Honourable Lord Cochrane, captain of the _Impérieuse_, stating the
services in which he has been employed on the coast of Languedoc.
Nothing can exceed the zeal and activity with which his lordship
pursues the enemy. The success which attends his enterprises clearly
indicates with what skill and ability they are conducted, besides
keeping the coast in constant alarm—causing a general suspension of
the trade, and harassing a body of troops employed in opposing him. He
has probably prevented _these troops which were intended for Figueras
from advancing into Spain, by giving them employment in the defence of
their own coasts_.
* * * * * * * *
“I have the honour to be, &c.
“COLLINGWOOD.”
(Enclosure.)
“_Impérieuse_, Gulf of Lyons, 28th Sept. 1808.
“MY LORD,—With varying opposition, but with unvaried success, the
newly constructed semaphoric telegraphs—which are of the utmost
consequence to the safety of the numerous convoys that pass along the
coast of France—at Bourdique, La Pinede, St. Maguire, Frontignan,
Canet, and Fay, have been blown up and completely demolished, together
with their telegraph houses, fourteen barracks of _gens d’armes_, one
battery, and the strong tower on the lake of Frontignan.
“Mr. Mapleton, first lieutenant, had command of these expeditions.
Lieutenant Johnson had charge of the field pieces, and Lieutenant Hore
of the Royal Marines. To them, and to Mr. Gilbert, assistant-surgeon,
Mr. Burney, gunner, Messrs. Houston Stewart[40] and Stoven,
midshipmen, is due whatever credit may arise from such mischief, and
for having, with so small a force, drawn about 2000 troops from the
important fortress of Figueras in Spain, for the defence of their own
coasts.
“The conduct of Lieutenants Mapleton, Johnston, and Hore, deserves my
praise, as well as that of the other officers, Royal Marines, and
seamen.
“I have the honour to be, my Lord,
“Your obedient servant, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood.”
_Impérieuse._—None killed, none wounded, one singed in blowing up the
battery.
_French._—One commanding officer of troops killed. How many others
unknown.
-----
Footnote 40:
The present gallant Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, commanding Her
Britannic Majesty’s squadron on the North American station.
-----
CHAP. XVII.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.
CAPTURE A SETTEE.—GET UNDER SAIL.—FIGHT BETWEEN THE PATRIOTS AND
FRENCH.—MAKE SAIL FOR ROSAS.—FORT TRINIDAD.—GALLANTRY OF CAPTAIN
WEST.—BRAVERY OF THE CATALAN.—REPULSE OF THE FRENCH.—ATTACK OF THE
IMPÉRIEUSE.—THE FRENCH REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS.—OCCUPATION OF
CATALONIA.—THE CASTLE OF TRINIDAD.—NATURE OF OUR POSITION.—NATURE OF
OUR OPERATIONS.—MANUFACTURE OF A MAN-TRAP.—LOSE MY NOSE.—THE FRENCH
ASSAULT ROSAS.—PRACTICE OF THE FRENCH.—PRESENTIMENT.—THE FRENCH
ATTACK.—THE ATTACK REPULSED.—BRAVERY OF A FRENCH SOLDIER.—HEAVY GALE
OF WIND.—UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT.—EVACUATE THE FORTRESS.—STAND TOWARDS
LA ESCALA.—LETTER FROM LORD COLLINGWOOD.—DESPATCH TO LORD
COLLINGWOOD.—LETTER TO THE ADMIRALTY.—TESTIMONY OF THE
SPANIARDS.—SIR WALTER SCOTT.—OFFICIAL GRATITUDE.
On the 19th of October we again quitted Gibraltar for the eastward,
having learned that the French frigates which had succeeded in getting
out of Toulon were at anchor in St. Fiorenzo bay, in the island of
Corsica. After leaving Gibraltar, we stood over towards the Spanish
possessions on the Barbary coast, and finding everything right there,
passed on to the Zaffarine Islands, inside of which we anchored for the
purpose of painting and refitting the ship, which stood much in need of
renovation.
This being accomplished, we again sailed on the 29th, and on the 31st
arrived in the harbour of Carthagena, where we found the Russian
ambassador to Austria on his way to Trieste. No English man-of-war
having been here since our former visit, we were received with great
hospitality and attention by the authorities and inhabitants, who
unanimously expressed their delight at being at peace with England;
though, as a Spanish fleet lay dismantled in the harbour, it struck me
that they might aid England to better purpose by looking after the
enemy. Even their convoys had to be protected by English ships, for
whilst we lay at Carthagena, the _Myrtle_ arrived from Tarragona, with
twelve sail of transports which she had convoyed thither with Spanish
troops from Lisbon, and again returned for more.
The _Impérieuse_ left Carthagena on the 10th of November, and rounding
Cape Palos, passed between Majorca and the mainland, where, on the 11th,
we captured a settee. On the 12th we anchored off Barcelona, which place
was still in possession of the French. The _Cambrian_ was at anchor in
the roads.
At night we sent the boats of the _Impérieuse_ to throw rockets into the
fort, and at daylight on the following morning got under weigh, but
perceiving two boats full of men in chase of some Spanish settees, we
lowered ours, and pulled for the boats, which on seeing our intention,
abandoned their prey, and ran in under the forts for protection.
On our arrival at Barcelona the _Cambrian_ went out for a run, leaving
the _Impérieuse_ to watch the enemy. On her return we again out boats,
and proceeded to blow up a fort close to the entrance of Llogrebat
river, and succeeded in so far shattering its foundations, as to render
it useless. On the 14th the _Impérieuse_ anchored near the mouth of this
river for the purpose of watering, sending at the same time a boat to
throw rockets into the barracks, in order to divert the attention of the
Barcelona garrison.
Having completed watering on the 15th, we again got under sail, and
resumed our position before the town, shortly after which we observed
about 2000 of the French army march out and ascend the hills, where they
soon became engaged with a large body of Spanish peasantry. The ships
followed, keeping as far as practicable in shore; but still at too great
a distance to render any material assistance to the patriots, who were
at last forced from their position. As soon as this action was over, the
batteries commenced firing shells at us. In place of replying to this,
both ships opened a heavy fire on the portion of the town occupied by
French troops, amongst whom, as we afterwards learned from the
Spaniards, our shot told with great effect.
Irritated by this unexpected movement, the whole of the batteries ashore
began to ply us with shot and shell, the latter of which were thrown
with excellent precision as regarded their direction, but fell either
over or short of us, two only bursting near the _Impérieuse_, but
without doing us any harm. The _Cambrian_, lying a little farther out,
escaped with similar impunity. With round shot the batteries were in our
case more lucky, one of these passing through the barge and galley, and
another striking the muzzle of a brass 32-pounder on the forecastle, in
such a way as to render it useless, though without injury to the men who
were at the time working the guns.
The circumstances under which the destruction of this gun was effected,
are too curious to be passed over.
By an extraordinary coincidence the enemy’s shot entered the muzzle at
the moment our men were firing it, so that the two shots met in the
bore! The consequence was, that the gun was blown up nearly in the
middle, the exterior being forced into a globular form—to our great
annoyance, for this gun was one of our most useful weapons.
On the 17th another action took place between the mountaineers and a
French force on the hills, the object of the patriots being to get
possession of the heights, where the French had established a battery,
but which on every side annoyed the _cordon_ of irregular troops
employed in intercepting provisions, from which the Spaniards could not
dislodge them, though they appeared to make their attacks with so much
judgment and vigour as to compel the enemy to remain on the defensive.
In the present case the attack was unsuccessful, the patriots being
compelled to retire without accomplishing their object.
After this affair was concluded, several Spanish officers came on board
the _Impérieuse_, and spoke confidently of being able to drive in the
French advanced force as soon as General Reding’s force joined. They
informed me that the presence of the _Impérieuse_ and _Cambrian_ had
been of great use, by compelling the French to keep a considerable
portion of their troops in the town, and to employ others in manning the
coast batteries, so that few were available for operations elsewhere;
but beyond this we had no opportunity of assisting the patriots, as the
heights to which the enemy clung so tenaciously were beyond the reach of
shot or shell from the ships.
On the 19th I received information of the French having invested Rosas,
and knowing that Lord Collingwood attached considerable importance to
this place, I considered it my duty, in accordance with his lordship’s
instructions, to proceed in that direction, hoping that the _Impérieuse_
might there render substantial service; we therefore left the _Cambrian_
before Barcelona, and made sail for Rosas, where we arrived on the
following day. As it fell calm, the ship was compelled to anchor ten
miles from the fortress.
On our arrival a heavy cannonade was going on between the ships and a
French battery thrown up on the cliff above Fort Trinidad. The
_Impérieuse_, as has been said, being out of range, I took the gig and
landed in the town, to ascertain how we might best employ ourselves.
Having satisfied myself on this point, I sent back the gig with orders
for the frigate to make every effort to get within range of the French
troops surrounding the town, so as to enfilade them. As the calm
continued, she was, however, unable to approach till the following day,
I meanwhile remaining in Rosas, to encourage the Spanish troops, whose
spirit was beginning to give way.
Previous to our arrival the marines of the _Excellent_, together with
some Spanish troops, had occupied the citadel. Many of these having been
wounded, the _Excellent_ took upwards of forty on board and sailed,
leaving the _Fame_ to watch the place, and her commander withdrew some
thirty marines, who, with sixty or seventy Spaniards, occupied Fort
Trinidad. The departure of the _Excellent_ in the first place, and the
withdrawal of the marines in the second, greatly dispirited the
Spaniards, who on the evening of the 21st began to quit the town in
boats.
A brief outline of what had occurred previous to my arrival in the
_Impérieuse_, will here be requisite, in order to comprehend the events
which followed. On the 6th of November a body of 6000 French, or rather
Italians, coming from Figueras, had taken possession of the town and the
heights commanding the roads. The inhabitants forthwith fled; but the
_Excellent_ and _Meteor_, then lying in the harbour, speedily drove out
the invaders.
On the assault of the town some of the inhabitants had fled to the
citadel, which was in a wretched condition, one of its bastions having
been blown down during the last war; and such had been the negligence of
the Spanish military authorities, that it had received no better repair
than a few planks and loose stones; whilst the stores were even in a
more wretched condition than the works. It was, however, necessary to
put it, as far as possible, in a defensible condition, and to this
Captain West, of the _Excellent_, energetically applied himself.
To the eastward of the town, on an eminence commanding the harbour,
stood Fort Trinidad, of which a description will presently be given. In
this fortress Captain West placed five-and-twenty of the _Excellent’s_
marines, in addition to the Spaniards who manned the fort; and, at the
same time, sent fifty seamen into the citadel to support the garrison.
The Spanish governor, O’Daly, now sent a request to the Junta of Gerona
for reinforcements; but the French, managing to intercept his
despatches, caused it to be reported to the Junta that the English had
taken forcible possession of the fortress, and deposed the governor;
whereupon, in place of sending reinforcements, the Junta wrote to
Captain West, demanding an explanation of conduct so extraordinary, and,
till this explanation revealed the trick, it remained undiscovered.
On the 9th the citadel was attacked by General Reille, and a breach
effected; but Captain West, placing the _Meteor_ in a position to flank
the breach, and sending some boats to enfilade the shore, prevented the
assault, and despatching more seamen to the citadel, the next day it was
again in a tolerably defensive state, so much so that Captain West had
sallied out with the seamen and effected the rescue of a party of
Catalonian militia.
The French commander, thus foiled by the gallantry and judgment of
Captain West, now deemed it necessary to proceed against Rosas by
regular siege, but first made an attempt to storm Fort Trinidad, in
which he was repulsed with considerable loss; but the fort was so much
in danger that, in order to prevent surprise, Captain West reinforced it
with thirty additional marines, who entered by means of rope ladders.
The French now, despite opposition from the ships, began to erect
batteries on the heights for the demolition of Fort Trinidad, and threw
up an entrenchment 300 yards from the citadel, for the purpose of
breaching that also. A 3-gun battery opened against the town walls, and
the joint effect of these being occasionally directed against the ships
compelled them to retire out of range.
Captain West was now superseded by Captain Bennett of the _Fame_, and,
as a breach had nearly been effected in the lower bomb proof of Fort
Trinidad, Captain Bennett withdrew the marines. At this juncture I
arrived at Rosas in the _Impérieuse_, having, indeed, come there to
render what assistance I could to the Spaniards, and, knowing the
endurance, as well as indomitable bravery of the Catalan or
_Michelet_[41] character; feeling, moreover, assured that the Junta of
Gerona would supply early assistance, I determined to replace the
marines which Captain Bennett had withdrawn, with others from my own
frigate. As it was generally known amongst vessels on the Mediterranean
station that I was acting under discretionary orders from Lord
Collingwood, Captain Bennett, though he had withdrawn his own men, and
notwithstanding that he was my senior officer, did not attempt to thwart
my resolution, probably because he considered that by so doing he might
be interfering with the instructions given me by Lord Collingwood.
-----
Footnote 41:
A name given at this period to the irregular Catalonian troops, as
well as to other Spaniards embodied with them, from one of their old
leaders, Michelet de Prato, the companion of Cæsar Borgia, and the
principal agent in many of his atrocities. In the old wars of Arragon,
they were called Almogavares, and at the period of which I write had
lost little of their traditional daring, or that ready ingenuity in
difficulties, which supplied the want of a more efficient warlike
equipment.
-----
On the 22nd, after having given further instructions on board the
_Impérieuse_ for annoying the enemy during my absence, I again went on
shore to the citadel, into which the French were incessantly throwing
shells, but without much effect; for although every shell fell within
the place, the shelter was excellent, and no great damage was done.
Having ascertained the position of the enemy’s entrenchments, I returned
on board, and despatched a party from the frigate to fire upon them at
the distance of about 600 yards, as well as to harass the batteries in
course of construction. The work was so well performed by our men as to
embarrass the troops in the batteries, and thus lessen their fire on the
citadel, the preservation of which, till further assistance should
arrive, was my principal object. A battery of 24-pounders on the top of
a cliff, and therefore inaccessible to our fire, kept up, however, an
unremitting fire on Fort Trinidad, every shot striking; but the fort
being bomb-proof, without injury to the little garrison, which, like
that of the citadel, was well sheltered, but had no means of returning
the fire except occasionally by musketry.
After pounding away at the fort for several days, the French made up
their minds to storm, but on coming within range of musket-shot, they
got such a reception from the garrison as to render a hasty retreat
imperative. As their discomfiture was visible from the ship, we fired a
salute of twenty-one guns by way of sarcastic compliment, but the enemy
had not the politeness to return the courtesy.
The _Impérieuse_ now got under weigh, and cleared for action, taking up
a position to the left of the citadel, and within musket-shot of the
French lines, into which we poured such a storm of shot as to drive out
the enemy. Satisfied with the success, I went on shore at Rosas, and got
700 Spaniards to embark in the boats, afterwards putting them on board a
light vessel, with the intention of landing them at the back of Fort
Trinidad, so as to dislodge the troops from the battery on the cliff,
and throw the guns over. The movement was, however, detected by the
French commander, and a force which had just been engaged at a distance
was hastily recalled, and rushed on, driving the Spaniards and some
Germans before them. Manning the batteries, the French instantly turned
their attention to the _Impérieuse_, against which they directed such a
well-aimed shower of shells as rendered it imperative to get under sail
and anchor out of range.
The firing between the batteries and the citadel was kept up during the
night without intermission, and at daylight the Spaniards we had landed
for the attack on the cliff battery appeared in such confusion, that it
became necessary to despatch the boats to bring off a party of marines,
who had been put on shore with them. Our men reported that the Spaniards
had unaccountably refused to follow them to the attack, and, as is usual
in such cases, had suffered far more severely than they would have done
had they persevered in the attempt to capture the battery. On sending
boats to bring off the Spaniards we only got 300 out of the 700, the
remainder being either killed or made prisoners.
On the 23rd we again ran in under Fort Trinidad, but this time on the
opposite side to the battery on the cliff, where we could effect
considerable mischief, without receiving much in return. It now fell
dead calm, so that it was lucky we had not taken up our former position,
where we might have been terribly annoyed.
The French, without paying much attention to us, now appeared to
redouble their efforts against both castle and citadel, whilst their
troops mustered strongly on the hills, with the evident intention of an
attack on both, the moment a breach became practicable.
Finding this to be the case, the _Fame_ withdrew her marines from Fort
Trinidad, upon which I went ashore, and after careful inspection of the
breach in course of formation, considering it still capable of prolonged
defence, begged the commandant to hold out till next day, when he should
be reinforced with marines from the _Impérieuse_, promising at the same
time to remain myself in the fortress with the men. With some difficulty
he was induced to consent to this arrangement, after telling me that it
had been his intention to capitulate on the same evening.
Nor was the Spanish governor at all to blame for his intention to
surrender the fortress. Captain Bennett had withdrawn his men, thinking,
no doubt, that it was untenable, and that therefore nothing was to be
gained by their exposure; so that the Spanish governor might fairly
plead that further resistance had been deemed unavailing by the English
themselves.
Lord Collingwood had, however, entrusted me with discretionary orders to
assist the Spaniards, and it appeared to me that the present was an
instance where those orders might be carried into effect, for I had no
doubt, if assistance arrived promptly, that the French would be
compelled to raise the siege of Rosas, as they had done that of Gerona.
In which case they would find themselves isolated at Barcelona; and
being cut off, as they already were by land, and exposed to bombardment
by sea, must surrender. The occupation of Catalonia, in short, turned on
two points; 1st, whether the Junta of Gerona supplied an adequate
reinforcement; and, 2ndly, whether I could hold Fort Trinidad till it
arrived. Neither do I blame Captain Bennett for withdrawing his men. It
was simply matter of opinion, his being that neither fort nor citadel
would long hold out—mine, formed on actual inspection of the fort, that
it was still in a condition to maintain itself, and being so, that its
retention was essential for the preservation of the town and citadel.
And had there been a little more alacrity on the part of the Gerona
Junta in supplying reinforcements, that opinion would have been
justified. Captain Bennett perhaps knew the dilatory habits of the
Spaniards better than I did; but although my senior officer, he was
disinterested enough not in any way to interfere with my plans.
Before daylight on the 24th we landed fifty men, ordering all the
marines to follow after sunset. Our first object was to effect such
repairs as would put the fort in a better state of defence, and this was
accomplished without any great difficulty, as the French were confining
their attention to one particular spot, where, by a constant succession
of quick firing, they hoped to make a practicable breach. This we could
not prevent, having no artillery to reply to theirs.
My principal ground for a belief in the practicability of holding the
fort arose from the peculiar form and thickness of the walls, to
penetrate which was no easy matter, if resolutely defended. Even if
eventually successful, it would not be difficult to evacuate the fort by
the lower portion, before the enemy could establish themselves in the
upper, whilst a well constructed mine would involve both them and the
castle in one common ruin.
The Castle of Trinidad stood on the side of a hill, having by no means a
difficult descent to the sea, but this hill was again commanded by a
higher and more precipitous cliff, which would have enabled an enemy to
drive out the occupants with ease, but for the peculiar construction of
the fortress.
Next to the sea was a fort constructed with strong walls some 50 feet
high. Behind this and joined to it, rose another fort to the height of
30 or 40 feet more, and behind this again was a tower rising some 20 or
30 feet still higher, the whole presenting the appearance of a large
church with a tower 110 feet high, a nave 90 feet high, and a chancel 50
feet. The tower, having its back to the cliff, as a matter of course
sheltered the middle and lower portions of the fortress from a fire of
the battery above it. Nothing, in short, for a fortress commanded by
adjacent heights could have been better adapted for holding out against
offensive operations, or worse adapted for replying to them; this on our
part being out of the question, as the French battery was too much
elevated on the cliff for artillery to reach, whilst the tower which
prevented their shot from annoying us, would also have prevented our
firing at them, even had we possessed artillery.
It was to this tower therefore that the French chiefly directed their
attention, as a practicable breach therein, followed by a successful
assault, would in their estimation place the fortress at their mercy, so
that we must either be driven out or forced to surrender. In consequence
of the elevated position of the enemy’s battery on the cliff, they could
however only breach the central portion of the tower, the lowest part of
the breach being nearly sixty feet above its base, so that when
practicable, it could only be reached by long scaling ladders.