HEDONISM.
=36.= The prevalence of Hedonism is mainly due to the
naturalistic fallacy. 59
=37.= Hedonism may be defined as the doctrine that ‘Pleasure is
the sole good’: this doctrine has always been held by Hedonists
and used by them as a fundamental ethical principle, although
it has commonly been confused with others. 61
=38.= The method pursued in this chapter will consist in
exposing the reasons commonly offered for the truth of Hedonism
and in bringing out the reasons, which suffice to shew it
untrue, by a criticism of J. S. Mill & H. Sidgwick. 63
A.
=39.= Mill declares that ‘Happiness is the only thing desirable
as an end,’ and insists that ‘Questions of ultimate ends are
not amenable to direct proof’; 64
=40.= yet he gives a proof of the first proposition, which
consists in (1) the fallacious confusion of ‘desirable’ with
‘desired,’ 66
=41.= (2) an attempt to shew that nothing but pleasure is
desired. 67
=42.= The theory that nothing but pleasure is desired seems
largely due to a confusion between the _cause_ and the _object_
of desire: pleasure is certainly not the sole _object_ of
desire, and, even if it is always among the _causes_ of desire,
that fact would not tempt anyone to think it a good. 68
=43.= Mill attempts to reconcile his doctrine that pleasure is
the sole object of desire with his admission that other things
are desired, by the absurd declaration that what is a means to
happiness is ‘part’ of happiness. 71
=44.= Summary of Mill’s argument and of my criticism. 72
B.
=45.= We must now proceed to consider the principle of Hedonism
as an ‘Intuition,’ as which it has been clearly recognised
by Prof. Sidgwick alone. That it should be thus incapable of
_proof_ is not, in itself, any reason for dissatisfaction. 74
=46.= In thus beginning to consider what things are good in
themselves, we leave the refutation of Naturalism behind, and
enter on the second division of ethical questions. 76
=47.= Mill’s doctrine that some pleasures are superior ‘in
quality’ to others implies both (1) that judgments of ends must
be ‘intuitions’; 77
=48.= and (2) that pleasure is _not_ the sole good. 79
=49.= Prof. Sidgwick has avoided these confusions made by
Mill: in considering his arguments we shall, therefore, merely
consider the question ‘Is pleasure the sole good?’ 81
=50.= Prof. Sidgwick first tries to shew that nothing outside
of Human Existence can be good. Reasons are given for doubting
this. 81
=51.= He then goes on to the far more important proposition
that no part of Human Existence, except pleasure, is desirable. 85
=52.= But _pleasure_ must be distinguished from _consciousness
of pleasure_, and (1) it is plain that, when so distinguished,
_pleasure_ is not the sole good; 87
=53.= and (2) it may be made equally plain that _consciousness
of pleasure_ is not the sole good, if we are equally careful to
distinguish it from its usual accompaniments. 90
=54.= Of Prof. Sidgwick’s two arguments for the contrary view,
the second is equally compatible with the supposition that
pleasure is a mere _criterion_ of what is _right_; 91
=55.= and in his first, the appeal to reflective intuition,
he fails to put the question clearly (1) in that he does not
recognise the principle of _organic unities_; 92
=56.= and (2) in that he fails to emphasize that the agreement,
which he has tried to shew, between hedonistic judgments and
those of Common Sense, only holds of _judgments of means_:
hedonistic judgments of _ends_ are flagrantly paradoxical. 94
=57.= I conclude, then, that a reflective intuition, if proper
precautions are taken, will agree with Common Sense that it is
absurd to regard mere consciousness of pleasure as the sole
good. 95
C.
=58.= It remains to consider Egoism and Utilitarianism. It
is important to distinguish the former, as the doctrine that
‘my own pleasure is sole good,’ from the doctrine, opposed to
Altruism, that to pursue my own pleasure exclusively is right
_as a means_. 96
=59.= Egoism proper is utterly untenable, being
self-contradictory: it fails to perceive that when I declare
a thing to be my own good, I must be declaring it to be _good
absolutely_ or else not good at all. 97
=60.= This confusion is further brought out by an examination
of Prof. Sidgwick’s contrary view; 99
=61.= and it is shewn that, in consequence of this confusion,
his representation of ‘the relation of Rational Egoism to
Rational Benevolence’ as ‘the profoundest problem of Ethics,’
and his view that a certain hypothesis is required to ‘make
Ethics rational,’ are grossly erroneous. 102
=62.= The same confusion is involved in the attempt to infer
Utilitarianism from Psychological Hedonism, as commonly held,
_e.g._ by Mill. 104
=63.= Egoism proper seems also to owe its plausibility to its
confusion with Egoism, as a doctrine of means. 105
=64.= Certain ambiguities in the conception of Utilitarianism
are noticed; and it is pointed out (1) that, as a doctrine
of the end to be pursued, it is finally refuted by the
refutation of Hedonism, and (2) that, while the arguments most
commonly urged in its favour could, at most, only shew it to
offer a correct _criterion_ of right action, they are quite
insufficient even for this purpose. 105
=65.= Summary of chapter. 108