CHAPTER I.

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE

Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

Bold text is denoted by =equal signs=.

A subscript x is denoted by _{x}, for example H_{2}O.

Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have

been placed at the end of the book.

Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.

THE UNSEEN UNIVERSE

... μὴ σκοπούντων ἡμῶν τὰ βλεπόμενα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα· τὰ

γὰρ βλεπόμενα, πρόσκαιρα· τὰ δὲ μὴ βλεπόμενα, αἰώνια. Πρὸς

Κορινθίους, Βʹ. δʹ.

Animula! vagula, blandula,

Hospes comesque corporis,

Quae nunc abibis in loca,—

Pallidula, rigida, nudula....

HADRIAN.

‘God hath endowed us with different faculties, suitable and

proportional to the different objects that engage them. We

discover sensible things by our senses, rational things by our

reason, things intellectual by understanding; but divine and

celestial things he has reserved for the exercise of our faith,

which is a kind of divine and superior sense in the soul. Our

reason and understanding may at some times snatch a glimpse,

but cannot take a steady and adequate prospect of things so

far above their reach and sphere. Thus, by the help of natural

reason, I may know there is a God, the first cause and original

of all things; but his essence, attributes, and will, are hid

within the veil of inaccessible light, and cannot be discerned

by us but through faith in his divine revelation. He that walks

without this light, walks in darkness, though he may strike out

some faint and glimmering sparkles of his own. And he that, out

of the gross and wooden dictates of his natural reason, carves

out a religion to himself, is but a more refined idolater than

those who worship stocks and stones, hammering an idol out of his

fancy, and adoring the works of his own imagination. For this

reason God is nowhere said to be jealous, but upon the account of

his worship.’—_Pilgrims Progress_, Part III.

‘To die,—to sleep;—

To sleep! perchance to dream;—ay, there’s the rub;

For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,

When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,

Must give us pause.’—SHAKESPEARE, _Hamlet_, Act iii. Scene 1.

[Illustration: (decorative icon)]

THE

UNSEEN UNIVERSE

OR

PHYSICAL SPECULATIONS

ON A

FUTURE STATE

BY

B. STEWART AND P. G. TAIT.

——the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are

not seen are eternal.

_SEVENTH EDITION_

(_Revised, and Enlarged._)

London

MACMILLAN AND CO

1878.

[_All Rights reserved._]

Blessed Lord, who hast caused all holy Scriptures to be written

for our learning; Grant that we may in such wise hear them, read,

mark, learn, and inwardly digest them, that by patience, and

comfort of thy holy Word, we may embrace, and ever hold fast _the

blessed hope of everlasting life_, which thou hast given us in

our Saviour Jesus Christ.—_Amen._

Edinburgh University Press:

T. AND A. CONSTABLE, PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY.

PREFACE.

[_The following was prefixed to our Sixth Edition. Though many

changes, some of importance, have since been made in the text, we

do not think it necessary to call attention to them here._]

Our readers will find near the end of our work the following

paragraph, which has appeared in every edition:—‘We are in hopes that

when this region of thought comes to be further examined, it may

lead to some common ground on which followers of science on the one

hand, and of revealed religion on the other, may meet together and

recognise each other’s claims without any sacrifice of the spirit

of independence, or any diminution of self-respect. Entertaining

these views, we shall welcome with sincere pleasure any remarks or

criticism on these speculations of ours, whether by the leaders of

scientific thought, or by those of religious inquiry.’

A work like ours, containing a challenge of this sort, has naturally

called forth a great amount of criticism. Bearing in mind the

existence of the ‘_odium theologicum_,’ we are bound to confess

that at first we were disposed to tremble on opening any review of

our work in a theological journal of repute. We were soon however

delightfully perplexed at finding that the leaders of religious

inquiry were disposed to treat us with the utmost courtesy,

agreeing with us in very many points, and stating when necessary

any difference of opinion in a manner calculated alike to preserve

their independence and to conciliate our self-respect. We feel much

gratified and encouraged by this treatment, and we think that if our

fourth edition be compared with our first, it will be found that we

possess some plasticity and have learned to make some use of the

criticism so faithfully and courteously bestowed upon us.

* * * * *

Here we would wish to take an opportunity of stating that the

Principle of Continuity as upheld by us has reference solely to the

intellectual faculties. We are led, for instance, by this principle

to assert that the process of production of the visible universe must

have been of such a nature as to be comprehensible more or less to

the higher intelligences of the universe.

But we are not led to assert the eternity of stuff or matter, for

that would denote an unauthorised application to the invisible

universe of the experimental law of the conservation of matter which

belongs entirely to the present system of things.

Nor are we led to assert that the ether must play some important

part in our future bodies, for our knowledge of things is vastly too

limited to enable us to come to any such conclusion.

* * * * *

Notwithstanding these remarks, if any theologian of repute thinks

that our fourth and subsequent editions savour too much of ideas

of this nature, we will gladly amend our language when a suitable

opportunity occurs. It is probably due to misconception of our

words, possibly to a difficulty, which we have all along felt, of

finding words exactly fitted to express some of the more novel of

the conceptions to which we have been led, that we have been spoken

of, to a certain extent even by some friendly critics, as ‘subtly

materialistic’ or as ‘loose Positivists.’ Unless we were to coin new

terms (which we may yet find it necessary to do), it will probably be

found all but impossible to escape such charges when writing on such

matters.

* * * * *

While the treatment we have experienced from the true leaders of

religious thought has been all that we could wish, and while some of

them have come forward as our champions rather than our critics, we

regret to think that certain of their following have not invariably

imitated the good example thus set them. All are not Bayards, whether

we regard the temper of the blade or that of the individual who

wields it.

Pages of so-called ‘extracts’ from our book have been strung

together, now by some writers of the High Church school, anon by

writers of the very lowest Evangelical type, in each case with

absolute disregard of their original collocation and surroundings,

and the result is of course as utterly unfair a representation of

our meaning as could possibly be given. These ‘extracts,’ which

are always scrupulously enclosed in inverted commas, are not

merely altered in meaning by being arbitrarily detached from the

context—they are often altered by the insertion of terms (_e.g.

luminiferous force!_) which we, as scientific men, could not possibly

have employed.

People who adopt a system like this deserve to have, once for all,

thoroughly brought home to them the bitter rebuke administered to

their analogues long ago by a witty if semi-profane divine, who

proposed to choose his text on their principle, and gave out, to the

astonishment of his audience, _part_ only of a verse, viz., ‘Hang all

the law and the prophets’!

We have placed at the commencement of this Preface the only words of

ours which appear to commit us to controversy, and we trust that a

study of them will convince our readers, as it has convinced us, that

we do not stand committed to the hopeless task of entering the lists

against _this species of controversialist_.

* * * * *

It is with reluctance that we have felt ourselves compelled to allude

to a method of controversy, in our opinion, as deficient in Christian

courtesy as it is powerful to stifle the interests of truth.

* * * * *

The attacks which have been made on our work since the sixth edition

was published, are (all at least that we have seen) completely met by

the _Introduction_. Their basis, when such exists, has usually been

some short passage, arbitrarily detached from its context, and thus

made susceptible of any gloss desired.

_November 1877._

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

Forgetful of the splendid example shown by intellectual giants like

Newton and Faraday, and aghast at the materialistic statements

now-a-days freely made (often professedly in the name of science),

the orthodox in religion are in somewhat evil case.

As a natural consequence of their too hastily reached conclusion,

that modern science is incompatible with Christian doctrine, not a

few of them have raised an outcry against science itself. This result

is doubly to be deplored; for there cannot be a doubt that it is

calculated to do mischief, not merely to science but to religion.

Our object, in the present work, is to endeavour to show that the

presumed incompatibility of Science and Religion does not exist.

This, indeed, ought to be self-evident to all who believe that the

Creator of the Universe is Himself the Author of Revelation. But it

is strangely impressive to note how very little often suffices to

alarm even the firmest of human faith.

Of course we cannot, in this small volume, enter upon the whole of

so vast a subject, and we have therefore contented ourselves with

a brief, though, we hope, sufficiently developed discussion of one

very important—even fundamental—point. We endeavour to show, in

fact, that immortality is strictly in accordance with the principle

of Continuity (rightly viewed); that principle which has been the

guide of all modern scientific advance. As one result of this inquiry

we are led, by strict reasoning on purely scientific grounds, to

the probable conclusion that ‘a life _for_ the unseen, _through_

the unseen, is to be regarded as the only perfect life.’ (See Chap.

VII.) We need not point out here the bearing of this on religion.

Incidentally, the reader will find many remarks and trains of

reasoning which (by the alteration of a word or two) can be made to

apply to other points of almost equal importance.

We may state that the ideas here developed—very imperfectly of

course, as must always be the case in matters of the kind—are not

the result of hasty guessing, but have been pressed on us by the

reflections and discussions of several years.

We have to thank many of our friends, theological as well as

scientific, for ready and valuable assistance. The matter of our work

has certainly gained by this, though it is likely that the manner may

have suffered by the introduction, here and there, of peculiarities

of style which could not easily be removed without damage to the

sense.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

As a preface to our Second Edition, we cannot do better than record

the experience derived from our first. It is indeed gratifying to

find a wonderful want of unanimity among the critics who assail

us, and it is probably owing to this cause that we have been able

to preserve a kind of kinetic stability, just as a man does in

consequence of being equally belaboured on all sides by the myriad

petty impacts of little particles of air.

Some call us infidels, while others represent us as very much too

orthodoxly credulous; some call us pantheists, some materialists,

others spiritualists. As we cannot belong at once to _all_ these

varied categories, the presumption is that we belong to none of them.

This, by the way, is our own opinion.

Venturing to classify our critics, we would divide them into three

groups:—

(1.) There are those who have doubtless faith in revelation;

but more especially, sometimes solely, in _their own_ method of

interpreting it; none, however, in the method according to which

really scientific men with a wonderful unanimity have been led

to interpret the works of nature. These critics call us, some

infidels, some pantheists, some dangerously subtle materialists,

etc.

(2.) There are those who have faith in the methods according

to which men of science interpret the laws of nature, but

none whatever in revelation or theology. These consider us as

orthodoxly credulous and superstitious, or as writers of ‘the

most hardened and impenitent nonsense that ever called itself

original speculation.’

(3.) There are those who have a profound belief that the

true principles of science will be found in accordance with

revelation, and who welcome any work whose object is to endeavour

to reconcile these two fields of thought. Such men believe that

the Author of revelation is likewise the Author of nature, and

that these works of His will ultimately be found to be in perfect

accord. Such of this school as have yet spoken have approved of

our work.

Our readers may judge for themselves which of these three classes of

belief represents most nearly the true Catholic Faith.

Many of our critics seem to fancy that we presume to attempt such

an absurdity as a demonstration of Christian truth from a mere

physical basis! We simply confute those who (in the outraged name of

science) have asserted that science is incompatible with religion.

Surely it is not _we_ who are dogmatists, but those who assert that

the principles and well-ascertained conclusions of science are

antagonistic to Christianity and immortality. If in the course of our

discussion we are to some extent constructors, and find analogies

in nature which seem to us to throw light upon the doctrines of

Christianity, yet in the main our object is rather to break down

unfounded objections than to construct apologetic arguments. These we

leave to the Theologian. The Bishop of Manchester has very clearly

described our position by stating that [_from a purely physical point

of view_, § 204] we ‘contend for the possibility of immortality and

of a personal God.’

To vary the metaphor, we have merely stripped off the hideous mask

with which materialism has covered the face of nature to find

underneath (what every one with faith in anything at all must expect

to find) something of surpassing beauty, but yet of inscrutable

depth. For indeed we are entire believers in the infinite depth of

nature, and hold that just as we must imagine space and duration to

be infinite, so must we imagine the structural complexity of the

universe to be infinite also. To our minds it appears no less false

to pronounce eternal _that aggregation we call the atom_, than it

would be to pronounce eternal _that aggregation we call the Sun_. All

this follows from the principle of Continuity, in virtue of which

we make scientific progress in the knowledge of things, and which

leads us, whatever state of things we contemplate, to look for its

antecedent in some previous state of things also in the Universe.

This principle represents the path from the known to the unknown,

or to speak more precisely, our conviction that there is a path.

Nevertheless it does not authorise us to dogmatise regarding the

properties of the unknown lying beyond or at the boundary of our

little ‘clearing.’ We must go up to it and examine it often, with

long continued labour, under great difficulties, before we can at all

say what its properties are.

Among those who recognise us as orthodox, and for that reason attack

us, there is one of deservedly high authority. Our ‘brother,’

Professor W. K. Clifford, has published a lively attack on our

speculations in a recent number of the _Fortnightly Review_. We are

bound respectfully to consider the arguments of an adversary of his

calibre.

He appears to be unable to conceive the possibility of a spiritual

body which shall not die with the natural body. Or rather, he

conceives that he is in a position to assert, from his knowledge of

the universe, that such a thing cannot be. We join issue with him

at once, for the depth of our ignorance with regard to the unseen

universe forbids us to come to any such conclusion with regard to a

possible spiritual body.

Our critic begins his article by summoning up or constructing a

most grotesque and ludicrous figure, which he calls _our argument_,

and forthwith proceeds to demolish; and he ends by summoning up a

horrible and awful phantom, against which he feelingly warns us.

This phantom has already, it seems, destroyed two civilisations, and

is capable of even worse things, though it is merely the ‘sifted

sediment of a residuum.’ He does not tell us whether he means

Religion in general, or only that particularly objectionable form of

it called Christianity.

Our critic shows that he has not read our work,—has, in fact, merely

glanced into it here and there. This is proved by what he says of

Struve’s notions, on which we lay no stress whatever, while he puts

them forward as the mainstay of our argument. We are also made out to

be the assertors of a peculiar molecular constitution of the unseen

universe, although with reference to this we say in our work, page

217, ‘_for the sake of bringing our ideas in a concrete form before

the reader, and for this purpose only_, we will now adopt a definite

hypothesis.’ Of course it is too much to expect a critic now-a-days

to read every word of a book which he is content to demolish, _but we

did hope he might have noticed the italics_.

Our critic too commits several singular mistakes due to imperfections

of memory. Why speak of the negative as universal, which appears in

such words as _im_mortality, end_less_ existence, etc., when the

most common of all expressions connected with the subject are the

phrases, ‘_eternal_ life,’ ‘_everlasting_ life,’ etc., none of which

involve the negative?

How the sun could go down upon ‘Gideon’ is not obvious. Had it done

so it would certainly have occasioned personal inconvenience (to

say the least) to that hero. But what’s in a name? Our critic was

evidently thinking of Joshua and ‘Gibeon,’ and why should a critic

care about the difference between Amorites and Amalekites? It is a

mere matter of spelling,—a trifle. Similar mistakes in a previous

article are apologised for in a footnote appended to that on the

‘Unseen Universe.’ Probably the author designed the apology to

extend to it also, but forgot to say so; again a trifle. But it is

of straws, some even weaker than these, that the imposing article is

built; so that when we come forth to battle we find nothing to reply

to.

To reduce matters to order, we may confidently assert that the

only reasonable and defensible alternative to our hypothesis (or,

at least, something similar to it) is, the stupendous pair of

assumptions that visible matter is _eternal_, and that IT IS ALIVE.

(See § 240.) If any one can be found to uphold notions like these

(from a scientific point of view), we shall be most happy to enter

the lists with him.

We have made numerous small though sometimes important changes in the

text, but none of them at all modify the general tenor of the work as

it first appeared two months ago.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

We have reason to think that notwithstanding all we have said,

the position we take is not yet clearly understood, and we would

therefore utilise the Preface to our Third Edition to put ourselves

right with the public on this vital point.

To begin with the scientific side of our argument, we must once more

make the statement that it is not we who are the dogmatists, but

rather that school of scientific men who assert the incompatibility

of science with Christianity.

Persistent as they have been in their endeavours to close the door

leading from the seen to the unseen, we as resolutely maintain that

it must be left open.

This class take credit to themselves for having thus barred the

entrance to a throng of superstitious fancies which would inevitably

rush through an open avenue—forgetting that they have by the same act

barred the way to all the higher aspirations of man.

But though we have founded no argument for immortality on the

existence of these higher aspirations, we cannot allow our

adversaries to bar the way upon the plea that it would inevitably be

the resort of unworthy passengers.

If it be the King’s highway it must be left open; if the unseen

universe be a reality, surely we are not to dismiss it from our minds

lest some people might entertain absurd views regarding its relation

to the present visible universe. Such fancies are no new thing in

the progress of knowledge. When two things are known to exist, we

may have ten thousand erroneous hypotheses regarding their mutual

relations, but only one true theory.

In the next place, we would say one word to that religious school

which is more particularly affected by our present inquiry,—we mean

the school who assert the resurrection of our material bodies, and a

grossly material future state.

We have endeavoured to explain to this class of men that their belief

is inconsistent with the integrity of that Principle of Continuity

which underlies not only all scientific inquiry, but all action of

any kind in this world of ours.

Under these circumstances such men have three honest alternatives

before them.

In the first place they may acknowledge the truth of our position

and change their views; or, secondly, they may combat our argument

regarding the alleged incompatibility of their position with the

Principle of Continuity; or, lastly, they may decline to accept this

scientific principle in matters which concern their faith. What we

complain of is, that the members of this school have chosen none of

these alternatives, but have rather attempted to brand us as infidels

and materialists, apparently forgetting (as usual) that such a method

of conducting a discussion is neither Christ-like nor convincing.

But while one class of religious men have tried to brand us with

these names, those of another school consider our theology narrow

and gloomy. We reply to these men that we do not pretend to be

theologians in any sense of the word. Our position in this respect

has been greatly misunderstood. We are, no doubt, endeavouring to

bring about a reconciliation between science and religion. In order

to accomplish this we must first find out what is the fundamental

principle of science, next what is the fundamental creed of the great

majority of Christians, and then endeavour to show that the two are

not incompatible with each other. In carrying out this process we

have been led to regard the Principle of Continuity as the great law

which regulates scientific inquiry, and there cannot be a doubt that

the Old and New Testaments are regarded as authoritative expositions

of religious truth by the great majority of the Church of Christ.

Now we find that the expressions in the Scriptures regarding the

future of man and the constitution of the unseen world, taken

in their obvious, if not absolutely literal meaning, are not

inconsistent with scientific deductions from the Principle of

Continuity.

We know very well that, especially of late years, a multitude of

religious schools have risen up who take many of these expressions in

a non-literal and far from obvious acceptation, and who, perhaps, do

not accord the same authority to the writers as was formerly done.

Into the disputes between these various religious schools we do not

pretend to enter, nor do we see that the Shibboleths of such schools

can be affected by our arguments, inasmuch as their discussions have,

in the great majority of cases, nothing whatever to do with Physical

principles. They are rather founded on historical, or moral, or

metaphysical considerations, all of which are foreign to our argument.

Having no pretensions to a title which we certainly do not covet, we

trust that we shall no longer be regarded as theologians either of a

narrow and gloomy, or a lax and heretical school, or indeed of any

school whatsoever.

_September 1875._

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH AND FIFTH EDITIONS.

In consequence of misapprehensions into which several of our critics

have fallen, we have prefixed to this edition an Introduction wherein

the objects of our work, and the mode in which we seek to attain

them, are fully but compactly explained. We need therefore say

nothing on these matters here. The work has been greatly enlarged,

and in many parts almost rewritten; but we have nowhere found it

necessary to alter or recall any of the statements hitherto made by

us.

As we now give our names, we can at length complain of the conduct of

a London ‘Weekly,’ which, only a few days after the first appearance

of our book, took the (we hope) very unusual course of stating the

authorship as a matter of absolute fact, not of conjecture. It was,

of course, not authorised to do so, either by ourselves or by our

Publisher:—and we regret to find that the exigencies of competition

for public favour can be thought capable of justifying, in the eyes

of any one, such a course of conduct.

As Professors of Natural Philosophy we have one sad remark to make.

The great majority of our critics have exhibited almost absolute

ignorance as to the proper use of the term _Force_, which has had

one, and only one, definite scientific sense since the publication

of the _Principia_. As such men are usually among the exceptionally

well educated, ignorance of this important question must be all but

universal. In addition to what we have said on the subject in the

text (§ 97), we would now only mention that the sole recorded case

of true Persistency or Indestructibility of Force which we recollect

having ever met with, occurs in connection with Baron Munchausen’s

remarkable descent from the moon. It is, no doubt, a very striking

case; but it is apparently unique, and it was not subjected to

scientific scrutiny.

B. STEWART. P. G. TAIT.

_April 1876._

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Page

INTRODUCTION, 1

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY SKETCH.

Article

Object of the Book, 1 22

Two classes of speculators, 2 24

Why doubters of immortality have lately increased, 3 26

_Belief of the Ancient Egyptians_—

Separation between priests and people, 4 26

The abode of the dead, 5 27

Transmigration of souls, 6 28

Embalming of the body, 7 28

_Belief of the Ancient Hebrews_—

Position of Moses, 8-9 28

His task, 10 29

Belief of the Jews in an unseen world, 11 30

Their belief in a future state, 12 31

Their belief in a resurrection, 13 32

_Belief of the Ancient Greeks and Romans_—

Unsubstantial nature of Elysium, 14 33

Transmigration introduced, 15 34

Rise of the Epicurean school, 16 36

Uncertainty of philosophic opinion, 17 37

_Belief of the Eastern Aryans_—

The Rig-Veda, 18 37

It inculcates immortality, 19 39

Double source of corruption, 20 40

Zoroastrian reformation and tenets, 21-22 40

Reformation of Buddha, 23 41

Meaning of Nirvâ_n_a, 24 42

Observations on ancient beliefs, 25-29 43

_Belief of the Disciples of Christ_—

The resurrection of Christ, 30 47

Future state taught by Christ, 31-32 49

Perishable nature of that which is seen, 33 50

The Christian Heaven and Hell, 34 51

General opinion regarding the person of Christ, 35 52

General opinion regarding the position of Christ, 36 53

Spread of the Christian religion, 37 54

Rise of Mohammed, 38 55

Materialistic conceptions of the dark ages, 39 57

Extreme scientific school, 40-41 59

Points of similarity between this school and Christians, 42 60

Varieties of opinions among Christians, 43-44 60

Believers in a new revelation, 45 62

Swedenborg and his doctrines, 46 63

Remarks on Swedenborg, 47 65

Modern spiritualists, 48-49 67

CHAPTER II.

POSITION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORS—PHYSICAL AXIOMS.

Class of readers to whom the Authors appeal, 50-53 69

_Position assumed by the Authors_—

Laws of the universe defined, 54 72

Embodiment of some sort essential, 55 73

Materialistic position described, 55 74

Unjustifiable assumptions of materialists, 56-58 74

Intimacy of connection between mind and matter, 59 77

_Essential requisites for continued existence_—

An organ of memory, 60 78

Possibility of action in the present, 61 78

_Principle of Continuity_—

Illustrated by reference to astronomy, 62-75 79

Breach of the principle illustrated, 76 87

Extension to other faculties of man, 77 88

_Application of this principle to Christian miracles_—

Erroneous position of old divines, 78 89

Such opposed to the genius of Christianity, 79 90

New method of explanation, 80-82 90

_Application of this principle to the doctrines of the

extreme scientific school_—

The visible universe will probably come to an end

in transformable energy, 83-84 92

It must have been developed out of the invisible, 85 94

THE UNIVERSE,— 86 95

Similar errors committed by the extreme schools of

theology and science, 87 96

_Application of this principle to Immortality_—

Three conceivable suppositions, 88 96

These reduced to two, 89 97

Future course of our argument, 90 97

The problem may be profitably discussed, 91 98

CHAPTER III.

THE PRESENT PHYSICAL UNIVERSE.

Definition of the term ‘Physical Universe’, 92 99

It contains something else besides _matter_ or _stuff_, 93 100

Grounds of our belief in an external universe, 94 101

These in accordance with our definition of the laws of

the universe (Art. 54), 95 102

Meaning of conservation, 96 103

[Use and Abuse of the Term _Force_,] 97 104

Conservation of _Momentum_, 97 105

Conservation of _Moment of Momentum_, 97 106

Conservation of _Vis Viva_, 97 107

Definition of _Energy_, 98-99 108

Newton’s second interpretation of his Third Law, 99-100 108

Friction changes work into heat, 101 110

Historical sketch of the theory of energy, 102-103 112

Transformability of energy constitutes its use, 104 115

Case where energy is useless, 105 116

_Historical Sketch of Second Law of Thermodynamics_—

*Carnot’s perfect heat-engine, *106 117

*Sir W. Thomson’s definition of absolute

temperature, *107 118

*Melting point of ice lowered by pressure, *108 120

*Sir W. Thomson’s rectification of Carnot’s

reasoning, *109-*110 120

*Professor J. Clerk-Maxwell’s demons, *111-*113 122

Degradation of energy, 114 126

Future of the physical universe, 114-115 126

Past of the physical universe, 116 128

CHAPTER IV.

MATTER AND ETHER.

Inquiry regarding structure and material of the universe, 117 129

_Various hypotheses regarding matter_—

(1.) Greek notion of the _Atom_, 118 130

Speculations of Lucretius, 119-130 131

(2.) Theory of Boscovich (centres of force), 131 137

(3.) Theory of infinite divisibility, 132 138

(4.) Vortex-atom theory, 133-134 139

Remarks on these theories, 135-136 141

Relative quantity of matter associated with energy, 137-138 142

_Universal gravitation_—

Is a weak force, 139 144

Two ways of accounting for it, 140 145

Le Sage’s hypothesis, 141-142 146

_The Ethereal medium_—

Its principal properties apparently incongruous, 143 148

Analogy of Professor Stokes, 144 149

Distortion and displacement of ether, 145 149

Inferior limit of its density, 146 150

Its supposed imperfect transparency, 147 151

Remarks on ether, 148 153

Remarks on the speculations of this chapter, 149-150 154

Modification of the vortex-ring hypothesis, 151-152 155

Possible disappearance of the visible universe, 153 157

CHAPTER V.

DEVELOPMENT.

Nature of inquiry stated, 154 158

_Chemical development_—

Changes in lists of elementary substances, 155 159

Prout’s speculations, 156 160

Experiments of M. Stas, 156 160

Family groups, 157 161

Mr. Lockyer’s speculations, 158-159 161

_Globe development_—

Hypothesis of Kant and Laplace, 160 163

Tendency to aggregation of mass, 161-162 164

Process cannot have been going on for ever, 163 166

Peculiarity of products developed inorganically, 164 167

_Life development_—

Morphological and physiological species, 165 168

Species regarded physiologically, 166 170

Position of a certain class of theologians, 167 171

Tendency to minor variations, 168 172

Artificial selection, 169 174

Natural selection, 170 175

Unproved point in the Darwinian hypothesis, 171 175

Remarks of Mr. Darwin, 172 177

Development of the Darwinian hypothesis, 173 177

Mr. Wallace’s views, 174 178

Professor Huxley’s remarks, 175 178

Position assumed by the authors, 176 179

CHAPTER VI.

SPECULATIONS AS TO POSSIBILITY OF SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCES

IN THE VISIBLE UNIVERSE.

Position of life in the present physical universe, 177 180

Two kinds of equilibrium, 178 181

Two kinds of machines or material systems, 179 182

Two respects in which a living being resembles a machine, 180 183

A living being resembles a delicately constructed machine, 181 185

The delicacy is due to chemical instability, 182 186

Delicacy of construction derived from the sun’s rays, 183 186

Delicacy of construction in atmospheric changes, 184 187

Worship of powers of nature—mediæval superstitions, 185 189

Theory which attributes a soul to the universe, 186 190

Real point at issue stated, 187 190

Man presents the highest order of the present visible

universe, 188 191

The same idea pervades the Old Testament, 189 192

And it likewise pervades the New Testament, 190-191 193

CHAPTER VII.

THE UNSEEN UNIVERSE.

Decadence of the visible universe, 192-193 195

Its arrangements apparently wasteful, 194 197

Explanation of this, 195 197

Memory of the universe, 196-197 198

Connection between seen and unseen, 197-198 198

Physical explanation of a future state, 199-201 199

Dr. Thomas Young’s conception of the unseen, 202 200

_Objections to the proposed theory of a future state

replied to_—

Religious, 203 202

Theological, 204-207 202

Scientific, 208-212 206

Quasi-scientific, 213 210

_Miracles and the Resurrection of Christ_—

Objections of extreme school stated, 214 211

How these are to be met, 215 212

Development has produced the visible universe, 216 214

Its atoms resemble manufactured articles, 217 215

Development through intelligence, 218-219 215

Idea presented in concrete form, 220 218

Christian theory of the development of the

universe, 221-227 223

Life development—Biogenesis, 228-229 228

Life comes from the Unseen Universe, 230 230

Christian theory of life development, 231 232

Position of life in the universe discussed, 232-238 233

Meteoric hypothesis implies Discontinuity, 239 240

Discussion of the notion that all matter is, in

some simple sense, alive, 240-241 242

Life, as well as matter, comes to us from the

Unseen Universe, 242-243 243

Position reviewed, 244 246

Miracles possible without breach of Continuity, 245 247

Peculiar communication with the unseen in the case of

Christ, 246 248

Apparent breaks are concealed avenues leading to the

unseen, 247 249

Probable nature of present connection between seen and

unseen. Efficacy of Prayer, 248 250

Angelic intelligences, 249 251

Remarks on God’s providential government, 250-252 253

Our argument may be very much detached from all

conceptions of the Divine essence, 253 257

Christian conceptions of Heaven, 254 258

Two ideas in all Christian hymns, 255 259

Possible glimpse into the conditions of the future

life, 256-257 260

Darker side of the future, 258 262

Plato on the markings of the soul, 259 263

Christian Gehenna, 260 264

Mediæval idea of Hell, 261 265

The _process_ in the Gehenna of the New Testament

apparently an enduring one, 262 267

Personality of the Evil One asserted by Scripture, 263 269

Brief statement of the results of this discussion, 264 270

The scientific conclusion is directly against the

opponents of Christianity, 265 271

Criticism invited from leaders of scientific thought

or of religious inquiry, 266 272

INTRODUCTION.

The present age is one of very rapid progress in almost all branches

of knowledge.

Like a wave swelling as it advances shoreward, this progress has

violently transformed whole regions of thought, while it has

repeatedly invaded others not heretofore deemed accessible to such

catastrophes.

Presuming upon a soil of great natural richness, the inhabitants of

these latter regions had for a long series of years given themselves

up to a species of husbandry which was beginning at length to be

detrimental in its effects.

It thus came to pass that while the immediate result of each

inundation was a sudden alarm and consequent confusion, yet

nevertheless a fertilising residuum was always left behind,

together with a very plain intimation that no region of thought

can permanently flourish if it be entirely cut off from any of the

intellectual influences around it.

Suchlike, we take it, have been the results of the recent great

floods of intellectual energy, much of them seemingly subversive,

which have repeatedly invaded the region occupied by the followers

of Christianity. At present there is no book more read than the

Bible, no life more deeply studied and discussed than the life of

Christ. There is probably a greater amount of earnest attention

devoted to these subjects than to any other branch of human inquiry.

Nevertheless there is great confusion, and an almost despairing

outcry from many of the inhabitants of the Christian region. It is

imagined that fences and landmarks have disappeared, and that at

length the rising tide is about to attack, as it has long threatened,

the very lives and holdings of the community.

It will be our endeavour to reassure these somewhat over-timid

people. Being students of physical science, we will try to gauge the

strength of the tide, and more especially of the forces which give

it motion, and endeavour to convince those who are sufficiently calm

to receive conviction, that there neither is nor can be any real

danger to their lives and holdings from the violence of the waters;

but that, on the contrary, they will ultimately receive a blessing

from that which will remain behind after the present confusion has

disappeared.

‘Skin for skin,’ said a certain evil one, ‘yea all that a man

hath will he give for his life,’ and the proverb is true (with

a modification) as regards the life of the soul, no less than

as regards that of the body. Take away all hope of a future

state,—appear to demonstrate, if not with absolute certainty,

yet with an approach to it, that such a condition of things is

antagonistic to well-understood scientific principles, and we feel

certain that the effect upon humanity would be simply disastrous.

At any rate, those who propound an argument of this kind must

reasonably expect determined opposition from the followers of

religion.

Let us here, before proceeding further, take the opportunity of

stating that we discuss only the _physical_ aspects of the argument

regarding a future state. Being neither metaphysicians nor moral

philosophers, we leave to others more competent than we can be the

argument which may be based upon the universal craving among the

intelligent races of mankind for a life beyond the grave.

In the fourth and following editions of our work, while we have not

materially altered our argument, we have recast to some extent the

shape in which it was first put before the reader, and this recasting

has taken a more definite form in our present edition.

The large amount of friendly criticism which our work has called

forth has convinced us that we did not at first sufficiently

separate between certain conclusions which inevitably flowed from

our argument, and certain others which, while deriving their strength

from a totally different quarter, were yet not inconsistent with the

former, but even, it might be, supported by them. The consequence

has been that we have found ourselves credited with attempts

which were very far from our thoughts, such, for instance, as the

endeavour to deduce Christian theological doctrine from mere physical

considerations.

We have therefore thought it desirable to bring in review before the

reader, in this introductory chapter, the fundamental points of our

argument, more especially as in what follows we may not always be

able without an undesirable formality to keep separate the foundation

and the superstructure.

* * * * *

In his justly renowned _Analogy_, Bishop Butler begins with a chapter

on a future life. He says with great truth that if there is an idea

that death will be the destruction of living powers, that idea must

arise either from _the reason of the thing_ or _the analogy of

nature_. ‘But it does not arise (he proceeds to say) from _the reason

of the thing_; for we do not know what death is. Again, we do not

know on what the existence of our living powers depends; for we see

them suspended in sleep, for example, or in a swoon, and still not

extinguished. Neither does it arise from _the analogy of nature_; for

death removes all sensible proof, and precludes us consequently from

tracing out any analogy which would warrant us in inferring their

destruction.’ Now, it is well known that since the days of Bishop

Butler a school has arisen, the members of which assert that they

have at length learned what Death is, and that in virtue of their

knowledge they are in a position to tell us that life is impossible

after death. It is one of the main objects of this volume to

demonstrate the fallacy which underlies the argument brought forward

by this school. We attempt to show that we are absolutely driven

by scientific principles to acknowledge the existence of an Unseen

Universe, and by scientific analogy to conclude that it is full of

life and intelligence—that it is in fact a spiritual universe and not

a dead one.

But while we are fully justified by scientific considerations in

asserting the existence of such an unseen universe, we are not

justified in assuming that we have yet attained, or can easily or

perhaps ever attain, to more than a very slight knowledge of its

nature. Thus we do not believe that we can really ascertain what

death is.

To those, therefore, who assert that there is no spiritual unseen

world, and that death is an end of the existence of the individual,

we reply by simply denying their first statement, and in consequence

of this denial, insisting that none of us know anything whatever

about death. Indeed, it is at once apparent that a scientific denial

of the possibility of life after death must be linked with at least

something like a scientific proof of the non-existence of a spiritual

unseen world. For if scientific analogy be against a spiritual

Unseen, then evidently it is equally against the likelihood of life

after death.

But if, on the other hand, we feel constrained to believe in a

spiritual universe, then though it does not follow that life is

certain after death, inasmuch as we do not know whether any provision

has been made in this unseen world for our reception, yet it does

follow that we cannot deny the possibility of a future life. For to

do so would imply on our part such an exhaustive knowledge of the

Unseen as would justify us in believing that no arrangement had been

made in it for our transference thither. Now, our almost absolute

ignorance with regard to the Unseen must prevent us from coming to

any such conclusion.

* * * * *

We have been accused by some of our critics of being dogmatists.

So far is this from being true that in the first part of our

argument—namely, that which relates to a spiritual unseen:—we

are content to develop from the present recognised condition of

things. We take the world as we find it, and are forced by a purely

scientific process to recognise the existence of an Unseen Universe.

We are likewise led to regard the Unseen as having given birth to the

present universe, a conclusion to which one of our leading critics

has apparently given his assent.

Here, however, we join issue with the materialistic school. They

continue to insist—against all analogy as we take it—that this Unseen

Universe is a dead one, having no life worthy of the name, although

it must have existed for inconceivable ages before the present

Universe arose.

Let our readers remark that in all this we introduce no dogma—we do

not require to assert or even assume the existence of God. We are

content to develop our argument from a position which is common to

our adversaries and to ourselves.

An objection has been raised that our argument tends to the

Swedenborgian doctrine of a spiritual body. Now, the same principles

which guide us from the continuous existence of the outer world

to acknowledge an Unseen, lead us on the assumption of our own

existence after death to acknowledge what we may term a spiritual

body. In other words, our conception of something which retains at

once a hold upon the past and a possibility of future life assumes

the form which we clothe in this or similar language.[1] But why

Swedenborgian? Why not Pauline? Was it not the great Apostle who

first gave utterance to his belief in these very words? If it be said

to us that the way in which we regard the spiritual body is decidedly

Swedenborgian, we would reply by asking our critics to tell us in

what way we regard it.

We certainly hold that if we are to accept scientific principles,

one of the necessary conditions of immortality is a frame surviving

death, but we as resolutely maintain that of the nature of this frame

we are and must probably remain profoundly ignorant.

* * * * *

It has likewise been objected that we do not sufficiently allow for

the possibility that the present universe may be infinite, and that

thus it might last for ever and continue, although spasmodically,

to be the residence of living beings even in spite of the constant

degradation of its energy. Unquestionably we cannot prove that the

present visible universe is not infinite; this we have acknowledged

in our work. But our chief argument is derived rather from the past

than from the future. We maintain that the visible universe—that is

to say the universe of atoms—must have had its origin in time, and

that while THE UNIVERSE is, in its widest sense, alike eternal and

infinite, the universe of atoms certainly cannot have existed from

all eternity.

While we freely confess that we cannot prove the finite magnitude of

the universe of atoms, inasmuch as we cannot be sure that the stars

which we see represent more than a small portion of this universe,

we are unable to perceive any scientific principle which leads us to

conclude that the number of such atoms must necessarily be infinite.

But whether it be finite or infinite, we have very great difficulty

in imagining this universe to be eternal. Regarding the atom as

something that has been developed from a previously existing unseen

universe, we cannot readily believe it capable of lasting for ever.

But if there be any element of decay in the material substance of the

visible universe, the assumption of its present infinity will not

enable us to predicate its future eternity.

Having thus defined our position, we may allow that in our earlier

editions we have possibly given undue prominence to the particular

argument in favour of an Unseen, which is derived from the future

degradation of the energy of the present visible universe.

We come now to the second part of our subject. All that we have yet

endeavoured to show is that the theory of a future life is not in any

way whatever in contradiction to any ascertained facts or principles

of science. But we have not succeeded in finding any proof that

arrangements have been made in the Unseen world for our translation

thither after death.

It has been shown that there is nothing in the whole range of

science to lead us to suppose that life is impossible after death;

but we have yet to inquire what evidence, if any, exists in favour

of a future state. Now it is well known that the followers of

Christianity believe they have received such evidence in virtue of

the resurrection of Christ, and it is equally well known that of late

years a school of scientific men have arisen who reject such an event

as one impossible to be believed.

It is not, however, rejected mainly because it is an uncommon event,

or one unconfirmed by modern experience, for it is sufficiently well

known that uncommon events have a recognised place in the universe.

Thus, for instance, there are certain conjunctions of the planets

which are very uncommon, and have not occurred in modern experience,

but we do not hesitate for a moment to believe in the possibility of

their occurrence. Nay, we are in a position to go further, and to

assert that at particular epochs of time, which we are capable of

defining with greater or less precision, such uncommon conjunctions

took place in the past, and will again take place in the future.

An absolutely new comet, one which (from the fact that its orbit

is hyperbolic) was probably never in the solar system before, and

probably cannot again return to it, is by no means a rarity.

Now we believe that an extension of purely scientific logic drives us

to receive as quite certain the occurrence of two events which are

as incomprehensible as any miracle; these are:—the introduction of

visible matter and its energy, and of visible living things into the

universe. Furthermore, we are led by scientific analogy to regard the

agency in virtue of which these two astounding events were brought

about as an intelligent agency, an agency whose choice of the time

for action is determined by considerations similar in their nature to

those which influence a human being when he chooses the proper moment

for the accomplishment of his purpose.

If this be true, the discussion regarding miracles must be removed

altogether from the domain of science, and this for the very good

reason that scientific logic admits the occurrence of events at least

as astounding. The question is now rather one for the historian and

the moral philosopher to decide. The first of these is clearly bound

to examine the evidence in favour of the life and resurrection of

Christ, while the latter is bound to look around and ask what moral

necessity there was for the interference of this peculiar intelligent

agency, and also whether, as a matter of fact, the interference has

proved beneficial.

But neither of these two ways of regarding the subject is at all

cognate to our inquiry.

We simply show that a reception of the miracles of Christ leads to no

intellectual confusion. Meanwhile, there are some who regard such a

reception as tending to historical confusion, or to moral confusion,

or to both; but with these sources of doubt we have nothing whatever

to do. It may be thought by some of our readers that here our

discussion ought to end; but, as it appears to us, there yet remains

another point vitally connected with our inquiry. There is, perhaps,

hardly a human being who seriously questions the moral beauty of the

character of Christ; there are many who question the truth of the

miracles recorded as having been wrought by Him; while still more, it

may be, question the truth of certain of His sayings, especially such

as have reference to the constitution of the Unseen world.

Entertaining the most profound reverence for Christ Himself, many

of the latter class, rather than believe that Christ enuntiated the

doctrine to which they object, maintain that it may have been a late

human fiction which grew up with and finally incrusted itself around

the true sayings of Christ: some again maintain that the sayings were

really those of Christ, but insist that the common interpretation

of them is erroneous. On this account we conceive that in order

to complete our programme we should extend our inquiry beyond the

miracles of Christ so as to embrace those of His sayings which have

reference to Himself and to the constitution of the Unseen world. We

are thus led to the consideration of another subject, which is, we

venture to think, intimately connected with that which appears on our

title-page; and in this respect the Bishop of Manchester has very

clearly defined our position by stating that (_from a purely physical

point of view_) we contend for the possibility of immortality and of

a personal God.

We must now, however, start from a new basis and assume the existence

of a Deity who is the Creator and Upholder of all things. It is not

our intention to enter into the argument by which the existence of

a Deity may be derived from a consideration of His works. Here,

therefore, we must necessarily part company with our materialistic

friends, for while they may have been content to go along with us

in our first argument to a greater or less length, they will most

assuredly not even set foot upon the second stage of our journey. We

cannot help it.

Assuming therefore the existence of a Deity, who is the Creator

and Upholder of all things, we further look upon the laws of the

universe as those laws according to which the beings in the universe

are conditioned by the Governor thereof, as regards time, place, and

sensation.

Nothing whatever lies, or can be even conceived to lie, outside of

this sovereign and paramount influence. There is no impression made

upon the bodily senses—no thought or other mental operation which

does not take place under conditions imposed by the will of God.

If it be asked how we can imagine any free-will or moral

responsibility to exist consistently with this doctrine, we may

reply that we cannot tell in virtue of what peculiar constitution

of things the sovereignty of God is consistent with our moral

responsibility, nor can we even conceive the possibility of our

obtaining the knowledge requisite to reply to this question. But it

may, we think, be shown that the doctrine of the sovereign power of

God as above defined is not inconsistent with moral responsibility.

For in the statement made three things are spoken of. _In the first

place_, there is God, the source of power; _secondly_, there are the

conditions which He imposes; and _thirdly_, there is the Ego, the

being who is thus conditioned. Now, the laws of thought absolutely

forbid our dismissing this Ego. It may possibly be argued that we

consist of a bundle of sensations bound together, just as a bundle

of threads are, by something which is no less a sensation, namely,

the impression that we have an individual existence and moral

responsibility; to which we would reply that even if this be granted

we must submit to impressions from which there is no escape.

Now, it appears to us that we cannot possibly have any impression

more deeply seated or more impossible to uproot than this:—that

we ourselves exist and are responsible; it is something which we

continually carry about with us, even into the grotesque regions

of thought, where all individuality is denied. It is into these

regions that the materialists invite us to accompany them in order

to perform, or rather to delude ourselves with the idea that we have

performed, this singularly unhappy despatch! But, just as we cannot

conceive of a man swallowing up himself, so neither can we conceive

of his getting rid of his own individuality by any legitimate

process of thought. Can we conceive of consciousness without a

being who is conscious? or of sensation without a being who feels?

We may perhaps take it for granted that the statements we have now

made, acknowledging at once a Sovereign Power and our own moral

responsibility, will commend themselves to a large body of thinkers

who will virtually agree with our conclusions. It is to these we

would now address ourselves, inviting them to accompany us upon the

second stage of our journey.

Let us here, therefore, regarding ourselves as moral and intellectual

beings, bear in mind that there are various avenues through which we

receive instruction. We do not, of course, mean that these avenues

are absolutely separate from each other, inasmuch as they must all

somehow or other merge into the one grand avenue through which we

perceive the Sovereign Power of God. Such avenues are,—the study of

matter and its laws,—communion with our fellows, and—example.

Now why should not all these various avenues be filled with the

knowledge of God, thus effecting the displacement of a vast throng of

mean and loathsome influences which would otherwise run riot there?

Surely that must be a singular process of reasoning by which the

Most High is altogether banished from these avenues into which it

is alleged He cannot possibly condescend to enter. We are confident

there is some misapprehension here; let us therefore try to point out

its probable nature.

We have assumed that a study of creation leads us up to some

conception of God—that we are driven by the faculties which He has

given us to acknowledge the existence of a Paramount Power, and

inasmuch as scientific thought leads us to regard THE UNIVERSE as

both infinite and eternal, so are we driven to regard this Power

which underlies all phenomena as infinite and eternal also.

This at least appears to us to be the conclusion to which we are

driven if we endeavour to reduce mental confusion to a minimum. It

is, however, manifestly absurd to imagine that by means of this

process we can ever comprehend the essential nature of God. We can

no more comprehend His essential nature by this means than we can

the essential nature of matter or of life. But surely we can judge

of His character by the various modes in which He influences us, and

indeed all scientific generalisations—even the simple conclusion

that the sun will rise to-morrow—are in a sense expressions of our

faith in the unchanging character of God. Now if we examine the

process by which we have obtained this conception of God it will be

seen that we start with a single intellectual being who is applying

himself to a scientific study of the works of nature. The idea of our

neighbour does not enter into it, and we agree to regard ourselves

as intellectual rather than as moral or social beings. The result

is that having voluntarily confined our argument to one channel,

we obtain a knowledge of God’s character—that is to say, of His

manifested relations towards us—which is necessarily incomplete. But

are we therefore entitled to say:—Because we obtain a very imperfect

conception of God by this method, we will not believe there is any

other method by which this conception may be rendered more complete?

Sound argument, it appears to us, leads the other way altogether.

For if we assume that the knowledge of God derived from one source

is incomplete, ought we not to try whether it can be supplemented

by knowledge derived from other sources? Undoubtedly if other

sources furnish, or seem to furnish, conceptions of God which are

fundamentally inconsistent with that which we have derived through

the scientific channel, we are entitled to sit in intellectual

judgment upon them until the source of confusion is in some way

removed.

But does this inconsistency as a matter of fact exist? We do not

think it does. The statements in the New Testament scriptures

regarding God are necessarily mysterious, but mystery can be no test

of their truth or falsehood, inasmuch as it must in such regions be

the almost inevitable accompaniment of truth.

The question is not whether they are mysterious, but whether they are

consistent with themselves, and with the knowledge we derive from

other sources. We therefore devote considerable portions of this

volume to a proof that the conception of God which the majority of

Christians derive from the New Testament is in no way inconsistent

with that deduced from scientific principles.

Meanwhile, and in conclusion, we must be allowed to express our

conviction that much evil has been wrought by a certain class of

sincere and well-meaning men in the various churches of Christ. By

dint of contemplating lofty truths from one point of view, and only

one, and by dint of developing excessively, and in one direction

only, those analogies by which the mysterious has been rendered

thinkable, they have produced a result for which they themselves are

mainly to blame. With a strange reversal of the process by which

Satan transforms himself into an Angel of Light, we have the noble,

the beautiful, and the true presented to us by these men in a form

which is fit only to inspire aversion or to create disgust.

It is in such terms that we reply to those of our critics, on the one

hand, who attack us for adopting what they call a narrow and gloomy

theology; and to those, on the other hand, who regard as dangerous

the method of discussion we have pursued. We have tried honestly to

view things with two eyes,—the eye of knowledge and the eye of faith:

first with one, then with the other, finally with both. To what

extent we have succeeded is, after all, a matter of minor importance

if only the lawfulness of this mode of vision be ultimately allowed.

And just as we have a better appretiation of the form and distance of

natural objects when we view them with both our physical eyes, so, we

venture to think, must it prove with the truths of which we now speak.

* * * * *

We have explained that the first part of our argument is altogether

independent of revelation; proceeding as it does solely upon

scientific data, and the conclusions which these seem to render

inevitable. In the second part, however, we feel that we ought not

to deprive ourselves of the overwhelming additional evidence which

we derive from Christian records. Here, therefore, we shall neither

gratify one class of our critics by starting from a point which

ignores what we regard as the fully warranted belief of the great

majority of Christians, nor shall we be overruled by the excessive

timidity of another class who apparently regard a two-eyed man as a

monster in those regions where truths of really vital importance are

concerned.

* * * * *

The horrors and blasphemies of Materialism are at least every first

day of the week so fully treated by many theologians that it is

almost unnecessary for us to say anything on their view of the

subject, especially as we could not compete with the great majority

of them in strength and happy audacity of language. We would

therefore content ourselves with mildly inquiring what sort of regard

for the image of the Divine in humanity is shown by those whose creed

levels us all with ‘the beasts that _perish_.’ Even the antient

Pagans were less disposed to such monstrosities:—

‘. . . . . . . . .

finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram,

os homini sublime dedit: cœlumque tueri

jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.

sic, modo quae fuerat rudis et sine imagine, tellus

induit ignotas hominum conversa figuras.’

It is well for the human race that such sophistical doctrines as

those of Materialism are as yet received by a small minority only.

‘If in this life alone we have hope,’ we should be led by common

sense and prudence to make the best of it, our neighbour’s sufferings

notwithstanding. At least we should listen to him only as did the

judge ‘who neither feared God, nor regarded man,’ when he said, ‘This

widow troubleth me; I will avenge her, lest by her continual coming

she weary me.’

We would conclude by observing that the natural disinclination to

receive as true a religion whose very first effect is ‘to convict

the world of sin,’ is admirably set forth in the striking words of

Peter[2]: ‘Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.’

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY SKETCH.

‘L’immortalité de l’âme est une chose qui nous importe si fort,

et qui nous touche si profondément, qu’il faut avoir perdu tout

sentiment pour être dans l’indifférence de savoir ce qui en

est.’—PASCAL.

‘For he should persevere until he has attained one of two things;

either he should discover or learn the truth about them, or,

if this is impossible, I would have him take the best and most

irrefragable of human notions, and let this be the raft upon

which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he

cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely

carry him.’—PLATO’S _Phædo_; translated by JOWETT.

1. The great majority of mankind have always believed in some fashion

in a life after death; many in the essential immortality of the soul;

but it is certain that we find many disbelievers in such doctrines

who yet retain the nobler attributes of humanity. It may, however, be

questioned whether it be possible even to imagine the great bulk of

our race to have lost their belief in a future state of existence,

and yet to have retained the virtues of civilised and well-ordered

communities.

We have said that the disbelievers in such doctrines form a minority

of the race; but at the same time it must be acknowledged that the

strength of this minority has of late years greatly increased, so

much so that at the present moment it numbers in its ranks not a few

of the most intelligent, the most earnest, and the most virtuous of

men.

It is, however, possible that, could we examine these, we should find

them to be unwilling disbelievers, compelled by the working of their

intellects to abandon the desire of their hearts, only after many

struggles, and with much bitterness of spirit.

Others, again, without absolutely abandoning all hope of a future

existence, are yet full of doubt regarding it, and have settled down

into the belief that we cannot come to any reasonable conclusion

upon the subject. Now, these men can have had nothing to gain, but

rather much to lose, in arriving at this result. It has been reached

by them with reluctance, with misgivings, not without a certain kind

of persecution, nor without the loss of friends and the stirring up

of strife; still they have fearlessly looked things in the face, and

have followed whithersoever they imagined they were led by facts,

even to the brink of an abyss.

It is the object of the present volume to examine the intellectual

process which has brought about such results, and we hope to be able

to show not only that the conclusion at which these men have arrived

is not justified by what we know of the physical universe, but that

on the other hand there are many lines of thought which point very

strongly towards an opposite conclusion.

2. A division as old as Aristotle separates[3] speculators into two

great classes,—those who study the How of the Universe, and those

who study the Why. All men of science are embraced in the former

of these, all men of religion in the latter. The former regard the

Universe as a huge machine, and their object is to study the laws

which regulate its working; the latter again speculate about the

object of the machine, and what sort of work it is intended to

produce. The disciples of How are accused by their adversaries of

being willing to sacrifice the individual to the system; while the

disciples of Why are accused by _their_ adversaries of being willing

to sacrifice the system to the individual.

We may compare the Universe to a great steamer plying between two

well-known ports, and carrying two sets of passengers. The one

set remain on deck and try to make out, as well as they can, the

mind of the Captain regarding the future of their voyage after

they have reached the port to which they know they are all fast

hastening, while the other set remain below and examine the engines.

Occasionally there is much wrangling at the top of the ladder where

the two sets meet, some of those who have examined the engines

and the ship asserting that the passengers will all be inevitably

wrecked at the next port, it being physically impossible that the

good ship can carry them further. To whom those on deck reply,

that they have perfect confidence in the Captain, who has informed

some of those nearest him that the passengers will not be wrecked,

but will be carried in safety past the port to an unknown land of

felicity. And so the altercation goes on; some who have been on deck

being unwilling or unable to examine the engines, and some who have

examined the engines preferring to remain below.

3. Our readers will perceive from what we have said, that

difficulties regarding the possibility of a future state of existence

are most likely to arise amidst the disciples of How or those who

study the machinery of the Universe, and inasmuch as this class has

greatly increased of late, it follows that the disbelievers in or

doubters of the future state have increased likewise. The disciples

of Why have, on the other hand, existed from time immemorial,

and have, in the plenitude of their power, frequently carried

themselves with much violence towards the disciples of How, who are

of comparatively modern origin. It must not, however, be inferred

that this old and venerable family have always been at peace amongst

themselves, for there have been numerous contentions among their

various sections, not the less acrimonious because the contending

members have been to some extent supporters of a common cause,

believing in some fashion in the reality of a world to come. We shall

therefore begin by giving our readers a sketch, necessarily and

purposely a very meagre one, of the various beliefs on these subjects

held by the different branches of this great family.

4. Let us begin with the Egyptians, who are perhaps the most antient

people of whom we have historical records. The manners and customs

of this nation have been very minutely described by Sir Gardner

Wilkinson, to whose work we are chiefly indebted for the following

account. In the first place it appears that we must separate between

what the priests believed and what was held by the great body of the

people. The bulk of the nation were left by the priests to believe in

a multiplicity of deities, and even to reverence animals as divine,

while on the other hand the higher orders of the priesthood, who

were initiated into the greater mysteries of their religion, appear

to have acknowledged the unity of God. These believed in one Eternal

God, from whom all other deities were produced, and whom they did

not permit themselves even to name, far less to represent under any

visible form. The Egyptians likewise believed in the existence of

Dæmons or Genii, who were present unseen amongst mankind.

5. The earliest Egyptian records attest the belief of this nation in

the immortality of the soul:—‘Dissolution, according to them, is only

the cause of reproduction—nothing perishes which has once existed,

and things which appear to be destroyed only change their natures and

pass into another form.’[4]

Anubis held in Egypt an office similar to that of Mercury among

the Greeks, being the usher of souls in their passage to the

future state. Amenti was the region to which the souls of men were

supposed to go after death, and Sir Gardner Wilkinson notices the

resemblance between this name and that of Ement ‘the West’—the west,

where the sun was seen to sink, being looked upon as the end of the

world. The guardian of the lower regions was called Ouom-n-Amenti,

or the Devourer of Amenti. It had frequently the appearance of a

hippopotamus, but was drawn sometimes with the head of a fanciful

creature something between the hippopotamus and the crocodile.

‘The judgment of the soul was conducted by Osiris, aided by forty-two

assessors, supposed to represent the forty-two crimes from which a

virtuous man was expected to be free when judged in a future state,

or rather the accusing spirits, each of whom examined if the deceased

was guilty of the peculiar crime which it was his province to

avenge.’[5]

6. As regards the fate of the soul when once the judgment had been

passed upon it,—the Egyptians considered the souls of men to be

emanations of the Divine soul, and each was supposed to return to

its Divine origin when sufficiently pure to unite with the Deity. On

the other hand, those who had been guilty of sin were doomed to pass

through a series of torments ending in the second death.

7. It is considered probable by some that the Egyptian custom of

embalming the body had relation to this religious doctrine, and

before the mummy was allowed burial it had to be judged and acquitted

by terrestrial authorities. Diodorus gives a detailed account of the

ceremonies which then took place, in which forty-two judges were

summoned to act as assessors and determine the fate of the body. If

it could be proved that the deceased had led an evil life, his body

was deprived of the accustomed burial, and on such occasions the

grief and shame felt by the family were excessive. Diodorus considers

that this was in itself a strong inducement to every one to abstain

from crime, and praises very strongly the authors of so wise an

institution.

8. Let us next consider the antient belief of the Hebrew nation.

Referring to the records of this nation, we find that at an early

period they had been slaves or serfs to the Egyptians, from whom

they were delivered by Moses, who became afterwards their lawgiver.

Moses had by a species of adoption obtained a very prominent position

among the Egyptians, and had probably been initiated into their

sacred mysteries, for we read that he was ‘learned in all the wisdom

of the Egyptians.’ Without discussing the question of inspiration,

we may readily imagine that, himself a believer in the unity of

God, this sagacious leader must have perceived the deficiency of a

religious system in which the truth was confined to a few, while the

many were allowed to remain in the most degrading idolatry.

He was thus in a fit state to recognise the paramount importance of

the whole mind and mass of the nation being pervaded with a belief

in one invisible, ever-present, ever-living God. We do not, however,

mean to assert that Moses got his religious notions from Egypt, but

we think it possible that his mind may have been prepared by the

failure of the Egyptian system to receive a better one.

9. In the Egyptian system there were two peculiarities which were

probably connected together. We have seen (Art. 4) that amongst the

higher orders of the priesthood there was a profound, but at the same

time a superstitious, reverence for the name of God, who was unnamed

and unapproachable, unless under some deified attribute. At the

same time there was, and probably in consequence of the former, an

ignorance of the unity of God amongst the great mass of the people,

and a worship of the various deified attributes of one supreme being

as so many separate divinities.

10. Now the task which Moses believed himself divinely commissioned

to accomplish was the revelation of this one living and ruling God

to the whole body of his countrymen. Thus we find God, in the sacred

writings of the Jews, saying to Moses, ‘I am the LORD (Jehovah),

and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the

name of God Almighty (El Shaddai); but by my name Jehovah was I

not known to them.’[6] We do not however intend to discuss the

precise meaning of the two names of God, which we find in the Hebrew

Scriptures—sufficient for us that Moses endeavoured to impress upon

his people the unity and ever-living presence of the Divine Being.

11. Again, it would appear that the Jews, in addition to their belief

as a nation in the unity of God, believed also in the reality of an

invisible world containing spiritual intelligences, some of whom were

the loyal servants and messengers of God, while others delighted in

the endeavour to thwart His counsels, and were in rebellion against

Him. Apparently both orders of these were supposed to have very

considerable power, not only over the minds and bodies of men, but

also over the operations of nature. Thus two angels were commissioned

by God to destroy Sodom;[7] and again, in the poem of Job, when Satan

received power over the Patriarch, he overwhelmed him by at once

inciting robbers who plundered his substance, killing his children

by a wind from the wilderness, and finally smiting the body of Job

himself with a loathsome disease.

It is perhaps worthy of note that while we read in these records of

various appearances of good spirits in the human form, we have no

certain account of any such manifestation of evil spirits. It may

even be supposed that a good deal of the Demonology of Scripture

belongs to poetic or semi-parabolic representation of spiritual

truths. Thus Coleridge and others have thought that the Satan of Job

is only the dramatic accuser or adversary imagined by the poet.

12. Very little is said about man’s future state in the Scriptures of

the Jews. The Hebrews, like the Assyrians and Chaldeans, believed in

Sheol (Hades), a dark and gloomy abode peopled by the shades of the

dead. But the continued existence of the ‘pithless’ shades (Rephaim)

in this land of powerlessness and forgetfulness was not thought of as

constituting immortality, but rather as the essence of death itself.

The religious hope of immortality which appears in some passages of

the Old Testament takes the form of a victory over or rescue from the

fear of Sheol. But this higher hope was not brought before the mind

of the Hebrew nation in the same way as was the presence and unity

of God. It seems to us that Dean Stanley’s conjecture is probably

correct where he says, with reference to this omission, ‘Not from

want of religion, but (if we might use the expression) from excess

of religion, was this void left in the Jewish mind. The future life

was not denied or contradicted, but it was overlooked, set aside,

overshadowed by the consciousness of the living, actual presence of

God Himself. That truth, at least in the limited conceptions of the

youthful nation, was too vast to admit of any rival truth, however

precious. When David or Hezekiah shrank from the gloomy vacancy of

the grave, it was because they feared lest, when death closed their

eyes in the present world, they should lose their hold on that Divine

friend with whose being and communion the present world had in their

minds been so closely interwoven.’[8]

13. As the nation grew older we find frequent and distinct allusions

indicating a belief in a resurrection of some kind. Thus we find the

angel saying to Daniel, ‘And many of them which sleep in the dust of

the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame

and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the

brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness

as the stars for ever and ever.’[9] And again: ‘Go thy way till the

end be; for thou shalt rest and stand in thy lot at the end of the

days.’[10] Again, in the Apocrypha, we find one of seven brethren who

were put to death by Antiochus, saying to that tyrant,—‘It is good,

being put to death by men, to look for hope from God, to be raised

up again by Him; as for thee, thou shalt have no resurrection to

life,’[11] and the other brethren spoke in like manner. Here it is

evident from the whole chapter that the hope expressed was rather the

result of perfect trust in God than derived from any process of their

own reason, or even from any revelation on the subject which they

imagined to have been made.

We have likewise the testimony of Josephus as well as of the

New Testament that the Pharisees believed in a resurrection.

Josephus tells us,—‘They [the Pharisees] say that all souls are

incorruptible, but that the souls of good men only are removed into

other bodies, but that the souls of bad men are subject to eternal

punishment.’[12] Again, we learn from the same two authorities that

the Sadducees held sceptical notions on the subject, and Josephus

says—‘They take away the belief of the immortal duration of the soul,

and the punishments and rewards in Hades.’

14. If we next turn to the Greek and Roman mythologies we find ideas

of a future state very similar to those entertained by the Egyptians,

from whom probably the Greek notions were originally largely derived.

They called by the name of Elysium the abode appropriated to the

souls of the good, while those of the wicked suffered punishment in

Tartarus. It has been well remarked by Archbishop Whately that these

regions were supposed to be of the most dreamy and unsubstantial

nature:—

‘The poet [remarks Whately] from whom so many were content to derive

their creed [meaning Homer] represents Achilles among the shades as

declaring that the life of the meanest drudge on earth is preferable

to the very highest of the unsubstantial glories of Elysium:—

Βουλοίμην κ’ ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ,

Ἀνδρὶ παρ’ ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη,

Ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν.

It is remarkable too that the same poet seems plainly to regard the

_body_ not the _soul_ as being properly “the man” after death has

separated them. _We_ should be apt to say that such a one’s body is

here, and that _he_, properly the person himself, is departed to the

other world; but Homer uses the very opposite language in speaking of

the heroes slain before Troy: viz., that their souls were despatched

to the shades, and that THEY themselves were left a prey to dogs and

birds:—

Πολλὰς δ’ ἰφθίμους ΨΥΧΑΣ Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν

Ἡρώων, ΑΥΤΟΥΣ δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν.’[13]

We agree with this writer that the belief in an unsubstantial

region of this description can have had no real influence either in

deterring men from vice, or in encouraging them to virtue. Indeed

its inevitable tendency must have been to foster an undue regard for

the pleasures of this present life to the absolute discouragement

of goodness and virtue. For while we of the present day regard the

future life as in some sense the reward of piety and goodness, the

antients looked upon Hades rather as a penalty which inexorable fate

had reserved for all men, and from which even piety and goodness were

powerless to exempt their possessors.

Cum semel occideris, et de te splendida Minos

Fecerit arbitria;

Non, Torquate, genus, non te facundia, non te

Restituet pietas.

Infernis neque enim tenebris Diana pudicum

Liberat Hippolytum;

Nec Lethæa valet Theseus abrumpere caro

Vincula Pirithöo.

15. The active-minded as well as the gross-minded members of

the community could hardly be expected to care much for such an

unsubstantial future, and this consideration may probably have

led to the readier acceptance of the doctrine of some of the Greek

philosophers who introduced a bodily state after death. But these,

in so doing, rather favoured the doctrine of transmigration than

that of a resurrection of the body which was seen to die, and which,

after being devoured by dogs, or destroyed in some other manner,

they could hardly conceive to rise again. It is well known that

Pythagoras taught the doctrine of transmigration, although as none of

his writings have come down to us we are not sure of the exact manner

in which he held it. Plato also alludes to a similar doctrine, in a

passage which refers no doubt to the doctrine of the pre-existence of

souls, and to the view that it is a punishment to become corporeal

at all. He tells us:—‘If any one’s life has been virtuous he shall

obtain a better fate hereafter; if wicked a worse. But no soul will

return to its pristine condition till the expiration of ten thousand

years, since it will not recover the use of its wings until that

period, except it be the soul of one who has philosophised sincerely

or together with philosophy has loved beautiful forms. These indeed

in the third period of a thousand years, if they have thrice chosen

this mode of life in succession, ... shall in the three thousandth

year fly away to their pristine abode, but other souls, being arrived

at the end of their first life, shall be judged. And of those who are

judged, some, proceeding to a subterraneous place of judgment, shall

there sustain the punishments they have deserved; but others, in

consequence of a favourable judgment, being elevated into a certain

celestial place, shall pass their time in a manner becoming the

life they have lived in a human shape. And in the thousandth year

both the kinds of those who have been judged, returning to the lot

and election of a second life, shall each of them receive a life

agreeable to his desire. Here also the human soul shall pass into the

life of a beast, and from that of a beast again into a man if it has

first been the soul of a man. For the soul which has never perceived

the truth cannot pass into the human form.’[14] A certain degree of

choice is here supposed to be left to the soul, and those who cannot

attain to the more ethereal and refined existence, have to choose a

bodily one, returning, after they have become sufficiently purified,

once more into human shape.

16. As a matter of course, a dim belief of this nature gave rise

to a class of philosophers who denied the possibility of a future

state altogether. The advent of this school of thought was probably

hastened by outward events. In the golden age of Greece a vigorous

republic served to concentrate upon itself the energies of the

citizens, and under these circumstances their minds were not likely

to question the truth of the national creed. While the gods smiled

upon them they were content to acknowledge their active existence.

It has been remarked by Schmitz, that the unfavourable political

circumstances of the time may have been concerned in the rise of

the Epicurean school—‘thinking men were led to seek within for that

which they could not find without.’ The gods of Epicurus, this writer

goes on to remark, ‘consisted of atoms, and were in the enjoyment of

perfect happiness, which had not been disturbed by the laborious

business of creating the world, and as the government of the world

would interfere with their happiness, Epicurus conceived them as

exercising no influence whatever upon the world or man.’

It is of such gods the poet speaks when he says:—

‘For they lie beside their nectar, and the bolts are hurl’d

Far below them in the valleys, and the clouds are lightly curl’d

Round their golden houses, girdled with the gleaming world

Where they smile in secret, looking over wasted lands,

Blight and famine, plague and earthquake, roaring deeps and

fiery sands,

Clanging fights, and flaming towns, and sinking ships and

praying hands.’

The antient Roman poet Lucretius, in his well-known poem ‘De Rerum

Natura,’ has beautifully interpreted the Epicurean philosophy.

Adopting like Epicurus the atomic or corpuscular theory of things, he

tells his readers that the soul of man perishes along with the body,

and that it is the height of folly for man to be afraid of that which

may happen to him after death.

17. It is unnecessary to discuss in detail the tenets of the various

Greek and Roman philosophers. A number of indefinite and sometimes

contradictory expressions sufficiently betrays the uncertainty of

their opinions. Desirous, it may be, themselves to believe—desirous

at least that the body of their countrymen should believe—in a future

state, it is yet not wonderful that they should have felt strongly

the difficulty of believing, or have expressed their doubts in

writings which were not intended to be read by the great mass of the

people.

18. Proceeding now to the extreme east, it is well known that of late

years very great light has been thrown upon the antient religions

of the Brahmans, the Magians, and the Buddhists. In an admirable

collection of essays by Professor Max Müller,[15] we have a good

epitome of what has been accomplished by the laborious investigations

of oriental scholars. We learn from these that the most antient

document is the Rig-Veda, or Sacred Hymns of the Brahmans, in which

we have the religious belief of a large section of the Indo-Germanic

race at a period supposed to be from 1200 to 2000 years before the

Christian era. In these hymns the gods are called Deva, a word which

is conjectured to be the same with the Latin Deus. ‘It would be

easy,’ says Max Müller, ‘to find in the numerous hymns of the Veda

passages in which every important deity is represented as supreme

and absolute. Thus in one hymn, Agni (fire) is called “the ruler of

the universe.”... In another hymn, another god, Indra, is said to be

greater than all. “The gods,” it is said, “do not reach thee, Indra,

nor men,—thou overcomest all creatures in strength.”... Another

god, Soma, is called the king of the world, the king of heaven and

earth, the conqueror of all.... Another poet says of another god,

Varu_n_a, “Thou art lord of all, of heaven and earth; thou art the

king of all, of those who are gods, and of those who are men.”...

This surely,’ remarks Max Müller, ‘is not what is commonly understood

by Polytheism. Yet it would be equally wrong to call it Monotheism.

If we must have a name for it, I should call it Kathenotheism.

The consciousness that all the deities are but different names of

one and the same godhead, breaks forth indeed here and there in

the Veda. But it is far from being general. One poet for instance

says, “They call him Indra, Mitra, Varu_n_a, Agni; then he is the

beautiful-winged heavenly Garutmat—that which is one, the wise call

it, in divers manners; they call it Agni, Yama, Mâtari_s_van.”’

19. We learn from the same author that ‘there is in the Veda no trace

of metempsychosis, or that transmigration of souls from human to

animal bodies, which is generally supposed to be a distinguishing

feature of Indian religion. Instead of this we find what is really

the _sine quâ non_ of all real religion, a belief in immortality and

in personal immortality.... Thus we read, He who gives alms goes to

the highest place in heaven; he goes to the gods.... Again we find

this prayer addressed to Soma:—

‘Where there is eternal light, in the world where the sun is placed,

in that immortal, imperishable world place me, O Soma!

‘Where King Vaivasvata reigns, where the secret place of heaven is,

where these mighty waters are, there make me immortal!

‘Where there is happiness and delight, where joy and pleasure reside,

where the desires of our desire are attained, there make me immortal!’

Max Müller further remarks, that the Rig-Veda contains allusions,

although vague, to a place of punishment for the wicked. ‘The dogs

of Yama, the king of the departed, present some terrible aspects,

and Yama is asked to protect the departed from them. Again, a pit is

mentioned, into which the lawless are said to be hurled down, and

into which Indra casts those who offer no sacrifices.’

20. A religion like this, however pure at its commencement, was

likely soon to become corrupted. It speedily merged into idolatry

and polytheism, as far at least as the main body of the worshippers

were concerned, while at the same time the rule of the Brahmans

or officiating priests became strengthened into an insupportable

social tyranny. Thus a double reformation was to be apprehended,

corresponding on the one hand to the religious, and on the other to

the ceremonial and social, development of the system.

21. The first reformation was that attributed to Zoroaster and his

disciples, whose belief is contained in the Zend-Avesta. In his

confession of faith, the disciple of the Eranian or Zoroastrian

religion declares, ‘I cease to be a worshipper of the daêvas.’

It must however be remembered that in this religion _daeva_ means

_devil_, or evil spirit. Thus the earliest forms of the Zoroastrian

religion need not have excluded, and apparently did not exclude, the

worship of good spirits.

Whilst the Zoroastrian disciples believed in a supreme God who rules

the world, they yet gave a prominent place to a spirit of evil, which

afterwards received the name of Ahriman, and was supposed to exercise

very considerable influence over the order of nature and the minds

of men. Indeed, Ahriman is apparently an independent power so strong

that but for the fact that he acts before he thinks, while Ormuzd

(the good spirit) thinks before he acts, the victory of good would

be doubtful. The whole system hinges on this and on the fact that

everything noxious and evil in creation is the work of Ahriman.

Max Müller is of opinion that ‘the Zoroastrian religion was founded

on a solemn protest against the whole worship of the powers of

nature involved in the Vedas;’ and again the same writer says, ‘The

characteristic change that has taken place between the Veda and

Avesta is, that the battle is no longer a conflict of gods and demons

for cows (alluding to a Vaidik myth), nor of light and darkness for

rain. It is the battle of a pious man against the power of evil.’

22. The disciples of the Zoroastrian religion believed in a future

state; the ill-speaker (the devil), we are told in the Zend-Avesta,

shall not destroy the second life.

The following extracts given by Max Müller from a catechism of the

modern Parsis or disciples of Zoroaster give us a very good idea of

their present creed:—

‘Q. Whom do we of the Zarthosti community believe in?

‘A. We believe in only one God, and we do not believe in any besides

Him.

‘Q. Do we not believe in any other God?

‘A. Whoever believes in any other God but this is an infidel, and

shall suffer the punishment of hell.’

In another extract the disciples are told that in the world to come

they shall receive the return according to their actions.

23. The next reform of the Brahminical system had reference to its

social characteristics, and was occasioned by the insupportable

tyranny of the priesthood. The reformer, a young prince, was born

about 500 years B.C., and from his life and doctrines received the

name of Buddha, or the Enlightened. After having learned from

various famous Brahmans, he came to the conclusion that their

austerities and doctrines could neither free men from the miseries of

this life nor from the fear of death. From this stage Buddha passed

into the belief that all we see is vanity—a delusion, a dream—and

that the highest wisdom consists in perceiving this, and in desiring

to enter into Nirvâ_n_a, or, in other words, to be blown out like a

flame.

It would seem from these words that Buddha himself regarded

annihilation rather than immortality as the _summum bonum_; but no

account of Buddhism would be satisfactory which did not pay special

regard to the notion so widely diffused in heathenism, that matter

is the source of all evil. To be liberated from _matter_ is to be

liberated from _evil_; and this would seem to be the fundamental

thought in the Nirvâ_n_a in all its different senses. But however

this may be, we know that, allied to these extreme metaphysical

opinions, Buddha inculcated a moral code which is one of the purest

the world has ever known. M. Laboulaye says, ‘It is difficult to

comprehend how men not assisted by revelation could have soared so

high;’ and M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire does not hesitate to assert

that ‘with the sole exception of Christ, there is not amongst the

founders of religion a more pure or touching figure than that of

Buddha.’

24. In process of time, among the followers of the Buddhist religion,

the word Nirvâ_n_a came to have a very different meaning from that

which it had at first. Buddha was himself worshipped as a divinity,

and his Nirvâ_n_a came to denote a state in which there was a total

absence of pain, or in other words an Elysium.

In illustration of this we may quote the account given by Max Müller

of the dying words of Hiouen-Thsang, a famous pilgrim from China to

the shrine of Buddha, who died in the year of our era 664:—

‘I desire,’ he said, ‘that whatever merits I may have gained by good

works may fall upon other people. May I be born again with them in

the heaven of the blessed, be admitted to the family of Mi-le, and

serve the Buddha of the future who is full of kindness and affection.

When I descend again upon earth, to pass through other forms of

existence, I desire at every new birth to fulfil my duties towards

Buddha, and arrive at the last at the highest and most perfect

intelligence.’

25. Having thus surveyed, however imperfectly, the belief regarding

a future state held by the greater nations both of the East and West

before the advent of Christianity, let us now make a few observations.

In the first place, there are manifestly two ways in which such a

belief may be held. In one of these it becomes the natural result

of an implicit faith in God and his goodness, which will not suffer

him to disappoint the natural and innate longings of his intelligent

creatures. And such a belief is most likely to arise amongst a nation

which has already vividly realised the living presence and goodness

of God. Now the ancient Jews were such a nation, and the belief that

even death cannot break the fellowship of the believer with God

comes out clearly enough in several of the Psalms. Moreover, the

notion of some sort of future life lies clearly in what is said of

Enoch. All this goes beyond the mere notion of Sheol, which is not

thought of as a happy place. But in the time of the Maccabees this

had grown into a definite belief in the resurrection, and without

insisting on the truthfulness of the Second Book of Maccabees as an

historical document, we may yet be sure that it embodies the feelings

of the Jewish nation at the time when it was written. It is of little

consequence whether a mother and seven brethren were actually put

to death because they would not transgress what they believed to be

the laws of God, or whether in dying they expressed their belief

that they would be continued in a bodily existence by the Creator.

For it is manifest from what we know of the Jews, that not merely

one family but many would under similar circumstances have acted in

the manner described by the historian, dying with the same fortitude

and encouraged by the same hope. We have here a region in which

there is no thought of the How—this troublesome question has not yet

arisen, nor is it likely to arise. No doubt has yet been entertained

regarding the power of God, nor would such a doubt be likely to

receive much encouragement here.

26. But the human mind will not refrain from speculation, and

this brings us to the second method in which a belief regarding a

future state may be held. It may be held after a mode determined by

speculations regarding the possible conditions of a future state.

Such speculations may of course take every variety of form, but yet

there are three well-defined classes into which they naturally group

themselves:—

_In the first place_, we have the doctrine of an ethereal state,

which may or may not be eternal;

_Secondly_, we have the doctrine of a bodily existence, which may or

may not be eternal; and,

_In the third place_, we have the doctrine that a future state is

inconceivable or impossible.

27. The first of these beliefs was probably held by a portion of

the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, and by most of the Jews. It was

likewise held by many amongst the eastern nations. It formed indeed

one of the two ways of imagining a future state, but it was of a

very vague and dreary nature; and from the passage of Homer already

quoted (Art. 14), we realise the longing supposed to be felt by the

inhabitants of such a place to escape into a more substantial region.

Unquestionably it was not a place in which practical men like the

Jews, for instance, would wish to dwell, and yet no doubt it had

great attraction for minds of a visionary and ecstatic nature, who

held matter to be the source of evil.

The return of the soul to its divine original, an Egyptian doctrine,

the entrance into Nirvâ_n_a, proclaimed by Buddha, and the absorption

into Buddha himself, proclaimed by some of his followers, are all

proofs that a doctrine of this nature has peculiar fascinations for

a dreamy order of minds. Nor must we analyse too rigidly the exact

meaning and tendency of such doctrines, inasmuch as we cannot easily

enter into the real feelings of those who propounded them, and who

probably entertained conceptions which cannot adequately be expressed

in words.

28. Coming now to the belief in a bodily future existence, it is

remarkable that the doctrine of a transmigration of souls was

extensively prevalent among all the nations we have named, if we

except the Jews. It was believed in, as we have seen, by a large

class of the Egyptians; it was introduced into Greece by Pythagoras

and his followers; it is considered to have been from time immemorial

a common property of the various religions of the extreme East;

and it is recorded by Cæsar that the Druids believed in the same

doctrine, although they confined the transmigration to human bodies.

It will perhaps surprise many of our readers to learn the extensive

prevalence of such a doctrine, wondering as they must how it is

possible to attach certainty to an existence which passes through

the body of various men and animals—something perhaps like a draught

of Lethe being administered at the moment of passage. But the

antients, being unable to rise to a higher conception of a bodily

future, were compelled to admit either this doctrine or one yet more

absurd, namely, that the _very same body_ which was laid in the tomb

will once more be animated by the spirit which formerly possessed

it. It does not therefore surprise us that the antients, with the

exception probably of a portion of the inhabitants of Egypt, and some

of the Jews, should have preferred the doctrine of transmigration;

but we are exceedingly surprised that the alternative doctrine, of

manifestly Egyptian parentage, should have come to be accepted by the

modern nations of Europe under the garb of Christianity. We shall

return again to this subject, but meanwhile let us observe that,

when men first began to ask the How of a future state, the reply was

something extremely vague and unsatisfying. No wonder, then, that a

class of men who had not unlimited confidence in God, and who could

not believe in either of the doctrines of a future state, should

have lapsed into philosophical infidelity and denied altogether the

possibility of a future state.

29. We have thus arrived at a stage of development in which we may

imagine the next step to be one which will throw some light upon this

question of How—that is, which will give, or at any rate profess to

give, some information regarding the conditions of a future life. The

intellect of man had attempted to obtain such knowledge for itself,

but the result was a conspicuous failure; the sword was not sharp

enough, nor the arm which wielded it powerful enough, to hew down the

thick and seemingly impenetrable barrier which closes the avenue to

the world of spirits.

‘We cannot go to them,’ was the unanimous wail of the antient

philosophers; till some of the more hopeful of them suggested as

an alternative that they might come to us. For clearly, if A and B

are separated from each other by a barrier, and there yet remains

good-will between them, two courses are possible, and only two, if

they are to be made acquainted with each other. One or other must

surmount the barrier. If A be so weak as to be unable to do so, and

if at the same time it would be a matter of importance to him to

become better acquainted with B, then B may be expected to surmount

the barrier if it be surmountable, and exhibit himself to A.

30. As a matter of history, it appears that about the time of the

birth of Christ there was an expectation, however vague, that

something of this nature was about to take place. And when Christ

made His appearance, and gathered round Him a little band of

disciples, there can be no doubt that He claimed to be the bearer of

intelligence from the world of spirits. All who accept the gospel

narratives, however much they may differ from one another as to

the light in which they regard His person and doctrine, will yet,

we think, agree in this. The claim made by His disciples for His

gospel was that it ‘had brought life and immortality to light’ (2

Tim. i. 10), and that Christ had by his resurrection ‘abolished

death.’ The grounds of the claim were built upon the belief that He

showed Himself after His resurrection to a body of men who had not

previously believed that the Messiah Himself was to die and rise

again.

His disciples in short took His resurrection for a proof that life is

possible after death. Christ was believed to be the first-fruits of a

system which was destined ultimately to enfold in the same glorious

immortality all those of His disciples who were united to their

Master by a sincere and living faith. Evidently Paul attached the

utmost importance to the fact of Christ’s resurrection, for he says

(1 Cor. xv. 14), ‘If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain,

and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of

God: because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ; whom

he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead

rise not, then is not Christ raised: and if Christ be not raised,

your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins.’

31. Let us now try to ascertain what sort of future state was taught

by Christ. In the first place, it was a bodily state—a state which

could even adapt itself with some modification to the views of the

Pharisees who believed in the resurrection of the body. But the

modification introduced is sufficiently important. The occasion of

its announcement was a disputation with the Sadducees, who attempted

to perplex Christ by stating to Him the case of a woman who had

been married in this life to seven brethren in succession, and then

asking Him whose wife she should be in the resurrection. We are told

(Matthew xxii. 29) that in reply to this question, ‘Jesus answered

and said unto them, Ye do err, not knowing the scriptures, nor the

power of God. For in the resurrection they neither marry nor are

given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven.’ We may

gather by implication from this narrative, that the question would

have puzzled the Pharisees, who had certainly not arrived at this

idea of the resurrection state.

They must evidently have thought that the resurrection body was to

be similar to the present one, and although they believed in the

existence of angels, and their occasional appearance to human beings,

they cannot have risen to the idea that it was possible for man to

reach a similar state after death.

32. It may perhaps be said that many of Christ’s sayings would seem

to lead towards the doctrine of a resurrection of the very same

material particles which are laid in the grave. To this, however, it

may be replied that Christ undoubtedly wished to impress upon His

hearers, who were for the most part unlearned and ignorant men, the

substantial and bodily reality of the future state, and therefore

spoke in plain language without entering into scientific minutiæ,

which would only have perplexed them, and diminished the impression

which His words were otherwise calculated to produce. Few of His

hearers would trouble themselves about the mode, nor was it until

an objection was started by the learned Sadducees that Christ took

occasion to develop His doctrine. In accordance with this view we

see that a similar difficulty must have occurred more than once in

the life of Paul, who was brought into contact with the philosophy

of Greece and Rome. For in one of his Epistles[16] he asks the

question,—How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they

come? He then replies to the supposed objector in the following noble

and beautiful language:—‘There is one glory of the sun, and another

glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star

differeth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of

the dead; it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption: it

is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness,

it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised a

spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual

body.’

33. In the next place we remark, that this conception of a spiritual

body similar to that of the angels is accompanied in the religious

system of Christ by a conviction that the present visible universe

will assuredly pass away. This is expressed in both divisions of the

writings acknowledged as sacred by the disciples of Christ. Thus it

is said:—‘Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth; and the

heavens are the works of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt

endure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment: as a vesture

shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed.’[17] Again, Paul

tells us that ‘the things which are seen are temporal, but the things

which are not seen are eternal.’[18] Likewise also Peter says—‘The

day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which

the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements

shall melt with fervent heat; the earth also, and the works that

are therein, shall be burned up.... Nevertheless we, according to

his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth

righteousness.’[19] In like manner John tells us that he saw in a

vision ‘a great white throne, and him that sat on it, from whose face

the earth and the heaven fled away; and there was found no place for

them.’[20]

From all this we may conclude that the more advanced disciples of

Christ supposed the resurrection body to be angelic in its nature,

and similar to that which they believed Christ had himself assumed;

and further, that they supposed this body would remain when the

present visible universe had passed away.

34. We have already remarked that it was the object of Christ to

bring the future state in a very vivid manner before His disciples,

so that they might realise its substantial existence, and He has

accordingly given them on the one hand exalted descriptions of the

joys of heaven, and on the other awful accounts of the fate of the

lost. Heaven was variously described by Him as a banqueting house,

as a beautiful city, as Abraham’s bosom, and, when speaking to His

immediate disciples, as a place where they shall dwell together

with their Master. On the other hand, it is believed that Christ’s

description of hell was borrowed from the valley of Hinnom, a place

near Jerusalem, which formed the receptacle for every species

of filth, the combustible parts of which were consumed by fire.

Putrefaction, or the worm, was always busy there, and the fire was

always burning, and this may have given rise to the expression:

‘Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.’ There

can be no doubt, we think, that such descriptions were meant to be

allegorical, the intention being by forcible earthly images to convey

an idea of what could not otherwise be conveyed.

35. It is well known that many varieties of opinion have been

entertained regarding the person of Christ even by those who profess

to be His disciples. It is not however here our object to enter

into theological controversies; our treatment of this subject is at

present historical, and we will therefore bring before our readers

only those views regarding the person of Christ and the constitution

of the invisible world, which are held by the large majority of those

who call themselves Christians.

Whilst all the Christian Churches believe in one God, yet by most

of them the Godhead is believed to consist of three persons, the

Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The first of these appears to

be regarded as the Being or Essence in virtue of whom the Universe

exists. Thus in reciting the Apostles’ Creed the Christian disciple

says:—‘I believe in God, the Father Almighty, maker of Heaven and

Earth;’ and the laws of the Universe are regarded by Christian

theologians as being expressions of the will acting in conformity

with the character of this Being. Thus Nature (according to Whately)

is the course in which the Author and Governor of all things proceeds

in His works.

But the majority of Christian Churches virtually assert that

there are two other Divine Persons, who work through and by the

Universe.[21] One great object of the second Person of the Trinity

is held to be the manifestation of God to man, and possibly to other

beings, in a manner and to an extent which could not be accomplished

by finite intelligences. One great object of the third Person is to

enter, as Lord and giver of life, into the souls of men, and possibly

of other beings, and to dwell there in such a manner as to fit them

for the position which they are destined ultimately to occupy in the

universe of God.

36. In Christ it is supposed that we have an incarnation of the

second Person of the Trinity, and the work which He accomplished

is regarded as done not in violation of the order of things as

established by God the Father, but rather in strict obedience to it.

But while this is generally accepted by the Church of Christ, yet the

doctrine of the submission of Christ to law has been held by some as

not inconsistent with a view which regards the miraculous works of

Christ as manifestations of His divine nature, so changing the order

of things as to denote something wrought upon the universe rather

than something wrought through it and by its means. We do not think

that this theory is borne out by the words of Christ himself. He

says: ‘I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father who sent

me.’[22] Again, we are told by Paul, that ‘when the fulness of the

time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under

the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that they might

receive the adoption of sons.’[23]

Christ also frequently represents His works as wrought by the

Father, as for instance when he says:—‘I do nothing of myself; but

as the Father hath taught me, I speak these things.’[24] In fine,

the whole genius of Christianity would appear to point towards a

total submission of Christ in every respect to all the laws of the

universe: for these, indeed, as we shall soon have occasion to show,

form but another expression for the will of God acting in conformity

with His character. To make our meaning clear, we may say that the

will of man is accomplished in conformity with the laws of the

universe, while on the other hand the will of God, as above defined,

constitutes in itself the laws of the universe. Now it appears to us

from what we find contained in the books of the Christian religion,

that Christ must in this sense be regarded as similar to man; but,

inasmuch as the relation of Christ to the universe is there asserted

to have been different from that of any mere man, so the works of

Christ are to be regarded as different from those which any mere man

can accomplish.

37. The Christian system, of which we have thus briefly described

the peculiarities, was soon called upon to do battle, on the one

hand with the antient philosophies of Greece and Rome, and on the

other with the semi-savage creeds of those less civilised races of

man which were destined ultimately to overpower the Roman Empire.

But it was chiefly when the apostolic pioneers came into contact

with the acute minds of the antient philosophers that we have light

struck regarding what may be termed the philosophical system of

Christianity; thus we have already remarked (Art. 32), that the

nature of the glorified body is most clearly indicated to us by the

Apostle Paul. As respects the more barbarous nations which afterwards

embraced Christianity, _they_ were not likely to puzzle themselves

about the physical possibilities of a future state, nor even to

contest the reality of a place of eternal physical torment. And so

it happened that, when dealing with a lower class of converts, some

prominent Christians in post-apostolic periods appealed more to their

fears than to their hopes, bringing vividly before them awful ideas

of the nature of hell; while on the other hand, the higher class of

converts, if they had not a very clear idea of heaven, were yet drawn

with intense longing to a future which they were to spend in the

company of Christ.

38. In the course of a few hundred years we find the whole Roman

Empire converted to Christianity, while, however, in Arabia and the

East it appears either to have made very little progress, or to have

become corrupted into something very different from that which we

read of in the New Testament. It had not become the national religion

of the Arabs; and we can well imagine that this nation, with their

pretensions to be regarded as the most antient representatives of

the Semitic race, would not look kindly upon a religion which took

its origin in a rival branch of the same family. We can further

imagine that, with such a feeling, they would be very ready to

welcome any skilfully devised religious system which should spring

up amongst themselves. Such an opportunity was afforded them by

Mohammed. Acknowledging in some measure the claims of Moses and

of Christ, Mohammed yet claimed for himself and his religion a

superiority over his rivals, flattering by this means the vanity

of his own countrymen, who considered themselves the elder branch

of the Semitic race. The heaven which was promised by Mohammed was

altogether of a sensuous character, and well calculated to strike

the imagination of his countrymen. He succeeded equally well in

describing hell as a place of physical torture reserved for those

who did not believe in his religion. He further commissioned his

followers to propagate his tenets by the sword, so that men became

converts from dread of earthly punishment, and were retained in his

ranks by the success which attended his arms, and by the promise of

a paradise full of earthly delights, as well as by the threat of a

horrible material hell which was reserved for unbelievers. We could

not possibly have a better or more graphic description of such a

system than that which is given us by Byron:—

‘But him the maids of paradise

Impatient to their halls invite,

And the dark Heaven of Houris’ eyes

On him shall shine for ever bright;

They come—their kerchiefs green they wave,

And welcome with a kiss the brave!

Who falls in battle ’gainst the Giaour

Is worthiest an immortal bower.

But thou, false Infidel! shalt writhe

Beneath avenging Monkir’s scythe;

And from its torment ’scape alone

To wander round lost Eblis’ throne,

And fire unquench’d, unquenchable,

Around, within, thy heart shall dwell;

Nor ear can hear nor tongue can tell

The tortures of that inward hell!’

The disciples of Mohammed believed in the unity of God, but it is

evident that they had not a very exalted conception of His character.

Their trust in Him could infuse zeal into their hearts and vigour

into their arms when they went to make proselytes by the sword,

but could not produce that lofty type of character which has so

frequently appeared amongst the followers of Christ.

39. We have now reached in the history of our problem the period

known as the dark ages, during which the spirit of scientific inquiry

was well-nigh extinct. At length, however, there arrived a time when

the human mind, from a variety of causes, suddenly awoke from the

lethargy into which it had sunk.

When scientific thought was once more directed to the subject of

immortality it was easily seen that the doctrine of the resurrection

in its vulgar acceptation could not possibly be true, since a case

might easily be imagined in which there might be a contention between

rival claimants for the same body. We might, for instance, imagine

a Christian missionary to be killed and eaten by a savage, who was

afterwards killed himself. It is indeed both curious and instructive

to note the reluctance with which various sections of the Christian

Church have been driven from their old erroneous conceptions on

this subject; and the expedients, always grotesque, and sometimes

positively loathsome, with which they have attempted to buttress up

the tottering edifice. Some deem it necessary that a single material

germ or organised particle of the body at death should survive until

the resurrection, forgetting that under such a hypothesis it would

be easy to deprive a man of the somewhat doubtful benefits of such a

resurrection, by sealing him up (while yet alive) in a strong iron

coffin, and by appropriate means reducing his whole physical body

into an inorganic mass. Boston, again, in his _Fourfold State_, goes

still further, adopting the idea that a single particle of insensible

perspiration which has escaped from a man during his life, will

be sufficient to serve as a nucleus for the resurrection body. So

that according to the disciples of this school, the resurrection

will be preceded by a gigantic manufacture of shoddy, the effete

and loathsome rags of what was once the body being worked up along

with a large quantity of new material into a glorious and immortal

garment, to form the clothing of a being who is to live for ever!

Unquestionably we have continuity in this hypothesis, but it is

the continuity of the Irishman’s coat in the story, the owner of

which always made a point of retaining as many as possible of the

rags which were present on the last occasion, those only which had

absolutely fallen to pieces being replaced by something new! We have

only to compare this grotesquely hideous conception with the noble

and beautiful language of Paul, to recognise the depth of abasement

into which the Church had sunk through the materialistic conceptions

of the Dark Ages.

40. But it is needless to say that this offer of a certain class of

theologians to surrender everything except a single shred of the

worn-out body, liberal as it may appear, was nevertheless at once

rejected by the school of scientific men. Death, they replied, must

be regarded as a total and complete destruction of the visible body,

so far at least as the individual life is concerned. At the same

time professing themselves unable to conceive such an existence as a

disembodied spirit, they were forced to conclude like Priestley,[25]

that the soul is not in its nature immortal. At this point, however,

the scientific school splits up into two or even three sections, one

believing with Priestley and others that immortality is a fresh and

miraculous gift conferred upon man at the resurrection; another,

unable to conceive the possibility of a miracle in the case of each

individual, denying a future state altogether; while a third section

maintains that there is no use in discussing the subject, because man

after death has passed beyond the sphere of human inquiry.

41. Regarding the existence and nature of the Deity, various opinions

have been entertained by the disciples of what we may term the

extreme school of science. Some have maintained that we have no

evidence of the existence of any such Being, others that we have no

evidence of His personality, while others argue that although we

may become convinced of His great power and wisdom from the works

of creation, there are other attributes of His character which are

not so revealed. We cannot, for instance, say they, maintain the

benevolence of the Deity in the way in which we understand the word

benevolence, nor have we any evidence that He is just in the way in

which we understand the word justice. It is well known that the late

John Stuart Mill would have regarded the claims of Christianity with

more favour had its character been more Manichæan, that is to say,

had the spirit of evil been allowed a position more nearly equal to

that of the spirit of good in the government of the universe.

42. Let us here pause to indicate two points of similarity between

this scientific school and the system of Christianity. Both, we

conceive, maintain in some sense the supremacy of law or the

invariability of the procedure adopted by the Deity in the government

of the universe (Art. 36); both maintain likewise that the outer

works of the visible universe are insufficient to manifest certain

attributes of the Deity. Here, however, the likeness ends; this

scientific school conceive they have no information beyond the

visible universe, while the Christian system asserts the existence of

an invisible order of things, and the fact of communications having

taken place between the two for the double purpose of revealing God

to man, and of raising man towards God.

43. Leaving now the views of those who may be said to constitute

the extreme left, let us shortly consider the various opinions held

regarding a future state by those who, though often differing widely

from one another, yet rank themselves within the pale of Christianity.

Not a few who revere the sacred writings, believe nevertheless that

the descriptions of the unseen world contained therein are purely

allegorical. These do not believe in the existence of evil spirits

exercising an influence over the mind of man. Satan is regarded by

them as a personification of evil (Διαβόλος, the accuser, Devil’s

advocate) rather than as possessing a real objective existence. The

worst half of the unseen world having thus been got rid of, the other

half follows in due course. Such men do not believe in the unseen

presence of angels (ἄγγελος, messenger); in fine they conceive that

there is nothing above man but the Deity, and that He always acts

according to rigid law. It is an immediate step from this to believe

in the futility of prayer, which is looked upon as necessarily

devoid of any objective influence, although the practice of it may

be regarded as possessing a beneficial subjective effect. A future

life is believed to be conceivable, but only under conditions and in

a universe about which we know and can know nothing. At this point,

however, the views of what may be called the left centre come into

contact with those of the extreme left.

44. But there are others quite disposed to believe in the existence

of the unseen world, who yet regard as figurative a large part of the

Biblical descriptions. Some, like the Church of Rome, consider the

separation of the souls of men after death into two categories, and

only two, as insufficient and unsupported by the spirit of Scripture;

while others cannot admit the eternity of misery, but believe that

the most reprobate will ultimately be reclaimed and elevated into the

regions of bliss.

Others again, arguing from some expressions in the Bible, regard

immortality as a boon reserved for the good alone, believing that the

wicked will be annihilated, both soul and body, in hell. No doubt by

an energetic nature such a fate would be regarded as even worse than

endless misery:

Sad cure! for who would lose,

Though full of pain, this intellectual being?

Those thoughts that wander through eternity

To perish rather, swallowed up and lost

In the wide womb of uncreated night,

Devoid of sense and motion.

So speaks Milton, putting the idea into the mouth of Belial, the

fallen spirit, when addressing his peers.

45. Such are a few of the ways in which the statements of Christ and

his Apostles regarding immortality have been interpreted by those

who call themselves Christians. But amid this great diversity there

is yet one principle common to all. It is imagined that something

peculiar in the history of the world took place at the coming of

Christ, which has not since been repeated. Communications were then

made to mankind which are regarded as unique, and the truth of which

it is held will only be verified in the case of each individual when

he has passed into that country from which we receive no travellers’

tales.

Notwithstanding this general belief, not a few have arisen pretending

to have received a new and supplementary revelation. In most of these

cases the scientific historian may at once come to a conclusion

without any violation of his impartiality,—they are so manifestly the

products of delusion if not of imposture. There is however one system

which merits fuller treatment, inasmuch as it has led to a mode of

viewing the spiritual world which has many followers even at the

present day.

46. Emanuel Swedenborg, the apostle of this system, was in many

respects a remarkable man. Living more than a century ago, and during

the time when Science was pausing for the spring she has since made,

he seems to have foreshadowed, if he did not anticipate, many of the

doctrines now current. We are not however now concerned with his

purely physical speculations.

Swedenborg has written at great length regarding the nature and

destiny of man, and the constitution of the unseen world into which

he asserts he had the power of entering.

He assumes the existence of a human or semi-human race before Adam,

of which he remarks that they lived as beasts. ‘Man,’ he tells us,

‘considered in himself, is nothing but a beast.... Man’s peculiarity

over animals—a peculiarity they neither have nor can have—consists

in the presence of the Lord in his will and understanding. It is in

consequence of this conjunction with the Lord that man lives after

death; and although he should exist like a beast, caring for nothing

but himself and his relations, yet the Lord’s mercy is so great,

being Divine and Infinite, that He never leaves him, but continually

breathes into him His own life, whereby he is enabled to recognise

what is good and evil and true and false.’

Regarding man’s mortal nature we are told by Swedenborg that ‘man at

birth puts on the grosser substances of nature, his body consisting

of such. These grosser substances by death he puts off, but retains

the purer substances of nature, which are next to those that are

spiritual. These purer substances serve thereafter as his body, the

continent and expression of his mind.’[26]

‘A man at death,’ he tells us again, ‘escapes from his material body

as from a rent or worn-out vesture, carrying with him every member,

faculty, and function complete, with not one wanting, yet the corpse

is as heavy as when he dwelt therein.’

Regarding the spiritual world, he tells us ‘that the whole natural

world corresponds to the spiritual world collectively and in every

part; for the natural world exists and subsists from the spiritual

world, just as an effect does from its cause.’ He also tells us

‘that if in the spiritual world two desire intensely to see each

other, that desire at once brings about a meeting. When any angel

goes from one place to another, whether it is in his own city, or

in the courts, or the gardens, or to others out of his own city, he

arrives sooner or later, just as he is ardent or indifferent, the

way itself being shortened or lengthened in proportion.... Change of

place being only change of state, it is evident that approximations

in the spiritual world arise from similitudes of mind and removals

from dissimilitudes; and thus spaces are merely signs of inner

differences.... From that cause alone the hells are altogether

separated from the heavens.’

Of God he says: ‘The Divine is incomprehensible even by the angels,

for there is no ratio between the finite and the infinite.

‘No man or angel can ever approach the Father and immediately

worship Him; for He is invisible, and being invisible can neither be

thought of nor loved.’

Of God’s Providence he says: ‘As in the Lord we are and act, His

Providence is over us from birth to death, and even to eternity....

To talk of the Lord’s Providence as universal, and to separate it

from particulars, is like talking of a whole in which there are no

parts, or of something in which there is nothing. Consequently it

is most false, a mere picture of the imagination, and downright

stupidity, to say that the Lord’s Providence is universal, and not at

the same time in the minutest particulars; for to provide and rule in

the universal, and not at the same time in the minutest particulars,

is not to rule at all.’

Swedenborg likewise believed in an intermediate state analogous to

purgatory, although he objected to the name. This was called by him

the world of spirits, after staying in which, for a longer or shorter

time, the souls of the departed were drafted off to heaven on the one

side, and to hell on the other.

47. We have now said enough to give our readers some idea of

Swedenborg’s spiritual system. Unquestionably it is the system of a

profound thinker, and many great men have not hesitated to express

their admiration of Swedenborg and his works. It is one thing however

to admit the beauty, the philosophical completeness, and even the

possible truth of many of his statements, and another thing to

believe that he actually conversed with the inhabitants of another

world in the way in which one man converses with another.

But, after all, suppose that the every-day experience of men is that

only he who lives in the world as not of the world lives a true life,

and this is the Bible teaching,—whose then is the true doctrine?

Swedenborg errs if he claims this as his _exclusive personal_

experience. Paul claimed it as belonging to all men. Surely men of

science should of all men claim this likewise.

Now, when a man unquestionably honest makes an assertion such as

Swedenborg made, there are only two possible conclusions to which we

can come, unless we choose to remain in a state of mental suspense.

We must either believe that he really saw what he professes to have

seen, or that he was the victim of some strange hallucination, in

virtue of which his subjective impressions became transferred into

the realms of objective realities. We know very well that the human

mind is extremely prone to such delusions, and that the nature

of the case is frequently betrayed by some indiscreet admission

which we have external grounds for believing to be incorrect. Had

Swedenborg confined himself to the invisible world it would have been

very difficult to prove him the subject of a delusion, but when he

converses with angels from the planets, and thus comes to describe

their inhabitants, he enters at once upon dangerous ground.

Concerning his description of the various planets it has been

remarked that his information relates only to those, the existence

of which was known when he wrote, Uranus and Neptune being passed

over. This of itself is a suspicious circumstance. Again, he peoples

the planets Jupiter and Saturn with inhabitants as well as our own

Moon; now, scientific analogy is strongly against either of these two

planets being inhabited, while it is next to certain that our moon

is entirely without inhabitants.

In fine, there is no reason to suppose that the speculations of

Swedenborg were anything else than the product of his own mind, in

the same sense as that in which the speculations of this volume may

be regarded as the product of the minds of its authors.

48. Before concluding this historical sketch let us say a few words

about modern spiritualists in so far as their pretensions have

reference to our subject. They assert the presence among them of the

spirits of the departed, assuming sometimes a visible shape, and

they compare these appearances to those which are recorded in the

Sacred writings. But there is this prominent distinction between the

two: the spiritual communications recorded in the Scriptures are

represented as made to those who were unprepared to receive them, and

also for the most part as taking place in open daylight, or, to speak

more properly, having no sort of reference to light or darkness.

Whatever be their explanation they have an open-air look about them.

On the other hand, the manifestations recorded by the spiritualists

take place as a rule in insufficient light, if not in total darkness,

and in presence of those who are in a state of mental excitement.

Now, for our own part, we should not be disposed to credit any

communication from the world of spirits that was not made openly, and

to those unprepared to receive it, and therefore unprejudiced.

The man of science must be perfectly recipient, but he must in the

interests of truth guard himself against the possibility of delusion.

We know the almost infinite power of the mind not only to delude

itself, but to propagate its delusions to other minds, and, as

we have already remarked, the conditions of these manifestations

are specially favourable to the spread of such delusions. We do

not therefore hesitate to choose between the two alternative

explanations, and to regard these pretended manifestations as having

no objective reality.

49. But while we altogether deny the reality of these appearances, we

think it likely that the spiritualists have enlarged our knowledge of

the power which one mind has of influencing another, and this is in

itself a valuable subject of inquiry. We agree too in the position

assumed by Swedenborg, and by the spiritualists, according to which

they look upon the invisible world not as something absolutely

distinct from the visible universe, and absolutely unconnected with

it, as is frequently thought to be the case, but rather as a universe

which has some bond of union with the present.

This line of argument will be developed in the following chapters of

our book.