On the morning of the 29th I had another interview with General Foch,
who informed me that strong reinforcements were hourly arriving to
support General Putz, and urged me to postpone issuing orders for any
retirement until the result of his attack, which was timed to commence
at daybreak on the 30th, should be known. To this I agreed, and
instructed Sir Herbert Plumer accordingly.
No substantial advance having been made by the French, I issued orders
to Sir Herbert Plumer at one o'clock on May 1 to commence his
withdrawal to the new line.
The retirement was commenced the following night, and the new line was
occupied on the morning of May 4.
I am of opinion that this retirement, carried out deliberately with
scarcely any loss, and in the face of an enemy in position, reflects
the greatest possible credit on Sir Herbert Plumer and those who so
efficiently carried out his orders.
The successful conduct of this operation was the more remarkable from
the fact that on the evening of May 2, when it was only half
completed, the enemy made a heavy attack, with the usual gas
accompaniment, on St. Julien and the line to the west of it.
An attack on a line to the east of Fortuin was made at the same time
under similar conditions.
In both cases our troops were at first driven from their trenches by
gas fumes, but on the arrival of the supporting battalions and two
brigades of a cavalry division, which were sent up in support from
about Potijze, all the lost trenches were regained at night.
On May 3, while the retirement was still going on, another violent
attack was directed on the northern face of the salient. This was also
driven back with heavy loss to the enemy.
Further attempts of the enemy during the night of the 3d to advance
from the woods west of St. Julien were frustrated entirely by the fire
of our artillery.
During the whole of the 4th the enemy heavily shelled the trenches we
had evacuated, quite unaware that they were no longer occupied. So
soon as the retirement was discovered the Germans commenced to
entrench opposite our new line and to advance their guns to new
positions. Our artillery, assisted by aeroplanes, caused him
considerable loss in carrying out these operations.
Up to the morning of the 8th the enemy made attacks at short
intervals, covered by gas, on all parts of the line to the east of
Ypres, but was everywhere driven back with heavy loss.
Throughout the whole period since the first break of the line on the
night of April 22 all the troops in this area had been constantly
subjected to violent artillery bombardment from a large mass of guns
with an unlimited supply of ammunition. It proved impossible whilst
under so vastly superior fire of artillery to dig efficient trenches,
or to properly reorganize the line, after the confusion and
demoralization called by the first great gas surprise and the
subsequent almost daily gas attacks. Nor was it until after this date
(May 8) that effective preventatives had been devised and provided. In
these circumstances a violent bombardment of nearly the whole of the
5th Corps front broke out at 7 A.M. on the morning of the 8th, which
gradually concentrated on the front of the Division between north and
south of Frezenberg. This fire completely obliterated the trenches and
caused enormous losses.
The artillery bombardment was shortly followed by a heavy infantry
attack, before which our line had to give way.