Difficulties of the Campaign--Prince Albert and the King of
Prussia--The Prince goes to France--Military Commanders--Critical
Relations of the Ministers--The Crimea--The Emperor Napoleon and
Prince Albert--Austria and the Allies--The Landing in the
Crimea--The Battle of the Alma--Royal Invitations--The Crimean
Expedition--Lord John's Hostility to his Colleagues--False Report
from Sebastopol--The Crimean Campaign--Anecdotes of Lord
Raglan--The Russian Defence--Trade with the Enemy--Anecdote of
Nesselrode--John Bright's Opinion of the War--Defence of
Sebastopol--The Balaklava Charge--The Judges at the Nomination of
Sheriffs--Lord John takes more moderate Views--The Battle of
Inkerman--Impolicy of the War--Inkerman--Spirit of the
Nation--Military Enthusiasm--Parliament summoned--Want of
Foresight--Accounts of the Battle--Lord Raglan as a
General--Sufferings of the Army--Agreement with Austria--Opponents
of the War--Meeting of Parliament--The Government attacked--The
Foreign Enlistment Bill--Foreign Enlistment Bill passed--Mr.
Bright's Speech on the War--Review of the Year.
_August 29th_, 1854.--I have been out of town since the above was
written; at Grimston for York races, where Lord Derby was in high force
and spirits, carrying everything before him at the races, and not a word
was ever uttered on politics. There is no news, but dreadful accounts of
the health of both armies and of the prevalence of cholera both abroad
and at home. The French particularly, who have lost the most, are said
to be completely demoralised and disheartened, and to abhor the war
which they always disliked from the beginning. My present impression is
that we shall come to grief in this contest; not that we shall be beaten
in the field by the Russians, but that between the unhealthy climate,
the inaccessibility of the country, and the distance of our resources,
Russia will be able to keep us at bay, and baffle our attempts to reduce
her to submission.
PRINCE ALBERT AND THE KING OF PRUSSIA.
_September 4th._--At The Grove for a couple of days, where I had much
talk with Clarendon, and he showed me a great many papers about
different matters: a very good letter written by Prince Albert to the
King of Prussia, who had written to him a hypocritical letter, asking
where the English and French fleets were going to winter, and whether he
might depend on them in case he was attacked by Russia in the Baltic,
which Clarendon said was a mere artifice to obtain knowledge of our
plans, that he might impart them to the Emperor Nicholas, as he well
knew he was in no danger of being attacked by Russia. The Prince wrote
an excellent answer, giving him no information, and entering into the
whole question of Prussian policy without reserve. He starts to-day to
Boulogne, invited by a letter from the Emperor himself, beginning 'Mon
cher frère,' replied to very well and civilly by Prince Albert who
began, 'Sire et mon cher frère.' Clarendon said Aberdeen was as hot as
any one upon the Crimean expedition.
They are not at all satisfied with Lord Raglan, whom they think
oldfashioned and pedantic, and not suited to the purpose of carrying on
active operations. They wanted him to make use of the Turkish light
cavalry, Bashi-Bazouks, who under good management might be made very
serviceable, but he would have nothing to say to them; and still more
they are disgusted with his discouragement of the Indian officers who
have repaired to the army, and who are, in fact, the most efficient men
there are. They look on General Brown as the best man there, and have
great expectations of Cathcart. It is very curious that neither the
Government nor the commanders have the slightest information as to the
Russian force in the Crimea or the strength of Sebastopol. Some
prisoners they took affirmed that there were 150,000 men in the
peninsula, but nobody believes that, except Dundas who gives credit to
it. They are impatient for the termination of Dundas's period of
service, which will be in December, when Lyons will command the fleet.
_September 11th._--I went to The Grove on Friday, but was brought up on
Saturday by gout, and detained in London ever since. We had much talk
about a variety of things. The Prince is exceedingly well satisfied
with his visit to the Emperor. The invitation to Windsor appears to have
been publicly given in an after dinner speech. Clarendon said a great
deal about the Government, its prospects and its difficulties, and of
the conduct and dispositions of different men in it, that the Peelites
had all behaved admirably, and he has a very high opinion of Newcastle,
who is able, laborious, and fair. He does not see so much of Aberdeen as
he did last year while the question of peace or war was still pending.
He and Aberdeen do not very well agree, and therefore Aberdeen does not
come to the Foreign Office as he used to do. I asked him in what they
differed, and what it was Aberdeen now wanted or expected. He said that
Aberdeen was quite of opinion that a vigorous prosecution of the war
afforded the best chance of restoring peace, and that he was as eager as
anybody for the expedition of Sebastopol, but he was out of humour with
the whole thing, took no interest in anything that was done, and instead
of looking into all the departments and animating each as a Prime
Minister should do, he kept aloof and did nothing, and constantly raised
objections to various matters of detail. In the Cabinet he takes hardly
any part, and when differences of opinion arise he makes no effort to
reconcile them, as it is his business to do. In short, though a very
good and honourable man, he is eminently unfitted for his post, and in
fact he feels this himself, has no wish to retain it, but the contrary,
and only does so because he knows the whole machine would fall to pieces
if he were to resign. John Russell Clarendon thinks a necessity as
leader of the House of Commons, but he is disgusted with his perpetual
discontent and the bad influence exercised over him by his confidants,
and he thinks he has not acted a generous part towards Aberdeen in
suffering him to be attacked and vilified as he has been by his (John's)
followers and adherents, who endeavour to make a distinction between him
and Aberdeen, which is equally unconstitutional on principle and false
in fact. The same thing applies to Palmerston, and they have neither of
them stood forward as they ought to have done in Aberdeen's defence,
and claimed a joint responsibility with him in every act of the
Government. We talked over what could possibly be done if Aberdeen did
retire, and I suggested that he (Clarendon) might take his place, and
that the rest would be more willing to accept him for the head of the
Government than any other man. He expressed the greatest disinclination
to this idea, to which he never could consent, but owned his present
office was extremely agreeable to him and deeply interesting.
Nevertheless, I do not think, if the case occurred and the place was
offered to him _consensu omnium_, that his scruples would be
insurmountable.
So certain are they of taking Sebastopol that they have already begun to
discuss what they shall do with it when they have got it. Palmerston
wrote Clarendon a long letter setting forth the various alternatives,
and expressing his own opinion that the Crimea should be restored to the
Turks. Clarendon is dead against this, and so, he told me, is Stratford.
At Boulogne the Emperor and Newcastle agreed that the best course will
be to occupy the Crimea and garrison Sebastopol with a large force of
English and French, and hold it _en dépôt_ till they can settle
something definitive; and Clarendon leans to this arrangement, which
will at least be a gain of time.
VISIT OF PRINCE ALBERT TO FRANCE.
_London, September 19th._--At The Grove again last week, where as usual
I heard a great deal of miscellaneous matters from Clarendon and read a
great many despatches from different people. I asked him what the Prince
had told him of his visit to Boulogne, and what his opinion was of the
Emperor. He said the Prince had talked to him a great deal about it all
at Osborne, and this is the substance of what he said as far as I
recollect it: The Prince was very well satisfied with his reception; the
Emperor took him in his carriage _tête à tête_ to the great review, so
that they conversed together long and without interruption or witnesses.
The Emperor seems to have talked to the Prince with more _abandon_ and
unreserve than is usual to him. The Prince was exceedingly struck with
his extreme apathy and languor (which corresponds with what Thiers told
me of him) and with his ignorance of a variety of matters which it
peculiarly behoved him to know. He asked the Prince a great many
questions about the English Constitution and its working, relating to
which the Prince gave him ample and detailed explanation, and Clarendon
said that all that he repeated as being said to the Emperor was as good,
sound, and correct as it possibly could be. The Emperor said that he
felt all the difficulties of his own position, and enlarged upon them
with great freedom, particularly adverting, as one of them, to the
absence of any aristocracy in France. The Prince, in reply to this,
seems to have given him very judicious advice; for he told him that any
attempt to _create_ an aristocracy in France resembling that of England
must be a failure, the conditions and antecedents of the two countries
being so totally dissimilar; that he might confer titles and
distinctions to any amount, and so surround himself with adherents whom
he had obliged, but that he had better confine himself to that and not
attempt to do more. When they parted, the Emperor said he hoped it would
not be the last time he should have the pleasure of seeing His Royal
Highness, to which the Prince replied that he hoped not, and that he was
charged by the Queen to express her hope that he would pay her a visit
at Windsor, and give her an opportunity of making the Empress's
acquaintance, to which the Emperor responded 'he should be very glad to
see the Queen at Paris.' This _insouciant_ reception of an invitation
which a few months before he would have jumped at is very unaccountable,
but it meant something, for it was evidently a _mot d'ordre_, because
when the Prince took leave of Marshal Vaillant, he said he hoped he
would accompany the Emperor to Windsor, where, though they could show no
such military spectacle as the Emperor had shown him, they would do what
they could, to which Vaillant replied, 'We hope to see Her Majesty the
Queen and Your Royal Highness at Paris.' There seems no disposition at
present to give him the Garter which is supposed to be the object of his
ambition, and which Walewski is always suggesting.
Clarendon is extremely disgusted at the conduct of Austria and her
declaration of neutrality, and he said that the complaints of the doings
of the Austrians in the Principalities were not without foundation.
Drouyn de Lhuys spoke very openly to Hübner on the subject, and pitched
into the Austrian Government without stint or reserve, and Cowley sent a
despatch in which all he said was detailed, with the addition that it
was Drouyn de Lhuys' intention to embody it in a formal despatch to
Bourqueney to be communicated to the Austrian Government.
LANDING IN THE CRIMEA.
_September 22nd._--The army has landed in the Crimea without opposition.
It is difficult to conceive that the Russians should have been so
utterly wanting in spirit, and so afraid to risk anything, as to let the
landing take place without an attempt either by land or sea to obstruct
it. They have a great fleet lying idle at Sebastopol, and though, if it
had come out, its defeat and perhaps destruction would have been
certain, it would have been better to perish thus, _vitam in vulnere
ponens_, and inflicting damage on its enemy as it certainly might have
done, than to remain ingloriously in harbour and wait to be taken or
destroyed, as it infallibly will be when the town itself shall fall.
Great indignation is expressed at the prospect of Napier's returning
from the Baltic without making any attempt on Cronstadt, or to perform
any exploit beyond the Bomarsund affair. He is detested by his officers,
and they one and all complain that he has been so little adventurous,
and maintain that more might have been done. The justness and
correctness of this, time will show.
_October 2nd._--At The Grove on Saturday, where I generally pick up some
scraps of information from Clarendon on one subject or another. On
Saturday came the news that Sebastopol had been taken, which we did not
believe a word of, but after dinner the same evening we got the
telegraphic account of the victory gained on the 20th on the heights
above the Alma, and yesterday Raglan's telegraphic despatch was
published. It is nervous work for those who have relations and friends
in the army to hear of a 'desperate battle' and severe loss, and to
have to wait so many days for the details and casualties. The affair
does not seem, so far as we can conjecture, to have been very decisive,
when only two guns and a few prisoners were taken. If it had depended on
St. Arnaud, the expedition would have put back even after it had sailed;
while actually at sea, St. Arnaud, who stated himself to be ill and
unable to move, summoned a council of war on board the 'Ville de Paris.'
The weather was so rough that it was determined that it would not be
safe for Raglan to go, as with his one arm he could not get on board; so
Dundas went, and General Brown, and some other officers deputed by
Raglan to represent himself, together with the French Admiral. A
discussion took place which lasted several hours. St. Arnaud strongly
urged that the expedition should be put off till the spring, and he
objected to all that was proposed as to the place of landing--in short,
threw every obstacle he could in the way of the whole thing. Dundas and
all the English officers vehemently protested against any delay and
change of plan, and represented the intolerable shame and disgrace of
putting back after having actually embarked, and their opposition to the
French general's proposal was so vehement that he ended by giving way,
rose from his sick bed, and consented to go on. He declared that he only
agreed to the place proposed for landing in consequence of the urgent
representations of his allies, and this he wrote home to his own
Government. He is a very incapable, unfit man, and Clarendon told me
that his own army recognised the great superiority of Raglan to him, and
that the French were all delighted with the latter.
THE INVITATION TO WINDSOR.
It seems that there was some misunderstanding as to the invitation given
by the Prince to the Emperor at Boulogne, and the latter gives a very
different account of what passed from that given by the Prince. The
Emperor says that when he took leave of the Prince, he said, 'I have not
been able to give you such a reception as I could have wished, but you
see I am only occupying an hotel; if you will come to Paris, where I
should be delighted to receive the Queen, I could give her and yourself
a more fitting reception;' and then, he says, the Prince invited him to
Windsor, which he only seems to have taken as a civility unavoidable
under the circumstances. It is impossible to say which account is the
true one, but I rather believe that of the Emperor to be correct.
Clarendon wrote this to the Queen, whose answer I saw; she said the
intention was to make the invitation something between a cordial
invitation and a mere civility, which the Emperor might avail himself of
or not, according to his convenience. However, Her Majesty says she
thinks the matter stands very well as it is, and she desires it may be
notified to the Emperor that the most convenient time for his visit, if
he comes, will be the middle of November.
The Duke of Cambridge and Prince Napoleon have both been strongly
opposed to the Crimean expedition; the latter, they say, does nothing
but cry, and is probably a poor creature and a poltroon. I am surprised
the Duke should be so backward; however, I hope to hear he has done his
duty in the field. The clamour against Dundas in the fleet is
prodigious, and the desire for his recall universal, but he will stay
out his time now, which will be up in December. It is the same thing
against Napier in the Baltic; he will come away as soon as the ice sets
in, and next year Lyons will be sent in his place, as the war will then
be principally carried on in the north.
I think a storm will before long threaten the Government from the
quarter of John Russell, who has been for some time at Minto. He wrote
to Clarendon the other day, and alluded to the necessity of having an
autumn session, to which Clarendon replied that he was not so fond of
Parliament as Lord John was, and deprecated very much any such measure.
To this Lord John sent as odious and cantankerous an answer as I ever
read, and one singularly illustrative of his character. He said that he
was not fonder of Parliament than other people, and his own position in
the House of Commons had not been such as to make him the more so, and
that it had been rendered more disagreeable by the fact of the two
morning papers which professed to support the Government being always
personally hostile to him; but, he went on, if we were fortunate enough
to obtain a complete success in the Crimea, he did not see why he should
not be at liberty to retire from this, which he thought the very worst
government he had ever known. Of course, if there was any failure, he
must remain to bear his share of the responsibility of it. Clarendon was
immensely disgusted, but wrote back a very temperate answer. He said
that it was equally difficult to go on with him and without him, for the
Whigs, though often very angry with him, would follow him and would not
follow anybody else. He thinks, however, that he is in a state of mind
to create all sorts of embarrassments, and particularly that he will
propose to bring forward his Reform Bill again, the consequences of
which nobody can foresee. He says Palmerston has behaved much better,
for though he might complain, having been disappointed in certain
objects he had (such as being War Minister), he has made no
difficulties, and been very friendly. Clarendon confirmed what I had
heard, that Aberdeen is in a state of great dejection and annoyance at
the constant and virulent attacks on him in the press; his mind is
dejected by the illness of his son, whom he never expects to see again,
and this renders him sensitive and fretful, and he is weak enough to
read all that is written against him instead of treating it with
indifference and avoiding to look at the papers whose columns are day
after day full of outrageous and random abuse.
_October 8th._--The whole of last week the newspapers without exception
(but the 'Morning Chronicle' particularly), with the 'Times' at their
head, proclaimed the fall of Sebastopol in flaming and triumphant
articles and with colossal type, together with divers victories and all
sorts of details, all which were trumpeted over the town and circulated
through the country. I never believed one word of it, and entreated
Delane to be less positive and more cautious, but he would not hear of
it, and the whole world swallowed the news and believed it. Very soon
came the truth, and it was shown that the reports were all false.
Anybody who was not run away with by an exaggerated enthusiasm might
have seen the probability that reports resting on no good authority
would probably turn out untrue, but the press took them all for gospel,
and every fool follows the press. When the bubble burst, the rage and
fury of the deluded and deluding journals knew no bounds, and the
'Times' was especially sulky and spiteful. In consequence of a trifling
error in a telegraphic despatch they fell on the Foreign Office and its
clerks with the coarsest abuse, much to the disgust of Clarendon.
_October 20th._--At Newmarket all last week; very successful on paper,
but won very little money. I am every day more confirmed in my
resolution to get rid of my racehorses, but shall do it gradually and as
opportunities occur, and then confine myself to breeding. The two
objects I now have in view are this, and to get out of my office. I want
to be independent, and be able to go where and do what I like for the
short remainder of my life. I am aware that 'man never is, but always to
be blest,' and therefore when I have shaken off racing and office I may
possibly regret both; but my mind is bent on the experiment, and I fancy
I can amuse myself with locomotion, fresh scenes, and dabbling in
literature _selon mes petits moyens_. Of politics I am heartily sick,
and can take but little interest in either governments or the
individuals who compose them; with the exception of Clarendon I am on
intimate and confidential terms with no one.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
Ever since the news came of the battle of the Alma, the country has been
in a fever of excitement, and the newspapers have teemed with letters
and descriptions of the events that occurred. Raglan has gained great
credit, and his march on Balaklava is considered a very able and
judicious operation. Although they do not utter a word of complaint, and
are by way of being fully satisfied with our allies the French, the
truth is that the English think they did very little for the success of
the day, and Burghersh told some one that their not pressing on was the
cause (and not the want of cavalry) why the Russian guns were not taken.
The French, nevertheless, have been well disposed to take the credit of
the victory to themselves.
Burghersh tells two characteristic anecdotes of Raglan. He was extremely
put out at the acclamations of the soldiers when he appeared amongst
them after the battle, and said to his staff as he rode along the line,
in a melancholy tone, 'I was sure this would happen.' He is a very
modest man, and it is not in his nature any more than it was in that of
the Duke of Wellington to make himself popular with the soldiers in the
way Napoleon used to do, and who was consequently adored by them. The
other story is that there were two French officers attached to
headquarters, very good fellows, and that the staff were constantly
embarrassed by the inveterate habit Raglan had of calling the enemy 'the
French.' He could not forget his old Peninsular habits.
In this war the Russians have hitherto exhibited a great inferiority in
their conduct to that which they displayed in their campaigns from 1807
to 1812, when they fought the battles of Eylau and Borodino against
Napoleon. The position of Alma must have been much stronger than that of
Borodino, and yet how much more stoutly the latter was defended than the
former. Then their having allowed the allies to land without molestation
is inconceivable, and there is no doubt that they might have attacked
Raglan with great effect as he emerged from the wood on his march to
Balaklava, but all these opportunities they entirely neglected. I
expect, however, that they will make a vigorous defence at Sebastopol,
and that the place will not be taken without a bloody struggle and great
loss of life.
RUSSIAN TRADE.
Within the last few days a very important question has arisen, the
decision of which is a very difficult matter. It has been found that the
commerce of Russia has not been materially diminished, as their great
staples (hemp, &c.) have passed regularly through the Prussian ports,
being brought there by land, and it is now desired to devise some means
of putting an end to this exportation. Clarendon has written to Reeve
about it, and Granville has obtained returns of the amount of hemp and
linseed imported from Russia in past years and in the present, from
which it appears that though there is a diminution it is not a very
considerable one. The effect produced is only the inevitable consequence
of the policy that was adopted deliberately and after great
consideration at the beginning of the war; and how that policy is to be
adhered to, and the consequences complained of prevented, is the problem
to be solved. A blockade of the Prussian ports in the Baltic has been
suggested--a measure, as it seems to me, very questionable in point of
right and political morality, and certain to be attended by the most
momentous consequences. Such a measure may not be without precedent, or
something resembling precedent; but no Power with anything like
self-respect or pride could tamely submit to such an outrage and such an
insult, and as it would certainly afford a _casus belli_, Prussia could
hardly, without abandoning all claim to be considered a great Power,
abstain from declaring war _instanter_; and, whatever may be the
sentiments of the Prussian nation and of the Germans generally with
regard to Russia, it is by no means unlikely that such an arbitrary and
imperious proceeding would enlist the sympathies and the passions of all
Germans without exception in opposition to us, and to France if she
became a party to it.
_Newmarket._--Granville told me on Saturday morning that he was much
alarmed at the disposition evinced by John Russell, and he expects an
explosion sooner or later.
_London, October 30th._--I returned last night and found a meeting of
the Committee of Council settled for to-day, to consider the question of
stopping Russian trade. Wilson has drawn up a paper in which he
discusses the various modes of accomplishing this object, and recommends
that the Queen should forbid all trade with Russia, and prohibit the
importation of Russian produce, and require certificates of origin for
tallow, hemp, &c. John Russell writes word that he cannot attend the
meeting, but is ready, though reluctant, to vote for Wilson's proposal.
Granville and Cardwell are both dead against it, after a discussion at
the Council Office at which the majority were against the proposal.
_November 4th._--At The Grove from Wednesday to Saturday; the Walewskis,
Lavradios, Granvilles, Azeglio, and Panizzi were there, a pleasant party
enough. Walewski told me a curious thing which he said he knew to be
true. We were talking of Nesselrode, and I asked if he knew what his
present position was with his Emperor. He said he had been out of
favour, but latterly had resumed all his influence and was very well at
Court; that although in the beginning of the quarrel he had done his
best to moderate the Emperor and to preserve peace, it was nevertheless
true that he was perhaps the immediate cause of the war, which had
turned upon the acceptance or refusal of the Turkish modifications of
the Vienna Note; that when they arrived the Emperor was inclined to
accept them, and that Nesselrode dissuaded him from doing so, advising
him to adhere to the unaltered Note, not to listen to the modifications,
and insisting that, if he did so, the allies would compel the Turks to
waive their demands and to accept the Note in its original shape.
Walewski also said that the Emperor was exceedingly incensed when the
fatal circular, which made the Vienna Note an impossibility, was
published. He said it was never intended for publication, and he found
great fault with the document itself, insisted on knowing by whom it had
been composed, and ordered the author to be brought before him. The man
(whose name I forget) was not to be found, and events which pressed on
drove it out of His Majesty's mind.
In the 'Times' of yesterday appeared a very able letter of Bright's with
his view of the war, and the faults committed by our Government in
respect to it, which letter as nearly as possible expresses my own
opinion on the subject. I have never agreed with those who fancy that by
mere bluster we might have averted the war, but I think by more firmness
towards not only Russia but towards Turkey, and still more towards the
press and the public excitement here, together with a judicious
employment of the resources of diplomacy, we might have prevented it.
However, we are in for it, and I not only see no chance of getting soon
out of it, but I do not feel the same confidence that everybody else
does, that we are certain to carry it to a successful end.
SEBASTOPOL BESIEGED.
_London, November 13th._--At Worsley all last week; nothing was thought
of but the war, its events and vicissitudes. The tardiness of
intelligence and the perplexity and agitation caused by vague reports
and telegraphic messages drive everybody mad; from excessive confidence,
the public, always nose-led by the newspapers, is fallen into a state of
alarm and discouragement. There is no end to the mischief which the
newspapers and their correspondents have done, are doing, and no doubt
will continue to do. There does not seem at this moment more reason to
doubt that we shall take Sebastopol than there ever was, but the
obstinate defence of the Russians indicates that its capture will not be
effected without a tremendous struggle and great sacrifice of life. On
the other hand, the Russians, instead of despairing of being able to
hold the place, are full of confidence that they will be able to
protract their defence, till our losses, and still more the weather,
will compel us to raise the siege, and then they expect to compel us to
abandon the Crimea altogether, and to make our re-embarkation a
dangerous and disastrous operation. It is to be hoped that such a
calamitous result is not in store for us, but there is no disguising
from ourselves that we have got a much tougher and more difficult job on
our hands than we ever contemplated, and that our success is by no means
such a certainty as we have all along flattered ourselves that it would
be; for supposing we succeed in entering the place by storm, our work
will then be not nearly done. Sebastopol is not invested, and when the
Russian garrison finds itself no longer able to hold the place, there is
nothing to prevent its evacuating it on the other side and effecting a
junction with the main Russian army. We shall then have to reduce the
forts on the northern side, to put the place in a state of defence, and
commence a fresh campaign against Menschikoff in the centre of the
Crimea. All this presents an endless succession of difficulties,
demanding large supplies and resources of all sorts which it will be no
easy matter to afford. We are now talking of sending every soldier we
possess to the scene of action, and expending our military resources to
the last drop, leaving everything else at home and abroad to take care
of itself, a course which nothing but an extreme necessity can justify,
while at the same time it cannot be denied that having gone so far we
cannot stop halfway, and having committed so large a part of our gallant
army in this unequal contest, we are bound to make the greatest
exertions and sacrifices to prevent their being overwhelmed by any
serious disaster. But this very necessity only affords fresh ground for
condemning the rashness with which we plunged into such a war and
exposed ourselves to such enormous dangers, and incurred such large
sacrifices for so inadequate an object.
It is not very easy to ascertain what the feeling is in Russia about the
war, but there is reason to believe that the nobles are getting very
sick of it, and are very discontented with the Emperor, not so much for
having engaged in it as for the manner in which it has been carried on.
At St. Petersburg there prevails an intense hostility to us, and great
wrath against Austria, and instead of yielding, or any thought of it,
the notion is that they mean to redouble their efforts next year, and
bring into the field far greater forces than they have yet done. I
perceive that the question of the disposal of the Crimea (when we get
it) is still undecided. Some fancy that we ought to hold it, as a great
advantage to have the power of offering it back to Russia when the
question of peace arises. I am more inclined to the other view, of
destroying the place, and if possible the harbour, and, after carrying
off or destroying all the ships, to abandon the peninsula and leave the
Russians to reoccupy it if they please. This would be very consistent
with the object with which the war was professedly undertaken, and the
Crimea, without Sebastopol and without a fleet, would be no longer
formidable to Turkey for many a year to come; but no doubt there would
be difficulty in this as in any arrangement, and much difference of
opinion, not unlikely to produce dissension, amongst our allies and
ourselves. There is good reason to believe that our late naval attack on
the forts was a blunder, and that it did no good whatever. If Lyons had
been in command, he probably would have declined to make it, and he
could have ventured to exercise his own discretion, which Dundas could
not. Then it was very badly arranged, and this was the fault of the
French Admiral, who at the last moment insisted on altering the plan of
attack, and (contrary to the advice of all his officers) Dundas gave way
to him. In this, however, it is not fair to blame the English Admiral,
who may have acted wisely; for his position was delicate and difficult,
and he had to consider the alliance of the countries and the harmonious
action of the two fleets, as well as the particular operation.
BALAKLAVA.
_November 14th._--Yesterday morning we received telegraphic news of
another battle, from which we may expect a long list of killed and
wounded. The affair of the 25th, in which our light cavalry was cut to
pieces, seems to have been the result of mismanagement in some quarter,
and the blame must attach either to Lucan, Cardigan, Captain Nolan who
was killed, or to Raglan himself. Perhaps nobody is really to blame,
but, if any one be, my own impression is that it is Raglan. He _wrote_
the order, and it was his business to make it so clear that it could not
be mistaken, and to give it conditionally, or with such discretionary
powers as should prevent its being vigorously enforced under
circumstances which he could not foresee, or of which he might have no
cognisance.
It is evidently the plan of the Russians to wear out the allied armies
by incessant attacks and a prolonged defence, sacrificing enormous
numbers of men which they can afford, but considering that they gain on
the whole by the disproportionate, but still considerable, losses they
inflict upon us. It is quite on the cards, if they can keep up the
spirit of their men, who show great bravery though they cannot stand
against our's, that they may _cunctando restituere rem_, and compel us
at last to raise the siege, and at St. Petersburg they are very
confident of this result. Here, though people are no longer so confident
and elated as they were, no human being doubts of our ultimately taking
the town.
Yesterday we had rather an amusing scene in the Court of Exchequer at
the nomination of sheriffs, which does not often supply anything lively.
The Head of Caius College, Cambridge, and this year Vice-Chancellor,
was on the list, and Judge Alderson vehemently protested against his
remaining there. A long discussion ensued, in which almost everybody
took part, whether his name should be kept on or not, and if he should
be struck off the roll. At last Alderson moved he should be struck off,
to which somebody moved as an amendment (a course I suggested) that he
should be omitted, but not struck off. It was to be put to the vote,
when I asked if Alderson himself could vote, whether it was not a
meeting of the Privy Council, at which the judges _attended_ to give in
names for sheriffs, and that Privy Councillors only could vote as to the
choice of them. Alderson vehemently denied this view, and asserted that
it was no meeting of the Privy Council, the proof of which was that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer took precedence of the Lord President, and
that the puisne judges had a right to vote. They then desired to see the
Act of Richard II., which the Chancellor examined and read out, and
afterwards he gave it as his opinion that the judges could vote, and
this opinion was acquiesced in by the rest. Ultimately they all agreed,
Alderson included, to accept the course I had proposed, and the Doctor's
name was omitted from the list, but not struck off the roll.
_November 15th._--The Duke of Bedford tells me that Lord John is in a
better frame of mind than was apprehended not long ago, by no means
satisfied with his own situation, and complaining of much that
appertains to the Government, but conscious that his position cannot be
altered at present, and not at all disposed by any captious conduct to
break up or endanger the Government itself. With regard to Reform he is
extremely reasonable, feeling the difficulty of his own antecedents in
regard to the question; he is ready to conform himself to the
necessities of the case, and does not think of urging anything
unreasonable and impracticable. He is naturally enough very anxious that
the Government should manage their affairs in Parliament better this
year than last, and not expose themselves to so many defeats and the
mortification of having their measures rejected or spoilt, and his
notion seems to be that they should introduce and announce fewer
measures, only such as are urgent and generally desired, and such as
they may reasonably expect to carry, and, having taken that course, to
stand or fall by them; this is the wisest and most becoming course, and
I hope it will be adhered to and succeed. Its success depends very much
on Lord John's own conduct, and the way in which he treats the Whig and
Liberal party. I hear nothing of the intentions and expectations of the
Opposition, but Lyndhurst tells me he considers them extinct as a party
and in no condition to get into power. He spoke very disparagingly of
Disraeli, and said his want of character was fatal to him, and weighed
down all his cleverness.
BATTLE OF INKERMAN.
_November 16th._--A telegraphic despatch arrived from Raglan with
account of the battle of the 5th,[1] from which we learn only that we
were entirely successful in repulsing the Russian attack, but that our
loss was very great. Another long interval of suspense to be succeeded
by woe and mourning; but besides the private misery we have to witness,
the aggregate of the news fills me with the most dismal forebodings.
Raglan says the Russian force was even greater than at Alma, and vastly
superior to his own. Menschikoff says that he is assembling all his
forces, and preparing to take the offensive, that their numbers are very
superior, and he confidently announces that he shall wear us out, and
that our army _cannot escape him_. I do not see how the siege is to be
continued by an army itself besieged by a superior force and placed
between two fires. The reinforcements cannot possibly arrive in time,
and even if they were all there now, they would not be sufficient to
redress the balance. I dread some great disaster which would be besides
a great disgrace. Whether every exertion possible has been made here to
reinforce Raglan, or whether anything more could have been done, I
cannot pretend to say; but if matters turn out ill there will be a fine
clamour, and principally from those rash and impatient idiots who were
so full of misplaced confidence, and who insisted on precipitating our
armies on the Crimea, and on any and every part of the Russian
territory, without knowing anything of the adequacy of our means for
such a contest. To overrate the strength and power of the allies, and to
underrate that of Russia on her own territory, has been the fault and
folly of the English public, and if they find themselves deceived in
their calculations and disappointed in their expectations, their rage
and fury will know no bounds, and be lavished on everybody but
themselves. In the height of arrogance few exceptions were found to
those who imagined it would be quite easy to crumple up Russia, and
reduce her to accept such terms as we might choose to impose upon her.
All the examples which history furnishes were disregarded, and a general
belief prevailed that Russia would be unable to oppose any effectual or
prolonged resistance to our forces combined. When the successes of the
Turks at the beginning of the war became known, this confidence not
unnaturally became confirmed, and boundless was the contempt with which
the Russians were treated; and the bare idea of granting peace to the
Emperor except on the most ruinous and humiliating terms was scouted. We
now see what sort of a fight the Russians can make; and though the
superhuman valour and conduct of our troops still inspire confidence and
forbid despair, it is evident that we have rashly embarked in a contest
which from the nature of it must be an unequal one, and that we are
placed in a position of enormous difficulty and danger.
[Footnote 1: The battle of Inkerman was fought on November 5.]
_November 23rd._--Last week at Savernake and at The Grange; came back on
Tuesday; and yesterday morning arrived the despatches with an account of
the furious battle of Inkerman, in which, according to Raglan's account,
8,000 English and 6,000 French resisted the attack of 60,000 Russians,
and eventually defeated and drove them back with enormous loss, our own
loss being very great. The accounts of Raglan and Canrobert do not quite
agree as to the numbers engaged, but, admitting that there may be some
exaggeration in the estimate of the numbers of the Russians and of their
loss, it still remains one of the most wonderful feats of arms that was
ever displayed; and, gallantly as our troops have always behaved, it
may be doubted if they ever evinced such constancy and heroism as on
this occasion--certainly never greater. My brother lost his youngest and
favourite son in this battle--a boy of 18, who had only landed in the
Crimea a few weeks before, and who was in a great battle for the first
and last time. This is only one of innumerable instances of the same
kind, and half England is in mourning. It is dreadful to see the misery
and grief in which so many are already plunged, and the universal terror
and agitation which beset all who have relations engaged in the war. But
the nation is not only as warlike as ever, but if possible more full of
ardour and enthusiasm, and thinking of nothing but the most lavish
expenditure of men and money to carry on the war; the blood that has
been shed appears only to animate the people, and to urge them to fresh
exertions. This is so far natural that I, hating the war, feel as
strongly as anybody that, now we are in it, and our soldiers placed in
great jeopardy and peril, it is indispensable to make every possible
exertion to relieve them; and I am therefore anxious for ample
reinforcements being sent out to them, that they may not be crushed by
overwhelming force.
MILITARY CRITICISMS.
In reading the various and innumerable narratives of the battle, and the
comments of the 'correspondents,' it is impossible to avoid coming to
some conclusions which may nevertheless be erroneous; and I have always
thought that people who are totally ignorant of military matters, and
who are living at ease at home, should not venture to criticise
operations of which they can be no judges, and the conduct of men who
cannot explain that conduct, and who are nobly doing their duty
according to their own judgement, which is more likely to be right than
any opinions we can form. With this admission of fallibility, it still
strikes me that there was a lack of military genius and foresight in the
recent operations. It is asserted that our position was open and
undefended, that General Evans had recommended that precautions should
be taken and defences thrown up, all of which was neglected, and nothing
done, and hence the sad slaughter which took place. This was Raglan's
fault, if any fault there really was. It is admitted that no tactical
skill was or could be displayed, and the battle was won by sheer courage
and firmness. Then Cathcart seems to have made a false and very rash
move which cost his own life and 500 men besides. These are melancholy
reflexions, and the facts prove that we have no Wellingtons in our army
now.
_November 26th._--Government have determined to call Parliament together
on the 12th of December, though it stands prorogued to the 14th. This is
done under the authority of an Act, 37th George III. ch. 120. In the
present state of affairs they are quite right, and it is better for them
to have fair Parliamentary discussion than clamour and the diatribes of
the press out of doors. The 'Times,' as usual, has been thundering away
about reinforcements, and urging the despatch of troops that do not
exist and cannot be created in a moment. I had a great battle with
Delane the other day about it, and asked why he did not appeal to the
French Government, who have boundless military resources, instead of to
our's who have none at all, and accordingly yesterday there was a very
strong article entirely about French reinforcements.
ADMINISTRATIVE BLUNDERS.
In the course of our talk he did, I must confess, make some strong
charges against the Government, and particularly Newcastle. He
complained that after the expedition was sent to the Crimea they
remained idle, and made no attempt to form an army of reserve or to send
continual reinforcements to supply the casualties which everybody knew
must occur, and this is true. Again, when he returned from the East[1]
he went to Newcastle and urged him to make an immediate provision of
wooden houses against the winter, which would in all probability be
required, and he suggested that this should be done at Constantinople,
where, all the houses being built of wood and the carpenters very
skilful, it might easily be done at a comparatively small expense, and
whence the conveyance was expeditious and cheap. His advice was not
taken; nothing was done, and now that the winter is come, and the
troops are already exposed to dreadful suffering and privation, the work
is begun here, where it will cost four times as much and, when done,
will require an enormous time to convey the houses to the Crimea,
besides taking up the space that is urgently required for other
purposes. I was obliged to confess that this was inexcusable negligence
and blundering, and I repeated what had passed to Granville last night,
who could make no defence, and only said that Newcastle, with many
merits, had the fault of wishing to do everything himself, and therefore
much was not done at all; and that the fact was, nobody ever imagined we
should be reduced to such straits, and there was a universal belief that
all would have been over in the Crimea before this, and that such things
would not be required. I am afraid Newcastle, who is totally ignorant of
military affairs of every sort, is not equal to his post, and hence the
various deficiencies; nor is Sidney Herbert much better--very well both
of them in ordinary times, but without the ability or the resource
necessary to deal with such an emergency as the present.
I saw a letter yesterday from Charles Windham, a Q.-M.-General on poor
Cathcart's staff, with an account of the battle, and he says that if,
directly after the march on Balaklava, Sebastopol had been assaulted, it
must have been taken. This corresponds with the reports of Russian
deserters, who declare that there were only 2,000 men in the place after
the battle of Alma. There is always so much difference of opinion and
fault finding in such affairs that it is not easy to come to a sound
conclusion thereupon.
[Footnote 1: Mr. Delane had gone to the theatre of war in the autumn,
and was there with Mr. Kinglake, the brilliant historian of the Crimean
War.]
_November 29th._--My surviving nephew arrived from the Crimea yesterday
morning. He gave me an account of the battle, and denies that General
Cathcart ever refused, or was ever offered, the aid of General Bosquet,
as has been stated. He says that Cathcart was not in command, and it was
not therefore to him that the offer would have been made, and that
Cathcart did not go into action till he was sent for by General
Pennefather, when he got his Division out, and went on the field. He was
killed quite early, about twenty minutes after he reached the field of
battle. My nephew confirms what has been said about the
non-fortification of the position, which seems to have been an enormous
blunder, against which most of the Generals of Division remonstrated. He
says Cathcart was opposed to the expedition to the Crimea, not thinking
they were strong enough, and he strongly advised, and in opposition to
Raglan, that the place should be attacked immediately after the battle
of Alma, while the Russians were still panic struck, and before they had
time to fortify the town on the south side. He says he left the army in
good health and spirits, but not expecting to take Sebastopol this year.
Their sufferings had not been very great, though it was a hard
life--plenty to eat, but mostly salt meat. He thinks, though the French
behaved very gallantly and their arrival saved the army, that they might
have done more than they did; and a body of them that came late on the
field actually never stirred and did nothing whatever.
In the evening I met Clarendon at the Travellers', and had a long talk
with him about all sorts of things. He has been much disturbed at the
'Times,' especially as to two things--its violent abuse of Austria and
its insertion of a letter from the Crimea, reflecting severely on Prince
Napoleon. With regard to Austria it is peculiarly annoying, because we
are now on the point of concluding a tripartite Treaty which is actually
on its way to Vienna, and in a day or two it will be decided whether she
signs it or not; and nothing is more calculated to make her hang back
than such articles in the 'Times.' Then as to Prince Napoleon, it has
annoyed the Emperor and all his family beyond expression, and to such a
degree that Drouyn de Lhuys has written an official letter to Walewski
about it--a very proper and reasonable letter, but still expressing
their vexation, and entreating that such attacks may, if possible, be
prevented for the future.
We talked over Lord Raglan and his capacity for command, and we both
agreed that he had given no proofs of his fitness for so mighty a task.
Clarendon said he was struck with the badness of his private letters,
as he had been from the beginning by those from Varna, showing that he
had evidently not a spark of imagination and no originality. We both
agreed that it would never do to hint a doubt about his merits or
capacity, and at all events that he is probably equal to anybody likely
to be opposed to him. His personal bravery is conspicuous, and he
exposes himself more than he ought. It is said that one of his
aides-de-camp remonstrated with him and received a severe rebuff, Raglan
telling him to mind his own business, and if he did not like the fire to
go to the rear. Clarendon says there is no chance of taking Sebastopol
this year, nor of taking it at all till we have an army strong enough to
drive the Russians out of the Crimea. For this, 150,000 men would be
required to make it a certainty; but with this force, no Russian army,
however numerous, could resist the allies, and then the place would
fall. This is a distant prospect. I expressed my wonder at the Russians
being able to obtain supplies, and he said they got them from the Don
and from Kertch.
SUFFERINGS OF THE ARMY.
_December 5th._--I was at Middleton on Saturday and returned yesterday.
There I saw a letter from Stafford, who is at Constantinople tending the
sick and wounded, writing for and reading to them, and doing all the
good he can--a very wise and benevolent way of re-establishing his
reputation and making his misdeeds at the Admiralty forgotten.[1] He
says he had heard so much of the sufferings and privations of the
soldiers, and of the bad state of the hospitals, that he resolved to go
there and judge for himself of the truth of all that had been written
and asserted on the subject; that he did so, and found the very worst
accounts exceeded by the reality, and that nothing could be more
frightful and appalling than it all was. It had greatly improved, but
still was bad enough. The accounts published in the 'Times,' therefore,
turn out to be true, and all the aid that private charity could supply
was no more than was needed. I believe there has been no lack of zeal
and humanity here, but a great deal of ignorance and inexperience, and,
above all, culpable negligence on the part of Lord Stratford, who had
_carte blanche_ from the Government as to expense, and who, after having
done his best to plunge us into this war, might at least have given his
time and attention to provide relief for the victims of it; but it seems
that from some fit of ill-temper he has chosen to do nothing, and
evinced nothing but indifference to the war itself and all its incidents
ever since it broke out. This I am assured is the case. His wife has
been very active and humane, and done all she could to assist Miss
Nightingale in her mission of benevolence and charity. But to return to
Stafford's letter. He says that while nothing could exceed the heroism
of our soldiers, the incapacity of their chiefs was equally conspicuous,
and that the troops had no confidence in their leaders; he adds, it is
essential to give them a good general if the war goes on. This, and much
more that I have heard, confirms the previous impression on my mind that
Raglan is destitute of military genius or skill, and quite unequal to
the command of a great army. It does not appear, however, that the enemy
are better off than we are in this respect, and we do not know that in
England a better general would now be found. The man, Stafford says, in
whom the army seem to have the greatest confidence is Sir Colin
Campbell. All this is very serious, and does not tend to inspire a great
expectation of glorious results. From what Clarendon said to me it is
evident that _he_ does not think much of Raglan, but it would never do
to express any doubt of his ability or of his measures in public. Delane
told me yesterday that he had received letters without end in this
sense, and that he entertained the same doubts that I did, but should
take care not to give utterance to them in the 'Times.' This reserve is
the more necessary and even just because, after all, the opinions may
not be well founded; and, as it is impossible to change the command, it
is very desirable not to weaken the authority and self-confidence of
the General by casting doubts upon his conduct of the war.
[Footnote 1: Mr. Augustus Stafford had been Secretary to the Admiralty
under Lord Derby's first Administration, where he was supposed not to
have done well; but when the accounts arrived of the sufferings and
privations of the army in the dreadful winter of 1854-5, Mr. Stafford
was one of the first persons to go out and endeavour to relieve the
deplorable condition of the troops.]
_December 11th._--For the last week the Austrian Treaty has occupied
everybody's thoughts, though, as the exact terms of it are not yet
known, people do not very well know what to expect from it. The great
question that lies behind it is, whether Prussia will follow in the wake
of Austria, and the rest of Germany with her. If all Germany joins the
Allies it seems absolutely impossible that Russia should offer any
effectual resistance to such a combination of forces; and it will then
be to be seen what impression can be made on an Empire which, with many
political deficiencies, nature has made so strong for defensive
purposes, and, if the contest continues, whether the opinions and object
of the Allies will not diverge and ultimately break up the alliance.
MR. BRIGHT ON THE WAR.
Bright has published his letter in a penny form (or somebody has done it
for him) with _pièces justificatives_ extracted from the Blue Books and
from other sources, and in my opinion he makes out a capital and
unanswerable case. He does not, indeed, prove, nor attempt to prove,
that the Emperor of Russia is in the right absolutely, but he makes out
that he is in the right as against England and France, and he shows up
the conduct of the Western Powers very successfully. But in the present
temper of the country, and while the war fever is still raging with
undiminished violence, all appeals to truth and reason will be totally
unavailing. Those who entertain such opinions either wholly or in part
do not dare to avow them, and all are hurried along in the vortex. I do
not dare to avow them myself; and even for holding my tongue, and
because I do not join in the senseless clamour which everywhere
resounds, I am called 'a Russian.' The progress of the contest has
changed the nature of public opinion, for now its principal motive is
the deep interest taken in the success of our arms and the safety of the
band of heroes who have been fighting in the Crimea. This is, of course,
right and patriotic, and a feeling which must be common to those who
have been against, and those who have been for the war.
_Panshanger, December 14th._--The debates on Tuesday night were on the
whole satisfactory, and not bad for the Government. Derby made a
slashing, effective philippic on the text of 'Too late,' asserting that
the fault of the Government had been that they had done everything too
late. Newcastle answered him, but was dull and feeble, totally unequal
to meet Derby in debate. His case was not bad, but he could not handle
it with effect. Government did better in the Commons, where Sidney
Herbert made a capital speech, and produced a very good case in a very
complete and satisfactory manner. He proved that reinforcements had been
sent out month after month, and that they had never folded their hands
and stood still as Derby charged them with having done. All the rage for
the war which is apparent in the country was manifested in both Houses.
According to present appearances, there will be very little done on the
part of the Opposition against the Government during this short session.
_December 17th._--These smooth appearances were deceitful, for the
Government met with an unexpected and violent opposition to their
Foreign Enlistment Bill, and only carried the second reading by a
majority of 12. Ellenborough, puffed up with conceit and soured by
disappointment and the nullity of his position, commenced a furious
attack on this bill in an able speech replete with bitterness and
sarcasm. Derby, too happy to join in any mischief, brought the support
of his party, and a debate ensued, in which, as usual, the speaking of
Ellenborough and Derby gave them the advantage, but the Government got a
majority enough for their purpose. The bill itself is very unpopular,
nobody can tell why, except that all sorts of misrepresentations were
made about it the first night, and people have not yet been undeceived.
I doubt if it was worth while to bring in such a bill, but it is certain
if they had not done so, and immediately, they would have been furiously
reproached by those who oppose them now, and above all accused of being
'too late.' The imprudent speech which John Russell made about Austria
the first night elicited a violent attack on him in the 'Times,' which
is sure to have put him in very bad humour. The speech and the attack
were equally unjustifiable and mischievous. I have no idea why he said
what he did, unless it was for the sake of appearing to fall in with the
vulgar prejudice against Austria.
THE FOREIGN ENLISTMENT BILL.
_December 18th._--The dislike of the Foreign Enlistment Bill is very
general, but nobody can give any reason for their opposition to it.[1]
It is, however, so great that it is not certain that it can be carried
through the House of Commons, and so little is the Government cared for
that I doubt many being found who will incur the resentment of their
constituents or give an unpopular vote to save them. If they should be
beaten, I think they must go out. John Russell is in a bad disposition
of mind, as may be gathered from his _entourage_, who are in rabid
opposition. Lord John, however, will probably do what he can to make
this measure go down, as I find he is himself the author of it; but I
much doubt if he would care for the Government being broken up, and he
is not unlikely to regard such a catastrophe as the event best
calculated to restore him to the post he so much covets. It is certainly
possible that Derby, conscious he could not make a Government himself,
would offer to support the Whig section of this Cabinet with all the
Peelites eliminated from it, and that an attempt might be made to form a
Government with Lord John, Palmerston, and perhaps Ellenborough.
However, all this is vague speculation, and not worth following out.
[Footnote 1: The object of the Foreign Enlistment Bill was to enable
the Government to enlist 15,000 foreigners in the British army to be
drilled in this country. It was denounced and opposed especially in the
House of Lords as a dangerous and unconstitutional measure, but it
eventually passed, and a considerable number of Germans were enlisted
under it.]
_December 20th._--Government got a majority of 39, better than was
expected. Lord John threatened to resign if he was beaten. The debate
will not do them much good when it is read, nor serve to render their
measure more popular. Everybody thinks the whole affair has been grossly
mismanaged, and that, instead of making a mystery of their intentions,
they ought to have thrown out such intimations of them as would have
elicited public opinion; but the truth is, not one of them had the least
suspicion that the measure would meet with any resistance or even
objection, nor would there have been any if Ellenborough had not started
the hare, and then Derby and his party joyfully availed themselves of
the opportunity to do mischief, and joined in the cry. When the bill was
announced, Derby never dreamt of opposing it. The arguments against the
measure seem to me very plausible, except the constitutional one, which
is all stuff, and in which none of those who urge it are sincere; on the
other hand, the former precedents do not apply in this case. The best
argument for it is, that Raglan wants trained men as soon as possible,
and complains that they send nothing but boys, who are of little use at
first, and who die in great numbers under the hardships and privations
the climate and the operations inflict on them. Not only were the
Government totally unconscious of the opposition they should encounter,
but, when they found the steam was getting up, they neglected to enter
into such explanations and make out such a case as might, if well done,
have extinguished dissension in the beginning. All this displays a want
of prudence and foresight, for in a matter of such importance it is not
enough to say that they did not expect any fault to be found with their
proposal, and they ought to have employed some means to see what was
likely to be thought of it before they committed themselves to it. They
ought to have ascertained how it was to be carried into effect, and if
they could count upon its success, and to be able to give Parliament
some assurance of it, instead of saying they had taken no initiative
steps out of affected deference to constitutional scruples, and knew not
how they were to get the men they are asking for. It seems the general
opinion of their own friends that they have mismanaged their case, and
plunged into a difficulty they might have avoided.
LORD RAGLAN'S DEFICIENCIES.
The best way of avoiding it would have been to raise a regiment or two
without applying to Parliament at all, mustered and arrayed them at
Malta or at Heligoland, or wherever they pleased out of England, and
sent them off as an experiment to the Crimea. Then, if they had done
good service, and Raglan had expressed his satisfaction and asked for
more, they might have raised any number and landed them here without
cavil or objection; but to have adopted this course they must have seen
the necessity of feeling their way, which not one of them did. The great
complaint now is the want of organisation and good arrangement in the
Crimea and generally at and about the seat of war, the confusion that
has taken place in forwarding and distributing supplies, and the want of
all expedients for facilitating the service in its various branches.
There is much truth in all this, but the responsibility for it rests
upon Raglan, who, if he had been of a prompt and energetic character,
would have looked to these things, seen what was wanting, and have taken
care to provide everything and set the necessary machinery in motion. He
had _carte blanche_ from the Government as to money and everything else,
and, if he had concerted what was necessary with Stratford, and insisted
on his exerting himself, I believe none of the complaints would have
been made, and none of the deficiencies have been found. This is what
the Duke of Wellington would have done, and his despatches are full of
proofs that it is what he was always doing.
_December 24th._--The third reading of the Enlistment Bill carried by
38, after a very fine speech from Bright, consisting of a part of his
letter with its illustrations. In my opinion this speech was
unanswerable, and no attempt was made to answer it. He was very severe
on both Lord John and Palmerston. It is impossible that such reasoning
as Bright's should not make _some_ impression in the country; but I do
not think any reasoning however powerful, or any display of facts
however striking, can stem the torrent of public opinion, which still
clamours for war and is so burning with hatred against Russia that no
peace could be deemed satisfactory, or, even tolerable, that did not
humble Russia to the dust and strip her of some considerable territory.
Yesterday the 'Times' ventured on an article against Raglan as the
cause of the disorder and confusion and consequent privations which
prevail in the army. Delane wrote to me about it, and said he was aware
he should be bitterly reviled for speaking these truths. I agree
entirely with what he said, and see no reason why the saddle should not
be put upon the right horse.
_The Grove, December 31st_, 1854.--The last day of one of the most
melancholy and disastrous years I ever recollect. Almost everybody is in
mourning, and grief and despair overspread the land. At the beginning of
the year we sent forth an army amidst a tumult of joyous and triumphant
anticipation, and everybody full of confidence and boasting and
expecting to force the Emperor Nicholas in the shortest possible time
humbly to sue for peace, and the only question was, what terms we should
vouchsafe to grant him, and how much of his dominions we should leave
him in possession of. Such presumptuous boasting and confidence have
been signally humbled, and the end of this year sees us deploring the
deaths of friends and relations without number, and our army perishing
before the walls of Sebastopol, which we are unable to take, and, after
bloody victories and prodigies of valour, the Russian power hardly as
yet diminished or impaired. All last week I was at Hatchford with Lord
Grey, when we did nothing but talk over the war, its management and
mismanagement, Raglan, etc. Grey's criticisms are clever and not unfair,
far from favourable to the Government, but detesting Derby, of whom he
has the worst opinion, formed from a very ancient date and upon long
experience of his character and conduct. Grey's idea is that there has
been much mismanagement here and still greater on the spot, and that
Raglan is quite incompetent and, as far as we can see, nobody else any
better. The opinion about Raglan appears to be rapidly gaining ground,
and the Ministers have arrived at the same conclusion.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE.
I came here yesterday to meet Cowley, come over for a few days from
Paris, and to have a talk with him and Clarendon. Cowley says that the
alliance between the two countries is very hollow, and in fact there is
nobody in France really friendly to us except the Emperor, Persigny,
and perhaps Drouyn de Lhuys. The Emperor is bent on pursuing the war
with vigour, and is sensible of the importance to himself of the French
flag being triumphant. I asked him what they thought of our armies and
our generals; he said from the Emperor downwards they had the highest
admiration for the wonderful bravery of the troops, but the greatest
contempt for the military skill of the commanders, and for all our
arrangements and _savoir faire_. He told us the following anecdote as a
proof of the blundering way in which our affairs are conducted.
Newcastle wrote to him lately to beg he would ask the French Government
to give us a model of certain carts their army used in the Crimea, the
like of which our people there had applied to him for. The French
Minister replied that he could give drawings, but had no model; but at
the same time he advised us not to think of having similar ones, as
these carts are so ill adapted for the purpose that they had discarded
them, and had ordered others and better ones to be made, which were now
in course of construction _at Malta_. So that we propose to get these
machines without finding out whether they are suitable or not, while the
French supply themselves with the proper article _in our own territory_.
I find from Clarendon that he is not only fully alive to Raglan's
inefficiency, but has all along suspected it, and now the Government
seem to have the same conviction; still they can take no step in the
matter, for he has done nothing and omitted nothing so flagrantly as to
call for or justify his recall, and if they were to recall him they do
not know where to look for a better man to replace him. The war has
hitherto failed to elicit any remarkable abilities or special aptitude
for war, except in one instance, that of Captain Butler, the defender of
Silistria, a young man of remarkable promise who, if he had lived, would
probably have done great things and have risen to distinction.
Canrobert writes to his Government that he hopes soon to attempt the
assault, but the Emperor and M. Vaillant by no means approve of it, and
have sent him orders not actually prohibiting it, but enjoining caution
in such a manner as will most probably effectually deter him from doing
anything. They all think that the capture of the place could only be
achieved (if at all) at a great cost of life, and that the captors could
not hold it for many hours, as they would be pounded from the Northern
forts which entirely command the place.
We discussed Austria and what she will do when the Russian answer comes
to the last communication of the Conference at Vienna, and what she can
do. Even if she recalls her ambassador from St. Petersburg and declares
war, Cowley thinks she will never cross bayonets with the Russians or
fire a shot unless attacked; and he believes, on what appear good
grounds, that if any fighting takes place between the Austrians and the
Russians, the former will get beaten, and that the Russian army is much
the best of the two. This is the reverse of the general notion, but it
seems that the Austrian officers themselves are of that opinion. It is
no wonder, therefore, that they have no mind to go to war and to
encounter this danger to accommodate us, whom they still cordially hate
on many accounts, but especially for the Haynau affair, which still
rankles in their hearts and in which they think their uniform was
insulted. _À propos_ of this, Clarendon told me that the Queen was
talking to him very lately about this affair, and told him that she had
entreated Palmerston at the time to write some expression of regret to
the Austrian Government, but that nothing would induce him to do it, and
he never did.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.
I asked Clarendon what was Palmerston's present tone about the war. He
said he was very uneasy about the army and its condition, but just as
confident as ever as to the final result of the war, and as lofty in his
ideas of the terms of peace we should exact from Russia. He is all for
restoring the Crimea to Turkey, and, what is more, he has persuaded the
Emperor Napoleon to embrace that opinion. As usual, he never sees any
difficulty in anything he wishes to do. I told Cowley and Clarendon what
Grey said--viz. that he agreed entirely with Bright's letter, and that
the war might have been avoided by either of the two courses--to have
told the Emperor of Russia in the beginning we would make war on him if
he persisted, and compelled to understand that we really meant it, or to
have forced the Turks to accept the Vienna Note; and, in either case,
war would have been avoided, but that, the Cabinet itself being divided,
everything was done in a spirit of compromise, and a middle course
adopted which led to all the mischief. Cowley answered the first
alternative and Clarendon the second. Cowley said that one of the great
difficulties of the British Government was to secure concert with the
French, and to explain their own conduct without hurting the
susceptibility of their allies or divulging what passed between the two
Governments. The French were perpetually blowing hot and cold, with a
false air of vigour superior to our's at one moment, and at another
wanting to do what our Ministers would have been torn to pieces for
consenting to. For instance, in spite of us they would send their fleet
to the Dardanelles to support the Turks, and afterwards they proposed to
send the two fleets to Constantinople to compel the Sultan to sign the
Vienna Note. Cowley told me this war in its present shape and with these
vast armaments had gone on insensibly and from small beginnings, nobody
could well tell how. In the first instance, the Emperor told Cowley he
had no intention of sending any land forces to the East, and when we
proposed to him to despatch there a small corps of 5,000 English and
10,000 French he positively declined. Soon after Sir John Burgoyne was
sent to examine and report on the state of the country, and he gave an
opinion that it would be desirable to send such a force to occupy a
fortified position at Gallipoli in case of the Russians making a sudden
attack with their fleet on Constantinople, in which case our fleets
might be in some danger. Cowley took him to the Emperor, to whom he told
his story. The Emperor said he thought his reasons good, and this was a
definite and tangible object, and he would send the troops. When Raglan
was offered the command of the forces we were to send out, he said he
would not go with less than 20,000 men; and when we agreed to send this
force, the French said if we sent 20,000 they must send 40,000, and so
the expedition began, and it has since swelled to its present
magnitude--our's in consequence of the clamour here and pressure from
without, and their's to keep pace with our's in relative proportions.
With regard to the Vienna Note, Clarendon said Stratford never would
have let the Turks sign it, and if they had recalled him the Cabinet
here would have been broken up, Palmerston would have gone out,
Stratford would have come home frantic and have proclaimed to the whole
country that the Turks had been sacrificed and betrayed, and the uproar
would have been so great that it would have been impossible to carry out
the intention. I think the first answer is more weighty than the last,
and that the popular clamour and Palmerston's secession ought to have
been encountered at whatever hazard rather than persist in the fatal
course which could hardly fail to lead, and did eventually lead, us into
this deplorable war.