VII

Repeal of the Missouri Compromise--State Fair Debate--Peoria

Debate--Trumbull Elected--Letter to Robinson--The Know-Nothings--Decatur

Meeting--Bloomington Convention--Philadelphia Convention--Lincoln's Vote

for Vice-President--Frémont and Dayton--Lincoln's Campaign

Speeches--Chicago Banquet Speech

After the expiration of his term in Congress Mr. Lincoln applied himself

with unremitting assiduity to the practice of law, which the growth of

the State in population, and the widening of his acquaintanceship no

less than his own growth in experience and legal acumen, rendered ever

more important and absorbing.

"In 1854," he writes, "his profession had almost superseded the thought

of politics in his mind, when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise

aroused him as he had never been before."

Not alone Mr. Lincoln, but, indeed, the whole nation, was so

aroused--the Democratic party, and nearly the entire South, to force the

passage of that repeal through Congress, and an alarmed majority,

including even a considerable minority of the Democratic party in the

North, to resist its passage.

Mr. Lincoln, of course, shared the general indignation of Northern

sentiment that the whole of the remaining Louisiana Territory, out of

which six States, and the greater part of two more, have since been

organized and admitted to the Union, should be opened to the possible

extension of slavery. But two points served specially to enlist his

energy in the controversy. One was personal, in that Senator Douglas of

Illinois, by whom the repeal was championed, and whose influence as a

free-State senator and powerful Democratic leader alone made the repeal

possible, had been his personal antagonist in Illinois politics for

almost twenty years. The other was moral, in that the new question

involved the elemental principles of the American government, the

fundamental maxim of the Declaration of Independence, that all men are

created equal. His intuitive logic needed no demonstration that bank,

tariff, internal improvements, the Mexican War, and their related

incidents, were questions of passing expediency; but that this sudden

reaction, needlessly grafted upon a routine statute to organize a new

territory, was the unmistakable herald of a coming struggle which might

transform republican institutions.

It was in January, 1854, that the accidents of a Senate debate threw

into Congress and upon the country the firebrand of the repeal of the

Missouri Compromise. The repeal was not consummated till the month of

May; and from May until the autumn elections the flame of acrimonious

discussion ran over the whole country like a wild fire. There is no

record that Mr. Lincoln took any public part in the discussion until the

month of September, but it is very clear that he not only carefully

watched its progress, but that he studied its phases of development, its

historical origins, and its legal bearings with close industry, and

gathered from party literature and legislative documents a harvest of

substantial facts and data, rather than the wordy campaign phrases and

explosive epithets with which more impulsive students and speakers were

content to produce their oratorical effects. Here we may again quote

Mr. Lincoln's exact written statement of the manner in which he resumed

his political activity:

"In the autumn of that year [1854] he took the stump, with no broader

practical aim or object than to secure, if possible, the reëlection of

Hon. Richard Yates to Congress. His speeches at once attracted a more

marked attention than they had ever before done. As the canvass

proceeded he was drawn to different parts of the State, outside of Mr.

Yates's district. He did not abandon the law, but gave his attention by

turns to that and politics. The State Agricultural Fair was at

Springfield that year, and Douglas was announced to speak there."

The new question had created great excitement and uncertainty in

Illinois politics, and there were abundant signs that it was beginning

to break up the organization of both the Whig and the Democratic

parties. This feeling brought together at the State fair an unusual

number of local leaders from widely scattered counties, and almost

spontaneously a sort of political tournament of speech-making broke out.

In this Senator Douglas, doubly conspicuous by his championship of the

Nebraska Bill in Congress, was expected to play the leading part, while

the opposition, by a common impulse, called upon Lincoln to answer him.

Lincoln performed the task with such aptness and force, with such

freshness of argument, illustrations from history, and citations from

authorities, as secured him a decided oratorical triumph, and lifted him

at a single bound to the leadership of the opposition to Douglas's

propagandism. Two weeks later, Douglas and Lincoln met at Peoria in a

similar debate, and on his return to Springfield Lincoln wrote out and

printed his speech in full.

The reader who carefully examines this speech will at once be impressed

with the genius which immediately made Mr. Lincoln a power in American

politics. His grasp of the subject is so comprehensive, his statement so

clear, his reasoning so convincing, his language so strong and eloquent

by turns, that the wonderful power he manifested in the discussions and

debates of the six succeeding years does not surpass, but only amplifies

this, his first examination of the whole brood of questions relating to

slavery precipitated upon the country by Douglas's repeal. After a

searching history of the Missouri Compromise, he attacks the

demoralizing effects and portentous consequences of its repeal.

"This declared indifference," he says, "but, as I must think, covert

real zeal for the spread of slavery, I cannot but hate. I hate it

because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it because

it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world;

enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to taunt us

as hypocrites; causes the real friends of freedom to doubt our

sincerity; and especially because it forces so many good men among

ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil

liberty, criticizing the Declaration of Independence, and insisting that

there is no right principle of action but self-interest.... Slavery is

founded in the selfishness of man's nature--opposition to it in his love

of justice. These principles are an eternal antagonism, and when brought

into collision so fiercely as slavery extension brings them, shocks and

throes and convulsions must ceaselessly follow. Repeal the Missouri

Compromise, repeal all compromises, repeal the Declaration of

Independence, repeal all past history, you still cannot repeal human

nature. It still will be the abundance of man's heart that slavery

extension is wrong, and out of the abundance of his heart his mouth

will continue to speak."

With argument as impetuous, and logic as inexorable, he disposes of

Douglas's plea of popular sovereignty:

"Here, or at Washington, I would not trouble myself with the oyster laws

of Virginia, or the cranberry laws of Indiana. The doctrine of

self-government is right--absolutely and eternally right--but it has no

just application as here attempted. Or perhaps I should rather say, that

whether it has such application depends upon whether a negro is not or

is a man. If he is not a man, in that case, he who is a man may, as a

matter of self-government, do just what he pleases with him. But if the

negro is a man, is it not to that extent a total destruction of

self-government to say that he too shall not govern himself? When the

white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs

himself and also governs another man, that is more than

self-government--that is despotism.... I particularly object to the new

position which the avowed principle of this Nebraska law gives to

slavery in the body politic. I object to it because it assumes that

there can be moral right in the enslaving of one man by another. I

object to it as a dangerous dalliance for a free people--a sad evidence

that, feeling prosperity, we forget right; that liberty, as a principle,

we have ceased to revere.... Little by little, but steadily as man's

march to the grave, we have been giving up the old for the new faith.

Near eighty years ago we began by declaring that all men are created

equal; but now, from that beginning, we have run down to the other

declaration, that for some men to enslave others is a 'sacred right of

self-government.' These principles cannot stand together. They are as

opposite as God and Mammon."

If one compares the serious tone of this speech with the hard cider and

coon-skin buncombe of the Harrison campaign of 1840, and its lofty

philosophical thought with the humorous declamation of the Taylor

campaign of 1848, the speaker's advance in mental development at once

becomes apparent. In this single effort Mr. Lincoln had risen from the

class of the politician to the rank of the statesman. There is a

well-founded tradition that Douglas, disconcerted and troubled by

Lincoln's unexpected manifestation of power in the Springfield and

Peoria debates, sought a friendly interview with his opponent, and

obtained from him an agreement that neither one of them would make any

further speeches before the election.

The local interest in the campaign was greatly heightened by the fact

that the term of Douglas's Democratic colleague in the United States

Senate was about to expire, and that the State legislature to be elected

would have the choosing of his successor. It is not probable that

Lincoln built much hope upon this coming political chance, as the

Democratic party had been throughout the whole history of the State in

decided political control. It turned out, nevertheless, that in the

election held on November 7, an opposition majority of members of the

legislature was chosen, and Lincoln became, to outward appearances, the

most available opposition candidate. But party disintegration had been

only partial. Lincoln and his party friends still called themselves

Whigs, though they could muster only a minority of the total membership

of the legislature. The so-called Anti-Nebraska Democrats, opposing

Douglas and his followers, were still too full of traditional party

prejudice to help elect a pronounced Whig to the United States Senate,

though as strongly "Anti-Nebraska" as themselves. Five of them brought

forward, and stubbornly voted for, Lyman Trumbull, an Anti-Nebraska

Democrat of ability, who had been chosen representative in Congress from

the eighth Illinois District in the recent election. On the ninth ballot

it became evident to Lincoln that there was danger of a new Democratic

candidate, neutral on the Nebraska question, being chosen. In this

contingency, he manifested a personal generosity and political sagacity

far above the comprehension of the ordinary smart politician. He advised

and prevailed upon his Whig supporters to vote for Trumbull, and thus

secure a vote in the United States Senate against slavery extension. He

had rightly interpreted both statesmanship and human nature. His

personal sacrifice on this occasion contributed essentially to the

coming political regeneration of his State; and the five Anti-Nebraska

Democrats, who then wrought his defeat, became his most devoted personal

followers and efficient allies in his own later political triumph, which

adverse currents, however, were still to delay to a tantalizing degree.

The circumstances of his defeat at that critical stage of his career

must have seemed especially irritating, yet he preserved a most

remarkable equanimity of temper. "I regret my defeat moderately," he

wrote to a sympathizing friend, "but I am not nervous about it."

We may fairly infer that while Mr. Lincoln was not "nervous," he was

nevertheless deeply impressed by the circumstance as an illustration of

the grave nature of the pending political controversy. A letter written

by him about half a year later to a friend in Kentucky, is full of such

serious reflection as to show that the existing political conditions in

the United States had engaged his most profound thought and

investigation.

"That spirit," he wrote, "which desired the peaceful extinction of

slavery has itself become extinct with the occasion and the men of the

Revolution. Under the impulse of that occasion, nearly half the States

adopted systems of emancipation at once, and it is a significant fact

that not a single State has done the like since. So far as peaceful

voluntary emancipation is concerned, the condition of the negro slave in

America, scarcely less terrible to the contemplation of a free mind, is

now as fixed and hopeless of change for the better as that of the lost

souls of the finally impenitent. The Autocrat of all the Russias will

resign his crown and proclaim his subjects free republicans sooner than

will our American masters voluntarily give up their slaves. Our

political problem now is, 'Can we as a nation continue together

permanently--forever--half slave and half free?' The problem is too

mighty for me--may God, in his mercy, superintend the solution."

Not quite three years later Mr. Lincoln made the concluding problem of

this letter the text of a famous speech. On the day before his first

inauguration as President of the United States, the "Autocrat of all the

Russias," Alexander II, by imperial decree emancipated his serfs; while

six weeks after the inauguration the "American masters," headed by

Jefferson Davis, began the greatest war of modern times to perpetuate

and spread the institution of slavery.

The excitement produced by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in

1854, by the election forays of the Missouri Border Ruffians into Kansas

in 1855, and by the succeeding civil strife in 1856 in that Territory,

wrought an effective transformation of political parties in the Union,

in preparation for the presidential election of that year. This

transformation, though not seriously checked, was very considerably

complicated by an entirely new faction, or rather by the sudden revival

of an old one, which in the past had called itself Native Americanism,

and now assumed the name of the American Party, though it was more

popularly known by the nickname of "Know-Nothings," because of its

secret organization. It professed a certain hostility to foreign-born

voters and to the Catholic religion, and demanded a change in the

naturalization laws from a five years' to a twenty-one years'

preliminary residence. This faction had gained some sporadic successes

in Eastern cities, but when its national convention met in February,

1856, to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President, the

pending slavery question, that it had hitherto studiously ignored,

caused a disruption of its organization; and though the adhering

delegates nominated Millard Fillmore for President and A.J. Donelson for

Vice-President, who remained in the field and were voted for, to some

extent, in the presidential election, the organization was present only

as a crippled and disturbing factor, and disappeared totally from

politics in the following years.

Both North and South, party lines adjusted themselves defiantly upon the

single issue, for or against men and measures representing the extension

or restriction of slavery. The Democratic party, though radically

changing its constituent elements, retained the party name, and became

the party of slavery extension, having forced the repeal and supported

the resulting measures; while the Whig party entirely disappeared, its

members in the Northern States joining the Anti-Nebraska Democrats in

the formation of the new Republican party. Southern Whigs either went

boldly into the Democratic camp, or followed for a while the delusive

prospects of the Know-Nothings.

This party change went on somewhat slowly in the State of Illinois,

because that State extended in territorial length from the latitude of

Massachusetts to that of Virginia, and its population contained an

equally diverse local sentiment. The northern counties had at once

become strongly Anti-Nebraska; the conservative Whig counties of the

center inclined to the Know-Nothings; while the Kentuckians and

Carolinians, who had settled the southern end, had strong antipathies to

what they called abolitionism, and applauded Douglas and repeal.

The agitation, however, swept on, and further hesitation became

impossible. Early in 1856 Mr. Lincoln began to take an active part in

organizing the Republican party. He attended a small gathering of

Anti-Nebraska editors in February, at Decatur, who issued a call for a

mass convention which met at Bloomington in May, at which the Republican

party of Illinois was formally constituted by an enthusiastic gathering

of local leaders who had formerly been bitter antagonists, but who now

joined their efforts to resist slavery extension. They formulated an

emphatic but not radical platform, and through a committee selected a

composite ticket of candidates for State offices, which the convention

approved by acclamation. The occasion remains memorable because of the

closing address made by Mr. Lincoln in one of his most impressive

oratorical moods. So completely were his auditors carried away by the

force of his denunciation of existing political evils, and by the

eloquence of his appeal for harmony and union to redress them, that

neither a verbatim report nor even an authentic abstract was made during

its delivery: but the lifting inspiration of its periods will never fade

from the memory of those who heard it.

About three weeks later, the first national convention of the Republican

party met at Philadelphia, and nominated John C. Frémont of California

for President. There was a certain fitness in this selection, from the

fact that he had been elected to the United States Senate when

California applied for admission as a free State, and that the

resistance of the South to her admission had been the entering wedge of

the slavery agitation of 1850. This, however, was in reality a minor

consideration. It was rather his romantic fame as a daring Rocky

Mountain explorer, appealing strongly to popular imagination and

sympathy, which gave him prestige as a presidential candidate.

It was at this point that the career of Abraham Lincoln had a narrow and

fortunate escape from a premature and fatal prominence. The Illinois

Bloomington convention had sent him as a delegate to the Philadelphia

convention; and, no doubt very unexpectedly to himself, on the first

ballot for a candidate for Vice-President he received one hundred and

ten votes against two hundred and fifty-nine votes for William L. Dayton

of New Jersey, upon which the choice of Mr. Dayton was at once made

unanimous. But the incident proves that Mr. Lincoln was already gaining

a national fame among the advanced leaders of political thought.

Happily, a mysterious Providence reserved him for larger and nobler

uses.

The nominations thus made at Philadelphia completed the array for the

presidential battle of 1856. The Democratic national convention had met

at Cincinnati on June 2, and nominated James Buchanan for President and

John C. Breckinridge for Vice-President. Its work presented two points

of noteworthy interest, namely: that the South, in an arrogant

pro-slavery dictatorship, relentlessly cast aside the claims of Douglas

and Pierce, who had effected the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and

nominated Buchanan, in apparently sure confidence of that

super-serviceable zeal in behalf of slavery which he so obediently

rendered; also, that in a platform of intolerable length there was such

a cunning ambiguity of word and concealment of sense, such a double

dealing of phrase and meaning, as to render it possible that the

pro-slavery Democrats of the South and some antislavery Democrats of the

North might join for the last time to elect a "Northern man with

Southern principles."

Again, in this campaign, as in several former presidential elections,

Mr. Lincoln was placed upon the electoral ticket of Illinois, and he

made over fifty speeches in his own and adjoining States in behalf of

Frémont and Dayton. Not one of these speeches was reported in full, but

the few fragments which have been preserved show that he occupied no

doubtful ground on the pending issues. Already the Democrats were

raising the potent alarm cry that the Republican party was sectional,

and that its success would dissolve the Union. Mr. Lincoln did not then

dream that he would ever have to deal practically with such a

contingency, but his mind was very clear as to the method of meeting it.

Speaking for the Republican party, he said:

"But the Union in any event will not be dissolved. We don't want to

dissolve it, and if you attempt it, we won't let you. With the purse and

sword, the army and navy and treasury, in our hands and at our command,

you could not do it. This government would be very weak, indeed, if a

majority, with a disciplined army and navy and a well-filled treasury,

could not preserve itself when attacked by an unarmed, undisciplined,

unorganized minority. All this talk about the dissolution of the Union

is humbug, nothing but folly. We do not want to dissolve the Union; you

shall not."

While the Republican party was much cast down by the election of

Buchanan in November, the Democrats found significant cause for

apprehension in the unexpected strength with which the Frémont ticket

had been supported in the free States. Especially was this true in

Illinois, where the adherents of Frémont and Fillmore had formed a

fusion, and thereby elected a Republican governor and State officers.

One of the strong elements of Mr. Lincoln's leadership was the cheerful

hope he was always able to inspire in his followers, and his abiding

faith in the correct political instincts of popular majorities. This

trait was happily exemplified in a speech he made at a Republican

banquet in Chicago about a month after the presidential election.

Recalling the pregnant fact that though Buchanan gained a majority of

the electoral vote, he was in a minority of about four hundred thousand

of the popular vote for President, Mr. Lincoln thus summed up the

chances of Republican success in the future:

"Our government rests in public opinion. Whoever can change public

opinion, can change the government, practically, just so much. Public

opinion on any subject always has a 'central idea,' from which all its

minor thoughts radiate. That 'central idea' in our political public

opinion at the beginning was, and until recently has continued to be,

'the equality of men.' And although it has always submitted patiently to

whatever of inequality there seemed to be as matter of actual necessity,

its constant working has been a steady progress towards the practical

equality of all men. The late presidential election was a struggle by

one party to discard that central idea and to substitute for it the

opposite idea that slavery is right in the abstract; the workings of

which as a central idea may be the perpetuity of human slavery and its

extension to all countries and colors.... All of us who did not vote for

Mr. Buchanan, taken together, are a majority of four hundred thousand.

But in the late contest we were divided between Frémont and Fillmore.

Can we not come together for the future? Let every one who really

believes, and is resolved, that free society is not and shall not be a

failure, and who can conscientiously declare that in the past contest he

has done only what he thought best--let every such one have charity to

believe that every other one can say as much. Thus let bygones be

bygones; let past differences as nothing be; and with steady eye on the

real issue, let us reinaugurate the good old 'central ideas' of the

republic. We can do it. The human heart is with us; God is with us. We

shall again be able, not to declare that 'all States as States are

equal,' nor yet that 'all citizens as citizens are equal,' but to renew

the broader, better declaration, including both these and much more,

that 'all men are created equal.'"

A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln Condensed from Nicolay & Hay's Abraham Lincoln: A History · 第 47 / 84 题