Now I think there can be no doubt that we do judge that there is

a difference of value, such as I have indicated, between the three

cases in question. We do think that the emotional contemplation of a

natural scene, supposing its qualities equally beautiful, is in some

way a better state of things than that of a painted landscape: we

think that the world would be improved if we could substitute for the

best works of representative art _real_ objects equally beautiful. And

similarly we regard a misdirected affection or admiration, even where

the error involved is a mere error of judgment and not an error of

taste, as in some way unfortunate. And further, those, at least, who

have a strong respect for truth, are inclined to think that a merely

poetical contemplation of the Kingdom of Heaven _would_ be superior

to that of the religious believer, _if_ it were the case that the

Kingdom of Heaven does not and will not really exist. Most persons,

on a sober, reflective judgment, would feel some hesitation even in

preferring the felicity of a madman, convinced that the world was

ideal, to the condition either of a poet imagining an ideal world, or

of themselves enjoying and appreciating the lesser goods which do and

will exist: But, in order to assure ourselves that these judgments are

really judgments of intrinsic value upon the question before us, and

to satisfy ourselves that they are correct, it is necessary clearly to

distinguish our question from two others which have a very important

bearing upon our total judgment of the cases in question.

=118.= In the first place (_a_) it is plain that, where we believe, the

question whether what we believe is true or false, will generally have

a most important bearing upon the value of our belief _as a means_.

Where we believe, we are apt to act upon our belief, in a way in which

we do not act upon our cognition of the events in a novel. The truth

of what we believe is, therefore, very important as preventing the

pains of disappointment and still more serious consequences. And it

might be thought that a misdirected attachment was unfortunate solely

for this reason: that it leads us to count upon results, which the

real nature of its object is not of a kind to ensure. So too the Love

of God, where, as usual, it includes the belief that he will annex to

certain actions consequences, either in this life or the next, which

the course of nature gives no reason to expect, may lead the believer

to perform actions of which the actual consequences, supposing no

such God to exist, may be much worse than he might otherwise have

effected: and it might be thought that this was the sole reason (as it

is a sufficient one) why we should hesitate to encourage the Love of

God, in the absence of any proof that he exists. And similarly it may

be thought that the only reason why beauty in Nature should be held

superior to an equally beautiful landscape or imagination, is that

its existence would ensure greater permanence and frequency in our

emotional contemplation of that beauty. It is, indeed, certain that

the chief importance of most _knowledge_--of the truth of most of the

things which we believe--does, in this world, consist in its extrinsic

advantages: it is immensely valuable _as a means_.

And secondly, (_b_) it may be the case that the existence of that which

we contemplate is itself a great positive good, so that, for this

reason alone, the state of things described by saying, that the object

of our emotion really exists, would be intrinsically superior to that

in which it did not. This reason for superiority is undoubtedly of

great importance in the case of human affections, where the object of

our admiration is the mental qualities of an admirable person; for that

_two_ such admirable persons should exist is greatly better than that

there should be only one: and it would also discriminate the admiration

of inanimate nature from that of its representations in art, in so far

as we may allow a small intrinsic value to the existence of a beautiful

object, apart from any contemplation of it. But it is to be noticed

that this reason would not account for any difference in value between

the cases where the truth was believed and that in which it was merely

cognised, without either belief or disbelief. In other words, so far

as this reason goes, the difference between the two subdivisions of

our second class (that of imaginative contemplation) would be as great

as between our first class and the second subdivision of our second.

The superiority of the mere _cognition_ of a beautiful object, when

that object also happened to exist, over the same cognition when the

object did not exist, would, on this count, be as great as that of the

_knowledge_ of a beautiful object over the mere imagination of it.

=119.= These two reasons for discriminating between the value of the

three cases we are considering, must, I say, be carefully distinguished

from that, of which I am now questioning the validity, if we are to

obtain a correct answer concerning this latter. The question I am

putting is this: Whether the _whole_ constituted by the fact that

there is an emotional contemplation of a beautiful object, which

both is believed to be and is _real_, does not derive some of its

value from the fact that the object _is_ real? I am asking whether

the value of this whole, _as a whole_, is not greater than that of

those which differ from it, _either_ by the absence of belief, with

or without truth, _or_, belief being present, by the mere absence of

truth? I am not asking _either_ whether it is not superior to them as

a means (which it certainly is), _nor_ whether it may not contain a

more valuable _part_, namely, the existence of the object in question.

My question is solely whether the existence of its object does not

constitute an addition to the value of the whole, quite distinct from

the addition constituted by the fact that this whole does contain a

valuable part.

If, now, we put this question, I cannot avoid thinking that it should

receive an affirmative answer. We can put it clearly by the method of

isolation; and the sole decision must rest with our reflective judgment

upon it, as thus clearly put. We can guard against the bias produced

by a consideration of value _as a means_ by supposing the case of an

illusion as complete and permanent as illusions in this world never can

be. We can imagine the case of a single person, enjoying throughout

eternity the contemplation of scenery as beautiful, and intercourse

with persons as admirable, as can be imagined; while yet the whole of

the objects of his cognition are absolutely unreal. I think we should

definitely pronounce the existence of a universe, which consisted

solely of such a person, to be _greatly_ inferior in value to one in

which the objects, in the existence of which he believes, did really

exist just as he believes them to do; and that it would be thus

inferior _not only_ because it would lack the goods which consist in

the existence of the objects in question, but _also_ merely because

his belief would be false. That it would be inferior _for this reason

alone_ follows if we admit, what also appears to me certain, that the

case of a person, merely imagining, without believing, the beautiful

objects in question, would, _although these objects really existed_,

be yet inferior to that of the person who also believed in their

existence. For here all the additional good, which consists in the

existence of the objects, is present, and yet there still seems to be

a great difference in value between this case and that in which their

existence is believed. But I think that my conclusion may perhaps be

exhibited in a more convincing light by the following considerations.

(1) It does not seem to me that the small degree of value which we may

allow to the existence of beautiful inanimate objects is nearly equal

in amount to the difference which I feel that there is between the

appreciation (accompanied by belief) of such objects, when they really

exist, and the purely imaginative appreciation of them when they do not

exist. This inequality is more difficult to verify where the object

is an admirable person, since a _great_ value must be allowed to his

existence. But yet I think it is not paradoxical to maintain that the

superiority of reciprocal affection, where both objects are worthy and

both exist, over an unreciprocated affection, where both are worthy

but one does not exist, does not lie solely in the fact that, in the

former case, we have two good things instead of one, but also in the

fact that each is such as the other believes him to be. (2) It seems to

me that the important contribution to value made by true belief may be

very plainly seen in the following case. Suppose that a worthy object

of affection does really exist and is believed to do so, but that there

enters into the case this error of fact, that the qualities loved,

though exactly like, are yet not the _same_ which really do exist.

This state of things is easily imagined, and I think we cannot avoid

pronouncing that, _although_ both persons here exist, it is yet not so

satisfactory as where the very person loved and believed to exist is

also the one which actually does exist.

=120.= If all this be so, we have, in this third section, added to our

two former results the third result that a true belief in the reality

of an object greatly increases the value of many valuable wholes.

Just as in sections (1) and (2) it was maintained that aesthetic and

affectionate emotions had little or no value apart from the cognition

of appropriate objects, and that the cognition of these objects had

little or no value apart from the appropriate emotion, so that the

whole, in which both were combined, had a value greatly in excess of

the sum of the values of its parts; so, according to this section, if

there be added to these wholes a true belief in the reality of the

object, the new whole thus formed has a value greatly in excess of the

sum obtained by adding the value of the true belief, considered in

itself, to that of our original wholes. This new case only differs from

the former in this, that, whereas the true belief, by itself, has quite

as little value as either of the two other constituents taken singly,

yet they, taken together, seem to form a whole of very great value,

whereas this is not the case with the two wholes which might be formed

by adding the true belief to either of the others.

The importance of the result of this section seems to lie mainly in two

of its consequences. (1) That it affords some justification for the

immense intrinsic value, which seems to be commonly attributed to the

mere _knowledge_ of some truths, and which was expressly attributed

to some kinds of knowledge by Plato and Aristotle. Perfect knowledge

has indeed competed with perfect love for the position of Ideal. If

the results of this section are correct, it appears that knowledge,

though having little or no value by itself, is an absolutely essential

constituent in the highest goods, and contributes immensely to their

value. And it appears that this function may be performed not only

by that case of knowledge, which we have chiefly considered, namely,

knowledge of the reality of the beautiful object cognised, but also

by knowledge of the numerical identity of this object with that which

really exists, and by the knowledge that the existence of that object

is truly good. Indeed all knowledge, which is directly concerned with

the nature of the constituents of a beautiful object, would seem

capable of adding greatly to the value of the contemplation of that

object, although, by itself, such knowledge would have no value at

all.--And (2) The second important consequence, which follows from

this section, is that the presence of true belief may, in spite of a

great inferiority in the value of the emotion and the beauty of its

object, constitute with them a whole equal or superior in value to

wholes, in which the emotion and beauty are superior, but in which a

true belief is wanting or a false belief present. In this way we may

justify the attribution of equal or superior value to an appreciation

of an inferior real object, as compared with the appreciation of a

greatly superior object which is a mere creature of the imagination.

Thus a just appreciation of nature and of real persons may maintain its

equality with an equally just appreciation of the products of artistic

imagination, in spite of much greater beauty in the latter. And

similarly though God may be admitted to be a more perfect object than

any actual human being, the love of God may yet be inferior to human

love, _if_ God does not exist.

=121.= (4) In order to complete the discussion of this first class

of goods--goods which have an essential reference to _beautiful_

objects--it would be necessary to attempt a classification and

comparative valuation of all the different forms of beauty, a task

which properly belongs to the study called Aesthetics. I do not,

however, propose to attempt any part of this task. It must only be

understood that I intend to include among the essential constituents of

the goods I have been discussing, every form and variety of beautiful

object, if only it be truly beautiful; and, _if_ this be understood,

I think it may be seen that the consensus of opinion with regard to

what is positively beautiful and what is positively ugly, and even with

regard to great differences in degree of beauty, is quite sufficient to

allow us a hope that we need not greatly err in our judgments of good

and evil. In anything which is thought beautiful by any considerable

number of persons, there is probably _some_ beautiful quality; and

differences of opinion seem to be far more often due to exclusive

attention, on the part of different persons, to different qualities

in the same object, than to the positive error of supposing a quality

that is ugly to be really beautiful. When an object, which some think

beautiful, is denied to be so by others, the truth is _usually_ that it

lacks some beautiful quality or is deformed by some ugly one, which

engage the exclusive attention of the critics.

I may, however, state two general principles, closely connected with

the results of this chapter, the recognition of which would seem to

be of great importance for the investigation of what things are truly

beautiful. The first of these is (1) a definition of beauty, of what

is meant by saying that a thing is truly beautiful. The naturalistic

fallacy has been quite as commonly committed with regard to beauty

as with regard to good: its use has introduced as many errors into

Aesthetics as into Ethics. It has been even more commonly supposed that

the beautiful may be _defined_ as that which produces certain effects

upon our feelings; and the conclusion which follows from this--namely,

that judgments of taste are merely _subjective_--that precisely the

same thing may, according to circumstances, be _both_ beautiful _and_

not beautiful--has very frequently been drawn. The conclusions of this

chapter suggest a definition of beauty, which may partially explain

and entirely remove the difficulties which have led to this error. It

appears probable that the beautiful should be _defined_ as that of

which the admiring contemplation is good in itself. That is to say: To

assert that a thing is beautiful is to assert that the cognition of it

is an essential element in one of the intrinsically valuable wholes

we have been discussing; so that the question, whether it is _truly_

beautiful or not, depends upon the _objective_ question whether the

whole in question is or is not truly good, and does not depend upon

the question whether it would or would not excite particular feelings

in particular persons. This definition has the double recommendation

that it accounts both for the apparent connection between goodness

and beauty and for the no less apparent difference between these two

conceptions. It appears, at first sight, to be a strange coincidence,

that there should be two _different_ objective predicates of value,

‘good’ and ‘beautiful,’ which are nevertheless so related to one

another that whatever is beautiful is also good. But, if our definition

be correct, the strangeness disappears; since it leaves only one

_unanalysable_ predicate of value, namely ‘good,’ while ‘beautiful,’

though not identical with, is to be defined by reference to this,

being thus, at the same time, different from and necessarily connected

with it. In short, on this view, to say that a thing is beautiful

is to say, not indeed that it is _itself_ good, but that it is a

necessary element in something which is: to prove that a thing is truly

beautiful is to prove that a whole, to which it bears a particular

relation as a part, is truly good. And in this way we should explain

the immense predominance, among objects commonly considered beautiful,

of _material_ objects--objects of the external senses; since these

objects, though themselves having, as has been said, little or no

intrinsic value, are yet essential constituents in the largest group of

wholes which have intrinsic value. These wholes themselves may be, and

are, also beautiful; but the comparative rarity, with which we regard

them as themselves _objects_ of contemplation, seems sufficient to

explain the association of beauty with external objects.

And secondly (2) it is to be observed that beautiful objects are

themselves, for the most part, organic unities, in this sense, that

they are wholes of great complexity, such that the contemplation of

any part, by itself, may have no value, and yet that, unless the

contemplation of the whole includes the contemplation of that part, it

will lose in value. From this it follows that there can be no single

criterion of beauty. It will never be true to say: This object owes its

beauty _solely_ to the presence of this characteristic; nor yet that:

Wherever this characteristic is present, the object must be beautiful.

All that can be true is that certain objects are beautiful, _because_

they have certain characteristics, in the sense that they would not

be beautiful _unless_ they had them. And it may be possible to find

that certain characteristics are more or less universally present in

all beautiful objects, and are, in this sense, more or less important

conditions of beauty. But it is important to observe that the very

qualities, which differentiate one beautiful object from all others,

are, if the object be truly beautiful, as _essential_ to its beauty,

as those which it has in common with ever so many others. The object

would no more have the beauty it has, without its specific qualities,

than without those that are generic; and the generic qualities, _by

themselves_, would fail, as completely, to give beauty, as those which

are specific.

=122.= II. It will be remembered that I began this survey of great

unmixed goods, by dividing all the greatest goods we know into the two

classes of aesthetic enjoyments, on the one hand, and the pleasures of

human intercourse or of personal affection, on the other. I postponed

the consideration of the latter on the ground that they presented

additional complications. In what this additional complication

consists, will now be evident; and I have already been obliged to

take account of it, in discussing the contribution to value made by

true belief. It consists in the fact that in the case of personal

affection, the object itself is not _merely_ beautiful, while possessed

of little or no intrinsic value, but is itself, in part at least,

of great intrinsic value. All the constituents which we have found

to be necessary to the most valuable aesthetic enjoyments, namely,

appropriate emotion, cognition of truly beautiful qualities, and true

belief, are equally necessary here; but here we have the additional

fact that the object must be not only truly beautiful, but also truly

good in a high degree.

It is evident that this additional complication only occurs in so far

as there is included in the object of personal affection some of the

_mental_ qualities of the person towards whom the affection is felt.

And I think it may be admitted that, wherever the affection is most

valuable, the appreciation of mental qualities must form a large part

of it, and that the presence of this part makes the whole far more

valuable than it could have been without it. But it seems very doubtful

whether this appreciation, by itself, can possess as much value as the

whole in which it is combined with an appreciation of the appropriate

_corporeal_ expression of the mental qualities in question. It is

certain that in all actual cases of valuable affection, the bodily

expressions of character, whether by looks, by words, or by actions, do

form a part of the object towards which the affection is felt, and that

the fact of their inclusion appears to heighten the value of the whole

state. It is, indeed, very difficult to imagine what the cognition of

mental qualities _alone_, unaccompanied by _any_ corporeal expression,

would be like; and, in so far as we succeed in making this abstraction,

the whole considered certainly appears to have less value. I therefore

conclude that the importance of an admiration of admirable mental

qualities lies chiefly in the immense superiority of a whole, in which

it forms a part, to one in which it is absent, and not in any high

degree of intrinsic value which it possesses by itself. It even appears

to be doubtful, whether, in itself, it possesses so much value as the

appreciation of mere corporeal beauty undoubtedly does possess; that is

to say, whether the appreciation of what has great intrinsic value is

so valuable as the appreciation of what is merely beautiful.

But further if we consider the nature of admirable mental qualities,

by themselves, it appears that a proper appreciation of them involves

a reference to purely material beauty in yet another way. Admirable

mental qualities do, if our previous conclusions are correct, consist

very largely in an emotional contemplation of beautiful objects;

and hence the appreciation of them will consist essentially in the

contemplation of such contemplation. It is true that the most valuable

appreciation of persons appears to be that which consists in the

appreciation of their appreciation of other persons: but even here a

reference to material beauty appears to be involved, _both_ in respect

of the fact that what is appreciated in the last instance may be the

contemplation of what is merely beautiful, _and_ in respect of the fact

that the most valuable appreciation of a person appears to _include_

an appreciation of his corporeal expression. Though, therefore, we

may admit that the appreciation of a person’s attitude towards other

persons, or, to take one instance, the love of love, is far the most

valuable good we know, and far more valuable than the mere love of

beauty, yet we can only admit this if the first be understood to

_include_ the latter, in various degrees of directness.

With regard to the question what _are_ the mental qualities of which

the cognition is essential to the value of human intercourse, it is

plain that they include, in the first place, all those varieties of

aesthetic appreciation, which formed our first class of goods. They

include, therefore, a great variety of different emotions, each of

which is appropriate to some different kind of beauty. But we must now

add to these the whole range of emotions, which are appropriate to

persons, and which are different from those which are appropriate to

mere corporeal beauty. It must also be remembered that just as these

emotions have little value in themselves, and as the state of mind in

which they exist may have its value greatly heightened, or may entirely

lose it and become positively evil in a great degree, according as the

cognitions accompanying the emotions are appropriate or inappropriate;

so too the appreciation of these emotions, though it may have some

value in itself, may yet form part of a whole which has far greater

value or no value at all, according as it is or is not accompanied by

a perception of the appropriateness of the emotions to their objects.

It is obvious, therefore, that the study of what is valuable in human

intercourse is a study of immense complexity; and that there may be

much human intercourse which has little or no value, or is positively

bad. Yet here too, as with the question what is beautiful, there seems

no reason to doubt that a reflective judgment will in the main decide

correctly both as to what are positive goods and even as to any _great_

differences in value between these goods. In particular, it may be

remarked that the emotions, of which the contemplation is essential

to the greatest values, and which are also themselves appropriately

excited by such contemplation, appear to be those which are commonly

most highly prized under the name of affection.

=123.= I have now completed my examination into the nature of those

great positive goods, which do not appear to include among their

constituents anything positively evil or ugly, though they include

much which is in itself indifferent. And I wish to point out certain

conclusions which appear to follow, with regard to the nature of the

Summum Bonum, or that state of things which would be the most perfect

we can conceive. Those idealistic philosophers, whose views agree

most closely with those here advocated, in that they deny pleasure to

be the sole good and regard what is completely good as having some

complexity, have usually represented a purely spiritual state of

existence as the Ideal. Regarding matter as essentially imperfect, if

not positively evil, they have concluded that the total absence of

all material properties is necessary to a state of perfection. Now,

according to what has been said, this view would be correct so far

as it asserts that any great good must be _mental_, and so far as it

asserts that a purely material existence, _by itself_, can have little

or no value. The superiority of the spiritual over the material has,

in a sense, been amply vindicated. But it does not follow, from this

superiority, that a perfect state of things must be one, from which

all material properties are rigidly excluded: on the contrary, if our

conclusions are correct, it would seem to be the case that a state of

things, in which they are included, must be vastly better than any

conceivable state in which they were absent. In order to see that this

is so, the chief thing necessary to be considered is _exactly what it

is_ which we declare to be good when we declare that the appreciation

of beauty in Art and Nature is so. That this appreciation _is_ good,

the philosophers in question do not for the most part deny. But, if we

admit it, then we should remember Butler’s maxim that: Everything is

what it is, and not another thing. I have tried to shew, and I think

it is too evident to be disputed, that such appreciation is an organic

unity, a complex whole; and that, in its most undoubted instances,

part of what is included in this whole is _a cognition of material

qualities_, and particularly of a vast variety of what are called

_secondary_ qualities. If, then, it is _this_ whole, which we know to

be good, and not another thing, then we know that material qualities,

even though they be perfectly worthless in themselves, are yet

essential constituents of what is far from worthless. What we know to

be valuable is the apprehension of just these qualities, and not of any

others; and, if we propose to subtract them from it, then what we have

left is _not_ that which we know to have value, but something else. And

it must be noticed that this conclusion holds, even if my contention,

that a true belief in the existence of these qualities adds to the

value of the whole in which it is included, be disputed. We should

then, indeed, be entitled to assert that the _existence_ of a material

world was wholly immaterial to perfection; but the fact that what we

knew to be good was a cognition of _material qualities_ (though purely

imaginary), would still remain. It must, then, be admitted on pain of

self-contradiction--on pain of holding that things are not what they

are, but something else--that a world, from which material qualities

were wholly banished, would be a world which lacked many, if not all,

of those things, which we know most certainly to be great goods. That

it _might_ nevertheless be a far better world than one which retained

these goods, I have already admitted (§ 111 (1)). But in order to shew

that any such world _would_ be thus better, it would be necessary to

shew that the retention of these things, though good in themselves,

impaired, in a more than equal degree, the value of some whole, to

which they might belong; and the task of shewing this has certainly

never been attempted. Until it be performed, we are entitled to assert

that material qualities are a necessary constituent of the Ideal;

that, though something utterly unknown _might_ be better than any

world containing either them or any other good we know, yet we have no

reason to suppose that anything whatever would be better than a state

of things in which they were included. To deny and exclude matter,

is to deny and exclude the best we know. That a thing may retain its

value, while losing some of its qualities, is utterly untrue. All that

is true is that the changed thing may have more value than, or as much

value as, that of which the qualities have been lost. What I contend is

that nothing, which we _know_ to be good and which contains no material

qualities, has such great value that we can declare it, _by itself_, to

be superior to the whole which would be formed by the addition to it of

an appreciation of material qualities. That a _purely_ spiritual good

may be the _best_ of single things, I am not much concerned to dispute,

although, in what has been said with regard to the nature of personal

affection, I have given reasons for doubting it. But that by adding

to it some appreciation of material qualities, which, though perhaps

inferior by itself, is certainly a great positive good, we should

obtain a greater sum of value, which no corresponding decrease in the

value of the whole, as a whole, could counterbalance--this, I maintain,

we have certainly no reason to doubt.

=124.= In order to complete this discussion of the main principles

involved in the determination of intrinsic values, the chief remaining

topics, necessary to be treated, appear to be two. The first of these

is the nature of great intrinsic _evils_, including what I may call

_mixed_ evils; that is to say, those evil wholes, which nevertheless

contain, as essential elements, something positively good or beautiful.

And the second is the nature of what I may similarly call _mixed_

goods; that is to say, those wholes, which, though intrinsically good

_as wholes_, nevertheless contain, as essential elements, something

positively evil or ugly. It will greatly facilitate this discussion,

if I may be understood throughout to use the terms ‘beautiful’ and

‘ugly,’ not necessarily with reference to things of the kind which

most naturally occur to us as instances of what is beautiful and ugly,

but in accordance with my own proposed definition of beauty. Thus I

shall use the word ‘beautiful’ to denote that of which the admiring

contemplation is good in itself; and ‘ugly’ to denote that of which the

admiring contemplation is evil in itself.

I. With regard, then, to great positive evils, I think it is evident

that, if we take all due precautions to discover _precisely what_ those

things are, of which, _if they existed absolutely by themselves_, we

should judge the existence to be a great evil, we shall find most of

them to be organic unities of exactly the same nature as those which

are the greatest positive goods. That is to say, they are cognitions of

some object, accompanied by some emotion. Just as neither a cognition

nor an emotion, _by itself_, appeared capable of being greatly good,

so (with one exception), neither a cognition nor an emotion, _by

itself_, appears capable of being greatly evil. And just as a whole

formed of both, even without the addition of any other element,

appeared undoubtedly capable of being a great good, so such a whole,

_by itself_, appears capable of being a great evil. With regard to the

_third_ element, which was discussed as capable of adding greatly to

the value of a good, namely, _true belief_, it will appear that it has

different relations towards different kinds of evils. In some cases the

addition of true belief to a positive evil seems to constitute a far

worse evil; but in other cases it is not apparent that it makes any

difference.

The greatest positive evils may be divided into the following three

classes.

=125.= (1) The first class consists of those evils, which seem always

to include an enjoyment or admiring contemplation of things which

are themselves either evil or ugly. That is to say these evils are

characterised by the fact that they include precisely the same emotion,

which is also essential to the greatest unmixed goods, from which they

are differentiated by the fact that this emotion is directed towards an

inappropriate object. In so far as this emotion is either a slight good

in itself or a slightly beautiful object, these evils would therefore

be cases of what I have called ‘mixed’ evils; but, as I have already

said, it seems very doubtful whether an emotion, completely isolated

from its object, has either value or beauty: it certainly has not much

of either. It is, however, important to observe that the very same

emotions, which are often loosely talked of as the greatest or the only

goods, may be essential constituents of the very worst wholes: that,

according to the nature of the cognition which accompanies them, they

may be conditions either of the greatest good, or of the greatest evil.

In order to illustrate the nature of evils of this class, I may take

two instances--cruelty and lasciviousness. That these are great

intrinsic evils, we may, I think, easily assure ourselves, by imagining

the state of a man, whose mind is solely occupied by either of these

passions, in their worst form. If we then consider what judgment we

should pass upon a universe which consisted _solely_ of minds thus

occupied, without the smallest hope that there would ever exist in it

the smallest consciousness of any object other than those proper to

these passions, or any feeling directed to any such object, I think

we cannot avoid the conclusion that the existence of such a universe

would be a far worse evil than the existence of none at all. But, if

this be so, it follows that these two vicious states are not only, as

is commonly admitted, bad as means, but also bad in themselves.--And

that they involve in their nature that complication of elements,

which I have called a love of what is evil or ugly, is, I think, no

less plain. With regard to the pleasures of lust, the nature of the

cognition, by the presence of which they are to be defined, is somewhat

difficult to analyse. But it appears to include both cognitions of

organic sensations and perceptions of states of the body, of which

the enjoyment is certainly an evil in itself. So far as these are

concerned, lasciviousness would, then, include in its essence an

admiring contemplation of what is ugly. But certainly one of its

commonest ingredients, in its worst forms, is an enjoyment of the same

state of mind in other people: and in this case it would therefore also

include a love of what is evil. With regard to cruelty, it is easy

to see that an enjoyment of pain in other people is essential to it;

and, as we shall see, when we come to consider pain, this is certainly

a love of evil: while, in so far as it also includes a delight in

the bodily signs of agony, it would also comprehend a love of what

is ugly. In both cases, it should be observed, the evil of the state

is heightened not only by an increase in the evil or ugliness of the

object, but also by an increase in the enjoyment.

It might be objected, in the case of cruelty, that our disapproval of

it, even in the isolated case supposed, where no considerations of

its badness as a means could influence us, may yet be really directed

to the pain of the persons, which it takes delight in contemplating.

This objection may be met, in the first place, by the remark that it

entirely fails to explain the judgment, which yet, I think, no one, on

reflection, will be able to avoid making, that even though the amount

of pain contemplated be the same, yet the greater the delight in its

contemplation, the worse the state of things. But it may also, I think,

be met by notice of a fact, which we were unable to urge in considering

the similar possibility with regard to goods--namely the possibility

that the reason why we attribute greater value to a worthy affection

for a _real_ person, is that we take into account the additional good

consisting in the existence of that person. We may I think urge, in

the case of cruelty, that its intrinsic odiousness is equally great,

whether the pain contemplated really exists or is purely imaginary. I,

at least, am unable to distinguish that, in this case, the presence

of _true belief_ makes any difference to the intrinsic value of the

whole considered, although it undoubtedly may make a great difference

to its value _as a means_. And so also with regard to other evils of

this class: I am unable to see that a true belief in the _existence_

of their objects makes any difference in the degree of their positive

demerits. On the other hand, the presence of another class of beliefs

seems to make a considerable difference. When we enjoy what is evil

or ugly, in spite of our knowledge that it is so, the state of things

seems considerably worse than if we made no judgment at all as to the

object’s value. And the same seems also, strangely enough, to be the

case when we make a false judgment of value. When we admire what is

ugly or evil, believing that it is beautiful and good, this belief

seems also to enhance the intrinsic vileness of our condition. It must,

of course, be understood that, in both these cases, the judgment in

question is merely what I have called a judgment of taste; that is to

say, it is concerned with the worth of the qualities actually cognised

and not with the worth of the object, to which those qualities may be

rightly or wrongly attributed.

Finally it should be mentioned that evils of this class, _beside_ that

emotional element (namely enjoyment and admiration) which they share

with great unmixed goods, appear always also to include some specific

emotion, which does not enter in the same way into the constitution

of any good. The presence of this specific emotion seems certainly

to enhance the badness of the whole, though it is not plain that, by

itself, it would be either evil or ugly.

=126.= (2) The second class of great evils are undoubtedly mixed

evils; but I treat them next, because, in a certain respect, they

appear to be the _converse_ of the class last considered. Just as it

is essential to this last class that they should include an emotion,

appropriate to the cognition of what is good or beautiful, but directed

to an inappropriate object; so to this second class it is essential

that they should include a cognition of what is good or beautiful, but

accompanied by an inappropriate emotion. In short, just as the last

class may be described as cases of the love of what is evil or ugly, so

this class may be described as cases of the hatred of what is good or

beautiful.

With regard to these evils it should be remarked: First, that the vices

of hatred, envy and contempt, where these vices are evil in themselves,

appear to be instances of them; and that they are frequently

accompanied by evils of the first class, for example, where a delight

is felt in the pain of a good person. Where they are thus accompanied,

the whole thus formed is undoubtedly worse than if either existed

singly.

And secondly: That in their case a true belief in the existence of the

good or beautiful object, which is hated, does appear to enhance the

badness of the whole, in which it is present. Undoubtedly also, as in

our first class, the presence of a true belief as to the _value_ of the

objects contemplated, increases the evil. But, contrary to what was the

case in our first class, a _false_ judgment of value appears to lessen

it.

=127.= (3) The third class of great positive evils appears to be the

class of _pains_.

With regard to these it should first be remarked that, as in the case

of pleasure, it is not pain itself, but only the consciousness of pain,

towards which our judgments of value are directed. Just as in Chap.

III., it was said that pleasure, however intense, which no one felt,

would be no good at all; so it appears that pain, however intense, of

which there was no consciousness, would be no evil at all.

It is, therefore, only the consciousness of intense pain, which can

be maintained to be a great evil. But that this, _by itself_, may be

a great evil, I cannot avoid thinking. The case of pain thus seems to

differ from that of pleasure: for the mere consciousness of pleasure,

however intense, does not, _by itself_, appear to be a _great_ good,

even if it has some slight intrinsic value. In short, pain (if we

understand by this expression, the consciousness of pain) appears to

be a far worse evil than pleasure is a good. But, if this be so, then

_pain_ must be admitted to be an exception from the rule which seems to

hold both of all _other_ great evils and of _all_ great goods: namely

that they are all organic unities to which _both_ a cognition of an

object _and_ an emotion directed towards that object are essential. In

the case of pain and of pain alone, it seems to be true that a mere

cognition, by itself, may be a great evil. It is, indeed, _an_ organic

unity, since it involves both the cognition and the object, neither of

which, by themselves, has either merit or demerit. But it is a less

complex organic unity than any other great evil and than any great

good, _both_ in respect of the fact that it does not involve, _beside_

the cognition, an emotion directed towards its object, _and also_ in

respect of the fact that the _object_ may here be absolutely simple,

whereas in most, if not all, other cases, the object itself is highly

complex.

This want of analogy between the relation of pain to intrinsic evil and

of pleasure to intrinsic good, seems also to be exhibited in a second

respect. Not only is it the case that consciousness of intense pain

is, by itself, a great evil, whereas consciousness of intense pleasure

is, by itself, no great good; but also the _converse_ difference

appears to hold of the contribution which they make to the value of

the whole, when they are combined respectively with another great evil

or with a great good. That is to say, the presence of pleasure (though

not in proportion to its intensity) does appear to enhance the value

of a whole, in which it is combined with any of the great unmixed

goods which we have considered: it might even be maintained that it

is _only_ wholes, in which _some_ pleasure is included, that possess

any great value: it is certain, at all events, that the presence of

pleasure makes a contribution to the value of good wholes greatly in

excess of its own intrinsic value. On the contrary, if a feeling of

pain be combined with any of the evil states of mind which we have been

considering, the difference which its presence makes to the value of

the whole, _as a whole_, seems to be rather for the better than the

worse: in any case, the only additional evil which it introduces, is

that which it, by itself, intrinsically constitutes. Thus, whereas pain

is _in itself_ a great evil, but makes no addition to the badness of a

whole, in which it is combined with some other bad thing, except that

which consists in its own intrinsic badness; pleasure, conversely, is

not _in itself_ a great good, but does make a great addition to the

goodness of a whole in which it is combined with a good thing, quite

apart from its own intrinsic value.

=128.= But finally, it must be insisted that pleasure and pain are

completely analogous in this: that we cannot assume either that the

presence of pleasure always makes a state of things better _on the

whole_, or that the presence of pain always makes it worse. This is the

truth which is most liable to be overlooked with regard to them; and

it is because this is true, that the common theory, that pleasure is

the only good and pain the only evil, has its grossest consequences in

misjudgments of value. Not only is the pleasantness of a state _not_

in proportion to its intrinsic worth; it may even add positively to

its vileness. We do not think the successful hatred of a villain the

less vile and odious, because he takes the keenest delight in it; nor

is there the least need, in logic, why we should think so, apart from

an unintelligent prejudice in favour of pleasure. In fact it seems to

be the case that wherever pleasure is added to an evil state of either

of our first two classes, the whole thus formed is _always_ worse than

if no pleasure had been there. And similarly with regard to pain. If

pain be added to an evil state of either of our first two classes, the

whole thus formed is _always_ better, _as a whole_, than if no pain

had been there; though here, if the pain be too intense, since that

is a great evil, the state may not be better _on the whole_. It is in

this way that the theory of vindictive punishment may be vindicated.

The infliction of pain on a person whose state of mind is bad may, if

the pain be not too intense, create a state of things that is better

_on the whole_ than if the evil state of mind had existed unpunished.

Whether such a state of things can ever constitute a _positive_ good,

is another question.

=129.= II. The consideration of this other question belongs properly to

the second topic, which was reserved above for discussion namely the

topic of ‘mixed’ goods. ‘Mixed’ goods were defined above as things,

which, though positively good _as wholes_, nevertheless contain, as

essential elements, something intrinsically evil or ugly. And there

certainly seem to be such goods. But for the proper consideration

of them, it is necessary to take into account a new distinction the

distinction just expressed as being between the value which a thing

possesses ‘_as a whole_,’ and that which it possesses ‘_on the whole_.’

When ‘mixed’ goods were defined as things positively good _as wholes_,

the expression was ambiguous. It was meant that they were positively

good _on the whole_; but it must now be observed that the value which

a thing possesses _on the whole_ may be said to be equivalent to the

sum of the value which it possesses _as a whole_, _together with_ the

intrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts. In fact, by the

‘value which a thing possesses as a whole,’ there may be meant two

quite distinct things. There may be meant either (1) That value which

arises solely _from the combination_ of two or more things; or else (2)

The total value formed by the addition to (1) of any intrinsic values

which may belong to the things combined. The meaning of the distinction

may perhaps be most easily seen by considering the supposed case of

vindictive punishment. If it is true that the combined existence of two

evils may yet constitute a less evil than would be constituted by the

existence of either singly, it is plain that this can only be because

there arises from the combination a positive good which is greater than

the _difference_ between the sum of the two evils and the demerit of

either singly: this positive good would then be the value of the whole,

_as a whole_, in sense (1). Yet if this value be not so great a good

as the sum of the two evils is an evil, it is plain that the value of

the whole state of things will be a positive evil; and this value is

the value of the whole, _as a whole_, in sense (2). Whatever view may

be taken with regard to the particular case of vindictive punishment,

it is plain that we have here _two distinct things_, with regard to

_either_ of which a separate question may be asked in the case of every

organic unity. The first of these two things may be expressed as _the

difference_ between the value _of the whole thing_ and the sum of the

value of its parts. And it is plain that where the parts have little or

no intrinsic value (as in our first class of goods, §§ 114, 115), this

difference will be nearly or absolutely identical with the value of

the whole thing. The distinction, therefore, only becomes important in

the case of wholes, of which one or more parts have a great intrinsic

value, positive or negative. The first of these cases, that of a

whole, in which one part has a great _positive_ value, is exemplified

in our 2nd and 3rd classes of great unmixed goods (§§ 120, 122); and

similarly the Summum Bonum is a whole of which _many_ parts have a

great _positive_ value. Such cases, it may be observed, are also very

frequent and very important objects of Aesthetic judgment; since the

essential distinction between the ‘classical’ and the ‘romantic’ styles

consists in the fact that the former aims at obtaining the greatest

possible value for the whole, _as a whole_, in sense (1), whereas

the latter sacrifices this in order to obtain the greatest possible

value for some _part_, which is itself an organic unity. It follows

that we cannot declare either style to be necessarily superior, since

an equally good result _on the whole_, or ‘as a whole’ in sense (2),

may be obtained by either method; but the distinctively _aesthetic_

temperament seems to be characterised by a tendency to prefer a good

result obtained by the classical, to an equally good result obtained by

the romantic method.

=130.= But what we have now to consider are cases of wholes, in which

one or more parts have a great _negative_ value--are great positive

evils. And first of all, we may take the _strongest_ cases, like that

of retributive punishment, in which we have a whole, exclusively

composed of two great positive evils--wickedness and pain. Can such a

whole ever be positively good _on the whole_?

(1) I can see no reason to think that such wholes ever are positively

good _on the whole_. But from the fact that they may, nevertheless, be

less evils, than either of their parts taken singly, it follows that

they have a characteristic which is most important for the correct

decision of practical questions. It follows that, quite apart from

_consequences_ or any value which an evil may have as a mere means,

it may, _supposing_ one evil already exists, be worth while to create

another, since, by the mere creation of this second, there may be

constituted a whole less bad than if the original evil had been left

to exist by itself. And similarly, with regard to all the wholes which

I am about to consider, it must be remembered, that, even if they are

not goods _on the whole_, yet, where an evil already exists, as in this

world evils do exist, the existence of the other part of these wholes

will constitute a thing desirable _for its own sake_--that is to say,

not merely a means to future goods, but one of the _ends_ which must

be taken into account in estimating what that best possible state of

things is, to which every right action must be a means.

=131.= (2) But, as a matter of fact, I cannot avoid thinking that there

are wholes, containing something positively evil and ugly, which are,

nevertheless, great positive goods on the whole. Indeed, it appears

to be to this class that those instances of virtue, which contain

anything intrinsically good, chiefly belong. It need not, of course,

be denied that there is sometimes included in a virtuous disposition

more or less of those unmixed goods which were first discussed--that

is to say, a real love of what is good or beautiful. But the typical

and characteristic virtuous dispositions, so far as they are not

mere means, seem rather to be examples of mixed goods. We may take

as instances (_a_) Courage and Compassion, which seem to belong to

the second of the three classes of virtues distinguished in our last

chapter (§ 107); and (_b_) the specifically ‘moral’ sentiment, by

reference to which the third of those three classes was defined (§ 108).

Courage and compassion, in so far as they contain an intrinsically

desirable state of mind, seem to involve essentially a cognition of

something evil or ugly. In the case of courage the object of the

cognition may be an evil of any of our three classes; in the case of

compassion, the proper object is pain. Both these virtues, accordingly,

must contain precisely the same cognitive element, which is also

essential to evils of class (1); and they are differentiated from these

by the fact that the emotion directed to these objects is, in their

case, an emotion of the same kind which was essential to evils of class

(2). In short, just as evils of class (2) seemed to consist in a hatred

of what was good or beautiful, and evils of class (1) in a love of what

was evil or ugly; so these virtues involve a _hatred_ of what is evil

or ugly. Both these virtues do, no doubt, also contain other elements,

and, among these, each contains its specific emotion; but that their

value does not depend solely upon these other elements, we may easily

assure ourselves, by considering what we should think of an attitude of

endurance or of defiant contempt toward an object intrinsically good

or beautiful, or of the state of a man whose mind was filled with pity

for the happiness of a worthy admiration. Yet pity for the undeserved

sufferings of others, endurance of pain to ourselves, and a defiant

hatred of evil dispositions in ourselves or in others, seem to be

undoubtedly admirable in themselves; and if so, there are admirable

things, which must be lost, if there were no cognition of evil.

Similarly the specifically ‘moral’ sentiment, in all cases where it has

any considerable intrinsic value, appears to include a hatred of evils

of the first and second classes. It is true that the emotion is here

excited by the idea that an action is right or wrong; and hence the

object of the idea which excites it is generally not an intrinsic evil.

But, as far as I can discover, the emotion with which a conscientious

man views a real or imaginary right action, contains, as an essential

element, the same emotion with which he views a wrong one: it seems,

indeed, that this element is necessary to make his emotion specifically

_moral_. And the specifically moral emotion excited by the idea of a

wrong action, seems to me to contain essentially a more or less vague

cognition of the kind of intrinsic evils, which are usually caused

by wrong actions, whether they would or would not be caused by the

particular action in question. I am, in fact, unable to distinguish, in

its main features, the moral sentiment excited by the idea of rightness

and wrongness, wherever it is intense, from the total state constituted

by a cognition of something intrinsically evil together with the

emotion of hatred directed towards it. Nor need we be surprised that

this mental state should be the one chiefly associated with the idea

of rightness, if we reflect on the nature of those actions which are

most commonly recognised as duties. For by far the greater part of the

actions, of which we commonly think as duties, are _negative_: what we

feel to be our duty is to _abstain_ from some action to which a strong

natural impulse tempts us. And these wrong actions, in the avoidance

of which duty consists, are usually such as produce, very immediately,

some bad consequence in pain to others; while, in many prominent

instances, the inclination, which prompts us to them, is itself an

intrinsic evil, containing, as where the impulse is lust or cruelty,

an anticipatory enjoyment of something evil or ugly. That right action

does thus so frequently entail the suppression of some evil impulse,

is necessary to explain the plausibility of the view that virtue

_consists_ in the control of passion by reason. Accordingly, the truth

seems to be that, whenever a strong moral emotion is excited by the

idea of rightness, this emotion is accompanied by a vague cognition of

the kind of evils usually suppressed or avoided by the actions which

most frequently occur to us as instances of duty; and that the emotion

is directed towards this evil quality. We may, then, conclude that the

specific moral emotion owes almost all its intrinsic value to the fact

that it includes a cognition of evils accompanied by a hatred of them:

mere rightness, whether truly or untruly attributed to an action, seems

incapable of forming the object of an emotional contemplation, which

shall be any great good.

=132.= If this be so, then we have, in many prominent instances of

virtue, cases of a whole, greatly good in itself, which yet contains

the cognition of something, whereof the existence would be a great

evil: a great good is absolutely dependent for its value, upon its

inclusion of something evil or ugly, although it does not owe its

value _solely_ to this element in it. And, in the case of virtues,

this evil object does, in general, actually exist. But there seems no

reason to think that, when it does exist, the whole state of things

thus constituted is therefore the better _on the whole_. What seems

indubitable, is only that the feeling contemplation of an object, whose

existence _would_ be a great evil, or which is ugly, may be essential

to a valuable whole. We have another undoubted instance of this in the

appreciation of tragedy. But, in tragedy, the sufferings of Lear, and

the vice of Iago may be purely imaginary. And it seems certain that,

if they really existed, the evil thus existing, while it must detract

from the good consisting in a proper feeling towards them, will add

no positive value to that good great enough to counterbalance such a

loss. It does, indeed, seem that the existence of a true belief in the

object of these mixed goods does add _some_ value to the whole in which

it is combined with them: a conscious compassion for real suffering

seems to be better, _as a whole_, than a compassion for sufferings

merely imaginary; and this may well be the case, even though the evil

involved in the actual suffering makes the total state of things bad

_on the whole_. And it certainly seems to be true that a _false_ belief

in the actual existence of its object makes a worse mixed good than

if our state of mind were that with which we normally regard pure

fiction. Accordingly we may conclude that the only mixed goods, which

are positively good _on the whole_, are those in which the object is

something which _would_ be a great evil, if it existed, or which _is_

ugly.

=133.= With regard, then, to those mixed goods, which consist in an

appropriate attitude of the mind towards things evil or ugly, and which

include among their number the greater part of such virtues as have any

intrinsic value whatever, the following three conclusions seem to be

those chiefly requiring to be emphasized:--

(1) There seems no reason to think that where the object is a thing

evil in itself, which _actually exists_, the total state of things is

ever positively _good on the whole_. The appropriate mental attitude

towards a really existing evil contains, of course, an element which

is absolutely identical with the same attitude towards the same evil,

where it is purely imaginary. And this element, which is common to

the two cases, may be a great positive good, on the whole. But there

seems no reason to doubt that, where the evil is _real_, the amount of

this real evil is always sufficient to reduce the total sum of value

to a negative quantity. Accordingly we have no reason to maintain the

paradox that an ideal world would be one in which vice and suffering

must exist in order that it may contain the goods consisting in the

appropriate emotion towards them. It is not a positive good that

suffering should exist, in order that we may compassionate it; or

wickedness, that we may hate it. There is no reason to think that any

actual evil whatsoever would be contained in the Ideal. It follows that

we cannot admit the actual validity of any of the arguments commonly

used in Theodicies; no such argument succeeds in justifying the fact

that there does exist even the smallest of the many evils which this

world contains. The most that can be said for such arguments is that,

when they make appeal to the principle of organic unity, their appeal

is valid _in principle_. It _might_ be the case that the existence of

evil was necessary, not merely as a means, but analytically, to the

existence of the greatest good. But we have no reason to think that

this _is_ the case in any instance whatsoever.

But (2) there _is_ reason to think that the cognition of things evil

or ugly, which are purely imaginary, is essential to the Ideal. In this

case the burden of proof lies the other way. It cannot be doubted that

the appreciation of tragedy is a great positive good; and it seems

almost equally certain that the virtues of compassion, courage, and

self-control contain such goods. And to all these the cognition of

things which would be evil, if they existed, is analytically necessary.

Here then we have things of which the existence must add value to

any whole in which they are contained; nor is it possible to assure

ourselves that any whole, from which they were omitted, would thereby

gain more in its value _as a whole_, than it would lose by their

omission. We have no reason to think that any whole, which did not

contain them, would be so good _on the whole_ as some whole in which

they were obtained. The case for their inclusion in the Ideal is as

strong as that for the inclusion of material qualities (§ 123, above).

_Against_ the inclusion of these goods nothing can be urged except a

bare possibility.

Finally (3) it is important to insist that, as was said above, these

mixed virtues have a great practical value, in addition to that which

they possess either in themselves or as mere means. Where evils do

exist, as in this world they do, the fact that they are known and

properly appreciated, constitutes a state of things having greater

value _as a whole_ even than the same appreciation of purely imaginary

evils. This state of things, it has been said, is never positively

good _on the whole_; but where the evil, which reduces its total value

to a negative quantity, already unavoidably exists, to obtain the

intrinsic value which belongs to it _as a whole_ will obviously produce

a better state of things than if the evil had existed by itself,

quite apart from the good element in it which is identical with the

appreciation of imaginary evils, and from any ulterior consequences

which its existence may bring about. The case is here the same as with

retributive punishment. Where an evil already exists, it is well that

it should be pitied or hated or endured, according to its nature; just

as it may be well that some evils should be punished. Of course, as in

all practical cases, it often happens that the attainment of this good

is incompatible with the attainment of another and a greater one. But

it is important to insist that we have here a real intrinsic value,

which must be taken into account in calculating that greatest possible

balance of intrinsic value, which it is always our duty to produce.

=134.= I have now completed such remarks as seemed most necessary to

be made concerning intrinsic values. It is obvious that for the proper

answering of this, the fundamental question of Ethics, there remains

a field of investigation as wide and as difficult, as was assigned

to Practical Ethics in my last chapter. There is as much to be said

concerning what results are intrinsically good, and in what degrees,

as concerning what results it is possible for us to bring about: both

questions demand, and will repay, an equally patient enquiry. Many of

the judgments, which I have made in this chapter, will, no doubt, seem

unduly arbitrary: it must be confessed that some of the attributions

of intrinsic value, which have seemed to me to be true, do not display

that symmetry and system which is wont to be required of philosophers.

But if this be urged as an objection, I may respectfully point out

that it is none. We have no title whatever to assume that the truth on

any subject-matter will display such symmetry as we desire to see--or

(to use the common vague phrase) that it will possess any particular

form of ‘unity.’ To search for ‘unity’ and ‘system,’ at the expense

of truth, is not, I take it, the proper business of philosophy,

however universally it may have been the practice of philosophers.

And that all truths about the Universe possess to one another all

the various relations, which may be meant by ‘unity,’ can only be

legitimately asserted, when we have carefully distinguished those

various relations and discovered what those truths are. In particular,

we can have no title to assert that ethical truths are ‘unified’ in

any particular manner, except in virtue of an enquiry conducted by

the method which I have endeavoured to follow and to illustrate. The

study of Ethics would, no doubt, be far more simple, and its results

far more ‘systematic,’ if, for instance, pain were an evil of exactly

the same magnitude as pleasure is a good; but we have no reason

whatever to assume that the Universe is such that ethical truths must

display this kind of symmetry: no argument against my conclusion,

that pleasure and pain do _not_ thus correspond, can have any weight

whatever, failing a careful examination of the instances which have

led me to form it. Nevertheless I am content that the results of this

chapter should be taken rather as illustrating the method which must

be pursued in answering the fundamental question of Ethics, and the

principles which must be observed, than as giving the correct answer

to that question. That things intrinsically good or bad are many and

various; that most of them are ‘organic unities,’ in the peculiar and

definite sense to which I have confined the term; and that our only

means of deciding upon their intrinsic value and its degree, is by

carefully distinguishing exactly what the thing is, about which we ask

the question, and then looking to see whether it has or has not the

unique predicate ‘good’ in any of its various degrees: these are the

conclusions, upon the truth of which I desire to insist. Similarly, in

my last chapter, with regard to the question ‘What ought we to do?’

I have endeavoured rather to shew exactly what is the meaning of the

question, and what difficulties must consequently be faced in answering

it, than to prove that any particular answers are true. And that these

two questions, having precisely the nature which I have assigned to

them, are _the_ questions which it is the object of Ethics to answer,

may be regarded as the main result of the preceding chapters. These

are the questions which ethical philosophers have always been mainly

concerned to answer, although they have not recognised what their

question was--what predicate they were asserting to attach to things.

The practice of asking what things are virtues or duties, without

distinguishing what these terms mean; the practice of asking what ought

to be here and now, without distinguishing whether as means or end--for

its own sake or for that of its results; the search for one single

_criterion_ of right or wrong, without the recognition that in order

to discover a criterion we must first know what things _are_ right or

wrong; and the neglect of the principle of ‘organic unities’--these

sources of error have hitherto been almost universally prevalent in

Ethics. The conscious endeavour to avoid them all, and to apply to

all the ordinary objects of ethical judgment these two questions and

these only: Has it intrinsic value? and Is it a means to the best

possible?--this attempt, so far as I know, is entirely new; and its

results, when compared with those habitual to moral philosophers, are

certainly sufficiently surprising: that to Common Sense they will not

appear so strange, I venture to hope and believe. It is, I think,

much to be desired that the labour commonly devoted to answering such

questions as whether certain ‘ends’ are more or less ‘comprehensive’

or more or less ‘consistent’ with one another--questions, which, even

if a precise meaning were given to them, are wholly irrelevant to the

proof of any ethical conclusion--should be diverted to the separate

investigation of these two clear problems.

=135.= The main object of this chapter has been to define roughly

the class of things, among which we may expect to find either great

intrinsic goods or great intrinsic evils; and particularly to point

out that there is a vast variety of such things, and that the simplest

of them are, with one exception, highly complex wholes, composed of

parts which have little or no value in themselves. All of them involve

consciousness of an object, which is itself usually highly complex,

and almost all involve also an emotional attitude towards this object;

but, though they thus have certain characteristics in common, the vast

variety of qualities in respect of which they differ from one another

are equally essential to their value: neither the generic character

of all, nor the specific character of each, is either greatly good

or greatly evil by itself; they owe their value or demerit, in each

case, to the presence of both. My discussion falls into three main

divisions, dealing respectively (1) with unmixed goods, (2) with evils,

and (3) with mixed goods. (1) Unmixed goods may all be said to consist

in the love of beautiful things or of good persons: but the number of

different goods of this kind is as great as that of beautiful objects,

and they are also differentiated from one another by the different

emotions appropriate to different objects. These goods are undoubtedly

good, even where the things or persons loved are imaginary; but it

was urged that, where the thing or person is real and is believed to

be so, these two facts together, when combined with the mere love of

the qualities in question, constitute a whole which is greatly better

than that mere love, having an additional value quite distinct from

that which belongs to the existence of the object, where that object

is a good person. Finally it was pointed out that the love of mental

qualities, by themselves, does not seem to be so great a good as that

of mental and material qualities together; and that, in any case, an

immense number of the best things are, or include, a love of material

qualities (113-123). (2) Great evils may be said to consist either

(_a_) in the love of what is evil or ugly, or (_b_) in the hatred of

what is good or beautiful, or (_c_) in the consciousness of pain.

Thus the consciousness of pain, if it be a great evil, is the only

exception to the rule that all great goods and great evils involve both

a cognition and an emotion directed towards its object (124-128). (3)

Mixed goods are those which include some element which is evil or ugly.

They may be said to consist either in hatred of what is ugly or of

evils of classes (_a_) and (_b_), or in compassion for pain. But where

they include an evil, which actually exists, its demerit seems to be

always great enough to outweigh the positive value which they possess

(129-133).

INDEX.

Aesthetic

enjoyments 189-202, 203

judgment 215

temperament 216

Aesthetics 200

Affection

beauty of 204-5

misdirected 195, 198

reciprocal 198

value of 188-9, 203-5

Altruism 96-7, 167

Analytic judgments 7, 29, 33-4, 35, 220-1

Appreciation 189-90, 200, 204-5, 221

Approval 131

Approve 60

Approbation 171

Appropriate, inappropriate 192, 199, 204-5, 209, 211, 220

defined 190

Aristotle 4

definition of virtue 171

valuation of virtues 176-7

valuation of knowledge 199

Art

value of 188

_representative_, value of 193, 195, 196, 200

Autonomy 127

Bad 5, 27, 28, 95, 140, 143, 157, 178, 181, 188, 209, 210, 213, 214,

216, 218

‘Based on’ 38, 49, 54, 114, 115, 118, 120, 122, 144

Beauty

corporeal 203-4

no criterion of 202

definition of 201-2, 208

mental 203-5

‘seeing’ of 190-1

value of 28, 81-2, 83-5, 86, 94, 188-9, 201-2, 209, 211, 224

Being, dist. from existence 110-11

Belief, value of 193-200, 208, 210-11, 212, 219, 224-5

Benevolence, Sidgwick’s ‘principle of Rational’ 102-3

Bentham 145

naturalistic fallacy 17-19

quantity of pleasure 77-8

Bradley, F. H.

pleasure and desire 70

theory of judgment 125

Butler, Bishop 86, 206

Casuistry 4-5

Causal judgments

relation to Ethics 21-7, 36, 146-8, 149, 180

Causal relations 31-3, 34-6

Chastity 158

Classical style 215-16

Christ

on value of motives 178

on love 179

Christian Ethics 178

on ‘external’ rightness 177

on ‘internal’ rightness 178-9

on value of motives 177-9

on value of virtue 174

Clifford, W. K. 40

Cognition

of evil 217-19

dist. from knowledge 194

relation to will and feeling 129-30, 133, 135-6, 141

value of 85, 189-92, 194, 199, 208, 212, 224, 225

Commands, confused with moral laws 128-9, 141

Common sense 224

on value of pleasure 86, 91-2, 94-5

on duties 156-9

Compassion 217, 219, 220, 225

Conduct, relation of to Ethics 2-3, 146, 180

Conscience

defined 178

not infallible 149, 180

Conscientiousness 218

defined 179

utility of 180

Contempt 211, 217

Corporeal beauty 203-4

Courage 217

Crimes 161

Criterion

of beauty 202

evolution as 46, 50, 55-6

of goodness 137-8

pleasure as 91-2, 94-5, 108

of right and wrong 223

will as 137-8

of truth 133

Cruelty 209-11, 218

Darwin 47

Definition, nature of 6-9, 18-20

Desirable, meaning of 65-7, 73

Desire, cause and object of 68-70, 73-4

Duty

= cause of or means to good 24-5, 105, 146-8, 167, 180, 223

fuller definitions of 148, 161, 180-1, 222

incapable of being known 149-50, 181

mainly negative 218

object of _psychological_ intuition 148

relations to expediency 167-70, 181

interest 170-1, 181

possibility 150-2

rightness 148

utility 146-7, 167-70

virtue 172

will 160, 161

not self-evident 148, 181

self-regarding 168

Egoistic Hedonism 18

Egoism, as doctrine of end 18, 96-105, 109

contradiction of 99, 101-5, 109

relation to Hedonism 97-8

relation to Naturalistic Hedonism 104-5

Sidgwick’s ‘Rational’ 98-9, 102-4

Egoism, as doctrine of means 96-7, 105, 167

Emotion

aesthetic 190

value of 189-92, 199, 203, 204-5, 208, 209, 211, 212, 217, 224, 225

Empirical 39, 111, 123

Empiricism 103, 124-5, 130

End = effect 32

End = good in itself 18, 24, 64-6, 72, 73, 79-81, 83, 85, 94-5, 184,

216

dist. from ‘good as means’ 24, 72, 74, 79-81, 89, 90, 94-5, 106-7,

173-4, 178, 216, 223

‘ultimate’ 51, 83, 85, 96-7, 99-102, 183, 189

‘never justifies means’ 147, 163

End = object of desire 68, 70, 71, 72

Enjoyment 77, 96, 188, 208

aesthetic 188-9, 203

of evil and ugly 208-11, 218

sexual 95

Envy 211

Epistemology 133, 140-1

Ethics

Evolutionistic 46, 50, 54, 58

Metaphysical 39, 58, 113-15

Naturalistic 39-41, 58, 59

Practical 115-18, 140, 146, 149, 151, 154, 180, 222

province of 1-6, 21, 24, 26-7, 36, 37, 77, 115, 118, 142-6, 184,

222-4

Eudaemonist 175

Evil 153, 156, 158, 160, 186, 193, 205, 207-14, 224, 225

mixed 208, 209, 211

positive value of 216-22, 225

Evolution 46-8, 54-8

Evolutionistic 46, 50, 52, 54, 58

Existence

dist. from being 110-12

judgments about 123-5

relation to value 115-18, 118-22, 125-6, 194, 196, 197-9, 206, 210,

216, 219, 220, 221, 225

Expediency 167-70, 181

Feeling

supposed analogy to cognition 129-31, 141

supposed bearing on Ethics 129-31, 141

Fiction 121-2

Freedom, value of 86, 186

Freedom (of Will) 127

God 82, 102-4

love of 113, 194, 195-6, 200

Good

indefinable 6-16, 41, 79, 110-11, 142-4

= means to good 21, 24

the Absolute 183, 184, 186

the Human 183, 184, 186

mixed and unmixed 208, 209, 214, 215, 217, 219-20, 224

my own 97-9, 101, 170

‘private’ 99

_the_ 8-9, 18

‘Universal’ 99-102

Will 174-5, 179 _n._ 2, 180

Green, T. H. 139

Guyau, M. 46

Habit 171, 175-6, 177

Hatred 211, 214

of beautiful and good 211, 217, 225

of evil and ugly 178, 217, 218, 220, 221, 225

Health 42-3, 65, 157, 167

Heaven 115, 174, 183, 185, 195

upon Earth 186

Hedonism 39, 52, 59-63, 90-1, 96, 108-9, 174

Egoistic 18

Ethical 70, 144

Intuitionistic 59, 74-6, 144

Naturalistic 46, 50, 53, 54, 68, 104, 105

Psychological 18, 68, 69, 70, 73

Universalistic 103

Hegel 30, 34, 110

Heteronomous 127

Higher 48-9, 78

Hobbes 97

Honesty 175-6

Hypothetical laws 22, 155

Ideal

three meanings of 183-4

_the_ 183, 185, 205-7, 220-1

Idealistic 130, 205

Imagination, value of 193, 194, 196, 197, 210, 219, 220, 221, 224

Imperative 128

Industry 157, 167

Intention 179 _n._ 1

Interest 102

meaning of 97-8, 106, 170-1

dist. from ‘duty’ 170-1, 181

Intrinsic

evil 207, 213, 218, 224

value 17, 21, 25-30, 36, 147, 173-7, 187, 189, 207, 214-16, 222-4

Intuition

= proposition incapable of proof 59, 77, 108

in psychological sense 75, 79, 85, 92, 108, 144, 148-9, 173

Intuitionism

in Sidgwick’s sense 59, 76, 144

in proper sense 106, 148

Judgment

error of 192-3

two types of ethical 21, 23-7, 115, 146, 148, 222, 224

Justice 178

Justify 97, 101, 147, 163

Kant 110, 129

‘Copernican revolution’ 133

value of Good Will 174-5, 179 _n._ 2, 180

value of Happiness 174-5

theory of judgment 125

‘Kingdom of Ends’ 113

‘practical love’ 179

connection of ‘goodness’ with ‘will’ 126-8

Knowledge

involves truth of object 132, 134

involves belief 194

value of 82, 86, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 211, 221

Lasciviousness 209-10

Law

ethical 155

hypothetical 22, 155

legal 126, 128

moral 126-8, 146, 148, 160, 162, 165

natural 26, 29, 57, 126, 183, 186

scientific 22-3, 124, 155

Legal 126, 128

Leibniz 125

Life 15, 46, 50, 52, 156

Logical

dependence 61, 110, 118, 122, 139, 143-4

fallacy 140-1

Love

Christ and Kant on 179

of beautiful and good 177-9, 199, 204, 217, 224

of evil and ugly 209, 210, 211, 217, 225

Lucian 45

Lust 209-10, 218

Lying 154

Mackenzie, Prof. J. S. 114, 120

Material qualities, value of 204, 205-7, 221, 225

Matter, value of 205-7

Meaning, ‘to have no’ 31, 34-5

Means = cause or necessary condition 18, 21-3, 89, 180

dist. from ‘part of organic whole’ 27, 29-30, 32, 220

goodness as, dist. from intrinsic value 21, 24, 26, 27, 37, 72, 74,

79-81, 89, 90, 94-5, 106-7, 115, 118, 173-4, 178, 187, 195-6,

197-8, 216, 223

‘not justified by end’ 147, 163

Mental

beauty of 203-5, 225

value of 205-7

Mercy 178

Metaphysical 39, 58, 110-15, 139-40

Method

of discovering intrinsic value 20, 36, 59-60, 64, 89, 91, 92, 93, 95,

142-5, 173, 185-6, 187-8, 195, 197-8, 206-7, 209, 223

of discovering value as means 22-3, 146, 148-54, 172-3

Mill, J. S. 145

Hedonism 63-81, 108

naturalistic fallacy 40, 66-7, 69, 72-3, 74, 104, 108

Psychological Hedonism 68, 72, 73-4

quality of pleasure 77-81, 108

Utilitarianism 104-5

Moral

approbation 171

law 126-8, 146, 148, 160, 162, 165

obligation 128

sentiment 168, 178, 217-19

Motive 67, 70, 177, 178-80

Murder 148, 151, 154, 156-7, 178

Natural

laws 26, 29, 57, 126, 183, 186

objects and properties 13-14, 39-41, 58, 110-11

selection 47

Natural = normal 42-4, 58

Natural = necessary 44-5, 58

Naturalism 20, 40, 58, 144

Naturalistic

Ethics 39-41, 58, 59

fallacy 10, 13-14, 18-20, 38-9, 48, 57, 58, 61, 64, 66-7, 69, 72-3,

74, 104, 108, 114, 118, 124, 125, 139, 173, 176, 201

Hedonism 46, 50, 53, 54, 68, 104, 105

Nature 40-1, 110, 111, 112

Nature, life according to 41-2, 113

Nature, value of 188, 193, 195, 200, 206

Necessity

analytic 22, 33-4, 35, 220, 221

causal or natural 29, 31-2, 34, 186, 187

New Testament 177, 178, 179

Object

of cognition 141, 191, 192, 193, 211

of desire 68-70

natural 13-14, 39-41, 58, 110-11

Objective 82, 201

Obligation

moral 103, 128, 147

Obligatory 25, 148, 170

Organic relation, unity, whole

common usage 30-6

my own usage 27-31, 32-3, 36, 93, 96, 149, 184, 187, 189, 190, 202,

206, 208, 212, 215, 220, 223

Ought

to aim at 24-6, 100

to do 26, 105, 115, 116, 117, 127, 128, 140, 146, 148, 173, 180, 223

to be or exist 17, 115, 118, 127, 128, 148, 173, 180, 223

Pain 64, 65, 210, 212-4, 217, 222-3, 225

Particular 3-4

Perception 111, 112, 134, 136

Pessimism 51, 53, 156

Plato

on Egoism 98

on goods 178

on Hedonism 88

on value of Knowledge 199

on universal truths 111

Pleasure 12-13, 16

consciousness of 87-91, 109, 212

as criterion 91-2, 108

and desire 68-71, 73-4

and ‘pleasures’ 79

‘quality of’ 77-81

value of 39, 46, 50-4, 59-66, 71-2, 74-5, 79-81, 83, 85-96, 144,

146, 171, 173, 174, 188, 205, 212-14, 222-3

Pity 217, 221

Positive science 39

Possible action 150-1

Practical 216, 221

Ethics 115-18, 140, 146, 149, 151, 154, 180, 222

Philosophy 2

Practice 2, 20

Praise 171

Preference 77-9, 131

Promises 157

Property, respect of 157

Propositions, types of 123-6

Prove 11, 65, 66, 74, 75-7, 99, 112, 137, 141, 143, 145, 169, 181

Prudence 168

‘Maxim of’ 102-4

Psychological 11, 130, 140, 148

Hedonism 18, 68, 69, 70, 73

Punishment 164

retributive or vindictive 214, 215, 216, 221

Reason 143-4

Representative art 193

Reward 174

Right 18, 24-5, 105, 146, 180, 216, 218, 223

dist. from ‘duty’ 148

relation to expediency 167

externally 176-7

internally 179 _n._ 1

Romantic style 215-16

Rousseau 42

Sanctions 159, 164

Secondary qualities 206

Self-evidence 143, 144, 148, 181

Self-realisation 113, 114, 120, 188

Self-sacrifice 170

Sensation 134

Sensationalist 130

Sidgwick, Henry 145

value of beauty 81-4, 85-7

on Bentham 17-19

rationality of Egoism 99-103

‘good’ unanalysable 17

Hedonism 59, 63, 64, 81-7, 91-6, 108-9

‘method’ of Intuitionism 59, 92-4

value of knowledge 82, 86

neglects principle of organic wholes 93

pleasure as criterion 91-2, 94-5

quality of pleasure 77, 81

value of unconscious 81-4

Sins 161

Spencer, Herbert 46, 48-58

Spinoza 110, 113

Spiritual, value of 205-6

Summum Bonum 183, 205

Stoics 41, 110

Synthetic 7, 58, 143

Taste, error of 192-3, 211

Taylor, A. E. 60

Temperance 157, 168

Theodicies 220

Tragedy 219, 221

Truth

relation to existence 111, 124-5

cognition 130, 132-4, 136, 141, 196

knowledge 134, 194

types of 111-12, 124-5

value of 85-6, 193-200, 208, 210, 211, 212

Tyndall 40

Ugly 208, 209-11, 214, 216-19, 221

Ultimate end 51, 83, 85, 96-7, 99-102, 183, 189

Unity 222

organic, see ‘Organic’

Universal

Good 99-102

truths 21-3, 27, 57, 111, 126, 154-5, 181

Universalistic Hedonism 103

Useful 106, 146, 167

Utilitarianism 63, 96, 99, 104-7, 109

Utopias 183, 186

Value

intrinsic 17, 21, 25-30, 36, 147, 173-7, 187, 189, 207, 214-16, 222-4

as means 21, 174, 195-6

negative 215, 216

Vice 171, 209, 211

Virtue

definition of 171-3, 181, 223

three kinds of 175

mixed 221

relation to ‘duty’ 172

value of 83, 85, 86, 87, 173-80, 181-2, 217-19, 221-2

Volition

supposed coordination with cognition 129-30, 133, 135-6, 141

supposed bearing on Ethics 130, 136, 141

Whole

good as a 208, 214-16, 219, 221

good on the 214-16, 219, 220, 221

organic, see ‘Organic’

Wickedness 220

Will

as criterion of value 137-8

relation to duty 160, 161, 180

the Good 174-5, 179 _n._ 2, 180

supposed analogy to cognition 129-30, 135-6

supposed bearing on Ethics 126-7, 128-31, 135-9, 141

Wrong 180, 218, 223

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AT THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS