Jackson's Valley Campaign--Lincoln's Visit to Scott--Pope Assigned to
Command--Lee's Attack on McClellan--Retreat to Harrison's
Landing--Seward Sent to New York--Lincoln's Letter to Seward--Lincoln's
Letter to McClellan--Lincoln's Visit to McClellan--Halleck made
General-in-Chief--Halleck's Visit to McClellan--Withdrawal from
Harrison's Landing--Pope Assumes Command--Second Battle of Bull Run--The
Cabinet Protest--McClellan Ordered to Defend Washington--The Maryland
Campaign--Battle of Antietam--Lincoln Visits Antietam--Lincoln's Letter
to McClellan--McClellan Removed from Command
During the month of May, while General McClellan was slowly working his
way across the Chickahominy by bridge-building and intrenching, there
occurred the episode of Stonewall Jackson's valley campaign, in which
that eccentric and daring Confederate commander made a rapid and
victorious march up the Shenandoah valley nearly to Harper's Ferry. Its
principal effect upon the Richmond campaign was to turn back McDowell,
who had been started on a land march to unite with the right wing of
McClellan's army, under instructions, however, always to be in readiness
to interpose his force against any attempt of the enemy to march upon
Washington. This campaign of Stonewall Jackson's has been much lauded by
military writers; but its temporary success resulted from good luck
rather than military ability. Rationally considered, it was an
imprudent and even reckless adventure that courted and would have
resulted in destruction or capture had the junction of forces under
McDowell, Shields, and Frémont, ordered by President Lincoln, not been
thwarted by the mistake and delay of Frémont. It was an episode that
signally demonstrated the wisdom of the President in having retained
McDowell's corps for the protection of the national capital.
That, however, was not the only precaution to which the President had
devoted his serious attention. During the whole of McClellan's Richmond
campaign he had continually borne in mind the possibility of his defeat,
and the eventualities it might create. Little by little, that general's
hesitation, constant complaints, and exaggerated reports of the enemy's
strength changed the President's apprehensions from possibility to
probability; and he took prompt measures to be prepared as far as
possible, should a new disaster arise. On June 24 he made a hurried
visit to the veteran General Scott at West Point, for consultation on
the existing military conditions, and on his return to Washington called
General Pope from the West, and, by an order dated June 26, specially
assigned him to the command of the combined forces under Frémont, Banks,
and McDowell, to be called the Army of Virginia, whose duty it should be
to guard the Shenandoah valley and Washington city, and, as far as might
be, render aid to McClellan's campaign against Richmond.
The very day on which the President made this order proved to be the
crisis of McClellan's campaign. That was the day he had fixed upon for a
general advance; but so far from realizing this hope, it turned out,
also, to be the day on which General Lee began his attack on the Army of
the Potomac, which formed the beginning of the seven days' battles, and
changed McClellan's intended advance against Richmond to a retreat to
the James River. It was after midnight of the next day that McClellan
sent Stanton his despairing and insubordinate despatch indicating the
possibility of losing his entire army.
Upon the receipt of this alarming piece of news, President Lincoln
instantly took additional measures of safety. He sent a telegram to
General Burnside in North Carolina to come with all the reinforcements
he could spare to McClellan's help. Through the Secretary of War he
instructed General Halleck at Corinth to send twenty-five thousand
infantry to McClellan by way of Baltimore and Washington. His most
important action was to begin the formation of a new army. On the same
day he sent Secretary of State Seward to New York with a letter to be
confidentially shown to such of the governors of States as could be
hurriedly called together, setting forth his view of the present
condition of the war, and his own determination in regard to its
prosecution. After outlining the reverse at Richmond and the new
problems it created, the letter continued:
"What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the
Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A
reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for its
protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops
in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or
indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which
we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain
this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my
term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would
publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I
fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a
thing understood as it really is."
Meanwhile, by the news of the victory of Malvern Hill and the secure
position to which McClellan had retired at Harrison's Landing, the
President learned that the condition of the Army of the Potomac was not
as desperate as at first had seemed. The result of Seward's visit to New
York is shown in the President's letter of July 2, answering McClellan's
urgent call for heavy reinforcements:
"The idea of sending you fifty thousand, or any other considerable
force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of
responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing
more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg
that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think
you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to
try just now. Save the army, material and personnel, and I will
strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of
eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I
accept."
And in another letter, two days later:
"To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a
month, or even six weeks, is impossible.... Under these circumstances,
the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save the
army--first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you
must."
To satisfy himself more fully about the actual situation, the President
made a visit to Harrison's Landing on July 8 and 9, and held personal
interviews with McClellan and his leading generals. While the question
of removing the army underwent considerable discussion, the President
left it undecided for the present; but on July 11, soon after his return
to Washington, he issued an order:
"That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole
land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief, and that he
repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions
and operations within the department now under his charge."
Though General Halleck was loath to leave his command in the West, he
made the necessary dispositions there, and in obedience to the
President's order reached Washington on July 23, and assumed command of
all the armies as general-in-chief. On the day following he proceeded to
General McClellan's headquarters at Harrison's Landing, and after two
days' consultation reached the same conclusion at which the President
had already arrived, that the Army of the Potomac must be withdrawn.
McClellan strongly objected to this course. He wished to be reinforced
so that he might resume his operations against Richmond. To do this he
wanted fifty thousand more men, which number it was impossible to give
him, as he had already been pointedly informed by the President. On
Halleck's return to Washington, it was, on further consultation,
resolved to bring the Army of the Potomac back to Acquia Creek and unite
it with the army of Pope.
On July 30, McClellan received a preliminary order to send away his
sick, and the withdrawal of his entire force was ordered by telegraph on
August 3. With the obstinacy and persistence that characterized his
course from first to last, McClellan still protested against the change,
and when Halleck in a calm letter answered his objections with both the
advantages and the necessity of the order, McClellan's movement of
withdrawal was so delayed that fully eleven days of inestimable time
were unnecessarily lost, and the army of Pope was thereby put in serious
peril.
Meanwhile, under President Lincoln's order of June 26, General Pope had
left the West, and about the first of July reached Washington, where for
two weeks, in consultation with the President and the Secretary of War,
he studied the military situation, and on July 14 assumed command of the
Army of Virginia, consisting of the corps of General Frémont, eleven
thousand five hundred strong, and that of General Banks, eight thousand
strong, in the Shenandoah valley, and the corps of General McDowell,
eighteen thousand five hundred strong, with one division at Manassas and
the other at Fredericksburg. It is unnecessary to relate in detail the
campaign which followed. Pope intelligently and faithfully performed the
task imposed on him to concentrate his forces and hold in check the
advance of the enemy, which began as soon as the Confederates learned of
the evacuation of Harrison's Landing.
When the Army of the Potomac was ordered to be withdrawn it was clearly
enough seen that the movement might put the Army of Virginia in
jeopardy; but it was hoped that if the transfer to Acquia Creek and
Alexandria were made as promptly as the order contemplated, the two
armies would be united before the enemy could reach them. McClellan,
however, continued day after day to protest against the change, and made
his preparations and embarkation with such exasperating slowness as
showed that he still hoped to induce the government to change its plans.
Pope, despite the fact that he had managed his retreat with skill and
bravery, was attacked by Lee's army, and fought the second battle of
Bull Run on August 30, under the disadvantage of having one of
McClellan's divisions entirely absent and the other failing to respond
to his order to advance to the attack on the first day. McClellan had
reached Alexandria on August 24; and notwithstanding telegram after
telegram from Halleck, ordering him to push Franklin's division out to
Pope's support, excuse and delay seemed to be his only response, ending
at last in his direct suggestion that Franklin's division be kept to
defend Washington, and Pope be left to "get out of his scrape" as best
he might.
McClellan's conduct and language had awakened the indignation of the
whole cabinet, roused Stanton to fury, and greatly outraged the feelings
of President Lincoln. But even under such irritation the President was,
as ever, the very incarnation of cool, dispassionate judgment, allowing
nothing but the daily and hourly logic of facts to influence his
suggestions or decision. In these moments of crisis and danger he felt
more keenly than ever the awful responsibilities of rulership, and that
the fate of the nation hung upon his words and acts from hour to hour.
His official counselors, equally patriotic and sincere, were not his
equals in calmness of temper. On Friday, August 29, Stanton went to
Chase, and after an excited conference drew up a memorandum of protest,
to be signed by the members of the cabinet, which drew a gloomy picture
of present and apprehended dangers, and recommended the immediate
removal of McClellan from command. Chase and Stanton signed the paper,
as also did Bates, whom they immediately consulted, and somewhat later
Smith added his signature. But when they presented it to Welles, he
firmly refused, stating that though he concurred with them in judgment,
it would be discourteous and unfriendly to the President to adopt such a
course. They did not go to Seward and Blair, apparently believing them
to be friendly to McClellan, and therefore probably unwilling to give
their assent. The refusal of Mr. Welles to sign had evidently caused a
more serious discussion among them about the form and language of the
protest; for on Monday, September 1, it was entirely rewritten by Bates,
cut down to less than half its original length as drafted by Stanton,
and once more signed by the same four members of the cabinet.
Presented for the second time to Mr. Welles, he reiterated his
objection, and again refused his signature. Though in the new form it
bore the signatures of a majority of the cabinet, the paper was never
presented to Mr. Lincoln. The signers may have adopted the feeling of
Mr. Welles that it was discourteous; or they may have thought that with
only four members of the cabinet for it and three against it, it would
be ineffectual; or, more likely than either, the mere progress of events
may have brought them to consider it inexpedient.
The defeat of Pope became final and conclusive on the afternoon of
August 30, and his telegram announcing it conveyed an intimation that he
had lost control of his army. President Lincoln had, therefore, to
confront a most serious crisis and danger. Even without having seen the
written and signed protest, he was well aware of the feelings of the
cabinet against McClellan. With what began to look like a serious
conspiracy among McClellan's officers against Pope, with Pope's army in
a disorganized retreat upon Washington, with the capital in possible
danger of capture by Lee, and with a distracted and half-mutinous
cabinet, the President had need of all his caution and all his wisdom.
Both his patience and his judgment proved equal to the demand.
On Monday, September 1, repressing every feeling of indignation, and
solicitous only to make every expedient contribute to the public safety,
he called McClellan from Alexandria to Washington and asked him to use
his personal influence with the officers who had been under his command
to give a hearty and loyal support to Pope as a personal favor to their
former general, and McClellan at once sent a telegram in this spirit.
That afternoon, also, Mr. Lincoln despatched a member of General
Halleck's staff to the Virginia side of the Potomac, who reported the
disorganization and discouragement among the retreating troops as even
more than had been expected. Worse than all, Halleck, the
general-in-chief, who was much worn out by the labors of the past few
days, seemed either unable or unwilling to act with prompt direction and
command equal to the emergency, though still willing to give his advice
and suggestion.
Under such conditions, Mr. Lincoln saw that it was necessary for him
personally to exercise at the moment his military functions and
authority as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. On the morning of
September 2, therefore, he gave a verbal order, which during the day was
issued in regular form as coming from the general-in-chief, that
Major-General McClellan be placed in command of the fortifications
around Washington and the troops for the defense of the capital. Mr.
Lincoln made no concealment of his belief that McClellan had acted badly
toward Pope and really wanted him to fail; "but there is no one in the
army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into
shape half as well as he can," he said. "We must use the tools we have;
if he cannot fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight."
It turned out that the second battle of Bull Run had by no means so
seriously disorganized the Union army as was reported, and that
Washington had been exposed to no real danger. The Confederate army
hovered on its front for a day or two, but made neither attack nor
demonstration. Instead of this, Lee entered upon a campaign into
Maryland, hoping that his presence might stimulate a secession revolt in
that State, and possibly create the opportunity successfully to attack
Baltimore or Philadelphia.
Pope having been relieved and sent to another department, McClellan soon
restored order among the troops, and displayed unwonted energy and
vigilance in watching the movements of the enemy, as Lee gradually moved
his forces northwestward toward Leesburg, thirty miles from Washington,
where he crossed the Potomac and took position at Frederick, ten miles
farther away. McClellan gradually followed the movement of the enemy,
keeping the Army of the Potomac constantly in a position to protect both
Washington and Baltimore against an attack. In this way it happened that
without any order or express intention on the part of either the general
or the President, McClellan's duty became imperceptibly changed from
that of merely defending Washington city to that of an active campaign
into Maryland to follow the Confederate army.
This movement into Maryland was begun by both armies about September 4.
On the thirteenth of that month McClellan had reached Frederick, while
Lee was by that time across the Catoctin range at Boonsboro', but his
army was divided. He had sent a large part of it back across the
Potomac to capture Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. On that day there
fell into McClellan's hands the copy of an order issued by General Lee
three days before, which, as McClellan himself states in his report,
fully disclosed Lee's plans. The situation was therefore, as follows: It
was splendid September weather, with the roads in fine condition.
McClellan commanded a total moving force of more than eighty thousand;
Lee, a total moving force of forty thousand. The Confederate army was
divided. Each of the separate portions was within twenty miles of the
Union columns; and before half-past six on the evening of September 13,
McClellan had full knowledge of the enemy's plans.
General Palfrey, an intelligent critic friendly to McClellan, distinctly
admits that the Union army, properly commanded, could have absolutely
annihilated the Confederate forces. But the result proved quite
different. Even such advantages in McClellan's hands failed to rouse him
to vigorous and decisive action. As usual, hesitation and tardiness
characterized the orders and movements of the Union forces, and during
the four days succeeding, Lee had captured Harper's Ferry with eleven
thousand prisoners and seventy-three pieces of artillery, reunited his
army, and fought the defensive battle of Antietam on September 17, with
almost every Confederate soldier engaged, while one third of McClellan's
army was not engaged at all and the remainder went into action piecemeal
and successively, under such orders that coöperative movement and mutual
support were practically impossible. Substantially, it was a drawn
battle, with appalling slaughter on both sides.
Even after such a loss of opportunity, there still remained a precious
balance of advantage in McClellan's hands. Because of its smaller total
numbers, the Confederate army was disproportionately weakened by the
losses in battle. The Potomac River was almost immediately behind it,
and had McClellan renewed his attack on the morning of the eighteenth,
as several of his best officers advised, a decisive victory was yet
within his grasp. But with his usual hesitation, notwithstanding the
arrival of two divisions of reinforcements, he waited all day to make up
his mind. He indeed gave orders to renew the attack at daylight on the
nineteenth, but before that time the enemy had retreated across the
Potomac, and McClellan telegraphed, apparently with great satisfaction,
that Maryland was free and Pennsylvania safe.
The President watched the progress of this campaign with an eagerness
born of the lively hope that it might end the war. He sent several
telegrams to the startled Pennsylvania authorities to assure them that
Philadelphia and Harrisburg were in no danger. He ordered a
reinforcement of twenty-one thousand to join McClellan. He sent a
prompting telegram to that general: "Please do not let him [the enemy]
get off without being hurt." He recognized the battle of Antietam as a
substantial, if not a complete victory, and seized the opportunity it
afforded him to issue his preliminary proclamation of emancipation on
September 22.
For two weeks after the battle of Antietam, General McClellan kept his
army camped on various parts of the field, and so far from exhibiting
any disposition of advancing against the enemy in the Shenandoah valley,
showed constant apprehension lest the enemy might come and attack him.
On October 1, the President and several friends made a visit to
Antietam, and during the three succeeding days reviewed the troops and
went over the various battle-grounds in company with the general. The
better insight which the President thus received of the nature and
results of the late battle served only to deepen in his mind the
conviction he had long entertained--how greatly McClellan's defects
overbalanced his merits as a military leader; and his impatience found
vent in a phrase of biting irony. In a morning walk with a friend,
waving his arm toward the white tents of the great army, he asked: "Do
you know what that is?" The friend, not catching the drift of his
thought, said, "It is the Army of the Potomac, I suppose." "So it is
called," responded the President, in a tone of suppressed indignation,
"But that is a mistake. It is only McClellan's body-guard."
At that time General McClellan commanded a total force of one hundred
thousand men present for duty under his immediate eye, and seventy-three
thousand present for duty under General Banks about Washington. It is,
therefore, not to be wondered at that on October 6, the second day after
Mr. Lincoln's return to Washington, the following telegram went to the
general from Halleck:
"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that
you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south.
Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river
between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your
operation, you can be reinforced with thirty thousand men. If you move
up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than twelve thousand or
fifteen thousand can be sent to you. The President advises the interior
line, between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is
very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will
immediately report what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross
the river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is
necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on
before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I
am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief
fully concur with the President in these instructions."
This express order was reinforced by a long letter from the President,
dated October 13, specifically pointing out the decided advantages
McClellan possessed over the enemy, and suggesting a plan of campaign
even to details, the importance and value of which was self-evident.
"You remember my speaking to you of what I called your
over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you
cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be
at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?... Change
positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your
communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread
his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives
up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but
to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall
upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the
water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route
that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him,
unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route
is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good
on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross
the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My
idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications,
which I would seize, if he would permit. If he should move northward I
would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should
prevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond, I would
press closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should
present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I
say 'try'; if we never try we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand
at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there,
on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of
coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him."
But advice, expostulation, argument, orders, were all wasted, now as
before, on the unwilling, hesitating general. When he had frittered away
another full month in preparation, in slowly crossing the Potomac, and
in moving east of the Blue Ridge and massing his army about Warrenton, a
short distance south of the battle-field of Bull Run, without a vigorous
offensive, or any discernible intention to make one, the President's
patience was finally exhausted, and on November 5 he sent him an order
removing him from command. And so ended General McClellan's military
career.