Criticism of the President for his Action on Slavery--Lincoln's Letters
to Louisiana Friends--Greeley's Open Letter--Mr. Lincoln's
Reply--Chicago Clergymen Urge Emancipation--Lincoln's Answer--Lincoln
Issues Preliminary Proclamation--President Proposes Constitutional
Amendment--Cabinet Considers Final Proclamation--Cabinet Discusses
Admission of West Virginia--Lincoln Signs Edict of Freedom--Lincoln's
Letter to Hodges
The secrets of the government were so well kept that no hint whatever
came to the public that the President had submitted to the cabinet the
draft of an emancipation proclamation. Between that date and the battle
of the second Bull Run intervened the period of a full month, during
which, in the absence of military movements or congressional proceedings
to furnish exciting news, both private individuals and public journals
turned a new and somewhat vindictive fire of criticism upon the
administration. For this they seized upon the ever-ready text of the
ubiquitous slavery question. Upon this issue the conservatives protested
indignantly that the President had been too fast, while, contrarywise,
the radicals clamored loudly that he had been altogether too slow. We
have seen how his decision was unalterably taken and his course
distinctly marked out, but that he was not yet ready publicly to
announce it. Therefore, during this period of waiting for victory, he
underwent the difficult task of restraining the impatience of both
sides, which he did in very positive language. Thus, under date of July
26, 1862, he wrote to a friend in Louisiana:
"Yours of the sixteenth, by the hand of Governor Shepley, is received.
It seems the Union feeling in Louisiana is being crushed out by the
course of General Phelps. Please pardon me for believing that is a false
pretense. The people of Louisiana--all intelligent people
everywhere--know full well that I never had a wish to touch the
foundations of their society, or any right of theirs. With perfect
knowledge of this, they forced a necessity upon me to send armies among
them, and it is their own fault, not mine, that they are annoyed by the
presence of General Phelps. They also know the remedy--know how to be
cured of General Phelps. Remove the necessity of his presence.... I am a
patient man--always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of
repentance, and also to give ample time for repentance. Still, I must
save this government if possible. What I cannot do, of course I will not
do; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not
surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed."
Two days later he answered another Louisiana critic:
"Mr. Durant complains that, in various ways, the relation of master and
slave is disturbed by the presence of our army, and he considers it
particularly vexatious that this, in part, is done under cover of an act
of Congress, while constitutional guarantees are suspended on the plea
of military necessity. The truth is that what is done and omitted about
slaves is done and omitted on the same military necessity. It is a
military necessity to have men and money; and we can get neither in
sufficient numbers or amounts if we keep from or drive from our lines
slaves coming to them. Mr. Durant cannot be ignorant of the pressure in
this direction, nor of my efforts to hold it within bounds till he and
such as he shall have time to help themselves.... What would you do in
my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecute
it in future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose-water? Would you
deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones? Would you give up the
contest, leaving any available means unapplied? I am in no boastful
mood. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can, to save
the government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personal
inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast
for malicious dealing."
The President could afford to overlook the misrepresentations and
invective of the professedly opposition newspapers, but he had also to
meet the over-zeal of influential Republican editors of strong
antislavery bias. Horace Greeley printed, in the New York "Tribune" of
August 20, a long "open letter" ostentatiously addressed to Mr. Lincoln,
full of unjust censure all based on the general accusation that the
President and many army officers as well, were neglecting their duty
under pro-slavery influences and sentiments. The open letter which Mr.
Lincoln wrote in reply is remarkable not alone for the skill with which
it separated the true from the false issue of the moment, but also for
the equipoise and dignity with which it maintained his authority as
moral arbiter between the contending factions.
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
August 22, 1862.
"HON. HORACE GREELEY.
"DEAR SIR: I have just read yours of the nineteenth, addressed to myself
through the New York 'Tribune.' If there be in it any statements or
assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and
here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may
believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them.
If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive
it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to
be right.
"As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant
to leave any one in doubt.
"I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the
Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the
nearer the Union will be 'the Union as it was.' If there be those who
would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save
slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save
the Union unless they could, at the same time, destroy slavery, I do not
agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the
Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save
the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save
it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by
freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do
about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to
save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe
it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall
believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I
shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct
errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as
they shall appear to be true views.
"I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty;
and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all
men everywhere could be free.
"Yours,
"A. LINCOLN."
It can hardly be doubted that President Lincoln, when he wrote this
letter, intended that it should have a twofold effect upon public
opinion: first, that it should curb extreme antislavery sentiment to
greater patience; secondly, that it should rouse dogged pro-slavery
conservatism, and prepare it for the announcement which he had resolved
to make at the first fitting opportunity. At the date of the letter, he
very well knew that a serious conflict of arms was soon likely to occur
in Virginia; and he had strong reason to hope that the junction of the
armies of McClellan and Pope which had been ordered, and was then in
progress, could be successfully effected, and would result in a decisive
Union victory. This hope, however, was sadly disappointed. The second
battle of Bull Run, which occurred one week after the Greeley letter,
proved a serious defeat, and necessitated a further postponement of his
contemplated action.
As a secondary effect of the new disaster, there came upon him once more
an increased pressure to make reprisal upon what was assumed to be the
really vulnerable side of the rebellion. On September 13, he was visited
by an influential deputation from the religious denominations of
Chicago, urging him to issue at once a proclamation of universal
emancipation. His reply to them, made in the language of the most
perfect courtesy nevertheless has in it a tone of rebuke that indicates
the state of irritation and high sensitiveness under which he was living
from day to day. In the actual condition of things, he could neither
safely satisfy them nor deny them. As any answer he could make would be
liable to misconstruction, he devoted the larger part of it to pointing
out the unreasonableness of their dogmatic insistence:
"I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by
religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the divine
will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in
that belief, and perhaps, in some respects, both. I hope it will not be
irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal
his will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, it might be
supposed he would reveal it directly to me.... What good would a
proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now
situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will
see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the
comet.... Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal or
constitutional grounds, for, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy
in time of war, I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may
best subdue the enemy; nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, in
view of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South.
I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on
according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the
suppression of the rebellion.... Do not misunderstand me because I have
mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have
thus far prevented my action in some such way as you desire. I have not
decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the
matter under advisement. And I can assure you that the subject is on my
mind, by day and night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be
God's will, I will do."
Four days after this interview the battle of Antietam was fought, and
when, after a few days of uncertainty it was ascertained that it could
be reasonably claimed as a Union victory, the President resolved to
carry out his long-matured purpose. The diary of Secretary Chase has
recorded a very full report of the interesting transaction. On this ever
memorable September 22, 1862, after some playful preliminary talk, Mr.
Lincoln said to his cabinet:
"GENTLEMEN: I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the
relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several
weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared on this subject, which,
on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since
then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have
thought, all along, that the time for acting on it might probably come.
I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that
we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels
has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been
driven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of
invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as
it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of
emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing
to any one, but I made the promise to myself and [hesitating a little]
to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfil
that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down.
I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have
determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect
for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this
question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered
them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that
which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in
the expressions I use, or in any minor matter which any one of you
thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive the suggestions.
One other observation I will make. I know very well that many others
might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was
satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one
of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could
be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him.
But, though I believe that I have not so much of the confidence of the
people as I had some time since, I do not know that, all things
considered any other person has more; and, however this may be, there is
no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here; I
must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course
which I feel I ought to take."
The members of the cabinet all approved the policy of the measure; Mr.
Blair only objecting that he thought the time inopportune, while others
suggested some slight amendments. In the new form in which it was
printed on the following morning, the document announced a renewal of
the plan of compensated abolishment, a continuance of the effort at
voluntary colonization, a promise to recommend ultimate compensation to
loyal owners, and--
"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any
State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be
in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward,
and forever free; and the executive government of the United States,
including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to
repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for
their actual freedom."
Pursuant to these announcements, the President's annual message of
December 1, 1862, recommended to Congress the passage of a joint
resolution proposing to the legislatures of the several States a
constitutional amendment consisting of three articles, namely: One
providing compensation in bonds for every State which should abolish
slavery before the year 1900; another securing freedom to all slaves
who, during the rebellion, had enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of
war--also providing compensation to legal owners; the third authorizing
Congress to provide for colonization. The long and practical argument in
which he renewed this plan, "not in exclusion of, but additional to, all
others for restoring and preserving the national authority throughout
the Union," concluded with the following eloquent sentences:
"We can succeed only by concert. It is not, 'Can any of us imagine
better?' but, 'Can we all do better?' Object whatsoever is possible,
still the question recurs, 'Can we do better?' The dogmas of the quiet
past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high
with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new,
so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and
then we shall save our country.
"Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. We, of this Congress and
this administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No
personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of
us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor
or dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The
world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union.
The world knows we do know how to save it. We--even we here--hold the
power and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we
assure freedom to the free--honorable alike in what we give and what we
preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of
earth. Other means may succeed, this could not fail. The way is plain,
peaceful generous, just--a way which, if followed, the world will
forever applaud, and God must forever bless."
But Mr. Lincoln was not encouraged by any response to this earnest
appeal, either from Congress or by manifestations of public opinion.
Indeed, it may be fairly presumed that he expected none. Perhaps he
considered it already a sufficient gain that it was silently accepted as
another admonition of the consequences which not he nor his
administration, but the Civil War, with its relentless agencies, was
rapidly bringing about. He was becoming more and more conscious of the
silent influence of his official utterances on public sentiment, if not
to convert obstinate opposition, at least to reconcile it to patient
submission.
In that faith he steadfastly went on carrying out his well-matured plan,
the next important step of which was the fulfilment of the announcements
made in the preliminary emancipation proclamation of September 22. On
December 30, he presented to each member of his cabinet a copy of the
draft he had carefully made of the new and final proclamation to be
issued on New Year's day. It will be remembered that as early as July
22, he informed the cabinet that the main question involved he had
decided for himself. Now, as twice before it was only upon minor points
that he asked their advice and suggestion, for which object he placed
these drafts in their hands for verbal and collateral criticism.
In addition to the central point of military emancipation in all the
States yet in rebellion, the President's draft for the first time
announced his intention to incorporate a portion of the newly liberated
slaves into the armies of the Union. This policy had also been under
discussion at the first consideration of the subject in July. Mr.
Lincoln had then already seriously considered it, but thought it
inexpedient and productive of more evil than good at that date. In his
judgment, the time had now arrived for energetically adopting it.
On the following day, December 31, the members brought back to the
cabinet meeting their several criticisms and suggestions on the draft he
had given them. Perhaps the most important one was that earnestly
pressed by Secretary Chase, that the new proclamation should make no
exceptions of fractional parts of States controlled by the Union armies,
as in Louisiana and Virginia, save the forty-eight counties of the
latter designated as West Virginia, then in process of formation and
admission as a new State; the constitutionality of which, on this same
December 31, was elaborately discussed in writing by the members of the
cabinet, and affirmatively decided by the President.
On the afternoon of December 31, the cabinet meeting being over, Mr.
Lincoln once more carefully rewrote the proclamation, embodying in it
the suggestions which had been made as to mere verbal improvements; but
he rigidly adhered to his own draft in retaining the exceptions as to
fractional parts of States and the forty-eight counties of West
Virginia; and also his announcement of intention to enlist the freedmen
in military service. Secretary Chase had submitted the form of a closing
paragraph. This the President also adopted, but added to it, after the
words "warranted by the Constitution," his own important qualifying
correction, "upon military necessity."