The Queen's Visit to France--Sir George C. Lewis on the
War--Inefficiency of Lord Panmure--The Queen and the Emperor--Lord
John Russell's Estrangement from his Friends--The Fall of
Sebastopol--The Queen on the Orleans Confiscation--The Prince
Regent's Letter on the Holy Alliance--Ferment in Italy--The Failure
at the Redan--Lord John's Defence--General Windham--Lord John
Russell's Retirement--Death of Sir Robert Adair--Adieu to the
Turf--Progress of the War--Colonial Office proposed to Lord
Stanley--Lord John Russell's Position--Relations with Mr.
Disraeli--Mr. Labouchere Colonial Secretary--Negotiations for
Peace--The Terms proposed to Russia--The King of Sardinia and M. de
Cavour at Windsor--The Demands of the King of Sardinia--Lord
Palmerston presses for War--Lord Macaulay's History of England--An
Ultimatum to Russia--Death of the Poet Rogers--French
Ministers--The Emperor's Diplomacy--Sir George C. Lewis's Aversion
to the War--Quarrels of Walewski and Persigny--Austria presents the
Terms to Russia--Baron Seebach mediates--The Emperor's Difficulties
and Doubts.
_London, August 21st._--The Queen as usual has had magnificent weather
for her Paris visit, and all has gone well there except that unluckily
she arrived after her time at Boulogne and still more at Paris,
consequently the Emperor was kept waiting at Boulogne, and the whole
population of Paris, which turned out and waited for hours under a
broiling sun, was disappointed, for they arrived when it was growing
dark. However, in spite of this, the scene appears to have been very
fine and animated. Clarendon, who is not apt to be enthusiastic, writes
so to Palmerston, and tells him that Marshal Magnan said he had known
Paris for fifty years, and had never seen such a scene as this, nor even
when Napoleon returned from Austerlitz.
George Lewis called on me yesterday. I have hardly seen him during the
session, and, having advised him to take his present office, I was glad
to be able to congratulate him on his success. He was very natural
about it, and owned that he had every reason to be satisfied with his
reception both by the House of Commons and the City. I found that his
sentiments about war and peace were identical with my own. He had been
all along against the war, and thought it ought to have been prevented,
and might have been in the outset, and that peace ought to have been
made the other day; but, as he was in no way responsible for the war, he
had nothing to do but to submit to the _fait accompli_ and to do his
best to raise the necessary supplies in the most advantageous manner. It
is evident that, if there could have been a potential peace party in the
Cabinet, he would have been one of them, but as it is he kept his real
sentiments to himself and subscribed to the decision of the majority. We
talked of the session and its incidents. He said history recorded
nothing like the profusion with which the present House of Commons was
inclined to spend money. It was impossible to ask for too much; their
only fear seemed to be lest the war should not be conducted with
sufficient vigour, and to accomplish this they were ready to vote any
amount of money. Lewis thinks the rage for war as violent as ever, and
the zeal of the country not at all diminished, he sees no symptoms of
it. The wealth and resources which the crisis has developed are most
curious; thus, he reduced the interest on Exchequer Bills not long
ago--an operation he believes never before attempted in time of war. War
has had little or no effect on trade, which is steady and flourishing;
but he thinks, unless some great successes infuse fresh animation into
the public mind, that before long they will begin to tire of the
contest, and to reflect that it is being carried on at an enormous cost
for no rational object whatever, and merely from motives of pride and
vanity and a false notion of honour. Charles Villiers thinks
differently, and that there is already a manifest change of opinion, and
that opposition to the war has already begun. I wish I could see some
symptoms of it, but, though there may be some, I think they are slight.
Lewis thinks John Russell has completely done for himself by his last
speech. He was recovering from the effects of his first; there was a
reaction in his favour; his friends were anxious to be reconciled to him
and to renew their support and confidence, when he played into the hands
of his enemies and made his own position worse than it was before.
Lewis told me that he was much struck with the mediocrity of Panmure,
who was one of the dullest men he ever knew, and that he was by far the
least able man in the Cabinet, and as bad as possible as Minister of
War--prejudiced, slow, and _routinier_. It is evident that Newcastle was
a much abler man, and if he had happened to have come after Panmure, he
would have been as much belauded as he has been abused.
BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA.
_September 5th._--A complete stagnation in every way; no news whatever
since the battle of the Tchernaya,[1] and nobody has the least idea,
Ministers included, of the state and progress of the war. I asked
Granville, who is just come from Paris, if he knew anything, and he said
he did not, and that the Emperor, whom he had seen a day or two ago,
complained of being equally in the dark. His Majesty, Granville said,
was very low about the war, and complained that none of the expeditions
and diversions had been undertaken which might have advanced the cause
more rapidly. Pélissier seems to be very much _déconsidéré_ and thought
worth very little as a general.
I saw Clarendon one day last week for a short time, but had no
opportunity of hearing the details of his sojourn at Paris. He said the
Queen was delighted with everything and especially with the Emperor
himself, who, with perfect knowledge of women, had taken the surest way
to ingratiate himself with her. This it seems he began when he was in
England, and followed it up at Paris. After his visit the Queen talked
it all over with Clarendon, and said, 'It is very odd; but the Emperor
knows everything I have done and where I have been ever since I was
twelve years old; he even recollects how I was dressed, and a thousand
little details it is extraordinary he should be acquainted with.' She
has never before been on such a social footing with anybody, and he has
approached her with the familiarity of their equal positions, and with
all the experience and knowledge of womankind he has acquired during his
long life, passed in the world and in mixing with every sort of society.
She seemed to have played her part throughout with great propriety and
success. Old Jérome did not choose to make his appearance till just at
the last moment, because he insisted on being treated as a king, and
having the title of _Majesté_ given him--a pretension Clarendon would
not hear of her yielding to.
[Footnote 1: The battle of the Tchernaya was fought on the 16th August,
when General Liprandi attacked the French and Sardinian armies in their
lines, with a large force, but was repulsed with great loss.]
_September 7th._--I had a long visit from the Duke of Bedford this
morning, who came to talk to me about his brother John, his position and
prospects. He has seen John and heard from him in great detail all his
case, and he has likewise seen Clarendon and heard his and the
Government's case. He tells me that he has never in his life suffered
more pain than at hearing these cases and witnessing the bitter feelings
which exist and the charges which are mutually made, especially between
Clarendon and Lord John. The latter thinks he has been very ill-used by
most of his former colleagues, but especially by Clarendon, whose
conduct he thinks both unjust and ungrateful. Clarendon wrote to him
while he was at Vienna in such a tone and language that Lord John had
determined to resign his embassy and return home, and had actually
written a letter to Clarendon for the purpose, but he gave up doing so
partly because he felt that it would make a prodigious noise all over
Europe and partly because, having consulted his brother-in-law, George
Elliot, he prudently advised him against such a step; but he felt
deeply, and resented what he thought bad conduct towards himself. I read
to the Duke all that I had written about John in the preceding pages,
against which he had nothing to say. He asked his brother how he came to
speak so ill _for himself_ in the House of Commons, and he replied that
he was embarrassed by the impossibility of saying everything that he
knew, especially the fact, which I have mentioned, of the way in which
the Emperor Napoleon determined to throw over Drouyn de Lhuys and to
reject the Vienna proposals. This was told to John by Baudin; and one of
the things he complains of is that the Cabinet never was informed of
what had passed, and its members were allowed to suppose, like the
public, that the Emperor's rejection had been spontaneous, instead of
having been suggested and urged upon him by us. John bitterly feels his
own position, his estrangement from his old friends, and, above all, the
unkindness and ingratitude he thinks they have been guilty of towards
him. He is now intent upon his own vindication, and is preparing to
compose it with a view of giving it to the world, though he does not
know, and it is difficult to determine, in what shape. He seems less
dissatisfied with his old enemy Palmerston than with any of the others,
and says he thinks Palmerston is the best man there is at present to be
Prime Minister. After Clarendon he most reproaches Charles Wood.
THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.
_September 17th._--Went to The Grove with Clarendon last Saturday
sennight; on Monday to Doncaster, where I had no time to write anything
but bets in my betting-book, all of which I lost. On the Saturday we
heard from General Simpson by telegraph that the assault was to take
place that day. We were kept in suspense all Sunday, but on Monday
morning read in the 'Times' that the Malakoff was taken, but we had no
idea then that the city with all its vast defences would fall
immediately after, but I heard it the same night at the Huntingdon
station.[1]
I heard a great deal from Clarendon about the royal visit to Paris, and
details connected with it, and we talked over the quarrel with John
Russell, at which he expressed great regret, though not without
bitterness. Clarendon said nothing could exceed the delight of the Queen
at her visit to Paris, at her reception, at all she saw; and that she
was charmed with the Emperor. They became so intimate, and she on such
friendly terms with him, that she talked to him with the utmost
frankness, and even discussed with him the most delicate of all
subjects, the confiscation of the Orleans' property, telling him her
opinion upon it. He did not avoid the subject, and gave her the reasons
why he thought himself obliged to take that course; that he knew all
this wealth was employed in fomenting intrigues against his Government,
which was so new that it was necessary to take all precautions to avert
such dangers. She replied that, even if this were so, he might have
contented himself with sequestrating the property and restoring it when
he was satisfied that all danger on that score was at an end. I asked
Clarendon what he thought of the Emperor himself, and he said that he
liked him, and he was very pleasing, but he was struck with his being so
indolent and so excessively ignorant. The Prince of Wales was put by the
Queen under Clarendon's charge, who was desired to tell him what to do
in public, when to bow to the people, and whom to speak to. He said that
the Princess Royal was charming, with excellent manners, and full of
intelligence. Both the children were delighted with their _séjour_, and
very sorry to come away. When the visit was drawing to a close, the
Prince said to the Empress that he and his sister were both very
reluctant to leave Paris, and asked her if she could not get leave for
them to stay there a little longer. The Empress said she was afraid this
would not be possible, as the Queen and the Prince would not be able to
do without them; to which the boy replied, 'Not do without us! don't
fancy that, for there are six more of us at home, and they don't want
us.' The Emperor himself proposed to the Queen to go to the Chapel
consecrated to the memory of the Duke of Orleans upon the spot where he
met with his fatal accident and expired. It is creditable to her that
she talks without _gêne_ or scruple to the Emperor about the Orleans
family, making no secret of her continued intimacy with them, and with
equal frankness to them of her relations with him. She wrote to the
Queen Marie Amélie an account of her going to the Chapel and of the
Emperor taking her there, and received a very amiable reply. The first
thing she did on her return was to receive the Duc and Duchesse de
Montpensier.
Clarendon told me a few things besides of no great importance, and which
I am not sure that I recollect: about Spain, he said that matters were
going on better there and the Government had contrived to get money--the
Spaniards were very anxious to take part in the war, but he had
discouraged it entirely. As to Naples, that we were calling the
Neapolitan Government to account for their recent impertinence to us,
but that Palmerston and he had disagreed as to what should be done,
Palmerston, according to his old habit, wanting to send ships of war to
Naples and to proceed to violence, while he was opposed to having
another Pacifico affair on our hands, and proposed to proceed with
caution and quietly.
MARRIAGES OF THE ROYAL FAMILY.
While they were in the yacht, crossing over, Prince Albert had told him
that there was not a word of truth in the prevailing report and belief
that the young Prince of Prussia and the Princess Royal were _fiancés_,
that nothing had ever passed between the parents on the subject, and
that the union never would take place unless the children should become
attached to each other. There would be no mere political marriage. The
Prince showed Clarendon all the correspondence which had taken place
between the Emperor of Russia and the Prince Regent about the Holy
Alliance, which he said was very curious, and George IV.'s letter
declining to be a party to it very good indeed. These documents were
left in Lord Liverpool's papers, and fell into the hands of Harcourt,
who married his daughter. Harcourt lent them to the Prince to read, but
exacting a promise that he would not take a copy of them, and he had
since repeatedly pressed the Prince to return them. I told Clarendon
they ought not to be returned, or at least that Harcourt ought to be
desired to give them to be preserved in the Government Archives, for
they can in no way be considered as private property. Lord Liverpool's
papers were for the most part destroyed, but these were preserved. This
is all I can recollect of what he told me.
[Footnote 1: The final bombardment of Sebastopol commenced on the
morning of September 5th, and continued without intermission until the
8th, when the Russians blew up their magazines and in the night
evacuated the southern portion of the city. The intelligence of the fall
of Sebastopol reached England on the afternoon of Monday, September 10,
and was received with great enthusiasm throughout the country.]
_September 23rd._--At The Grove from Saturday to Monday; nobody there
but Reeve; nothing very particular. Clarendon said Prussia was very
anxious to interpose to renew negotiations, but they would not hear of
her interference, and if anything was done it could only be by Austria.
He showed me a paper sent by Hudson with an account, very brief, of the
state of Italy, which is in fermentation though not in open disturbance.
The Sicilian malcontents sent to the King of Sardinia an offer of their
crown for one of his sons. He replied, 'You have need of a man, and a
boy will be of no use to you.' This they took for a refusal, and they
are now thinking of a Coburg; in no case will they have a Murat. I
forget what the Neapolitan Liberals want, but I doubt if the country
will have either the courage or the power to emancipate itself.
GENERAL CHARLES WINDHAM.
_September 28th._--No fresh news, but a letter from Charles Windham (the
hero of the Redan), in which he gives an account of that affair which
corresponds very closely with the report of Russell, the 'Times'
Commissioner. He gives a poor character of the generals in the Crimea,
and says the troops, except some of the old soldiers, behaved by no
means well. The whole thing seems to have been grievously mismanaged on
our part.[1]
I have had much correspondence with the Duke of Bedford about Lord John
and his case, which the Duke says, now that he has heard it all and seen
the correspondence, he thinks much better than he had supposed, and that
John was meditating the publication of a defence of himself, but could
not determine in what shape it should be. I earnestly advised him to
dissuade his brother from publishing anything, as he could not make an
effectual defence of his conduct without making revelations that would
be held unjustifiable and cause all sorts of ill humour and
recriminations, and render his position, both personal and political,
worse than it now is. Some communications in a friendly spirit have
taken place between Lord John and Clarendon, but I can see that there is
still existing a great deal of soreness and a not very cordial feeling
between them. I have been reading Lord Grey's speech on the war, which
he has published in a pamphlet, and I think it excellent and
unanswerable. I long to write something on the subject and to add to
Grey's argument on other parts of the case. I do not care about the
unpopularity of doing so, and am only deterred from taking so much
trouble by feeling that it would be unavailing, and that to attempt to
make the public listen to reason and take a dispassionate view of the
various questions connected with the war on which they have been so
completely bamboozled and misled, would be like Mrs. Partington and her
mop.
[Footnote 1: The British attack on the Redan failed, whilst the French
attack on the Malakoff succeeded, to the extreme annoyance of the
British army and public: but in his assault Colonel Charles Windham (as
he then was) displayed the most signal bravery, which in some measure
redeemed the credit of the British forces. This circumstance gave him an
amount of popularity and distinction which his rank in the army and his
previous services did not altogether justify.]
_October 2nd._--I have been in correspondence for a long time with
Charles Windham, and had a letter from him written a few days after his
great exploit at the Redan. I showed his letter to Granville, and he to
Palmerston and Clarendon. I was glad to find every disposition to reward
his bravery and conduct, and Henry Grenfell told me they had made him a
general and were going to give him a division, as Markham and Bentinck
are both coming home. This was no more than was reasonable to expect;
but great was my astonishment when I was told yesterday morning that
they were thinking of making Windham _Commander-in-Chief_, and I was
asked to give any of his letters to me, from which extracts might be
made to show to the Cabinet to enable them to judge of his character and
talents. I offered to get his journal and letters, from his wife and
others, which I did; but at the same time I said I thought it a
hazardous speculation to raise him _per saltum_ from being a colonel and
brigadier to the command of a great army. B---- said this was true, but
the matter pressed and they did not know where to find a man. This
morning I gave him some papers, and he then told me Simpson had
resigned, and it was necessary to come to some immediate decision.
Codrington would have been undoubtedly chosen if he had not apparently
(for as yet we know very little) failed in what he had to do on the 8th.
With regard to Windham what the Cabinet will do I know not. I suggested
that it would be better to try him first in his command of a division
and go on if possible for some time longer, but Simpson's resignation
compels them to come to some immediate decision, and they do not like to
appoint another man _pro tempore_. I still incline to the opinion that
Windham's extraordinary promotion from so low to so high a rank, and his
passing over the heads of such multitudes of officers, will occasion
great jealousy, envy, heart-burning, and resentment, besides casting a
slur on the whole service in the eyes of the world; for when every
general in the service is passed over, and a colonel appointed who has
never done any but subordinate work, and shown extraordinary bravery and
coolness, but no aptitude for command, because he has had no opportunity
of so doing, every general and superior colonel now on service will feel
himself insulted and a stigma cast upon him. I am not at all sure
Windham may do better than any other man would do, but to justify such
an appointment he ought to do far better; and, though he is a sharp
fellow enough, I have never seen anything in him which indicates real
genius or a superior intellect.
_October 7th._--At Woburn, where the Duke and I had much conversation
about Lord John and his position, and he showed me a great many of
John's letters to him about his quarrel with the Government and the
conduct of Clarendon to him, which he cannot forgive, though they are
again corresponding with ostensible amity. The Duke owns that he does
not see how John can take any prominent part in public life, at least
for the present, and indeed considers it probable that his career as a
statesman is closed; and, what is more, John seems to consider it so
himself and to acquiesce in his position, though what his secret
aspirations may be none can tell. He has, however, determined to give
up his house in town, which looks like retirement. I strongly advised
that John should go to the House of Lords, where he might still act a
dignified and useful part; his position in the House of Commons would be
very anomalous and disagreeable, and it is not at all certain that he
would not lose his seat in the event of an election--very doubtful
whether he would be returned again for the City; and the thing most to
be deprecated is that he should stand and be defeated for that or any
other place. The Duke neither agreed nor dissented, but he owned what I
said of John's position was true, though he still thought he would be
very reluctant to quit the House of Commons for ever, and retire to the
Lords.
DEATH OF SIR ROBERT ADAIR.
On Tuesday last, after a few days' illness, Sir Robert Adair died at the
age of 93, having preserved his faculties, and especially his remarkable
memory, quite to the last. He was the last survivor of the intimate
friends of Fox and of the political characters of his times. He had
entertained a warm affection for Fox, and he preserved a boundless
veneration for his memory; and the greatest pleasure he had was in
talking of Fox and his contemporaries, and pouring forth to willing
circles of auditors anecdotes and reminiscences of the political events
with which he had been mixed up, or of which he had been cognisant in
the course of his long life. This he did in a manner quite remarkable at
so advanced an age, and he never had any difficulty in finding listeners
to his old stories, which were always full of interesting matter, and
related to the most conspicuous characters who flourished during the
reigns of George III. and George IV.
_October 29th._--All last week at Newmarket, and probably very nearly
for the last time as an owner of racehorses, for I have now got rid of
them all, and am almost off the turf, after being on it more or less for
about forty years. I am sorry that I have never kept any memoranda of my
turf life, which might have been curious and amusing; for I have known
many odd characters, and lived with men of whom it would have been
interesting to preserve some record. Perhaps I may one day rake together
my old recollections and trace the changes that have taken place in this
racing life since I first knew it and entered into it, but I cannot do
so now.
Since I last wrote, the war has proceeded without any great events, but
with the same progress and success on the side of the Allies which have
marked the contest throughout and have excited my wonder. The most
important of these successes has been the defeat of Mouravieff at Kars
by the Turks under English officers, which, after what Clarendon told
me, was the very last thing I expected. The death of Molesworth has made
a difficulty for Palmerston; I knew so little of him that I cannot
pretend to say anything about him. That of Lord Wharncliffe touches me
more nearly; but this is more matter of private regret than of public
concern, as the part he played in life was never important, though very
honourable. The appointment of Codrington seems to be well taken, more
perhaps because nobody can suggest a better choice than from any
peculiar merits of the new Commander-in-Chief.[1]
[Footnote 1: The Right Hon. Sir William Molesworth, Secretary of State
for the Colonial Department, died on October 22, 1855, aged 45. John,
2nd Baron Wharncliffe, also died on the 22nd. General Sir William
Codrington had been appointed to the command of the British forces in
the Crimea, on the resignation of General Simpson.]
LORD STANLEY.
_London, November 7th._--The event of the last few days has been the
offer of the Colonial Office to Lord Stanley and his refusal to take it.
When Palmerston proposed it to him he said that he could not give an
answer without consulting his father, which _implied_ that he would
accept if his father gave his consent. He posted down to Knowsley, from
whence he had just come, and entered the room where Derby was playing at
billiards, and much to his astonishment saw his son suddenly return.
'What on earth,' he cried out, 'has brought you back so soon? Are you
going to be married, or what has happened to you?' Stanley said he
wanted to speak to him, and carried him off. What passed is not known,
but of course he advised his son to refuse office. He wrote to
Palmerston in very becoming terms, and, I hear, a very good letter. He
had, if not consulted, certainly imparted to Disraeli what passed, for
Disraeli told me so. I think he judged wisely in declining, for it would
have been an awkward thing to pass at once from the Opposition side of
the House to the Treasury Bench, and take high office in a Cabinet
without having any political or personal connexion with a single member
of it, and to which he has hitherto been opposed generally, although
upon many subjects his opinions have much more coincided with theirs
than with those of the party to which he still nominally belongs. He is
young and can afford to wait, and his position and abilities are certain
before long to make him conspicuous and to enable him to play a very
considerable part. He is exceedingly ambitious, of an independent turn
of mind, very industrious, and has acquired a vast amount of
information. Not long ago, Disraeli gave me an account of him and of his
curious opinions--exceedingly curious in a man in his condition of life
and with his prospects. Last night Lord Strangford (George Smythe)
talked to me about him, expressed the highest opinion of his capacity
and acquirements, and confirmed what Disraeli had told me of his notions
and views even more, for he says that he is a real and sincere democrat,
and that he would like if he could to prove his sincerity by divesting
himself of his aristocratic character and even of the wealth he is heir
to. How far this may be true I know not: if it be true, it may possibly
be ascribed in some degree to his own consciousness that the realisation
of his ideology is impossible, and at all events time will show whether
these extreme theories will not be modified by circumstances and
reflexions. Nothing appears to me certain but that he will play a
considerable part for good or for evil, but I cannot pretend to guess
what it will be. At present he seems to be more allied with Bright than
with any other public man; and, as his disposition about the war and its
continuance is very much that of Bright, it would have been difficult
for him to take office with Palmerston, whose whole political existence,
or at least his power, rests on the cry for war and its active and
energetic prosecution.
_London, November 12th._--I saw John Russell on Saturday morning to have
a talk with him about the state of affairs and the questions of peace
and war. There still exists a great deal of bitterness between him and
Clarendon, he thinking that he has been very ill used by Clarendon and
others of his former colleagues. He is particularly sore about their
allowing so many things to be said to his disadvantage concerning the
Vienna negotiations which they know to be untrue, without saying a word
to contradict them and cause justice to be done to him, particularly in
reference to the matter of Austria having engaged to join if Russia
refused her last proposals. George Grey denied that Austria had so
engaged, and none of the others ever admitted it, whereas it was
perfectly true. Lord John and I do not agree as to the earlier part of
the question, because he was originally a party to the war while I was
always against it. He was, however, rather against it quite at first,
being, as he told me, with Aberdeen, and against Clarendon and
Palmerston, who were all along inclined to go to war. He had been at the
Mansion House dinner the night before, where he was very ill received,
though he would not allow it; he prefers to flatter himself that the
signs of his unpopularity were not so strong and marked as everybody
else who was present thought them.
I likewise saw Disraeli and had some talk with him. He told me that he
had now nothing whatever to do with the 'Press,' and that the series of
articles in that paper on the war and in favour of peace were all
written by Stanley. He said he had received a letter from Stanley to
this effect: 'My dear Disraeli,--I write to you in confidence to tell
you that I have been offered and have refused the Colonial Office. As it
is due to Lord Palmerston to keep his offer secret, I have told nobody
of it but yourself and my father, and I beg you not to mention it to
anybody.' On receiving this he said he began to concoct an answer in his
mind of rather a sentimental kind, and conveying his approbation of the
course he had taken, but before he put pen to paper he got the 'Times'
with Stanley's letter to Sir----, which was tantamount to a disclosure
of the whole thing, on which he wrote instead, 'Dear Stanley,--I thank
you for your letter, but I had already received your confidential
communication through your letter to Sir----.'
I have occasion to see Disraeli very often about ----'s affairs, about
which he has been wonderfully kind and serviceable, and on these
occasions he always enters on some political talk, and in this way we
have got into a sort of intimacy such as I never thought could have
taken place between us.
MR. LABOUCHERE TAKES OFFICE.
_London, November 24th._--After his failure with Stanley, Palmerston
applied to Sidney Herbert, who went to Broadlands, but, finding that he
and Palmerston could not agree upon the subject of war and peace (the
details of their disagreement I do not know), he declined the offer of
the Colonial Office. Palmerston then sent for Labouchere, who
accepted.[1] He called on me the day after and told me he had been to
Broadlands, that Palmerston had told him everything about the state of
affairs and his own views and opinions, and, as he could find nothing
therein to object to, he had accepted the office. As Labouchere is
certainly moderate, this would indicate more moderation on the part of
Palmerston than Sidney Herbert found in him, unless Labouchere and
Sidney Herbert take totally dissimilar views of affairs.
After this, a few days ago, I had a long conversation with George Lewis,
who told me that France and Austria were endeavouring to bring about
peace, and that communications were going on between France and our
Government on the subject, and he said, moreover, that Palmerston was by
no means so stiff and so bent on continuing the war as was generally
supposed. This intelligence appeared to me to explain what I could not
understand in his communications with Sidney Herbert and Labouchere;
for, if the Emperor has really intimated to our Government his
determination to try and make peace, Palmerston must needs come down
from his very high horse and evince a disposition to go along with our
Imperial ally, who has got the whole game in his own hands, and whom we
must perforce follow when he is determined to take his own course. Then
our warlike propensities may be probably restrained by the alarming
prospect of financial difficulties which Lewis sees looming in the
distance. He said to me, 'I am sure I do not know how I shall provide
ways and means next year, for the enormously high prices will be a great
blow to consumption, and the money market is in a very ticklish state.'
I said, 'You will have to trust to a great loan, and ten per cent.
income tax;' to which he assented. They have now patched up the
Government, by getting Baines to take the Duchy of Lancaster with a seat
in the Cabinet--a very respectable man, who cannot speak, and who will
be of no use to them. Neither he nor Labouchere will add much to their
strength, but they are both very unexceptionable appointments. I think
that, in spite of the undiminished violence of the press, the prevailing
opinion is that there is the beginning of a change in the public mind,
and an incipient desire for peace; and I agree with Disraeli, who thinks
that, when once the current has fairly turned, it will run with great
rapidity the other way.
[Footnote 1: The Right Hon. Henry Labouchere, born in 1798, a highly
respected member of the Whig party, who filled many offices in Liberal
Governments. He was created Baron Taunton on his retirement from office
in 1859, and died in July 1869.]
PROPOSALS FOR PEACE.
_November 27th._--At length there really does appear to be a prospect of
putting an end to this odious war, and my conjectures of a few days ago
are assuming the shape of realities. Yesterday morning I met George
Lewis in the Park and turned back and walked with him to the door of his
office, when he told me the exact state of affairs. I had received a
letter from the Duke of Bedford in the morning, who said that Charles
Wood, who was at Woburn, had told him the statement in the 'Press' a
week ago was so substantially accurate that they must, he thought, have
received their information from some French official source. This was in
itself confirmatory of all I had already inferred and believed. Lewis's
story was this: The Austrians have framed a proposal for peace which
they offer to send to Russia, and, if she refuses it, Austria engages
to join the Allies and to declare war. The Emperor Napoleon agrees with
Austria, and is resolved not to go on with the war if peace can be
arranged on the Austrian terms. This resolution he has communicated to
us, and invited us to accede thereto; Walewski's letters are not merely
pressing, but even peremptory. It is in fact a second edition of the
Vienna Conference and proposals, with this difference, that, while on
the last occasion the Emperor knocked under to us and reluctantly agreed
to go on with the war, he is now determined to go on with it no longer,
and requires that we should defer to his wishes. Our Government are
aware that they have no alternative, and that nothing is left for them
but to acquiesce with a good grace and make the best case they can for
themselves here, the case being that the Emperor is determined to make
peace, and that we cannot carry on the war alone. This was the amount of
Lewis' information, to which he added the expression of his disgust at
the pitiful figure we cut in the affair, being obliged to obey the
commands of Louis Napoleon, and, after our insolence, swagger, and
bravado, to submit to terms of peace which we have already scornfully
rejected; all which humiliation, he justly said, was the consequence of
our plunging into war without any reason and in defiance of all prudence
and sound policy. Afterwards I saw Charles Villiers and had a talk with
him. He told me Clarendon had been sent for on Sunday to Windsor in a
great hurry to meet Palmerston there. The Queen had received a letter
from the Emperor, brought by the Duke of Cambridge, which no doubt
contained in a private and friendly shape to her the communications
which Walewski had already made officially to the Government and she
wanted to know what answer she should send to it. Charles Villiers told
me that Palmerston had already thrown out a feeler to the Cabinet to
ascertain if they would be willing to carry on the war without France,
but this was unanimously declined. I can hardly imagine that even
Palmerston really contemplated such a desperate course.
_November 29th._--I met Sidney Herbert last night. He seems to know
what is going on and thinks we shall have peace; he only doubts whether
the terms will be such as Russia will accept, for he is not convinced,
as I am, that Austria has already settled that with Russia. He told me
that, when Palmerston offered him office, he had not received the French
communication, and was ignorant that it was coming.
_December 4th._--At The Grange the last four days, where I found
everybody in total ignorance of what is passing about peace, except
Sidney Herbert, who told me that the plan is _neutralisation_. On coming
back yesterday I met Lord Malmesbury just come from Paris; he is
supposed to be the person who supplied all its information to the
'Press' paper, and I believe it was he. He confirmed the Emperor's
desire for peace, but thought it very doubtful whether Russia would
accept the terms of the Allies. He told me likewise that Pélissier has
sent word he is in a fix, as he cannot advance or expel the Russians
from their positions; and James Macdonald told me the Duke of Cambridge
is going again to Paris to represent us at a grand council of war to be
held there, to decide on future operations. If it were not that the
Allies seem infallible and invincible, and the Russians unable to
accomplish anything, offensive or defensive, I should augur very ill
from this council of war, for nothing can be worse than to have a set of
men at Paris forming plans to be executed by another set in the Crimea
who have had no share in the deliberations.
This morning the Duke of Bedford writes me word that Westmorland tells
him he has heard from Clarendon the state of affairs, and the answer we
have sent to France, and he augurs ill of peace, as he thinks there can
be no agreement with Russia on such terms; and the 'Morning Post,' which
has long been quite silent about war or peace, has this morning an
article which is evidently a regular Palmerstonian manifesto, decidedly
adverse to any hope of peace, for it is certain that Russia will
continue the war, _coûte que coûte_, rather than submit to such
conditions as the 'Morning Post' says we are to impose on her. I am
persuaded Palmerston and Clarendon will do all they can to prevent
peace being made on any moderate terms, and the only hope is that the
Emperor Napoleon may take the matter into his own hands and employ a
_douce violence_ to compel us to give way.
THE PROPOSALS MODIFIED.
_December 5th._--I met Charles Villiers last night, who told me a good
deal of what is going on, and cleared up some matters. The Austrian
proposal transmitted here by the Emperor Napoleon was considered by the
Cabinet and sent back with amendments--that is, it was made more
stringent. The Emperor consented to send it so amended to Vienna, and it
remains to be seen what course Austria will take--whether she will send
it in its present shape to Russia or adhere to her own edition, and
whether, if she does send it, she will (supposing it to be rejected)
join the Allies and declare war. The latter, I think, she will not do,
nor be bound to do. Next is the question what the Emperor Napoleon will
do if Austria declines to adopt the amended version, or if Russia should
reply she would take the original proposal, but not our amendments. The
Emperor is certainly very anxious to make peace, and when he is bent
upon a thing he generally does it, and my own opinion and hope is that
he will refuse to give way to us _now_ as he did last May. It is
universally admitted that every man in France desires peace ardently.
There is, Charles Villiers tells me, great uneasiness amongst
Palmerston's adherents, and some idea that, if peace cannot be had on
the terms he has insisted on, he will be no party to making it, and if
the majority of the Cabinet are for taking the original terms proposed,
supposing the Emperor Napoleon again to press their acceptance, that he
will resign, throw himself on the popular enthusiasm for the war, and
leave his colleagues to make an unpopular peace. If Palmerston was forty
instead of seventy he would probably do this; but he has not time to
wait for fresh combinations and to speculate on distant chances, so he
will probably consent to make peace if he is obliged by France to do so,
and trust to fortune to enable him to reconcile Parliament and the
country to it. This is rendered more likely by Disraeli having made a
communication to the Government that he and Stanley will be ready to
support any peace they may now make.
_December 6th._--I saw George Lewis yesterday, who told me the state of
affairs so far as he recollects it; but it is evident that he takes but
a secondary interest in the details of diplomacy, however anxious he may
be about the results, and what passed shows the extreme difficulty of
keeping clear of mistakes, even when one's information is derived from
the best sources. He said he did not think Russia would accept the
offered terms, and Clarendon thought not also. The terms which it will
be most difficult for her to swallow are the neutralisation of the Black
Sea, which as worked out is evidently worse than limitation, for she is
to have no fortress and no arsenal there, so that she will, in fact, be
quite defenceless, while the other Powers can at any time collect fleets
in the Bosphorus and attack her coasts when they please. Then she is to
cede half Bessarabia to the Turks, including the fortress of Ismail, the
famous conquest of Souvaroff when he wrote to the Empress Catherine,
'_L'orgueilleuse Ismailoff est à vos pieds_;' and they are not to repair
Bomarsund, or erect any fortress on the Aland Isles. The alterations we
made in the scheme sent to us were not important, and what surprised me
much was, the terms, instead of being tendered by Austria, were
concocted at Paris by Walewski and the Emperor--at least so Walewski
asserts, but there must I think be some incorrectness in this, for it is
impossible to doubt that the Emperor and Austria really concerted them
between themselves, though Walewski may have had a hand in the matter in
some way. However, the terms are gone or going directly to St.
Petersburg. I earnestly hope they may be accepted, be they what they
may. Russia is to be asked whether she will take them Yes or No, and,
upon the preliminaries being signed, hostilities will cease. I asked if
Russia might not accept as a basis, and negotiate as to modification and
details, but Lewis professed not to understand how this is, or whether
her acceptance generally would or not bind her to _all_ the conditions
precisely as they are set forth. He knows nothing in fact of diplomacy
and its niceties and operations.
M. DE CAVOUR AT WINDSOR.
Lord John Russell met Clarendon at Windsor Castle,[1] but refused to
hear what Clarendon offered to tell him of the state of the negotiation;
he thought he should compromise his own independent action if he did. He
says, 'Were peace to be made on the four points newly explained and
enlarged, I would do nothing but applaud and support.' The only men Lord
John communicated with at Windsor were Cavour and Azeglio. He writes: 'I
asked Cavour what was the language of the Emperor of the French; he said
it was to this effect: France had made great efforts and sacrifices, she
would not continue them for the sake of conquering the Crimea; the
alternative was such a peace as can now be had by means of Austria, or
an extension of the war for Poland,' etc. The Sardinians, Ministers and
King, are openly and warmly for the latter course. I suspect Palmerston
would wish the war to glide imperceptibly into a war of nationalities,
as it is called, but would not like to profess it openly now. I am
convinced such a war might suit Napoleon and the King of Sardinia, but
would be very dangerous for us in many ways. Cavour says if peace is
made without anything being done for Italy, there will be a revolution
there. Clarendon is incredulous.
[Footnote 1: The King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel, arrived in England
on the 30th November, accompanied by his Minister, M. de Cavour. Lord
Clarendon and Lord John Russell were invited to Windsor to meet the
King.]
THE KING OF SARDINIA.
_London, December 11th._--I met Clarendon at the Travellers' on Friday
evening, and had a talk with him. He did not seem inclined to enter much
into the question of peace and war, but he told me that Buol declared
most solemnly that he had had no communication with Russia about _the
terms_, and that he had only slight hopes that peace might be made. Of
the terms themselves Clarendon did not say a word. He talked a great
deal about the King of Sardinia, and gave me an account of his
conversations both with the King and Cavour. He thinks well of the King,
and that he is intelligent, and he has a very high opinion indeed of
Cavour, and was especially struck with his knowledge of England, and our
Constitution and constitutional history. I was much amused, after all
the praises that have been lavished on Sardinia for the noble part she
has played and for taking up arms to vindicate a great principle in so
_unselfish_ a manner, that she has after all a keen view to her own
interest, and wants some solid pudding as well as so much empty praise.
The King asked Clarendon what the Allies meant to do for him, and
whether he might not expect some territorial advantage in return for his
services. Clarendon told him this was out of the question, and that, in
the state of their relations with Austria, they could hold out no such
expectation; and he put it to the King, supposing negotiations for peace
were to take place, and he wished his pretensions to be put forward by
us, what he would himself suggest that a British Minister could say for
him; and the King had the candour to say he did not know what answer to
give. Cavour urged the same thing, and said the war had already cost
them forty millions of francs, instead of twenty-five which they had
borrowed for it and was the original estimate, and they could only go on
with it by another loan and fresh taxes, and he did not know how he
should propose these to the Chambers without having something
advantageous to offer to his own country, some Italian acquisition. They
would ask for what object of their's the war was carried on, and what
they had to gain for all their sacrifices and exertions. Clarendon said
they must be satisfied with the glory they had acquired and the high
honour their conduct had conferred on them; but Cavour, while he said he
did not repent the part they had taken, thought his countrymen would be
very little satisfied to have spent so much money and to continue to
spend more without gaining some Italian object. They complained that
Austria had, without any right, for a long time occupied a part of the
Papal territory, and suggested she should be compelled to retire from
it; but Clarendon reminded him that France had done the same, and that
this was a very ticklish question to stir.
The King and his people are far better satisfied with their reception
here than in France, where, under much external civility, there was very
little cordiality, the Emperor's intimate relations with Austria
rendering him little inclined towards the Piedmontese. Here the Queen
was wonderfully cordial and attentive; she got up at four in the morning
to see him depart. His Majesty appears to be frightful in person, but a
great, strong, burly, athletic man, brusque in his manners, unrefined in
his conversation, very loose in his conduct, and very eccentric in his
habits. When he was at Paris his talk in society amused or terrified
everybody, but here he seems to have been more guarded. It was amusing
to see all the religious societies hastening with their addresses to
him, totally forgetting that he is the most debauched and dissolute
fellow in the world; but the fact of his being excommunicated by the
Pope and his waging war with the ecclesiastical power in his own country
covers every sin against morality, and he is a great hero with the Low
Church people and Exeter Hall. My brother-in-law said that he looked at
Windsor more like a chief of the Heruli or Longobardi than a modern
Italian prince, and the Duchess of Sutherland declared that, of all the
Knights of the Garter she had seen, he was the only one who seemed as if
he would have the best of it with the Dragon.
My hopes of peace wax fainter. Everybody seems to think there is no
chance of Russia accepting our terms, or of her proposing any that the
Allies would accept. Lewis told me yesterday evening that he expected
nothing, and that Russia had now made known (but in what way he did not
say) that she was disposed to treat. Meanwhile Palmerston continues to
put articles in the 'Morning Post' full of arrogance and _jactance_, and
calculated to raise obstacles to peace. I told Lewis so, and he said it
was very foolish, and that he held very different language in the
Cabinet, but this is only like what he did in '41, when he used to agree
to certain things with his colleagues and then put violent articles in
the 'Morning Chronicle' totally at variance with the views and
resolutions of the Cabinet. Labouchere told me that he thought the
condition of the cession of Ismail ought never to have entered into the
terms proposed to Russia.
_December 14th._--My hopes of peace, never very sanguine, are now
completely dashed, for Lewis told me last night that he thought the
terms were at last pretty well agreed upon between England, France, and
Austria. I was greatly surprised, for I thought they had been agreed
upon long ago and must be by this time on their way to St. Petersburg. I
said so; and he replied, 'Oh no, they are only just on the point of
being settled.' It was quite extraordinary, he said, how eager
Palmerston was for pursuing the war. I gathered from him that our
Government has been vehemently urging that of France, through Cowley, to
be firm in pressing the most stringent terms on Russia, and particularly
not to consent to any negotiation, and to compel her to accept or
refuse. I said this was not reasonable, and that we had no right to
propose the terms as an ultimatum. That, he replied, was exactly what we
were doing, that Cowley was very urgent with the Emperor, who appeared
to be intimidated by him, and that he was evidently very much in awe of
England and afraid of having any difference with us. I said I could not
believe that the Emperor would not leave himself a loophole, and if, as
was most probable, Russia declined the terms, but offered to negotiate,
that he would agree to that course, which, however, Lewis clearly
thought he would not do against our inclination. I was greatly surprised
to hear this, because I had a strong impression that the Emperor, when
he really desired anything very much (as I believe that he did this
peace), would obstinately persevere in it; and it seems so obviously his
interest to gratify his own people rather than to be led by this
country, that I was persuaded he never would consent to this proposal
being _un dernier mot_, and thus to ensure the failure of the attempt.
Palmerston, who is the most obstinate man alive in pressing any object
he has once set his mind upon, was sure to press the French Government
with the utmost vehemence and pertinacity as soon as he found there was
a chance of making them yield to his will.
MACAULAY'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND.
_December 17th._--This morning the two new volumes of Macaulay's History
came forth. The circumstances of this publication are, I believe,
unprecedented in literary history; 25,000 copies are given out, and the
weight of the books is fifty-six tons. The interest and curiosity which
it excites are prodigious, and they afford the most complete testimony
to his immense popularity and the opinion entertained by the world of
his works already published. His profits will be very great, and he will
receive them in various shapes. But there is too much reason to
apprehend that these may be the last volumes of his history that the
world will see, still more that they are the last that will be read by
me and people of my standing. Six years have elapsed since the
appearance of the first volumes, and these two only advance about ten
years. He announced at the outset that he meant to bring down the
history of England to a period within the memory of persons still
living, but his work has already so much expanded, and of course will do
so still more from the accumulation of materials as he advances, that at
his present rate of progress he must live much beyond the ordinary
duration of human life, and retain all his faculties as long, to have
any chance of accomplishing his original design; and he is now in such a
precarious state of health that in all human probability he will not
live many years. It is melancholy to think that so gifted an intellect
should be arrested by premature decay, and such a magnificent
undertaking should be overthrown by physical infirmities, and be limited
to the proportions of a splendid fragment. He is going to quit
Parliament and to reside in the neighbourhood of London.
This morning the 'Morning Post' has published the terms which are
offered by the Allies and are now on their way from Vienna to St.
Petersburg. They were already pretty well known, but it is the first
time that Palmerston (for the article is evidently his own) has
announced them so openly and distinctly, and they state _totidem verbis_
that it is an Ultimatum which is sent to St. Petersburg. I believe this
course to be unprecedented, and it is certainly unfair. If Russia had
applied to the Allies and expressed a desire for peace, if she had asked
them on what terms they would consent to terminate the war, it would
have been quite fair and reasonable that they should have stated the
precise conditions, adding if they pleased that they would consent to no
others and to no change whatever in them, though it may be doubted if it
would be wise to be thus peremptory. But to send to Russia and propose
to her to make peace, and accompany the proposal with an Ultimatum and
an announcement that they would listen to no remonstrances or
suggestions, much less any alterations, and that she must say Yes or No
at once, is a stretch of arrogance and dictation not justified by the
events of the war and the relative conditions of the belligerents, or by
any usage or precedent that I ever heard of.
Reports are very rife of the distressed state of Russia and of her
inability to make head any longer against the Allies, but very little is
really known of the condition of the country, of its remaining
resources, and of the disposition of the people. Nobody can doubt that
the terms are deeply humiliating to the pride of such a Power, which has
been long accustomed to stand in so high a position and hold such lofty
language; and if she consents to accept the offered terms, it must be
that her enormous losses have really incapacitated her for going on with
the war, and that her Government is conscious that the next campaign
will be still more disastrous to her than the two preceding ones have
been. I have very little doubt that Palmerston has hastened to publish
these terms in hopes that they may find acceptance with a considerable
part of the public here, and that they may the more tightly bind the
Emperor Napoleon, and, in the event of Russia sending any conditional
acceptance and proposing to treat, that he may be unable to enter into
any negotiation whatever. It has surprised me that he should have so
completely given way to Palmerston as he has done.
DEATH OF MR. ROGERS.
_December 21st._--The poet Rogers died two days ago at the age of 93. I
have known him all my life, and at times lived in a good deal of
intimacy with him, but for some years past he had so great an aversion
to me that I kept away from him and never saw anything of him.[1] He was
an old man when I first made his acquaintance between thirty and forty
years ago, or probably more. He was then very agreeable, though peculiar
and eccentric; he was devoured by a morbid vanity, and could not endure
any appearance of indifference or slight in society. He was extremely
touchy, and always wanted to be flattered, but above all to be listened
to, very angry and mortified when he was not the principal object in
society, and provoked to death when the uproarious merriment of Sydney
Smith or the voluminous talk of Macaulay overwhelmed him and engrossed
the company; he had a great friendship nevertheless for Sydney Smith,
but he never liked Macaulay. I never pretended, or could pretend, to be
a rival to him, but I was not a patient and attentive listener to him,
and that was what affronted him and caused his dislike to me as well as
to anyone else of whom he had the same reason to complain. His voice was
feeble, and it has been said that his bitterness and caustic remarks
arose from the necessity of his attracting attention by the pungency of
his conversation. He was undoubtedly a very clever and accomplished man,
with a great deal of taste and knowledge of the world, in the best of
which he had passed his life. He was hospitable, generous, and
charitable, with some weaknesses, many merits, and large abilities, and
he was the last survivor of the generation to which he belonged.
[Footnote 1: Samuel Rogers, the author of the _Pleasures of Memory_
(which was published in 1792), was born at Stoke Newington in 1762. His
father was a banker, and he remained a partner in the bank all his life.
He died on December 18, 1855.]
_The Grove, December 23rd._--Came here for Christmas. No other guests
but the family. We have had some talk about the peace propositions and
other odds and ends. Clarendon told me that Walewski and Persigny are
bitter enemies, and their estrangement the greater because Walewski is a
corrupt jobber and speculator, and Persigny an honest man. When Drouyn
de Lhuys resigned the Foreign Office, much to the Emperor's annoyance
and regret, he did not know where to find a man, and he determined to
appoint Walewski because he knew not whom else to take. Not choosing to
send the offer to him through Drouyn, he employed Cowley, and requested
him to telegraph in cypher to Clarendon a request that Cowley would send
for Walewski and communicate to him the Emperor's intentions. A curious
shift to be reduced to, but throughout the Eastern Question Cowley has
acted the part of Foreign Minister to the Emperor almost as much as that
of Ambassador.
Lewis this morning recapitulated to me the exact circumstances of the
overtures from France about peace. It arrived here on a Saturday; was
submitted to the Queen on Sunday, who approved of it; on Monday (or
Tuesday) it was read to the Cabinet, when no discussion took place, but
Palmerston shortly said, without giving any reasons, that he thought we
must agree to the proposal, which was generally concurred in. The next
day there was another Cabinet, when they examined in detail all the
articles and discussed them. A few alterations were made, none of which
were of any importance except the Bomarsund question. The cession of
Bessarabia and the neutralisation of the Black Sea both formed part of
the original proposal, and the latter was particularly insisted upon,
and reasoned out at considerable length by France, for it turns out that
the Emperor has never had so much in view the object of _making peace_
(not expecting, nor ever having expected, that these proposals would be
accepted) as the object of securing the active cooperation of Austria,
which he expects to do. Austria engages, if Russia refuses the
conditions, to put an end to diplomatic relations between the two
Empires, and Napoleon thinks this cannot fail to end in hostilities, and
to this extension of the alliance he looks for bringing the war to a
conclusion. He thinks, moreover, that, when Austria has declared war,
Russia will attack her defenceless frontier, and that as any attack upon
Austria will compel the whole of Germany to assist her and to take part
in the war against Russia, this offer will lead to Prussia and the whole
of the German States being engaged on the side of the Allies, and that
such a confederacy cannot fail to bring the war to a successful issue,
because Russia would be absolutely incapable of offering any resistance
to it. This is a new view of the policy and motives of France, but I
very much doubt if the whole of the Emperor's scheme will be realised.
Even though Austria may take up arms, it is probable that Russia will
act strictly on the defensive, and will avoid giving any cause to the
German States to depart from their neutrality. We both agreed that the
conduct of Austria is quite inexplicable, and that Russia will never
forgive her for the part she has acted and is acting now.
CRITICISMS ON THE WAR.
_The Grove, December 24th._--George Lewis and I have been walking and
talking together all the morning. He is fully as pacific as I am, and
entertains exactly the same thoughts that I do, of the egregious folly
of the war, of the delusion under which the English nation is labouring,
and of the wickedness of the press in practising upon the popular
credulity in the way it has done. He seems to like to talk to me on this
subject, because he can talk freely to me, which he could hardly do with
any of his own colleagues, still less in any other society. This morning
he again recurred to the circumstances of the negotiations now going on,
and he gave me an account of the transaction which puts the whole thing
in a very ridiculous light, which would be very comical if it were not
so very tragical. 'Think,' he said, 'that this is a war carried on for
the independence of Turkey, and we, the Allies, are bound to Turkey by
mutual obligations not to make peace but by common consent and
concurrence. Well, we have sent an offer of peace to Russia of which the
following are among the terms: We propose that Turkey, who possesses one
half of the Black Sea coast, shall have no ships, no ports, and no
arsenals in that sea; and then there are conditions about the Christians
who are subjects of Turkey, and others about the mouths of the Danube,
to which part of the Turkish dominions are contiguous. Now in all these
stipulations so intimately concerning Turkey, for whose independence we
are fighting, Turkey is not allowed to have any voice whatever, nor has
she ever been allowed to be made acquainted with what is going on,
except through the newspapers, where the Turkish Ministers may have read
what is passing, like other people. When the French and Austrian terms
were discussed in the Cabinet, at the end of the discussion someone
modestly asked whether it would not be proper to communicate to Musurus
(the Turkish Ambassador in London) what was in agitation and what had
been agreed upon, to which Clarendon said he saw no necessity for it
whatever; and indeed that Musurus had recently called upon him, when he
had abstained from giving him any information whatever of what was going
on. Another time, somebody suggesting in the Cabinet that we were bound
to Turkey by treaty not to make peace without her consent, Palmerston,
who is a great stickler for Turkey, said very quietly that there would
be no difficulty on that score; in point of fact, the Turk evidently
'Stands like a cypher in the great account.'
_The Grove, December 26th._--Since I have been here Clarendon has
resumed all his old habits of communication and confidence with me, has
told me everything and shown me everything that is interesting and
curious. I wish I could remember it all. Such fragments as have remained
in my memory I will jot down here as they recur to me. Here are letters
from Seymour at Vienna describing his good reception there, gracious
from the Court, and cordially civil from the great society, especially
from Metternich who seems to have given the _mot d'ordre_. Metternich
talked much to Seymour of his past life and recollections, complimented
him for his reports of conversations with the Emperor Nicholas, and said
that many years ago the Emperor had talked to him (Metternich) about
Turkey in the same strain, and used the same expression about '_le
malade_' and '_l'homme malade_,' when Metternich asked him '_Est-ce que
Votre Majesté en parle comme son médecin ou comme son héritier_?' Also
letters from Bloomfield (Berlin) and from Buchanan (Copenhagen) with
different opinions as to the probability of Russia accepting or
refusing--the former for, the second against; some curious letters from
Cowley, full of his indignation against Walewski; the quarrels of
Persigny and Walewski; the perplexity of the Emperor, his desire for
peace, his hopes that Russia may lend a favourable ear to the proposals;
Cowley's suspicions of Walewski, and in a smaller degree of the Emperor
himself, especially of His Majesty's communications with Seebach, the
Saxon Minister, and not impossibly through him with St. Petersburg.
A curious anecdote showing the strange terms the parties concerned are
on: One day Cowley was with Walewski (at the time the question of terms
was going on between France and Austria) and the courier from Vienna was
announced. Walewski begged Cowley, who took up his hat, not to go away,
and said he should see what the courier brought. He opened the
despatches and gave them to Cowley to read, begging him not to tell the
Emperor he had seen them. In the afternoon Cowley saw the Emperor, who
had then got the despatches; the Emperor also gave them to Cowley to
read, desiring him not to let Walewski know he had shown them to him!
DISPUTES OF FRENCH MINISTERS.
There has been a dreadful _rixe_ between Walewski and Persigny. I have
forgotten exactly the particular causes, but the other day Persigny went
over to Paris partly to complain of Walewski to the Emperor. He would
not go near Walewski, and told the Emperor he should not; the Emperor,
however, made them both meet in his Cabinet the next day, when a violent
scene took place between them, and Persigny said to Walewski before his
face all that he had before said behind his back; and he had afterwards
a very long conversation with the Emperor, in which he told him plainly
what danger he was in from the corruption and bad character of his
_entourage_, that he had never had anything about him but adventurers
who were bent on making their own fortunes by every sort of infamous
_agiotage_ and speculation, by which the Imperial Crown was placed in
imminent danger. 'I myself,' Persigny said, 'am nothing but an
adventurer, who have passed through every sort of vicissitude; but at
all events people have discovered that I have clean hands and do not
bring disgrace on your Government, like so many others, by my profligate
dishonesty.' 'Well,' said the Emperor, 'but what am I to do? What remedy
is there for such a state of things?' Persigny replied that he had got
the remedy in his head, but that the time was not come yet for revealing
his ideas on the subject.
As we went to town, we talked over the terms proposed to Prussia.
Clarendon said he could not understand the policy of Austria nor what
she was driving at. She had entered very heartily into plans of a
compulsory and hostile character against Russia, who would never forgive
her, especially for proposing the cession of Bessarabia. I said I
thought the most objectionable item of their propositions (and I
believed the most unprecedented) was the starting by making it an
Ultimatum. He replied that it was Austria who tendered the Ultimatum,
and that it was not exactly so, the sharp edge having been rounded off
by the mode to be adopted, which was as follows: Esterhazy was to
communicate the project to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and say he had
reason to believe that the Allies would be willing to make peace on
those terms; he was then to wait nine days. If in that time the Russian
Government replied by a positive negative, he was, as soon as he got
this notification, to quit St. Petersburg with all his embassy; if no
answer was returned at the end of nine days, he was to signify that his
orders were to ask for an answer in ten days, and if at the end thereof
the answer was in the negative, or there was no answer, he was to come
away, so that there was to be no Ultimatum in the first instance. 'But,'
I said, 'what if Russia proposed some middle course and offered to
negotiate?' 'His instructions were not to agree to this.' 'Well,' said
I, 'but when you abstain from calling this an Ultimatum, it is next to
impossible that Russia should not propose to negotiate, and if she does
beg that her proposal may be conveyed to the Allies before everything
is closed, it will be very difficult to refuse this; and is it not
probable that France and Austria will both vote for entering into
_pourparlers_; and, if they do, can you refuse?' He seemed struck with
this, and owned that it was very likely to occur, and that, if it did,
we should be obliged to enter into negotiation. So probable does this
contingency appear, that there has already been much discussion as to
who shall go from hence to the Congress, if there is one. I said he had
much better go himself. He expressed great dislike to the idea, but said
the Queen and Prince wished him to go, and that Cowley urged him also,
and was desirous of going with him. I see he has made up his mind to
prevent any negotiation if he can, and, if it is unavoidable, to take it
in hand.
NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.
This afternoon Persigny arrived from Paris and came directly to the
Foreign Office. The Emperor had given him an account of his interview
with M. de Seebach,[1] who had gone off directly afterwards _viâ_ Berlin
to St. Petersburg. The Emperor told him to do all he could to induce the
Russian Government to consent to the terms, and to assure them that, if
they did not, it would be long enough before they would have any other
chance of making peace; that he wished for peace, but that above
everything else he was desirous of maintaining unimpaired his alliance
and friendship with England; that England had most fairly and in a very
friendly spirit entered into his difficulties and his wishes; that she
was a constitutional country with a Government responsible to
Parliament, and that he was bound in honour to enter in like manner into
the obligations and necessities of this Government. They had had some
differences of opinion which were entirely reconciled; they were now
agreed as one man, and no power on earth should induce him to separate
himself from England or to take any other line than that to which he had
bound himself in conjunction with her. This announcement, which the
Emperor made with great energy, carried consternation to the mind of
Seebach, and he resolved to lose no time in getting to St. Petersburg
to make known the Emperor's intentions.
It is thus evident that the Emperor's mind is divided between his
anxiety to make peace and his determination to have no difference with
England; but his desire for peace must be great when, as Clarendon
assures me, it was not without difficulty that he was deterred from
ordering his army away from the Crimea. The feeling here towards the
Emperor seems to be one of liking and reliance, not unaccompanied with
doubt and suspicion. He is not exempt from the influence of his
_entourage_, though he is well aware how corrupt that is, and he listens
willingly to Cowley and to whatever the English Government and the Queen
say to him, but his own people eternally din into his ears that we are
urging him on to take a part injurious to his own and to French
interests for our own purposes, and because our Government is itself
under the influence of a profligate press and a deluded people; and
although he knows that those who tell him this are themselves working
for their own private interests, he knows also that there is a great
deal of truth in what they say. His own position is very strange,
insisting upon being his own Minister and directing everything, and at
the same time from indolence and ignorance incapable of directing
affairs himself, yet having no confidence in those he employs. The
consequence is that a great deal is ill done, much not done at all, and
a good deal done that he knows nothing about, and he is surrounded with
quarrels, jealousies, and struggles for influence and power both between
his own Ministers and between them and the foreign diplomatists at his
Court.
LORD PALMERSTON'S POSITION.
We have had a good deal of talk about Palmerston. Clarendon says nothing
can go on better than he and Palmerston do together. They seldom meet
except in the Cabinet, and their communications go on by notes between
Downing Street and Piccadilly. Palmerston, much more moderate and
reasonable than he used to be, sometimes suggests things or expressions
in despatches, which Clarendon always adopts or declines according to
his own ideas, and Palmerston never insists. Palmerston is now on very
good terms with the Queen, which is, though he does not know it, greatly
attributable to Clarendon's constant endeavours to reconcile her to him,
always telling her everything likely to ingratiate Palmerston with her,
and showing her any letters or notes of his calculated to please her;
but he says it is impossible to conceive the hatred with which he is
regarded on the Continent, particularly all over Germany. An agent of
his (Clarendon's) who, he says, has supplied him with much useful
information, has reported to him that he finds the old feeling of
antipathy to Palmerston as strong and as general as ever, and that it is
as much on the part of the people as of the Governments, both thinking
they have been deceived and thrown over by him.
[Footnote 1: M. de Seebach was the Saxon Minister in Paris, through
whom many of these communications passed.]
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
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