In The Fortnightly Review for July E.J. Dillon is sweeping in his
arraignment of the new Pope Benedict XV. and the Vatican, of the Pope
because of his "neutrality in matters of public morality," and of the
Vatican because of its hostility to the cause of Allies. Toward
martyred Belgium and suffering France the Pope "has been generous in
lip sympathy and promises of rewards in the life to come," Mr. Dillon
says; but he has "found no word of blame for their executioners." Mr.
Dillon personally offered Benedict XV. "some important information on
the subject which seemed adequate to change his views or modify his
action," but he "turned the conversation to other topics." In fairness
he adds that "personally Benedict XV. had been careful to keep aloof
from Buelow and his band," and has neither said nor done anything
blameworthy with the sole exception of the interview and message which
he was reported to have given "to an American-German champion of
militarism at the instigation of his intimate counsellor, Monsignor
Gerlach"--an interview, by the way, which the Pope has since expressly
repudiated.
Monsignor Gerlach, Mr. Dillon says, is "one of the most compromising
associates and dangerous mentors that any sovereign ever admitted to
his privacy," and continues:
Years ago, the story runs, Gerlach made the acquaintance of
a worldly minded papal Nuntius in the fashionable salons of
gay Vienna, and, being men of similar tastes and
proclivities, the two enjoyed life together, eking out the
wherewithal for their costly amusements in speculations on
the Exchange. When the Nuntius returned to Rome, donned the
Cardinal's hat, and was appointed to the See of Albano as
Cardinal Agliardi, he bestowed a canonry on the boon
companion who had followed him to the eternal city. The
friendship continued unabated, and was further cemented by
the identity of their political opinions, which favored the
Triple Alliance. Gerlach became Agliardi's tout and
electioneering agent when that Cardinal set up as candidate
for the papacy on the death of Leo XIII. But as his chances
of election were slender, the pair worked together to defeat
Rampolla, who was hated and feared by Germany and Austria.
Their bitter opponent was Cardinal Richard, a witty French
prelate who labored might and main for Rampolla, and told me
some amusing stories about Agliardi. Some years ago
Gerlach's name emerged above the surface of private life in
Rome in connection with what the French term _un drame
passionel_, which led to violent scenes in public and to a
number of duels later on. That this man of violent
Pan-German sentiments should be the Pope's mentor and guide
through the labyrinth of international politics seems a
curious anachronism.
Although Cardinal della Chiesa, shortly before he became Benedict XV.,
was spoken of as the inheritor of Rampolla's Francophile leanings, it
is "now conjectured that at the Conclave this legend secured from his
not only the votes of the Teutonic Cardinals, who knew what his
sentiments really were, but also those of the French and Belgians, who
erroneously fancied that they knew," Dr. Dillon says. He does not
hesitate to believe that the Pope is "at heart a staunch friend of
Austria and a warm admirer of Germany, whom he looks upon as the
embodiment of the principle of authority and conservatism." For the
Vatican his words are more unsparing:
The Vatican, as distinguished from the Pope, was and is
systematically hostile to the Allies. Its press organs,
inspired by an astute and influential Italian ecclesiastic
named Tedeschini, by Koeppenberg, a rabid German convert,
and by the Calabrian Daffina, organized a formidable
campaign against the King's Government and their supposed
interventionist leanings. Its agents, including the priest
Boncampagni and the German Catholics Erzberger, Koeppenberg,
and others, were wont to meet in the Hotel de Russie to
arrange their daily plan of campaign, and when at last the
people rose up against Giolitti and his enormities, the
Vatican had its mob in readiness to make
counter-demonstrations, and was prevented from letting it
loose only by the superhuman efforts of decent Catholics and
orderly citizens. It is a fair thing to add that the
attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy throughout Italy has
with some few exceptions been consistently patriotic. Even
the bishops and archbishops of the provinces have deserved
well of their King and country, while their flocks have left
nothing to be desired on the score of loyalty and
patriotism.
Buelow's mission to Italy and his relations with Giolitti, the
defeated abettor of Austria in the business preceding Italy's
declaration of war, when they encountered the statecraft of Sonnino
and Salandra, are given in this version of Buelow's playing of his
"trump card":
Although the die was cast and Italy's decision taken, he had
the Austrian concessions greatly amplified, and he offered
them, _not to the King's Government_, but to Giolitti, his
secret ally, who was not in office, but was known to be the
Dictator of Italy. And Giolitti accepted them on the
condition, to be fulfilled after the Cabinet's fall, that
the territory would be further enlarged and consigned to
Italy before the end of the war. The increase of prestige
which this concession would bestow on the tribune was to be
his reward for co-operation with the German Ambassador.
Giolitti having thus approved the offer, undertook to have
it ratified by Parliament, _in spite of the engagements
which the Cabinet had already entered into with the Allied
Powers_. In this sense he spoke to the King, wrote a letter
designed for the nation, and obtained the public adhesion of
a majority of the Chamber which was not then sitting.
Thereupon the Cabinet resigned and left the destinies of
Italy in the hands of the King and the nation. On the part
of the Cabinet this was a brilliant tactical move and a
further proof of the praiseworthy moral courage which it had
displayed throughout the crisis. Indeed, the firmness,
perseverance, and dignified disregard of mild invective and
more deliberate criticism manifested by Sonnino and
Salandra, entitle these Ministers to the lasting gratitude
of their country. For it should be borne in mind that they
had against them not only the Senate, the Chamber, a section
of the Press, the "cream" of the aristocracy, the puny sons
and daughters of the leaders of the Risorgimento, but also,
strange to say, the majority of Italian diplomatists in the
capitals of the Great Powers, one of whom actually fell ill
at the thought that Italy was about to fight shoulder to
shoulder with the State to which he was accredited. It would
be interesting to psychologists to learn how this
diplomatist and one or two of his colleagues felt when a few
days later they were serenaded by enthusiastic crowds whom
they were constrained to address.
Are the Allies Winning?
In a Doubting Thomas article headed "Are We Winning?" the anonymous
"Outis" in The Fortnightly Review concludes that "the Allies are
winning, but very slowly. If their conquest is to be assured, Great
Britain's task is to mobilize every soldier and every workman, in
order to prove that whoever may fail, she at least does not intend to
desist until the final triumph is won." Moreover, the conquest must be
in the West "if anywhere," and he looks somewhat askance at the
Dardanelles adventure:
A good many competent authorities have disliked the idea of
the Dardanelles expedition, on the strength of a general
principle applicable to all military operations. It is said
that in every war there is one distinct objective, and that
that should never be neglected for any subsidiary
operations. Thus, in the present instance, our main effort
is to drive the Germans out of France and Belgium, and then
to attack them in their own territory. Anything which
interferes with this or throws it, however temporarily, into
the background, is held to be unwise, because it leads to
the most dangerous of results in warfare--the dissipation of
forces, which, if united, would win the desired success, but
if disunited will probably fail. Thus we are told that we
must not fritter away our energies in enterprises which,
however important in themselves, are not comparable with the
one unique preoccupation of our minds--the conquest of
Germany in Europe.