THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE
An interesting item in the experience that winter at Falmouth was the
celebration of St. Patrick's day by the Irish brigade and their
multitude of friends. They were encamped about a mile to the south of
our brigade upon a beautiful, broad, open plain between the surrounding
hills, which gave them a superb parade and drill-ground. Upon this they
had laid out a mile race track in excellent shape, and they had provided
almost every conceivable sort of amusement that was possible to army
life--matches in running, jumping, boxing, climbing the greased pole,
sack races, etc. But the usual pig performance had to be omitted owing
to the enforced absence of the pig. The appearance of a live porker
would have stampeded the army in a wild chase for fresh meat.
[Illustration: ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF ANTIETAM
Fourth Reunion of Survivors of 132d Regiment P. V., held Sept. 17, 1891,
on the ground occupied by the Regiment during the battle, in front of
Sunken Road, near Roulette House]
The chief events were horse races. The army abounded in excellent
thoroughbreds, private property of officers, and all were anxious to
show the mettle of their steeds. Everybody was invited to be present and
take such part as he pleased in any of the events. It was a royal gala
day to the army; from morning until night there were excitement and
side-splitting amusement. Nor was there, throughout the whole day, a
thing, not even a small fight, that I heard of, to mar the wholesome
fun, until towards night our old enemy, John Barleycorn, managed to get
in some of his work.
The chief event of the day and the wind-up was a hurdle and ditch race,
open to officers only. Hurdles and ditches alternated the course at a
distance of two hundred yards, except at the finish, where a hurdle and
ditch were together, the ditch behind the hurdle. Such a race was a
hare-brained performance in the highest degree; but so was army life at
its best, and this was not out of keeping with its surroundings.
Excitement was what was wanted, and this was well calculated to produce
it.
The hurdles were four and five feet high and did not prove serious
obstacles to the jumpers, but the ditches, four and five feet wide and
filled with water, proved a _bete noir_ to most of the racers. Some
twenty-five, all young staff-officers, started, but few got beyond the
first ditch. Many horses that took the hurdle all right positively
refused the ditch. Several officers were dumped at the first hurdle, and
two were thrown squarely over their horses' heads into the first ditch,
and were nice-looking specimens as they crawled out of that bath of
muddy water. They were unhurt, however, and remounted and tried it
again, with better success.
The crowning incident of the day occurred at the finish of this race at
the combination hurdle and ditch. Out of the number who started, only
three had compassed safely all the hurdles and ditches and come to the
final leap. The horses were about a length apart each. The first took
the hurdle in good shape, but failed to reach the further bank of the
ditch and fell over sideways into it, carrying down his rider. Whilst
they were struggling to get out, the second man practically repeated the
performance and fell on the first pair, and the rear man, now unable to
check his horse, spurred him over, only to fall on the others. It was a
fearful sight for a moment, and it seemed certain that the officers were
killed or suffocated in that water, now thick with mud. But a hundred
hands were instantly to the rescue, and in less time than it takes to
tell it all were gotten out and, strange to say, the horses were unhurt
and only one officer seriously injured, a broken leg only to the bad for
the escapade. But neither officers nor horses were particularly handsome
as they emerged from that ditch. The incident can be set down as a
terrific finale to this first and last army celebration of St. Patrick's
day.
The tedium of routine duty occupied our time without specially exciting
incident until pleasanter weather towards the middle of April brought
rumors of impending army movements again. About April 20 we heard the
cavalry under Stoneman were on the move, and this was confirmed the next
day, when I saw that general with quite a body of cavalry marching
leisurely north. The horses appeared in excellent condition after a
winter of partial rest. General Stoneman was a large man, with short
gray whiskers and gray hair and a strikingly bronzed red face. This
story was told of him anent this movement, that Hooker had told him to
do something with his horses; to cross the river at one of the fords
above and shake out his cavalry, that it was "about time the army saw a
dead cavalryman." Stoneman had replied, asking for materials to build
bridges with, and "Fighting Joe" had impatiently replied that he
wouldn't "give a d----n for a cavalryman who couldn't make a bridge
without materials," meaning who could not cross a river without a
bridge.
Soon orders came to supply ourselves with extra ammunition, and be
prepared to move with six days' rations at a moment's notice. This
settled it that "business" was about to commence again in earnest. What
the contemplated movement was we had not the remotest idea, though we
knew, of course, it was to be another whack in some form at the Johnnies
on the other side of the river. We set about disposing of all surplus
baggage which had accumulated for winter quarters, and putting
everything in trim for field living once more. We could now see columns
of troops in the distance marching north. Was the new movement, then, to
be in that direction? This was the topic upon all lips. The desire to
know something of what was being done with us was naturally very strong.
Where were we going? What were we going to do? Yet a desire that in the
nature of things could not be satisfied. One can have no conception of
the feeling of going day after day blindly ahead, not knowing whither or
why; knowing only that sooner or later you are going to fetch up against
a fight, and calculating from your surroundings the probabilities of
when.
We felt one satisfaction, however, that this was to be our last campaign
as a regiment. Most of our men had enlisted in the July previous for
nine months, and their time was now practically out; but, to their
credit be it said, they would not raise this question during an active
movement. There were troops who threw down their arms on the eve of
battle and refused to go into action because their time was out. Such
action has been severely criticised, and I think uncharitably. After a
man has honorably and patriotically served his full time and is entitled
to his discharge, it would seem pretty hard to force him to go into
battle and be killed or wounded. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact,
nearly this whole campaign was overtime for most of our regiment, yet
the question was not raised.
On April 28 our corps broke camp and joined the column northward. The
winter's rest had brought some accessions to our ranks from the sick and
wounded, though the severe picket duty and the excessively damp weather
had given us a large sick list. We had, to start with, upward of three
hundred and seventy-five men, to which was added some twenty-five or
thirty from the sick list, who came up to us on the march. It is a
curious fact that many men left sick in camp, unable to march when the
regiment leaves, will get themselves together after the former has been
gone a few hours and pull out to overtake it. I saw men crying like
children because the surgeon had forbidden them going with the regiment.
The loneliness and homesickness, or whatever you please to call it,
after the regiment has gone are too much for them. They simply cannot
endure it, and so they strike out and follow. They will start by easy
marches, and they generally improve in health from the moment they
start. Courage and nerve are both summoned for the effort, and the
result is that at the end of the second or third day they rejoin the
regiment and report for duty. This does not mean that they were not
really sick, but that will power and exercise have beaten the disease. I
have heard many a sick man say he would rather die than be left behind.
We marched about six miles the first day, much of our route being
through a wooded country, some of it so wet and spongy that corduroy
roads had to be built for the wagons and artillery. The army can, as a
rule, move as rapidly as it can move its artillery and supply trains,
and no faster. Of course, for short distances and special expeditions,
where circumstances require, both cavalry and infantry move very
rapidly, ignoring the wagon trains and artillery; but on a general
campaign this is impossible, and so where the ground is bad these must
be helped along. In a wooded country the usual method is by corduroy
road. Extra details are made to assist the pioneer corps, who cut down
young saplings three to six inches in diameter and about six feet in
length and lay them side by side on the ground, which is roughly
levelled to receive them. They do not make a handsome road to speed
over, but they bear up the artillery and army schooners, and that is all
that is wanted of them.
The second day we crossed the Rappahannock at United States ford on a
pontoon bridge. There had been a sharp skirmish here when the first
troops crossed a couple of days before, and a battery of artillery was
still in position guarding the crossing. We now began to experience once
more the unmistakable symptoms of approaching battle,--sharp spurts of
cannonading at irregular intervals some distance to the south and west
of us, with the hurry of marching troops, ambulances and stretcher corps
towards the front; more or less of army debris scattered about, and the
nervous bustle everywhere apparent. We reached the famous
Chancellorsville House shortly after midnight. This was an old-time
hostelry, situated on what was called the Culpeper plank-road. It stood
with two or three smaller houses in a cleared square space containing
some twenty or thirty acres, in the midst of the densest forest of trees
and undergrowth I ever saw. We had marched all day on plank and corduroy
roads, through this wild tanglewood forest, most of the time in a
drizzling rain, and we had been much delayed by the artillery trains,
and it was after midnight when we reached our destination. The distance
marched must have been twelve or more miles, and our men became greatly
fatigued towards the last.
It was my first experience with the regiment on the march in the field
in my new position as major. As adjutant my place had been with the
colonel at the head of the column. Now my duties required me to march in
the rear and keep up the stragglers. After nightfall it became intensely
dark, and at each rest the men would drop down just where they were and
would be instantly sound asleep. Whether they dropped down into mud or
not made little difference to many of them, for they were soaking wet
and were so exhausted that they did not care. My troubles began when the
"forward" was sounded, to arouse these seeming logs and get them on
their feet once more and started. All who were practically exhausted had
drifted to the rear and were on my hands. We had a provost guard in the
rear, whose duty it was to bring up every man and permit no straggling,
but they were in almost as bad a plight as the rest of the regiment. To
arouse these sleeping men I had occasionally to resort to a smart blow
with the flat of my sword and follow it up with the most energetic
orders and entreaties. An appeal to their pluck and nerve was generally
sufficient, and they would summon new courage and push manfully on. My
own condition was scarcely better than that of the men. I rode that
night considerable distances between our halts for rest, sitting bolt
upright in my saddle fast asleep. I had all day alternated with some of
the men in marching whilst they rode, and was not only thoroughly tired,
but wet through. The march was much more trying to us because of our
unseasoned condition owing to the long winter's exemption from this
exercise. Furthermore, we had been marching towards the firing, and were
under the nervous strain always incident to operations in the presence
of the enemy. Nothing will quicker exhaust men than the nervous tension
occasioned by the continued firing which indicates the imminence of a
battle.
At daylight we were aroused and under arms again. We found we were at
the head-quarters of the army. The Chancellorsville House, which had
been vacated by its occupants, was used for office purposes, and much of
the open space around it was occupied by the tents of General Hooker and
staff and hospital tents. Of the latter there were three or four pitched
so as to connect with each other, and over them was flying the yellow
flag of the corps hospital. The First and Third Divisions of our Second
Corps were massed in this Chancellorsville square, beside Pettit's
battery. Our brigade now consisted of the Fourth New York, First
Delaware, and our regiment. The first named was sent off on some
guard duty, which left Colonel Albright, of our regiment, the senior
officer in command of the brigade. The ominous rattle of musketry
not far away became momentarily more pronounced, and ambulances and
stretcher-carriers were passing back and forth to the hospitals,
carrying wounded men. The dead body of a regular army captain was soon
brought back from the front, where Sykes's division of regulars was
sharply engaged. I do not know the name of this captain, but he was a
fine-looking young officer. He had been killed by a minie-ball squarely
through his forehead.
We were marching out the plank-road as they brought this body in.
Passing out of the clearing, the woods and undergrowth each side the
road was so dense that we could not see into it a half-dozen steps. We
had gone possibly a quarter of a mile when we were overtaken by a
staff-officer, who in whispers ordered us to turn back, regardless of
orders from the front, and get back to the Chancellorsville House as
rapidly as possible, and to do so absolutely noiselessly; that a heavy
force of rebels were in the woods on both sides of us, and we were in
great danger of being cut to pieces and captured. We obeyed, and he
rapidly worked his way to the front of the brigade and succeeded very
quickly in getting us all safely out. We formed line near the
Chancellorsville House and were resting on our arms when I noticed
another brigade going down that same road from which we had just been so
hurriedly gotten out. The circumstance was so strange that I inquired
what brigade it was, and learned that it was Colonel (afterwards
Governor) James A. Beaver's brigade of Hancock's division of our corps.
They had been gone but a short time when the rebels opened upon them
from both sides of the road, and they were very roughly handled. Colonel
Beaver was soon brought back, supposed mortally wounded. I saw him as he
was brought to the rear. It was said he was shot through the body.
Afterwards, whilst he was governor, I mentioned the circumstance to him,
and asked how he succeeded in fighting off the last enemy at that time.
He said he then fully believed his wound was mortal. The bullet had
struck him nearly midway of his body and appeared to have passed through
and out of his back, and he was bleeding freely. He was brought to the
hospital, where the corps surgeon--his own family physician at
home--found him, and with an expression of countenance indicating the
gravest fear proceeded to examine his wound. Suddenly, with a sigh of
relief, he exclaimed: "Colonel, you are all right; the ball has struck a
rib and followed it around and out." It was one of the hundreds of
remarkable freaks performed by those ugly minie-balls during the war.
Why that brigade should have been allowed to march into that ambuscade,
from which we had so narrowly escaped, I could not understand. It was
one of the early _faux pas_ of that unfortunate comedy, rather tragedy
of errors,--battle.
In view of the events of the next two days, it will be interesting to
recall the somewhat windy order published to the army by General Hooker
on the morning of the 1st of May, the date of the first day's battle, on
which the events narrated in the last chapter occurred. This is the
order:
HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA.,
April 30, 1863.
It is with heartfelt satisfaction the commanding general announces
to the army that the operations of the last three days have
determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out
from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, when
certain destruction awaits him.
* * * * *
By command of Major-General Hooker.
S. WILLIAMS,
_Asst. Adjt.-Gen'l._
My recollection recalls a phrase in this order reading something like
this: "We have got the enemy where God Almighty can't save him, and he
must either ingloriously," etc. I have been surprised not to find it in
the records, and my memory is not alone in this respect, for a
lieutenant-colonel of Portland, Me., in his account of this battle
alludes to Hooker's blasphemous order.
The purpose of this order was to encourage the men and inspire them with
the enthusiasm of forthcoming victory. But when we consider that the
portion of the army operating around Chancellorsville was at that very
moment apparently as thoroughly caged up in a wilderness of almost
impenetrable undergrowth, which made it impossible to move troops, and
into which one could not see a dozen feet, as though they were actually
behind iron bars, it will be seen how little ground there was for
encouragement. I can think of no better comparison of the situation than
to liken it to a fleet of ships enveloped in a dense fog endeavoring to
operate against another having the advantage of the open.
It will be remembered that when this movement commenced the Army of the
Potomac numbered from one hundred and twenty thousand to one hundred and
thirty thousand men, about double the opposing rebel force. Hooker
divided this army, taking with him four corps, numbering probably
seventy thousand men, to operate from Chancellorsville towards
Fredericksburg, and leaving three corps, about fifty thousand men, under
Sedgwick, to move upon the latter place from below. The purpose was to
get Lee's army between these two forces and crush him. All historians of
this battle agree that up to a certain point Hooker's strategy was most
admirable. General Pleasanton, who commanded our cavalry forces in that
action, says that up to a certain point the movement on Chancellorsville
was one of the most brilliant in the annals of war. He put that point at
the close of Thursday, April 30. He had made a full reconnoissance of
all that country and had informed General Hooker of the nature of the
ground, that for a depth of from four to five miles it was all unbroken
tanglewood of the densest undergrowth, in which it was impossible to
manoeuvre an army or to know anything of the movements of the enemy;
that beyond this wilderness the country was open and well adapted to
military movements, and he had taken occasion to urge upon him the
importance of moving forward at once, so as to meet the enemy in open
ground, but his information and advice, he tells us, fell upon leaden
ears.
Lee had, up to this time, no information of the movement upon
Chancellorsville, having been wholly occupied with Sedgwick at
Fredericksburg. The former was therefore a complete surprise to him.
The "golden moment," according to Pleasanton, to move forward and carry
the battle out into the open, where the army could have been handled and
would have had a chance, was on that day, as instantly the movement was
disclosed, the enemy, being familiar with every foot of the country,
would detach a sufficient force to operate in the open, and along the
edge of the wilderness could keep us practically bottled up there and
beat us in detail; and that is precisely what seems to have been done.
The inexplicable question is, Why did fighting "Joe Hooker," with
seventy thousand as good troops as ever fired a gun, sit down in the
middle of that tanglewood forest and allow Lee to make a monkey of him
while Sedgwick was doing such magnificent work below?
Two distinguished participants in all these events holding high
commands, namely, General Alfred Pleasanton, quoted above, and General
Doubleday, commanding First Division, First Army Corps, have written
articles upon this battle, agreeing on the feasibility and brilliancy of
the movement, but by inference and things unsaid have practically left
the same question suspended in the air. It is possible the correct
answer should not now be given.
To return to our own doings, on that Friday, 1st of May, our division
was drawn up in line of battle in front of the Chancellorsville House,
and we were permitted to rest on our arms. This meant that any moment we
might be expected to move forward. The battle was now on in earnest.
Heavy firing was heard some miles below us, which was Sedgwick's work at
Fredericksburg. Nearer by there was cannonading and more or less severe
musketry firing. Ambulances and stretcher-carriers were constantly
coming back from the front with wounded soldiers, taking them to the
field hospital, which was just in our rear, and we could see the growing
piles of amputated legs and arms which were thrown outside with as
little care as if they were so many pieces of wood. We were evidently
waiting for something, nobody seemed to know what. Everything appeared
to be "at heads." Our corps and division commanders, Couch, Hancock, and
French, with their staffs, were in close proximity to the troops, and
all seemed to be in a condition of nervous uncertainty. What might be
progressing in those black woods in front, was the question. A nearer
volley of musketry would start everybody up, and we would stand arms in
hand, as if expecting the unseen enemy to burst through the woods upon
us. Then the firing would slacken and we would drop down again for a
time.
In the mean time shells were screeching over us continually, and an
occasional bullet would whiz uncomfortably near. The nervous strain
under such conditions may be imagined. This state of affairs continued
all through Friday night and most of Saturday. Of course, sleep was out
of the question for any of our officers. On Thursday and Friday nights
the men got snatches of sleep, lying on their arms, between the times
all were aroused against some fresh alarm.
On Saturday some beef cattle were driven up and slaughtered in the open
square in front of our lines, and the details were progressing with the
work of preparing the meat for issue when the storm of disaster of
Saturday afternoon burst upon us and their work was rudely interrupted.
We had anxious premonitions of this impending storm for some hours.
Captain Pettit, who commanded the famous battery of that name, which was
posted immediately in our rear, had spent much of his time in the
forenoon of Saturday high up in a tall tree which stood just in front of
the Chancellorsville House and close to our line, with his field glass
reconnoitring. Several times he had come down with information that
heavy bodies of the enemy were massing for a blow upon our front and
where he believed they would strike. This information, we were told, he
imparted to Hooker's chief of staff, and begged permission to open at
long range with his rifled guns, but no attention was paid to him. I saw
him up the tree and heard some of his ejaculating, which indicated that
he was almost wild with apprehension of what was coming. Once on coming
down he remarked to General Hancock that we would "catch h----l in less
than an hour." The latter seemed to be thoroughly alive to the situation
and exceedingly anxious, as were Couch and French, to do something to
prepare for what was coming, yet nothing more was done until suddenly
the firing, which had been growing in volume and intensity and gradually
drawing nearer, developed in a storm of musketry of terrific fury
immediately in our right front, apparently not more than three hundred
yards away.
We could not see a thing. What there might be between us and it, or
whether it was the onslaught of the enemy or the firing of our troops,
we knew not. But we had not long to wait. Soon stragglers, few in
numbers, began to appear, emerging from the woods into our clearing, and
then more of them, these running, and then almost at once an avalanche
of panic-stricken, flying men without arms, without knapsacks, many
bareheaded, swearing, cursing, a wild, frenzied mob tearing to the rear.
Instantly they began to appear, General Couch, commanding our corps,
took in the situation and deployed two divisions to catch and hold the
fugitives. Part of the Third Corps was also deployed on our left. We
were ordered to charge bayonets and permit no man to pass through our
ranks. We soon had a seething, howling mob of Dutchmen twenty to thirty
feet in depth in front of our line, holding them back on the points of
our bayonets, and still they came. Every officer of our division, with
drawn sword and pistol, was required to use all possible endeavor to
hold them, and threatening to shoot the first man who refused to stand
as ordered. General French and staff were galloping up and down our
division line assisting in this work.
In the mean time another line of battle was rapidly thrown in between
these fugitives and the woods to stay the expected advance of the enemy.
This was the famous break of the Eleventh Corps, starting with Blenker's
division and finally extending through the whole corps, some fifteen
thousand men. It seemed as though the whole army was being stampeded. We
soon had a vast throng of these fugitives dammed up in our front, a
terrible menace to the integrity of our own line as well as of all in
our rear. We were powerless to do anything should the enemy break
through, and were in great danger of being ourselves swept away and
disintegrated by this frantic mob. All this time the air was filled with
shrieking shells from our own batteries as well as those of the enemy,
doing, however, little damage beyond adding to the terror of the
situation. The noise was deafening. Pandemonium seemed to reign supreme
in our front. Our line, as well as that of the Third Corps on our left,
was holding firm as a rock. I noticed a general officer, I thought it
was General Sickles, was very conspicuous in the vigor of his efforts to
hold the line. A couple of fugitives had broken through his line and
were rapidly going to the rear. I heard him order them to halt and turn
back. One of them turned and cast a look at him, but paid no further
attention to his order. He repeated the order in stentorian tones, this
time with his pistol levelled, but it was not obeyed, and he fired,
dropping the first man dead in his tracks. He again ordered the other
man to halt, and it was sullenly obeyed. These men seemed to be almost
stupid, deaf to orders or entreaty in their frenzy.
An incident in our own front will illustrate. I noticed some extra
commotion near our colors and rushed to see the cause. I found an
officer with drawn sword threatening to run the color-sergeant through
if he was not allowed to pass. He was a colonel and evidently a German.
My orders to him to desist were answered with a curse, and I had to
thrust my pistol into his face, with an energetic threat to blow his
head off if he made one more move, before he seemed to come to his
senses. I then appealed to him to see what an example he as an officer
was setting, and demanded that he should get to work and help to stem
the flight of his men rather than assist in their demoralization. To his
credit be it said, he at once regained his better self, and thenceforth
did splendid work up and down amongst these German fugitives, and later
on, when they were moved to the rear, he rendered very material
assistance. I did not learn who he was, but he was a splendid-looking
officer and spoke both English and German fluently.
One may ask why those men should have lost their heads so completely. To
answer the question intelligently, one needs to put oneself into their
place. The facts as we were told at the time were: That the Eleventh
Corps, which contained two divisions of German troops, under Schurz and
Blenker (I think Steinwehr commanded the latter division in this
action), was posted on the right of Hooker's line in the woods, some
distance in front and to the right of the Chancellorsville House. That
at the time Stonewall Jackson made his famous attack, above referred to,
he caught one of those divisions "napping"--off their guard. They had
stacked their guns and knapsacks, and were back some twenty yards,
making their evening coffee, when suddenly the rebel skirmishers burst
through the brush upon them, followed immediately by the main line, and
before they realized it were between these troops and their guns.
Consternation reigned supreme in an instant and a helter-skelter flight
followed. Jackson followed up this advantage with his usual impetuosity,
and although the other divisions of the Eleventh made an effort to hold
their ground, this big hole in the line was fatal to them and all were
quickly swept away. Of course, the division and brigade commanders were
responsible for that unpardonable carelessness. No valid excuse can be
made for such criminal want of watchfulness, especially for troops
occupying a front line, and which had heard, or should have heard, as
we a half mile farther in the rear had, all the premonitions of the
coming storm. But it was an incident showing the utter folly of the
attempt to maintain a line of battle in the midst of a dense
undergrowth, through which nothing could be seen. It is exceedingly
doubtful whether they could have held their line against Jackson's onset
under those conditions had they been on the alert, for he would have
been on and over them almost before they could have seen him. To resist
such an onset needs time to deliver a steady volley and then be ready
with the bayonet.
It was towards six o'clock in the evening when this flying mob struck
our lines, and darkness had fallen before we were rid of them and
something like order had been restored. In the mean time it certainly
seemed as if everything was going to pieces. I got a little idea of what
a panic-stricken army means. The fearful thing about it was, we knew it
was terribly contagious, and that with all the uncertainties in that
black wilderness from which this mob came and the pandemonium in
progress all about us, it might seize our own troops and we be swept
away to certain destruction in spite of all our efforts. It is said
death rides on horseback with a fleeing army. Nothing can be more
horrible. Hence a panic must be stopped, cost what it may. Night
undoubtedly came to our rescue with this one.
One of the most heroic deeds I saw done to help stem the fleeing tide of
men and restore courage was not the work of a battery, nor a charge of
cavalry, but the charge of a band of music! The band of the Fourteenth
Connecticut went right out into that open space between our new line
and the rebels, with shot and shell crashing all about them, and played
"The Star-Spangled Banner," the "Red, White, and Blue," and "Yankee
Doodle," and repeated them for fully twenty minutes. They never played
better. Did that require nerve? It was undoubtedly the first and only
band concert ever given under such conditions. Never was American grit
more finely illustrated. Its effect upon the men was magical. Imagine
the strains of our grand national hymn, "The Star-Spangled Banner,"
suddenly bursting upon your ears out of that horrible pandemonium of
panic-born yells, mingled with the roaring of musketry and the crashing
of artillery. To what may it be likened? The carol of birds in the midst
of the blackest thunder-storm? No simile can be adequate. Its strains
were clear and thrilling for a moment, then smothered by that fearful
din, an instant later sounding bold and clear again, as if it would
fearlessly emphasize the refrain, "Our flag is still there."