Transcriber’s Notes
Italic text enclosed with _underscores_.
Small-caps replaced by ALL CAPS.
Tables require a monospace font in order to align properly.
More notes appear at the end of the file.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Illustration:
_Photo, Cribb, Southsea._]
THE BRITISH SUBMARINE “E.2.”
Displacement, 800 tons; Speed, 16·10 knots; Armament, 4 torpedo tubes
and 2 q.-f. guns.
There are 17 vessels of this class, completed between 1912‒14.
]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBMARINES, MINES AND TORPEDOES IN THE WAR
BY
CHARLES W. DOMVILLE-FIFE
AUTHOR OF “SUBMARINES OF THE WORLD’S NAVIES”,
“SUBMARINE ENGINEERING OF TO-DAY,” ETC.
ILLUSTRATED
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXIV
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PREFACE
Warfare has become so largely a matter of science that in order to
arrive at an intelligent understanding of the _naval situation_ or of
the _military campaigns_ in the Great European War, a knowledge of the
scientific factors contributing to victory or defeat is essential. And
in this volume it has been my aim not only to review the actual fighting
underseas, but also to present a compendium of information relative to
the submarine fleets and arms of the great Naval Powers engaged; which I
venture to hope will prove of present interest on account of the
prominent part played by the under-water fighting ships and appliances,
and of permanent historic value as being the first work to describe the
vast preparations and curious events leading to the new “Submarine
Phase” in naval warfare.
C. W. D-F.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION—THE SUBMARINE PHASE OF THE NAVAL WAR 9
CHAPTER I
THE MODERN SUBMARINE TORPEDO-BOAT 40
CHAPTER II
BRITISH SUBMARINES 60
CHAPTER III
FRENCH SUBMARINES 79
CHAPTER IV
RUSSIAN SUBMARINES 94
CHAPTER V
JAPANESE SUBMARINES 104
CHAPTER VI
GERMAN SUBMARINES 108
CHAPTER VII
AUSTRIAN SUBMARINES 118
TABLE SHOWING SUBMARINE FLOTILLAS OF THE NEUTRAL EUROPEAN POWERS 123
CHAPTER VIII
SUBMARINES IN ACTION 124
CHAPTER IX
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS 146
CHAPTER X
THE SUBMARINE TORPEDO 160
CHAPTER XI
SUBMARINE MINES 168
CHAPTER XII
MINE-LAYING FLEETS 174
CHAPTER XIII
MINE-SWEEPING FLEETS 179
CHAPTER XIV
COMPARATIVE FIGHTING VALUE OF THE SUBMARINE FLEETS AT WAR 184
------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTRODUCTION
THE SUBMARINE PHASE OF THE NAVAL WAR
In the mist of war which envelops over half the entire world, no less
than 264 underwater fighting ships are engaged. They form the submarine
fleets of England, France, Russia, Japan, Germany and Austria; and the
highly-trained crews of these modern additions to the fighting navies
comprise nearly 20,000 men. But the conduct of submarine warfare on the
grand scale requires far more than flotillas of submergible warships and
their daring crews. This new branch of naval science is ever widening in
its scope, its means of offence, and in its attendant ramifications.
Every important naval base has its curious submarine floating docks,
ready for crippled members of its attached flotilla; every naval
construction department has its corps of submarine experts; each of the
1,500 surface warships engaged in this titanic struggle for the dominion
of Europe and the mastery of the seas carries the means for delivering
submarine attacks in its torpedoes and surface and submerged discharging
tubes. The oceans in the theatres of war have been strewn with German
and Austrian mines; then they have been either counter-mined or swept
clear and mined again. British seaplanes, with specially trained
observers, are continually searching from high in the air for the _dark
patches in the semi-transparent sea-green_ which denote the presence of
mines and submarines. Within signal-range or wireless call of the aërial
scouts and their attendant ships are destroyer flotillas to give battle
to the hostile submarines, while hundreds of trawlers and small
steamers, fitted with special apparatus, are continually sweeping up the
hundreds of submarine mines laid by the enemy’s vessels which are fitted
to enable them to sow like seeds over the pathways of the sea these
deadly perils to navigation. Submerged wire entanglements in conjunction
with boom-defences and observation and contact submarine mines protect
the seaward approaches to harbours in the same way as similar appliances
are used to protect the approaches to land fortifications; and every
harbour, waterway and channel of strategic importance is protected by
elaborate submarine mine defences. All this is part of the new warfare
underseas—that science which is daily rendering hazardous the life of
the greatest battleship and the smallest merchantman afloat in the zone
of war.
Before placing in review order the vast preparations made for submarine
attack and defence in the years which preceded the outbreak of war and
describing in detail the powerful submarine fleets engaged, it is
necessary to make clear to the reader the wonderful change which this
new mode of attack has made in all branches of naval warfare and its
influence on sea power. As indicative of this change we have only to
survey _in their submarine aspect_ the naval operations in the opening
phase of this, the greatest war in history.
In the domain of naval strategy we find reflected the altered
conditions caused by these invisible arms. Every battle on land and
sea teaches its lesson of concealment and sudden stealthy attack; and
even as the huge siege guns and devastating artillery fire of the land
forces is causing the extension of the battle-front and the rapid
burrowing under earth or entrenching of positions dearly won or with
difficulty retained—“approximating to siege warfare”—so are the
powerful 12 and 13.5-inch naval guns (weight of projectile 850 lbs.
and 1,400 lbs. respectively), combined with the rapidity and accuracy
of the modern warship’s secondary armament, necessitating the
reduction in numbers of the big surface ships of the opposing fleets
by frequent submarine and torpedo attacks prior to the decisive
engagements between the battle fleets. Hence we find, in the opening
phase of the naval war, the German and Austrian fleets, inferior in
numbers and gun power, skulking behind fortifications and waiting for
their submarine and surface torpedo-boats and light cruisers, in
conjunction with the hundreds of submerged mines strewn over the North
Sea, Baltic, Adriatic and elsewhere to reduce the number and power of
the British, French, Russian and Japanese fleets before the decisive
actions are fought; and in order that these tactics might be
frustrated, and the big British ships, as well as those of her allies,
costing several millions sterling each, should not be exposed to these
grave risks when no good could result, they have been compelled to
delay initiative, and meanwhile all their operations had to be
screened by smaller and faster vessels of the cruiser and destroyer
types, while they waited within call should the German Battle Fleet—in
the case of the North Sea—dare to come out to fight. The British
submarines of the large sea-going type were in the meantime employed
in watching the Frisian coast with the object of attacking any of the
enemy’s ships which ventured from behind the elaborate coast
fortifications. Not content with this _rôle_, however, several British
submarines made their way unseen through the dangerous waters of the
Heligoland Bight and succeeded in getting within reconnoitering
distance of the German submerged harbour defences, behind which lurk
their big ships.
With what degree of success this new opening or _submarine phase_ in
naval warfare has been attended is shown by the sinking, during the
first few weeks of the war, of the British cruiser _Amphion_, a vessel
of 3,440 tons displacement, completed in 1912, and carrying ten 4-inch
guns, with a loss of 131 men, by contact with a German mine; the
destruction of the German submarine U.15 by the British cruiser
_Birmingham_; the sinking of an Austrian torpedo-boat by a mine off
Pola; the torpedoing of H.M.S. _Pathfinder_, a fleet scout of about
3,000 tons displacement, completed in 1905‒6, by a German submarine; the
destruction of the Wilson liner _Runo_ by a mine; the sinking of the
German cruiser _Hela_, a vessel of 2,000 tons displacement, built in
1896, by the British submarine E 9, and the torpedoing of the British
armoured cruisers _Aboukir_, _Hogue_ and _Cressy_—vessels of 12,000 tons
displacement, carrying two 9.2-inch and twelve 6-inch guns besides
twelve 12-pounder quick-firing guns and two torpedo tubes—by German
submarines concealed behind a trawler engaged in laying mines, over
which the Dutch flag had been hoisted as a blind.
This is in addition to the lamentable destruction of much life and
property belonging to neutral powers caused by the laying of German
floating mines on the trade-routes.
To the Allies this _submarine phase_ did not come unexpected. The
British Naval yards in conjunction with the big shipbuilding and
engineering firms, such as Messrs. Vickers Ltd., Barrow-in-Furness;
Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. Ltd., Newcastle-on-Tyne; the
Whitehead Torpedo Company Ltd., Weymouth; Messrs. Siebe, Gorman and Co.
Ltd., London; and Messrs. Scotts’ Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd.,
as well as many other firms and individual submarine experts had been
engaged for many years in solving one after another the problems
continually arising in the practical application of all forms of
submarine warfare. The first British naval submarines were launched in
1901‒2 from Messrs. Vickers’ works at Barrow, and the subsequent growth
of our submarine flotillas has been rapid both in number of vessels and
in size and armament. The British submarine fleet now numbers 82
vessels. The original boats from which the British type has since been
evolved were built from the designs of Mr. John P. Holland, an American
inventor.
[Illustration: North Sea Coastlines]
To France belongs the honour of being the first naval power to adopt the
submarine torpedo-boat as a vessel of war; and the first vessel, the
_Gymnôte_, was launched in 1888, but it was not until 1893 that the
Republic commenced the construction of her now powerful submarine
flotilla, numbering 92 vessels.
The first Russian submarine was launched at Kronstadt in 1902, and since
that date the Russian flotilla has steadily increased until it now
numbers 37 vessels.
Japan commenced the construction of what is now a powerful and
up-to-date flotilla of seventeen vessels by the acquisition of a
British-Holland boat in 1904.
Turning to Germany we find at first a great reluctance on the part of
the Ministry of Marine to provide for the construction of submarines,
but in 1905‒6 this initial hesitation was overcome and the two vessels
U.1 and U.2 were launched. Since then the belief in a powerful submarine
flotilla steadily grew until at the moment when war was declared Germany
possessed no less than 30 to 36 submarines of a very efficient type. The
Austro-Hungarian Navy did not adopt submarines as units of the Fleet
until 1909, and now possess only six small vessels.
From this brief _resumé_ of the growth of the submarine fleets of the
six great naval Powers at war, it will be seen that in point of numbers
as well as in priority, bringing with it practical experience, Great
Britain and France have a very appreciable superiority. It must,
however, be left for succeeding chapters to describe in detail the
steady growth and present size and capabilities of the submarine fleets
at war.
The lessons taught by the Russo-Japanese war were not lost on the
British Admiralty, and special methods had been prepared to deal with
submarine attack in its various forms. Having in mind the destruction
caused to both Russian and Japanese warships by submarine
mines—especially those of the “offensive contact” type, which are moored
to the bottom, float just under the surface and explode immediately on
contact; and in the Russo-Japanese War were responsible for the sinking
of the Japanese battleships _Hatsuse_ and _Yashima_ as well as the
Russian battleship _Petropavlovsk_ and the cruiser _Boyarin_—the British
Admiralty foresaw the danger to which both warships and merchantmen
would be exposed in time of war if the seas strewn with these mines
could not be quickly cleared, and a new type of auxiliary came into
being. This was the mine-sweeper, and eight vessels of the old
torpedo-gunboat type were fitted out for the work. In addition to these,
however, the Admiralty purchased a considerable number of steam fishing
trawlers, and fitted them with mine-sweeping appliances, and made
arrangements for a large fleet of similar vessels to be placed at the
disposal of the navy in the event of war. In order to man this new
mine-sweeping fleet with experienced sailors on the outbreak of war, a
new section of the Royal Naval Reserve was created in 1911. This is
known as the “Trawler Section,” and consists of 142 _skippers_ and 1,136
men taken from the fishing fleet.
Realizing the value of the submarine mine in certain cases, the British
Admiralty went further and created a small mine-laying fleet from seven
old second-class cruisers, which had their aft-decks cleared and
provided with rails for a large number of mines to be run down and slid
over the stern into the water as the vessels steamed along, thus quickly
laying a mine-field. But as the laying of mines, speaking generally, is
a defensive mode of warfare and the policy of the British Navy—owing to
its supremacy—is attack and not defence, the mine-laying fleet is of
second importance to the sweeping fleet, the work of which, although
much augmented by additional small steamers pressed into service, was,
during the first few weeks of the war, of a nature more arduous and
dangerous than will ever be realised. Hundreds of German mines were
swept up, and hundreds more were exploded by being dragged into contact
with each other during the progress of sweeping operations.
What the clearance of these vast fields of floating and anchored mines
in the North Sea meant to the British Navy, engaged in blockading the
German Fleet, and to the Mercantile Marine not only of England, France,
Russia and Belgium, but also to that of the neutral countries, it is
perhaps a little difficult to realize until one remembers that several
hundred British and French warships were patrolling the North Sea and
Channel, and, at the opening of hostilities, there were hundreds of
merchantmen homeward bound whose course lay across this mine-infested
sea. Many of these vessels had on board not only valuable cargoes of
food, raw material for manufacture and gold and silver bullion, but also
officers and men returning from various parts of the world to rejoin
their regiments. Again, the Expeditionary Force had to be transported
across the Channel to France. This could not be attempted until a
guarantee had been given by the Navy that the seas were clear of hostile
warships, submarines and mines. The fleet blockading the Frisian coast
had to be supplied with coal and fresh food; and last but by no means
least it was of vital importance to the Allied Armies in the Field that
the whole coast-line from Bordeaux to Antwerp, forming the rear and
left-flank, should be accessible to friendly shipping. It is not
difficult to realize what would have been the effect had thousands of
these deadly German contact mines been allowed to float unhindered in
these narrow seas, for, notwithstanding the magnificent effort made by
thousands of seamen in hundreds of mine-sweepers assisted by seaplanes,
many vessels—some belonging to neutral powers and others to the enemy
themselves—were destroyed before the seas could be effectively swept
clear, the hostile mine-layers destroyed or chased into port and there
blockaded with their cowardly fleet.
The torpedo has long been recognised as one of the most effective of
naval arms. It is carried by every modern warship afloat, but it is
essentially the arm of the submarine and of the small and fast surface
vessel. For a torpedo attack to be successful it is absolutely necessary
for the vessel carrying the weapon to get within about 1,000 yards of
the object of attack. The difficulty of accomplishing this manœuvre with
an enemy on the alert is easily apparent, but if the attacking vessel
can creep up to within torpedo range unobserved her chances of sinking
the enemy are decidedly good, and it is the quality possessed by the
submarine of making herself invisible by sinking beneath the surface and
approaching her enemy “seeing but unseen” that makes this type of vessel
the ideal torpedo-boat. But, like everything else, there are limits to
its use, for a submarine, although it can navigate on the surface like
an ordinary torpedo-boat, cannot deliver a submerged attack at night
owing to the periscopes, which are the “eyes” of these underwater
fighting ships, being useless in the dark. When night covers the sea,
however, the chances of the fast grey-painted surface torpedo-boat or
destroyer being able to approach the enemy unseen are more than doubled,
and in this way fleets become exposed to submarine torpedo attack by day
and surface torpedo attack by night. Further, a submarine will often
attack while a seaplane hovers over the enemy in order to draw
attention. It is this constant exposure to sudden and unseen submarine
attack which is primarily responsible for the terrible nerve strain
imposed on the crews of modern surface warships in time of war.
Owing to the ability of submarines to deliver stealthy attacks by day,
naval tacticians have designated this type of craft “Daylight
torpedo-boats,” but they are rapidly passing beyond the purely torpedo
and coastal defensive stage and are taking on to themselves the _rôle_
of the ocean cruiser. The size of these vessels has increased from 50 to
1,000 tons displacement in ten years. They now carry not only a
considerable number of the largest size torpedo but also quick-firing
guns for repelling attacks by small surface vessels, and are capable of
accompanying fleets to sea. The Australian naval submarines A.E.1 and
A.E.2 both made the voyage from Barrow to Sydney under their own power
and without convoy. The radius of action of the latest vessels both of
the British and French Navies amounts to several thousand miles. In the
case of the British “F” class the displacement has risen to 1,500 tons,
the speed to 20 knots and the armament to six torpedo tubes and four
12-pounder quick-firing guns, thus making them in every sense ocean
cruisers capable of keeping the sea in almost any weather and possessing
wide range of action and considerable offensive power. Hitherto British
submarines, like the ordinary surface torpedo-boats, have been known by
numbers only, but the latest vessels are to receive names which
indicates the increase in size and importance of these craft. They may
be termed the advance guards of the submarine battleships of the future.
The torpedo, which is the principal arm of the submarine boat, is itself
a submarine projectile. After being discharged from the firing tube it
sinks a short distance below the surface and is propelled by its own
engines at a high rate of speed in a straight line towards its object of
attack. Great improvements have been made during the past ten years in
the construction of these delicate weapons. The extreme effective range
and speed has risen from 4,000 yards at 18 knots to 7,000 yards at 45
knots or 11,000 yards at 30 knots. The “war-head” or front section of
the torpedo contains a charge of about 200 pounds of damp gun-cotton
which is fired by a detonator on the torpedo striking an object. This
very powerful explosive charge is capable of tearing open an enormous
hole in the unprotected under-water skin of the surface warship. The
type of weapon used in the British, French, Russian and Japanese Navies
is the _Whitehead_ torpedo (18-inch and 21-inch). The German Navy uses
the _Schwartzkopf_ torpedo (18-inch and 21-inch), which is very similar
to the Whitehead and is a very powerful weapon.
In the first phase of the naval war no less than eight warships have
been sunk by submarine torpedoes.
The activity of the British submarines _in the theatre of war_, from the
beginning of hostilities, is admirably set forth in the following
dispatch from Commodore Roger B. Keyes, C.B., which is the first
dispatch in the history of naval warfare to describe in detail submarine
attack and reconnaissance:—
H.M.S. _Maidstone_,
_17th October, 1914_.
“Sir,—In compliance with Their Lordships’ directions, I have the
honour to report as follows upon the services performed by the
Submarines since the commencement of hostilities:—
“Three hours after the outbreak of war, Submarines E.6
(Lieutenant-Commander Cecil P. Talbot), and E.8 (Lieutenant-Commander
Francis H. H. Goodhart), proceeded unaccompanied to carry out a
reconnaissance in the Heligoland Bight. These two vessels returned
with useful information, and had the privilege of being the pioneers
on a service which is attended by some risk.
“During the transportation of the Expeditionary Force the _Lurcher_
and _Firedrake_ and all the Submarines of the Eighth Submarine
Flotilla occupied positions from which they could have attacked the
High Sea Fleet, had it emerged to dispute the passage of our
transports. This patrol was maintained day and night without relief,
until the _personnel_ of our Army had been transported and all chance
of effective interference had disappeared.
“These Submarines have since been incessantly employed on the Enemy’s
Coast in the Heligoland Bight and elsewhere, and have obtained much
valuable information regarding the composition and movement of his
patrols. They have occupied his waters and reconnoitred his
anchorages, and, while so engaged, have been subjected to skilful and
well executed anti-submarine tactics; hunted for hours at a time by
Torpedo Craft and attacked by gun-fire and torpedoes.
“At midnight on August 26th, I embarked in the _Lurcher_, and, in
company with _Firedrake_ and Submarines D.2, D.8, E.4, E.5, E.6, E.7,
E.8, and E.9 of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla, proceeded to take part
in the operations in the Heligoland Bight arranged for August 28th.
The Destroyers scouted for the Submarines until nightfall on the 27th,
when the latter proceeded independently to take up various positions
from which they could co-operate with the Destroyer Flotillas on the
following morning.
“At daylight on August 28th the _Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_ searched the
area, through which the Battle Cruisers were to advance, for hostile
Submarines, and then proceeded towards Heligoland in the wake of
Submarines E.6, E.7, and E.8, which were exposing themselves with the
object of inducing the enemy to chase them to the westward.
“On approaching Heligoland, the visibility, which had been very good
to seaward, reduced to 5,000 to 6,000 yards, and this added
considerably to the anxieties and responsibilities of the Commanding
Officers of Submarines, who handled their vessels with coolness and
judgment in an area which was necessarily occupied by friends as well
as foes.
“Low visibility and calm sea are the most unfavourable conditions
under which Submarines can operate, and no opportunity occurred of
closing with the Enemy’s Cruisers to within torpedo range.
“Lieutenant-Commander Ernest W. Leir, Commanding Submarine E.4,
witnessed the sinking of the German Torpedo-Boat Destroyer V.187
through his periscope, and, observing a Cruiser of the _Stettin_ class
close, and open fire on the British Destroyers which had lowered their
boats to pick up the survivors, he proceeded to attack the Cruiser,
but she altered course before he could get within range. After
covering the retirement of our Destroyers, which had had to abandon
their boats, he returned to the latter, and embarked a Lieutenant and
nine men of _Defender_, who had been left behind. The boats also
contained two Officers and eight men of V.187, who were unwounded, and
eighteen men who were badly wounded. As he could not embark the
latter, Lieutenant-Commander Leir left one of the Officers and six
unwounded men to navigate the British boats to Heligoland. Before
leaving he saw that they were provided with water, biscuit, and a
compass. One German Officer and two men were made prisoners of war.
“Lieutenant-Commander Leir’s action in remaining on the surface in the
vicinity of the enemy and in a visibility which would have placed his
vessel within easy gun range of an enemy appearing out of the mist,
was altogether admirable.
“This enterprising and gallant Officer took part in the reconnaissance
which supplied the information on which these operations were based,
and I beg to submit his name, and that of Lieutenant-Commander Talbot,
the Commanding Officer of E.6, who exercised patience, judgment, and
skill in a dangerous position, for the favourable consideration of
Their Lordships.
“On September 13th, E.9 (Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton) torpedoed
and sank the German Light Cruiser _Hela_ six miles South of
Heligoland.
“A number of Destroyers were evidently called to the scene after E.9
had delivered her attack, and these hunted her for several hours.
“On September 14th, in accordance with his orders,
Lieutenant-Commander Horton examined the outer anchorage of
Heligoland, a service attended by considerable risk.
“On September 25th, Submarine E.6 (Lieutenant-Commander C. P. Talbot),
while diving, fouled the moorings of a mine laid by the enemy. On
rising to the surface she weighed the mine and sinker; the former was
securely fixed between the hydroplane and its guard; fortunately,
however, the horns of the mine were pointed outboard. The weight of
the sinker made it a difficult and dangerous matter to lift the mine
clear without exploding it. After half an hour’s patient work this was
effected by Lieutenant Frederick A. P. Williams-Freeman and Able
Seaman Ernest Randall Cremer, Official Number 214235, and the released
mine descended to its original depths.
“On October 6th, E.9 (Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton), when
patrolling off the Ems, torpedoed and sank the enemy’s Destroyer
S.126.
“The enemy’s Torpedo Craft pursue tactics which, in connection with
their shallow draft, make them exceedingly difficult to attack with
torpedo, and Lieutenant-Commander Horton’s success was the result of
much patient and skilful zeal. He is a most enterprising submarine
officer, and I beg to submit his name for favourable consideration.
“Lieutenant Charles M. S. Chapman, the Second in Command of E.9, is
also deserving of credit.
“Against an enemy whose capital vessels have never, and Light Cruisers
have seldom, emerged from their fortified harbours, opportunities of
delivering Submarine attacks have necessarily been few, and on one
occasion only, prior to the 13th September, has one of our Submarines
been within torpedo range of a Cruiser during daylight hours.
“During the exceptionally heavy westerly gales which prevailed between
the 14th and 21st September the position of the Submarines on a lee
shore, within a few miles of the Enemy’s coast, was an unpleasant one.
“The short steep seas which accompany westerly gales in the Heligoland
Bight make it difficult to keep the conning tower hatches open. There
was no rest to be obtained, and even when cruising at a depth of 60
feet, the Submarines were rolling considerably, and pumping—_i.e._
vertically moving about twenty feet.
“I submit that it was creditable to the Commanding Officers that they
should have maintained their stations under such conditions.
“Service in the Heligoland Bight is keenly sought after by the
Commanding Officers of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla, and they have
all shown daring and enterprise in the execution of their duties.
These Officers have unanimously expressed to me their admiration of
the cool and gallant behaviour of the Officers and men under their
command. They are however, of the opinion that it is impossible to
single out individuals when all have performed their duties so
admirably, and in this I concur.
“The following Submarines have been in contact with the enemy during
these operations:—
D.1 (Lieutenant-Commander Archibald D. Cochrane).
D.2 (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Jameson).
D.3 (Lieutenant-Commander Edward C. Boyle).
D.5 (Lieutenant-Commander Godfrey Herbert).
E.4 (Lieutenant-Commander Ernest W. Leir).
E.5 (Lieutenant-Commander Charles S. Benning).
E.6 (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil P. Talbot).
E.7 (Lieutenant-Commander Ferdinand E. B. Feilmann).
E.9 (Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton).
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) ROGER KEYES,
Commodore (S).”
In conclusion, it must therefore be set on record that the opening phase
in the greatest naval war in history has been one of submarine attack
and counter-attack, mine-laying and destroying, warships and merchantmen
sunk in a few minutes by submarine torpedoes and mines, with sharp
engagements between the cruisers and destroyers acting in conjunction
with the under-water craft. The much-vaunted German Fleet, like that of
its ally Austria-Hungary, has not dared to show itself from behind the
forts and carefully-screened anchorages of the naval bases, suffering
rather the everlasting disgrace of having stood in cowardly idleness
while the 5,000 merchant ships it was built to protect hauled down the
flag of the “Fatherland” and German maritime commerce was swept from the
seas while the Allied fleets hold undisputed command of every ocean.
The First Lord of the British Admiralty has said that if the German
Fleet will not come out to fight it must be “dug out like rats in a
hole.” This, then, may be the second phase in the naval war, and out in
the grey mist of the North Sea, ready and eager for the work, lies the
great battle fleets of England.
CHAPTER I
THE MODERN SUBMARINE TORPEDO-BOAT
The submarine torpedo-boat is to most people a complete mystery, and
before describing the composition and strength of the submarine fleets
at war it may therefore be of interest to say something of the principal
features common to all types of submarine craft.
_Method of Submergence_
It may sound ridiculous, in face of the many accidents which have
occurred, to say that one of the greatest difficulties is to make a
submarine sink sufficiently quickly, and one of the easiest of
operations to make her rise, and yet such is undeniably the case.[1]
It will be readily understood that any delay in disappearing beneath the
surface when attacking would be a great danger to a submarine in action.
For example, a number of hostile torpedo-boat destroyers are scouring
the sea in advance of a fleet, and are discovered at daybreak by the
submarines, which are waiting to attack the fleet behind, approaching at
a speed of 30 knots an hour. A hurried dive beneath the surface is
necessary if the waiting submarines would avoid detection, which would,
in all probability, mean destruction by the quick-firing guns of the
destroyers.
When a submarine is travelling on the surface she is in what is
technically called the _light condition_, that is to say, with her water
ballast tanks empty, but when it is required to sink her so that only
the tiny platform, or deck, and conning-tower are above the surface,
water is let into these ballast tanks, and the additional weight causes
her to sink into the sea until her _back_ is almost flush with the
surface—this is known as the _awash condition_.
It is not difficult to perceive that when travelling awash, a wave might
at any moment roll along the tiny unprotected deck of the submarine,
break over the mouth of the conning-tower, and descend like a waterspout
into the interior. Were this to happen a terrible disaster might result,
for it must be remembered that when travelling awash, a very little
additional weight would cause the submarine to plunge beneath the
surface. In order to obviate this risk it has become a rule that when
proceeding with this small margin of buoyancy, the hatch covering the
mouth of the conning-tower should be screwed down and the submarine
hermetically closed, ready to sink.
To many it may appear strange that total submergence is not accomplished
by letting still more water into the ballast tanks, but entirely with
the aid of the propellers and rudders. A submarine has two, and
sometimes three, pairs of rudders; one pair of ordinary vertical ones to
guide her to port or starboard, and a horizontal pair to cause her to
dive and rise. Two additional _fins_ are frequently placed on each side
of the forepart of the vessel to assist the diving and rising.
In order to make the submarine dive beneath the surface, the horizontal
rudders are deflected when the boat is proceeding at full speed. The
action of the water against the rudders is such that the bows are forced
down and the whole vessel slides under the surface. The principle is
much the same as that of steering an ordinary surface vessel, where the
force of the water against the rudder causes the vessel to swing to
right or left.
From this it will be seen that a submarine is only held below the
surface by the action of her rudders on the passing water; should the
propellers driving her along cease to revolve and the vessel slow down,
she automatically rises to the surface because the rudders have no
longer any effect.
Although the steering both on the vertical and horizontal plane is
controlled by hand, it would be quite beyond the strength of a man to
move the various rudders as required, so electric motors are installed
to perform the actual work. In fact, almost everything in a submarine is
operated by electricity.
In the earlier types of submarine boats, a considerable time was
required to open the valves and allow sufficient water to enter the
ballast tanks to make them sink to the awash condition. Some of the now
obsolete French naval boats took as long as fifteen to twenty minutes to
carry out this simple operation. The main reason for this was, that they
were designed with too much surface buoyancy, that is to say, they rode
too high in the water when floating in the light condition compared with
the inadequate means then employed for the inlet of water into the
ballast tanks, and were thus forced to let in an enormous quantity of
water at a very slow rate before they settled down sufficiently to
enable total submergence to be accomplished by the use of the horizontal
fins and rudders. This great drawback has now been completely overcome,
and the modern submarine can sink below the surface in about three
minutes.
When water is pumped into the ballast tanks in order to make the
submarine settle down, the air which normally fills these tanks is
compressed into a fraction of its proper space, and is therefore always
exerting a downward pressure which increases as more water is pumped in.
Therefore, when it is desired to bring the submarine to the surface
again, all that is necessary is to open the valves and allow the
compressed air to force the water out. It should, however, be remembered
that there is really no need to “blow out” the ballast tanks in order to
bring the submarine to the surface, for this can be much quicker
accomplished by simply elevating the horizontal rudders; but in this
case the submarine only rises just above the surface—to the awash
condition—whereas if the tanks are emptied of water she rises to the
light or cruising condition. This substantiates the assertion made at
the beginning of this chapter—that it is far more difficult to make a
submarine sink than it is to make her rise.
It has been said that a man walking from one end of a submarine to the
other would, in all probability, cause her to plunge dangerously, so
delicate is the state of equipoise when totally submerged. Whatever may
have been the case in the early types it is certainly not so now. So
steady are modern submarines when running below the surface, especially
those of the British, Russian, French, and Japanese and German Navies,
that the long up and down hill glides, which, with some boats, used to
amount to yaws of from 20 to 30 feet, have now been reduced to a few
feet in so many hundreds of yards. In fact, this switch-back motion is
almost unnoticeable except when the submarine is being swung round at a
sharp angle. In no case, however, is it sufficient materially to affect
the firing of the torpedoes.
The reserve buoyancy of a submarine in the awash condition—or
_diving-trim_, as it is called in the British flotillas—is necessarily
very small, amounting to little more than two or three pounds in a
thousand, which in a 300-ton vessel means a difference of only about 100
gallons of sea-water between the ability to float and the inevitability
of sinking. Any material increase in the small margin of what is known
as _positive-buoyancy_ must be accompanied by a corresponding increase
in the power of propulsion, otherwise it would be quite impossible to
drive her under, or, in other words, to overcome the vessel’s natural
tendency to float on the surface.
For these and other reasons, a submarine when running submerged is in
such a delicate state of equipoise that any sudden increase or loss of
weight would upset the balance and so cause the vessel to either dive or
rise with dangerous rapidity.
This would be the effect produced when a torpedo was discharged were
provision not made to counter-balance this sudden loss of weight by
means of _compensating-tanks_, into which sufficient water is pumped to
compensate for the loss of weight incurred by the discharge of _each_
torpedo.
Many submarines are also fitted with bow and stern _trimming-tanks_,
into which water can be pumped in such a manner as to correct any
tendency of the vessel to float too high or low at either extremity.
_Propulsion._
Of the many complicated problems surrounding submarine boat construction
the motive power and propelling engines have been in the past, and are
still, the most profound puzzles. Steam, compressed air, electricity,
petrol, and heavy oil have all been used with varying results since
first this type of vessel came into being; and many curious engines for
using these _prime movers_ in conjunction with each other and with
chemical compounds have been evolved by ingenious inventors.
About steam and compressed air little need be said, for although given a
good trial, especially by the French naval authorities, they were
abandoned some years ago in favour of a combination of petrol and
electric engines, which in turn have given place to more powerful
machines using heavy oil and electricity. Steam is, however, again being
used in conjunction with turbine engines for surface propulsion.
The carrying of large quantities of petrol, or heavy oil, is under all
circumstances attended with a certain amount of risk, and when many tons
have to be carried in a confined space, as in a submarine, this risk is
more than doubled, as the slightest leakage when the vessel is submerged
would mean that a powerful explosive mixture of petrol and air would be
made.
[Illustration:
A modern submarine torpedo-boat (British type). _A._ Deck
superstructure. _B._ Scuppers for filling superstructure. _D._ External
connections. _E._ Conning-tower (4-inch armour). _F._ Periscope. _G._
Periscope motor (for turning, &c.). _H._ Air cowls. _I._ Conning-tower
cap (opening sideways). _J._ Mast stays. _K._ Mast (not part of service
equipment). _L._ Torpedo-tube cap. _M._ Torpedo-tubes (twin), torpedoes
in. _N._ Air-flask (for expelling torpedoes). _O._ Hydroplane engines.
_X._ Double casing, with special vent for accumulators. _Y._ Spare
torpedoes. _Z._ Petrol storage tanks (2). 1. Air flasks. 2. Centrifugal
pumps. 3. Air-lock, with submarine escape dresses. 4. Commander’s
platform. 5. Ladders. 6. Depth and deflection indicator, registering
submarine’s deflection from horizontal. 7. Speed dials. 9. Petrol
engines. 10. Electric engines. 11. Dynamo, for recharging batteries.
12. Petrol engines—exhaust.
]
It being also quite impossible, for obvious reasons, to use a petrol
engine when running submerged, a second motive power, an engine, with
its additional space and weight, has to be carried to drive the
submarine when under water. For this purpose electricity is used in
almost all types. But electricity, again, has many drawbacks. It costs
in weight nearly thirty times more than other motive powers, and is
extremely dangerous, for should salt water in any way gain access to the
storage batteries, chlorine gas would be given off in large quantities,
although in the more recent vessels of the British, American, and French
Navies this danger has been minimised by enclosing the batteries in
air-tight cases. On account of the weight and the space required, it is
impossible to install a very powerful electric engine in a submarine
(compared with the size of the boat), and thus both the speed and radius
of action are curtailed.
If this division of power between the surface and submerged engines
could be overcome, and the whole space made available for one powerful
set of engines suitable for driving the vessel both on the surface and
when submerged, not only would the mechanism of submarines be
simplified, but a very considerable increase in both speed and range of
action would naturally result.
In the “D,” “E” and “F” classes of British submarines, and in the more
modern vessels of the French, Russian and German Navies, heavy oil is
being used in place of petrol on account of the increase in power
obtained with greater safety.
Arrangements are made in almost all modern submarines so that when the
vessel is using the oil engines for running on the surface the
electricity for use when submerged is being made by a dynamo and stored
in batteries. From this it will be seen that there are really three
separate engines in a submarine:—(1) the oil or petrol motor, which
drives the vessel when on the surface, and, at the same time, by a
suitable arrangement of gearing, operates a dynamo, (2) which makes the
electric current for storage, and (3) an electric engine which drives
the vessel when submerged, obtaining the necessary power from the
batteries.
It is, however, technically incorrect to say that there are two sources
of power in a submarine, for electricity is not, in itself, a source of
power, but merely a handy method of storing and transmitting it. The
only actual source being the oil or petrol.
There are also numerous small engines to add to the complexity of
machinery in a submarine, such as the air compressors used for charging
the torpedo tubes with compressed air for expelling the torpedoes and
for other purposes, and electric motors for operating the pumps,
steering mechanism, and periscopes. In addition to all this,
hand-mechanism is provided for use in case of a breakdown to operate
most of these important appliances. Then again there is, of course, the
armament mechanism for working the torpedo tubes and semi-automatic
quick-firing guns.
From the foregoing it may appear that the interior of a submarine
presents a picture of mechanical complexity utterly incomprehensible.
Yet such is not the case. The fanciful belief that the crew stand, boxed
up in these vessels, sweating with the heat, struggling for breath, and
with crank-shafts whirling uncomfortably close to the small of their
backs, electric motors buzzing within a few inches of their ears, and
nervous hands grasping one or other of the levers ranged in rows in
front of them, is, doubtless, most romantic, but quite unreal. Much of
the undoubtedly complicated machinery in a submarine is tucked away in
the conical extremities, under the interior decking, and fixed to the
arched steel sides. The centre is left almost entirely clear, so that
trestle-tables may be erected for meals, hammocks swung for sleeping,
and sufficient space allowed to make these small vessels as habitable as
possible. Not the least difficulty of the submarine designer is to
create order and leave space among the chaos of machinery which has to
be installed in these peculiar and deadly little torpedo craft.
_Vision When Submerged._
Perhaps the greatest difficulty which has beset both submarine
construction and navigation is the puzzle how to see when submerged.
This is now accomplished by means of periscopes, or tubes extending up
from the roof of the submarine to a height of several feet above the
surface—not unlike hollow masts. By a series of lenses and reflectors a
picture of the surface is thrown down these tubes on to reflectors
inside the submarine. A man with his eyes at the bottom of a periscope
can see the surface clearly. Although it projects above the surface when
the whole submarine is submerged, it is far too small an object to be
easily seen moving through the water, and extremely difficult to hit by
gun-fire.
The latest panoramic periscope—two of which are fitted in modern
submarines—has a field of vision of about 60 degrees. The range of
vision is, however, very short, owing to the periscopic tube projecting
only a few feet above the surface. On a moderately smooth and fairly
clear day steering by periscope is not altogether difficult, but at
night or in fog this instrument is useless, and for this reason it would
be almost impossible for a submarine to effect a submerged attack on an
enemy at night. Hence the name given to this type of craft—daylight
torpedo-boats—for in the brilliant light of day, when any attempt by
ordinary torpedo craft to get sufficiently close to hostile warships to
discharge a torpedo with reasonable hope of success would be foredoomed
to failure, there is every possibility that submarines would effect a
surprise attack.
_Armament._
The chief armament of all naval submarines is the torpedo, which is
expelled by a blast of compressed air from one of the tubes fitted in
the bow and stern. Several torpedoes are usually carried by each boat,
so that if one failed to strike the object of attack further attempts
can be made.
About the efficiency of torpedoes nothing need be said here, for they
now form an important weapon in every navy, and to this subject a future
chapter is devoted.
The latest submarines built are also fitted with quick-firing guns for
use when these vessels are cruising on the surface. The guns are
arranged so that when it is desired to sink they can be made to
disappear beneath the narrow deck of the submarine. The provision of
guns has been made with the object of giving these vessels a means of
defence should they be discovered by prowling hostile torpedo-boat
destroyers, or by air-craft.
_Habitability._
Many people imagine the interior of a submarine to resemble a stokehold,
hot, stifling, and semi-dark, whereas the exact contrary is the truth.
The temperature is but little above the normal for a ship’s engine-room,
the air-supply is amply sufficient, and the whole interior is well
illuminated by electric lamps.
The necessary supply of pure air is derived either from large steel
cylinders containing the air in a highly compressed state or from flasks
of oxylithe. The carbonic acid gas of the respired air being at the same
time chemically absorbed.
Food is cooked for the crew by electricity, and drinking water obtained
from special tanks. Notwithstanding these arrangements, however, it is
almost impossible for the crew to live on board for many weeks at a
time, owing to the small free space in the interior and to the cramped
deck; but as the size and radius of action of these boats increase, so
also does the space available for exercise, and thus the habitability.