present system, are kept at sea in a dangerous state, and that the
lives of many officers and men are in constant peril. Lieutenant
Cameron, who commanded the _Felix_, and since lost in that vessel, was
one of the best and ablest officers I ever knew. He found it incumbent
on him to report that the _Felix_ ought to be sent into port to
repair. I shall read part of two letters from the surgeon, dated three
months before they all perished, and previous to Lieutenant Cameron’s
being appointed to command that vessel. The other dated eight days
before that melancholy event. On the 14th of November, he says,—“Our
noble commander has been very active in his endeavours to get
confirmed to this vessel, much more than I should be: she sails worse
and worse, and I think the chances are against our ever bringing her
into an English port.” On the 14th of January, 1807, the surgeon
says,—“Every endeavour has been put in force by Cameron and myself to
get her into port, but without success. He attacked the commodore with
most miserable epistles of distress throughout, and I attacked him
with a very formidable sick list, but all, my friend, would not do.”
“‘I may be told that there is danger in agitating such subjects; but
there can be none at any time in bringing to the knowledge of the
Legislature, for redress, that which is notorious to those who have a
right to claim it. No, Sir, let grievances be redressed in time, and
complaints will cease. When the _Impérieuse_, the ship I command, was
about to leave Rochefort, I was ordered to revictual the _Atalante_
for six weeks, though she had then been out eight months—a period
sufficient to ruin the health, break the energy, and weary the spirit
of all employed in such a vessel. The _Atalante_ was hauled alongside,
the commander and several officers came on board, and informed me of
the bad condition of their sloop. They said she was wholly unfit to
keep the sea, and that a gale of wind would cause her inevitable loss.
I think they said the fore-mast, and bowsprit, and fore-yard, were all
sprung; besides, the vessel made twenty inches of water per hour. I
thought it well to mention the circumstances, thus reported, to the
commanding officer off Rochefort—for I well knew that the minds of
subordinate officers ordered to survey were impressed with terror,
lest any vessel surveyed should not be found, on arriving in port,
quite so bad as represented. Their usual plan therefore is, to say
such a vessel can keep the sea a while longer—knowing that if any
accident occurs it will be ascribed to zeal for the good of His
Majesty’s service! So much impressed was I with the bad state of this
vessel, that I said to the builder of Plymouth-yard, in the presence
of Admiral Sutton, on my arrival there, that the first news we should
have from Rochefort, if there should happen to be a gale of wind,
would be the loss of the _Atalante_. Under the harassing system of
eight or nine months’ cruises, men get tired of their lives, and even
indifferent as to the choice between a French prison and their present
misery.
“‘The next document I propose to move for is—“An abstract of the
weekly accounts of H. M.’s ships and frigates employed off Brest and
Rochefort, from the 1st of March, 1806, until the 1st of March, 1807.”
From this the number of men employed, the number of sick, the time the
ships have been kept at sea, and the time they have been allowed in
harbour to refit the vessels and recruit the crews, will appear. The
_Plantagenet_, for instance, was eight months within four hours’ sail
of England. She was then forced, by stress of weather, into Falmouth,
where she remained twelve days wind-bound; but an order existed (which
I shall presently make the subject of a motion,) by which neither
officer nor man could stretch his legs on the gravel beach within
fifty yards of the ship! In order to show how little benefit has been
derived from supplies at sea, as a substitute for refreshment and
recreation which the crews were formerly suffered to enjoy, I shall
next move—“That there be laid before this House an account of the
quantity of fresh provisions, expressed in day’s allowance, received
at sea by each of H. M.’s ships off Rochefort and Brest, from the 1st
of March, 1806, to the 1st of March, 1807.” Formerly, when the four
months’ provisions were expended, the return of a ship to port was a
matter of course; but now they are victualled and revictualled at sea;
so that an East India voyage is performed with more refreshment than a
Channel cruise. Lime-juice is the substitute for fresh provisions, a
debilitating antidote to the scurvy—unfit to re-establish the strength
of the body impaired by the constant use of salt provisions.
“‘The next motion (which I shall propose) is—“That there be laid
before this House all orders issued and acted on between the 1st of
March, 1806, and March, 1807, respecting leave to be granted or
withheld from officers or men, distinguishing who was
Commander-in-chief at the times of issuing such orders.” It is a hard
case that in harbour neither officer nor men shall be permitted to go
on shore; these orders I do not hesitate to condemn; and the injustice
appears the more striking, when it is remembered that the
Commander-in-chief resided in London, enjoying not only the salary of
his office, but claiming the emolument of prize-money gained by the
toil of those in active service. I shall not be surprised to find the
office of Commander-in-chief bestowed on some favourite as a sinecure
by some future minister.
“‘With respect to the sick, I feel it necessary to say a few words,
but I shall first read my motion on that subject—“That there be laid
before this House all orders issued and acted on between the 1st of
March, 1805, and the 1st of March, 1807, by, or by the authority of
the Commander-in-chief of H.M.’s ships and vessels in the Channel,
allowing or restraining commanding officers from sending men to the
naval hospitals, or restricting their admission to such hospitals.” In
consequence of regulations established in these institutions, men are
frequently refused admittance. No man, whatever may be his state of
health, can be sent to an hospital from any of the ships in the
Channel fleet, unless previously examined by the surgeon of the
Commander-in-chief. Deaths, amputations, and total loss of health,
were the consequences of the impossibility of this officer going from
ship to ship, in bad weather, when opportunity offered to convey the
sick to port. So pertinaciously were such regulations adhered to, that
although I sent a sick lieutenant and a man ruptured to the hospital,
they were not admitted. The disease of the one (who was under
salivation) was declared to be contrary to the order regulating
admission, and he was returned through sleet and rain: the other was
refused because everything _possible_ had not been done to reduce the
rupture, as he had not been hung up by the heels, in a rolling sea,
which might have proved his death!
“‘The system of naval hospitals is thoroughly bad. Mistaken economy
has even reduced the quantity of lint for the purpose of dressing
wounds. To the ships there is not half enough allowed. Unworthy
savings have been unworthily made, endangering the lives of officers
and seamen. Indeed the grievances of the Navy have been, and are so
severe, through rigour and mistaken economy, that I can see nothing
more meritorious than the patience with which these grievances have
been endured.’
“Sir Samuel Hood, Admiral Harvey, Admiral Markham, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Mr. Windham, and others, spoke against the motion.
“Lord Cochrane rose _in reply_, and said, ‘I disclaim, Sir, any motive
whatever, except a regard for the real interests of my country, though
I confess that I cannot help feeling in common with others the
treatment received. Improper motives have been imputed to me, and I
might reply to one of those gentlemen who has denied facts which I can
prove, that he was one of those who established this abominable
system. What his abilities may be, in matters not connected with the
naval service, I know not; but it is a known fact that his noble
patron, the Earl of St. Vincent, sent the master of the _Ville de
Paris_ to put his ship in some tolerable order. (Here there was a cry
of order, order, from Admiral Harvey and others.)
“‘With respect to the assertion made by the same gentleman, that the
health of the men is increased by long cruises at sea, and that of the
Commander-in-chief is improved by being on shore, he may reconcile
that if he can. I shall not follow the example of imputing improper
motives (looking at Captain Sir Samuel Hood); but another complaint
is, that under this obnoxious system of favouritism, captains have
been appointed to large commands of six and seven sail of the line, as
many frigates and as many sloops of war, the right of admirals who
have served, and can serve their country, and who have bled in its
cause. But perhaps, for such times, their ranks did not afford a
prospect of their being sufficiently subservient.
“‘This House, I believe, need not be told that from this cause there
are admirals of ability who have lingered in neglect. (A cry of order,
order, from Admiral Harvey and others.) Sir, two parts of the
statement of the Honourable Knight are especially worthy of notice, so
far as they were meant as a reply to my statement. He said he had an
hundred men killed and wounded in his ship, and no complaint, no
inconvenience arose from want of lint, or anything else. First, this
occurred when surgeons supplied their own necessaries, and next, the
wounded men were sent on the day following to Gibraltar Hospital.
“‘Now, Sir, with respect to the blame said to be attributed by me to
Lord St. Vincent for the loss of the _Felix_ and _Atalante_—I have to
say, that it is of the general system and its consequences of which I
complain—of endless cruises, rendering surveys at sea a substitute for
a proper examination of the state of ships in port. The Honourable
Knight is a little unfortunate in the comparison he has made—saying,
that Lord St. Vincent was no more to blame in the case of these
vessels, than for my getting the _Impérieuse_ on shore on the coast of
France. Now, since this subject has been touched on, I must state,
that I made application for a court-martial on my conduct; but it was
not granted, because the blame would have fallen where it ought—on the
person whose repeated positive commands sent the ship to sea in an
unfit condition. The people of the yard had not finished the work, all
was in confusion. The quarter-deck guns lay unfitted, forty tons of
ballast, besides provisions of all kinds, remained on deck. The powder
(allowed to be taken on board only when the ship is out of harbour)
was received when the ship was in that condition, and the _Impérieuse_
was hurried to sea without a cartridge filled or a gun loaded! The
order issued was, to quit the port the instant the ship would steer,
regardless of every other material circumstance. (Another cry of
order, order, from the same gentlemen. The Speaker said the Noble Lord
must confine himself to the motion before the House.)
“‘Well, Sir, it is asserted that a profusion of oranges is supplied to
the fleet at Lisbon, in reply to my statement, that none are allowed
in the hospitals at home. I have not heard from any of those who have
so zealously spoken on the other side, a defence of the obnoxious
order to keep all officers and men on board. All such grievances may
seem slight and matter of indifference to those who are here at their
ease; but I view them in another light, and if no one better qualified
will represent subjects of great complaint, I will do so, independent
of every personal consideration.
“‘In the course of the debate it has been asserted, that I said
lime-juice was a bad cure for the scurvy—no, it is a cure, and almost
a certain cure, but debilitating—it destroys the disease, but ruins
the constitution. An Hon. member (Mr. Sheridan) has said, that all
this should have been represented to the Admiralty, that this House is
an improper place for such discussions, and he has threatened to call
for all letters from me to the Board. To the first, I answer, that
Boards pay no attention to the representations of individuals whom
they consider under their command; next, that if the Right Honourable
gentleman calls for my letters, he will find some that will not suit
his purpose.
“‘Sir, besides the public abuses, the oppression and scandalous
persecution of individuals, often on anonymous information, has been,
and is matter of great complaint. Sir, if the present Admiralty shall
increase the sum allowed for the refreshment of crews in port, instead
of corrupting their bodies by salt provisions, and then drenching them
with lime-juice, they will deserve the gratitude and thanks of all
employed. In the Navy, we have had to lament the system that makes the
Admiralty an appendage of the minister of the day, and that just as a
Board begin to see, and perhaps to plan reform, they are removed from
office. I trust, Sir, that I shall not be denied the papers moved for,
and that my motion will not be got rid of by a blind vote of
confidence, or the subterfuge of the previous question.’
“The motion was negatived without a division.”[36]
-----
Footnote 36:
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, vol. ix.
-----
From the preceding extract it will have been seen that my motion
produced no effect upon the House. It however produced a _cessation of
my legislative functions!_ for immediately afterwards I was ordered to
join Lord Collingwood’s fleet in the Mediterranean; it being perhaps
anticipated that I should vacate my seat in consequence; but this the
electors of Westminster prevented, by giving me unlimited leave of
absence from my parliamentary duties.
CHAP. XIV.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_.
CRUISE OF THE IMPÉRIEUSE.—ENGAGEMENT WITH THE KING GEORGE.—OFF
TOULON.—FALL IN WITH THIRTEEN MERCHANTMEN.—AM RECALLED BY LORD
COLLINGWOOD.—RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF WAR.—CAPTURE A VESSEL FROM
CORFU.—RUN INTO VALENCIA.—CLEAR FOR ACTION.—DEATH OF LIEUT.
CAULFIELD.—CHASE ROUND CAPE NEGRETTI.—BLOW UP A TOWER AT
MINORCA.—CAPTURE OF SPANISH WINE.—FALL IN WITH THE LEONIDAS.—CAPTURE
A XEBEC.—CHASE THREE SHIPS.—CAPTURE A XEBEC.—CAPE PALOS.—GALE AT
SEA.—JOSEPH PROCLAIMED KING OF SPAIN.—SPAIN DECLARES WAR AGAINST
FRANCE.
On the 12th of September, 1807, the _Impérieuse_ sailed from Portsmouth
to join Lord Collingwood’s fleet in the Mediterranean, having in charge
a convoy of thirty-eight sail of merchantmen destined for Gibraltar and
Malta. We reached Malta on the 31st of October, and finding that Lord
Collingwood was cruising off Palermo, sailed on the 5th of November to
join his fleet.
On the 14th, under the land of Corsica, two strange sail were
discovered, and it being calm, the boats were manned and gave chase, the
larger of the vessels showing English colours. Finding that this _ruse_
did not check the progress of the boats, she hove to, and when they had
advanced within musket shot, hauled in her colours and commenced firing
with musketry and long guns; the boats, however, dashed alongside, and
in five minutes, after considerable slaughter, were in possession.
She proved to be a Maltese privateer of 10 guns; her crew, however,
consisting of Russians, Italians, and Sclavonians, the captain only
being a Maltese. In this affair we lost one man killed, and two officers
and thirteen men wounded. The loss of the privateer was far more
considerable, her treachery being severely punished.
I was much vexed at this affair, for the vessel, though hailing from
Malta, was in reality a pirate, and ought to have been treated as such.
After despatching her to Malta, I addressed the following letter on the
subject to Lord Collingwood:—
“H. M. S. _Impérieuse_, off Corsica,
14th Nov. 1807.
“MY LORD,—I am sorry to inform your Lordship of a circumstance which
has already been fatal to two of our best men, and I fear of thirteen
others wounded two will not survive. These wounds they received in an
engagement with a set of desperate savages collected in a privateer,
said to be the _King George_, of Malta, wherein the only subjects of
his Britannic Majesty were three Maltese boys, one Gibraltar man, and
a naturalised captain; the others being renegadoes from all countries,
and great part of them belonging to nations at war with Great Britain.
“This vessel, my Lord, was close to the Corsican shore. On the near
approach of our boats a union-jack was hung over her gunwale. One boat
of the three, which had no gun, went within hail, and told them that
we were English. The boats then approached, but when close alongside,
the colours of the stranger were taken in, and a volley of grape and
musketry discharged in the most barbarous and savage manner, their
muskets and blunderbusses being pointed from beneath the netting close
to the people’s breasts.
“The rest of the men and officers then boarded and carried the vessel
in the most gallant manner. The bravery shown and exertion used on
this occasion were worthy of a better cause.
“I have the honour, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Collingwood.”
This pirate, for the capture of which, as was subsequently learned,
500_l._ had been offered, was after much trouble condemned as a _droit
of Admiralty!_ it being evidently hoped that by this course such
influence might be brought to bear as would eventually procure her
restoration: for it was currently reported at Malta that certain persons
connected with the Admiralty Court had a share in her! Be this as it
may, we never obtained the premium for her capture, but in place thereof
were _condemned by the Court of Admiralty to pay five hundred double
sequins_! After this, the Maltese court always threw every obstacle in
the way of condemning our prizes, and, when this was effected, with such
costs as to render the term “prize” almost a misnomer; a subject on
which some strange stories will have to be told in another place.
On the 19th we joined Lord Collingwood’s fleet off Toulon, consisting of
the _Ocean_, _Malta_, _Montague_, _Tiger_, _Repulse_, _Canopus_, and
_Espoir_. The _Impérieuse_ was forthwith ordered to Malta, to land the
wounded, after which we were directed by Lord Collingwood to proceed to
the Archipelago, his Lordship giving me an order to supersede the
officer in command of the blockading squadron there.
On the 26th we again fell in with the fleet off Sardinia, and on the
29th anchored in Valetta, our pirate prize having arrived on the
preceding evening. On the 6th of December, the _Impérieuse_ sailed for
the Archipelago, and on the 8th passed between Zante and Cephalonia. On
the 11th we joined the blockading squadron in the Adriatic, consisting
of the _Unité_, _Thames_, _Porcupine_, and _Weasel_, which were then
watching some French frigates in Corfu. On the 12th, the _Impérieuse_
overhauled three Russian vessels, one of which threw overboard three
bundles of letters. By prompt exertion we were lucky enough to rescue
these, and found them to contain important intelligence.
On arriving off Corfu, and pending the necessary arrangements for
transferring the command of the blockading squadron to myself, I asked
leave of the senior officer still in command to take a run to the north
end of the island. This being granted, we sailed forthwith, and to our
surprise soon afterwards fell in with thirteen merchantmen, as leisurely
proceeding along the blockaded coast as though we had belonged to their
own nation! Singling out the three nearest to us, we took possession of
them, and to our astonishment found that each had a pass from the
officer I was ordered to supersede!
Despite this unlooked-for protection, I sent them to Malta for
adjudication, and they were, I believe, condemned. The immediate result
to myself, however—as Lord Collingwood long afterwards told me—was _the
withdrawal of my appointment to the command of the blockading squadron_!
The commanding officer, whose passes I had intercepted, promptly took
the initiative, and without apprising me, despatched one of his vessels
to Lord Collingwood, with a letter stating generally that, “_from my
want of discretion I was unfit to be entrusted with a single ship, much
less with the command of a squadron_!” Lord Collingwood acted on the
representation without making inquiry into its cause, and the
consequence was my recall to receive further orders from his Lordship,
this amounting to my deposition from the only command of a squadron that
was ever offered to me.
I was, of course, ignorant of Lord Collingwood’s reasons for recalling
me, though greatly disappointed at such a result. It was not till some
time afterwards, when too late to remedy the injury, that I ventured to
ask his Lordship the reason of such a proceeding. He frankly told me,
when I as frankly informed him of the intercepted passes, and that my
senior officer had traduced me to his Lordship, by way of first blow in
a serious scrape. Lord Collingwood was very indignant, but from the
lapse of time, and probably from having neglected to investigate the
matter at the time, he thought it better not to reopen it, and thus my
traducer continued his pass trade with impunity.
I give the above incident as it occurred. Those to whom such a statement
may appear incredible, will find, on consulting the pages of Captain
Brenton, that it was not an isolated instance.
I shall add, that on my return from the Mediterranean, in 1809, an
officer, who shall be nameless, waited on me at Portsmouth, and begged
me not to make official or public mention of the preceding circumstance,
or it would be his ruin. I made him no promise, but having then the
preparation for the Basque Roads attack on my hands, there was no time
to attend to the matter, and as the circumstance had not been officially
reported by me at the time—as indeed it did not come within my province
to report it—I never afterwards troubled myself about it, though this
shameless proceeding had deprived me of the only chance I ever had to
command more than a single ship![37]
-----
Footnote 37:
The excuse offered to me was, that the purser had been making use of
the captain’s name, for his own purposes! A very improbable story, as
in such a case it would not have been difficult to convict the purser
and exonerate himself. The disgraceful letter to Lord Collingwood,
however, clearly pointed out the delinquent.
-----
On the 17th we fell in with a brig bound from Trieste to Lord
Collingwood with despatches, announcing that Russia had declared
hostilities against England. This intelligence was fortunate, as there
were several Russian ships of war in the Gulf, with one of which—a
line-of-battle ship—we had fallen in only two days previous.
The professed origin of the declaration of Russia against England was
our questionable conduct at Copenhagen. But, notwithstanding the
assumption by Russia, that she had endeavoured to serve our cause at
Tilsit, there is no doubt but that she was secretly leagued with
Napoleon against us. I never knew what was in the letters we rescued, as
they were sent to Lord Collingwood; but no doubt they contained
important intelligence for the French squadron then in the Archipelago,
and, coming from a Russian source, there was little question as to the
nature of their contents, which appeared to be conclusive in the
estimation of the British authorities.
On the 22nd the _Impérieuse_ stood into the Gulf of Valona under French
colours, and saw some vessels close in under the batteries. As soon as
it became dark, we manned the boats and brought out a Turkish vessel
under the fire of a battery. On the 30th again joined the squadron, and
learned that the Russian fleet, consisting of five sail of the line and
three frigates, had left Corfu and gone up the Adriatic.
On the 2nd of January, 1808, we joined Lord Collingwood, the fleet then
bearing up in the direction of Syracuse. On the 8th gave chase to some
vessels off the south point of Cephalonia, sending the boats after them
into the bay; but the enemy being on the alert, and the vessels being
run on shore, it became necessary to recall the boats. On the 12th, when
off Otranto, we captured a vessel from Corfu to that place, laden with
clothing and iron.