Congress--The President's Message--Men and Money Voted--The
Contraband--Dennison Appoints McClellan--Rich Mountain--McDowell--Bull
Run--Patterson's Failure--McClellan at Washington
While these preparations for a Virginia campaign were going on, another
campaign was also slowly shaping itself in Western Virginia; but before
either of them reached any decisive results the Thirty-seventh Congress,
chosen at the presidential election of 1860, met in special session on
the fourth of July, 1861, in pursuance of the President's proclamation
of April 15. There being no members present in either branch from the
seceded States, the number in each house was reduced nearly one third. A
great change in party feeling was also manifest. No more rampant
secession speeches were to be heard. Of the rare instances of men who
were yet to join the rebellion, ex-Vice-President Breckinridge was the
most conspicuous example; and their presence was offset by prominent
Southern Unionists like Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, and John J.
Crittenden of Kentucky. The heated antagonisms which had divided the
previous Congress into four clearly defined factions were so far
restrained or obliterated by the events of the past four months, as to
leave but a feeble opposition to the Republican majority now dominant in
both branches, which was itself rendered moderate and prudent by the new
conditions.
The message of President Lincoln was temperate in spirit, but positive
and strong in argument. Reciting the secession and rebellion of the
Confederate States, and their unprovoked assault on Fort Sumter, he
continued:
"Having said to them in the inaugural address, 'You can have no conflict
without being yourselves the aggressors,' he took pains not only to keep
this declaration good, but also to keep the case so free from the power
of ingenious sophistry that the world should not be able to
misunderstand it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding
circumstances, that point was reached. Then and thereby the assailants
of the government began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight or
in expectancy to return their fire, save only the few in the fort sent
to that harbor years before for their own protection, and still ready to
give that protection in whatever was lawful.... This issue embraces more
than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of
man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy--a
government of the people by the same people--can or cannot maintain its
territorial integrity against its own domestic foes."
With his singular felicity of statement, he analyzed and refuted the
sophism that secession was lawful and constitutional.
"This sophism derives much, perhaps the whole, of its currency from the
assumption that there is some omnipotent and sacred supremacy pertaining
to a State--to each State of our Federal Union. Our States have neither
more nor less power than that reserved to them in the Union by the
Constitution--no one of them ever having been a State out of the
Union.... The States have their status in the Union, and they have no
other legal status. If they break from this, they can only do so against
law and by revolution. The Union, and not themselves separately,
procured their independence and their liberty. By conquest or purchase
the Union gave each of them whatever of independence or liberty it has.
The Union is older than any of the States, and, in fact, it created them
as States. Originally some dependent colonies made the Union, and, in
turn, the Union threw off their old dependence for them, and made them
States, such as they are. Not one of them ever had a State constitution
independent of the Union."
A noteworthy point in the message is President Lincoln's expression of
his abiding confidence in the intelligence and virtue of the people of
the United States.
"It may be affirmed," said he, "without extravagance that the free
institutions we enjoy have developed the powers and improved the
condition of our whole people beyond any example in the world. Of this
we now have a striking and an impressive illustration. So large an army
as the government has now on foot was never before known, without a
soldier in it but who has taken his place there of his own free choice.
But more than this, there are many single regiments whose members, one
and another, possess full practical knowledge of all the arts, sciences,
professions and whatever else, whether useful or elegant, is known in
the world; and there is scarcely one from which there could not be
selected a President, a cabinet a congress, and, perhaps, a court,
abundantly competent to administer the government itself.... This is
essentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union it is a
struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of
government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men; to
lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of
laudable pursuit for all; to afford all an unfettered start, and a fair
chance in the race of life.... I am most happy to believe that the plain
people understand and appreciate this. It is worthy of note that while
in this, the government's hour of trial, large numbers of those in the
army and navy who have been favored with the offices have resigned and
proved false to the hand which had pampered them, not one common soldier
or common sailor is known to have deserted his flag."
Hearty applause greeted that portion of the message which asked for
means to make the contest short and decisive; and Congress acted
promptly by authorizing a loan of $250,000,000 and an army not to exceed
one million men. All of President Lincoln's war measures for which no
previous sanction of law existed were duly legalized; additional direct
income and tariff taxes were laid; and the Force Bill of 1795, and
various other laws relating to conspiracy, piracy, unlawful recruiting,
and kindred topics, were amended or passed.
Throughout the whole history of the South, by no means the least of the
evils entailed by the institution of slavery was the dread of slave
insurrections which haunted every master's household; and this vague
terror was at once intensified by the outbreak of civil war. It stands
to the lasting credit of the negro race in the United States that the
wrongs of their long bondage provoked them to no such crime, and that
the Civil War appears not to have even suggested, much less started, any
such organization or attempt. But the John Brown raid had indicated some
possibility of the kind, and when the Union troops began their movements
Generals Butler in Maryland and Patterson in Pennsylvania, moving
toward Harper's Ferry, and McClellan in West Virginia, in order to
reassure non-combatants, severally issued orders that all attempts at
slave insurrection should be suppressed. It was a most pointed and
significant warning to the leaders of the rebellion how much more
vulnerable the peculiar institution was in war than in peace, and that
their ill-considered scheme to protect and perpetuate slavery would
prove the most potent engine for its destruction.
The first effect of opening hostilities was to give adventurous or
discontented slaves the chance to escape into Union camps, where, even
against orders to the contrary, they found practical means of protection
or concealment for the sake of the help they could render as cooks,
servants, or teamsters, or for the information they could give or
obtain, or the invaluable service they could render as guides.
Practically, therefore, at the very beginning, the war created a bond of
mutual sympathy based on mutual helpfulness, between the Southern negro
and the Union volunteer; and as fast as the Union troops advanced, and
secession masters fled, more or less slaves found liberation and refuge
in the Union camps.
At some points, indeed, this tendency created an embarrassment to Union
commanders. A few days after General Butler assumed command of the Union
troops at Fortress Monroe, the agent of a rebel master who had fled from
the neighborhood came to demand, under the provisions of the
fugitive-slave law, three field hands alleged to be in Butler's camp.
Butler responded that as Virginia claimed to be a foreign country the
fugitive-slave law was clearly inoperative, unless the owner would come
and take an oath of allegiance to the United States. In connection with
this incident, the newspaper report stated that as the breastworks and
batteries which had been so rapidly erected for Confederate defense in
every direction on the Virginia peninsula were built by enforced negro
labor under rigorous military impressment, negroes were manifestly
contraband of war under international law. The dictum was so pertinent,
and the equity so plain, that, though it was not officially formulated
by the general until two months later, it sprang at once into popular
acceptance and application; and from that time forward the words "slave"
and "negro" were everywhere within the Union lines replaced by the
familiar, significant term "contraband."
While Butler's happy designation had a more convincing influence on
public thought than a volume of discussion, it did not immediately solve
the whole question. Within a few days he reported that he had slave
property to the value of $60,000 in his hands, and by the end of July
nine hundred "contrabands," men, women, and children, of all ages. What
was their legal status, and how should they be disposed of? It was a
knotty problem, for upon its solution might depend the sensitive public
opinion and balancing, undecided loyalty and political action of the
border slave States of Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri.
In solving the problem, President Lincoln kept in mind the philosophic
maxim of one of his favorite stories, that when the Western Methodist
presiding elder, riding about the circuit during the spring freshets,
was importuned by his young companion how they should ever be able to
get across the swollen waters of Fox River, which they were approaching,
the elder quieted him by saying he had made it the rule of his life
never to cross Fox River till he came to it.
The President did not immediately decide, but left it to be treated as a
question of camp and local police, in the discretion of each commander.
Under this theory, later in the war, some commanders excluded, others
admitted such fugitives to their camps; and the curt formula of General
Orders, "We have nothing to do with slaves. We are neither negro
stealers nor negro catchers," was easily construed by subordinate
officers to justify the practice of either course. _Inter arma silent
leges_. For the present, Butler was instructed not to surrender such
fugitives, but to employ them in suitable labor, and leave the question
of their final disposition for future determination. Congress greatly
advanced the problem, soon after the battle of Bull Run, by adopting an
amendment which confiscated a rebel master's right to his slave when, by
his consent, such slave was employed in service or labor hostile to the
United States. The debates exhibited but little spirit of partizanship,
even on this feature of the slavery question. The border State members
did not attack the justice of such a penalty. They could only urge that
it was unconstitutional and inexpedient. On the general policy of the
war, both houses, with but few dissenting votes, passed the resolution,
offered by Mr. Crittenden, which declared that the war was not waged for
oppression or subjugation, or to interfere with the rights or
institutions of States, "but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality,
and rights of the several States unimpaired." The special session
adjourned on August 6, having in a single month completed and enacted a
thorough and comprehensive system of war legislation.
The military events that were transpiring in the meanwhile doubtless had
their effect in hastening the decision and shortening the labors of
Congress. To command the thirteen regiments of militia furnished by the
State of Ohio, Governor Dennison had given a commission of major-general
to George B. McClellan, who had been educated at West Point and served
with distinction in the Mexican War, and who, through unusual
opportunities in travel and special duties in surveys and exploration,
had gained acquirements and qualifications that appeared to fit him for
a brilliant career. Being but thirty-five years old, and having reached
only the grade of captain, he had resigned from the army, and was at the
moment serving as president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad.
General Scott warmly welcomed his appointment to lead the Ohio
contingent, and so industriously facilitated his promotion that by the
beginning of June McClellan's militia commission as major-general had
been changed to a commission for the same grade in the regular army, and
he found himself assigned to the command of a military department
extending from Western Virginia to Missouri. Though this was a leap in
military title, rank, and power which excels the inventions of romance,
it was necessitated by the sudden exigencies of army expansion over the
vast territory bordering the insurrection, and for a while seemed
justified by the hopeful promise indicated in the young officer's zeal
and activity.
His instructions made it a part of his duty to encourage and support the
Unionists of Western Virginia in their political movement to divide the
State and erect a Union commonwealth out of that portion of it lying
northwest of the Alleghanies. General Lee, not fully informed of the
adverse popular sentiment, sent a few Confederate regiments into that
region to gather recruits and hold the important mountain passes.
McClellan, in turn, advanced a detachment eastward from Wheeling, to
protect the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; and at the beginning of June,
an expedition of two regiments, led by Colonel Kelly, made a spirited
dash upon Philippi, where, by a complete surprise, he routed and
scattered Porterfield's recruiting detachment of one thousand
Confederates. Following up this initial success, McClellan threw
additional forces across the Ohio, and about a month later had the good
fortune, on July 11, by a flank movement under Rosecrans, to drive a
regiment of the enemy out of strong intrenchments on Rich Mountain,
force the surrender of the retreating garrison on the following day,
July 12, and to win a third success on the thirteenth over another
flying detachment at Carrick's Ford, one of the crossings of the Cheat
River, where the Confederate General Garnett was killed in a
skirmish-fire between sharp-shooters.
These incidents, happening on three successive days, and in distance
forty miles apart, made a handsome showing for the young department
commander when gathered into the single, short telegram in which he
reported to Washington that Garnett was killed, his force routed, at
least two hundred of the enemy killed, and seven guns and one thousand
prisoners taken. "Our success is complete, and secession is killed in
this country," concluded the despatch. The result, indeed, largely
overshadowed in importance the means which accomplished it. The Union
loss was only thirteen killed and forty wounded. In subsequent effect,
these two comparatively insignificant skirmishes permanently recovered
the State of West Virginia to the Union. The main credit was, of course,
due to the steadfast loyalty of the people of that region.
This victory afforded welcome relief to the strained and impatient
public opinion of the Northern States, and sharpened the eager
expectation of the authorities at Washington of similar results from
the projected Virginia campaign. The organization and command of that
column were intrusted to Brigadier-General McDowell, advanced to this
grade from his previous rank of major. He was forty-two years old, an
accomplished West Point graduate, and had won distinction in the Mexican
War, though since that time he had been mainly engaged in staff duty. On
the morning of July 16, he began his advance from the fortifications of
Washington, with a marching column of about twenty-eight thousand men
and a total of forty-nine guns, an additional division of about six
thousand being left behind to guard his communications. Owing to the
rawness of his troops, the first few days' march was necessarily
cautious and cumbersome.
The enemy, under Beauregard, had collected about twenty-three thousand
men and thirty-five guns, and was posted behind Bull Run. A preliminary
engagement occurred on Thursday, July 18, at Blackburn's Ford on that
stream, which served to develop the enemy's strong position, but only
delayed the advance until the whole of McDowell's force reached
Centreville Here McDowell halted, spent Friday and Saturday in
reconnoitering, and on Sunday, July 21, began the battle by a circuitous
march across Bull Run and attacking the enemy's left flank.
It proved that the plan was correctly chosen, but, by a confusion in the
march, the attack, intended for day-break, was delayed until nine
o'clock. Nevertheless, the first half of the battle, during the
forenoon, was entirely successful, the Union lines steadily driving the
enemy southward, and enabling additional Union brigades to join the
attacking column by a direct march from Centreville.
At noon, however, the attack came to a halt, partly through the fatigue
of the troops, partly because the advancing line, having swept the field
for nearly a mile, found itself in a valley, from which further progress
had to be made with all the advantage of the ground in favor of the
enemy. In the lull of the conflict which for a while ensued, the
Confederate commander, with little hope except to mitigate a defeat,
hurriedly concentrated his remaining artillery and supporting regiments
into a semicircular line of defense at the top of the hill that the
Federals would be obliged to mount, and kept them well concealed among
the young pines at the edge of the timber, with an open field in their
front.
Against this second position of the enemy, comprising twelve regiments,
twenty-two guns, and two companies of cavalry, McDowell advanced in the
afternoon with an attacking force of fourteen regiments, twenty-four
guns, and a single battalion of cavalry, but with all the advantages of
position against him. A fluctuating and intermitting attack resulted.
The nature of the ground rendered a combined advance impossible. The
Union brigades were sent forward and repulsed by piecemeal. A battery
was lost by mistaking a Confederate for a Union regiment. Even now the
victory seemed to vibrate, when a new flank attack by seven rebel
regiments, from an entirely unexpected direction, suddenly impressed the
Union troops with the belief that Johnston's army from Harper's Ferry
had reached the battle-field; and, demoralized by this belief, the Union
commands, by a common impulse, gave up the fight as lost, and half
marched, half ran from the field. Before reaching Centreville, the
retreat at one point degenerated into a downright panic among army
teamsters and a considerable crowd of miscellaneous camp-followers; and
here a charge or two by the Confederate cavalry companies captured
thirteen Union guns and quite a harvest of army wagons.
When the truth came to be known, it was found that through the want of
skill and courage on the part of General Patterson in his operations at
Harper's Ferry, General Johnston, with his whole Confederate army, had
been allowed to slip away; and so far from coming suddenly into the
battle of Bull Run, the bulk of them were already in Beauregard's camps
on Saturday, and performed the heaviest part of the fighting in Sunday's
conflict.
The sudden cessation of the battle left the Confederates in doubt
whether their victory was final, or only a prelude to a fresh Union
attack. But as the Union forces not only retreated from the field, but
also from Centreville, it took on, in their eyes, the proportions of a
great triumph; confirming their expectation of achieving ultimate
independence, and, in fact, giving them a standing in the eyes of
foreign nations which they had hardly dared hope for so soon. In numbers
of killed and wounded, the two armies suffered about equally; and
General Johnston writes: "The Confederate army was more disorganized by
victory than that of the United States by defeat." Manassas was turned
into a fortified camp, but the rebel leaders felt themselves unable to
make an aggressive movement during the whole of the following autumn and
winter.
The shock of the defeat was deep and painful to the administration and
the people of the North. Up to late Sunday afternoon favorable reports
had come to Washington from the battle-field, and every one believed in
an assured victory. When a telegram came about five o'clock in the
afternoon, that the day was lost, and McDowell's army in full retreat
through Centreville, General Scott refused to credit the news, so
contradictory of everything which had been heard up to that hour. But
the intelligence was quickly confirmed. The impulse of retreat once
started, McDowell's effort to arrest it at Centreville proved useless.
The regiments and brigades not completely disorganized made an
unmolested and comparatively orderly march back to the fortifications of
Washington, while on the following day a horde of stragglers found their
way across the bridges of the Potomac into the city.
President Lincoln received the news quietly and without any visible sign
of perturbation or excitement; but he remained awake and in the
executive office all of Sunday night, listening to the personal
narratives of a number of congressmen and senators who had, with undue
curiosity, followed the army and witnessed some of the sounds and sights
of the battle. By the dawn of Monday morning the President had
substantially made up his judgment of the battle and its probable
results, and the action dictated by the untoward event. This was, in
brief, that the militia regiments enlisted under the three months' call
should be mustered out as soon as practicable; the organization of the
new three years' forces be pushed forward both east and west; Manassas
and Harper's Ferry and the intermediate lines of communication be seized
and held; and a joint movement organized from Cincinnati on East
Tennessee, and from Cairo on Memphis.
Meanwhile, General McClellan was ordered from West Virginia to
Washington, where he arrived on July 26, and assumed command of the
Division of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and around Washington
on both sides of the river. He quickly cleared the city of stragglers,
and displayed a gratifying activity in beginning the organization of the
Army of the Potomac from the new three years' volunteers that were
pouring into Washington by every train. He was received by the
administration and the army with the warmest friendliness and
confidence, and for awhile seemed to reciprocate these feelings with
zeal and gratitude.