But neither in the importation of exotic socialistic germs n

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THE FALL

OF THE

GREAT REPUBLIC.

BOSTON:

ROBERTS BROTHERS.

1886.

_Copyright_, 1885,

BY ROBERTS BROTHERS.

University Press:

JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE.

THE FALL

OF THE

GREAT REPUBLIC.

(1886–88.)

BY

SIR HENRY STANDISH COVERDALE

(_Intendant for the Board of European Administration

in the Province of New York._)

“O Liberty! Liberty! How many crimes are committed

in thy name!”

_By Permission of the Bureau of Press Censorship._

NEW YORK:

1895.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

I. INTRODUCTORY.--THE “HARD TIMES”

OF 1882–1887 7

II. THE MORAL INTERREGNUM 15

III. THE SOCIALISTIC POISON 27

IV. THE RULE OF IRELAND IN AMERICA 32

V. THE FIRST ERUPTION 51

VI. ANXIOUS FOREBODINGS 77

VII. THE REVOLUTIONISTS’ MASTER-STROKE 86

VIII. THE REIGN OF ANARCHY 96

IX. ATTEMPTS TO SAVE THE GOVERNMENT 103

X. THE LAST PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES 115

XI. A PRECIOUS TRIUMVIRATE 124

XII. WAR WITH ENGLAND 128

XIII. CAPTURE OF BOSTON 141

XIV. THE EUROPEAN COALITION 159

XV. THE ALLIES ATTACK NEW YORK 171

XVI. THE FINAL STRUGGLE 192

XVII. FOREIGN OCCUPATION 198

APPENDIX.

I. THE SOCIALISTIC SPIRIT IN 1885 207

II. A REVOLUTION NEAR AT HAND.--“IT

MUST COME” 209

III. A FEMALE SOCIALIST’S ADVICE 211

IV. ATHEISM, COMMUNISM, AND ANARCHY 212

V. THE FORCES ARRAYED AGAINST CIVILIZATION 213

VI. THE PROSPECTS OF AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN

DYNAMITERS AND COMMUNISTS 214

VII. TWO CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS 215

VIII. THE COURTS.--ONE JOURNALISTIC WARNING

OUT OF MANY 217

IX. THE UNPROTECTED ATLANTIC COAST 218

X. A SINGLE ILLUSTRATION OF THE IRISH-AMERICAN

SPIRIT 219

XI. THE ARMY OF THE DISCONTENTED 222

XII. DEFENDING DYNAMITE ASSASSINATION 223

THE FALL OF THE GREAT REPUBLIC.

I.

INTRODUCTORY.--THE “HARD TIMES” OF

1882–1887.

It is my purpose to relate the fall of the Great Republic. I shall be

brief, yet shall omit no detail necessary to a perfect comprehension of

the causes which underlay the catastrophe and the events through which

it came to pass. I shall set forth the curious sequence of ignorance,

wickedness, and folly which led to the terrible result. I shall show

how the boasted wisdom of the fathers became the inherited curse of

their descendants. I shall describe the political and social revolution

by which in a few months a nation of grand promise, and with a history

unequalled for its century of growth and achievement, was transformed

into the most pitiful wreck of all time. I shall narrate the story

whose outcome has proved to the world the utter futility of the

experiment of popular self-government, until men shall have attained a

richer knowledge and a sweeter morality than thus far exist.

The citizens of the United States felt at the close of the Civil

War of 1861–1865 that they had demonstrated their ability to govern

themselves wisely and successfully. They considered the experimental

stage of their history passed, the volume completed and closed, the

verdict rendered. They imagined the possibility of no greater strain

on their institutions than had already been triumphantly endured. In

truth, there was the appearance of reason in their conviction. No

nation had ever more successfully passed the ordeal of civil strife.

The magnanimity shown to the conquered rebels after the war, even

after the assassination of Lincoln; the temperate endurance with which

the country suffered the incubus of Johnson’s maudlin administration;

the rapidity and ease with which the enormous war-debt was paid off;

the general good-nature which averted bloodshed during the disputed

election of 1876; the smoothness with which the administrative

machinery bore the shock of Garfield’s murder,--all these events,

coming closely after the vindication of the national idea and of

personal liberty in the suppression of the Southern rebellion,

convinced the people of the United States, and those of other lands

as well, that “the experiment of popular self-government” had really

achieved success.

And yet there had been warnings enough of the volcano smouldering

underfoot, if the eyes and ears of public men had been open to see and

hear. Beginning at the time of President Garfield’s assassination, the

one cry which went up from the common people, the working people of

the land, was for years that of “Hard Times.” Business received a blow

in that year from which it did not recover. Trade was slow and meagre;

purchases of all sorts were made “from hand to mouth;” workshops and

factories lay idle because there was insufficient demand for their

products; men who felt keenly the disgrace of failure to support their

families were compelled to beg for public aid to keep their humble

homes and to supply even the most sordid demands of life. For years

the country’s economic policy had been such as to poison the air with

false doctrine and enervate the energies of commerce by vacillating

action. It would be a bootless task to discuss now the relative merits

of “Free-trade” and “Protection” to the United States. Perhaps either

policy, adhered to with reasonable fidelity and administered, as to

its details, with such common-sense as men are accustomed to use in the

conduct of their private affairs, would have obviated the loss of work

and the consequent poverty and want which filled the land, from 1882 to

1887, with a constantly deepening tide of misery. But the whole subject

was made the shuttlecock of petty politics and pitiful politicians,

until the nation ceased to have a policy which could be recognized or

was of any avail as a stay before the sweep of commercial failure and

pecuniary distress.

It is asserted that no less than two and a half million operatives

and working-men were idle in the fall of 1887, when the first serious

outbreaks occurred. By far the larger number of these had been unable

to earn enough, during the preceding two years, to pay the rents

demanded for their cottages and hovels, and were constantly in danger

of ejection, without the hope of finding another home. The land was

filled with idle workmen, many of them foreigners unaccustomed to free

institutions, and bitter in their denunciations of all government,

which was to them the synonym of tyranny. Few, of either foreign or

native birth, were possessed of sufficient discrimination to discover

the underlying causes of their misfortunes, or of wisdom enough to set

about remedying them.

Despite the world-wide knowledge of this lack of remunerative

employment in the United States, the ranks of the unemployed and

dissatisfied there were constantly recruited by immigrants from the

most dangerous classes of Europe. The vigorous action which had been

taken in 1886 and 1887 by the Governments of Germany, Russia, and

Austria, looking to the extirpation in their dominions of socialism,

nihilism, and their kindred poisons, and the refusal of Switzerland,

England, and France to afford asylum to the expelled fanatics, had

forced them to take refuge in America. One or two of the wisest and

bravest among the statesmen of the land raised their voices against

receiving and harboring these men. But the public had few statesmen in

its service. Mere politicians and demagogues were in greater popular

favor than statesmen who despised the cheap tricks and unworthy

flattery which won the common ear. Public men generally had come

to think more of majorities than of principles; to labor for their

own election to office rather than for the good of the country. The

newspapers were commonly partisan and devoted to purely partisan

ends,--the chief of which was, naturally, partisan success. None dared

to do or say anything which might offend and alienate voters; and so

every steamship from Europe continued to bring to the Atlantic ports

of the country full steerage-loads of men who were not thought fit

to live under the Governments of Europe, but who, almost on their

landing, became citizens and voters in the Republic. Added to these

were the tens of thousands of Irishmen whom the stringent measures of

Parliament, adopted after the dynamite explosions of 1884 and 1885,

had driven from their native island. Over half a million able-bodied

men, without mention of women or children, expelled outlaws of Europe,

landed at New York, Boston, and Philadelphia in the two years of

1885 and 1886. They swelled the ranks of workmen without work, and

helped reduce by competition and division the already scanty wages

of labor. Every one of them was a poisonous ferment dropped into the

already over-stimulated mass of popular discontent and agitation. They

invariably united with the existing centres of socialism and Fenianism,

making these organizations, even without other converts, tenfold more

dangerous than they had ever been before.

II.

THE MORAL INTERREGNUM.

It was in many respects a strange era; it justified the phrase which

an eminent writer had suggested for it,--of the “moral interregnum.”

Immersed in the cares of private business, and chiefly actuated by

an insatiable craving for money or the luxury and social distinction

which money brought, the majority of those men who should have been

the stay and support of good government paid little heed to public

affairs, but rather left them to the control of adventurers, of

professional politicians who followed politics as gamblers follow

cards,--for the sake of what they could steal from more honest men,--of

the least intelligent and least moral members of the state. Their

common pleas were, either that they were invariably out-manœuvred

in the political battle by these veteran strategists, and that they

could do no real good at the primaries and the polls, or that the

solid good sense and honesty of the country could be relied upon to

come out and assume control whenever things passed beyond endurance,

and that, meantime, all effort was simply thrown away. It is a natural

assumption, now that the end has been seen of all men, that those who

used these arguments must have been either fools or selfish knaves. Yet

they comprised within their number a large proportion of the successful

business and professional men of the country, who could not have thus

succeeded had they been devoid of all ability, and who certainly

regarded themselves as honest men. The result of their neglect of their

country in behalf of their pockets was that while domestic morality,

both ideal and real, remained in many parts of the land upon a lofty

plane, public morality practically ceased to exist.

Men were elected to office, not because they were fitted for the

positions to which they aspired, nor because any one believed them

fitted, but because they were “available;” because they happened to

have few active enemies; because they were comparatively unknown, and

nothing could be said against them; because they were rich enough to

contribute liberally to corruption funds for the purchase of venal

voters; because, in short, they were especially unfit for either honor,

trust, or responsibility. The tone of public life became deplorably

low. Officials of every station accustomed themselves to ask, when any

course of action offered itself, not “Is it right? Is it wise?” but

“How will it affect my continuance in office? Will it hurt the party’s

prospects?”

Saddest of all and most disheartening was the almost universal extent

to which this feeling spread among the people. They came to consider

this dishonorable and cowardly attitude on the part of Government

officers as natural and quite to be expected. The few who remonstrated

or pleaded for a more honest official spirit were regarded with

good-natured contempt as men meaning well and having lofty ideals, but

too visionary for “practical politics;” as “doctrinaires,” “theorists,”

etc. There has been corruption in other lands and under other forms of

government. But the demoralizing fact in the United States was, not

so much that official corruption and cowardice was the rule, as that

the people who had the power to rebuke and reform such a condition of

things condoned it, took it for granted, continued the corrupt and

cowardly time-servers in office and responsibility, or changed them for

other equally unfit but shrewder rogues.

It was not strange, in this condition of public sentiment, that other

trusts than those of Government were abused. The last decade of the

Republic was signalized by an unprecedented number of defalcations,

embezzlements, and similar crimes against private trust. In the

treatment of these crimes, even more clearly than in regard of

public dereliction, the utter demoralization of public opinion was

demonstrated. It is true that the public prints teemed after each

new rascality with virtuous demands for the infliction of condign

punishment. It is true that prosecuting officers commonly made

complaints and issued warrants with exemplary promptness, taking

good care that the newspapers were duly informed of their energetic

action. It is true that occasional embezzlers were actually punished

by sentences of imprisonment fixed at the minimum extreme of lax and

unjustly lenient laws. But these were exceptional cases. Many of the

embezzlers were men of social standing or of political importance; they

had numerous friends; and, no matter though their guilt was clear as

the day, it was assumed by the nonchalant public,--taken for granted,

even by those who had suffered most,--that these friends would use

all their influence to obstruct or prevent merited punishment. In a

majority of cases they were too successful. Officials who should have

stood faithful sentinels over the public weal to compel the enforcement

of justice, generally bowed before the influence which might be exerted

to oust them from their offices if they should prove inconveniently

virtuous. Sometimes the embezzler was allowed to bribe his custodian

and escape. Sometimes he was admitted to bail in such a trifling

sum that a percentage of his stealings paid the cost of a default.

Sometimes he was allowed to bargain with those whom he had robbed.

It was not considered disgraceful or wrong, if a bank cashier had

stolen enough to ruin his bank, for the directors to accept his offer

to repay half the amount stolen, in consideration of their agreement

not to prosecute him. Public sentiment admitted that this compounding

felony was objectionable, but refused to condemn the directors who

committed the crime for trying to save some of their property from

complete wreck. It was taken for granted that men cared more for their

wealth than for their honor or the public weal. Even such embezzlers as

were actually imprisoned seldom failed to secure from pliant pardoning

boards such commutations as rendered their punishment farcical. It came

to be a common saying that it was safer to rob a bank of a million

dollars than to steal five dollars from a merchant’s till to buy food

for a starving wife or child.

The courts, which should have remained the trust and reliance of the

people, became as untrustworthy as public sentiment itself. Lawyers

adopted the rule that it was their part to win causes for their

clients, right or wrong. “Get money! honestly if you can; but get

money,” was the motto of the business element. “Win your case! by fair

means, if possible; but win your case,” was the motto of the legal

guild. The advocate who won his client’s case by taking advantage of

technicalities or by securing an incapable or prejudiced jury, or

by the introduction of false witnesses whose perjuries could not be

exposed at the moment, was sure to attain wealth and a high position at

the bar. Actual jury-bribing was suspected in many cases; but those who

should have been the first to ferret out such offences cared not enough

about the purity of the courts to trouble their leisure with the matter.

The judges aided in many States to make the courts over which they

presided inefficient and to bring them into public contempt by their

blind adherence to outworn precedent and their indiscriminating

affection for technical pleadings. Though generally men of the highest

personal probity, they might be relied upon in any trial to ignore the

spirit of the law and the interests of society if a clever attorney

could point out in the letter of the law or in some century-old

precedent anything to justify them in so doing. A misplaced comma was

sufficient to overthrow the intent of an entire statute.

This characteristic of the courts found ample room and verge enough for

the most fantastic tricks in a society which was governed by annual

legislatures, pouring forth with each succeeding session a very flood

and freshet of ill-considered and crudely expressed legislation. So

complicated and unintelligible at last became the law that those judges

and counsellors who really loved Justice and persistently sought after

her, were seldom able to discover her form or features through the

mist and fog of statutes and codes and revisions and amendments and

precedents which filled the atmosphere in every court devoted to law

and, ostensibly, to justice. The wisest men and those who devoted

their life-long study to the subject were not always able to tell what

the law really meant, or whether it meant anything, under the varying

interpretations put upon it by different expounders.

Thus it came to pass that any suitor or defendant, provided he was rich

enough to secure adroit and learned counsel, was generally able so to

delay and hamper the naturally loitering steps of the courts as, by

the very law of chance, to bring about opportunities for escape which

time could not help affording him. The rich man, whether in a civil or

a criminal trial, was much more likely to win his case, whatever its

merits, than the man who was unable to employ counsel familiar with the

quips and crookednesses of the law. In truth, the prisoner accused of

crime who was unable to pay large counsel fees or to bring “influence”

to bear in some way or other upon the prosecuting officials, was

apt to be treated with comparative severity. Within the same year a

bank cashier of New York stole $800,000 from his bank, but escaped

all punishment by negotiating with the directors for the return of

$400,000; while a young street thief of the same city was sent to the

penitentiary for twelve years for stealing a penknife worth twenty-five

cents! The needy mechanic who purloined a few dollars worth of old junk

and sold it to buy either bread for his family or liquor for himself

was fairly sure to be punished with as long a term of imprisonment as

the defaulter who made away with millions. He was, moreover, certain

of punishment, if detected; while the greater thief had at least three

chances in four of escaping untouched.

In all directions public sentiment had become corrupted; the popular

aspiration had declined to low and sordid levels: yet men looked calmly

on the sham and humbug and selfishness and dishonesty and injustice

which made up the social order of the time, and felt neither fear nor

disgust. Even those whose moral senses were acute enough to perceive

the rottenness around them stopped their moral olfactories and blinded

their moral vision with the unworthy reflection that the existing

fabric would last out their time; and then the deluge might sweep

whither it would.

III.

THE SOCIALISTIC POISON.

Meanwhile, below the thin and treacherous surface, the volcanic fires

of a socialistic agitation were blazing up with daily increasing

fierceness. The failure of work to laboring men; the widespread and

intense suffering consequent thereupon; the conviction that this was

not due to any lack of zeal or industry on their part, but to the

unequal workings of an artificial and false social order; the growing

belief that poverty had become a bar to civil rights, even in the

courts, and that wealth had become a sufficient protector of injustice

and crime,--all these things combined to add an irresistible weight in

the minds of thousands of the less discriminating among the laboring

class, especially those of foreign birth, to the arguments and appeals

of the socialistic leaders in behalf of a complete overturn,--a

“revolution.”

Some of these socialistic apostles were simply theorists who could

not comprehend why their lofty ideals were in any way impracticable.

Others were fanatics,--honest, zealous, earnest, and illogical as

fanatics have always been. Others were really maniacs, whom a long

life spent under the oppression and tyranny of foreign monarchies had

driven into a fierce and virulent hatred of all government and all

order. Others were men who would have been unwilling to earn their

daily bread by honest industry, had the means been placed at their

hands, but who foresaw in great popular disturbances possibilities

for self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment. All worked harmoniously,

however, in the common direction of social anarchy. They had utterly

unlike conceptions of the new order which ought to be established on

the ruins of the old, but they were united in the one conviction that

the old must be wholly demolished before the task of reconstruction

could be properly begun. And so idealists of noble but impracticable

aspirations, and brawling fanatics, and beery mountebanks, and maniacs

ambitious for unbridled and orderless anarchy, though perhaps not on

speaking terms with each other personally, worked together for one

common end, and that end revolution and destruction.

The vigorous measures which had been taken by all the nations of

Europe between 1885 and 1887 to clear their own borders of these

revolutionists had been effectual in driving hundreds of thousands

of them to America. They brought with them their theories, their

fanaticism, their fierce hatred of all orderly society. Belonging for

the most part themselves to the working-class, they mingled freely with

the discontented and suffering workmen whom they found already too

numerous in the land for the work which was offered either to labor or

to skill. Everywhere they spread the infection of their destructive

theories. Socialistic organizations sprang up, under one name or

another, in almost every city and town and village. Beginning with the

Hocking Valley riots in 1884–1885, and, like those disturbances, in

constantly closer alliance with the trades-unions, these socialistic

societies caused numerous local outbreaks in the districts where

workmen were most numerous and work hardest to obtain. Pittsburg,

Wheeling, and Fall River suffered especial loss in these riots.

So early as the winter of 1884–1885 it was estimated that in New York

city alone eighty-five thousand would-be industrious workmen lay idle,

in addition to other thousands never estimated, because outside the

pale of any possible census-taking, who would not have worked had the

opportunity been offered them. A little more than a year later it was

freely asserted among the socialists of the country that twice this

number were enrolled in their organizations within a radius of ten

miles from the New York city hall. In the outbreaks which occurred at

other places the officers to whom was committed the task of restoring

order generally found themselves opposed most vindictively by men who,

a few years before, would have been regarded as the “bone and sinew”

of the land. It was noted, too, that these men were always the last to

yield to force; that they were always the most sullen and revengeful

when finally compelled to do so; and that, even when convicted and

undergoing imprisonment, they never showed repentance or sorrow except

for failure, constantly boasted of their determination to “try it

over again,” and steadily adhered to the belief they would ultimately

triumph.

IV.

THE RULE OF IRELAND IN AMERICA.

But neither in the importation of exotic socialistic germs nor in the

fungus-like growth of indigenous disaffection and corruption lay the

only dangers of the Republic. The heterogeneous elements which made up

the population of the United States had suffered a great and wholly

unfortunate race-change since the foundation of the Government. At the

close of the Revolution which separated the colonies from England the

country was populated with a sparse but homogeneous people, possessing

in an eminent degree the sterling virtues and the robust common-sense

which characterize the Anglo-Saxon race. The freedom which these men

won and had no capacity for abusing they felt would be safe forever in

the hands of descendants sprung from their loins. The government they

formed was exactly fitted for themselves and for a succeeding nation

possessing their sense of order and their intelligence. But they saw a

vast unexplored continent opening its wealth before them. Their numbers

were but few for its conquest and reclamation. They felt the need of

more men. Relying upon the freedom of the institutions they bequeathed

and upon the virtue and vigor with which they endowed their heirs,

they invited immigration from Europe. They took it for granted that

the immigrants would be few in comparison with the native population,

and that they would be absorbed and assimilated by the majority as

snow-flakes falling in the ocean are absorbed by the great waters and

made a part of them.

At first the stream of immigration which flowed westward was no larger

than they had anticipated, and gave cause for little fear, either by

reason of its size or of the classes and races which composed it. But

before the first fifty years of the Republic had passed, it became

clear that the asylum which it offered was being taken advantage of

chiefly by the Irish, and by the very worst portion of the Irish at

that. They found their own little island too narrow for them, and

flocked to the United States by the hundred thousand. Coming, the most

of them, from the lowest ranks of a degraded and ignorant peasantry,

they found themselves, in the United States as at home, in a position

of inferiority in everything save citizenship. Clannish by race and

religious prejudice, they brought with them all their insular and

ethnic narrowness and exclusiveness, and remained up to the end of the

chapter a class by themselves. Other nationalities sent immigrants who

threw off their old allegiances upon touching American soil, became

in fact as well as in name Americans, intermarried with Americans,

and brought up their children to become wholly American in deed and

aspiration. But the Irish seldom married outside their own race; they

brought up their children to be first Catholic and then Irish as

themselves; they remained, and their descendants after them to the

third and fourth generation, as much Irishmen as their cousins who

continued to inhabit Leinster and Munster.

But they seized with greater eagerness than was exhibited by any other

immigrants every political privilege which was within their reach. In

politics as in all other interests, their clannishness kept them mainly

confined to one party; but even in that they stood as far as possible

aloof from the real and patriotic Americans serving in the same

organization. Coarse of feature and coarser of mind; servile in their

devotion to religious forms, which were never any better than forms

to them; superstitious to the last degree; blunted in moral sense so

as to be amenable to fear alone as a restraining sentiment; utterly

illogical and the slaves of ignorant prejudice,--it would be difficult

to conceive of immigrants from any modern race less fitted than they

for self-government or for exercising a share in the government of

others. There were occasional brilliant and noble exceptions; but of

the majority this picture is not over-colored. Wherever they touched

the political garment they defiled it. In the cities, where their

increase by steady immigration and by their own amazing procreative

fertility gave them the majority, their power was invariably signalized

by a corruption and local tyranny greater than that against which Adams

and Jefferson and Washington revolted. As their numbers increased and

they became more assured of their political power, their arrogance and

reckless abuse of public trust became daily more and more exasperating.

Through all the political changes to which other voters were subject,

they remained in practical effect an organization by themselves. As has

been said, they grasped with insatiate greed every political right and

privilege which the laws afforded them, but refused to become any the

less Irishmen. They stubbornly persisted in putting loyalty to the land

they had abandoned above loyalty to the land they had adopted and which

had opened its hospitality to them. Instead of becoming in reality

as well as name American citizens, they remained Irish citizens, an

_imperium in imperio_, and spoke of their life in the United States,

even while they were exercising the franchise or sharing in the

emoluments of office there, as an “exile.” They boldly proclaimed

themselves “patriots,” because, having fled to the United States and

accepted its protection and its asylum, they still professed greater

devotion and a heartier loyalty to the fatherland they had forsworn

than to the country to which they had solemnly pledged, by becoming

citizens of it, their voluntary and complete allegiance.

In immense numbers these “exiles” united in more or less secret and

criminal associations for the “freeing of Ireland.” At first their

schemes were comparatively peaceful and their meetings open; but as

time passed on, and little visible progress was made in the task of

abrogating English supremacy in Ireland, the plots of the wilder

zealots grew in acceptance, and the machinations of the plotters took

on deadlier aspects. Not only did nine tenths of the later immigrants

hasten into these various societies, but fully as great a proportion

of the American-born sons of Irish refugees went with them. Whatever

may have been their original intentions, such societies as the “Ancient

Order of Hibernians,” the “Clan-na-Gael,” the “Emmet Clubs,” the

“National Leagues,” and the like became in the end a series of widely

ramifying conspiracies. In their meetings the wildest schemes of

vengeance against England were planned, and bloody plots deliberately

woven, not only for the commission of the most fiendish and inhuman

crimes against English men and English women and children, but also

aiming at the embroilment of the United States in actual war with the

other great Anglo-Saxon Power. A large proportion of the most brutal

crimes committed in England and Ireland during the long agitation were

planned in the United States by these organizations. By far the larger

part of the money with which the agitation was fomented and the crimes

paid for came from contributions made in the United States, openly and

without any attempt to conceal the purposes for which they were made.

At the head of one of the worst of these Irish organizations was

an agitator who had been driven out of Ireland on account of his

persistent attempts against the Government, named Patrick O’Halloran,

but more commonly known as “Patsy.” It was by this assumed addition

to his name that he was best known. The gang of which he was the

acknowledged leader conceived the idea of using dynamite, either in its

crude form or made up into “infernal machines,” for the destruction of

property and life in England. It was the natural weapon of cowards,

who fancied they saw in it a means to inflict serious injury on

their enemy without his being able to strike back. It was eagerly

adopted by numerous Irish “patriots,” and a school of murderers and

destroyers arose, calling themselves “dynamiters.” These American

societies collected the necessary funds and sent emissaries to England

to purchase or carry with them dynamite for use in blowing up public

buildings.

During 1884 two explosions, thus planned, took place in London

railway-stations. They were so calculated as to render probable the

greatest loss of life among the travelling public; but by lucky chances

failed to do anything more than cause much destruction of property and

a few slight wounds. In the winter of 1884–1885 explosions of a similar

nature occurred in the Tower and the Parliament buildings. By these

several innocent sight-seers, including a number of little children,

were shockingly mutilated. Shortly afterwards the police discovered and

frustrated a plot to blow up the entire auditorium of the Princess’s

Theatre during an expected visit of the Prince of Wales to that place

of amusement. The details were kept secret, however, in the hope of

finding some clew to the perpetrators of the villany. Beyond the

discovery that an unknown Irishman had brought the explosive with him

from America in a crowded steamship, thus endangering the lives of

several hundred passengers, nothing was definitely found out.

It was inevitable that these events should have the effect of hardening

the English heart towards Ireland and increasing the unwillingness

of the English Government to grant anything like home rule to a

people which showed itself capable of such crimes, and which almost

unanimously applauded them. Nor, considering the Irish character and

the utter inability of the Irish mind to reason where its prejudices

are involved, could it be thought strange that the English severity

which these outrages compelled was accepted by the entire Irish

populace as a sufficient excuse to throw aside every figment of

humanity to which they had thus far laid claim, and to join themselves,

heart and soul, to the most barbarous schemes of the vilest wretches

who professed affection for “Poor Ireland.”

In the early winter of 1886–1887 a state dinner had been prepared at

Windsor Castle. A large number of titled and prominent guests had been

bidden, and it was announced that the Queen would honor the banquet by

her presence. Owing to a detention of a few minutes in the arrival of

the train from London, bringing several members of the Cabinet, the

hour originally set for the dinner was, at the last moment, changed,

and a short postponement of the dinner ordered. In this interval, and

not ten minutes after the time at which, had the original arrangements

been carried out, the guests would have entered the dining-hall,

there occurred under it a terrible explosion, by which it was utterly

wrecked. As it happened, no one was in the room except a servant, who

was engaged in arranging the flowers upon the table. His death was

instantaneous; and it was hours before the mangled remains of his body

were exhumed from the smoking ruins.

The news of this direct attempt on the Queen’s life filled England with

a perfect fury of revenge. Popular sentiment demanded the adoption

of stringent measures for the suppression of “dynamitism” and the

punishment of criminals engaged in it. A flood of bills was let loose

upon Parliament, the enactment of the mildest of which would have

resulted in the depopulation of Ireland and its transformation into

an English colony. Meetings were held in every part of England and

Scotland to express detestation of this attempt to murder the Queen.

The newspapers were filled with the most sensational appeals and the

most scorching invective aimed at Irishmen.

In the midst of this turmoil the police arrested Timothy Gallivan, an

American, born in Massachusetts and educated in its common schools,

but the son of an Irish immigrant, full of half-crazy ideas about his

“duty” to Ireland, and fevered with anxiety in some way to “revenge”

her upon her “oppressors.” Secreted in one of the hiding-places to

which Gallivan was tracked were found papers constituting an extensive

correspondence. They proved that Gallivan was an American; that he

was a member of an Irish society in New York; that he held office

in that society; that he had been sent to London as its accredited

agent and representative and at its expense; that his instructions

had been to cause the death, by dynamite explosion, of some member

or members of the royal family, “the nearer the top the better;” and

that he had associated with him, either before or after his arrival

in London from New York, some twenty kindred spirits. The names of

his fellow-conspirators were obtained, either from Gallivan’s papers

or from the confessions of those whose identity had been therein

disclosed. When once any Irish conspiracy began to be unravelled,

there never failed to appear at least half as many “informers” as

conspirators, eager to betray their associates for reward or safety.

This was no exception. In less than two weeks from the date of the

explosion in Windsor Castle, every detail of the plot was in the

possession of the public, and twenty of the “dynamiters,” including

their leader and chief, were in custody, with amply sufficient evidence

in the way of documents, confessions, and corroborating circumstance to

send them all to the gallows. By far the most important and significant

feature, however, in the whole murderous affair was the amount of proof

it put into the hands of the police that the crime was exclusively

Irish-American in its inception, its details, its payment, and even the

_personnel_ of the criminals.

Armed with this proof, the British Government peremptorily demanded

of the United States that the Irish societies within its jurisdiction

which were engaged in this crime be put down, and that action be

taken to prevent further attacks on England by their associate

organizations. The Secretary of State unquestionably appreciated

the justice of the British demand. Unfortunately, however, for both

parties, the British note was couched in a dictatorial and offensive

style. Even this a man of the Secretary of State’s common sense

would doubtless have excused as the natural outcome of a justifiable

indignation, had not an incautious employé in his department allowed

a copy of the note to fall into the possession of a New York daily

newspaper. In twenty-four hours it had been read by every dynamiter in

the country capable of spelling out words. Congress and the executive

departments were promptly made to feel that upon the tone of the answer

to England’s demand depended the political support of more than a

million voters, whose withdrawal would insure the crushing defeat of

the party then in power.

It was the same position in which the men who ruled in Congress and in

the administration had been placed many a time before, confronting

the question whether to do that which was clearly right and trust to

a future public sentiment to justify them, or to throw conscience

and judgment overboard, trim sails to the political squall of the

moment, and hope for the chance at some indefinite future of using

the power thus retained to undo the wrong committed in holding it.

Popular sentiment had often enough shown that the man who did right to

his own detriment was regarded as an impractical fellow, a theorist,

a “doctrinaire.” It was the man who succeeded, who attained power

the soonest and retained it the longest, no matter by what tricks or

sacrifices of conscience, who was looked upon as “smart” and admired

for his “ability.” So, when this time again the question came home to

the men in place and station whether they could afford to do right

and lose the support of the only element which gave their party hope

of success in the North and West, or bow to the blast and continue in

possession of the Government for four or eight years more, they yielded

as they had become accustomed to yield in all similar dilemmas.

A curt and sarcastic reply was despatched from Washington to the

English note, and care was taken that it should be published as widely

in the United States as that document had been. It was received with

a roar of Irish triumph. A few journals criticised it; but they soon

found that there was so much resentment at the offensive tone of the

British letter even among men who sympathized least with the Irish

plot that the Secretary’s snub caused fully as much quiet enjoyment

as annoyance. Other correspondence followed between the two foreign

offices in constantly angrier spirit, and the spring of 1887 found both

nations standing on the very verge of war, waiting only for some overt

_casus belli_ to draw the sword against each other.

Such was the domestic condition of the country, such the elements of

convulsion and upheaval fermenting beneath the thin crust of its social

order, such its relations with the greatest naval Power of the world,

in the month of April, 1887. From that time the march of events was

rapid to the final disaster.

V.

THE FIRST ERUPTION.

The 19th of April was a fateful day in the history of the Republic.

On the 19th of April, 1775, was fought the battle of Lexington, from

which the nation dated its birth as an independent Power. On the 19th

of April, 1861, the Massachusetts Volunteers, hurrying to Washington to

protect the national capital from the threatened attacks of Southern

rebels, were fired upon in the streets of Baltimore by a mob of rebel

sympathizers. On the 19th of April, 1887, began in bloody earnest

the revolution which was fated to end in the utter extinction of the

Republic and the erasure of its once proud name from the list of

nations.

The socialist leaders took to heart and profited by the lesson which

the Cincinnati riots of 1884 had taught. Those disturbances began in

the indignation of an outraged public, angered beyond endurance by

the shameful, repeated, and demoralizing defeats to which justice had

been subjected in the local courts of law. But they soon took on a

different cast. What had at first been the protest of good citizenship

was transformed into a saturnalia of crime and ruffianism. Yet the

very fact that good citizens had been concerned in the first day’s

imprudences made the task of putting down the outlaws and criminals

who continued the riots on the second and third days so much the more

difficult. The suggestion contained in this was not to lie fallow

in the secret councils where anarchy was plotted. Long after the

conspirators were ready to strike, they delayed the blow, till an

occasion should arise in which they might seem, for a time at least,

to be the allies of good and patriotic citizens. Had a leader with

a purpose been behind the Cincinnati riots, they saw that the work

of suppressing them, after their initial success, would have taxed

the resources of the country as well as the State. They waited for an

opportunity.

Composed of men whose grievance was against all law and order, and

whose dream was of untrammelled personal liberty and license, the

socialistic organizations had yet been gathered together, at this time,

into a certain union. They aspired after anarchy, but had reason enough

left to see that if they would destroy an organized government, they

must themselves organize. They had a head, a mysterious centre known

among outsiders and to the most of the socialists themselves as “The

Council of Seven,” but whom the few fully initiated knew to be a single

individual.

Even to this day the name of this person is unrevealed. Like “The

Man in the Iron Mask,” his identity promises to become one of the

mysteries of the ages. Those who were permitted to share his counsels

were few in number, and bound to him and to each other by terrible

oaths requiring them to preserve eternal silence. Among themselves his

name was never uttered or written. He was referred to sometimes as

“Number One,” sometimes as “Ben Hassan,” sometimes, with an approach

to familiarity, as “The Old Man.” Whoever he was, it is certain that

he must have been a man of vast executive ability, of iron will, of

amazingly fertile resources, and of a hatred of civilization and

of the amenities of humanity which would have done credit to the

prime minister of hell. He received the advice of his “cabinet” of

confidential associates; he was in constant correspondence with

socialistic societies all over the Union and in Europe: but it is the

testimony of all the correspondence of this period so far unearthed

that his rule was autocratic, and that even those who protested most

fiercely against all distinction of rank and position yielded him for

the time being a slavish obedience, holding in complete abeyance their

dearest theories until such time as their schemes of disorganization

and anarchy should have become successful. His headquarters were never

mentioned, and his orders emanated from widely separated parts of the

Union; but it was commonly believed that his principal abiding place

was in Chicago.

For years Chicago had been noted for the inefficiency and corruption

of its courts, which were so manifest as to call down censure even

from men who saw nothing serious in the decadence of courts elsewhere.

Frequent miscarriages of justice had made the people of the city

angry beyond measure; and the prophecy had been in many mouths that

a repetition there of the Cincinnati riots, starting from a similar

cause, was only a question of time.

On the morning of the 19th of April, 1887, the jury which had been

sitting in the case of Alfred McKenna, a young man charged with the

murder of John P. Quillinan, returned a verdict finding McKenna

guilty of assault and recommending him to mercy. The murder had been

a peculiarly atrocious one. Quillinan and McKenna had been rivals for

some minor local office, and had quarrelled. McKenna had followed

Quillinan to his home and shot him in the presence of his wife and

daughter, seriously wounding the little girl, who endeavored to protect

her father’s life. There was no denial of these facts by the defence.

But McKenna was a man of some social position, of considerable wealth,

of handsome person and winning address. Moreover, he and his friends

wielded a powerful political influence. The case had required three

trials. Twice the jury had disagreed. The third trial lasted nearly

a month, and the jury took five days to agree upon their scandalous

verdict. It was handed to the clerk of the court in writing during a

temporary adjournment, and the jury separated, first allowing it to be

known that they had originally stood seven for acquittal to five for

murder in the first degree, and that the seven had refused to accept

any compromise more severe upon the prisoner than the one finally

adopted.

In less than an hour after the verdict had been announced, its

character was known over the entire city. McKenna’s political friends

rejoiced; but the vast majority of better citizens felt outraged

beyond endurance. Angry knots of men gathered at every street corner.

A fierce wave of indignation swept over the city. Into the midst of

this public excitement came the news that McKenna had paid the fine of

fifty dollars and costs which the court had imposed, and had left the

court-house a free man, while Quillinan’s widow had been removed in a

fainting-fit, her wounded daughter clinging to her dress, to the county

poor-house. This news was like a shaft of lightning falling upon an

oil-tank. In an instant the city blazed up with inextinguishable fury.

A crowd of maddened men, including in their number many of the best and

most respected citizens of Chicago, hurried with frenzied yells to the

court-house. They filled its lobbies and surged into the room in which

the judge who had fined McKenna was presiding over another case. He

saw mischief in the faces of the very first who burst unceremoniously

upon the speech of the drawling advocate before him. He heard something

worse than mere mischief in the roar of passion and vengeance which

swelled in the courtyard and the street. Hastily adjourning the court,

he fled, barely in time to save his own life.

The Fall of the Great Republic (1886-88) · 第 1 / 8 段