The first year of the European war has drawn to a close. A resume
covering the military events it has produced brings to view two
distinct phases of the campaign. The first phase comprises the period
from Aug. 3 to Oct. 27, and consists of a tenacious effort to carry
through the original plan of war of the German General Staff: to
strike a crushing blow at France, and after putting her "hors de
combat," to turn on the enemy in the East. The second phase comprises
the time from Oct. 27 to the present, and consists in the pursuance of
military aims forming the direct reversal of the original ones.
The campaign against France, in consequence of the German plan of
strategy the first one to come into prominence, can, in its first
phase, be divided into four periods.
The first period comprises the operations in Belgium, German Lorraine
and Alsace, from Aug. 3 to Aug. 23, the day before the Battle for the
Invasion of France, commonly, but incorrectly known as the battle of
Mons.
The main blow at France was to come through Belgium. Five German
armies out of eight were hurled against this gateway to Northern
France. In Lorraine and Alsace the Germans were temporarily to remain
on the defensive. The protection of Lorraine was intrusted to the
Bavarian (Sixth) Army, that of Alsace to the remaining two armies.
The French plan of operation was to check the invasion of Belgium on
the line Tongres-Liege-Longwy, where the Belgian Army, from a strictly
military point of view, forming the advance guards of the French Army
of the North, was holding strong positions, and with superior forces
to strike at the German Army of Lorraine. The aim was, avoiding Metz,
to reach the Moselle near Trier through the valley of the Saar, and to
roll up the German Army of the North from its left wing. An invasion
of Alsace was merely to satisfy political aspirations.
The German advance in Belgium, however, remained unchecked, and in
Lorraine the battles of Dieuze and Saarbourg on Aug. 20 decided the
issue in favor of the Bavarians. In Alsace the French were victorious
over the Eighth Army and took Muelhausen, while further north, between
Muenster and Shirmeck, the Seventh Army checked the French invasion.
Meanwhile the German avalanche in Belgium had reached the second line
of defense, Brussels-Namur-Longwy, before the French Army of the
North. The capture of Namur prompted the French staff to recall
advance guards, which had reached the fortress just as it surrendered,
and to accept battle in the line Mons-Charleroi-Givet-Longwy. The
battle for the invasion of France and the retirement of the French
armies in all the theatres of action which it caused opens the second
period of the campaign against France.
The English contingent from Havre had joined the French Army just
before the German onslaught began. The battle was lost by the Allies
tactically and strategically through the defeat of their right wing at
Longwy and Neufchateau, and through the encircling of their left wing
at Mons. The direct result of the outcome was the German invasion of
France; the indirect consequence (resulting from the necessity of
drawing troops from the other fields of action to stem the German
invasion) was the retirement of the French armies in Lorraine and
Alsace to the line Verdun-Nancy-St. Die, and further south to the
passes of the Vosges, which they have been holding ever since.
Sweeping on through Northern France, the German Army of the North was
breaking up all resistance in its path, such as was attempted by the
British at St. Quentin on Aug. 28, and was tearing with it all
fortresses, such as Longwy, La Fere, Maubeuge, and others; but it was
failing in its principal aim: to embrace the skillfully retreating
enemy before he could reach the line Paris-Verdun, which he had
selected and prepared for the next stand.
On Aug. 30 the German plan of strategy was changed, and it was
resolved to break the centre of the enemy, throwing his left wing into
Paris and on the Seine and his right wing into Verdun, Toul, and
Epinal. The armies of the centre were pushed forward, while either
wing held back. The Allies were established in the general line
Paris-Verdun.
The battle ensuing on Sept. 5 and the retreat of the Germans to the
Aisne are the events of the third period of this campaign, lasting
from Sept. 5 to Sept. 28. On Sept. 8, while the German attacks had all
but pierced the French centre, having already bent it back beyond the
line Sezanne-Vitry, the German right wing found itself outflanked by a
new allied army from Paris, which was rapidly moving northward and
threatened to roll up the entire German battle front from the
direction of Compiegne. The critical question, who would succeed
first, the Allies in outflanking the German right or the Germans in
piercing the French centre, was decided in favor of the Allies.
Anglo-French strategy triumphed.
The tactical aspect of the situation, though, is best illustrated by
the message sent to his commander-in-chief by General Foch, commanding
the French Army of the Centre when he received the order to
counter-attack: "My left has been forced back, my right is routed. I
shall attack with the centre." When the counter-attack came it found
but rear guards opposing it. The retreat of the Germans, their right
flank constantly in danger of being rolled up, was a fine military
achievement. On Sept. 12 it halted on the Aisne. In the regions
northeast of Verdun the German left wing joined hands with the Sixth
German Army, which had followed up the retirement of the French Army
of Lorraine to the line Verdun-St. Die.
Thus resting on Metz with its left wing the German battle-front was
strongly established on a line passing Verdun, to the east and
northeast, extending from there in a general westerly direction to the
valley of the Aisne as far as the region north of Compiegne, and from
that point northward to the region west of Peronne and Cambrai.
The stability of this line, enabling a constant shifting of forces
toward the right wing, and the arrival there of the army released from
Maubeuge, made possible the extension of the battle-front to the
region of Arras, and frustrated all flanking movements on the part of
the Allies.
The situation was again safe, but the plan to put the French army hors
de combat was far from having been realized. The German General Staff
therefore decided on a new plan. Its purpose was to gain control of
the northeast coast of France. A wedge should be driven between the
two allied countries, and Pas-de-Calais made the base of further
operations against both. The following out of this plan constitutes
the fourth and last period of the first phase of the western
campaign. It starts with the beginning of the siege of Antwerp on
Sept. 28 and ends with the first battle of Ypres on Oct. 27.
The first step toward the accomplishment of the new aims was the
capture of Antwerp. Antwerp in the hands of the Allies meant a
constant menace to the German line of communication; in possession of
the Germans it signified the key to Northern France. The fortress was
taken on Oct. 9. The next point of strategic importance for the
pursuance of the German plan was Lille, which was taken on Oct. 12.
But the change in the German plan of strategy had been recognized by
the Allies, and a new English army from Havre was hurried to the line
Bethune-Dunkirk to extend the allied left wing to the coast and block
the road to Calais. It reached West Flanders on Oct. 13, and on Oct.
16 it came in contact with the German Army that approached from
Antwerp. The latter joined the German right wing north of Lille and
extended it to Westende. On the 18th, after having brought up all
their reserves, the Germans began their onslaught to break through in
the region of Dixmude and Ypres.
While, by Oct. 27, no appreciable impression had been made on the
allied battleline, the situation in the eastern seat of war had begun
to assume an alarming aspect, and necessitated the complete change in
the German plan of strategy, which marks the beginning of the second
phase of the war.
On the western front this second phase meant for the Germans the going
into the defensive along the entire battleline, which the allied
armies have been relentlessly attempting to break. In spite of their
continuous heroic efforts only minor successes, such as that of the
British at Neuve Chapelle and that of the French to the north of
Arras, have been achieved. Counter attacks, forming the most essential
element of the modern defensive, have been launched by the Germans
incessantly, and have on several occasions resulted in successes
similar to those of the Allies, as, for instance, at Soissons and at
Ypres. On the whole, no changes of strategic importance have taken
place, and the German wall in France stands firm to this day.