CHAPTER V

THE PATH OF SAFETY

We stand on the brink of a precipice.[134] To say that Englishmen are

asked to take a leap in the dark is far to understate the peril of the

moment. We are asked to leave an arduous but well-known road, and to

spring down an unfathomed ravine filled with rocks, on any one of which

we may be dashed to pieces.

The very excess of the peril hides its existence from ordinary citizens.

Mr. Gladstone, they argue, is a wise man and a good man, his colleagues

are partisans, they are not conspirators; it is incredible that they

should recommend a measure fraught with ruin to England. But the matter

is intelligible enough. Mr. Gladstone's weakness, no less than his

strength, has always lain in his temporary but exclusive preoccupation

with some one dominant idea. The one notion which possesses his mind--to

judge from his public conduct and speeches--is that at any cost Home

Rule, that is, an Irish Executive and an Irish Parliament, must be

conceded to Ireland. Enthusiasm, pride, ambition, all the motives, good

and bad, which can influence a statesman, urge him to achieve this one

object. If he succeeds his political career is crowned with victory, if

not with final triumph; if he fails his whole course during the last

seven years turns out an error. But it has long been manifest that only

with the greatest difficulty can English electors be persuaded to accept

Home Rule. Hence it has been found essential that the principles of the

measure should not be known before the time for passing it into law.

Hence the ill-starred avoidance of discussion. Hence the ultimate

framing of a scheme which is made to pass, but is not made to work, and

which probably enough does not represent the real wishes or convictions

of any one statesman. Where is the Minister who will tell us that this

particular Government of Ireland Bill is according to his judgment--I

will not say in its details, but in each and all of its leading

principles--the best constitution which can be framed for determining

the relations between England and Ireland? This Minister has not

appeared--I doubt whether he exists. The Bill may be a model of artful

provision for conciliating the prejudices or soothing the fears of

English electors, but it is not a well-digested constitution. It is

inferior to the Home Rule Bill of 1886. Another consequence of the

circumstances under which the Bill has been framed is that its authors

themselves have never had the benefit to be derived from the mature

discussion of its principles. Mr. Gladstone himself cannot say what are

and what are not the fundamental ideas of his scheme. He obviously held,

at any rate when the Bill was introduced, that the presence of the Irish

members at Westminster was a detail, whereas it is in reality the fact

which governs the character of the new constitution. To imply that such

a matter can be treated as subsidiary is, in the eyes of any student of

constitutions, as ridiculous as it would seem to Mr. Gladstone for a

Chancellor of the Exchequer, on introducing his budget, to assert that,

whether he maintained or did not maintain the income tax, was an organic

detail which did not fundamentally affect his financial proposals. The

Ministry are as much at sea as their chief; nor is this wonderful. There

are two things of which English statesmen have had little experience.

The one is a revolutionary movement, the other is the construction of a

constitution. But the Home Rule Bill is at once the effect and the sign

of a revolutionary movement, and the task in which the Gladstonians are

engaged is the formation of a new constitution. Blind leaders are

leading a blind people, and our blind leaders, some of whom care more

for Radical supremacy in England than for Imperial supremacy in Ireland,

are like many other men of our time, the slaves of phrases, such as

'trust in the people,' which pass muster for principles. If the blind

lead the blind, what wonder if they stumble over a precipice?

The peril in which the country stands is concealed from us by a curious

reaction of opinion. Good political institutions, it was at one time

held, were the cause of a nation's happiness, and England, it was firmly

believed, owed her prosperity wholly to her constitution. A century of

revolutions has taught us all that a good form of government cannot of

itself save a state from ruin, and many of us have come to think that

forms of government are nothing, and that no constitutional changes can

impair the strength of England. No delusion however is more patent or

more noxious. Never was a country richer in the elements of strength

than were the Thirteen Colonies when their independence was acknowledged

by England. Yet the Confederation by the vices of its constitution

filled the colonies with discord, and made them both weak at home and

contemptible abroad, whilst the creation of the United States restored

them to peace and opened for them the road to greatness. The

predominance for more than fifty years of the Slave Power in the

politics of the American Union, the struggle measured by centuries

through which at last the Protestant and progressive Cantons of

Switzerland asserted their rightful supremacy over the Catholic and

unprogressive Cantons of Switzerland, the weakness of Prussia when, not

much more than forty[135] years back, she could hardly maintain her

rights and her dignity against Austria, the classical instance of

Germany, which though possessed of every source of power lay for

generations at the mercy of France, mainly on account of vicious

political institutions, are proofs, if evidence were wanting, of the

capacity of ill-designed constitutions to hamper the action and threaten

the prosperity of great nations. A constitution in truth is a national

garb. A good constitution will not make a weak country strong, but an

unsuitable constitution may reduce a strong country to feebleness. A

weakling does not become a strong man by putting on armour, but a giant

can derive no advantage from his strength if once he be got by fraud or

force into a strait waistcoat.

Strength, it is true, will in the long run assert itself. The artificial

supremacy of Ireland, or of a faction supported by Irish votes, will not

last for ever; probably it will not last long. If the new constitution

prove unbearable by England it will not be borne; it will be overthrown

or evaded. Far am I from asserting that the breach or evasion will, when

it shall occur, be justifiable. Englishmen's ideas of good faith are

strict, but they are narrow. One main reason for dreading the new

constitution is that it may try beyond measure the patience and the

honesty of England. If, for instance, Ulster should resist the legal

authority of the Parliament at Dublin, there may arise one of those

terrible periods in which the observation of pledged faith seems

inconsistent with the natural dictates of honour and humanity, and weak

concession at the present moment will, at such a crisis, be found to

have contained among its other perils the danger lest England, when at

last she re-asserts her power in Ireland, should not re-establish her

justice.

Where then lies the path of safety? The road is difficult, but it is

clearly marked; it is at any rate to be found, not by any exercise of

subtlety or of extraordinary acuteness, but by obeying the plain

dictates of common sense and sound public morality. The characteristics

of Unionist policy must be seriousness, simplicity, and reliance upon

an appeal to the nation.

Seriousness is essential.

The need of the time is to impress on the mass of the people the intense

gravity of the crisis. Far too much was said before the general election

about the weaknesses and the inconsistencies of the Gladstonians, and

far too little about the causes of their strength and the absolute

necessity for arduous efforts to defeat the Separatists at the

polling-booths. The error must not be repeated.

The people must be told, as they may be told with absolute truth, that

the fate of England is in question, and that nothing but the efforts of

every Unionist throughout the land can save the country from

destruction. The contest has, without either party being aware of the

change, shifted its character since 1886. Then the names of Unionists

and Separatists expressed the whole difference between the opponents and

supporters of the Home Rule Bill. The Gladstonians for the most part

meant the Bill to affect, as far as possible, the condition of Ireland

alone. They did not mean to change the constitution of the United

Kingdom. It is now plain, as has been shown throughout these pages, that

the measure of so-called Home Rule is a new constitution for the whole

United Kingdom. In 1886 the Gladstonians _bona fide_ intended to close

the period of agitation. In 1893 many Gladstonians see in Home Rule for

Ireland only the first step towards an extended scheme of federalism.

In 1886 no Gladstonian had palliated crime or oppression, no

Gladstonian statesman had discovered that boycotting was nothing but

exclusive dealing, no Gladstonian Chancellor had made light of

conspiracy. All this is changed. Alliance with revolutionists or

conspirators has imbued respectable English statesmen with revolutionary

doctrines and revolutionary sentiment. The difference between Unionist

and Separatist remains, but it is merged in the wider difference between

Constitutionalists and Revolutionists. The question at issue is not

merely, though this is serious enough, whether the Act of Union shall be

repealed or relaxed, but whether the United Kingdom is morally a nation,

and whether as a nation it has a right to insist upon the supreme

authority belonging to the majority of its citizens. A similar question

was some thirty-two years ago put to the people of the United States; it

was decided by the arbitrament of battle.

The terrible calamity of an appeal to the test of force Englishmen may

avoid, but if it is to be avoided the national rights of the whole

people of the United Kingdom must be asserted as strenuously by their

votes as the rights of the citizens of the United States were vindicated

by their arms. The people of England again must be solemnly warned that

errors in policy or acts of injustice may snatch from us the power of

determining a political controversy at the ballot-box instead of on the

battle-field. It is folly to raise cases on the constitution; it is

always of the most doubtful prudence to handle the casuistry of

politics. Nothing will tempt me to discuss in these pages what are the

ethical limits to the exercise of constitutionally unlimited

sovereignty, or at what point legal oppression justifies armed

resistance. Two considerations must at this crisis be kept in mind. The

one is that, until oppression is actually committed, the maintenance of

order is the duty of every citizen, and, like most political duties, is

also a matter of the most obvious expediency; the other is that the

compulsion of loyal citizens to forgo the direct protection of the

government whose sovereignty they admit, and to accept the rule of a

government whose moral claim to their allegiance they deny, is a

proceeding of the grossest injustice. Let the people of England also be

solemnly warned that the Gladstonian policy of 1893 repeats the

essential error of the condemned policy of Protestant ascendency.

Gladstonians hold that the democracy of England may ally itself with the

democracy of Ireland, and may treat lightly the rights and the wishes of

a Protestant and Conservative minority. In bygone times the aristocratic

and Protestant government of England allied itself with the Protestant

and aristocratic government of Ireland, and held light the rights and

the wishes of the Catholic majority. Each policy labours under the same

defect. The enforced supremacy of a class, be it a minority or a

majority, is opposed to the equitable principle of the supremacy of the

whole nation. There is no reason to suppose that Catholic ascendency

will be found more tolerable than was Protestant ascendency.

The policy of Unionism should be marked by simplicity.

The Unionist leaders have a clear though a difficult duty to perform.

Their one immediate function is resistance to a dangerous revolution.

Logically and politically, there was a good deal to be said for the

deliberate refusal to discuss, or to vote upon, any of the details of

the Home Rule Bill. There is always a danger lest the attempt to amend a

radically and essentially vicious measure should promote the delusion

that it is amendable. And any success in debate would be dearly

purchased if it led the electors to suppose that the Government of

Ireland Bill, which in fact embodies a policy, so fundamentally perverse

that no alteration of details can render it tolerable, is a measure

which, though faulty in its execution, is sound in principle. The

Unionists leaders, however, whom we can absolutely trust, have decided

that abstention from debate would be an error. As far as the matter is

to be looked at from a parliamentary point of view their judgment is

decisive, and since the policy of combating the Bill point by point has

been adopted it should be carried out, as it is being carried out, with

the utmost stringency. Minute discussion of the clauses of the Bill is

elaborate instruction for the mass of the nation.

To the cry of obstruction no heed whatever need be paid. As long as

there is real discussion obstruction becomes, when the matter in debate

is the formation of a new constitution for the United Kingdom, an

impossibility. The business needs the most careful consideration.

Ministers themselves are uncertain as to what are the essential

principles of their own scheme. Every detail involves a principle, and

in a Bill where clearness is of vital importance, every clause involves

an ambiguity. Each part moreover of the new constitution must be

considered with regard to the rest, and the expression of different

views as to the meaning of the Bill is of itself of utility, when it is

of the greatest importance that Englishmen and Irishmen, Conservatives

and Radicals, should be agreed as to the meaning of the new Fundamental

Law. When, in short, a constitution for the country is being drawn up,

no discussion which is rational can be obstructive. If a week or a

fortnight of parliamentary time is expended in defining the meaning of

the supreme authority of Parliament, or in deciding whether the Irish

delegacy is or is not to be retained at Westminster, not a moment too

much is devoted to points of such transcendent importance. 'But the

debate,' it is urged, 'will at this rate last for months.' Why not? 'No

other Bills,' it is added, 'can be passed.' What Bills, I answer, ought

to be passed whilst the constitution of England is undergoing

fundamental alteration? 'But the principles of the measure,' it is

objected, 'might have been discussed and settled during the last seven

years.' So, I reply, they might, if it had pleased the Gladstonians

either to produce their Bill or to announce its general principles.

Their silence was politic; it won them a majority at the general

election, but you cannot from the nature of things combine the

advantages both of reticence and of outspokenness. Silence may have been

justified as a piece of clever party tactics; it is a very different

question whether the concealment of seven years has turned out high

statesmanship. Gladstonians, like other men, cannot, as the saying goes,

have their cake and eat it. They have had the advantages, they are now

paying the inevitable price of reserve. Unionists in any case are bound

to turn this invaluable time to account. Discussion of the constitution

is the education of the people.

In order, however, that this political training may be effective, our

parliamentary teachers must take care that the public are not confused

by the prominence necessarily given to details. Minute criticism of the

Bill is important, but at the present moment it is important only as

enforcing the radical vice of its main principles. No effort must be

spared to keep the mind of the nation well fixed upon these principles.

The surrender by the British Parliament and the British Government of

all effective part in the government of Ireland, the ambiguities of such

a term as 'Imperial supremacy' and all that these ambiguities involve,

the inadequacy and the futility of the Restrictions, the errors and

impolicy of the financial arrangements, above all the injustice to

England and the injury to Ireland of retaining, under a system of Home

Rule, even a single Irish representative at Westminster, these broad

considerations are the things which should be pressed, and pressed home,

upon the electors. Minor matters are good topics for parliamentary

discussion, but should not receive a confusing and illusory prominence.

The electors again must be made to feel that it is the essential

principle of Home Rule, the setting up of an Irish Government and an

Irish Parliament, to which Unionists are opposed. The least appearance

of concession to Home Rulers, or any action which gives increased

currency to the delusion, certainly cherished by some moderate

Gladstonians, that Home Rule can be identified with or cut down to

extended local self-government,[136] will be fatal to the cause of

Unionism. The concession to Ireland of a petty, paltry, peddling

legislature, which dare hardly call itself a Parliament, and is

officially designated say as a national council, combined with some

faint imitation of a Cabinet, called say a committee, would disappoint

and irritate Home Rulers; it would cheat their hopes, but it would

afford them the means of gaining their end. It would not give assurance

to Unionists, it would not be a triumph of Unionist policy, it would

rather be the destruction of Unionism. The one course of safety is to

take care that at the next general election the country has laid before

it for determination a clear and unmistakable issue. The question for

every elector to answer must be reducible to the form Aye or No; will

you, or will you not, repeal the Union and establish an Irish Executive

and an Irish Parliament in Dublin? If the question be so raised

Unionists have no reason to fear an answer.

The policy of Unionism has always relied on an appeal to the nation.

The one desire of Unionists has always been to fight their opponents on

the clear unmistakable issue of Home Rule. The policy of Separatists has

been to keep Home Rule in the background whilst making its meaning

indefinite, and to mix up all the multifarious issues raised by the

Newcastle programme, as well as many others, with the one essential

question whether we should or should not repeal or modify the Act of

Union.

To their policy of appeal to the people the Unionists will, of course,

adhere. The House of Lords will, it may be presumed, as a matter not so

much of right as of obvious duty, reject the present Home Rule Bill, so

as to refer to the electors of the United Kingdom the question whether

we shall, or shall not, have a new constitution. Even if such a

reference to the electors should result in a Gladstonian majority, it is

still possible that a further dissolution might be necessary. The

majority for Home Rule might be much reduced. I doubt whether Mr.

Gladstone himself would maintain that with a majority say of ten or

twenty, a Minister would be morally justified in attempting a

fundamental change in the constitution. As to such speculative matters

there is no need to say anything. It is worth while, however, to repeat

a statement which cannot be too often insisted upon, that the most

important function of the House of Lords at the present day is to take

care that no fundamental change in the constitution takes place which

has not received the undoubted assent of the nation. The peers are more

and more clearly awakening to the knowledge that under the circumstances

of modern public life this protection of the rights of the nation, which

is in complete conformity with democratic principle, is the supreme duty

of the Upper House.

The question, however, to be considered at the moment is whether for the

performance of this duty something more may not be required than the

compelling of a dissolution. This something more is a direct appeal to

the electors in the nature of a Referendum. The question is still a

theoretical one; it cannot (unfortunately as it will appear to many

persons) be raised during the debates on the Bill in the House of

Commons. When the Bill reaches the House of Lords, it will, we may

suppose, be rejected, and all that a Unionist can wish for is, first,

that before actual rejection its general principles should be subjected

to complete discussion, and what is in this case the same thing,

exposure, and next that the House of Lords should, if necessary, take

steps which can easily be imagined, for providing that the rejection of

the Bill shall entail a dissolution. If, however, the dissolution should

result in a Gladstonian majority, and should lead to another Home Rule

Bill being sent up to their lordships, the question then arises as to

the Referendum. My own conviction, which has been before laid before the

public, is that the Lords would do well if they appended to any Home

Rule Bill which they were prepared to accept a clause which might make

its coming into force depend upon its, within a limited time, receiving

the approval of the majority of the electors of the United Kingdom. And

in the particular case of the Home Rule Bill it is fair, for reasons

already stated,[137] that the Bill before becoming law should receive

the assent of a majority of the electors both of Great Britain and of

Ireland. This course, it may be said, is unconstitutional. This word has

no terrors for me; it means no more than unusual, and the institution of

a Referendum would simply mean the formal acknowledgment of the doctrine

which lies at the basis of English democracy--that a law depends at

bottom for its enactment on the assent of the nation as represented by

the electors. At a time when the true danger is that sections or classes

should arrogate to themselves authority which belongs to the State, it

is an advantage to bring into prominence the sovereignty of the nation.

The present is exactly a crisis at which we may override the practices

to save the principles of the constitution. The most forcible objection

which can be made is that you ought not for the sake of avoiding a

particular evil to introduce an innovation of dubious expediency. The

objection itself is valid, but it is in the present instance

inapplicable. My conviction is that the introduction of the Referendum,

in one shape or another in respect of large constitutional changes,

would be a distinct benefit to the country. It affords the one available

check on the recklessness of party leaders; for the check is at once

effective and in perfect conformity with democratic principle and

sentiment. A second objection is that a Referendum renders any law which

obtains the approval of the electors more difficult of alteration than

an ordinary Act of Parliament. The allegation is true, but it really

tells greatly in favour of an ultimate reference to the people of any

Home Rule Bill passed in a Parliament. If such a Bill becomes law, it

ought to be a law not admitting of easy repeal. No doubt reaction may be

justifiable, but reaction is a great evil, and the Referendum puts a

check as well on reaction as on hasty innovation. In any case the time

has arrived when Unionist statesmen should consider the expediency of

announcing that no Home Rule Bill will finally be accepted until it has

undergone a reference to and received the approval of the electors. On

no better issue could battle be joined with revolutionists than on the

question whether the people of the United Kingdom should or should not

be allowed to express their will. Unionists have every reason to feel

confidence in their cause; their only policy, their one path of safety

is to make it, as they can do, absolutely plain that they rely upon

justice, and that they appeal from parties to the nation.

We have now before us the essential features of the new constitution

framed by Gladstonians for the whole United Kingdom. We know its

inherent defects and inconsistencies; we have considered what may be

said on its behalf, or rather of the policy of which it is the outcome.

The proposed change in our form of government touches the very

foundations of the State, and deeply, though indirectly, threatens the

unity of the whole Empire. Never surely since the day when the National

Assembly of France drew up that Constitution of 1791, which built to be

eternal endured for not quite a year, has an ancient nation been so

strangely invited to accept an untried and unknown polity.

The position indeed of the French constitution-makers was in some

respects stronger and more defensible than the position of our English

innovators. The members of the National Assembly knew precisely what

they were doing. They meant to alter the fundamental institutions of

France. A change moreover in the whole scheme of French government was

an admitted necessity. France might be uncertain as to the working of

the new constitution, but France was absolutely certain that the _ancien

régime_ was detestable. Individuals or nations may wisely risk much when

they are escaping from a social condition which they detest, they may

know that an innovation is in itself of doubtful expediency, yet may

consider any alleged reform worth a trial when no change can be a change

for the worse. In the France of 1791 confidence in the future meant

abhorrence of the past.

The authors of our new constitution can hardly be called the designers

of their own handiwork; they have been the sport of accident. Their

intention, or rather the intention of their leader, was in 1886 merely

to grant some sort of Parliamentary independence to Ireland. The

resolution to concede Home Rule was sudden; it may have been taken up

without due weighing of its consequences. It has assuredly led to

unexpected results. The statesmen who meant merely to give Home Rule to

Ireland have stumbled into the making of a new constitution for the

United Kingdom. What wonder that their workmanship betrays its

accidental origin. It has no coherence, no consistency; nothing is

called by its right name, and words are throughout substituted for

facts; the new Parliament of Ireland is denied its proper title; the

supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is nominally saved, and is really

destroyed; and the very statesmen who proclaim the supremacy of the

Imperial Parliament refuse to assert the subordination of the Irish

Parliament. The authors of the constitution are at sea as to its

leading principles, and its most essential provision they deem an

organic detail, which may at any moment be modified or removed. The

whole thing is an incongruous patchwork affair, made up of shreds and

tatters torn from the institutions of other lands. It is as inconsistent

with the proposed and rejected Constitution of 1886 as with the existing

Constitution of England. While however our constitution-makers tender

for the acceptance of the nation a scheme of fundamental change, whereof

the effect is uncertain, conjectural, and perilous, and the permanence

is not guaranteed by its authors, Englishmen are well satisfied with

their old constitution; they may desire its partial modification or

expansion, they have never even contemplated its overthrow. Politicians,

in short, who meant to initiate a moderate reform, are pressing a

revolutionary change on a country which neither needs nor desires a

revolution; they propose to get rid of grave, though temporary,

inconveniences by a permanent alteration of which no man can calculate

the results in our whole system of government. Never before was a nation

so strangely advised by such bewildered counsellors to take for so

little apparent reason so desperate a leap in the dark.

FOOTNOTES:

[134] The whole gist of this chapter applies to the state of England in

1911 with greater force than even to its condition in 1893. Home Rule

will be carried, if at all, only by a House of Commons freed from the

authority of the House of Lords, and from the need of an appeal to the

people.

[135] Now sixty-one years.

[136] If any one wishes to see the difference between local

self-government and Home Rule, let him compare the Bill for the

extension of self-government in Ireland, brought in by the late

Ministry, with the Home Rule Bill. The Local Government Bill went very

far, some persons may even maintain dangerously far, in creating and in

extending the authority of local bodies in Ireland. But it was not Home

Rule, or anything like Home Rule. The most extended Local Government

Bill and the most restricted Home Rule Bill differ fundamentally in

principle. The one in effect denies, the other in effect concedes, a

separate national government to Ireland.

[137] See pp. 119-121, _ante_.

APPENDIX

GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL

ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES

_Legislative Authority_

Clause.

1. Establishment of Irish Legislature.

2. Powers of Irish Legislature.

3. Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature.

4. Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature.

_Executive Authority_

5. Executive power in Ireland.

_Constitution of Legislature_

6. Composition of Irish Legislative Council.

7. Composition of Irish Legislative Assembly.

8. Disagreement between two Houses, how settled.

_Irish Representation in House of Commons_

9. Representation in Parliament of Irish counties and boroughs.

_Finance_

10. As to separate Consolidated Fund and taxes.

11. Hereditary revenues and income tax.

12. Financial arrangements as between United Kingdom and

Ireland.

13. Treasury Account (Ireland).

14. Charges on Irish Consolidated Fund.

15. Irish Church Fund.

16. Local loans.

17. Adaptation of Acts as to Local Taxation Accounts and probate, etc.,

duties.

18. Money bills and votes.

19. Exchequer judges for revenue actions, election petitions, etc.

_Post Office Postal Telegraphs and Savings Banks_

20. Transfer of post office and postal telegraphs.

21. Transfer of savings banks.

_Irish Appeals and Decision of Constitutional Questions_

22. Irish appeals.

23. Special provision for decision of constitutional questions.

_Lord Lieutenant and Crown Lands_

24. Office of Lord Lieutenant.

25. Use of Crown lands by Irish Government.

_Judges and Civil Servants_

26. Tenure of future judges.

27. As to existing judges and other persons having salaries charged on

the Consolidated Fund.

28. As to persons holding civil service appointments.

29. As to existing pensions and superannuation allowances.

_Police_

30. As to Police.

_Miscellaneous_

31. Irish Exchequer Consolidated Fund and Audit.

32. Law applicable to both Houses of Irish Legislature.

33. Supplemental provisions as to powers of Irish Legislature.

34. Limitation on borrowing by local authorities.

_Transitory Provisions_

35. Temporary restriction on powers of Irish Legislature and Executive.

36. Transitory provisions.

37. Continuance of existing laws, courts, officers, etc.

38. Appointed day.

39. Definitions.

40. Short title.

SCHEDULES

A BILL TO AMEND THE PROVISION FOR

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND[138]

Whereas it is expedient that without impairing or restricting the

supreme authority of Parliament, an Irish Legislature should be created

for such purposes in Ireland as in this Act mentioned:

Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and

with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and

Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of

the same, as follows:

_Legislative Authority_

1. _On and after the appointed day_ there shall be in Ireland a

Legislature consisting of Her Majesty the Queen and of two Houses, the

Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly.

2. With the exceptions and subject to the restrictions in this Act

mentioned, there shall be granted to the Irish Legislature power to

make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland in

respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof.

3. The Irish Legislature shall not have power to make laws in respect of

the following matters or any of them:--

(1) The Crown, or the succession to the Crown, or a Regency; or the

Lord Lieutenant as representative of the Crown; or

(2) The making of peace or war or matters arising from a state of

war; or

(3) Naval or military forces, or the defence of the realm; or

(4) Treaties and other relations with foreign States or the

relations between different parts of Her Majesty's dominions or

offences connected with such treaties or relations; or

(5) Dignities or titles of honour; or

(6) Treason, treason-felony, alienage, or naturalisation; or

(7) Trade with any place out of Ireland; or quarantine, or

navigation (except as respects inland waters and local health or

harbour regulations); or

(8) Beacons, lighthouses, or sea marks (except so far as they can

consistently with any general Act of Parliament be constructed or

maintained by a local harbour authority); or

(9) Coinage; legal tender; or the standard of weights and measures;

or

(10) Trade marks, merchandise marks, copyright, or patent rights.

Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void.

4. The powers of the Irish Legislature shall not extend to the making of

any law--

(1) Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or

(2) Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, on

account of religious belief; or

(3) Abrogating or prejudicially affecting the right to establish or

maintain any place of denominational education or any

denominational institution or charity; or

(4) Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a

school receiving public money, without attending the religious

instruction at that school; or

(5) Whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, or may be denied the equal

protection of the laws, or whereby private property may be taken

without just compensation; or

(6) Whereby any existing corporation incorporated by Royal Charter

or by any local or general Act of Parliament (not being a

corporation raising for public purposes taxes, rates, cess, dues,

or tolls, or administering funds so raised) may, unless it

consents, or the leave of Her Majesty is first obtained on address

from the two Houses of the Irish Legislature, be deprived of its

rights, privileges, or property without due process of law; or

(7) Whereby any inhabitant of the United Kingdom may be deprived of

equal rights as respects public sea fisheries.

Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void.

_Executive Authority_

5.--(1) The executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in Her

Majesty the Queen, and the Lord Lieutenant, on behalf of Her Majesty,

shall exercise any prerogatives or other executive power of the Queen

the exercise of which may be delegated to him by Her Majesty, and shall,

in Her Majesty's name, summon, prorogue, and dissolve the Irish

Legislature. (2) There shall be an Executive Committee of the Privy

Council of Ireland to aid and advise in the government of Ireland, being

of such numbers, and comprising persons holding such offices, as Her

Majesty may think fit, or as may be directed by Irish Act. (3) The Lord

Lieutenant shall, on the advice of the said Executive Committee, give or

withhold the assent of Her Majesty to Bills passed by the two Houses of

the Irish Legislature, subject nevertheless to any instructions given by

Her Majesty in respect of any such Bill.

_Constitution of Legislature_

6.--(1) The Irish Legislative Council shall consist of _forty-eight_

councillors. (2) Each of the constituencies mentioned in the First

Schedule to this Act shall return the number of councillors named

opposite thereto in the schedule. (3) Every man shall be entitled to be

registered as an elector, and when registered to vote at an election, of

a councillor for a constituency, who owns or occupies any land or

tenement in the constituency of a rateable value of more than _twenty_

pounds, subject to the like conditions as a man is entitled at the

passing of this Act to be registered and vote as a parliamentary elector

in respect of an ownership qualification or of the qualification

specified in section five of the Representation of the People Act, 1884,

as the case may be: Provided that a man shall not be entitled to be

registered, nor if registered to vote, at an election of a councillor in

more than one constituency in the same year. (4) The term of office of

every councillor shall be _eight_ years, and shall not be affected by a

dissolution; and one _half_ of the councillors shall retire in every

_fourth_ year, and their seats shall be filled by a new election.

7.--(1) The Irish Legislative Assembly shall consist of _one hundred and

three_ members, returned by the existing parliamentary constituencies in

Ireland, or the existing divisions thereof, and elected by the

parliamentary electors for the time being in those constituencies or

divisions. (2) The Irish Legislative Assembly when summoned may, unless

sooner dissolved, have continuance _for five_ years from the day on

which the summons directs it to meet and no longer. (3) After _six_

years from the passing of this Act, the Irish Legislature may alter the

qualification of the electors, and the constituencies, and the

distribution of the members among the constituencies, provided that in

such distribution due regard is had to the population of the

constituencies.

8. If a Bill or any provision of a Bill adopted by the Legislative

Assembly is lost by the disagreement of the Legislative Council, and

after a dissolution, or the period of _two years_ from such

disagreement, such Bill, or a Bill for enacting the said provision, is

again adopted by the Legislative Assembly and fails within three months

afterwards to be adopted by the Legislative Council, the same shall

forthwith be submitted to the members of the two Houses deliberating and

voting together thereon, and shall be adopted or rejected according to

the decision of the majority of those members present and voting on the

question.

_Irish Representation in House of Commons_

9. Unless and until Parliament otherwise determines, the following

provisions shall have effect--

(1) After _the appointed day_ each of the constituencies named in

the Second Schedule to this Act shall return to serve in Parliament

the number of members named opposite thereto in that schedule, and

no more, and Dublin University shall cease to return any member.

(2) The existing divisions of the constituencies shall, save as

provided in that schedule, be abolished.

(3) An Irish representative peer in the House of Lords and a member

of the House of Commons for an Irish constituency shall not be

entitled to deliberate or vote on--

(_a_) any Bill or motion in relation thereto, the operation of

which Bill or motion is confined to Great Britain or some part

thereof; or

(_b_) any motion or resolution relating solely to some tax not

raised or to be raised in Ireland; or

(_c_) any vote or appropriation of money made exclusively for some

service not mentioned in the Third Schedule to this Act; or

(_d_) any motion or resolution exclusively affecting Great Britain

or some part thereof or some local authority or some person or

thing therein; or

(_e_) any motion or resolution, incidental to any such motion or

resolution as either is last mentioned, or relates solely to some

tax not raised or to be raised in Ireland, or incidental to any

such vote or appropriation of money as aforesaid.

(4) Compliance with the provisions of this section shall not be

questioned otherwise than in each House in manner provided by the

House.

(5) The election laws and the laws relating to the qualification

of parliamentary electors shall not, so far as they relate to

parliamentary elections, be altered by the Irish Legislature, but

this enactment shall not prevent the Irish Legislature from

dealing with any officers concerned with the issue of writs of

election, and if any officers are so dealt with, it shall be

lawful for Her Majesty by Order in Council to arrange for the

issue of such writs, and the writs issued in pursuance of such

Order shall be of the same effect as if issued in manner

heretofore accustomed.

_Finance_

10.--(1) _On and after the appointed day_ there shall be an Irish

Exchequer and Consolidated Fund separate from those of the United

Kingdom. (2) The duties of customs and excise and the duties on postage

shall be imposed by Act of Parliament, but subject to the provisions of

this Act the Irish Legislature may, in order to provide for the public

service of Ireland, impose any other taxes. (3) Save as in this Act

mentioned, all matters relating to the taxes in Ireland and the

collection and management thereof shall be regulated by Irish Act, and

the same shall be collected and managed by the Irish Government and form

part of the public revenues of Ireland: Provided that--

(_a_) the duties of customs shall be regulated, collected, managed,

and paid into the Exchequer of the United Kingdom as heretofore;

and

(_b_) all prohibitions in connection with the duties of excise, and

so far as regards articles sent out of Ireland, all matters

relating to those duties, shall be regulated by Act of Parliament;

and

(_c_) the excise duties on articles consumed in Great Britain shall

be paid in Great Britain or to an officer of the Government of the

United Kingdom.

(4) Save as in this Act mentioned, all the public revenues of Ireland

shall be paid into the Irish Exchequer and form a Consolidated Fund, and

be appropriated to the public service of Ireland by Irish Act. (5) If

the duties of excise are increased above the rates in force on _the

first day of March one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three_, the net

proceeds in Ireland of the duties in excess of the said rates shall be

paid from the Irish Exchequer to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

(6) _If the duties of excise are reduced below the rates in force on the

said day, and the net proceeds of such duties in Ireland are in

consequence less than the net proceeds of the duties before the

reduction, a sum equal to the deficiency shall, unless it is otherwise

agreed between the Treasury and the Irish Government, be paid from the

Exchequer of the United Kingdom to the Irish Exchequer_.

11.--(1) The hereditary revenues of the Crown in Ireland which are

managed by the Commissioners of Woods shall continue during the life of

Her present Majesty to be managed and collected by those Commissioners,

and the net amount payable by them to the Exchequer on account of those

revenues, after deducting all expenses (but including an allowance for

interest on such proceeds of the sale of those revenues as have not been

re-invested in Ireland), shall be paid into the Treasury Account

(Ireland) hereinafter mentioned, for the benefit of the Irish Exchequer.

(2) A person shall not be required to pay income tax in Great Britain in

respect of property situate or business carried on in Ireland, and a

person shall not be required to pay income tax in Ireland in respect of

property situate or business carried on in Great Britain. (3) _For the

purpose of giving to Ireland the benefit of the difference between the

income tax collected in Great Britain from British, Colonial, and

foreign securities held by residents in Ireland, and the income tax

collected in Ireland from Irish securities held by residents in Great

Britain, there shall be made to Ireland out of the income tax collected

in Great Britain, an allowance of such amount as may be from time to

time determined by the Treasury, in accordance with a minute of the

Treasury laid before Parliament before the appointed day, and such

allowance shall be paid into the Treasury Account (Ireland) for the

benefit of the Irish Exchequer_. (4) Provided that the provisions of

this section with respect to income tax shall not apply to any excess of

the rate of income tax in Great Britain above the rate in Ireland or of

the rate of income tax in Ireland above the rate in Great Britain.

12.--(1) The duties of customs contributed by Ireland and, save as

provided by this Act, that portion of any public revenue of the United

Kingdom to which Ireland may claim to be entitled, whether specified in

the Third Schedule to this Act or not, shall be carried to the

Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, as the contribution of Ireland

to Imperial liabilities and expenditure as defined in that Schedule. (2)

The civil charges of the Government in Ireland shall, subject as in this

Act mentioned, be borne after the appointed day by Ireland. (3) After

_fifteen_ years from the passing of this Act the arrangements made by

this Act for the contribution of Ireland to Imperial liabilities and

expenditure, and otherwise for the financial relations between the

United Kingdom and Ireland, may be revised in pursuance of an address to

Her Majesty from the House of Commons, or from the Irish Legislative

Assembly.

13.--(1) There shall be established under the direction of the Treasury

an account (in this Act referred to as the Treasury Account (Ireland)).

(2) There shall be paid into such account all sums payable from the

Irish Exchequer to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, or from the

latter to the former Exchequer, and all sums directed to be paid into

the account for the benefit of either of the said Exchequers. (3) All

sums which are payable from either of the said Exchequers to the other

of them, or being payable out of one of the said Exchequers are

repayable by the other Exchequer, shall in the first instance be payable

out of the said account so far as the money standing on the account is

sufficient; and for the purpose of meeting such sums, the Treasury out

of the customs revenue collected in Ireland, and the Irish Government

out of any of the public revenues in Ireland, may direct money to be

paid to the Treasury Account (Ireland) instead of into the Exchequer.

(4) Any surplus standing on the account to the credit of either

Exchequer, and not required for meeting payments, shall at convenient

times be paid into that Exchequer, and where any sum so payable into the

Exchequer of the United Kingdom is required by law to be forthwith paid

to the National Debt Commissioners, that sum may be paid to those

Commissioners without being paid into the Exchequer. (5) All sums

payable by virtue of this Act out of the Consolidated Fund of the United

Kingdom or of Ireland shall be payable from the Exchequer of the United

Kingdom or Ireland, as the case may be, within the meaning of this Act,

and all sums by this Act made payable from the Exchequer of the United

Kingdom shall, if not otherwise paid, be charged on and paid out of the

Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

14.--(1) There shall be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund in favour

of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom as a first charge on that fund

all sums which--

(_a_) are payable to that Exchequer from the Irish Exchequer; or

(_b_) are required to repay to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom

sums issued to meet the dividends or sinking fund on guaranteed

land stock under the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891, or (_c_)

otherwise have been or are required to be paid out of the Exchequer

of the United Kingdom in consequence of the non-payment thereof out

of the Exchequer of Ireland or otherwise by the Irish Government.

(2) If at any time the Controller and Auditor-General of the United

Kingdom is satisfied that any such charge is due, he shall certify the

amount of it, and the Treasury shall send such certificate to the Lord

Lieutenant, who shall thereupon by order, without any counter-signature,

direct the payment of the amount from the Irish Exchequer to the

Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and such order shall be duly obeyed by

all persons, and until the amount is wholly paid no other payment shall

be made out of the Irish Exchequer for any purpose whatever.

(3) There shall be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund next after the

foregoing charge:

(_a_) all sums, for dividends or sinking fund on guaranteed land

stock under the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891, which the

Land Purchase Account and the Guarantee Fund under that Act are

insufficient to pay; (_b_) all sums due in respect of any debt

incurred by the Government of Ireland, whether for interest,

management, or sinking fund; (_c_) an annual sum of _five thousand_

pounds for the expenses of the household and establishment of the

Lord Lieutenant; (_d_) all existing charges on the Consolidated

Fund of the United Kingdom in respect of Irish services other than

the salary of the Lord Lieutenant; and (_e_) the salaries and

pensions of all judges of the Supreme Court or other superior court

in Ireland or of any county or other like court, who are appointed

after the passing of this Act, and are not the Exchequer judges

hereafter mentioned.

(4) Until all charges created by this Act upon the Irish Consolidated

Fund and for the time being due are paid, no money shall be issued from

the Irish Exchequer for any other purpose whatever.

15.--(1) All existing charges on the Church property in Ireland--that is

to say, all property accruing under the Irish Church Act, 1869, and

transferred to the Irish Land Commission by the Irish Church Amendment

Act, 1881--shall so far as not paid out of the said property be charged

on the Irish Consolidated Fund, and any of those charges guaranteed by

the Treasury, if and so far as not paid, shall be paid out of the

Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

(2) Subject to the existing charges thereon, the said Church property

shall belong to the Irish Government, and be managed, administered, and

disposed of as directed by Irish Act.

16.--(1) All sums paid or applicable in or towards the discharge of the

interest or principal of any local loan advanced before the appointed

day on security in Ireland, or otherwise in respect of such loan, which

but for this Act would be paid to the National Debt Commissioners, and

carried to the Local Loans Fund, shall, after the appointed day, be

paid, until otherwise provided by Irish Act, to the Irish Exchequer.

(2) For the payment to the Local Loans Fund of the principal and

interest of such loans, the Irish Government shall after the appointed

day pay by half-yearly payments an annuity for _forty-nine_ years, at

the rate of _four_ per cent, on the principal of the said loans,

exclusive of any sums written off before the appointed day from the

account of assets of the Local Loans Fund, and such annuity shall be

paid from the Irish Exchequer to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom,

and when so paid shall be forthwith paid to the National Debt

Commissioners for the credit of the Local Loans Fund.

(3) After the appointed day, money for loans in Ireland shall cease to

be advanced either by the Public Works Loan Commissioners or out of the

Local Loans Fund.

17.--(1) So much of any Act as directs payment to the Local Taxation

(Ireland) Account of any share of probate, excise, or customs duties

payable to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom shall, together with any

enactment amending the same, be repealed as from the appointed day

without prejudice to the adjustment of balances after that day; but the

like amounts shall continue to be paid to the Local Taxation Accounts in

England and Scotland as would have been paid if this Act had not passed,

and any residue of the said share shall be paid into the Exchequer of

the United Kingdom.

(2) The stamp duty chargeable in respect of the personalty of a deceased

person shall not in the case of administration granted in Great Britain

be chargeable in respect of any personalty situate in Ireland, nor in

the case of administration granted in Ireland be chargeable in respect

of any personalty situate in Great Britain; and any administration

granted in Great Britain shall not, if re-sealed in Ireland, be exempt

from stamp duty on administration granted in Ireland, and any

administration granted in Ireland shall not, when re-sealed in Great

Britain, be exempt from stamp duty on administration granted in Great

Britain.

(3) In this section the expression "administration" means probate or

letters of administration, and as respects Scotland, confirmation

inclusive of the inventory required under the Acts relating to the said

stamp duty, and the expression "personalty" means personal or movable

estate and effects.

18.--(1) Bills for appropriating any part of the public revenue or for

imposing any tax shall originate in the Legislative Assembly.

(2) It shall not be lawful for the Legislative Assembly to adopt or pass

any vote, resolution, address, or Bill for the appropriation for any

purpose of any part of the public revenue of Ireland, or of any tax,

except in pursuance of a recommendation from the Lord Lieutenant in the

session in which such vote, resolution, address, or Bill is proposed.

19.--(1) Two of the judges of the Supreme Court in Ireland shall be

Exchequer judges, and shall be appointed under the great seal of the

United Kingdom; and their salaries and pensions shall be charged on and

paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

(2) The Exchequer judges shall be removeable only by Her Majesty on

address from the two Houses of Parliament, and each such judge shall,

save as otherwise provided by Parliament, receive the same salary and be

entitled to the same pension as is at the time of his appointment fixed

for the puisne judges of the Supreme Court, and during his continuance

in office his salary shall not be diminished, nor his right to pension

altered, without his consent.

(3) An alteration of any rules relating to such legal proceedings as are

mentioned in this section shall not be made except with the approval of

Her Majesty the Queen in Council; and the sittings of the Exchequer

judges shall be regulated with the like approval.

(4) All legal proceedings in Ireland, which are instituted at the

instance of or against the Treasury or Commissioners of Customs, or any

of their officers, or relate to the election of members to serve in

Parliament, or touch any matter within the powers of the Irish

Legislature, or touch any matter affected by a law which the Irish

Legislature have not power to repeal or alter, shall, if so required by

any party to such proceedings, be heard and determined before the

Exchequer judges or (except where the case requires to be determined by

two judges) before one of them, and in any such legal proceeding an

appeal shall, if any party so requires, lie from any court of first

instance in Ireland to the Exchequer judges, and the decision of the

Exchequer judges shall be subject to appeal to Her Majesty the Queen in

Council and not to any other tribunal.

(5) If it is made to appear to an Exchequer judge that any decree or

judgment in any such proceeding as aforesaid has not been duly enforced

by the sheriff or other officer whose duty it is to enforce the same,

such judge shall appoint some officer whose duty it shall be to enforce

the judgment or decree; and for that purpose such officer and all

persons employed by him shall be entitled to the same privileges,

immunities, and powers as are by law conferred on a sheriff and his

officers.

(6) The Exchequer judges, when not engaged in hearing and determining

such legal proceedings as above in this section mentioned, shall perform

such of the duties ordinarily performed by other judges of the Supreme

Court in Ireland as may be assigned by Her Majesty the Queen in Council.

(7) All sums recovered by the Treasury or the Commissioners of Customs

or any of their officers, or recovered under any Act relating to duties

of customs, shall, notwithstanding anything in any other Act, be paid to

such public account as the Treasury or the Commissioners direct.

_Post Office Postal Telegraphs and Savings Banks_

20.--(1) As from _the appointed day_ the postal and telegraph service in

Ireland shall be transferred to the Irish Government, and may be

regulated by Irish Act, except as in this Act mentioned and except as

regards matters relating--

(_a_) to such conditions of the transmission or delivery of postal

packets and telegrams as are incidental to the duties on postage;

or

(_b_) foreign mails or submarine telegraphs or through lines in

connection therewith; or (_c_) to any other postal or telegraph

business in connection with places out of the United Kingdom.

(2) The administration of or incidental to the said excepted matters

shall, save as may be otherwise arranged with the Irish Post Office,

remain with the Postmaster-General.

(3) As regards the revenue and expenses of the postal and telegraph

service, the Postmaster-General shall retain the revenue collected and

defray the expenses incurred in Great Britain, and the Irish Post Office

shall retain the revenue collected and defray the expenses incurred in

Ireland, subject to the provisions of the Fourth Schedule to this Act;

which schedule shall have full effect, but may be varied or added to by

agreement between the Postmaster-General and the Irish Post Office.

(4) _The sums payable by the Postmaster-General or Irish Post Office to

the other of them in pursuance of this Act shall, if not paid out of the

Post Office moneys, be paid from the Exchequer of the United Kingdom or

of Ireland, as the case requires, to the other Exchequer_.

(5) Sections forty-eight to fifty-two of the Telegraph Act 1863, and any

enactment amending the same, shall apply to all telegraphic lines of the

Irish Government in like manner as to the telegraphs of a company within

the meaning of that Act.

21.--(1) As from _the appointed day_ there shall be transferred to the

Irish Government the post office savings banks in Ireland and all such

powers and duties of any department or officer in Great Britain as are

connected with post office savings banks, trustee savings banks or

friendly societies in Ireland, and the same may be regulated by Irish

Act.

(2) The Treasury shall publish not less than six months' previous notice

of the transfer of savings banks.

(3) If before the date of the transfer any depositor in a post office

savings bank so requests, his deposit shall, according to his request,

either be paid to him or transferred to a post office savings bank in

Great Britain, and after the said date the depositors in a post office

savings bank in Ireland shall cease to have any claim against the

Postmaster-General or the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, but

shall have the like claim against the Government and Consolidated Fund

of Ireland.

(4) If before the date of the transfer the trustees of any trustee

savings bank so request, then, according to the request, either all sums

due to them shall be repaid and the savings bank closed, or those sums

shall be paid to the Irish Government, and after the said date the

trustees shall cease to have any claim against the National Debt

Commissioners or the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, but shall

have the like claim against the Government and Consolidated Fund of

Ireland.

(5) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, if a sum

due on account of any annuity or policy of insurance which has before

the above-mentioned notice been granted through a post office or trustee

savings bank is not paid by the Irish Government, that sum shall be paid

out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

_Irish Appeals and Decision of Constitutional Questions_

22.--(1) The appeal from courts in Ireland to the House of Lords shall

cease; and where any person would, but for this Act, have a right to

appeal from any court in Ireland to the House of Lords, such person

shall have the like right to appeal to Her Majesty the Queen in Council;

and the right so to appeal shall not be affected by any Irish Act; and

all enactments relating to appeals to Her Majesty the Queen in Council,

and to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, shall apply

accordingly.

(2) When the Judicial Committee sit for hearing appeals from a court in

Ireland, there shall be present not less than four Lords of Appeal,

within the meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and at least

one member who is or has been a judge of the Supreme Court in Ireland.

(3) A rota of privy councillors to sit for hearing appeals from courts

in Ireland shall be made annually by Her Majesty in Council, and the

privy councillors, or some of them, on that rota shall sit to hear the

said appeals. A casual vacancy in such rota during the year may be

filled by Order in Council.

(4) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction of the House of

Lords to determine the claims to Irish peerages.

23.--(1) If it appears to the Lord Lieutenant or a Secretary of State

expedient in the public interest that steps shall be taken for the

speedy determination of the question whether any Irish Act or any

provision thereof is beyond the powers of the Irish Legislature, he may

represent the same to Her Majesty in Council, and thereupon the said

question shall be forthwith referred to and heard and determined by the

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, constituted as if hearing an

appeal from a court in Ireland.

(2) Upon the hearing of the question such persons as seem to the

Judicial Committee to be interested may be allowed to appear and be

heard as parties to the case, and the decision of the Judicial Committee

shall be given in like manner as if it were the decision of an appeal,

the nature of the report or recommendation to Her Majesty being stated

in open court.

(3) Nothing in this Act shall prejudice any other power of Her Majesty

in Council to refer any question to the Judicial Committee or the right

of any person to petition Her Majesty for such reference.

_Lord Lieutenant and Crown Lands_

24.--(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any Act, every

subject of the Queen shall be qualified to hold the office of Lord

Lieutenant of Ireland, without reference to his religious belief.

(2) The term of office of the Lord Lieutenant shall be _six years_,

without prejudice to the power of Her Majesty the Queen at any time to

revoke the appointment. 25. Her Majesty the Queen in Council may place

under the control of the Irish Government, for the purposes of that

government, such of the lands and buildings in Ireland vested in or held

in trust for Her Majesty, and subject to such conditions or restrictions

(if any) as may seem expedient.

_Judges and Civil Servants_

26. A judge of the Supreme Court or other superior court in Ireland, or

of any county court or other court with a like jurisdiction in Ireland,

appointed after the passing of this Act, shall not be removed from his

office except in pursuance of an address from the two Houses of the

Legislature of Ireland, nor during his continuance in office shall his

salary be diminished or right to pension altered without his consent.

27.--(1) All existing judges of the Supreme Court, county court judges,

and Land Commissioners in Ireland and all existing officers serving in

Ireland in the permanent civil service of the Crown and receiving

salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, shall,

if they are removeable at present on address from both Houses of

Parliament, continue to be removeable only upon such address, and if

removeable in any other manner shall continue to be removeable only in

the same manner as heretofore; and shall continue to receive the same

salaries, gratuities, and pensions, and to be liable to perform the same

duties as heretofore, or such duties as Her Majesty may declare to be

analogous, and their salaries and pensions, if and so far as not paid

out of the Irish Consolidated Fund, shall be paid out of the Exchequer

of the United Kingdom: Provided that this section shall be subject to

the provisions of this Act with respect to the Exchequer judges.

(2) _If any of the said judges, commissioners, or officers retires from

office with the Queen's approbation before completion of the period of

service entitling him to a pension, Her Majesty may, if she thinks fit,

grant to him such pension, not exceeding the pension to which he would

on that completion have been entitled, as to Her Majesty seems meet_.

28.--(1) All existing officers in the permanent civil service of the

Crown, who are not above provided for, and are at the appointed day

serving in Ireland, shall after that day continue to hold their offices

by the same tenure and to receive the same salaries, gratuities, and

pensions, and to be liable to perform the same duties as heretofore or

such duties as the Treasury may declare to be analogous; _and the said

gratuities and pensions, and until three years after the passing of this

Act, the salaries due to any of the said officers if remaining in his

existing office, shall be paid to the payees by the Treasury out of the

Exchequer of the United Kingdom_.

(2) Any such officer may after _three years_ from the passing of this

Act retire from office, and shall, at any time during those three years,

if required by the Irish Government, retire from office, and on any such

retirement may be awarded by the Treasury a gratuity or pension in

accordance with the Fifth Schedule to this Act; Provided that--

(_a_) six months' written notice shall, unless it is otherwise

agreed, be given either by the said officer or by the Irish

Government as the case requires; and

(_b_) such number of officers only shall retire at one time and at

such intervals of time as the Treasury, in communication with the

Irish Government, sanction.

(3) If any such officer does not so retire, the Treasury may award him

after the said three years a pension in accordance with the Fifth

Schedule to this Act which shall become payable to him on his ultimate

retirement from the service of the Crown.

(4) _The gratuities and pensions awarded in accordance with the Fifth

Schedule to this Act shall be paid by the Treasury to the payees out of

the Exchequer of the United Kingdom._

(5) All sums paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom in

pursuance of this section shall be repaid to that Exchequer from the

Irish Exchequer.

(6) This section shall not apply to officers retained in the service of

the Government of the United Kingdom.

29. Any existing pension granted on account of service in Ireland as a

judge of the Supreme Court or of any court consolidated into that court,

or as a county court judge, or in any other judicial position, or as an

officer in the permanent civil service of the Crown other than in an

office the holder of which is after the appointed day retained in the

service of the Government of the United Kingdom, shall be charged on the

Irish Consolidated Fund, and if and so far as not paid out of that fund,

shall be paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom.

_Police_

30.--(1) The forces of the Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin

Metropolitan Police shall, when and as local police forces are from time

to time established in Ireland in accordance with the Sixth Schedule to

this Act, be gradually reduced and ultimately cease to exist as

mentioned in that Schedule; and after the passing of this Act, no

officer or man shall be appointed to either of those forces;

Provided that until the expiration of _six_ years from the appointed

day, nothing in this Act shall require the Lord Lieutenant to cause

either of the said forces to cease to exist, if as representing Her

Majesty the Queen he considers it inexpedient.

(2) The said two forces shall, while they continue, be subject to the

control of the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty, and the

members thereof shall continue to receive the same salaries, gratuities,

and pensions, and hold their appointments on the same tenure as

heretofore, _and those salaries, gratuities, and pensions, and all the

expenditure incidental to either force, shall be paid out of the

Exchequer of the United Kingdom_.

(3) When any existing member of either force retires under the

provisions of the Sixth Schedule to this Act, the Treasury may award to

him a gratuity or pension in accordance with that Schedule.

(4) _Those gratuities and pensions and all existing pensions payable in

respect of service in either force, shall be paid by the Treasury to the

payees out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom_.

(5) _Two-thirds of the net amount payable in pursuance of this section

out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom shall be repaid to that

Exchequer from the Irish Exchequer_.

_Miscellaneous_

31. Save as may be otherwise provided by Irish Act--

(_a_) The existing law relating to the Exchequer and Consolidated

Fund of the United Kingdom shall apply with the necessary

modifications to the Exchequer and Consolidated Fund of Ireland,

and an officer shall be appointed by the Lord Lieutenant to be the

Irish Comptroller and Auditor General; and

(_b_) The accounts of the Irish Consolidated Fund shall be audited

as appropriation accounts in manner provided by the Exchequer and

Audit Departments Act, 1866, by or under the direction of such

officer.

32.--(1) Subject as in this Act mentioned and particularly to the

Seventh Schedule to this Act (which Schedule shall have full effect) all

existing election laws relating to the House of Commons and the members

thereof shall, so far as applicable, extend to each of the two Houses of

the Irish Legislature and the members thereof, but such election laws so

far as hereby extended may be altered by Irish Act.

(2) The privileges, rights, and immunities to be held and enjoyed by

each House and the members thereof shall be such as may be defined by

Irish Act, but so that the same shall never exceed those for the time

being held and enjoyed by the House of Commons, and the members thereof.

33.--(i) The Irish Legislature may repeal or alter any provision of this

Act which is by this Act expressly made alterable by that Legislature,

and also any enactments in force in Ireland, except such as either

relate to matters beyond the powers of the Irish Legislature, or being

enacted by Parliament after the passing of this Act may be expressly

extended to Ireland. An Irish Act, notwithstanding it is in any respect

repugnant to any enactment excepted as aforesaid, shall, though read

subject to that enactment, be, except to the extent of that repugnancy,

valid.

(2) An order, rule, or regulation, made in pursuance of, or having the

force of, an Act of Parliament, shall be deemed to be an enactment

within the meaning of this section.

(3) Nothing in this Act shall affect Bills relating to the divorce or

marriage of individuals, and any such Bill shall be introduced and

proceed in Parliament in like manner as if this Act had not passed.

34. The local authority for any county or borough or other area shall

not borrow money without either--

(_a_) special authority from the Irish Legislature, or

(_b_) the sanction of the proper department of the Irish

Government:

and shall not, without such special authority, borrow;

(i) in the case of a municipal borough or town or area less than a

county, any loan which together with the then outstanding debt of

the local authority, will exceed twice the annual rateable value of

the property in the municipal borough, town, or area; or

(ii) in the case of a country or larger area, any loan which

together with the then outstanding debt of the local authority,

will exceed one-tenth of the annual rateable value of the property

in the county or area; or

(iii) in any case a loan exceeding one-half of the above limits

without a local inquiry held in the county, borough, or area by a

person appointed for the purpose by the said department.

_Transitory Provisions_

35.--(1) During _three_ years from the passing of this Act, and if

Parliament is then sitting until the end of that session of Parliament,

the Irish Legislature shall not pass an Act respecting the relations of

landlord and tenant, or the sale, purchase, or letting of land

generally: Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent the

passing of any Irish Act with a view to the purchase of land for

railways, harbours, waterworks, town improvements, or other local

undertakings.

(2) During _six_ years from the passing of this Act, the appointment of

a judge of the Supreme Court or other superior courts in Ireland (other

than one of the Exchequer judges) shall be made in pursuance of a

warrant from Her Majesty countersigned as heretofore.

36.--(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act Her Majesty the Queen in

Council may make or direct such arrangements as seem necessary or proper

for setting in motion the Irish Legislature and Government and for

otherwise bringing this Act into operation. (2) The Irish Legislature

shall be summoned to meet on the _first Tuesday in September, one

thousand eight hundred and ninety-four_, and the first election of

members of the two Houses of the Irish Legislature shall be held at such

time before that day, as may be fixed by Her Majesty in Council. (3)

Upon the first meeting of the Irish Legislature the members of the House

of Commons then sitting for Irish constituencies, including the members

for Dublin University, shall vacate their seats, and writs shall, as

soon as conveniently may be, be issued by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland

for the purpose of holding an election of members to serve in

Parliament for the constituencies named in the Second Schedule of this

Act. (4) The existing Chief Baron of the Exchequer, and the senior of

the existing puisne judges of the Exchequer Division of the Supreme

Court, or if they or either of them are or is dead or unable or

unwilling to act, such other of the judges of the Supreme Court as Her

Majesty may appoint, shall be the first Exchequer judges. (5) Where it

appears to Her Majesty the Queen in Council, before the expiration of

_one year_ after the appointed day, that any existing enactment

respecting matters within the powers of the Irish Legislature requires

adaptation to Ireland, whether--

(_a_) by the substitution of the Lord Lieutenant in Council, or of

any department or officer of the executive Government in Ireland,

for Her Majesty in Council, a Secretary of State, the Treasury, the

Postmaster-General, the Board of Inland Revenue, or other public

department or officer in Great Britain; or (_b_) by the

substitution of the Irish Consolidated Fund or moneys provided by

the Irish Legislature for the Consolidated Fund of the United

Kingdom, or moneys provided by Parliament; or (_c_) by the

substitution or confirmation by, or other act to be done by or to,

the Irish Legislature for confirmation by or other act to be done

by or to Parliament; or (_d_) by any other adaptation; Her Majesty,

by Order in Council, may make that adaptation.

(6) Her Majesty the Queen in Council may provide for the transfer of

such property, rights, and liabilities, and the doing of such other

things as may appear to Her Majesty necessary or proper for carrying

into effect this Act or any Order in Council under this Act.

(7) An Order in Council under this section may make an adaptation or

provide for a transfer either unconditionally or subject to such

exceptions, conditions, and restrictions as may seem expedient.

(8) The draft of every Order in Council under this section shall be laid

before both Houses of Parliament for not less than two months before it

is made, and such Order when made shall, subject as respects Ireland to

the provisions of an Irish Act, have full effect, but shall not

interfere with the continued application to any place, authority,

person, or thing, not in Ireland, of the enactment to which the Order

relates.

37. Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all existing laws,

institutions, authorities, and officers in Ireland, whether judicial,

administrative, or ministerial, and all existing taxes in Ireland shall

continue as if this Act had not passed, but with the modifications

necessary for adapting the same to this Act, and subject to be

repealed, abolished, altered, and adapted in the manner and to the

extent authorised by this Act.

38. Subject as in this Act mentioned the appointed day for the purposes

of this Act shall be the day of the first meeting of the Irish

Legislature, or such other day not more than _seven_ months earlier or

later as may be fixed by order of Her Majesty in Council either

generally or with reference to any particular provision of this Act, and

different days may be appointed for different purposes and different

provisions of this Act, whether contained in the same section or in

different sections.

39. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires--The expression

'existing' means existing at the passing of this Act.

The expression 'constituency' means a parliamentary constituency or a

county or borough returning a member or members to serve in either House

of the Irish Legislature, as the case requires, and the expression

'parliamentary constituency' means any county, borough, or university

returning a member or members to serve in Parliament.

The expression 'parliamentary elector' means a person entitled to be

registered as a voter at a parliamentary election.

The expression 'parliamentary election' means the election of a member

to serve in Parliament.

The expression 'tax' includes duties and fees, and the expression

'duties of excise' does not include licence duties.

The expression 'foreign mails' means all postal packets, whether

letters, parcels, or other packets, posted in the United Kingdom and

sent to a place out of the United Kingdom, or posted in a place out of

the United Kingdom and sent to a place in the United Kingdom, or in

transit through the United Kingdom to a place out of the United Kingdom.

The expression 'telegraphic line' has the same meaning as in the

Telegraph Acts, 1863 to 1892.

The expression 'duties on postage' includes all rates and sums

chargeable for or in respect of postal packets, money orders, or

telegrams, or otherwise under the Post Office Acts or the Telegraph Act,

1892.

The expression 'Irish Act' means a law made by the Irish Legislature.

The expression 'election laws' means the laws relating to the election

of members to serve in Parliament, other than those relating to the

qualification of electors, and includes all the laws respecting the

registration of electors, the issue and execution of writs, the creation

of polling districts, the taking of the poll, the questioning of

elections, corrupt and illegal practices, the disqualification of

members and the vacating of seats.

The expression 'rateable value' means the annual rateable value under

the Irish Valuation Acts.

The expression 'salary' includes remuneration, allowances, and

emoluments.

The expression 'pension' includes superannuation allowance.

40. This Act may be cited as the Irish Government Act, 1893.

SCHEDULES

FIRST SCHEDULE

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

CONSTITUENCIES AND NUMBER OF COUNCILLORS

Constituencies Councillors.

-------------- -----------

Antrim county Three

Armagh county One

Belfast borough Two

Carlow county One

Cavan county One

Clare county One

Cork county--

East Riding Three

West Riding One

Cork borough One

Donegal county One

Down county Three

Dublin county Three

Dublin borough Two

Fermanagh county One

Galway county Two

Kerry county One

Kildare county One

Kilkenny county One

King's county One

Leitrim and Sligo counties One

Limerick county Two

Londonderry county One

Longford county One

Louth county One

Mayo county One

Meath county One

Monaghan county One

Queen's county One

Roscommon county One

Tipperary county Two

Tyrone county One

Waterford county One

Westmeath county One

Wexford county One

Wicklow county One

-----------

Forty-eight

The expression 'borough' in this Schedule means an existing

parliamentary borough.

Counties of cities and towns not named in this Schedule

shall be combined with the county at large in which they are

included for parliamentary elections, and, if not so included,

then with the county at large bearing the same name.

A borough named in this Schedule shall not for the purposes

of this Schedule form part of any other constituency.

SECOND SCHEDULE

IRISH MEMBERS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

Constituencies. Number of Members for House of Commons

Antrim county Three

Armagh county Two

Belfast borough (in divisions

as mentioned below) Four

Carlow county One

Cavan county Two

Clare county Two

Cork county (in divisions as

mentioned below) Five

Cork borough Two

Donegal county Three

Down county Three

Dublin county Two

Dublin borough (in divisions

as mentioned below) Four

Fermanagh county One

Galway county Three

Galway borough One

Kerry county Three

Kildare county One

Kilkenny county One

Kilkenny borough One

King's county One

Leitrim county Two

Limerick county Two

Limerick borough One

Londonderry county Two

Londonderry borough One

Longford county One

Louth county One

Mayo county Three

Meath county Two

Monaghan county Two

Newry borough One

Queen's county One

Roscommon county Two

Sligo county Two

Tipperary county Three

Tyrone county Three

Waterford county One

Waterford borough One

Westmeath county One

Wexford county Two

Wicklow county One

--------

Eighty

(1) In this Schedule the expression 'borough' means an

existing parliamentary borough.

(2) In the parliamentary boroughs of Belfast and Dublin, one

member shall be returned by each of the existing parliamentary

divisions of those boroughs, and the law relating to the divisions

of boroughs shall apply accordingly.

(3) The county of Cork shall be divided into two divisions,

consisting of the East Riding and the West Riding, and three

members shall be elected by the East Riding, and two members

shall be elected by the West Riding; and the law relating to

divisions of counties shall apply to those divisions.

THIRD SCHEDULE

FINANCE

IMPERIAL LIABILITIES, EXPENDITURE, AND MISCELLANEOUS

REVENUE

_Liabilities_

For the purposes of this Act 'Imperial liabilities' consist of:--

(1) The funded and unfunded debt of the United Kingdom, inclusive

of terminable annuities paid out of the permanent annual charge for

the National Debt, and inclusive of the cost of the management of

the said funded and unfunded debt, but exclusive of the Local Loans

stock and Guaranteed Land stock and the cost of the management

thereof; and

(2) All other charges on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom

for the repayment of borrowed money, or to fulfil a guarantee.

_Expenditure_

For the purpose of this Act Imperial expenditure consists of

expenditure for the following services:--

I. Naval and military expenditure (including Greenwich Hospital).

II. Civil expenditure, that is to say--

(_a_) Civil list and Royal family.

(_b_) Salaries, pensions, allowances, and incidental expenses of--

(i) Lord Lieutenant of Ireland;

(ii) Exchequer judges in Ireland.

(_c_) Building, works, salaries, pensions, printing, stationery,

allowances, and incidental expenses of--

(i) Parliament;

(ii) National Debt Commissioners;

(iii) Foreign Office and diplomatic and consular service,

including secret service, special services, and telegraph

subsidies;

(iv) Colonial Office, including special services and telegraph

subsidies;

(v) Privy Council;

(vi) Board of Trade, including the Mercantile Marine Fund, Patent

Office, Railway Commission, and Wreck Commission, but

excluding Bankruptcy; (vii) Mint; (viii) Meteorological Society;

(ix) Slave trade service.

(_d_) Foreign mails and telegraphic communication with places

outside the United Kingdom.

_Revenue_

For the purposes of this Act the public revenue to a portion

of which Ireland may claim to be entitled consists of revenue

from the following sources:--

1. Suez Canal shares or payments on account thereof.

2. Loans and advances to foreign countries.

3. Annual payments by British possessions.

4. Fees, stamps, and extra receipts received by departments, the

expenses of which are part of the Imperial expenditure.

5. Small branches of the hereditary revenues of the Crown.

6. Foreshores.

[The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Schedules are for the

saving of space omitted.]

FOOTNOTES:

[138] The Bill is printed as it was originally presented to the House of

Commons.

INDEX

_American Commonwealth_, by Rt. Hon. James Bryce, 37 _n_

_American History, Critical Period of_, by Fiske, 103

Andrews, Mr. Justice, a Unitarian, 71 _n_

Appeals under Irish Government Act, 209

Asquith, Rt. Hon. H.H., on the policy of Home Rule, 26, 74 _n_

Balfour, Rt. Hon. Arthur, on Ireland, 71

Beaumont, Gustave de, 142

Bright, John, on Free Trade, 134

Bryce, Rt. Hon. James, 26, _American Commonwealth_, 37, 169

Burke, Edmund, _Reflections on the Revolution in France_, 134

Cambray, Mr., _Irish Affairs and the Home Rule Question_, 1, 23

Canada as a self-governing colony, 20, 25

Civil servants under Irish Government Act, 210

Clancy, Mr., M.P., and the financial clauses of the Home Rule Bill, 103

Cobden and Free Trade, 134

Coercion Act, the, 144

Colonies, self-governing, _see_ New Zealand, Canada, Victoria

_Constitution, Law of_, by Professor Dicey, 6 _n_, 29 _n_, 67 _n_

Constitution of Legislature under Irish Government Act, 199

Constitution, old and new, 1-20, 56;

the new, 21 _et seq_., 191;

no settlement of the Irish question, 112 _et seq_.;

rests on an unsound foundation and contradictory, 125;

pleas for, 132 _et seq._

Constitutional questions, decision of, under Irish Government Act, 209

Contracts, laws as to, 85, 86

Crown Lands under Irish Government Act, 210

Davitt, Michael, and the New Constitution, 115, 142, 167

Dicey, Professor A.V., _Law of the Constitution,_ 6 _n_, 29 _n_, 67 _n_

Duffy, Sir Gavan, Irish Nationalist, 39, 166;

his prediction, 128

England, present constitution of, 2 _et seq_.;

retention of Irish Members at Westminster, 32 _et seq_., 66,

123, 200, 218, 221;

inducements to, 48;

meaning of Home Rule to, 53 _et seq_.;

result of helping Portugal and Spain, 116;

opposition to Home Rule, 119 _et seq_.;

Grattan's constitution, 149;

the path of safety, 175 _et seq._

_England's Case against Home Rule_, 59 _n_, 91 _n_, 94

_n_, 97 _n_, 138 _n_, 155 _n_, 162 _n_

Executive authority under Irish Government Act, 198

Feast of Concord in France, 172

Federalism, 6;

and Home Rule, 13 _et seq_., 96, 118;

application to England, 155;

how it works in other countries, 153 _et seq._

Finance, under Irish Government Act, 27, 100, 102, 201-207, 222, 223

Fiske, _Critical Period of American History_, 103

Ford, Patrick, 166

France, and Italy, 116;

Feast of Concord, 172;

the constitution of 1791, 191

Freeman, E.A., _Irish Home Rule and Its Analogies_, 67 _n_, 153 _n_

Germany, federalism in, 6

Girardin, M., on the French Revolution, 135

Gladstone, W.E., and Home Rule, 26, 113, 128 _n_, 140, 163, 175;

on the retention of Irish Members at Westminster, 32 _n_, 39, 66, 123

Government, _see_ Parliament

Government of Ireland Bill, _see_ Home Rule Bill

Grattan's constitution, 139, 149-152

Hilty, Professor, Swiss publicist, 160

Home Rule, a new constitution for the United Kingdom, 1, 19;

compared with the old constitution, 8 _et seq_.;

four leading features of, 22;

the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, 22-31;

the retention of the Irish Members in the Imperial Parliament, 32 _et

seq_., 66 _n_, 123, 200, 218-221;

powers of the Irish Government, 66 _et seq_., 197 _et seq _.;

the Veto, 88;

Finance, 100-103, 201-207, 222, 223;

as a settlement of the Irish question, 112 _et seq_.;

is federalism, 118;

reasons for, 132 _et seq_.;

necessity for, 138;

the safeguards, 149;

Grattan's constitution, 149;

success of, 152 _et seq_.;

the policy of trust, 163 _et seq_.;

a revolutionary movement, 177, 191

Imperial Parliament, _see_ Parliament Ireland, the old constitution, 1-8;

the new constitution, 8 _et seq_.;

the retention of Irish Members in the Imperial Parliament, 32 _et seq_.,

66 _n_, 123, 200, 218-221;

meaning of Home Rule to, 53;

powers of the Irish Government under Home Rule Bill, 66 _et seq_.,

197 _et seq_.;

the Irish Parliament, 75;

restrictions and obligations, 80 _et seq_.;

the Veto, 88;

the Privy Council and the Courts, 90 _et seq_.;

Home Rule no settlement of the Irish question, 112 _et seq_.;

arguments for the new constitution, 132 _et seq_.;

her desire for parliamentary independence, 140

_Irish Affairs and the Home Rule Question_, by Cambray, 1, 23 _n_

Irish Constabulary under Home Rule Bill, 75 _n_, 212

Irish Executive, 66

Irish Government Act, _see_ Home Rule Bill

_Irish Home Rule and its Analysis_, by E.A. Freeman, 67 _n_, 153 _n_

Irish Parliament, 75

Irish representation in the House of Commons, 32 _et seq_., 66, 123,

200, 218-221

Italy and France, 116

Jackson, Andrew, President of the United States, 158

Judges under Home Rule Bill, 210

Lalor, Mr., 142

Lecky, Mr., _History of England in the Eighteenth Century_, 150

Legislative authority under Home Rule Bill, 197 _et seq_.

Local Government Bill compared with Home Rule Bill, 186

Lord Lieutenant, office of, 66, 210

McCarthy, J., on the effect of the Home Rule Bill, 112, 142, 167

Mahoney, Pierce, _Irish Independent_ on the release of prisoners, 117

Marshall, John, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,

158

Melbourne, Irish informers' reception at, 161, 162

Mill, John Stuart, _Representative Government_, 6 _n_, 118 _n_.

Morley, John, Chief Secretary for Ireland, on retention of Irish Members

at Westminster, 39-43, 49, 62;

changes in administration, 71;

safeguards against legislation setting aside contracts, 86

New Zealand as a self-governing colony, 4, 5, 9, 20, 25, 31;

compared with Ireland, 156

Nulty, Dr., Roman Catholic Bishop of Meath, 71 _n_.

O'Connell, Daniel, compared with Parnell, 139; 166

Parliament, British and Imperial, authority of, in the United Kingdom,

2 _et seq_.;

in the Colonies, 4 _et seq_.;

supremacy of, 22 _et seq_.;

retention of Irish Members in, 32 _et seq_.;

power up to 1782, 55;

since the Union, 56 _et seq._

Parnell, 34;

and Home Rule, 139, 142, 167

Phoenix Park murders, 146

Police under Home Rule Bill, 75 _n_, 212

Post Office and postal telegraphs under Home Rule Bill, 207, 208

Privy Council and the Courts, 90

Protection, 99, 198

Redmond, John, M.P., Home Rule, 26, 50, 103;

and the imprisoned dynamiters, 117 _n_, 168

Referendum, Dicey on, 189, 190

Religion, restrictions on, 99

_Representative Government_, by John Stuart Mill, 118 _n._

Restrictions and obligations in Home Rule Bill, 80 _et seq_.,

197, 198, 214

Retention of Irish Members in House of Commons, 32 _et seq_.,

66, 123, 200, 218-221

Russell, Lord John, 32 _n_

Savings banks under Home Rule Bill, 207, 208

Sexton, Thomas, on Home Rule Bill, 16 _n_, 26, 112, 126

Siéyès, Abbé, 19

Switzerland an example of successful federalism, 6, 159

Taxes, right to impose, 2, 3

Ticino, insurrection in, 107, 160, 161

_Times Parliamentary Debates, 26 _n_, 32 _n_;

Mr. Asquith on executive authority, 74 _n_;

John Morley on legislation to set aside contracts, 86 _n_;

J. McCarthy and W.E. Gladstone on Home Rule as a final settlement,

112 _n_, 113 _n_, 142 _n_;

Gladstone on the policy of trust, 163 _n_.

Tocqueville, Alexis de, and the French Revolution, 134, 173

Trust, the policy of, 163

Unionism, the policy for, 183 _et seq._

_Unionist Delusions, _62 _n_.

United States of America, division of parties in, 37 _n_;

no law allowed to impair the obligation of a contract, 85;

Bryce on State Legislatures in, 169, 170

Veto, the, 15, 199;

its uselessness, 88

Victoria as a self-governing colony, 4 _n_.

_Victoria, Government of_, by Jenks, 9 _n_.