ETHICS IN RELATION TO CONDUCT.
=86.= The question to be discussed in this chapter must
be clearly distinguished from the two questions hitherto
discussed, namely (1) What is the nature of the proposition:
‘This is good in itself’? 142
=87.= and (2) What things are good in themselves? to which we
gave one answer in deciding that pleasure was not the only
thing good in itself. 144
=88.= In this chapter we shall deal with the _third_ object of
ethical enquiry: namely answers to the question ‘What conduct
is a _means_ to good results?’ or ‘What ought we to do?’ This
is the question of _Practical_ Ethics, and its answer involves
an assertion of _causal_ connection. 146
=89.= It is shewn that the assertions ‘This action is right’
or ‘is my duty’ are equivalent to the assertion that the total
results of the action in question will be the best possible; 146
=90.= and the rest of the chapter will deal with certain
conclusions, upon which light is thrown by this fact. Of which
the first is (1) that Intuitionism is mistaken; since no
proposition with regard to duty can be self-evident. 148
=91.= (2) It is plain that we cannot hope to prove which
among all the actions, which it is possible for us to perform
on every occasion, will produce the best total results:
to discover what is our ‘duty,’ in this strict sense, is
impossible. It may, however, be possible to shew which among
the actions, which we are _likely_ to perform, will produce
the best results. 149
=92.= The distinction made in the last § is further explained;
and it is insisted that all that Ethics has done or can do, is,
_not_ to determine absolute duties, but to point out which,
among a _few_ of the alternatives, possible under _certain_
circumstances, will have the better results. 150
=93.= (3) Even this latter task is immensely difficult, and
no adequate proof that the total results of one action are
superior to those of another, has ever been given. For (_a_)
we can only calculate actual results within a comparatively
near future: we must, therefore, assume that no results of the
same action in the infinite future beyond, will reverse the
balance--an assumption which perhaps _can_ be, but certainly
has not been, justified; 152
=94.= and (_b_) even to decide that, of any two actions, one
has a better total result than the other _in the immediate
future_, is very difficult; and it is very improbable, and
quite impossible to prove, that any single action is _in all
cases_ better as means than its probable alternative. Rules
of duty, even in this restricted sense, can only, at most, be
_general_ truths. 154
=95.= But (_c_) most of the actions, most universally approved
by Common Sense, may perhaps be shewn to be _generally_ better
as means than any probable alternative, on the following
principles. (1) With regard to some rules it may be shewn
that their general observance would be useful in any state of
society, where the instincts to preserve and propagate life and
to possess property were as strong as they seem always to be;
and this utility may be shewn, independently of a right view as
to what is good in itself, since the observance is a means to
things which are a necessary condition for the attainment of
_any_ great goods in considerable quantities. 155
=96.= (2) Other rules are such that their general observance
can only be shewn to be useful, as means to the preservation
of society, under more or less temporary conditions: if any of
these are to be proved useful in _all_ societies, this can only
be done by shewing their causal relation to things good or evil
in themselves, which are not generally recognised to be such. 158
=97.= It is plain that rules of class (1) may _also_ be
justified by the existence of such temporary conditions as
justify those of class (2); and among such temporary conditions
must be reckoned the so-called _sanctions_. 159
=98.= In this way, then, it may be possible to prove the
_general_ utility, for the present, of those actions, which in
our society are _both_ generally recognised as duties _and_
generally practised; but it seems very doubtful whether a
conclusive case can be established for any proposed change in
social custom, without an independent investigation of what
things are good or bad in themselves. 159
=99.= And (_d_) if we consider the distinct question of how a
single individual should decide to act (α) in cases where the
_general_ utility of the action in question is certain, (β) in
other cases: there seems reason for thinking that, with regard
to (α), where the generally useful rule is also generally
observed, he should _always_ conform to it; but these reasons
are not conclusive, if _either_ the general observance _or_ the
general utility is wanting: 162
=100.= and that (β) in all other cases, _rules of action_
should not be followed at all, but the individual should
consider what positive goods, _he_, in his particular
circumstances, seems likely to be able to effect, and what
evils to avoid. 164
=101.= (4) It follows further that the distinction denoted by
the terms ‘duty’ and ‘expediency’ is not primarily ethical:
when we ask ‘Is this really expedient?’ we are asking precisely
the same question as when we ask ‘Is this my duty?,’ viz.
‘Is this a means to the best possible?.’ ‘Duties’ are mainly
distinguished by the non-ethical marks (1) that many people
are often tempted to avoid them, (2) that their most prominent
effects are on others than the agent, (3) that they excite
the moral sentiments: so far as they _are_ distinguished by
an ethical peculiarity, this is not that they are peculiarly
useful to perform, but that they are peculiarly useful to
sanction. 167
=102.= The distinction between ‘duty’ and ‘interest’ is
also, in the main, the same non-ethical distinction: but
the term ‘interested’ does also refer to a distinct ethical
predicate--that an action is to ‘my interest’ asserts only that
it will have the best possible effects of one particular kind,
not that its total effects will be the best possible. 170
=103.= (5) We may further see that ‘virtues’ are not to be
defined as dispositions that are good in themselves: they are
not necessarily more than dispositions to perform actions
generally good as means, and of these, for the most part,
only those classed as ‘duties’ in accordance with section
(4). It follows that to decide whether a disposition is or is
not ‘virtuous’ involves the difficult causal investigation
discussed in section (3); and that what is a virtue in one
state of society may not be so in another. 171
=104.= It follows also that we have no reason to presume, as
has commonly been done, that the exercise of virtue in the
performance of ‘duties’ is ever good in itself--far less, that
it is the sole good: 173
=105.= and, if we consider the intrinsic value of such
exercise, it will appear (1) that, in most cases, it has no
value, and (2) that even the cases, where it has some value,
are far from constituting the sole good. The truth of the
latter proposition is generally inconsistently implied, even by
those who deny it; 174
=106.= but in order fairly to decide upon the intrinsic value
of virtue, we must distinguish three different kinds of
disposition, each of which is commonly so called and has been
maintained to be the only kind deserving the name. Thus (_a_)
the mere unconscious ‘habit’ of performing duties, which is the
commonest type, has no intrinsic value whatsoever; Christian
moralists are right in implying that mere ‘external rightness’
has no intrinsic value, though they are wrong in saying that it
is therefore not ‘virtuous,’ since this implies that it has no
value even as a means: 175
=107.= (_b_) where virtue consists in a disposition to have,
and be moved by, a sentiment of love towards really good
consequences of an action and of hatred towards really evil
ones, it has some intrinsic value, but its value may vary
greatly in degree: 177
=108.= finally (_c_) where virtue consists in
‘conscientiousness,’ _i.e._ the disposition not to act, in
certain cases, until we believe and feel that our action is
right, it seems to have some intrinsic value: the value of this
feeling has been peculiarly emphasized by Christian Ethics, but
it certainly is not, as Kant would lead us to think, either the
sole thing of value, or always good even as a means. 178
=109.= Summary of chapter. 180