English and Spanish colours at the main, fired a salute of 21 guns! The
French, who were in possession of the place[39], to our great amusement
resented the affront by firing at us from all their batteries, but their
shot fell short. We could distinctly see the inhabitants crowding the
house-tops and public places of the city by thousands, and the French
cavalry and infantry meanwhile patrolling the streets. Knowing that the
French held their own with difficulty, especially in the adjacent towns,
we again hove-to and displayed English colours over French, and then
Spanish over French, firing an additional salute, which increased the
cannonade from the batteries, but to no purpose.
-----
Footnote 39:
Barcelona had been seized by General Duhesme just before Buonaparte
announced his intention of placing his brother on the throne of Spain.
Having arrived in the vicinity of the city on the 15th of February, he
requested permission to halt and refresh his troops for a few days,
before going on to Valencia. The gates were forthwith opened, and the
French treated as friends and allies. On the 16th, the _générale_ was
beat, as though they were about to proceed on their march, and the
townspeople came out to bid them farewell. To the surprise of the
latter, the French general ordered one part of his force to the
citadel, and the other to Fort Monjui, possessing himself of both.
Pampeluna was occupied on the same day by similar treachery.
-----
We then bore up along the coast, and when clear of the enemy’s lines, a
number of boats came off complaining bitterly of the French troops who
were burning their towns on the least resistance, or even pretended
resistance, and were permitted by their officers to plunder and kill the
inhabitants with impunity. Perhaps it would be more in accordance with
military justice to say, that with the ideas of equality and fraternity
then prevalent amongst the soldiers, their officers had no control over
them.
On the 6th, the _Impérieuse_ came to an anchor between the towns of
Blanes and Mataro, in nearly the same position as that taken up on the
last cruise. Great numbers of people came off, and the frigate was
speedily filled with visitors of both sexes, bringing with them all
kinds of presents; being most politely oblivious of all the mischief we
had been effecting in their vicinity for months past. On the 7th, after
paying a visit to Blanes, we got under weigh, the Spaniards having sent
us word that the French had entered the town of Mataro, at the same time
requesting our co-operation against them.
On the 8th we were becalmed close to several villages, one of which had
been nearly destroyed by the French on pretence of some trifling
resistance. A deputation from the inhabitants of one village came off,
and informed us that their church had been plundered of everything, and
that forty-five houses had been burned to the ground. A wretched policy
truly, and one which did the French great harm by the animosity thus
created amongst the people, who were treated as rebels, rather than in
the light of honourable adversaries.
The _Impérieuse_ could effect nothing against the French in Mataro, from
its unassailable position, but having received intelligence that a
considerable force under General Duhesme was advancing towards
Barcelona, it occurred to me that their progress might be checked.
Landing accordingly with a party of seamen, we blew down the overhanging
rocks and destroyed the bridges so effectually as to prevent the passage
either of cavalry or artillery, at the same time pointing out to the
Spaniards how they might impede the enemy’s movements elsewhere along
the coast by cutting up the roads,—an operation on which they entered
with great alacrity, after being shown how to set about their work.
The nature of these operations will be readily comprehended by the
statement that a considerable portion of the main road ran along the
face of the precipitous rocks nearest the sea. By blowing up the roads
themselves in some places, and the overhanging rocks in others, so as to
bury the road beneath the _débris_, it was rendered impassable for
cavalry or artillery, whilst removal of the obstructions within
reasonable time was out of the question—indeed, so long as the frigate
remained in the vicinity, impossible, as any operation of the kind would
have been within reach of our guns.
Having effected all the damage possible, and there being no beneficial
end to be answered by longer stay in the vicinity of Mataro, we again
made sail, and on the 17th the _Impérieuse_ arrived at Port Mahon, where
we found a squadron embarking Spanish troops for Catalonia, the crews of
the six ships of the line in harbour taking their places in manning the
batteries. On the 19th the troops sailed under convoy of some English
frigates, as did others destined for Tortosa.
Having filled up with provisions and water, we quitted Port Mahon for
another cruise on the Spanish coast, and on the 22nd were close to San
Felin, when the whole of the convoy entered the harbour to the great
delight of the inhabitants, who reported that, despite the obstacles
created, the French had, in the absence of the _Impérieuse_, forced the
pass from Mataro, and marched for Gerona, to which place the Spanish
troops, just disembarked, were next day despatched, together with 1200
militia, raised from amongst the peasantry in the neighbourhood. Heavy
firing was heard shortly afterwards in the interior, and at night it was
ascertained that the French had made an attack on Hostalrich and were
beaten back. This place was about nine miles from San Felin.
On the 24th we again anchored about four miles from Mataro, and there
learned the mode in which the French had surmounted the obstacles
interposed by the Spaniards in cutting up the roads, viz. by compelling
the inhabitants to fill up the gaps with everything movable, even to
their agricultural implements, furniture, and clothes. After this, the
French, by way of deterring the Spaniards from again interfering with
the highways, sacked and burned all the dwelling-houses in the
neighbourhood.
Taking a party of marines on shore, we again blew up additional portions
of the road to the eastward, and as the gaps made on our last visit had
been chiefly filled up with wood, and other inflammable articles just
mentioned, we set fire to them, and thus not only renewed the obstacles,
but created fresh ones, in the assurance that as everything movable was
now destroyed, the obstruction must become permanent. Whilst this was
going on the seamen and marines of the _Impérieuse_ destroyed a battery
completed by the French, and threw over the cliff the four brass
24-pounders. These were next day recovered.
On the 26th we dropped down to the town of Cañette, and embarked some
more brass guns which the enemy had placed in position on the top of a
high cliff. These guns were got on board by means of hawsers carried
from the frigate to the cliff, one end being made fast to the masthead.
By the application of the capstan and tackles, the guns were thus hopped
on board. After these had been secured, I again took a party of seamen
and marines on shore, and broke down or blew up the road in six
different places. On paying a visit to the town, there was scarcely a
house which the French had not sacked, carrying off everything that was
valuable, and wantonly destroying the remainder. The inhabitants were in
a miserable condition.
The two next days were employed in blowing down rocks, and otherwise
destroying roads in every direction which the French were likely to
take, the people aiding heart and soul, anxiously listening to every
suggestion for retarding the enemy’s movements, and evincing the
greatest alacrity to put them in practice. In short, I had taken on
myself the duties of an engineer officer, though occupation of this kind
was, perhaps, out of my sphere as commander of a frigate; and there is
no doubt that I might have better consulted my personal interests by
looking after prizes at sea, for, except from Lord Collingwood, not so
much as an acknowledgment of my persevering exertions was vouchsafed. I
was, however, indignant at seeing the wanton devastation committed by a
military power, pretending to high notions of civilisation, and on that
account spared no pains to instruct the persecuted inhabitants how to
turn the tables on their spoilers; making—as throughout life I have ever
done—common cause with the oppressed.
Having effected all the mischief possible, we weighed for Mongat, ten
miles from Barcelona, and anchored off the place at sunset. I had
previously received intelligence that General Duhesme was approaching
Barcelona with a strong force to relieve the French garrison in
possession, and my object was to destroy the fort at Mongat before
Duhesme’s force came up. For this, however, we were too late, the
advanced guard having occupied the fort before our arrival. The people,
however, came off with an assurance that, if we would attack the French,
800 Spaniards were ready to assist us. As the destruction of the fort
was my principal object, I at once assented, and we commenced blowing up
the road between Barcelona and Mongat, so that the communication on that
side was effectively cut off, whilst the guns of General Duhesme’s force
were rendered immovable on the other; these he afterwards abandoned.
On the 30th it fell calm, and having weighed anchor we drifted down as
far as Mataro, but too distant from the shore to attempt anything.
Having received intelligence of the continued advance of General
Duhesme, we again returned, and anchored within five miles of Mongat,
the inhabitants coming off to beg for assistance, as the French in the
fort were keeping up a constant fire on their party in the woods, though
without venturing to dislodge them.
It is, perhaps, here necessary to explain that General Duhesme had on
the 26th of July been compelled by a well-executed movement on the part
of the Count de Caldagues, to raise the siege of Gerona, in which he had
been employed for upwards of a fortnight, his force being driven to
Sarria, where they were protected by their cavalry. During the night
they separated into two divisions, one retreating towards Figueras, and
the other in the direction of Barcelona.
It was to the latter division that my attention was directed. To reach
Barcelona with heavy guns, the enemy must of necessity proceed by way of
Mongat, the castle or fort of which place commanded a pass on their way.
By breaking up the roads, the passage of the guns was impeded, as has
been described; but, as the French had possession of the castle, it was
essential that they should be dislodged as speedily as possible. The
Spanish militia, being eager to second our efforts, I determined to make
the attack forthwith.
At 8 A.M. on the 31st the _Impérieuse_ got under weigh, and stood
towards the castle, whilst I landed in the gig, and mounted the hills
overhanging the position, for the purpose of reconnoitring; finding an
attack practicable, I returned on board, and we cleared for action.
The Spaniards, seeing the _Impérieuse_ stand in, and being eager for the
onset, gallantly dashed up a hill where the French had established an
outpost, and either killed or took the whole prisoners; upon which the
garrison in the fort opened a heavy fire to dislodge the victorious
Spaniards, but without effect. By this time I had got the _Impérieuse_
well in, and had given the castle a couple of well-directed broadsides
when the enemy hung out flags of truce.
On this I landed with a party of marines, but the exasperated Spaniards,
elated by their recent victory, paid no attention to the flags of truce,
and were advancing up the hill to storm the place, the French still
firing to keep them in check. I was immediately conducted to the castle,
where the French troops were drawn up on each side of the gate. On
entering, the commandant requested me not to allow the peasantry to
follow, as they would only surrender to me, and not to the Spaniards, of
whose vengeance they were evidently afraid.
After giving the commandant a lecture on the barbarities that had been
committed on the coast, and pointing out the folly of such a course,
inasmuch as, had his troops fallen into the hands of the Spanish
peasantry, not a man would have escaped with life, I acceded to the
request to surrender to us alone, and promised the escort of our marines
to the frigate.
The commandant then gave me his sword, and his troops forthwith laid
down their arms. We had, however, even after this surrender, some
trouble in keeping out the irritated Spaniards, who were actuated rather
by the excitement of vengeance than by the rules of war; and it was not
without a few blows, and forcing some of the assailants over the
parapet, that we succeeded in keeping them off.
The Spaniards were with some difficulty made to understand that, however
exasperated they might be at the conduct of the French, the latter were
British prisoners, and not a hair of their heads should be hurt. When we
were somewhat assured of their safety, the prisoners were marched down
to the boats; and glad enough they were to get there, for the Spaniards
accompanied them with volleys of abuse, declaring that they might thank
the English for their lives, which, had the Spanish party succeeded in
storming the fort, should have been sacrificed.
What became of the men forming the captured outpost I never knew, and
was not anxious to inquire. Having placed the troops on board, we took
off four brass field-pieces with their appendages, and threw the iron
guns over the parapet; after which the Spaniards were allowed to ransack
the fort. At 6 P.M. we laid a train to the French ammunition, and soon
after the whole blew up. Spanish colours were then hoisted on the ruins,
amidst the hearty cheers of thousands with arms in their hands, who had
by this time flocked to the spot, though when we landed not a single
inhabitant was to be seen. Soon after we gained possession, men, women,
and children came from their hiding-places in abundance, expressing
grateful satisfaction at the capture of the enemy.
It would have been well if the leaders of the French army in other parts
of Spain could have seen the exasperation produced by the barbarous
propensities of these detachments of troops, who appeared to be under no
moral discipline. Except, perhaps, in actual fight, their officers had
no control over them, so that their path was marked by excesses of every
kind. This is a fatal mistake in armies, as the French afterwards found
elsewhere—it degrades war into extermination. Our prisoners did not even
deny that the Spaniards would only have exercised a just retaliation by
immolating them, but contented themselves by saying that they would
never have given in to the Spaniards whilst a man remained alive.
After we had blown up the castle, the _Cambrian_ arrived, and to her, by
permission of her captain, we transferred half our prisoners. On the
following morning we sailed from Mongat, having first presented the
chief commanding the Spaniards with two of the field-pieces taken the
day before, together with a sufficient supply of powder and ammunition.
General Duhesme reached Barcelona by making a _détour_ into the
interior, after an absence of about a month, during which the
destruction of the roads had been going on. He was highly exasperated
with the unfortunate inhabitants, though for no better reason than that
all his plans had been thwarted, and, pointing the guns of the citadel
on the town, he threatened it with destruction, unless his force was
supplied with 12,000 rations daily, with wine and brandy in proportion;
following up this injustice by seizing the most respectable inhabitants
for the purpose of extorting ransoms for their liberation.
Great credit is due to the Catalans for the spirit thus manifested at a
time when all the more important strongholds of Catalonia were in the
hands of the enemy. I say Catalonia, as being concerned with that
province only, though there was reason to know that the like patriotism
was manifested in the western provinces, though, from the preponderance
of the enemy, with less effect.
Even when Duhesme had reached Barcelona, he had great difficulty in
maintaining himself, as the activity of the patriots in cutting off his
supplies by land was worthy of their cause, and the _Impérieuse_ and
other English vessels of war took care that he got no supplies by sea.
On the 31st of July I addressed the subjoined despatch to Lord
Collingwood:—
“H. M. S. _Impérieuse_, off Mongat, Catalonia,
“31 July, 1808.
“MY LORD,—The castle of Mongat, an important post, completely
commanding a pass on the road from Gerona to Barcelona, which the
French are now besieging, and the only post between these towns
occupied by the enemy, surrendered this morning to his Majesty’s ship
under my command.
“The Spanish militia behaved admirably in carrying an outpost on a
neighbouring hill. Lieutenant Hore of the marines took possession of
the castle, which, by means of powder, is now levelled with the
ground, and the pending rocks are blown down into the road, which in
many other places is also rendered impassable to artillery, without a
very heavy loss of men if the French resolve to repair them.
“I enclose to your Lordship a list of the prisoners, and of the
material part of the military stores, all of which that could be
useful to the Spaniards have been delivered to them.
“I have the honour, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Rt. Hon. Lord Collingwood.”
Having effected everything possible at Mongat, we made sail on the 4th
of August, and anchored off San Felin, where,—whilst the ship was
employed in filling up water—I rode five miles into the country to
inspect a battery which the Spaniards had erected to prevent the French
from marching on the town. It was situated on an eminence, commanding
the road to Gerona and Mataro, and was completely surrounded by high
trees, so as not to be visible from the road. If properly defended, it
would have presented a formidable obstacle, but as it was, the French
infantry would have taken it in a few minutes. I gave the Spaniards
instructions how to strengthen the position, but as they told me they
could in a short time collect 3000 armed peasantry, I bid them rather
rely on these by maintaining a guerilla warfare, which, if conducted
with their usual judgment and activity, would harass the enemy more than
the battery.
The Catalans made capital guerilla troops, possessing considerable skill
in the use of their weapons, though previously untrained. A character
for turbulence was often attributed to them; but, in a country groaning
under priestcraft and bad government, the sturdy spirit of independence,
which prompted them to set the example of heroic defence of their
country, might be, either mistakenly or purposely—the latter the more
probable—set down for discontent and sedition. At any rate, the
descendants of men who, in a former age, formed the outposts of the
Christian world against Mahomedism, in no way disgraced their ancestors,
and became in the end the terror of their enemies. One quality they
pre-eminently possess, viz. patience and endurance under privation; and
this added to their hardy habits and adventurous disposition,
contributed to form an enemy not to be despised—the less so that they
were in every way disposed to repay the barbarities of the French with
interest.
At 8 A.M. on the 6th, the _Impérieuse_ got under sail from San Felin,
and passing close to Palamos, arrived in the afternoon at Rosas, where
we found the _Montague_ and _Hind_, to the latter of which we
transferred the prisoners. The _Hind_ was bound for Port Mahon with the
Governor of Figueras and his family, who had to be escorted to the ship
by the marines of the _Montague_, in order to protect him from popular
vengeance, so exasperated were the Spaniards on account of the
governor’s cowardice or treachery in allowing the French to enter the
fortress he had commanded, though from its position and strength he
could easily have held out.
The fortress of Figueras was about twelve miles from Rosas, and was a
place of amazing strength, having been constructed for the defence of
one of the principal passes on the borders of Spain, and being well
garrisoned and provisioned, it ought certainly to have withstood a
considerable force. The Rosas people had a right to be indignant at its
pusillanimous surrender, for not only did this expose their town, but it
formed a marked contrast to one of their own exploits, when, being
attacked by a large French force, they drove them back with the loss of
300 men.
On the 7th we filled up with water at a wretched place on the opposite
side of the Bay of Rosas, and on the 8th sailed for San Felin, where we
arrived on the 9th. On the 10th we were again off Barcelona, when a flag
of truce was sent by the French to ask what had become of the troops we
had taken at Mongat. On the 11th, we bore up for San Felin and were
joined by our gunboat, after which we proceeded to see what was being
done on the French coast, and bore up for Marseilles.
My object in proceeding in this direction was, that as the French troops
kept out of our reach, there was no beneficial object to be gained by
remaining on the Spanish coast; and it occurred to me, that by giving
the French, in the neighbourhood of Marseilles, a taste of the evils
they were inflicting on their Spanish neighbours, it would be possible
to create an amount of alarm, which would have the effect of diverting
troops intended for Catalonia, by the necessity of remaining to guard
their own seaboard. It is wonderful what an amount of terrorism a small
frigate is able to inspire on an enemy’s coast. Actions between
line-of-battle ships are, no doubt, very imposing; but for real effect,
I would prefer a score or two of small vessels, well handled, to any
fleet of line-of-battle ships.
On the 15th we stood into the Bay of Marseilles, and anchored off the
mouth of the Rhone, which was distant about eight miles. Sent the
gun-boat in chase of a small vessel, but the crew ran her on shore, and
escaped. The gun-boat burned her, and joined us again on the following
morning, when we anchored abreast of a telegraph employed in signalising
our appearance on the coast. Here was a hint, the beneficial nature of
which could not be doubted, and at once I decided on destroying the
enemy’s communications along shore. As a commencement, this telegraph
was demolished without opposition.
On the 16th sent the gun-boat in chase of two vessels, close to Cette.
They escaped, but she brought back a boat with four men, who gave such
information as induced me to send her on a cruise.
On the 17th, there being nothing in sight, we made preparations for
destroying the signal-station on the island of Boni, which commands the
entrance to the Rhone. Landing ninety men in the boats, we were just in
time to see the troops in charge of the station abandon it; and having
possessed ourselves of the signals, we blew up the place and returned to
the ship.
We then got under weigh, and by 4 o’clock were close to Montpelier,
firing on a fort as we passed. Perceiving another signal-station in the
vicinity, we again out boats, and proceeded to destroy it, but found
this not so easy a matter as on the last occasion, for we had two rivers
to ford, each midleg in mud, and had moreover to encounter a fire of
musketry, but at a distance which did no harm, so that with some
difficulty we accomplished our object. This station was called
Frontignan, the one last blown up being named La Pinede. At 8 P.M. we
returned to the _Impérieuse_, with no other damage than being thoroughly
encased in mud.
In the night we ran out about ten miles, having no confidence in the
anchorage, and at daylight on the 19th again went in shore, carefully
feeling our way by the lead, which showed us that the soundings were
highly dangerous. We, nevertheless, came to an anchor off a place called
Dumet, when we again out boats and destroyed another signal tower,
together with four houses connected with it. At 2 P.M. we got under sail
and bore up, joining the gun-boat to leeward. Supplying her with a new
yard and bowsprit, her former spars being carried away, we sent her in
shore.