And Present Condition of Tripoli, with some accounts of the other
Barbary States.
No. III.
From 1798 to 1803, William Eaton, formerly a captain in the army of the
United States, was their consul[1] in Tunis. As the character of this
remarkable man will be best illustrated by the account of his
proceedings in Barbary, it will be sufficient to premise that he had,
before his mission to that country, given proofs of more than ordinary
courage and capacity, and that the utmost confidence was placed in his
honor and integrity by those who possessed the means of forming an
opinion with regard to him. These are admirable qualities for a
diplomatic agent; on the other hand, he was irritable and cynical, and
was considered eccentric by persons who were unable to comprehend his
views or his plans. Ever open and liberal himself, he could not easily
conceal his contempt for those in whom he discovered signs of duplicity
or meanness; and his irrepressible frankness on such occasions, was not
calculated to render him an object of favor with a government which
reprobated treachery only when it was unsuccessful.
[Footnote 1: The consuls residing in the Barbary States, are considered
as the representatives of their several governments, and are
essentially diplomatic agents; although they are not so termed, out of
respect for the Porte.]
The Bey Hamouda, to whom Eaton was accredited, was a man vastly
superior to the generality of Barbary sovereigns; though free from none
of the vices which appear to have fixed their seat in that portion of
the earth, he was yet by no means their slave, being neither a brutal
ruffian nor a luxurious sybarite. His passions, though violent, seldom
obscured his observation, or led him to the commission of imprudences
or wanton cruelties; and it was only by means of sagacity, energy and
laboriousness such as he possessed, that the throne of Tunis could have
been held by one man for thirty-two stormy years (1782 to 1815).
The intercourse between these two shrewd and fiery spirits, was a
continued series of discussions and struggles, of attempted
encroachments on the part of the Bey, and of obstinate resistance on
that of Eaton. The African Prince soon perceived that the American was
of a different stamp from the consuls to whom he had been hitherto
accustomed, and whom he regarded in general as mere intriguers, or
instruments for the conveyance of flattery and presents; and Eaton,
although he could not like or respect the Bey, yet seems to have
excepted him from the anathema of contempt in which he involved all
other inhabitants of Barbary. In the accounts of their interviews, we
see Hamouda ever anxious to secure advantages, yet at times displaying
something like a feeling of national pride; Eaton placing the honor of
his country as the first consideration, yet mindful of its smallest
interests when they could be reconciled with this primary object: the
Bey endeavoring to inveigle or surprise the American consul into a
promise of his influence to obtain some future concession from his
government; Eaton carefully avoiding, or boldly refusing the slightest
encouragement to such expectations, well knowing that it would be
construed and afterwards quoted as a definite or a partial engagement.
These accounts are indeed only to be found in the despatches of Eaton.
But independently of the character of the writer, his details bear
every mark of truth, and together present one of the most original and
interesting specimens of negotiation to be found in the annals of
diplomacy. The strength and the weakness of these anomalous governments
are there clearly exposed; and after the demonstrations thus given, it
would have been unpardonable in the Americans to have longer persisted
in the submissive course which they had been induced to adopt.
Eaton's first business was to have amendments made in a treaty which
had been concluded between the United States and Tunis, through the
agency of a Frenchman named Famin; this was effected, after a display
of great ingenuity on both sides, and some mutual concessions. Then
came the arrangement of the presents from the American government,
which the Bey attempted to raise far beyond the amount agreed on,
hinting that war might be the consequence of refusal. It was on this
occasion that Eaton commenced his solicitations for the despatch of an
American squadron to the Mediterranean--"Send the _stipulated_
presents," said he, "but accompany them by a respectable force, and let
them be tendered under our guns; if then refused, the obligation is at
an end; delay, and we shall soon be obliged to redeem our citizens from
slavery." No ship of war appearing to support the resistance of the
American consul, the Bey increased his demands, requiring at one time a
frigate, and afterwards ten thousand stand of arms. At length the
appearance of Dale's squadron (1801) induced him to lower his tone and
to suspend his exactions.
The war between the United States and Tripoli soon occasioned new
difficulties, in the course of which the Bey showed himself well
acquainted with the received principles of national law; and
unfortunately the manner in which the operations of the American
squadron were conducted, gave him the advantage in the argument.
Tripoli had been declared in a state of blockade; yet months elapsed
during which no ship appeared on the coast to enforce it; indeed the
frigates (of which, with the exception of the schooner Enterprize, the
American squadron was entirely composed,) were nearly useless for that
purpose; the shallowness of the water enabling lighter vessels to leave
or enter the port, by running some distance close to the shore. Eaton
was unceasing in his solicitations to his government, and to the
officers of the squadron, for the pursuance of more energetic measures;
but his government adhered to its system of caution, and the naval
commanders appear to have been affected with that jealousy or distrust
which always exists in the minds of such officers with regard to the
representatives of their nation abroad, particularly towards those who
are termed consuls. They received his recommendations with hauteur, and
treated them with neglect; and on one or two occasions only could he
obtain their co-operation.
The Bey seeing this, demanded passports for his vessels to carry grain
to Tripoli, which they had been in the habit of supplying with that
article. Eaton refused, alleging that it would be an infringement of
the blockade. The Bey replied that no blockade existed _de facto_; and
a series of discussions ensued, in which we see the Barbary Prince
insisting on an observance of the rules of national law, and the
American representative agent upholding a paper blockade.
The difficulties between Eaton and the Bey were much increased by the
intrigues of the Tunisian ministers and officers; particularly by those
of Sidi Yusuf, the _Seid-e-Tapa_, or Keeper of the Seal, commonly
called the Sapatapa, a wretch who by the most infamous practices had
amassed an immense fortune, and raised himself from the condition of a
Georgian slave to the highest place in the ministry. To their ceaseless
importunities for presents Eaton at first yielded; but finding that
compliance only rendered them more frequent, and that the requests put
on the form of exactions, he at length plainly refused, frequently
clothing his denial in a sarcastic dress, or accompanying it by
observations which no interpreter could soften into compliments.
Indeed, on several occasions, when the inferior agents were insolent,
he did not scruple to lay his cane over their shoulders; and even Famin
the Frenchman, who had been the representative of his government in the
negotiation of the treaty, felt the weight of his arm. These
circumstances rendered him obnoxious to the whole Tunisian government,
and every attempt was made to get rid of him, in order to obtain
another consul who might be of more pliable stuff. Intimidate him they
could not, but they succeeded fully in disgusting him.
Circumstances at length occurred which revived his hopes of seeing the
honor of his country vindicated, and its relations with the Barbary
powers established on a fair and firm basis. It has been stated that
Hamet, the exiled Prince of Tripoli, had sought refuge in Tunis from
the persecutions of his brother; he was there received and supported by
the Bey, partly from compassion, but principally from political
motives, as he might thus be employed to keep Yusuf in check. In the
summer of 1801, it was suggested to Eaton by the ex-consul Cathcart,
that the restoration of Hamet to the throne of Tripoli might in all
probability be easily effected through the assistance of the United
States, and that it would prove highly advantageous to American
interests. Eaton at first paid but little attention to the suggestion;
but afterwards having obtained information from Tripoli on which he
could rely, that the Pasha was very unpopular, and his subjects ripe
for revolt, he became acquainted with the Prince, and gradually
communicated to him his views. He proposed that Hamet should proceed to
Tripoli with the whole American squadron, and be there presented to the
people as their rightful sovereign; if accepted, peace was to be made,
on terms of which the principal were stated, one of them being the
delivery of Yusuf to the Americans; if the inhabitants should however
refuse to receive him, the war was to be prosecuted with vigor to a
conclusion.
Hamet at first appeared to enter into the plan, and communicated
information from which its success appeared still more probable; but
his natural irresolution soon returned, and innumerable difficulties
presented themselves to his imagination. The most serious ground of
objection taken by him was, that his family were still retained as
hostages in Tripoli, and the ruthlessness of his brother's character
rendered it highly probable that he might exercise towards them any
degree of violence, when prompted either by interest or revenge. To
this, Eaton opposed the consideration, that the appearance of an
overwhelming force, with the country too in arms against Yusuf, would
impress upon him the inutility of resistance, and oblige him to enter
into some arrangement for the release of Hamet's family, and the
surrender of the throne. The exiled Prince would however make no
promises, until he had been assured of the assistance of the American
force, which Eaton immediately endeavored to obtain; but neither his
instructions, nor those of the commander of the squadron, would warrant
such proceedings; and indeed, as the proposition came from Eaton, it
was of course reprobated and pronounced visionary by the latter. The
consul therefore wrote to his government, detailing his plan, and
urging its attention; and his health being much enfeebled, he
determined to await an answer in Italy, for which country he sailed in
December, 1801.
These projects could not be devised so secretly as to escape the
vigilance of the Tunisian government; and they were soon communicated
to Yusuf, by one of its ministers whom he kept in pay. They created in
him the utmost alarm. He had just then involved himself also in a war
with Sweden, and a fleet from that country had already entered the
Mediterranean under Admiral Cederstrom, who had orders to act in
concert with the Americans. His two largest vessels were lying useless
at Gibraltar; and Morat Rais, without whom he could do little towards
equipping others, was also at that place closely watched by his
enemies.
In this state of things, he endeavored to amuse the Americans with
propositions of peace; and the sovereigns of Algiers and Tunis being in
consequence engaged by him as mediators, sounded the consuls of the
United States at their respective courts, as to the dispositions of
their government. Nothing definite could be drawn from either: they
merely hinted what they hoped and believed, that nothing would be paid,
either for peace or as tribute; and the mediators were not disposed to
continue their good offices on such grounds. The Emperor of Morocco
also undertook to load the ships lying at Gibraltar with wheat, and to
procure for them, as his own property, American passports for Tripoli.
These were however refused by the consul of the United States at
Tangiers, and by the commander of their squadron; at which the Emperor
was so much incensed, that he ordered the American consul to quit his
dominions, and commenced hostilities against their commerce. Morat
Rais, the Scotch renegade, was however conveyed on board a British ship
of war to Malta, whence he easily passed over to Tripoli, much to the
disappointment of Eaton, who considered him as the chief exciter of the
difficulties, and as the only person in the Pasha's service at all
acquainted with naval affairs. But very little advantage was derived
from his skill; worthy Peter had indeed found it much easier to profit
by the licenses of his new creed, than to submit to its restrictions,
and some of his old propensities had probably been revived during his
residence at Gibraltar; for after his return to Tripoli, he remained
some time in a constant state of intoxication.
Yusuf still carried on his preparations for defence with great energy.
Moors and Arabs were called in and enrolled, some principal persons
from each village or tribe being kept as hostages in the castle. The
Swedish and American prisoners were employed in repairing the
fortifications, making gun carriages, &c.; and as no vessels could be
built in Tripoli, some were purchased and prepared for use as cruisers.
But he had another object in view, of still greater importance; which
was to get Hamet again in his power. In this the Bey of Tunis
consented, it is said reluctantly, to aid him. Hamouda had no objection
to see the Pasha of Tripoli in an embarrassed state, or indeed to have
Hamet placed on the throne; but he was little inclined to favor the
pretensions of the latter on the score of _legitimacy_, he himself
being a usurper, and the heir to the throne of Tunis by regular
descent, being a prisoner in his castle; he also apprehended that the
success of Eaton's plan would encourage other christian powers to
interfere in the concerns of Barbary. It was therefore proposed to
Hamet to return to the government of Derne, which with his family,
Yusuf offered to restore to him; and the proposition was accompanied by
a hint that he would receive no farther supplies in case he remained in
Tunis. The poor Prince thus driven to extremities was obliged to yield;
a Russian vessel was in consequence engaged to convey him to Derne, and
he was to be escorted by a guard of honor consisting of forty Tripoline
soldiers, who had been sent to Tunis for the purpose.
Had these arrangements proceeded much farther, there can be little
doubt as to what would have been the fate of Hamet; but information of
them was conveyed to Eaton by the Sapatapa, whose services he had
engaged before leaving Tunis. He was then at Leghorn, awaiting the
determination of his government; no answer to his communication with
regard to the restoration of Hamet had arrived, but he had just
received a letter from the Secretary of State which authorized him to
suppose that his plan would be favorably received. Therefore
considering that the present circumstances were too important to permit
delay, he hastily purchased and manned a vessel of fourteen guns,
called the Gloria, and sailed in her for Tunis, where he arrived on the
18th of March, 1802. The Bey instantly demanded of him a passport for
Hamet and his suite, who were on the point of departure. This he of
course refused. Hamouda became outrageous, threatened to imprison him,
and to declare war against the United States; but threats only
suggested new resources to this energetic man, and his determination
was soon taken. In order to secure himself however, he called a
consultation of the principal Americans then in Tunis who having
approved his measures, the Gloria was despatched with letters, to be
delivered to the commander of the first American ship of war which
could be met with, communicating the state of the affair, and
requesting assistance to prevent the Prince from entering the Tripoline
territory. The frigate Boston was luckily soon found; her commander,
O'Neill, readily agreed to what was requested, and having commissioned
the Gloria as an United States ship, to act against Tripoli, he sailed
for the coast of Derne, in order to intercept the vessel carrying
Hamet. The Gloria returned in a few days to Tunis. In the meantime
Eaton had, by a promise of ten thousand dollars to the Sapatapa, to be
given in case of the success of his plans, opened a communication with
the Tripoline Prince, whom he was not permitted to see. Every means was
used to operate on his hopes, his fears, and even his superstitious
feelings. The prospects of his restoration by the aid of the United
States, were contrasted with the danger, nay the certainty, of death,
to which he exposed himself, by confiding in his cruel and perfidious
brother; the prophecies of a Marabout, respecting his being replaced on
the throne of Tripoli, by a people from the setting sun, were gravely
and ingeniously repeated; and when all these representations had proved
ineffectual, he was plainly assured that he would not be allowed to
reach Derne, but that he would be attacked on his passage by the
American squadron, and treated if taken, as a Tripoline enemy. The
miserable exile had no other resource than to throw himself on the
protection of the American consul. It was therefore arranged that he
should sail ostensibly for Derne, furnished with a passport and also a
private letter from Eaton, to be delivered to any American commander or
other authority with whom he might fall in; and that the vessel should
on the way put into Malta, under pretence of avoiding the Americans and
Swedes. This was done, and Hamet landed safely at that island on the
11th of April.
The news of his arrival excited the strongest interest throughout
Barbary. The Bey of Tunis pronounced that all was over with Yusuf,
unless he made peace at once. The people of Tripoli were also much
excited, as they expected an attack to be immediately made. Yusuf,
though greatly alarmed, continued his preparations for defence; and it
is said, assembled in the course of the summer, fifty thousand troops
about the city; this was probably however, an exaggerated statement.
His naval force ready for sea, amounted to one vessel of eighteen guns,
one of sixteen, three of fourteen, and one of ten; with these, Morat
Rais when a little sobered, proposed to sail for Gibraltar, and after
releasing and manning the two vessels there lying, to put out on the
Atlantic, where he expected to reap a rich harvest of prizes. In order
to escape observation, he had provided his sailors with the dresses of
christian nations; but this _ruse_, as well as the plan it was intended
to promote, were soon communicated to the watchful Eaton, and by him to
the officers of the squadron.
However Tripoli was so carelessly blockaded, that some of the vessels
got to sea, one of which captured the brig Franklin, of Philadelphia,
and carried her into Algiers, where an attempt was made to dispose of
her and her crew. The American Consul at Algiers, remonstrated against
this proceeding, and endeavored to procure the surrender of the brig
and men, on the grounds that the Dey was bound, as guaranty of the
peace between the United States and Tripoli, to cause her delivery. The
Dey replied, that he had engaged to act only as mediator, but not to
employ force in having the treaty respected; and that moreover the
principal parties to it being then at war, and the United States
actually holding Tripoli under blockade, the treaty as well as the
guaranty were in fact at an end. However, after some delay, the
Tripoline was ordered to quit the place, which he did, taking his prize
with him, to the little port of Biserta, in the Tunisian territory,
sixty miles from the capital; and the next day (July 8) the brig and
her crew were advertised for sale at Tunis. What were the feelings of
Eaton on this occasion may be conceived; his application to Commodore
Murray who commanded the squadron nominally blockading Tripoli produced
no effect; and to his mortification he saw the cruiser quit the place
with the American captives in irons, (the brig being left at Biserta,)
and heard of its safe entry into Tripoli actually in sight of the
frigate Constellation. As a last resource, in order to alleviate the
miseries of their captivity, he wrote a moderate and conciliatory
letter to the Pasha, recommending him not to allow the American
prisoners to be sold as slaves, but to have them treated with lenity,
to refrain from farther hostilities, and even to receive Mr. Morris,
the captain of the Franklin, as the agent of the United States until
affairs could be arranged.
The American ships of war soon after quitted that coast, to which they
did not return until the spring of 1803, leaving the consuls to defend
as they could their refusal to grant passports for Tripoli. Eaton
maintained his ground with obstinacy, the others yielded; the consul at
Algiers gave his passport to vessels which he knew were to be laden
with wheat for Tripoli; and the agent at Tangiers actually gave his, to
one of the Tripoline vessels of war which had been lying at Gibraltar,
and which accordingly sailed for Tripoli, laden with wheat from
Morocco. These circumstances when known, put an end to all
consideration and respect for the American consul, and even for the
American name in Tunis; as Eaton says, "it was a matter of exultation
at that piratical court, that _the American consul had been abandoned
by his countrymen_, and the occasion was seized _to humble his pride_."
He had involved himself in great expenses in furtherance of his plans
respecting Hamet, without authorization from his government; a portion
of the sums expended had been obtained in Tunis, and the ten thousand
dollars promised to the Sapatapa as a bribe, and which had been
forfeited by his treachery, were now demanded as the balance in a
mercantile transaction. Neither party could bring any written proofs,
the case was therefore referred to the Bey, who of course decided
against Eaton, and the successful minister on retiring from the hall of
justice, sarcastically remarked, that _in Tunis they knew how to keep
consuls to their promises_. The demand for a frigate from the United
States was renewed, which Eaton, in spite of threats and attempts to
bribe him, having refused even to submit to his government, his brig,
the Gloria, was seized and charged with the conveyance of a letter to
the President, containing the requisition; she however got safely to
Leghorn, where she was sold.
All these things Eaton could only represent to his government, which he
did in forcible language; he demonstrated the weakness of the Barbary
States, and showing that they had not a single ship capable of
withstanding a sloop of war, again urged the employment of smaller
vessels. Finally he expressed a desire to "_be supported or
displaced_," and that "_if farther concessions were to be made, he
might not be the medium through which they were to be presented_."
Although Eaton almost despaired of procuring the means for executing
his plan upon Tripoli, yet he maintained an active correspondence with
Hamet, for whose support he advanced the necessary funds. Soon after
the arrival of that Prince at Malta, he had met with Captain O'Neill,
of the Boston, who appeared ready to forward the project by every
exertion in his power, as also did the Swedish commander. Commodore
Murray too, who came there with the Constellation, thought better of
the affair, and offered to take him to Derne; but he preferred going
privately, in an English brig, which he had chartered, and at length
sailed in November (1802) for that place, where he was received with
every demonstration of affection by the inhabitants, and the
surrounding Arab tribes. He was soon after joined by a nephew, who had
been living in exile in Egypt, at the head of a considerable force; and
thus considering himself strong enough to commence his march upon the
capital, he despatched a confidential messenger to Eaton, in order to
inform him of the state of his affairs, and to hasten the arrival of
the expected succors; he even assured him that the appearance of a
single American frigate before Tripoli, would be sufficient to cause
its surrender.
The receipt of this information must have been martyrdom to Eaton; he
restrained his vexation as he could, and kept the messenger concealed
in his house. At length, on the 22d of February, 1803, Commodore Morris
appeared off the harbor in the frigate Chesapeake, and soon after
landed with one or two of his officers. The object of his visit was to
contest the demand made by the Bey, for the restoration of some
Tunisian property, which had been seized in an Imperial vessel while it
was endeavoring to enter Tripoli. After some discussion, it was agreed
that the property should be restored; but this compliance only
emboldened the Bey and his minister, to demand immediate payment of all
Eaton's debts in Tunis, real or pretended; and on refusal of both the
commodore and the consul, the former was actually detained in Tunis,
and not allowed to communicate with his ship. As they were thus
completely in the power of the Bey, who had besides, at least the
semblance of right in his pretensions, nothing was left but to pay the
money, which was done. During these proceedings Eaton by his animated
remonstrances, and by the charges which he openly advanced against the
minister, had so far irritated the Bey, that he ordered him immediately
to quit the place, declaring, "that he was a man of a good heart, but a
wrong head; too obstinate and violent;" and that he "must have a consul
more congenial with the Barbary interests." Eaton therefore took his
leave, and quitted Tunis on the 10th of March. Before his departure he
had introduced Hamet's agent to the commodore, and the plans and
resources of that Prince were exposed to him. Morris however, either
did not partake of Eaton's conviction relative to the practicability of
the scheme, or did not anticipate from its success results so favorable
to his country as to warrant his interference. He therefore refused all
immediate assistance, and only promised to appear before Tripoli in
June, when, "_provided an equivalent were guarantied to the United
States in the event of success_," he would furnish Hamet with "_twenty
barrels of powder_." He did indeed appear before Tripoli about the end
of May, with five frigates and a schooner; but, with the exception of
an unsuccessful attempt to destroy some vessels laden with wheat, which
had been chased into the harbor of Old Tripoli, (the ancient Sabrata)
he confined himself entirely to negotiations. Yusuf demanded two
hundred thousand dollars and the expenses of the war "_for a peace_,"
and on this being refused, he told the Commodore that "the business was
at an end, and that he must depart." Morris quitted the coast
immediately, leaving two frigates to blockade the port; he soon after
received orders to return to America, where he was tried before a court
martial, and received severe censure for his inactivity and incapacity.
Captain John Rodgers who was left in command, succeeded on the 21st of
June in destroying the Tripoline ship of war of twenty-two guns, which
as before stated had sailed from Gibraltar, loaded with wheat by the
Emperor of Morocco. With Hamet no communication appears to have taken
place.
Eaton arrived at Boston on the 5th of May 1803, and in June proceeded
to Washington, to adjust his accounts and to urge the adoption of more
rigorous measures towards the Barbary powers. He appears to have been
coldly received. His expenses incurred on Hamet's account, were not
allowed by the Department of State, nor indeed were they completely
admitted until they had been before Congress during its two ensuing
sessions. His desire to be relieved from his situation, unless a more
determined course were pursued, was considered as a resignation of his
office, in which Mr. Cathcart had been appointed to succeed him; and
instructions had been forwarded to that gentleman to negotiate both
with Tripoli and Tunis, _on the amount_ to be paid as presents and
yearly tribute. To crown all, a letter had been written to the Bey, in
which Eaton was declared "_to have gone beyond the letter and spirit of
his instructions_," and his acts were "_disclaimed as in opposition to
his orders_." With all these circumstances he was not indeed made
acquainted immediately; but the manner of his reception did not impress
him favorably with respect to the members of the Administration, and
much increased his natural irritability.
The American government did not however neglect to take advantage of
his information and experience; and news having arrived of some success
on the part of Hamet, it was determined to send a much larger force to
the Mediterranean. This squadron sailed on the 13th of August, under
the command of Commodore Preble; and after halting a few days in the
Straits of Gibraltar, in order to settle affairs with the Emperor of
Morocco at Tangiers, it joined the other ships off Tripoli in October.
A circumstance here occurred of the most disastrous nature, and which
probably contributed more than any other, to prevent the dethronement
of Yusuf, or the termination of the differences between the United
States and the Barbary nations, in a manner entirely satisfactory to
the former. The frigate Philadelphia, while in chase of a Tripoline
ship on the 31st of October (1803), struck upon a rock at the entrance
of the harbor of Tripoli with so much violence, that she remained
immoveable by any means at the disposition of the crew, and
consequently defenceless. Her situation being ascertained in the city,
a number of gun boats were instantly sent out, to which, as no
resistance could be made, she was of necessity surrendered. The crew,
consisting of three hundred, with their captain Bainbridge, were
transferred to the city; two days after the ship was got off, towed
into port, and being easily repaired, was likely to prove a valuable
accession to the naval strength of the Pasha.
The capture of the Philadelphia was however calculated to produce a
moral effect infinitely more injurious to the American cause than the
mere loss of the ship, and her acquisition by Tripoli. The skill, and
even the personal bravery of the naval men of the United States, had
been rendered doubtful by the proceedings of the two previous years;
these doubts now assumed the form of a certainty, the most unfavorable
and mortifying; and unless something had been immediately done to
retrieve the honor of the flag, it must have quitted the Mediterranean
in disgrace, or designated every ship over which it waved, as the
bearer of tribute.
But there were noble spirits in the American squadron who determined
that this should not be. On the night of the 15th of February, 1804,
Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, accompanied by seventy resolute men,
entered the harbor of Tripoli, in a small schooner which he had
previously taken and called the Intrepid, and succeeded in boarding the
Philadelphia, then lying under the guns of the castle. In a few minutes
the Tripoline crew were overpowered; many were killed, others swam to
the shore, and communicated the astounding facts. A terrible fire was
instantly opened upon the ship from the castle and batteries, aided by
those of two vessels lying near; and it being impossible to carry off
the Philadelphia, she was set on fire. The Americans retreated to the
Intrepid; a breeze fortunately sprung up; they were soon beyond the
power of their enemies, and reached the ship which awaited them,
without losing a man. The Philadelphia was totally destroyed.
This heroic achievement restored confidence to the Americans, and
determined Commodore Preble to make a desperate attempt upon the city.
His force had however been much reduced by the loss of the Philadelphia
and the recall of other ships; and judging that an addition was
necessary to afford any prospect of success, he proceeded to Naples,
where he obtained from the King the use of two bomb vessels and six gun
boats. These were strong, heavy, flat bottomed vessels, bad sailers,
but manageable by oars, and well calculated for harbor operations. The
gun boats mounted each a long twenty four pounder, and were manned by
thirty-five men; the bombs carried thirteen inch mortars and forty men;
several Neapolitan gunners and bombardiers were also engaged to assist
in working them. The whole American force thus amounted to one frigate,
(the Constitution,) three brigs, three schooners, two bombs, and six
gun boats, carrying in all about one hundred and twenty guns, and one
thousand and sixty men; and with this armament Preble appeared before
Tripoli on the 25th of July, 1804.
Yusuf was not however taken unawares, and he had made formidable
preparations for resistance. The number of his troops in the city was
supposed to be twenty-five thousand; the batteries mounted one hundred
and fifteen pieces of cannon; besides which, the harbor was defended by
nineteen gun boats, two gallies, two schooners of eight guns each, and
a brig of ten guns.
The weather was for several days unfavorable for an attack. At length
on the 3d of August the American squadron approached the harbor, and
began to throw shells into the town. The fire was returned from the
batteries and vessels, and during five hours a constant cannonade was
kept up on both sides. Three of the Tripoline gun boats were boarded
and taken; their other vessels were materially injured, and much damage
was done to the town and fortifications: but as nothing more could be
effected, the squadron withdrew, having lost only one man, Lieutenant
James Decatur, and had thirteen wounded.
The results not proving sufficient to bring Yusuf to terms, another
attack was made on the 7th of August, which terminated less favorably
to the Americans; one of their prizes having been blown up, and their
whole loss amounting to fourteen killed, and four wounded, without
having produced any notable injury to the Tripolines. On the evening of
this day a frigate arrived from the United States, bringing information
that a large reinforcement might be soon expected, under the command of
Commodore Samuel Barron, who being the senior officer, would supercede
Preble. This news caused a suspension of the attacks, during which
Yusuf made offers of peace, on consideration of receiving five hundred
dollars as the ransom of each of his prisoners. This offer was rejected
at once, and the expected reinforcement not appearing, Tripoli was
bombarded on the night of the 24th of August. On the 28th another
attack was made, by which the castle and town suffered considerably,
and three of the Tripoline gun boats were destroyed; and on the 3d of
September another, with less success.
On the 4th a bold attempt was made to set fire to the vessels lying in
the harbor, and injure the batteries. The schooner Intrepid, with which
Decatur had executed his enterprise on the Philadelphia, was converted
into a fire ship, being filled with powder and combustibles; and in it,
with merely a boat attached in order to return after the fire had been
communicated, Lieutenants Wadsworth, Somers and Israel embarked, and
steered in the direction of the vessels. Two of the Tripoline gallies
were seen to row towards the Intrepid, and place themselves one on each
side of her; a terrific explosion then took place; the three vessels
were shivered into atoms, and a number of shells fell, spreading
destruction on the unfortunate town. Of those who had embarked in the
Intrepid, nothing was ever heard. It is supposed that seeing escape
impossible, they had involved themselves and their enemies in one
common destruction.
No more attempts were made upon Tripoli during this season. The storms
which prevail on that coast in the Autumn had commenced, and it was
considered improper to expose the small vessels to their violence. They
were therefore sent to Syracuse, the Constitution and two brigs
remaining to keep up the blockade.
Information of the capture of the Philadelphia did not reach the United
States until March, 1804; and it seems to have produced upon the
American government the same effects which it had upon the officers of
the squadron. It infused energy into its councils, and determined the
President to act with more vigor than he had hitherto manifested; he
resolved "to send to the Mediterranean a force which would be able,
beyond the possibility of a doubt, to coerce the enemy to a peace, on
terms compatible with the honor and the interests of the country." Four
frigates were prepared for this purpose, and placed under the command
of Commodore Samuel Barron, who was furnished with extensive authority,
to act against or treat with the Barbary powers.
News had arrived that Hamet had met with some successes in his
expedition from Derne against his brother, and the President
"considering that concerted operations by those who have a common enemy
were entirely justifiable, and might produce effects favorable to both,
_without binding either to guaranty the objects of the other_," says in
his instructions to Barron, "with respect to the ex-Pasha of Tripoli,
we have no objection to your availing yourself of his co-operation with
you against Tripoli, if you shall upon a full view of the subject,
after your arrival upon the station, consider his co-operation
expedient." Eaton had been appointed to accompany the squadron as navy
agent for the Barbary states, with a view to his being employed, in
case a junction with Hamet were determined on; but he was placed
entirely under the orders of the Commodore, and is merely mentioned in
the instructions to that officer as likely to be "_extremely useful_."
Before the departure of the squadron, information was received that
Hamet had been deserted by his followers, and had taken refuge in
Egypt. Of his expedition no particulars appear to be on record, and no
account can be obtained of the circumstances which led to his failure:
but between Yusuf in possession, and Hamet as pretender, unsupported
too by any man of strong character, and without resources, the contest
could not have been doubtful. No change however was made in the
destination of Eaton, who sailed with the squadron in the above
mentioned capacity, in July, 1804, and arrived at Malta on the 5th of
September following. He there learnt that Hamet, fearing to trust
himself in the hands of the Turkish authorities in Egypt, had taken
refuge among the revolted Mamelukes, in one of the provinces up the
Nile. This did not discourage Eaton; determining at least to have an
interview with the exiled Prince, he prevailed on Commodore Barron to
commit the affair to his charge, and sailed with Captain Isaac Hull in
the brig Argus for Alexandria, where he arrived on the 25th of
November, 1804.
(_To be continued_.)
For the Southern Literary Messenger.