The Secession Movement--South Carolina Secession--Buchanan's
Neglect--Disloyal Cabinet Members---Washington Central Cabal--Anderson's
Transfer to Sumter--Star of the West--Montgomery Rebellion---Davis and
Stephens--Corner-stone Theory--Lincoln Inaugurated--His Inaugural
Address--Lincoln's Cabinet--The Question of Sumter--Seward's
Memorandum--Lincoln's Answer--Bombardment of Sumter--Anderson's
Capitulation
It is not the province of these chapters to relate in detail the course
of the secession movement in the cotton States in the interim which
elapsed between the election and inauguration of President Lincoln.
Still less can space be given to analyze and set forth the lamentable
failure of President Buchanan to employ the executive authority and
power of the government to prevent it, or even to hinder its
development, by any vigorous opposition or adequate protest. The
determination of South Carolina to secede was announced by the governor
of that State a month before the presidential election, and on the day
before the election he sent the legislature of the State a revolutionary
message to formally inaugurate it. From that time forward the whole
official machinery of the State not only led, but forced the movement
which culminated on December 20 in the ordinance of secession by the
South Carolina convention.
This official revolution in South Carolina was quickly imitated by
similar official revolutions ending in secession ordinances in the
States of Mississippi, on January 9, 1861; Florida, January 10; Alabama,
January 11; Georgia, January 19; Louisiana, January 26; and by a still
bolder usurpation in Texas, culminating on February 1. From the day of
the presidential election all these proceedings were known probably more
fully to President Buchanan than to the general public, because many of
the actors were his personal and party friends; while almost at their
very beginning he became aware that three members of his cabinet were
secretly or openly abetting and promoting them by their official
influence and power.
Instead of promptly dismissing these unfaithful servants, he retained
one of them a month, and the others twice that period, and permitted
them so far to influence his official conduct, that in his annual
message to Congress he announced the fallacious and paradoxical doctrine
that though a State had no right to secede, the Federal government had
no right to coerce her to remain in the Union.
Nor could he justify his non-action by the excuse that contumacious
speeches and illegal resolves of parliamentary bodies might be tolerated
under the American theory of free assemblage and free speech. Almost
from the beginning of the secession movement, it was accompanied from
time to time by overt acts both of treason and war; notably, by the
occupation and seizure by military order and force of the seceding
States, of twelve or fifteen harbor forts, one extensive navy-yard, half
a dozen arsenals, three mints, four important custom-houses, three
revenue cutters, and a variety of miscellaneous Federal property; for
all of which insults to the flag, and infractions of the sovereignty of
the United States, President Buchanan could recommend no more
efficacious remedy or redress than to ask the voters of the country to
reverse their decision given at the presidential election, and to
appoint a day of fasting and prayer on which to implore the Most High
"to remove from our hearts that false pride of opinion which would impel
us to persevere in wrong for the sake of consistency."
Nor must mention be omitted of the astounding phenomenon that,
encouraged by President Buchanan's doctrine of non-coercion and purpose
of non-action, a central cabal of Southern senators and representatives
issued from Washington, on December 14, their public proclamation of the
duty of secession; their executive committee using one of the rooms of
the Capitol building itself as the headquarters of the conspiracy and
rebellion they were appointed to lead and direct.
During the month of December, while the active treason of cotton-State
officials and the fatal neglect of the Federal executive were in their
most damaging and demoralizing stages, an officer of the United States
army had the high courage and distinguished honor to give the
ever-growing revolution its first effective check. Major Robert
Anderson, though a Kentuckian by birth and allied by marriage to a
Georgia family, was, late in November, placed in command of the Federal
forts in Charleston harbor; and having repeatedly reported that his
little garrison of sixty men was insufficient for the defense of Fort
Moultrie, and vainly asked for reinforcements which were not sent him,
he suddenly and secretly, on the night after Christmas, transferred his
command from the insecure position of Moultrie to the strong and
unapproachable walls of Fort Sumter, midway in the mouth of Charleston
harbor, where he could not be assailed by the raw Charleston militia
companies that had for weeks been threatening him with a storming
assault. In this stronghold, surrounded on all sides by water, he
loyally held possession for the government and sovereignty of the United
States.
The surprised and baffled rage of the South Carolina rebels created a
crisis at Washington that resulted in the expulsion of the President's
treacherous counselors and the reconstruction of Mr. Buchanan's cabinet
to unity and loyalty. The new cabinet, though unable to obtain President
Buchanan's consent to aggressive measures to reëstablish the Federal
authority, was, nevertheless, able to prevent further concessions to the
insurrection, and to effect a number of important defensive precautions,
among which was the already mentioned concentration of a small military
force to protect the national capital.
Meanwhile, the governor of South Carolina had begun the erection of
batteries to isolate and besiege Fort Sumter; and the first of these, on
a sand-spit of Morris Island commanding the main ship-channel, by a few
shots turned back, on January 9, the merchant steamer _Star of the
West_, in which General Scott had attempted to send a reinforcement of
two hundred recruits to Major Anderson. Battery building was continued
with uninterrupted energy until a triangle of siege works was
established on the projecting points of neighboring islands, mounting a
total of thirty guns and seventeen mortars, manned and supported by a
volunteer force of from four to six thousand men.
Military preparation, though not on so extensive or definite a scale,
was also carried on in the other revolted States; and while Mr. Lincoln
was making his memorable journey from Springfield to Washington,
telegrams were printed in the newspapers, from day to day, showing that
their delegates had met at Montgomery, Alabama, formed a provisional
congress, and adopted a constitution and government under the title of
The Confederate States of America, of which they elected Jefferson Davis
of Mississippi President, and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia
Vice-President.
It needs to be constantly borne in mind that the beginning of this vast
movement was not a spontaneous revolution, but a chronic conspiracy.
"The secession of South Carolina," truly said one of the chief actors,
"is not an event of a day. It is not anything produced by Mr. Lincoln's
election, or by the non-execution of the fugitive-slave law. It is a
matter which has been gathering head for thirty years." The central
motive and dominating object of the revolution was frankly avowed by
Vice-President Stephens in a speech he made at Savannah a few weeks
after his inauguration:
"The prevailing ideas entertained by him [Jefferson] and most of the
leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution,
were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of
nature; that it was wrong in _principle_, socially, morally, and
politically.... Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite
idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great
truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man; that
slavery--subordination to the superior race--is his natural and normal
condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the
world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth."
In the week which elapsed between Mr. Lincoln's arrival in Washington
and the day of inauguration, he exchanged the customary visits of
ceremony with President Buchanan, his cabinet, the Supreme Court, the
two Houses of Congress, and other dignitaries. In his rooms at Willard's
Hotel he also held consultations with leading Republicans about the
final composition of his cabinet and pressing questions of public
policy. Careful preparations had been made for the inauguration, and
under the personal eye of General Scott the military force in the city
was ready instantly to suppress any attempt to disturb the peace or
quiet of the day.
On March 4 the outgoing and incoming Presidents rode side by side in a
carriage from the Executive Mansion to the Capitol and back, escorted by
an imposing military and civic procession; and an immense throng of
spectators heard the new Executive read his inaugural address from the
east portico of the Capitol. He stated frankly that a disruption of the
Federal Union was being formidably attempted, and discussed
dispassionately the theory and illegality of secession. He held that the
Union was perpetual; that resolves and ordinances of disunion are
legally void; and announced that to the extent of his ability he would
faithfully execute the laws of the Union in all the States. The power
confided to him would be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property
and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and
imposts. But beyond what might be necessary for these objects there
would be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people
anywhere. Where hostility to the United States in any interior locality
should be so great and universal as to prevent competent resident
citizens from holding the Federal offices, there would be no attempt to
force obnoxious strangers among them for that object. The mails, unless
repelled, would continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union; and
this course would be followed until current events and experience should
show a change to be necessary. To the South he made an earnest plea
against the folly of disunion, and in favor of maintaining peace and
fraternal good will; declaring that their property, peace, and personal
security were in no danger from a Republican administration.
"One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be
extended," he said, "while the other believes it is wrong and ought not
to be extended; that is the only substantial dispute.... Physically
speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections
from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband
and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the
reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot do
this. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, either
amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then,
to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after
separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can
make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens, than
laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always;
and when, after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you cease
fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are
again upon you.... In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and
not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will
not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the
aggressors.... I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We
must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break
our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from
every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and
hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the
Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels
of our nature."
But the peaceful policy here outlined was already more difficult to
follow than Mr. Lincoln was aware. On the morning after inauguration the
Secretary of War brought to his notice freshly received letters from
Major Anderson, commanding Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, announcing
that in the course of a few weeks the provisions of the garrison would
be exhausted, and therefore an evacuation or surrender would become
necessary, unless the fort were relieved by supplies or reinforcements;
and this information was accompanied by the written opinions of the
officers that to relieve the fort would require a well-appointed army of
twenty thousand men.
The new President had appointed as his cabinet William H. Seward,
Secretary of State; Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Simon
Cameron, Secretary of War; Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy; Caleb
B. Smith, Secretary of the Interior; Montgomery Blair,
Postmaster-General; and Edward Bates, Attorney-General. The President
and his official advisers at once called into counsel the highest
military and naval officers of the Union to consider the new and
pressing emergency revealed by the unexpected news from Sumter. The
professional experts were divided in opinion. Relief by a force of
twenty thousand men was clearly out of the question. No such Union army
existed, nor could one be created within the limit of time. The officers
of the navy thought that men and supplies might be thrown into the fort
by swift-going vessels, while on the other hand the army officers
believed that such an expedition would surely be destroyed by the
formidable batteries which the insurgents had erected to close the
harbor. In view of all the conditions, Lieutenant-General Scott,
general-in-chief of the army, recommended the evacuation of the fort as
a military necessity.
President Lincoln thereupon asked the several members of his cabinet the
written question: "Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort
Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?" Only two
members replied in the affirmative, while the other five argued against
the attempt, holding that the country would recognize that the
evacuation of the fort was not an indication of policy, but a necessity
created by the neglect of the old administration. Under this advice, the
President withheld his decision until he could gather further
information.
Meanwhile, three commissioners had arrived from the provisional
government at Montgomery, Alabama, under instructions to endeavor to
negotiate a _de facto_ and _de jure_ recognition of the independence of
the Confederate States. They were promptly informed by Mr. Seward that
he could not receive them; that he did not see in the Confederate States
a rightful and accomplished revolution and an independent nation; and
that he was not at liberty to recognize the commissioners as diplomatic
agents, or to hold correspondence with them. Failing in this direct
application, they made further efforts through Mr. Justice Campbell of
the Supreme Court, as a friendly intermediary, who came to Seward in the
guise of a loyal official, though his correspondence with Jefferson
Davis soon revealed a treasonable intent; and, replying to Campbell's
earnest entreaties that peace should be maintained, Seward informed him
confidentially that the military status at Charleston would not be
changed without notice to the governor of South Carolina. On March 29 a
cabinet meeting for the second time discussed the question of Sumter.
Four of the seven members now voted in favor of an attempt to supply the
fort with provisions, and the President signed a memorandum order to
prepare certain ships for such an expedition, under the command of
Captain G.V. Fox.
So far, Mr. Lincoln's new duties as President of the United States had
not in any wise put him at a disadvantage with his constitutional
advisers. Upon the old question of slavery he was as well informed and
had clearer convictions and purposes than either Seward or Chase. And
upon the newer question of secession, and the immediate decision about
Fort Sumter which it involved, the members of his cabinet were, like
himself, compelled to rely on the professional advice of experienced
army and navy officers. Since these differed radically in their
opinions, the President's own powers of perception and logic were as
capable of forming a correct decision as men who had been governors and
senators. He had reached at least a partial decision in the memorandum
he gave Fox to prepare ships for the Sumter expedition.
It must therefore have been a great surprise to the President when, on
April 1, Secretary of State Seward handed him a memorandum setting forth
a number of most extraordinary propositions. For a full enumeration of
the items the reader must carefully study the entire document, which is
printed below in a foot-note;[4] but the principal points for which it
had evidently been written and presented can be given in a few
sentences.
[Footnote 4: SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION. APRIL
1, 1861.
First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet
without a policy, either domestic or foreign.
Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been
unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet
applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and
more grave matters.
Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for
both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on
the administration, but danger upon the country.
Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But
how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith,
leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.
Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular
and perhaps not sufficiently explained My system is built upon this
idea as a ruling one, namely, that we must
CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR
ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION.
In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to
one of _Patriotism_ or _Union_.
The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a
slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper
manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by the
Union men in the South.
I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the
issue. I deem it fortunate that the last administration created the
necessity.
For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and reinforce all the
ports in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations
to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under
martial law.
This will raise distinctly the question of _Union_ or _Disunion_. I
would maintain every fort and possession in the South.