_Copyright, 1915, by Arnold Bennett_
The pessimistic attitude toward the military situation
assumed by a large part of British society, after the
arrival of warm weather, without the heralded concerted
advance of the Allies in France and Belgium, is dealt with
by Mr. Bennett in the subjoined article, which appeared in
the London Daily News of June 16, 1915. It is here
reproduced by Mr. Bennett's express permission.
In a recent article I said that for reasons discoverable and
undiscoverable the military situation had been of late considerably
falsified in the greater part of the Press. This saying (which by the
way was later confirmed by the best military experts writing in the
Press) aroused criticism both public and private. That it should have
been criticised in certain organs was natural, for these organs had
certainly been colouring or manipulating their war news, including
casualties, chiefly by headlines and type, and even influencing their
expert analysis of war-news, to suit what happened to be at the moment
their political aims.
Even the invasion scare was last week revived by the "Daily Mail" as
an aid to compulsion. The "Daily Mail" asserted that, whatever we
might say, invasion was possible. True. It is. Most things are. But
invasion is responsibly held to be so wildly improbable that our
military, as distinguished from our naval, plans are permitted
practically to ignore the possibility. Compulsion or no compulsion,
those plans will be the same. They will be unaffected by any amount of
invasion-scaring, and therefore to try to foster pessimism in the
public by alarums about invasion is both silly and naughty.
Newspapers quite apart, however, there has been in the country a
considerable amount of pessimism which I have not been able to
understand, much less sympathise with; pessimism of the kind that
refuses to envisage the future at all. It has not said: "We shall be
beaten." But it has groaned and looked gloomy, and asked mute
questions with its eyes. It has resented confident faith and demanded
with sardonic superiority the reasons for such faith.
Of the tribe of pessimists I count some superlative specimens among my
immediate acquaintances. The explanation of their cases is, I contend,
threefold. First, they lack faith, not merely in the Allied arms, but
in anything. They have not the faculty of faith. Secondly, they
unconsciously enjoy depression, and this instinct distorts all
phenomena for them. Thus they exhibited no satisfaction whatever at
the capture of Przemysl full of men and munitions by the Russians,
whereas the recapture of Przemysl empty of men and munitions by the
Germans filled them with delicious woe. Thirdly, they lack patience,
and therefore a long-sustained effort gets on their nerves. Others I
can inoculate with my optimism, but the effect passes quickly, and
each succeeding reinoculation has been less and less effective, with
the monotonous questioning, ever more sardonic in tone: "How can you
be deluded by the official bulletins?" or: "What do you know about
war, to make you so cocksure?"
The truth is that I am not deluded by the official bulletins. I don't
know how long it is since I learnt to appreciate official bulletins at
their true value, but it is a long while ago. A full perception of
the delusiveness of official bulletins can only be obtained by reading
histories of the war. The latest I have read are those of Mr. John
Buchan and Mr. Hillaire Belloc. (Mr. Buchan's is good. Mr. Belloc's is
more than good: it is--apart from a few failures in style, due either
to fatigue or to the machinery of dictation--absolutely brilliant,
both militarily and politically. I am inclined to rate the last dozen
pages of Mr. Belloc's book as the finest piece of writing yet produced
by the war.) And when one compares, in these works, the coherent,
impartial, and convincing accounts of, say, the first month of the
war, with the official bulletins of the Allies during that month, one
marvels that even officialism could go so far in evasion and
duplicity, and the reputation of official bulletins is ruined for the
whole duration of the conflict. No wonder the contents of the Allied
newspapers in that period inspired the Germans with a scornful
incredulity, which nothing that has since happened can shake.
It is not that official bulletins are incorrect; they are incomplete,
and, therefore, misleading. The policy which frames them seems now to
be utterly established, but my motion that it is a mistaken policy
remains unaltered. When the policy is pushed as far as the suppression
of isolated misfortunes which flame in the headlines of the enemy
Press from Cologne to Constantinople, then I begin to wonder whether I
am living in three dimensions or in four.
If, then, he does not rely on the official bulletins, and he has no
military expertise, how is the civilian justified in being optimistic?
The reply is that the use of his common-sense may justify his
optimism. The realm of common-sense being universal, even war comes
within it. And the fact is that the major aspects of the war are no
more military than they are political, social, and psychological. Take
one of the most important aspects--the character of generals. It
cannot be denied that after ten months, confidence in Joffre has
increased. At the beginning of the war, when the German plan was
being exactly followed and was succeeding, when the Germans had an
immense advantage of numbers, when their reserves of men and munitions
were untouched, when everything was against us, and everything in
favour of the Germans, Joffre, aided by the British, defeated the
Germans. He defeated them by superior generalship. Common-sense says
that now, when the boot is on the other leg, Joffre will assuredly
defeat the Germans--and decisively, and common-sense is quite prepared
to wait until Joffre is ready. Again, take the case of the Grand Duke.
The Grand Duke has shown over and over again that he is an extremely
brilliant general of the first order. In the very worst days, when
everything was against him and everything in favour of the Germans, as
in the West, he held his own and he has continually produced many more
casualties in the German ranks than the Germans have produced in his
ranks. He still has many things against him, but it is not possible
reasonably to believe that the Grand Duke will let himself in for a
disaster. That he should avoid a disaster is all that the West front
demands of him at present.
On the other side, General von Moltke, head of the German Great
General Staff, has been superseded. What German General has advanced
in reputation? There is only one answer--von Hindenberg. Von
Hindenberg won the largest (not the most important) victory of the war
in the Battle of Tannenberg. He won it because the ground was
exceedingly difficult, and because he knew the ground far better than
any other man on earth. He was entitled to very high credit. He got
it. He became the idol of the German populace, and the bugbear of the
Allied countries. But he has done nothing since. Soon after Tannenberg
he made a fool of himself on the Russian frontier, and showed that
success had got into his head. He subsequently initiated several
terrific attempts, all of which were excessively costly and none of
which was carried through. If he has not ceased to be an idol, he has
at any rate ceased to be a bugbear.
As for the average intelligence of the opposing forces, it may be said
that Prussian prestige, though it dies very slowly, is dying, even in
the minds of our pessimists. Their zest for elaborate organization of
plan gave the Germans an immense advantage at the start, but it is
proved that, once the plan has gone wrong, they are at the best not
better in warfare than ourselves. Their zest for discipline, and their
reserves, have enabled them to stave off a catastrophe longer than
perhaps any other nation could have staved it off. But time is now
showing that excessive discipline and organization produce defects
which ultimately outweigh the qualities they spring from. The tenacity
of the Germans is remarkable, but does it surpass ours? Man for man, a
soldier of the Allies is better than a soldier of the Central
Powers--or ten thousand observers have been deceived. As for the
intelligence of the publics upon whose moral the opposing forces
ultimately depend, it is undeniable that the German public is
extremely hysterical, and far more gullible even than ourselves at our
very worst. The legends believed by the German public today are
ridiculous enough to stamp Germany for a century as an arch-simpleton
among nations. Its vanity is stupendous, eclipsing all previously
known vanities. The Great General Staff must know fairly well how
matters stand, and yet not the mere ignorant public, but the King of
Bavaria himself, had the fatuity as late as last week to talk about
the new territory that Germany would annex as a result of the war!
In numbers we in the West had got the better of them, and were slowly
increasing our lead, before Italy, by joining us, increased the
Allies' advantage at a stroke by over three-quarters of a million
fully mobilised men, and much more than as many reserves.
In financial resources there is simply no comparison between the enemy
and ourselves. We are right out of sight of the enemy in this
fundamental affair.
We lack nothing--neither leading, nor brains, nor numbers, nor
money--save ammunition. Does any pessimist intend to argue that we
shall not get all the ammunition we need? It is inconceivable that we
should not get it. When we have got it the end can be foretold like
the answer to a mathematical problem.
Lastly, while the Germans have nothing to hope for in the way of
further help, we have much to hope for. We have, for example, Rumania
to hope for; and other things needless to mention. And we have in hand
enterprises whose sudden development might completely change the face
of the war in a few hours; but whose failure would not prejudice our
main business, because our main business is planned and nourished
independently of them. One of these enterprises is known to all men.
The other is not. The Germans have no such enterprises in hand.
For all the foregoing argument no military expertise is necessary. It
lies on a plane above military expertise. It appeals to common-sense
and it cannot be gainsaid. I have not yet met anybody of real
authority who has attempted to gainsay it, or who has not endorsed it.
The sole question is, not whether we shall win or lose, but when we
shall win.
For this reason I strongly object to statesmen, no matter who they be,
going about and asserting to listening multitudes that we are fighting
for our very existence as a nation. We most emphatically are not. It
is just conceivable that certain unscrupulous marplots might by
chicane produce such domestic discord in this country as would
undermine the very basis of victory. I regard the thing as in the very
highest degree improbable, but it can be conceived. The result might
be an inconclusive peace, and another war, say, in twenty years, when
we probably _should_ be fighting for our very existence as a nation.
But we are not now, and at the worst shall not be for a long time,
fighting for our very existence as a nation. Nobody believes such an
assertion; pessimists themselves do not believe it. And when
statesmen give utterance to it in the hope of startling the
working-class into a desired course of conduct, they under-rate the
intelligence of the working-class and the result of such oratory is
far from what they could wish.
Our national existence is as safe as it has been any time this
century; indeed, it is safer, for its chief menace has received a
terrible blow, and the Prussian superstition is exploded. All that can
be urged is that we have an international job to finish; that in order
to finish it properly and within a reasonable period we must work with
a will and in full concord; and that if we fail to do this the job
will be botched, with a risk of sinister consequences to the next
generation. The notion that to impress the public it is necessary to
pile on the agony with statements that no moderately enlightened
person can credit, is a wrong notion, and, like all wrong notions, can
only do harm. The general public is all right, quite as all right as
the present Government or any other. Had it not been so we should not
be where we are today, but in a far less satisfactory position. Not
Governments, not generals, but the masses make success in these mighty
altercations. Read Tolstoi's "War and Peace."