During the early 1700's cannon were used to protect an army's
deployment and to prepare for the advance of the troops by firing upon
enemy formations. There was a tendency to regard heavy batteries,
properly protected by field works or permanent fortifications, as the
natural role for artillery. But if artillery was seldom decisive in
battle, it nevertheless waxed more important through improved
organization, training, and discipline. In the previous century,
calibers had been reduced in number and more or less standardized;
now, there were notable scientific and technical improvements. The
English scientist Benjamin Robins wedded theory to practice; his _New
Principles of Gunnery_ (1742) did much to bring about a more
scientific attitude toward ballistics. One result of Robins' research
was the introduction, in 1779, of carronades, those short, light
pieces so useful in the confines of a ship's gun deck. Carronades
usually ranged in caliber from 6- to 68-pounders.
In North America, cannon were generally too cumbrous for Indian
fighting. But from the time (1565) the French, in Florida, loosed the
first bolt at the rival fleet of the Spaniard Menéndez, cannon were
used on land and sea during intercolonial strife, or against corsairs.
Over the vast distances of early America, transport of heavy guns was
necessarily by water. Without ships, the guns were inexorably walled
in by the forest. So it was when the Carolinian Moore besieged St.
Augustine in 1702. When his ships burned, Moore had to leave his guns
to the Spaniards.
One of the first appearances of organized American field artillery on
the battlefield was in the Northeast, where France's Louisburg fell to
British and Colonial forces in 1745. Serving with the British Royal
Artillery was the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Boston,
which had originated in 1637. English field artillery of the day had
"brigades" of four to six cannon, and each piece was supplied with 100
rounds of solid shot and 30 rounds of grape. John Müller's _Treatise
on Artillery_, the standard English authority, was republished in
Philadelphia (1779), and British artillery was naturally a model for
the arm in America.
[Illustration: Figure 8--AMERICAN 6-POUNDER FIELDPIECE (c. 1775).]
At the outbreak of the War of Independence, American artillery was an
accumulation of guns, mortars, and howitzers of every sort and some 13
different calibers. Since the source of importation was cut off, the
undeveloped casting industries of the Colonies undertook cannon
founding, and by 1775 the foundries of Philadelphia were casting both
bronze and iron guns. A number of bronze French guns were brought in
later. The mobile guns of Washington's army ranged from 3- to
24-pounders, with 5-1/2- and 8-inch howitzers. They were usually
bronze. A few iron siege guns of 18-, 24-, and 32-pounder caliber were
on hand. The guns used round shot, grape, and case shot; mortars and
howitzers fired bombs and carcasses. "Side boxes" on each side of the
carriage held 21 rounds of ammunition and were taken off when the
piece was brought into battery. Horses or oxen, with hired civilian
drivers, formed the transport. On the battlefield the cannoneers
manned drag ropes to maneuver the guns into position.
Sometimes, as at Guilford Courthouse, the ever-present forest
diminished the effectiveness of artillery, but nevertheless the arm
was often put to good use. The skill of the American gunners at
Yorktown contributed no little toward the speedy advance of the siege
trenches. Yorktown battlefield today has many examples of
Revolutionary War cannon, including some fine ship guns recovered from
British vessels sunk during the siege of 1781.
In Europe, meanwhile, Frederick the Great of Prussia learned how to
use cannon in the campaigns of the Seven Years' War (1756-63). The
education was forced upon him as gradual destruction of his veteran
infantry made him lean more heavily on artillery. To keep pace with
cavalry movements, he developed a horse artillery that moved rapidly
along with the cavalry. His field artillery had only light guns and
howitzers. With these improvements he could establish small batteries
at important points in the battle line, open the fight, and protect
the deployment of his columns with light guns. What was equally
significant, he could change the position of his batteries according
to the course of the action.
Frederick sent his 3- and 6-pounders ahead of the infantry. Gunners
dismounted 500 paces from the enemy and advanced on foot, pushing
their guns ahead of them, firing incessantly and using grape shot
during the latter part of their advance. Up to closest range they
went, until the infantry caught up, passed through the artillery line,
and stormed the enemy position. Remember that battle was pretty
formal, with musketeers standing or kneeling in ranks, often in full
view of the enemy!
[Illustration: Figure 9--FRENCH 12-POUNDER FIELD GUN (c. 1780).]
Perhaps the outstanding artilleryman of the 1700's was the Frenchman
Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval, who brought home a number of ideas after
serving with the capable Austrian artillery against Frederick. The
great reform in French artillery began in 1765, although Gribeauval
was not able to effect all of his changes until he became Inspector
General of Artillery in 1776. He all but revolutionized French
artillery, and vitally influenced other countries.
Gribeauval's artillery came into action at a gallop and smothered
enemy batteries with an overpowering volume of fire. He created a
distinct matériel for field, siege, garrison, and coast artillery. He
reduced the length and weight of the pieces, as well as the charge and
the windage (the difference between the diameters of shot and bore);
he built carriages so that many parts were interchangeable, and made
soldiers out of the drivers. For siege and garrison he adopted 12- and
16-pounder guns, an 8-inch howitzer and 8-, 10-, and 12-inch mortars.
For coastal fortifications he used the traversing platform which,
having rear wheels that ran upon a track, greatly simplified the
training of a gun right or left upon a moving target (fig. 10).
Gribeauval-type matériel was used with the greatest effect in the new
tactics which Napoleon introduced.
Napoleon owed much of his success to masterly use of artillery. Under
this captain there was no preparation for infantry advance by slowly
disintegrating the hostile force with artillery fire. Rather, his
artillerymen went up fast into closest range, and by actually
annihilating a portion of the enemy line with case-shot fire, covered
the assault so effectively that columns of cavalry and infantry
reached the gap without striking a blow!
After Napoleon, the history of artillery largely becomes a record of
its technical effectiveness, together with improvements or changes in
putting well-established principles into action.