed it good policy to discourage and, if possible, suppress all

such applications. Hence Mr. Pinckney's famous resolution, in 1836,

declaring, "that all petitions, or papers, relating _in any way, or

to any extent_ whatever to the _subject of slavery_, shall, without

being printed or referred, be laid on the table; and no further

action, whatever shall be had thereon!"

The peculiar atrocity of this resolution was, that it not merely

trampled upon the rights of the petitioners, but took from each

member of the House his undoubted privilege, as a legislator of the

District, to introduce any proposition he might think proper, for the

protection of the slaves. In every Slave State there are laws

affording, at least, some nominal protection to these unhappy beings;

but, according to this resolution, slaves might be flayed alive in

the streets of Washington, and no representative of the people could

offer even a resolution for inquiry. And this vile outrage upon

constitutional liberty was avowedly perpetrated "to repress agitation,

to allay excitement, and re-establish harmony and tranquillity among

the various sections of the Union!!"

But this strange opiate did not produce the stupefying effects

anticipated from it. In 1836, the petitioners were only 37,000--the

next session they numbered 110,000. Mr. Hawes, of Ky., now essayed

to restore tranquillity, by gagging the uneasy multitude; but, alas!

at the next Congress, more than 300,000 petitioners carried new

terror to the hearts of the slaveholders. The next anodyne was

prescribed by Mr. Patton, of Va., but its effect was to rouse from

their stupor some of the Northern Legislatures, and to induce them

to denounce his remedy as "a usurpation of power, a violation of the

Constitution, subversive of the fundamental principles of the

government, and at war with the prerogatives of the people."[105] It

was now supposed that the people most be drugged by a _northern_ man,

and _Atherton_ was found a fit instrument for this vile purpose; but

the dose proved only the more nauseous and exciting from the foul

hands by which it was administered.

[Footnote 105: Resolutions of Massachusetts and Connecticut, April and

May, 1838.]

In these various outrages, although all action on the petitions was

prohibited, the papers themselves were received and laid on the table,

and _therefore_ it was contended, that the right of petition had

been preserved inviolate. But the slaveholders, maddened by the

failure of all their devices, and fearing the influence which the

mere sight of thousands and tens of thousands of petitions in behalf

of liberty, would exert, and, taking advantage of the approaching

presidential election to operate upon the selfishness of some

northern members, have succeeded in crushing the right of petition

itself.

That you may be the more sensible, fellow citizens, of the exceeding

profligacy of the late RULE and of its palpable violation of both the

spirit and the letter of the Constitution, which those who voted for

it had sworn to support, suffer us to recall to your recollection a

few historical facts.

The framers of the Federal Constitution supposed the right of

petition too firmly established in the habits and affections of the

people, to need a constitutional guarantee. Their omission to notice

it, roused the jealousy of some of the State conventions, called to

pass upon the constitution. The _Virginia_ convention proposed,

as an amendment, "that every _freeman_ has a right to petition,

or apply to the Legislature, for a redress of grievances." And this

amendment, with others, was ordered to be forwarded to the different

States, for their consideration. The Conventions of North Carolina,

New York, and Rhode Island, were held subsequently, and, of course,

had before them the Virginia amendment. The North Carolina Convention

adopted a declaration of rights, embracing the very words of the

proposed amendment; and this declaration was ordered to be submitted

to Congress, before that State would enter the Union. The Conventions

of New York and of Rhode Island incorporated in their _certificates

of ratification_, the assertion that "Every _person_ has a right to

petition or apply to the legislature for a redress of

grievances"--using the Virginia phraseology, merely substituting the

word _person_ for _freeman_, thus claiming the right of petition even

for slaves; while Virginia and North Carolina confined it to freemen.

The first Congress, assembled under the Constitution, gave effect to

the wishes thus emphatically expressed, by proposing, as an amendment,

that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or _abridging_

the freedom of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble, and _to petition Government_ for a redress of grievances."

This amendment was duly ratified by the States, and when members of

Congress swear to support the Constitution of the United States,

they are as much bound by their oath to refrain from abridging the

right of petition, as they are to fulfil any other constitutional

obligation. And will the slaveholders and their abettors, dare to

maintain that they have not foresworn themselves, because they have

abridged the right of the people to petition for a redress of

grievances, by a RULE of the House, and not by a _law_? If so, they

may by a RULE require every member, on taking his seat, to subscribe

the creed of a particular church, and then call their Maker to

witness that they are guiltless of making a _law_ "respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

The right to petition is one thing, and the disposition of a petition

after it is received, is another. But the new rule makes no

disposition of the petitions; it PROHIBITS THEIR RECEPTION; they may

not be brought into the legislative chamber. Hundreds of thousands

of the people are debarred all access to their representatives, for

the purpose of offering them a prayer.

It is said that the manifold abominations perpetrated in the District

are no grievances to the petitioners, and _therefore_ they have no

right to ask for their removal. But the right guaranteed by the

Constitution, is a right to ask for the redress of _grievances_,

whether personal, social, or moral. And who, except a slaveholder,

will dare to contend that it is no grievance that our agents, our

representatives, our servants, in our name and by our authority,

enact laws erecting and licensing markets in the Capital of the

Republic, for the sale of human beings, and converting free men into

slaves, for no other crime, than that of being too poor to pay

United States' officers the JAIL FEES accruing from an iniquitous

imprisonment?

Again, it is pretended that the objects prayed for, are palpably

unconstitutional, and that _therefore_ the petitions ought not to be

received. And by what authority are the people deprived of their

right to petition for any object which a majority of either

House of Congress, for the time being, may please to regard as

unconstitutional? If this usurpation be submitted to, it will not be

confined to abolition petitions. It is well known that most of the

slaveholders _now_ insist, that all protecting duties are

unconstitutional, and that on account of the tariff the Union was

nearly rent by the very men who are now horrified by the danger to

which it is exposed by these _petitions_! Should our Northern

Manufacturers again presume to ask Congress to protect them from

foreign competition, the Southern members will find a precedent,

sanctioned by Northern votes, for a rule that "no petition, memorial,

resolution, or other paper, praying for the IMPOSITION OF DUTIES FOR

THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF MANUFACTURES, shall be received by the House,

or entertained in any way whatever."

It does indeed, require Southern arrogance, to maintain that,

although Congress is invested by the Constitution with "exclusive

jurisdiction, in all cases whatsoever," over the District of Columbia,

yet that it would be so palpably unconstitutional to abolish the

slave-trade, and to emancipate the slaves in the District, that

petitions for these objects ought not to be received. Yet this is

asserted in that very House, on whose minutes is recorded a

resolution, in 1816, appointing a committee, with power to send for

persons and papers, "to inquire into the existence of an inhuman and

illegal traffic in slaves, carried on, in and through the District

of Columbia, and report whether any, and what means are necessary

for putting a stop to the same:" and another, in 1829, instructing

the Committee on the District of Columbia to inquire into the

expediency of providing by law, "for the gradual abolition of

slavery in the District."

In the very first Congress assembled under the Federal Constitution,

petitions were presented, asking its interposition for the

mitigation of the evils, and final abolition of the African

slave-trade, and also praying it, as far as it possessed the power,

to take measures for the abolition of slavery. These petitions

excited the wrath and indignation of many of the slave-holding

members, yet no one thought of refusing to receive them. They were

referred to a select committee, at the instance of Mr. Madison,

himself, who "entered into a critical review of the circumstances

respecting the adoption of the Constitution, and the ideas upon the

limitation of the powers of Congress to interfere in the regulation

of the commerce of slaves, and showed that they undoubtedly were not

precluded from interposing in their importation; and generally to

regulate the mode in which every species of business shall be

transacted. He adverted to the western country, and the Cession of

Georgia, in which Congress have certainly the power to _regulate the

subject of slavery_; which shows that gentlemen are mistaken in

supposing, that Congress cannot constitutionally interfere in the

business, in any degree, whatever. He was in favor of committing the

petition, and justified the measure by repeated precedents in the

proceedings of the House."--_U.S. Gazette, 17th Feb._, 1790.

Here we find one of the earliest and ablest expounders of the

Constitution, maintaining the power of Congress to "regulate the

subject of slavery" in the national territories, and urging the

reference of abolition petitions to a special committee.

The committee made a report; for which, after a long debate, was

substituted a declaration, by the House, that Congress could not

abolish the slave trade prior to the year 1808, but had a right so

to regulate it as to provide for the humane treatment of the slaves

on the passage; and that Congress could not interfere in the

emancipation or treatment of slaves in the _States_.

This declaration gave entire satisfaction, and no farther abolition

petitions were presented, till after the District of Columbia had

been placed under the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the General

Government.

You all remember, fellow citizens, the wide-spread excitement which

a few years since prevailed on the subject of SUNDAY MAILS. Instead

of attempting to quiet the agitation, by outraging the rights of the

petitioners, Congress referred the petitions to a committee, and

made no attempt to stifle discussion.

Why, then, we ask, with such authorities and precedents before them,

do the slaveholders in Congress, regardless of their oaths, strive to

gag the friends of freedom, under _pretence_ of allaying agitation?

Because conscience does make cowards of them all--because they know

the accursed system they are upholding will not bear the

light--because they fear, if these petitions are discussed, the

abominations of the American slave trade, the secrets of the

prison-houses in Washington and Alexandria, and the horrors of the

human shambles licensed by the authority of Congress, will be

exposed to the score and indignation of the civilized world.

Unquestionably the late RULE surpasses, in its profligate contempt of

constitutional obligation, any act in the annals of the Federal

Government. As such it might well strike every patriot with dismay,

were it not that attending circumstances teach us that it is the

expiring effort of desperation. When we reflect on the past

subserviency of our northern representatives to the mandates of the

slaveholders, we may well raise, on the present occasion, the shout

of triumph, and hail the vote on the recent RULE as the pledge of a

glorious victory. Suffer us to recall to your recollection the

majorities by which the successive attempts to crush the right of

petition and the freedom of debate have been carried.

Pinckney's Gag was passed May, 1836, by a majority of 51

Hawes's Jan. 1837, 58

Patton's Dec. 1837, 48

Atherton's Dec. 1838, 48

JOHNSON's Jan. 1840, 6

Surely, when we find the majority against us reduced from 58 to

6, we need no new incentive to perseverance.

Another circumstance which marks the progress of constitutional

liberty, is the gradual diminution in the number of our northern

_serviles_. The votes from the free States in favor of the several

gags were as follows:--

For Pinckney's 62

For Hawes's 70

For Patton's 52

For Atherton's 49

For JOHNSON's 28

There is also another cheering fact connected with the passage of

the RULE which deserves to be noticed. Heretofore the slaveholders

have uniformly, by enforcing the previous question, imposed their

several gags by a silent vote. On the present occasion they were

twice baffled in their efforts to stifle debate, and were, for days

together, compelled to listen to speeches on a subject which they

have so often declared should not be discussed.

A base strife for southern votes has hitherto, to no small extent,

enlisted both the political parties at the north in the service of

the slaveholders. The late unwonted independence of northern

politicians, and the deference paid by them to the wishes of their

own constituents, in preference to those of their southern colleagues,

indicates the advance of public opinion. No less than 49 northern

members of the administration party voted for the Atherton gag,

while only 27 dared to record their names in favor of Johnson's; and

of the representation of SIX States, _every vote_ was given _against_

the rule, without distinction of party. The tone in which opposite

political journals denounce the late outrage may warn the

slaveholders that they will not much longer hold the north in bonds.

The leading administration paper in the city of New York regards the

RULE with "utter abhorrence;" while the official paper of the

opposition, edited by the state printer, trusts that the names of

the recreant northerners who voted for it may be "handed down to

eternal infamy and execration."

The advocates of abolition are no longer consigned to unmitigated

contempt and obloquy. Passing by the various living illustrations of

our remark, we appeal for our proofs to the dead. The late WILLIAM

LEGGETT, the editor of a Democratic Journal in the city of New York,

was denounced, in 1835, by the "Democratic Republican General

Committee," for his abolition doctrines. Far from faltering in his

course, on account of the censure of his own party, he exclaimed,

with a presentiment almost amounting to prophecy, "The stream of

public opinion now sets against us, but it is about to turn, and the

regurgitation will be tremendous. Proud in that day may well be the

man who can float in triumph on the first refluent wave, swept

onward by the deluge which he himself, in advance of his fellows,

had largely shared in occasioning. Such be my fate; and, living or

dying, it will in some measure be mine. I have written my name in

ineffaceable letters on the abolition record." And he did live to

behold the first swelling of the refluent wave. The denounced

abolitionist was honored by a democratic President with a diplomatic

mission; and since his death, the resolution condemning him has been

EXPUNGED from the minutes of the democratic committee.

Of the many victims of the recent awful calamity in our waters, what

name has been most frequently uttered by the pulpit and the press in

the accents of lamentation and panegyric? On whose tomb have freedom,

philanthropy, and letters been invoked to strew their funeral wreaths?

All who have heard of the loss of the Lexington are familiar with

the name of CHARLES FOLLEN. And who was he? One of the men

officially denounced by President Jackson as a gang of miscreants,

plotting insurrection and murder--and, recently, a member of the

Executive Committee of the American Anti-Slavery Society.

Let us then, fellow citizens, in view of all these things, thank God

and take courage. We are now contending, not merely for the

emancipation of our unhappy fellow men, kept in bondage under the

authority of our own representatives--not merely for the overthrow

of the human shambles erected by Congress on the national

domain--but also for the preservation of those great constitutional

rights which were acquired by our fathers, and are now assailed by

the slaveholders and their northern auxiliaries. That you may

remember these auxiliaries and avoid giving them new opportunities

of betraying your rights, we annex a list of their dishonored names.

The following twenty-eight members from the Free States voted in the

affirmative on the recent GAG RULE.

MAINE.

Virgil D. Parris

Albert Smith

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Charles G. Atherton

Edmund Burke

Ira A. Eastman

Tristram Shaw

NEW YORK.

Nehemiah H. Earle

John Fine

Nathaniel Jones

Governeur Kemble

James de la Montayne

John H. Prentiss

Theron R. Strong

PENNSYLVANIA.

John Davis

Joseph Fornance

James Gerry

George M'Cullough

David Petriken

William S. Ramsey

OHIO.

D.P. Leadbetter

William Medill

Isaac Parrish

George Sweeney

Jonathan Taylor

John B. Weller

INDIANA.

John Davis

George H. Proffit

ILLINOIS.

John Reynolds.

Let us turn to our more immediate representatives, and we trust more

faithful servants. Our State Legislatures will not refuse to hear

our prayers. Let us petition them immediately to rebuke the treason

by which the Constitution has been surrendered into the hands of the

slaveholders--let us implore them to demand from Congress, in the

name of the free States, that they shall neither destroy nor abridge

the right of petition--a right without which our government would be

converted into a despotism.

We call on you, fellow citizens of every religious faith and party

name, to unite with us in guarding the citadel of our country's

freedom. If there are any who will not co-operate with us in

laboring for the emancipation of the slave, surely there are none

who will stand aloof from us while contending for the liberty of

themselves, their children, and their children's children.

To the rescue, then, fellow citizens! and, trusting in HIM without

whom all human effort is weakness, let us not doubt that our faithful

endeavors to preserve the rights HE has given us will, through HIS

blessing, be crowned with success.

ARTHUR TAPPAN,

JAMES G. BIRNEY,

JOSHUA LEAVITT,

LEWIS TAPPAN,

SAMUEL E. CORNISH,

SIMEON S. JOCELYN,

LA ROY SUNDERLAND,

THEODORE S. WRIGHT,

DUNCAN DUNBAR,

JAMES S. GIBBONS,

HENRY B. STANTON

_Executive Committee

of the

American

Anti-Slavery Society_.

_New York, February_ 13, 1840.