KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE[1] AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. THEORY
OF FREEDOM.
The attack I have made, in the cause of truth, on Kant's system of
Morals, does not, like those of my predecessors, touch the surface
only, but penetrates to its deepest roots. It seems, therefore,
only just that, before I leave this part of my subject, I should
bring to remembrance the brilliant and conspicuous service which he
nevertheless rendered to ethical science. I allude to his doctrine of
the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity. We find it first in the
_Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ (pp. 533-554 of the first, and pp. 561-582
of the fifth, edition); but it is still more clearly expounded in the
_Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ (fourth edition, pp. 169-179; R., pp.
224-231).
The strict and absolute necessity of the acts of Will, determined by
motives as they arise, was first shown by Hobbes, then by Spinoza,
and Hume, and also by Dietrich von Holbach in his _Système de la
Nature_; and lastly by Priestley it was most completely and precisely
demonstrated. This point, indeed, has been so clearly proved, and
placed beyond all doubt, that it must be reckoned among the number of
perfectly established truths, and only crass ignorance could continue
to speak of a freedom, of a _liberum arbitrium indifferentiae_ (a
free and indifferent choice) in the individual acts of men. Nor did
Kant, owing to the irrefutable reasoning of his predecessors, hesitate
to consider the Will as fast bound in the chains of Necessity, the
matter admitting, as he thought, of no further dispute or doubt. This
is proved by all the passages in which he speaks of freedom only from
the =theoretical= standpoint. Nevertheless, it is true that our
actions are attended with a consciousness of independence and original
initiative, which makes us recognise them as our own work, and every
one with ineradicable certainty feels that he is the real author
of his conduct, and morally =responsible= for it. But since
responsibility implies the possibility of having acted otherwise,
which possibility means freedom in some sort or manner; therefore
in the consciousness of responsibility is indirectly involved also
the consciousness of freedom. The key to resolve the contradiction,
that thus arises out of the nature of the case, was at last found by
Kant through the distinction he drew with profound acumen, between
phaenomena and the Thing in itself (_das Ding an sich_). This
distinction is the very core of his whole philosophy, and its greatest
merit.
The individual, with his immutable, innate character strictly
determined in all his modes of expression by the law of Causality,
which, as acting through the medium of the intellect, is here called
by the name of Motivation,--the individual so constituted is only the
=phaenomenon= (_Erscheinung_). The =Thing= in itself which
underlies this phaenomenon is outside of Time and Space, consequently
free from all succession and plurality, one, and changeless. Its
constitution in itself is the =intelligible character=, which
is equally present in all the acts of the individual, and stamped on
every one of them, like the impress of a signet on a thousand seals.
The empirical character of the phaenomenon--the character which
manifests itself in time, and in succession of acts--is thus determined
by the intelligible character; and consequently, the individual, as
phaenomenon, in all his modes of expression, which are called forth
by motives, must show the invariableness of a natural law. Whence it
results that all his actions are governed by strict necessity. Now
it used to be commonly maintained that the character of a man may
be transformed by moral admonitions and remonstrances appealing to
reason; but when the distinction between the intelligible and empirical
character had once been drawn, it followed that the unchangeableness,
the inflexible rigidity of the empirical character, which thinking
people had always observed, was explained and traced to a rational
basis, and consequently accepted as an established fact by Philosophy.
Thus the latter was so far harmonised with experience, and ceased to
stand abashed, before popular wisdom, which long before had spoken the
words of truth in the Spanish proverb: _Lo que entra con el capillo,
sale con la mortaja_ (that which comes in with the child's cap, goes
out with the winding-sheet); or: _Lo que en la leche se mama, en la
mortaja se derrama_ (what is imbibed with the milk, is poured out again
in the winding-sheet).
This doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity I regard
as the greatest of all the achievements of human sagacity. With the
Transcendental Aesthetics it forms the two great diamonds in the crown
of Kant's fame, which will never pass away. In his Treatise on Freedom,
Schelling obviously served up the Kantian teaching in a paraphrase,
which by reason of its lively colouring and graphic delineation, is for
many people more comprehensible. The work would deserve praise if its
author had had the honesty to say that he is drawing on Kant's wisdom,
not on his own. As it is, a certain part of the philosophic public
still credits him with the entire performance.
The theory itself, and the whole question regarding the nature of
Freedom, can be better understood if we view them in connection with
a general truth, which I think, is most concisely expressed by a
formula frequently occurring in the scholastic writings: _Operari
sequitur esse_.[2] In other words, everything in the world operates in
accordance with what it is, in accordance with its inherent nature, in
which, consequently, all its modes of expression are already contained
potentially, while actually they are manifested when elicited by
external causes; so that external causes are the means whereby the
essential constitution of the thing is revealed. And the modes of
expression so resulting form the =empirical= character; whereas
its hidden, ultimate basis, which is inaccessible to experience, is
the =intelligible= character, that is, the real nature _per se_
of the particular thing in question. Man forms no exception to the
rest of nature; he too has a changeless character, which, however,
is strictly individual and different in each case. This character is
of course =empirical= as far as we can grasp it, and therefore
only =phaenomenal=; while the =intelligible= character is
whatever may be the real nature in itself of the person. His actions
one and all, being, as regards their external constitution, determined
by motives, can never be shaped otherwise than in accordance with the
unchangeable individual character. As a man is, so he his bound to act.
Hence for a given person in every single case, there is absolutely only
one way of acting possible: _Operari sequitur esse_[3] Freedom belongs
only to the intelligible character, not to the empirical. The _operari_
(conduct) of a given individual is necessarily determined externally
by motives, internally by his character; therefore everything that he
does necessarily takes place. But in his _esse_ (_i.e._, in what he
is), =there=, we find Freedom. He =might have been= something
different; and guilt or merit attaches to that which he is. All that
he does follows from what he is, as a mere corollary. Through Kant's
doctrine we are freed from the primary error of connecting Necessity
with _esse_ (what one is), and Freedom with _operari_ (what one does);
we become aware that this is a misplacement of terms, and that exactly
the inverse arrangement is the true one. Hence it is clear that the
moral responsibility of a man, while it, first of all, and obviously,
of course, touches what he does, yet at bottom touches what he is;
because, what he is being the original =datum=, his conduct, as
motives arise, could never take any other course than that which it
actually does take. But, however strict be the necessity, whereby,
in the individual, acts are elicited by motives, it yet never occurs
to anybody--not even to him who is convinced of this necessity--to
exonerate himself on that account, and cast the blame on the motives;
for he knows well enough that, objectively considered, any given
circumstance, and its causes, perfectly admitted quite a different,
indeed, a directly opposite course of action; nay, that such a course
would actually have taken place, =if only he had been a different
person=. That he is precisely such a one as his conduct proclaims
him to be, and no other--this it is for which he feels himself
responsible; in his _esse_ (what he is) lies the vulnerable place,
where the sting of conscience penetrates. For Conscience is nothing
but acquaintance with one's own self--an acquaintance that arises out
of one's actual mode of conduct, and which becomes ever more intimate.
So that it is the _esse_ (what one is) which in reality is accused
by conscience, while the _operari_ (what one does) supplies the
incriminating evidence. Since we are only conscious of =Freedom=
through the sense of =responsibility=; therefore where the latter
lies the former must also be; in the _esse_ (in one's being). It is
the _operari_ (what one does) that is subject to necessity. But we can
only get to know ourselves, as well as others =empirically=; we
have no _a priori_ knowledge of our character. Certainly our natural
tendency is to cherish a very high opinion of it, because the maxim:
_Quisque praesumitur bonus, donec probetur contrarium_ (every one is
presumed to be good, until the contrary is proved), is perhaps even
more true of the inner court of justice than of the world's tribunals.
NOTE.
He who is capable of recognising the essential part of a thought,
though clothed in a dress very different from what he is familiar with,
will see, as I do, that this Kantian doctrine of the intelligible and
empirical character is a piece of insight already possessed by Plato.
The difference is, that with Kant it is sublimated to an abstract
clearness; with Plato it is treated mythically, and connected with
metempsychosis, because, as he did not perceive the ideality of Time,
he could only represent it under a temporal form. The identity of the
one doctrine with the other becomes exceedingly plain, if we read the
explanation and illustration of the Platonic myth, which Porphyrius has
given with such clear exactitude, that its agreement with the abstract
language of Kant comes out unmistakably. In the second book of his
Eclogues, chap. 8, §§ 37-40,[4] Stobaeus has preserved for us _in
extenso_ that part of one of Porphyrius' lost writings which specially
comments on the myth in question, as Plato gives it in the second half
of the tenth book of the Republic.[5] The whole section is eminently
worth reading. As a specimen I shall quote the short § 39, in the hope
of inducing any one who cares for these things to study Stobaeus for
himself. It will then immediately become apparent that this Platonic
myth is nothing less than an allegory of the profound truth which Kant
stated in its abstract purity, as the doctrine of the intelligible and
empirical character, and consequently that the latter had been reached,
in its essentials, by Plato thousands of years ago. Indeed, this view
seems to go back much further still, for Porphyrins is of opinion that
Plato took it from the Egyptians. Certainly we already find the same
theory in the Brahmanical doctrine of metempsychosis, and it is from
this Indian source that the Egyptian priests, in all probability,
derived their wisdom. § 39 is as follows:--
_Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον βούλημα τοιοῡτ' ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τοῡ Πλάτωνος ἔχειν μὲν τὸ
αὐτεξουσιον τὰς ψυχὰς, πρὶν εἰς σώματα καὶ βίους διαϕέρους ἐμπεσεῖν,
εἰς τὸ ἢ τοῡτoν τὸν βίον ἕλεσθαι, ἢ ἄλλον, ὅν, μετὰ ποιᾱς ζωῆς καὶ
σώματος οἰκείον τῇ ζωῇ, κτέλεσειν μέλλει (καὶ γὰρ λέοντος βίον ἐπ'
αὐτῇ εἶνai ἔλεσθαι, καὶ ἀνδρὸς). Kakeῑνο μέντοι τὸ αὐτeξoύσιον, ἅμα
τῇ πρός τινα τῶν τοιούτων βίων πτώσει, ἐμπεπόδισται. Κατελθοῡσαι
γὰρ εἰς τὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀντὶ ψυχῶν aπολυτῶν γεγονῑυαι ψυχαὶ ζώων, τὸ
αὐτεξούσιον ϕέρουσιν οἰκείον τῇ τοῡ ζώον κατασκευῇ, καὶ ἐϕ' ὧν μὲν
εἶνai πολύνουν καὶ πολυκίνητον, ὡς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπον, ἐϕ' ὡν δὲ λυγοκίνηττον
καὶ μονότροπον, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλον σχεδὸν πάντων ζώων. Ήρτῆσθαι δὲ
τὸ αὐτeξoύσιον τοῡτo ἀπὸ τῆς κατασκετῆς, κινούμενον μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῡ,
ϕερόμενον δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῆς κατασκευῇς γυγνομένας προθυμίας._[6]
[1] _V_. Note on "intelligible" in Chapter I. of this
Part.--(_Translator_)
[2] _I.e._, what is done is a consequence of that which is.
[3] _I.e._, his acts are a consequence of what he is.
[4] _V_. Joannes Stobaeus. _Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae_, edit.
Curtius Wachsmuth et Otto Hense; Weidmann, Berlin, 1884. Vol. II., pp.
163-168.--(_Translator._)
[5] _V_. Plat., _Rep_., edit. Stallbaum, 614 sqq. It is the _ἀπόλoγos
Ήρὸς τοῡ Άρμενίον_.--(_translator._)
[6] To sum up. What Plato meant seems to be this. Souls (he said) have
free power, before passing into bodies and different modes of being,
to choose this or that form of life, which they will pass through in a
certain kind of existence, and in a body adapted thereto. (For a soul
may choose a lion's, equally with a man's, mode of being.) But this
free power of choice is removed simultaneously with entrance into one
or other of such forms of life. For when once they have descended into
bodies, and instead of unfettered souls have become the souls of living
things, then they take that measure of free power which belongs in each
case to the organism of the living thing. In some forms this power
is very intelligent and full of movement, as in man; in some it has
but little energy, and is of a simple nature, as in almost all other
creatures. Moreover, this free power depends on the organism in such a
way that while its capability of action is caused by itself alone, its
impulses are determined by the desires which have their origin in the
organism.--(_Translator._)