CHAPTER III

WHY THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL NOT BE A

SETTLEMENT OF THE IRISH QUESTION

'_We believe that this measure [the Home Rule Bill] when improved in

Committee will be, at all events in our time, a final settlement of the

Irish question_.'[95]

'Five speeches were made from the Irish benches ... there was not one of

those speeches which fell short of what we have declared to be in our

opinion necessary for the acceptance of this Bill. That is where we

look for a durable and solid statement as to finality. We find the word

_finality_ not even eschewed by the generous unreserve of the honourable

member for North Longford[96] who attached the character of finality to

the Bill.... What said the honourable member for Kerry[97] last night?

He said, "_This is a Bill that will end the feud of ages_" This is

exactly what we want to do. That is what I call acceptance by the Irish

members of this Bill.... _What we mean by this Bill is to close and bury

a controversy of seven hundred years.'_[98]

This hope of ending the feud of ages has been for years dangled by

Gladstonians before the English electorate. It has gained thousands of

votes for Home Rule. But it is doomed to disappointment. The new

constitution will never be a settlement of the Irish question: and this

for three reasons, which can be definitely stated and easily understood.

_First._ The new constitution satisfies neither Ireland nor England.

It does not satisfy Ireland.

Ulster, Protestant Ireland, and indeed, speaking generally, all men of

property in Ireland, whether Protestant or Catholic, detest Home Rule.

They hate the new constitution, they protest against the new

constitution, they assert that they will to the utmost of their ability

resist the introduction and impede the working of the new constitution.

Their abhorrence of Home Rule may be groundless, their threats may be

baseless; their power to give effect to their menaces may have no

existence. All that I now contend is that the strongest, and the most

energetic, part of Irish society is in fact and in truth bitterly

opposed, not only to the details, but to the fundamental principle, of

the new polity. It avails nothing to urge that the Protestants and the

educated Catholics are in a minority. This plea shows that in Parliament

they can be outvoted; it does not show that they will, or can, be

pacified by a policy which runs counter to their traditions, their

interests, and their sentiment. You cannot vote men into content, you

cannot coerce them into satisfaction. Let us look facts in the face. The

measure which is supposed to gratify Ireland satisfies at most a

majority of Irishmen. This may be enough for a Parliamentary tactician,

it is not enough for a far-seeing statesman or a man of plain common

sense. When we are told a minority are filled with discontent, we must

ask who constitute the minority. When we find that the minority consists

of men of all descriptions and of all creeds, that they represent the

education, the respectability, the worth, and the wealth of Ireland, we

must be filled with alarm. Wealth, no doubt, is no certain sign of

virtue, any more than poverty can be identified with vice; a rich man

may be a scoundrel, and a poor man may be an honour to the human race,

but the world would be much worse constituted than it is, if the

possession of a competence were not connected with honesty, energy,

adherence to duty, and every other civic virtue. When it is said or

admitted by Gladstonians that the propertied classes of Ireland are

against Home Rule we know what this means; it means that the energy of

Ireland is against Home Rule, that the honesty of Ireland is against

Home Rule, that the learning of Ireland is against Home Rule, that all

that makes a nation great is against Home Rule, and that the Irishmen

most entitled to our respect and honour implore us not to force upon

them the curse of Home Rule. This is no trifle. Let us at any rate have

done with phrases; let us admit that the satisfaction of Ireland means

merely the satisfaction of a class, though it may be the most numerous

class of Irishmen, and that it also means the bitter discontent of the

one class of Irishmen who are specially loyal to Great Britain. If we

are closing one feud we are assuredly opening another feud which it may

at least be as hard to heal.

But is it true that even the Home Rulers of Ireland are satisfied? Their

representatives indeed accept the new constitution. Their acceptance may

well, as far as intention goes, be honest. Mr. Davitt, I dare say, when

he sentimentalises in the House of Commons about his affection for the

English democracy, is nearly, though not quite, as sincere as when he

used to express passionate hatred of England.[99] But acquiescence is

one thing, satisfaction is another. There is every reason why the Irish

members should acquiesce in the new constitution. They obtain much, and

they gain the means of getting more. Quite possibly they feel grateful.

But their gratitude is not the gratitude of Ireland, and gratitude is

hardly a sentiment possible, or indeed becoming, to a nation.

England saved Portugal and Spain from the domination of France. Do we

find that Portuguese and Spaniards gladly subordinate their interests to

the welfare of England? France delivered Italy from thraldom to Austria;

French blood paid the price of Italian freedom. Yet France is detested

from one end of Italy to the other, whilst Italians rejoice in the

alliance with Austria. In all this there is nothing unreasonable and

nothing to blame. Policy is not sentimentality, and the relations of

peoples cannot be regulated in the same manner as the relations of

individuals. Thirty, twenty, ten, five years hence all the sentiment of

the year 1893 will have vanished. Irish content and satisfaction must,

if it is to exist at all, rest on a far more solid basis than the hopes,

the words, the pledges, or the intentions of Mr. M'Carthy, Mr. Sexton,

or Mr. Davitt. Note that their satisfaction is even now of a limited

kind. It absolutely depends on the new constitution being worked exactly

in the way which they desire. The use of the veto, legislation for

Ireland by the Imperial Parliament, any conflict between the wish of

England and the wish, I do not say of Ireland, but of the Irish

Nationalists, must from the nature of things put an end to all gratitude

or content. But we may go further than this: the new constitution

contains elements of discord. It denies to Ireland the rights of a

nation; it does not concede to her the full privileges of colonial

independence. No genuine Nationalist can really acquiesce in the

prohibition of Ireland's arming even in self-defence. Where, again, is

the Nationalist who is prepared to say that he will not if the Bill is

passed demand that every conspirator and every dynamiter, who is

suffering for the cause of Ireland, shall be released from prison? Is it

credible that the Land Leaguers have forgotten what is due to the

wounded soldiers of their cause? Are they prepared to forget the

imperative claims of evicted tenants or imprisoned zealots?[100] I

cannot believe it.

But if they are so base as to forget what is due to their friends and

victims, what trust could England place in the permanence of any

sentiment expressed by such men with however much temporary fervour and

however much apparent honesty? If, as I am convinced, the Irish leaders

are not prepared to betray the fanatics or ruffians who have trusted and

served them, then with what content does England look on the prospect of

a general amnesty for criminals or of lavish rewards for breach of

contract and the defiance of law?

But in truth the new constitution provides for the general discontent,

not of one class of Irishmen, but of the whole Irish people.

Home Rule is at bottom federalism, and the successful working of a

federal government depends on the observation by its founders of two

principles. The first is that no one State should be so much more

powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with the

whole, or even with many of them combined.[101] The second is that the

federal power should never if possible come into direct conflict with

the authority of any State. Each of these well-known principles has,

partly from necessity and partly from want of skill, been violated by

the constructors of the spurious federation which is to be miscalled the

United Kingdom. The confederacy will consist of two States; the one,

England, to use popular but highly significant language, in wealth, in

population, and in prestige immensely outweighs the other, Ireland. And

by an error less excusable because it might have been avoided, the power

of the central government will be brought into direct conflict with the

authority of the Irish State. Read the Bill as it should be read by any

one who wishes to understand the working of the new constitution, and

throughout substitute 'England' for the term 'United Kingdom.' Note then

what must be the operation of the constitution in the eyes of an

Irishman. The federal power is the power of England. An English Viceroy

instructed by an English Ministry will veto Bills passed by an Irish

Parliament and approved by the Irish people. An English court will annul

Irish Acts; English revenue officers will collect Irish customs, and

every penny of the Irish customs will pass into the English Exchequer.

An English army commanded by English officers, acting under the orders

of English ministers, will be quartered up and down Ireland, and, in the

last resort, English soldiers will be employed to wring money from the

Irish Exchequer for the rigorous payment of debts due from Ireland to

England. Will any Irishman of spirit bear this? Will not Irishmen of all

creeds and parties come to hate the constitution which subjects Ireland

to English rule when England shall have in truth been turned into an

alien power?

The new constitution does not in any case satisfy England.

That England is opposed to Home Rule is admitted on all hands; that

England has good reason to oppose the new form of Home Rule with very

special bitterness is apparent to every Unionist, and must soon become

apparent to any candid man, whether Gladstonian or Unionist, who

carefully studies the provisions of the new constitution, and meditates

on the effect of retaining Irish representatives in the Parliament at

Westminster. For my present purpose there is no need to establish that

English discontent is reasonable; enough to note its existence.

A consideration must be here noticed which as the controversy over Home

Rule goes on will come into more and more prominence. We are engaged in

rearranging new terms of union between England and Ireland; this is the

real effect of the Home Rule Bill; but for such a rearrangement Great

Britain and Ireland must in fairness, no less than in logic, be treated

as independent parties. Whether you make a Union or remodel a Union

between two countries the satisfaction of both parties to the treaty is

essential. Till England is satisfied the new constitution lacks moral

sanction. That the Act of Union could not have been carried without, at

any rate, the technical assent both of Great Britain and Ireland is

admitted, and yet the moral validity of the Treaty of Union is, whether

rightly or not, after the lapse of ninety-three years assailed, on the

ground that the assent of Ireland was obtained by fraud and undue

influence. But if the separate assent of both parties was required for

the making of the treaty, so the free assent of both must be required

for its revision, and the politicians who force on Great Britain the

terms of a political partnership which Great Britain rejects, repeat in

1893 and in an aggravated form the error or crime of 1800.[102]

_Secondly_. The new constitution rests on an unsound foundation.

It is a topsy-turvy constitution, it aims at giving weakness supremacy

over strength.

The main, though not the sole, object of a well-constituted polity is to

place political power (whilst guarding against its abuse) in the hands

of the men, or body of men, who from the nature of things, _i.e._ by

wealth, education, position, numbers, or otherwise, form the most

powerful portion of a given state. The varying forms of the English

Constitution have, on the whole, possessed the immense merit of giving

at each period of our history political authority into the hands of the

class, or classes, who made up the true strength of the nation. Right

has in a rough way been combined with might. Wherever this is not the

case, and genuine power is not endowed with political authority, there

exists a sure cause of revolution; for sooner or later the natural

forces of any society must assert their predominance. No institution

will stand which does not correspond with the nature of things. Vain

were all the efforts of party interest or of philanthropic enthusiasm to

give to the Blacks political predominance in the Southern States. Votes,

ballot boxes, laws, federal arms, all were in vain. By methods which no

man will justify, but which no power could resist, the Whites have

re-acquired political authority. The nature of things could not be made

obedient to the dogmas of democratic equality. Now the gravest flaw of

the new constitution, the disease from which it is certain to perish, is

that, in opposition to the forces which ultimately must determine the

destiny of the United Kingdom, it renders the strong elements of the

community subordinate to the weak.

In Ireland Dublin is made supreme over Belfast, the South is made not

the equal, but in effect the master of the North; ignorance is given

dominion over education, poverty is allowed to dispose of wealth. If

Ireland were an independent state, or even a self-governed British

colony, things would right themselves. But the politicians who are to

rule in Dublin will not depend upon their own resources or be checked by

a sense of their own feebleness. They will be constitutionally and

legally entitled to the support of the British army; they will

constitute the worst form of government of which the world has had

experience, a government which relying for its existence on the aid of

an external power finds in its very feebleness support for tyranny.

Murmurs are already heard of armed resistance. These mutterings, we are

told, are nothing but bluster. It is at any rate that sort of "bluster"

at which the justice and humanity of a loyal Englishman must take alarm.

I have not yet learnt to look without horror on the possibility of civil

war, nor to picture to myself without emotion the situation of brave men

compelled by the British army to obey rulers whose moral claim to

allegiance they justly deny and whose power unaided by British arms they

contemn. Civil warfare created by English policy and despotism

maintained by English arms must surely be to any Englishman objects of

equal abhorrence.

But in England no less than in Ireland our new constitution gives

artificial power to weakness. At Westminster the Irish members, be they

80 or 103, will have no legitimate place. Mr. Gladstone on this point

is, for aught I know, at one with the Unionists. In 1886 he without

scruple, and therefore no doubt without any sense of injustice, expelled

the representatives of Ireland from the British Parliament. In 1893 he

brings them back to Westminster. But his words betray his hesitation. He

expects, may we not say he hopes, that they will remain in Ireland and

on their occasional visits to London have the good sense and good taste

not to interfere in British affairs. Few are the persons who share these

anticipations. If they are to be realised they must be embodied in the

constitution; the Premier might at this moment without shame, and

without regret, revert to the better policy of 1886. On his present

policy we all know that his expectations will not be fulfilled. The

voluntary absence of the Irish members from Westminster is as vain a

dream as the fancy that Ireland under Home Rule may suffer from a

plethora of money. To Westminster the Irish members will come. If they

do not come of their own accord they will be fetched by allies who need

their help. At Westminster they will hold the balance of parties, and

will while the constitution lasts rule the destiny of England with a

sole regard at best to the immediate interest of Ireland, at worst to

the interests of an Irish faction. To Ireland will be given power

without responsibility, to England will belong responsibility without

power. Nor will the unnatural subjection of a great, a flourishing, a

wealthy, and a proud country to a weaker and poorer neighbour be

rendered the more bearable by the knowledge that the ill-starred

supremacy of Ireland means, in England, the equally unnatural and

equally ominous predominance of an English faction, which, since it

needs Irish aid, does not command England's confidence. Radicals or

revolutionists will in the long run have bitter cause to regret an

arrangement which identifies their political triumph with England's

humiliation.

_Thirdly_. The new constitution is based on a play of words which

conceals two contradictory interpretations of its character.[103]

The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament means to Irish Home Rulers and

to most Gladstonians that Ireland shall possess colonial

independence.[104] It means to Unionists and to many electors who can

hardly be called either Unionists or Gladstonians, that the British

Parliament, or, in other words, England, shall retain the real,

effective, and even habitual control of Irish affairs. In the one sense

it means only that Ireland shall remain part of the British Empire, in

the other that Ireland shall still be part of the United Kingdom. And,

what is of great importance, the mass of Englishmen waver between these

two interpretations of Imperial supremacy. When they think of Home Rule

as satisfying Ireland, they hold that it gives Irishmen everything which

they can possibly ask. When they think of Home Rule as not dismembering

the United Kingdom, they fancy that it leaves to the British Parliament

all the real authority which Parliament can possibly require.

This difference of interpretation lays the foundation of

misunderstanding, but it does far more harm than this. It must keep

Irish Nationalists alarmed, and not without reason, for the permanence

of the independence which they may have obtained. A change of feeling or

a change of party may cause the Imperial Parliament to assert its

reserved authority. England keeps her pledges.[105] Yes, but here it is

not a mere question of good faith. When two contractors each from the

beginning put _bona fide_ a different interpretation upon their

contract, neither of them is chargeable with dishonesty for acting in

accordance with his own view of the agreement. The spirit of Unionism

and the spirit of Separation will survive the creation of the new

constitution. Under one form or another Unionists will be opposed to

Federalists and it is more than possible, should the Bill pass, that the

division of English parties may turn upon their reading of the Irish

Government Act, 1893.

The possibility, again, that the Parliament at Westminster may assert

its reserved authority, if it raises the fears of Irishman, may excite

the hopes of English politicians. If at any time the supremacy of

Ireland becomes unbearable to British national sentiment, or if the

condition of Ireland menaces or is thought to menace English interests,

the new constitution places in the hands of a British majority a

ready-made weapon for the restoration of British power. The result might

be attained without the necessity for passing any Act of Parliament, or

of repealing a single section of the Irish Government Act, 1893. A

strong Viceroy might be sent to Ireland; he might be instructed not to

convoke the Irish Parliament at all; or, having convoked, at once to

prorogue it. He might thereupon form any Ministry he chose out of the

members of the Irish Privy Council. The Imperial Parliament would at

once resume its present position and could pass laws for Ireland. This

might be called revolution or reaction. For my argument it matters not

two straws by what name this policy be designated. The scheme sketched

out is not a policy which I recommend. My contention is not that it

will be expedient--this is a matter depending upon circumstances which

no man can foresee--but that it will be strictly and absolutely legal.

The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, combined with the presence of

the Irish members at Westminster, will thus by a curious fatality turn

out a source at once of permanent disquietude to Ireland and of

immediate, if not of permanent, weakness to England.

Our New Constitution is not made to last Home Rule does not close a

controversy; it opens a revolution.

No one in truth expects that the new constitution will stand. Its very

builders hesitate when they speak of its permanence,[106] and are

grateful for the generous credulity of a friend who believes in its

finality. Nor is it hard to conjecture (and in such a matter nothing but

conjecture is possible) what are the forces or tendencies which threaten

its destruction.

If Ireland is discontented Irishmen will demand either the extension of

federalism or separation. In every federal government the tendency of

the States is to diminish as far as possible the authority of the

federal power. But this tendency will be specially strong in the

grotesque Anglo-Irish federation, since the federal power will be

nothing but the predominance of England. The mode of weakening the

federal authority is only too obvious. 'The more there is of the more,'

says a profound Spanish proverb, 'the less there is of the less.' The

more the number of separate States in the confederacy, the less will be

the weight of England, and the greater the relative authority of

Ireland. Let England, Scotland, and Wales become separate States, let

the Channel Islands and Man, and, if possible, some colonies, be added

to the federation, and as the greatness of England dwindles so the

independence of Ireland will grow.

Some seven years ago Sir Gavan Duffy predicted that before ten years had

elapsed there would be a federation of the Empire.[107] Like other

prophets he may have antedated the fulfilment of his prediction, but his

dictum is the forecast of an experienced politician--it points to a

pressing danger. Home Rule for Ireland menaces the dissolution of the

United Kingdom, and the unity of the United Kingdom is the necessary

condition for maintaining the existence of the British Empire. Home Rule

is the first stage to federalism.

But Irish discontent, should it not find satisfaction in a movement for

federalism, will naturally take the form of the demand for colonial or

for national independence. You cannot play with the spirit of political

nationality. The semi-independence of Ireland from England, combined

with the undue influence of Ireland in English politics, is certain to

produce both unreasonable and reasonable grounds for still further

loosening the tie which binds together the two islands. The cry 'Ireland

a nation' is one of which no Irishman need be ashamed, and to which

North and South alike, irritated by the vexations of a makeshift

constitution, are, as I have already insisted, likely enough to rally.

Nor is it certain that Irish Federalists or Irish Nationalists will not

obtain allies in England. The politicians who are content with a light

heart to destroy the work of Pitt may, for aught I know, with equal

levity, annul the Union with Scotland and undo the work of Somers, or by

severing Wales from the rest of England render futile the achievement of

the greatest of the Plantagenets. Enthusiasts for 'Home Rule all round'

would appear to regard their capacity for destroying the United Kingdom

as a proof of their ability to build up a new fabric of Imperial power,

and to fulfil their vain dreams of a federated Empire. Sensible men may

doubt whether a turn for revolutionary destruction is any evidence that

politicians possess the rare gift of constructive statesmanship. And

should the working of the new constitution confirm these doubts, persons

of prudence will begin to perceive that Irish independence is for both

England and Ireland a less evil than the extension of federalism.

The natural expression however of English discontent or disappointment

is reactionary opposition. Reaction, or the attempt of one party in a

state to reverse a fundamental policy deliberately adopted by the

nation, is one of the worst among the offspring of revolution, and is

almost, though not entirely, unknown to the history of England. Yet

there is more than one reason why if the Home Rule Bill be carried,

reaction should make its ill-omened appearance in the field of English

public life. The policy of Home Rule, even should it be for the moment

successful, lacks the moral sanctions which have compelled English

statesmen to accept accomplished facts. The methods of agitation in its

favour have outraged the moral sense of the community. Mr. Gladstone's

victory is the victory of Mr. Parnell, and the triumph of Parnellism is

the triumph of conspiracy, and of conspiracy rendered the more base

because it was masked under the appearance of a constitutional movement.

Neither the numbers nor the composition of the ministerial majority are

impressive. The tactics of silence, evasion, and ambiguity may aid in

gaining a parliamentary victory, but deprive the victory of that respect

for the victors on the part of the vanquished which, in civil contests

at any rate, alone secures permanent peace. But the pleas and

justifications for reaction are rarely its causes. If Englishmen attempt

to bring about the legal destruction of the new constitution, their

action will be produced by a sense of the false position assigned to

England. No device of statesmanship can stand which is condemned by the

nature of things. The predominance of England in the affairs of the

United Kingdom is secured by sanctions which in the long run can neither

be defied nor set aside; the constitution which does not recognise this

predominance is doomed to ruin. That its overthrow would be just no one

dare predict; the future is as uncertain as it is dark. A main reason

why a wise man must deprecate the weak surrender by Englishmen of

rightful power is the dread that, if in a moment of irritation they

reassert their strength, they may exhibit neither their good faith nor

their justice.

FOOTNOTES:

[95] J. M'Carthy, April 10, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 354.

No part of these quotations is italicised in the report.

[96] J. M'Carthy.

[97] Mr. Sexton.

[98] Mr. Gladstone, April 21, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p.

565.

[99] At Bodyke, June 2, 1887, Mr. M. Davitt said:--'Our people, however,

who so leave Ireland are not lost in the Irish cause, for they will join

the ranks of the Ireland of retribution beyond the Atlantic; and when

the day shall again come that we have a right to manage our own affairs,

the sun may some day shine down upon England when we here in Ireland

will have the opportunity of having vengeance upon the enemy for its

crimes in Ireland.'--_Freeman's Journal_, June 3, 1887. See 'Notes on

the Bill,' published by the Irish Unionist Alliance, p. 368. These

expressions were used after the union of hearts.

[100] 'But all these matters are, as it were, minor details. They all

sink into comparative insignificance before the one great demand--and I

almost apologise for mentioning them--because I want you to concentrate

your attention on the one great demand which we make, and the one

unalterable statement we intend to adhere to, that whether guilty or

innocent, these men, according to their lights and their consciences,

were trying to serve Ireland; that any of them who were guilty were

driven into this course by the misgovernment of Ireland, and the

oppression of Ireland by an outside power, and that if we are asked to

settle this Irish question, if we are asked to let peace reign where

discord and hatred reign at present, there must be no victims--that if

there is to be peace there must also be amnesty. I don't discuss the

question of guilt or innocence. For the sake of argument I will say that

there are some men in jail who are guilty. They must come out as well as

the innocent, because their guilt is due to misgovernment in the

past.'--Mr. Pierce Mahony, _Irish Independent_, April 5. See 'Notes on

the Bill,' p. 423.

'There is no use in deceiving ourselves upon this matter; we would be

fools if we thought that in the next few weeks, or within the next few

months, we would succeed in getting our brethren out of prison. I don't

believe we will; ... but I am convinced of this, that there is not a man

amongst them who will ever be called upon to serve anything like the

remainder of his sentence. I am convinced that in a short time--and the

extent of its duration depends upon other circumstances--every one of

these men will be restored to liberty if only we conduct this agitation

with determination, with resolution, and I would say above all with

moderation and with wisdom.'--Mr. John Redmond, M.P., _Dublin Irish

Independent_, April 5. See 'Notes on the Bill,' p. 424.

[101] See Mill, _Representative Government_, 1st ed. p. 300.

[102] Of course I do not for a moment dispute the legal right of

Parliament to repeal all or any of the articles of the Treaty of Union

with Ireland. I am writing now not upon the law, but upon the ethics of

the constitution. My contention is, that, as things stand, the undoubted

assent of Great Britain (or even perhaps of England, in the narrower

sense) is morally requisite for the repeal or at any rate for the

remodelling of the Treaty of Union. Note that Ireland would stand

morally and logically in a stronger position if demanding Separation

than when demanding a revision of the Act of Union. An example shows my

meaning. _A, B_, and _C_ form a partnership. _A_ is by far the richest,

and _C_ by far the poorest of the firm. _C_ finds the terms of

partnership onerous. He may have a moral right to retire, but certainly

he cannot have a moral, and would hardly under any system of law have a

legal, right to say, 'I do not want to leave the firm, but I insist that

the terms of partnership be remodelled wholly in my favour.' Nor again

is it conceivable that _B_ and _C_ by uniting together could in fairness

claim to impose upon _A_ disadvantages the burden of which he had never

intended to accept.

[103] See pp. 22-31, _ante_.

[104] 'But who proposed that Ireland should be anything else than an

integral part of the United Kingdom (Ministerial cheers), or rather of

the Empire?' (Opposition cheers).--Mr. Sexton, April 20, 1893, _Times

Parliamentary Debates_, p. 522. The confusion of ideas and the

hesitation implied in Mr. Sexton's expressions are noteworthy.

[105] England adhered with absolute fidelity to her renunciation of the

right to legislate for Ireland. Whatever were the other flaws in the

Treaty of Union, it was no violation either of 22 Geo. III. c. 63, or of

23 Geo. III. c. 28. The worst features of the method by which the Act of

Union was carried would have been avoided had the English Parliament

resumed the right to legislate for Ireland. The Treaty of Union depends

on Acts both of the British and of the Irish Legislature. This is

elementary but has escaped the attention of Mr. Sexton (see _Times

Parliamentary Debates_, Feb. 13, 1893, p. 319), whose investigations

into the history of his country are apparently recent.

[106] "The plan that was to be proposed was to be such as, at least in

the judgment of its promoters, presented the necessary

characteristics--I will not say of finality, because it is a discredited

word--but of a real and continuing settlement."--Mr. Gladstone, Feb. 13,

1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates_, p. 303.

[107] See Mr. Gladstone's Irish Constitution, _Contemporary Review_,

May, 1886, p. 616.

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