The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left dangerously
exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a
prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the
Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the
East.
In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held
their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage; and
it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these
splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with
the most serious consequences.
They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the
divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting
in billets.
Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective
counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with
the French right, and a new line was formed.
The 2d London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian
Division, was posted behind the right of the French Division, and,
being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. It was
recaptured by the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns
could not be withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.
During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian
Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of
Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General Officer
Commanding the Second Army. I also directed other reserve troops from
the 3d Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet
eventualities.
In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in
capturing the bridge at Steenstraate and some works south of Lizerne,
all of which were in occupation by the French.
The enemy having thus established himself to the west of the Ypres
Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a
wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point. I directed,
therefore, that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used
to support and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in
preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.
At about ten o'clock on the morning of the 23d connection was finally
ensured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French
right, about 800 yards east of the canal; but as this entailed the
maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that
which they had held before the attack commenced on the previous night,
there were no reserves available for counter-attack until
reinforcements, which were ordered up from the Second Army, were able
to deploy to the east of Ypres.
Early on the morning of the 23d I went to see General Foch, and from
him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by
General Putz. General Foch informed me that it was his intention to
make good the original line and regain the trenches which the French
Division had lost. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my
present line, assuring me that the original position would be
re-established in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he
had ordered up large French reinforcements, which were now on their
way, and that troops from the North had already arrived to reinforce
General Putz.
I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish to re-establish
our old line, and agreed to co-operate in the way he desired,
stipulating, however, that if the position was not re-established
within a limited time I could not allow the British troops to remain
in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous
twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.
During the whole of the 23d the enemy's artillery was very active, and
his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns
which had been brought down from the coast in the neighborhood of
Ostend.
The loss of the guns on the night of the 22d prevented this fire from
being kept down, and much aggravated the situation. Our positions,
however, were well maintained by the vigorous counter-attacks made by
the 5th Corps.
During the day I directed two brigades of the 3d Corps, and the Lahore
Division of the Indian Corps, to be moved up to the Ypres area and
placed at the disposal of the Second Army.
In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined
to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most
difficult to deal with.
The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division,
and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy's
advance at all costs, led to a mixing up of units and a sudden
shifting of the areas of command, which was quite unavoidable. Fresh
units, as they came up from the South, had to be pushed into the
firing line in an area swept by artillery fire, which, owing to the
capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.