XX

The Blockade--Hatteras Inlet--Roanoke Island--Fort Pulaski--Merrimac

and Monitor--The Cumberland Sunk--The Congress Burned--Battle of the

Ironclads--Flag-officer Farragut--Forts Jackson and St. Philip--New

Orleans Captured--Farragut at Vicksburg--Farragut's Second Expedition to

Vicksburg--Return to New Orleans

In addition to its heavy work of maintaining the Atlantic blockade, the

navy of the United States contributed signally toward the suppression of

the rebellion by three brilliant victories which it gained during the

first half of the year 1862. After careful preparation during several

months, a joint expedition under the command of General Ambrose E.

Burnside and Flag-Officer Goldsborough, consisting of more than twelve

thousand men and twenty ships of war, accompanied by numerous

transports, sailed from Fort Monroe on January 11, with the object of

occupying the interior waters of the North Carolina coast. Before the

larger vessels could effect their entrance through Hatteras Inlet,

captured in the previous August, a furious storm set in, which delayed

the expedition nearly a month. By February 7, however, that and other

serious difficulties were overcome, and on the following day the

expedition captured Roanoke Island, and thus completely opened the whole

interior water-system of Albemarle and Pamlico sounds to the easy

approach of the Union fleet and forces.

From Roanoke Island as a base, minor expeditions within a short period

effected the destruction of the not very formidable fleet which the

enemy had been able to organize, and the reduction of Fort Macon and the

rebel defenses of Elizabeth City, New Berne, and other smaller places.

An eventual advance upon Goldsboro' formed part of the original plan;

but, before it could be executed, circumstances intervened effectually

to thwart that object.

While the gradual occupation of the North Carolina coast was going on,

two other expeditions of a similar nature were making steady progress.

One of them, under the direction of General Quincy A. Gillmore, carried

on a remarkable siege operation against Fort Pulaski, standing on an

isolated sea marsh at the mouth of the Savannah River. Here not only the

difficulties of approach, but the apparently insurmountable obstacle of

making the soft, unctuous mud sustain heavy batteries, was overcome, and

the fort compelled to surrender on April 11, after an effective

bombardment. The second was an expedition of nineteen ships, which,

within a few days during the month of March, without serious resistance,

occupied the whole remaining Atlantic coast southward as far as St.

Augustine.

When, at the outbreak of the rebellion, the navy-yard at Norfolk,

Virginia, had to be abandoned to the enemy, the destruction at that time

attempted by Commodore Paulding remained very incomplete. Among the

vessels set on fire, the screw-frigate _Merrimac_, which had been

scuttled, was burned only to the water's edge, leaving her hull and

machinery entirely uninjured. In due time she was raised by the

Confederates, covered with a sloping roof of railroad iron, provided

with a huge wedge-shaped prow of cast iron, and armed with a formidable

battery of ten guns. Secret information came to the Navy Department of

the progress of this work, and such a possibility was kept in mind by

the board of officers that decided upon the construction of the three

experimental ironclads in September, 1861.

The particular one of these three especially intended for this peculiar

emergency was a ship of entirely novel design, made by the celebrated

inventor John Ericsson, a Swede by birth, but American by adoption--a

man who combined great original genius with long scientific study and

experience. His invention may be most quickly described as having a

small, very low hull, covered by a much longer and wider flat deck only

a foot or two above the water-line, upon which was placed a revolving

iron turret twenty feet in diameter, nine feet high, and eight inches

thick, on the inside of which were two eleven-inch guns trained side by

side and revolving with the turret. This unique naval structure was

promptly nicknamed "a cheese-box on a raft," and the designation was not

at all inapt. Naval experts at once recognized that her sea-going

qualities were bad; but compensation was thought to exist in the belief

that her iron turret would resist shot and shell, and that the thin edge

of her flat deck would offer only a minimum mark to an enemy's guns: in

other words, that she was no cruiser, but would prove a formidable

floating battery; and this belief she abundantly justified.

The test of her fighting qualities was attended by what almost suggested

a miraculous coincidence. On Saturday, March 8, 1862, about noon, a

strange-looking craft resembling a huge turtle was seen coming into

Hampton Roads out of the mouth of Elizabeth River, and it quickly became

certain that this was the much talked of rebel ironclad _Merrimac_, or,

as the Confederates had renamed her, the _Virginia_. She steamed

rapidly toward Newport News, three miles to the southwest, where the

Union ships _Congress_ and _Cumberland_ lay at anchor. These saw the

uncouth monster coming and prepared for action. The _Minnesota_, the

_St. Lawrence_, and the _Roanoke_, lying at Fortress Monroe also saw her

and gave chase, but, the water being low, they all soon grounded. The

broadsides of the _Congress_, as the _Merrimac_ passed her at three

hundred yards' distance, seemed to produce absolutely no effect upon her

sloping iron roof. Neither did the broadsides of her intended prey, nor

the fire of the shore batteries, for even an instant arrest her speed

as, rushing on, she struck the _Cumberland_, and with her iron prow

broke a hole as large as a hogshead in her side. Then backing away and

hovering over her victim at convenient distance, she raked her decks

with shot and shell until, after three quarters of an hour's combat, the

_Cumberland_ and her heroic defenders, who had maintained the fight with

unyielding stubbornness, went to the bottom in fifty feet of water with

colors flying.

Having sunk the _Cumberland_, the _Merrimac_ next turned her attention

to the _Congress_, which had meanwhile run into shoal water and grounded

where the rebel vessel could not follow. But the _Merrimac_, being

herself apparently proof against shot and shell by her iron plating,

took up a raking position two cables' length away, and during an hour's

firing deliberately reduced the _Congress_ to helplessness and to

surrender--her commander being killed and the vessel set on fire. The

approach, the manoeuvering, and the two successive combats consumed the

afternoon, and toward nightfall the _Merrimac_ and her three small

consorts that had taken little part in the action withdrew to the rebel

batteries on the Virginia shore: not alone because of the approaching

darkness and the fatigue of the crew, but because the rebel ship had

really suffered considerable damage in ramming the _Cumberland_, as well

as from one or two chance shots that entered her port-holes.

That same night, while the burning _Congress_ yet lighted up the waters

of Hampton Roads, a little ship, as strange-looking and as new to marine

warfare as the rebel turtleback herself, arrived by sea in tow from New

York, and receiving orders to proceed at once to the scene of conflict,

stationed herself near the grounded _Minnesota_. This was Ericsson's

"cheese-box on a raft," named by him the _Monitor_. The Union officers

who had witnessed the day's events with dismay, and were filled with

gloomy forebodings for the morrow, while welcoming this providential

reinforcement, were by no means reassured. The _Monitor_ was only half

the size of her antagonist, and had only two guns to the other's ten.

But this very disparity proved an essential advantage. With only ten

feet draft to the _Merrimac's_ twenty-two, she not only possessed

superior mobility, but might run where the _Merrimac_ could not follow.

When, therefore, at eight o'clock on Sunday, March 9, the _Merrimac_

again came into Hampton Roads to complete her victory, Lieutenant John

L. Worden, commanding the _Monitor_, steamed boldly out to meet her.

Then ensued a three hours' naval conflict which held the breathless

attention of the active participants and the spectators on ship and

shore, and for many weeks excited the wonderment of the reading world.

If the _Monitor's_ solid eleven-inch balls bounded without apparent

effect from the sloping roof of the _Merrimac_, so, in turn, the

_Merrimac's_ broadsides passed harmlessly over the low deck of the

_Monitor_, or rebounded from the round sides of her iron turret. When

the unwieldy rebel turtleback, with her slow, awkward movement, tried

to ram the pointed raft that carried the cheese-box, the little vessel,

obedient to her rudder, easily glided out of the line of direct impact.

Each ship passed through occasional moments of danger, but the long

three hours' encounter ended without other serious damage than an injury

to Lieutenant Worden by the explosion of a rebel shell against a crevice

of the _Monitor's_ pilot-house through which he was looking, which,

temporarily blinding his eye-sight, disabled him from command. At that

point the battle ended by mutual consent. The _Monitor_, unharmed except

by a few unimportant dents in her plating, ran into shoal water to

permit surgical attendance to her wounded officer. On her part, the

_Merrimac_, abandoning any further molestation of the other ships,

steamed away at noon to her retreat in Elizabeth River. The forty-one

rounds fired from the _Monitor's_ guns had so far weakened the

_Merrimac's_ armor that, added to the injuries of the previous day, it

was of the highest prudence to avoid further conflict. A tragic fate

soon ended the careers of both vessels. Owing to other military events,

the _Merrimac_ was abandoned, burned, and blown up by her officers about

two months later; and in the following December, the _Monitor_ foundered

in a gale off Cape Hatteras. But the types of these pioneer ironclads,

which had demonstrated such unprecedented fighting qualities, were

continued. Before the end of the war the Union navy had more than twenty

monitors in service; and the structure of the _Merrimac_ was in a number

of instances repeated by the Confederates.

The most brilliant of all the exploits of the navy during the year 1862

were those carried on under the command of Flag-Officer David G.

Farragut, who, though a born Southerner and residing in Virginia when

the rebellion broke out, remained loyal to the government and true to

the flag he had served for forty-eight years. Various preparations had

been made and various plans discussed for an effective attempt against

some prominent point on the Gulf coast. Very naturally, all examinations

of the subject inevitably pointed to the opening of the Mississippi as

the dominant problem to be solved; and on January 9, Farragut was

appointed to the command of the western Gulf blockading squadron, and

eleven days thereafter received his confidential instructions to attempt

the capture of the city of New Orleans.

Thus far in the war, Farragut had been assigned to no prominent service,

but the patience with which he had awaited his opportunity was now more

than compensated by the energy and thoroughness with which he

superintended the organization of his fleet. By the middle of April he

was in the lower Mississippi with seventeen men-of-war and one hundred

and seventy-seven guns. With him were Commander David D. Porter, in

charge of a mortar flotilla of nineteen schooners and six armed

steamships, and General Benjamin F. Butler, at the head of an army

contingent of six thousand men, soon to be followed by considerable

reinforcements.

The first obstacle to be overcome was the fire from the twin forts

Jackson and St. Philip, situated nearly opposite each other at a bend of

the Mississippi twenty-five miles above the mouth of the river, while

the city of New Orleans itself lies seventy-five miles farther up the

stream. These were formidable forts of masonry, with an armament

together of over a hundred guns, and garrisons of about six hundred men

each. They also had auxiliary defenses: first, of a strong river

barrier of log rafts and other obstructions connected by powerful

chains, half a mile below the forts; second, of an improvised fleet of

sixteen rebel gunboats and a formidable floating battery. None of

Farragut's ships were ironclad. He had, from the beginning of the

undertaking, maintained the theory that a wooden fleet, properly

handled, could successfully pass the batteries of the forts. "I would as

soon have a paper ship as an ironclad; only give me _men_ to fight her!"

he said. He might not come back; but New Orleans would be won. In his

hazardous undertaking his faith was based largely on the skill and

courage of his subordinate commanders of ships, and this faith was fully

sustained by their gallantry and devotion.

Porter's flotilla of nineteen schooners carrying two mortars each,

anchored below the forts, maintained a heavy bombardment for five days,

and then Farragut decided to try his ships. On the night of the

twentieth the daring work of two gunboats cut an opening through the

river barrier through which the vessels might pass; and at two o'clock

on the morning of April 24, Farragut gave the signal to advance. The

first division of his fleet, eight vessels, led by Captain Bailey,

successfully passed the barrier. The second division of nine ships was

not quite so fortunate. Three of them failed to pass the barrier, but

the others, led by Farragut himself in his flag-ship, the _Hartford_,

followed the advance.

The starlit night was quickly obscured by the smoke of the general

cannonade from both ships and forts; but the heavy batteries of the

latter had little effect on the passing fleet. Farragut's flag-ship was

for a short while in great danger. At a moment when she slightly

grounded a huge fire-raft, fully ablaze, was pushed against her by a

rebel tug, and the flames caught in the paint on her side, and mounted

into her rigging. But this danger had also been provided against, and by

heroic efforts the _Hartford_ freed herself from her peril. Immediately

above the forts, the fleet of rebel gunboats joined in the battle, which

now resolved itself into a series of conflicts between single vessels or

small groups. But the stronger and better-armed Union ships quickly

destroyed the Confederate flotilla, with the single exception that two

of the enemy's gunboats rammed the _Varuna_ from opposite sides and sank

her. Aside from this, the Union fleet sustained much miscellaneous

damage, but no serious injury in the furious battle of an hour and a

half.

With but a short halt at Quarantine, six miles above the forts, Farragut

and his thirteen ships of war pushed on rapidly over the seventy-five

miles, and on the forenoon of April 25 New Orleans lay helpless under

the guns of the Union fleet. The city was promptly evacuated by the

Confederate General Lovell. Meanwhile, General Butler was busy moving

his transports and troops around outside by sea to Quarantine; and,

having occupied that point in force, Forts Jackson and St. Philip

capitulated on April 28. This last obstruction removed, Butler, after

having garrisoned the forts, brought the bulk of his army up to New

Orleans, and on May 1 Farragut turned over to him the formal possession

of the city, where Butler continued in command of the Department of the

Gulf until the following December.

Farragut immediately despatched an advance section of his fleet up the

Mississippi. None of the important cities on its banks below Vicksburg

had yet been fortified, and, without serious opposition, they

surrendered as the Union ships successively reached them. Farragut

himself, following with the remainder of his fleet, arrived at

Vicksburg on May 20. This city, by reason of the high bluffs on which it

stands, was the most defensible point on the whole length of the great

river within the Southern States; but so confidently had the

Confederates trusted to the strength of their works at Columbus, Island

No. 10, Fort Pillow, and other points, that the fortifications of

Vicksburg had thus far received comparatively little attention. The

recent Union victories, however, both to the north and south, had

awakened them to their danger; and when Lovell evacuated New Orleans, he

shipped heavy guns and sent five Confederate regiments to Vicksburg; and

during the eight days between their arrival on May 12 and the twentieth,

on which day Farragut reached the city, six rebel batteries were put in

readiness to fire on his ships.

General Halleck, while pushing his siege works toward Corinth, was

notified as early as April 27 that Farragut was coming, and the logic of

the situation ought to have induced him to send a coöperating force to

Farragut's assistance, or, at the very least, to have matured plans for

such coöperation. All the events would have favored an expedition of

this kind. When Corinth, at the end of May, fell into Halleck's hands,

Forts Pillow and Randolph on the Mississippi River were hastily

evacuated by the enemy, and on June 6 the Union flotilla of river

gunboats which had rendered such signal service at Henry, Donelson, and

Island No. 10, reinforced by a hastily constructed flotilla of heavy

river tugs converted into rams, gained another brilliant victory in a

most dramatic naval battle at Memphis, during which an opposing

Confederate flotilla of similar rams and gunboats was almost completely

destroyed, and the immediate evacuation of Memphis by the Confederates

thereby forced.

This left Vicksburg as the single barrier to the complete opening of the

Mississippi, and that barrier was defended by only six batteries and a

garrison of six Confederate regiments at the date of Farragut's arrival

before it. But Farragut had with his expedition only two regiments of

troops, and the rebel batteries were situated at such an elevation that

the guns of the Union fleet could not be raised sufficiently to silence

them. Neither help nor promise of help came from Halleck's army, and

Farragut could therefore do nothing but turn his vessels down stream and

return to New Orleans. There, about June 1, he received news from the

Navy Department that the administration was exceedingly anxious to have

the Mississippi opened; and this time, taking with him Porter's mortar

flotilla and three thousand troops, he again proceeded up the river, and

a second time reached Vicksburg on June 25.

The delay, however, had enabled the Confederates greatly to strengthen

the fortifications and the garrison of the city. Neither a bombardment

from Porter's mortar sloops, nor the running of Farragut's ships past

the batteries, where they were joined by the Union gunboat flotilla from

above, sufficed to bring the Confederates to a surrender. Farragut

estimated that a coöperating land force of twelve to fifteen thousand

would have enabled him to take the works; and Halleck, on June 28 and

July 3, partially promised early assistance. But on July 14 he reported

definitely that it would be impossible for him to render the expected

aid. Under these circumstances, the Navy Department ordered Farragut

back to New Orleans, lest his ships of deep draft should be detained in

the river by the rapidly falling water. The capture of Vicksburg was

postponed for a whole year, and the early transfer of Halleck to

Washington changed the current of Western campaigns.