WHY FREDERICKSBURG WAS LOST
I promised to give my convictions relative to the responsibility for the
disaster of Fredericksburg, and I might as well do it here.
Recalling the fact heretofore stated that we seemed to have been thrown
against Marye's Heights to be sacrificed; that we were not ordered to
charge their works, but to advance and maintain a line of battle-fire
where such a thing was absolutely impossible, I come to the inquiry,
what was the character and purpose of the movement and why did it fail?
So thoroughly impressed was I that there was something radically wrong
about it, that I determined to solve that question if possible, and so
made a study of the subject at that time and later after my return home.
I had personal friends in the First and Sixth Corps, which had operated
on the extreme left, and I discussed with them the movements that day.
Finally, after my return home, I got access to Covode's congressional
reports on the conduct of the war covering that campaign, and from all
these sources learned what I then and now believe to be substantially
the facts about that campaign. The army was divided into three grand
divisions, composed of two army corps each, namely, the Second and
Ninth, the right grand division, commanded by Sumner; the First and
Sixth, the left grand division, commanded by Franklin, and the Third
and Fifth, the centre, commanded by Hooker. The plan of battle was to
hold Lee's army at Fredericksburg by a "feint in force" (which means an
attack sufficiently strong to deceive the enemy into the belief that it
is the real or main attack) at that point, whilst the left grand
division was to throw a pontoon bridge across the river three miles
below and turn his flank (_i.e._, get behind them) in the rear of
Marye's Heights. For this purpose the left grand division was to advance
and attack vigorously. If successful, Lee would then have been between
Franklin's forces on the left and our own on the right, with every
possibility of being crushed. Hooker was to hold his division in
readiness to support either wing. Had this plan been carried out, our
work at the right would, at its conception, have been as it appeared to
be, a mad sacrifice of men, but with an opportunity later on of pushing
forward and reaping a victory. In that event, our position would have
made us a tremendous factor in the result.
Now how was the plan carried out? The student will be puzzled on finding
such a paucity of records concerning this disastrous movement. The
official documents are remarkable for what they do not contain. A study
of Covode's reports on the conduct of the war will, I think, justify my
conclusions, viz., that the disaster of Fredericksburg was due not to
accident, nor to a faulty plan of battle, but to a failure of the left
grand division to perform the vital part assigned to it. My information
gained at the time was that Franklin was to remain concealed until the
signal for our attack came; then he was to cross over and attack
vigorously, a military expression, meaning to put all possible vigor
and power into the movement. The signal was given as our attack began.
Whatever force may have crossed the river at that time, my information
was that the division known as the Pennsylvania Reserve, now numbering
probably not more than six thousand men, under General Meade, was the
only body of troops which made a determined attack on Lee's right, in
support of our work in front of Marye's Heights. Realizing the
opportunity, General Meade pushed forward with his usual vigor and,
though meeting strenuous opposition, soon found himself well in Lee's
rear, but without support. He sent back aide after aide to hurry forward
the supporting lines, but without avail, finally galloping back himself.
He found General Birney resting near the bridge with his division. An
eye-witness[E] to Meade's interview with Birney says the language of
General Meade as he upbraided Birney for not coming to his support was
enough to "almost make the stones creep;" that Meade was almost wild
with rage as he saw the golden opportunity slipping away and the
slaughter of his men going for naught. He said Birney responded that he
agreed with General Meade fully, and was ready and most anxious to come
to his support, but that his orders were peremptory to await further
orders in his present position: that he had been for an hour trying to
find General Franklin to obtain permission to move forward. This loss of
time and want of support to Meade's charge changed a possible victory
into a fearful disaster. This was substantially the testimony of
Major-General Reynolds, commanding the First Corps, before the Committee
on the Conduct of the War. Burnside rode down to the left and vigorously
expostulated with Franklin for his failure to carry out his orders, and
peremptorily ordered him to make the attack as originally directed,
whilst he repeated the movement at the right. It was now considerably
after noon, and this order was undoubtedly a mistake. The plan of battle
had been revealed, and there was practically no hope of success. Had the
left grand division vigorously performed its part in the earlier
movement, can any one doubt the result? I cannot think so. Had Meade,
Reynolds, or Hancock been in command on the left that day, I feel
confident that Fredericksburg would have been recorded a glorious
victory instead of a horrible slaughter.
Now, why did the left grand division fail to make the attack as ordered?
Halleck, in his report on the operations at Fredericksburg, says
"alleged misunderstanding of orders." Here is his language:
"It was intended that Franklin's grand division, consisting of the corps
of Reynolds (First) and Smith (Sixth), should attack the enemy's right
and turn his position on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg,
while Sumner and Hooker attacked him in front. But by some alleged
misunderstanding of orders Franklin's operations were limited to a mere
reconnoissance, and the direct attacks of Sumner and Hooker were
unsupported." "Rebellion Records," vol. xxi., page 47.
Is the theory of a misunderstanding of orders tenable? The records show
that on the 11th of December, two days before the battle, Burnside
ordered his division commanders to so dispose their troops as to bring
them within easy reach of Fredericksburg, and that on that day at twelve
o'clock noon these officers were ordered to meet him personally at his
head-quarters for final instructions. There are no records of what those
instructions were, but is it credible that either general retired from
that conference with a misunderstanding as to the plan of battle or of
his own part in it? Certain it is that neither Sumner nor Hooker
misunderstood.
And the excuse said to have been made by Franklin, that he did not deem
the attack on the left practicable, is not consistent with the idea of
misunderstanding. Otherwise, why did he attack at all? General Halleck's
guarded language clearly indicates where he placed the responsibility
for that disaster, and that he did not credit the "misunderstanding of
orders" theory. It is plainly evident Burnside did not accept that
excuse, as appears from his celebrated Order No. 8, issued a month
later, relieving Franklin, Smith, Newton, Cochran, and Ferrero, and
stating as his reason that "it being evident that these officers can be
of no further service to this army,"--the first named being the
commander of the left grand division, the second the commander of the
Sixth Corps, and the others subordinate commanders in that wing of the
army. General Burnside explained to the Committee on the Conduct of the
War[F] that in asking the President to approve this order, and making
that a condition upon which he would consent to remain at the head of
the army, he had explicitly stated, "that was the only condition on
which he could command the Army of the Potomac." In other words, he
could not command that army with those officers as his subordinates. The
inference that there had been insubordination is inevitable. It was the
current belief amongst us officers of the army that the battle of
Fredericksburg had been lost through a want of hearty co-operation, if
not direct disobedience of orders, on the part of the officer commanding
on the left that day, and some of his subordinates, and that this was
due to a spirit of jealousy. McClellan had but recently been removed
from the command of the army, and the officers relieved were strong
personal friends and partisans of the latter. Again, Burnside, his
successor, was alleged to be junior in actual rank to Franklin. Whether
either of these facts supplied the motives for the jealousy which lost
that battle, if such was true, the judgment day alone will reveal. It is
devoutly to be hoped that the light of that day will relieve the
terrible disaster of Fredericksburg of this awful shadow, and that
nothing worse than a "misunderstanding of orders" was responsible for
it.
That Order No. 8 was disapproved at Washington, and General Burnside
promptly tendered his resignation of the command of the Army of the
Potomac. He felt that he had not received and was not likely to receive
the cordial and hearty support of all his subordinate officers, and
under those circumstances he did not want the responsibility of command.
He expressed himself as anxious to serve his country and willing to work
anywhere it might please the President to place him. He was not
relieved, however, until a month or so later. In writing the foregoing I
know that many brave men will take exception. I would say, however, that
I have made a somewhat careful study of the subject from an absolutely
unprejudiced stand-point, and such are the conclusions I reached, and
they were shared by many of my fellow-officers who were in that
campaign. The losses in this battle amount to nearly one-third the
troops actually engaged, a most remarkable fact, and which stamps this
engagement as one of the bloodiest in all history. Burnside reports his
loss as twelve hundred and eighty-four killed and nine thousand six
hundred wounded, making a total loss, including the missing, of twelve
thousand six hundred and fifty-three. Of this loss the right grand
division (the Second and Ninth Corps) lost five thousand three hundred
and eleven. The left grand division, Franklin's (First and Sixth Corps,
which numbered considerably more than the right grand division), lost
three thousand four hundred and sixty-two, and most of this was
sustained in the second attack in the afternoon. These facts sustain
the belief above referred to in the army, that the main attack in the
morning on the left was not what it should have been, and was the cause
of the disaster.
A remarkable fact connected with this loss is the great number of
wounded as compared with the killed. Usually the former exceeds the
latter in the proportion of three and four to one, but at Fredericksburg
it was nearly nine to one. How this is to be explained I never
understood, unless it be that most of the casualties were from exploding
shells. The minute fragments of a shell scatter very widely and wound,
whilst there are fewer of the large pieces which kill. For example, the
shell that exploded in the front of our second company, as it was
turning to enter the street leading out towards Marye's Heights,
previously described, knocked out ten men, only one of whom was
instantly killed. It is safe to estimate that of the nine thousand six
hundred reported as wounded, one-third died or were permanently disabled
therefrom.
To show how quickly troops can recover from such a shock as the disaster
of Fredericksburg, the Second Corps had a grand review back of Falmouth
the second week after the battle. Major-General Edwin V. Sumner,
commanding the right grand division, was the reviewing officer. I have
spoken before of this distinguished officer. This was his farewell to
the Second Corps, which he had long commanded and to which he was
greatly attached, a sentiment which was most cordially reciprocated by
the men. He was now probably the oldest in years of all the officers in
the army, yet still vigorous, intrepid, and efficient. He was relieved
from active command in the field and assigned to the command of the
Department of the Ohio, but a few months later died peacefully at his
home in New York. Is it not singular that this old hero should have
escaped the numberless missiles of death in all the battles through
which he had passed, so soon to succumb in the quietude of retirement?
Our regiment had present at this review but few over two hundred men,
and the other regiments were proportionally small, so that the corps was
scarcely larger than a good-sized division, yet it appeared in splendid
condition. Its depleted numbers and battle-scarred flags alone told the
story of its recent experiences. The following week our regiment was
detailed for a ten-days' tour of picket duty, and was encamped some
distance above Falmouth in a pretty grove. This change of service was a
welcome one to the men in many respects, for there was better foraging
opportunities, and there was also considerable excitement attending this
service in the presence of the enemy. The Rappahannock River was the
dividing line of the two armies, and their respective pickets lined its
banks. At this time the two lines were kept as far as possible concealed
from each other, though there was practically no picket firing. Later on
the two lines were posted in full view of each other, and by agreement
under a "flag of truce" all picket firing was strictly forbidden.
Thereafter, although forbidden, there was more or less conversation
carried on between the two lines.