return to their allegiance—the co-operation of the King of France in aid
of the revolt—the discreditable war which followed—and the singular
recoil of his own principles on the head of Louis XVI. himself, are
matters of history and need not here be further alluded to.
When the _Thetis_ was first on the coast, the American republic was
universally recognised, and it must be admitted that our treatment of
its citizens was scarcely in accordance with the national privileges to
which the young republic had become entitled. There were, no doubt, many
individuals amongst the American people who, caring little for the
Federal government, considered it more profitable to break than to keep
the laws of nations, by aiding and supporting our enemy, and it was
against such that the efforts of the squadron had been chiefly directed;
but the way in which the object was carried out was scarcely less an
infraction of those international laws which we were professedly
enforcing.
The practice of taking English seamen out of American vessels, without
regard to the safety of navigating them when thus deprived of their
hands, has been already mentioned. To this may be added, the detention
of vessels against which nothing contrary to international neutrality
could be established, whereby their cargoes became damaged; the
compelling them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other than those
to which they were destined, and generally treating them as though they
were engaged in contraband trade.
Of these transactions the Americans had a right to complain; but in
other respects their complaints were indefensible; such as that of our
not permitting them to send corn and provisions to France, a violation
of neutrality into which, after declaration of blockade, none but an
inexperienced government could have fallen; though there was perhaps
something in the collateral grievance that American ships were not
permitted to quit English ports without giving security for the
discharge of their cargoes in some other British or neutral port.
It would be wearisome to enter into further details respecting the
operations of a squadron so ingloriously employed, or to notice the
subordinate part which a junior lieutenant could take in its
proceedings. Suffice it to say, that after remaining five years on the
North American station, the _Thetis_ returned to England.
CHAP. IV.
SERVICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
I JOIN LORD KEITH’S SHIP.—AN UNPLEASANT ALTERCATION, ENDING IN A
COURT-MARTIAL.—THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.—FRENCH FLEET IN THE
OFFING.—PURSUED BY LORD KEITH.—ENEMY’S VESSELS BURNT AT TOULON.—LORD
KEITH RECALLED BY LORD ST. VINCENT.—LORD ST. VINCENT RESIGNS THE
COMMAND.—LORD KEITH PURSUES THE FRENCH FLEET TO BREST, AND FROM
THENCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN.—STATE OF THE FRENCH MARINE.—LORD KEITH
APPOINTS ME TO THE GÉNÉREUX.—BURNING OF THE QUEEN CHARLOTTE.—ACTION
WITH PRIVATEERS OFF CABRITTA POINT.—RECOMMENDED FOR PROMOTION.
Towards the close of the autumn of 1798, Lord Keith was appointed to
relieve Lord St. Vincent in the command of the Mediterranean fleet, and
kindly offered to take me with him as a supernumerary. I therefore
embarked, by his lordship’s invitation, in the flag-ship.
We arrived at Gibraltar on the 14th of December, and found Lord St.
Vincent residing on shore, his flag flying on board the _Souverain_
sheerhulk.
His lordship’s reception of me was very kind, and on the 24th of
December, at Lord Keith’s request, he gave an order for my appointment
to the _Barfleur_, to which ship Lord Keith had shifted his flag. This
appointment, from a certain dissatisfaction at my having received such a
commission after being so short a time at sea, afterwards brought me
into trouble.
Lord St. Vincent did not, as was expected, immediately transfer to Lord
Keith the command of the Mediterranean fleet, but remained at Gibraltar,
giving orders to his lordship to blockade the Spanish fleet in Cadiz.
The first part of the year was spent in this employment, Lord Keith’s
force varying from eleven to fifteen sail of the line, but without
frigates, though the commander-in-chief had a considerable number under
his orders. The omission was the more remarkable, as the blockaded
Spanish force numbered upwards of twenty ships of the line, with
frigates and smaller vessels in proportion.
The British force, for upwards of four months, was anchored some seven
or eight miles from Cadiz, but without rousing the national spirit of
the Spaniards, who manifested no disposition to quit their shelter, even
though we were compelled from time to time to leave our anchorage for
the purpose of procuring water and cattle from the neighbouring coast of
Africa. It was during one of these trips in the _Barfleur_ that an
absurd affair involved me in serious disaster.
Our first lieutenant, Beaver, was an officer who carried etiquette in
the wardroom and on deck almost to despotism. He was laudably particular
in all matters visible to the eye of the admiral, but permitted an
honest penny to be turned elsewhere by a practice as reprehensible as
revolting. On our frequent visits to Tetuan, we purchased and killed
bullocks _on board the Barfleur_, for the use of the whole squadron. The
reason was, that raw hides, being valuable, could be stowed away in her
hold in empty beef-casks, as especial perquisites to certain persons
connected with the flagship; a natural result being, that, as the fleshy
parts of the hides decomposed, putrid liquor oozed out of the casks, and
rendered the hold of the vessel so intolerable, that she acquired the
name of “The stinking Scotch ship.”
As junior lieutenant, much of the unpleasantness of this fell to my
share, and as I always had a habit of speaking my mind without much
reserve, it followed that those interested in the raw hide speculation
were not very friendly disposed towards me.
One day, when at Tetuan, having obtained leave to go ashore and amuse
myself with shooting wild-fowl, my dress became so covered with mud, as
to induce me not to come off with other officers in the pinnace which
took me on shore, preferring to wait for the launch, in which the filthy
state of my apparel would be less apparent. The launch being delayed
longer than had been anticipated, my leave of absence expired shortly
before my arrival on board—not without attracting the attention of
Lieutenant Beaver, who was looking over the gangway.
Thinking it disrespectful to report myself on the quarter deck in so
dirty a condition, I hastened to put on clean uniform, an operation
scarcely completed when Lieutenant Beaver came into the wardroom, and in
a very harsh tone demanded the reason of my not having reported myself.
My reply was, that as he saw me come up the side, he must be aware that
my dress was not in a fit condition to appear on the quarter deck, and
that it had been necessary to change my clothes before formally
reporting myself.
Lieutenant Beaver replied to this explanation in a manner so offensive
that it was clear he wanted to surprise me into some act of
insubordination. As it would have been impossible to be long cool in
opposition to marked invective, I respectfully reminded him that by
attacking me in the wardroom he was breaking a rule which he had himself
laid down; viz. that “Matters connected with the service were not there
to be spoken of.” The remark increased his violence, which, at length,
became so marked as to call forth the reply, “Lieutenant Beaver, we
will, if you please, talk of this in another place.” He then went on
deck, and reported to Captain Elphinstone that in reply to his remarks
on a violation of duty, he had received a challenge!
On being sent for to answer the charge, an explanation of what had
really taken place was given to Captain Elphinstone, who was kindly
desirous that the first lieutenant should accept an apology, and let so
disagreeable a matter drop. This was declined on my part, on the ground
that, in the conversation which had passed, I had not been in the wrong,
and had therefore no apology to make. The effect was, that Beaver
demanded a court-martial on me, and this, after manifest reluctance on
the part of Lord Keith, was ordered accordingly; the decision of which
was an admonition to be “more careful in future”—a clear proof that the
court thought great provocation had been given by my accuser, or their
opinion would have been more marked.
The Judge-Advocate on this occasion was the admiral’s secretary, one of
those who had taken offence about the raw hides before mentioned! After
the business of the court was concluded, Lord Keith, who was much vexed
with the whole affair, said to me privately: “Now, Lord Cochrane, pray
avoid for the future all flippancy towards superior officers.” His
secretary overheard and embodied the remark in the sentence of the
court-martial; so that shortly afterwards his officiousness or malice
formed an impediment to my promotion, though the court had actually
awarded no censure.
Lord Keith, who had in vain used every endeavour to induce the Spaniards
to risk an engagement, began to get tired of so fruitless an operation
as that of watching an enemy at anchor under their batteries, and
resolved to try if he could not entice or force them to quit their
moorings. With this view, the British force, though then consisting of
twelve ships only, without a single frigate to watch the enemy
meanwhile, proceeded to water, as usual, at Tetuan, so as to be in
readiness for any contingencies that might arise. As the events which
followed have been incorrectly represented by naval historians, if not
in one instance misrepresented, it is necessary, in order to do justice
to Lord Keith, to detail them at some length.
Immediately after our return from Tetuan, the _Childers_ arrived with
intelligence that five Spanish sail of the line had got out of Ferrol,
and she was followed on the same day by the _Success_ frigate, which had
been chased by a French fleet off Oporto. Lord Keith at once despatched
the _Childers_ to Gibraltar, to inform Lord St. Vincent, as was
understood in the squadron, that he intended, if the French fleet came
to Cadiz, to engage them, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers. Lord
Keith’s force, by the arrival of three additional ships of the line and
one frigate, now amounted to sixteen sail; viz. one 112-gun ship, four
98's, one 90, two 80's, seven 74's, and one frigate, and these were
immediately got under weigh and formed in order of battle, standing off
and on in front of the harbour.
About 8 A.M. on the 6th of May the French fleet was signalled in the
offing, and was made out to consist of thirty-three sail, which with the
twenty-two sail of Spaniards in Cadiz made fifty-five, besides frigates,
to be encountered by the comparatively small British force. The French
fleet was on the larboard tack, and our ships immediately formed on the
same tack to receive them. To our surprise they soon afterwards wore and
stood away to the south-west; though from our position between them and
the Spaniards they had a fair chance of victory had the combined fleets
acted in concert. According to Lord Keith’s pithily expressed opinion,
we lay between “the devil and the deep sea.”
Yet there was nothing rash. Lord Keith calculated that the Spaniards
would not move unless the French succeeded in breaking through the
British line, and this he had no doubt of preventing. Besides which, the
wind, though not dead on shore, as has been said, was unfavourable for
the Spaniards coming out with the necessary rapidity. The great point to
be gained was to prevent the junction of the enemies’ fleets, as was
doubtless intended; the attempt was however completely frustrated by the
bold interposition of Lord Keith, who, strange to say, never received
for this signal service the acknowledgment of merit which was his due.
It has been inferred by naval historians that a gale of wind, which was
blowing on the first appearance of the French fleet, was the cause of
their standing away. A better reason was their disinclination to
encounter damage, which they knew would defeat their ultimate object of
forming a junction with the Spanish fleet elsewhere.
At daylight on the 7th we were still standing off and on before Cadiz,
expecting the enemy to return; when shortly afterwards four of their
ships were seen to windward of the British force, which immediately gave
chase; but the enemy outstripping us, we returned to the coast, to guard
every point by which they might get into Cadiz. Seeing no symptoms of
the main body of the French fleet, Lord Keith concluded that the four
ships just noticed had been left as a decoy to draw his attention from
their real object of running for Toulon, now that they had been foiled
in their expectation of carrying with them the Spanish fleet. We
accordingly made all sail for Gibraltar.
From the intelligence forwarded by the _Childers_, there was reason to
suppose that Lord St. Vincent would have prepared for instant pursuit.
To our surprise, the signal was made to anchor and obtain water and
provision. Three entire days were consumed in this operation; with what
effect as regarded the other ships I do not know, but so far as the
_Barfleur_ was concerned, and as far as I know of the other ships, the
delay was unnecessary. The fleet was greatly disappointed at being thus
detained, as the enemy would thereby reach Toulon without molestation,
and for any good which could be effected we might as well remain where
we lay.
This impatience was, after a lapse of three days, ended by Lord St.
Vincent hoisting his flag on board the _Ville de Paris_; when,
reinforced by the _Edgar_, 74, the fleet shaped its course up the
Mediterranean.
After we had proceeded as far as the Bay of Rosas, Lord St. Vincent,
having communicated with Lord Keith, parted company in the _Ville de
Paris_ for Minorca, leaving Lord Keith to pursue the enemy with the
remaining ships. We now made straight for Toulon, where we learned from
some fishing boats that the enemy’s fleet had embarked spars, cordage,
anchors, and other heavy articles for the equipment of their ships of
war built or building at Spezzia—and had sailed to the eastward.
After burning some merchant vessels working into Toulon, we again
started in chase. It was now of even greater importance to overtake the
French fleet, in order to frustrate a double mischief; first, their
escape; and secondly, their getting to Spezzia with the materials for so
important an addition to their force. With this object the British ships
crowded all sail in the direction the enemy had taken, and at length
came in sight of their look-out frigates between Corsica and Genoa.
Just as we were upon the point of seeing the fleet also, a fast sailing
transport arrived from Lord St. Vincent, with orders to return to Port
Mahon; intelligence of the sailing of the French fleet having reached
that port, which, Lord St. Vincent feared, might become the object of
attack. Lord Keith, however, knowing exactly the position of the enemy,
within reach of whom we now virtually were, persevered in the pursuit.
Shortly afterwards another fast sailing transport hove in sight, firing
guns for Lord Keith to bring to, which having done, he received
peremptory orders to repair immediately to Minorca; Lord St. Vincent
still imagining that as the enemy had left Toulon they might catch him
in Port Mahon; the fact of their having gone to Spezzia, though known to
us, being unknown to him. Compliance with this unseasonable order was
therefore compulsory, and Lord Keith made the signal for all captains,
when, as reported by those officers, his lordship explained that the
bearing up was no act of his, and the captains having returned on board
their respective ships, reluctantly changed the course for Minorca,
leaving the French fleet to proceed unmolested to Spezzia.
On Lord Keith receiving this order, I never saw a man more irritated.
When annoyed, his lordship had a habit of talking aloud to himself. On
this occasion, as officer of the watch, I happened to be in close
proximity, and thereby became an involuntary listener to some very
strong expressions, imputing jealousy on the part of Lord St. Vincent as
constituting the motive for recalling him. The actual words of Lord
Keith not being meant for the ear of any one, I do not think proper to
record them. The above facts are stated as coming within my own personal
knowledge, and are here introduced in consequence of blame being cast on
Lord Keith to this day by naval historians, who could only derive their
authority from _data_ which are certainly untrue—even if official. Had
the command been surrendered to Lord Keith on his arrival in the
Mediterranean, or had his lordship been permitted promptly to pursue the
enemy, they could not have escaped.
The French fleet, after we were compelled to relinquish the chase (when
in sight of their look-out frigates), were reported to have landed 1000
men at Savona, and convoyed a supply of wheat to Genoa, as well as
having landed their naval stores at Spezzia, not one of which services
could have been effected had it not been for the unfortunate delay at
Gibraltar and the before-mentioned recall of the pursuing fleet.
Immediately after our departure from Gibraltar, the Spanish fleet
quitted Cadiz for the Mediterranean, and as no force remained to watch
the Straits, they were enabled to pass with impunity, the whole, after
suffering great damage by a gale of wind, succeeded in reaching
Carthagena.
On our arrival at Minorca, Lord St. Vincent resumed the command, and
proceeded for some distance towards Toulon. On the 2nd of June, his
lordship again quitted the fleet for Mahon, in the _Ville de Paris_. On
the 14th Lord Keith shifted his flag from the _Barfleur_ to the _Queen
Charlotte_, a much finer ship, to which I had the honour to accompany
him.
We once more proceeded in quest of the French fleet, and on the 19th the
advance ships captured three frigates and two brigs of war on their way
from Egypt to Toulon, but learned nothing of the fleet we were in search
of. On the 23rd of June, Lord St. Vincent at length resigned the
Mediterranean command and sailed for England, so that Lord Keith had no
alternative but to return to Port Mahon to make the necessary
arrangements.
Scarcely had we come to an anchor when we received intelligence that the
French fleet had passed to the westward to join the Spanish fleet at
Carthagena!
Without even losing time to fill up with water, every exertion was made
for immediate pursuit, and on the 10th we started for Carthagena, but
finding the enemy gone, again made sail, and on the 26th reached Tetuan,
where we completed our water. On the 29th Lord Keith communicated with
Gibraltar, but as nothing was heard of the combined fleets, it was
evident they had gone through the Straits in the dark; we therefore
followed and examined Cadiz, where they were not. Pursuing our course
without effect along the Spanish and Portuguese coasts—on the 8th of
August we fell in with a Danish brig off Cape Finisterre, and received
from her information that she had two days before passed through the
combined French and Spanish fleets. We then directed our course for
Brest, hoping to be in time to intercept them, but found that on the day
before our arrival they had effected their object, and were then safely
moored within the harbour. We now shaped our course for Torbay, and
there found the Channel fleet under Sir Alan Gardner—the united force
being nearly fifty ships of the line.
On our arrival at Torbay, Lord Keith sent me with despatches on board
the commander-in-chief’s ship, where, after executing my commission, it
was imperiously demanded by her captain whether I was aware that my
coming on board was an infringement of quarantine regulations? Nettled
at the over-bearing manner of an uncalled-for reprimand to an inferior
officer, my reply was that, having been directed by Lord Keith to
deliver his despatches, his lordship’s orders had been executed
accordingly; at the same time, however, assuring my interrogator that we
had no sickness in the fleet, nor had we been in any contagious
localities. From the captain’s manner, it was almost evident that, for
being thus plain spoken, he intended to put me under arrest, and I was
not sorry to get back to the _Queen Charlotte_; even a show of
resistance to an excess of authority being in those days fatal to many
an officer’s prospects.
I shall not enter into detail as to what occurred in the Channel;
suffice it to say that despite the imposing force lying at Torbay, the
combined French and Spanish fleets found no difficulty in getting out of
Brest, and that on the 6th of December Lord Keith returned in pursuit to
Gibraltar, where he resumed the Mediterranean command, administered by
Lord Nelson during his absence.
It is beyond the province of this work to notice the effectual measures
taken by Lord Nelson in the Mediterranean during our absence, as they
are matters in which I bore no part. But whilst Nelson and Lord Keith
had been doing their best there, little appeared to be done at home to
check the enemy’s operations.
From Gibraltar we proceeded to Sicily, where we found Lord Nelson
surrounded by the _élite_ of Neapolitan society, amongst whom he was
justly regarded as a deliverer. It was never my good fortune to serve
under his lordship, either at that or any subsequent period. During our
stay at Palermo, I had, however, opportunities of personal conversation
with him, and from one of his frequent injunctions, “Never mind
manœuvres, always go at them,” I subsequently had reason to consider
myself indebted for successful attacks under apparently difficult
circumstances.
The impression left on my mind during these opportunities of association
with Nelson was that of his being an embodiment of dashing courage,
which would not take much trouble to circumvent an enemy, but being
confronted with one would regard victory so much a matter of course as
hardly to deem the chance of defeat worth consideration.
This was in fact the case; for though the enemy’s ships were for the
most part superior to ours in build, the discipline and seamanship of
their crews was in that day so inferior as to leave little room for
doubt of victory on our part. It was probably with the object of
improving his crews that Admiral Bruix had risked a run from the
Mediterranean to Brest and back, as just now detailed. Had not Lord
Keith been delayed at Gibraltar, and afterwards recalled to Minorca, the
disparity of numbers on our side would not have been of any great
consequence.
Trafalgar itself is an illustration of Nelson’s peculiar clash. It has
been remarked that Trafalgar was a rash action, and that had Nelson lost
it and lived he would have been brought to a court-martial for the way
in which that action was conducted. But such cavillers forget that, from
previous experience, he had calculated both the nature and amount of
resistance to be expected; such calculation forming as essential a part
of his plan of attack as even his own means for making it. The result
justified his expectations of victory, which were not only well founded
but certain.
The fact is, that many commanders in those days committed the error of
overrating the French navy, just as, in the present day, we are
nationally falling into the still more dangerous extreme of underrating
it. Steam has, indeed, gone far towards equalising seamanship; and the
strenuous exertions of the French department of Marine have perhaps
rendered discipline in their navy as good as in ours. They moreover keep
their trained men, whilst we thoughtlessly turn ours adrift whenever
ships are paid off—to be replaced by raw hands in case of emergency!