MORALITY WITHOUT GOD.
The mystery-monger flourishes almost as well in ethics as he does in
theology. Indeed, in some respects he seems to have forsaken one field
of exercise only to find renewed scope in the other. He approaches the
consideration of moral questions with the same hushed voice and
"reverential" air that is so usual in theology, and talks of the mystery
of morality with the same facility that he once talked about the mystery
of godliness--and with about an equal amount of enlightenment to his
hearers or readers.
But the mystery of morality is nearly all of our own making. Essentially
there is no more mystery in morality than there is in any other question
that may engage the attention of mankind. There are, of course, problems
in the moral world as there are in the physical one, and he would be a
fool who pretended to the ability to satisfactorily solve them all. The
nature of morality, the causes that led to the development of moral
"laws," and still more to the development of a sense of morality, all
these are questions upon which there is ample room for research and
speculation. But the talk of a mystery is misleading and mystifying. It
is the chatter of the charlatan, or of the theologian, or of the partly
liberated mind that is still under the thraldom of theology. In ethics
we have exactly the same kind of problem that meets us in any of the
sciences. We have a fact, or a series of facts, and we seek some
explanation of them. We may fail in our search, but that is not
evidence of a "mystery," it is proof only of inadequate knowledge, of
limitations that we may hope the future will enable us to overcome.
For the sake of clarity it will be better to let the meaning of morality
emerge from the discussion rather than to commence with it. And one of
the first things to help to clear the mind of confusion is to get rid of
the notion that there is any such thing as moral "laws" which correspond
in their nature to law as the term is used in science. In one sense
morality is not part of physical nature at all. It is characteristic of
that part of nature which is covered by the human--at most by the higher
animal--world. Nature can only, therefore, be said to be moral in the
sense that the term "Nature" includes all that is. In any other sense
nature is non-moral. The sense of values, which is, as we shall see, of
the essence of the conception of morality, nature knows nothing of. To
speak of nature punishing us for _bad_ actions or rewarding us for
_good_ ones is absurd. Nature neither punishes nor rewards. She meets
actions with consequences, and is quite indifferent to any moral
consideration. If I am weakly, and go out on a cold, wet night to help
someone in distress, nature does not act differently than it would if I
had gone out to commit a murder. I stand exactly the same chances in
either case of contracting a deadly chill. It is not the moral value of
an action with which natural forces are concerned, but merely with the
action, and in that respect nature never discriminates between the good
man and the bad, between the sinner and the saint.
There is another sense in which moral laws differ from natural laws. We
can break the former but not the latter. The expression so often used,
"He broke a law of nature," is absurd. You cannot break a law of
nature. You do not break the law of gravitation when you prevent a stone
falling to the ground; the force required to hold it in the air is an
illustration of the law. It is, indeed, one of the proofs that our
generalization does represent a law of nature that it cannot be
"broken." For broken is here only another word for inoperative, and a
law of nature that is inoperative is non-existent. But in the moral
sphere we are in a different world. We not only can break moral laws, we
do break them; that is one of the problems with which our teachers and
moralisers have constantly to deal. Every time we steal we break the law
"Thou shalt not steal." Every time we murder we break the law "Thou
shalt not kill." We may keep moral laws, we ought to keep them, but we
can, quite clearly, break them. Between a moral law and a law of nature
there is plainly a very radical distinction. The discovery of that
distinction will, I think, bring us to the heart of the subject.
Considering man as merely a natural object, or as a mere animal, there
is only one quality that nature demands of him. This is efficiency.
Nature's sole law is here "Be Strong." How that strength and efficiency
is secured and maintained is of no consequence whatever. The heat he
requires, the food he needs may be stolen from others, but it will
serve. The food will not nourish the less, the fire will not warm the
less. So long as efficiency is acquired it is a matter of absolute
indifference how it is secured. Considered as a mere animal object it is
difficult to see that morality has any meaning at all for man. It is
when we come to regard him in his relation to others that we begin to
see the meaning and significance of morality emerge.
Now one of the first things that strike us in connection with moral laws
or rules is that they are all statements of relation. Such moral
commands as "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not kill," the commands
to be truthful, kind, dutiful, etc., all imply a relation to others.
Apart from this relation moral rules have simply no meaning whatever. By
himself a man could neither steal, nor lie, nor do any of the things
that we habitually characterize as immoral. A man living by himself on
some island would be absolved from all moral law; it would have no
meaning whatever for him. He would be neither moral nor immoral, he
would simply be without the conditions that make morality possible. But
once bring him into relations with his kind and his behaviour begins to
have a new and peculiar significance, not alone to these others, but
also to himself. What he does affects them, and also affects himself so
far as they determine the character of his relations to these others. He
must, for example, either work with them or apart from them. He must
either be on his guard against their securing their own efficiency at
his expense, or rest content that a mutual forbearance and trust will
govern their association. To ignore them is an impossibility. He must
reckon with these others in a thousand and one different ways, and this
reckoning will have its effect on the moulding of his nature and upon
theirs.
Morality, then, whatever else it may be, is primarily the expression of
a relation. And the laws of morality are, consequently, a summary or
description of those relations. From this point of view they stand upon
exactly the same level as any of the arts or sciences. Moral actions are
the subject matter of observation, and the determination of their
essential quality or character is by the same methods as we determine
the essential quality of the "facts" in chemistry or biology. The task
before the scientific enquirer is, therefore, to determine the
conditions which give to moral rules or "laws" their meaning and
validity.
One of the conditions of a moral action has already been pointed out.
This is that all moral rules imply a relation to beings of a similar
nature. A second feature is that conduct represents a form of
efficiency, it is a special feature of the universal biological fact of
adaptation. And the question of why man has a "moral sense" is really on
all fours with, and presents no greater mystery than is involved in, the
question of why man has digestive organs, and prefers some kinds of food
to others. Substantially, the question of why man should prefer a diet
of meat and potatoes to one of prussic acid is exactly the question of
why society should discourage certain actions and encourage others, or
why man's moral taste should prefer some forms of conduct to other
forms. The answer to both questions, while differing in form, is the
same in substance.
Man as we know him is always found as a member of a group, and his
capacities, his feelings, and tastes must always be considered in
relation to that fact. But considering man merely as an animal, and his
conduct as merely a form of adaptation to environment, the plain
consideration which emerges is that even as an individual organism he is
compelled, in order to live, to avoid certain actions and to perform
others, to develop certain tastes and to form certain distastes. To take
our previous illustration it would be impossible for man to develop a
liking for life-destroying foods. It is one of the conditions of living
that he shall eat only that food which sustains life, or that he shall
abstain from eating substances which destroy it. But conduct at that
stage is not of the kind which considers the reasons for acting; indeed,
life cannot be based upon considered action, however much reason may
justify the actions taken. Further, as all conscious action is prompted
by the impulse to do what is pleasant and to avoid what is unpleasant,
it follows, as Spencer pointed out, that the course of evolution sets up
a close relation between actions that are pleasurable in the performance
and actions that are life preserving. It is one of the conditions of the
maintenance of life that the pleasurable and the beneficial shall in the
long run coincide.
When we take man as a member of a group we have the same principle in
operation, even though the form of its expression undergoes alteration.
To begin with, the mere fact of living in a group implies the growth of
a certain restraint in one's relations to, and of reciprocity in dealing
with, others. Men can no more live together without some amount of trust
and confidence in each other, or without a crude sense of justice in
their dealings with each other, than an individual man can maintain his
life by eating deadly poisons. There must be a respect for the rights of
others, of justice in dealing with others, and of confidence in
associating with others, at least to the extent of not threatening the
possibility of group life. There are rules in the game of social life
that must be observed, and in its own defence society is bound to
suppress those of its members who exhibit strong anti-social tendencies.
No society can, for example, tolerate homicide as an admitted practice.
There is, thus, from the earliest times, a certain form of elimination
of the anti-social character which results in the gradual formation of
an emotional and mental disposition that habitually and instinctively
falls into line with the requirements of the social whole.
To use an expression of Sir Leslie Stephen's, man as a member of the
group becomes a cell in the social tissue, and his fitness to survive is
dependent upon, positively, his readiness to perform such actions as the
welfare of the group require, and, negatively, upon his refraining from
doing those things that are inimical to social welfare.[23] Moreover,
there is the additional fact that the group itself is, as a whole,
brought into contact with other groups, and the survival of one group as
against another is determined by the quality and the degree of cohesion
of its units. From this point of view, participation in the life of the
group means more than refraining from acts that are injurious to the
group, it involves some degree of positive contribution to social
welfare.
[23] The question of what are the things that are essential to the
welfare of the group, and the fact that individuals are often suppressed
for doing what they believe is beneficial to the group, with the kindred
fact that there may exist grave differences of opinion on the matter,
does not alter the essential point, which is that there must exist
sufficient conformity between conduct and group welfare to secure
survival.
But the main thing to note is that from the very dawn of animal life the
organism is more or less under the pressure of a certain discipline that
tends to establish an identity between actions which there is a tendency
to perform and those that are beneficial to the organism. In the social
state we simply have this principle expressed in another way, and it
gives a degree of conscious adaptation that is absent from the
pre-social or even the lower forms of the social state. It is in the
truly social state also that we get the full influence of what may be
called the characteristically human environment, that is, the operation
of ideas and ideals. The importance of this psychological factor in the
life of man has been stressed in an earlier chapter. It is enough now to
point out that from the earliest moment the young human being is, by a
process of training, imbued with certain ideals of truthfulness,
loyalty, duty, etc., all of which play their part in the moulding of his
character. However much these ideals may vary in different societies,
the fact of the part played by them in moulding character is plain. They
are the dominant forces in moulding the individual to the social state,
even while the expressions of the social life may be in turn checked by
the fact that social conduct cannot persist if it threatens those
conditions upon which the persistence of life ultimately depends.
There is one other consideration that must be noted. One very pregnant
fact in life is that nature seldom creates a new organ. What it usually
does is to refashion an old one, or to devote an old one to new uses.
This principle may be seen clearly in operation in connection with moral
evolution. On the one hand the various forces that play upon human
nature drive the moral feelings deeper into it. On the other hand it
develops them by their steady expansion over a wider area. Whether it is
an actual fact or not--I do not stress it because the point is the
subject of discussion--it is at least possible that the earliest human
group is the family. And so long as that was the case such feelings of
right and wrong as then existed will have been confined to the family.
But when a group of families combine and form the tribe, all those
feelings of confidence, justice, etc., which were formerly
characteristic of the smaller group are expanded to cover the larger
one. With the expansion of the tribe to the nation we have a further
development of the same phenomenon. There is no new creation, there is
nothing more than expansion and development.
The process does not and cannot, obviously, stop here. From the tribe to
the nation, from the nation to the collection of nations which we call
an empire, and from the empire to the whole of humanity. That seems the
inevitable direction of the process, and there does not require profound
insight to see it already on the way. Development of national life
involves a growing interdependence of the world of humankind. Of hardly
any nation can it be said to-day that it is self-supporting or
self-contained or independent. There is nothing national or sectarian in
science, and it is to science that we have to look for our principal
help. All over the world we utilize each other's discoveries and profit
by each other's knowledge. Even economic interdependence carries with it
the same lesson. The human environment gets gradually broader and wider,
and the feelings that have hitherto been expanded over the narrower area
have now to be expanded over the wider one. It is the gradual
development of a human nature that is becoming adapted to a conception
of mankind as an organic unit. Naturally, in the process of adaptation
there is conflict between the narrower ideals, conserved in our
educational influences, and the wider ones. There are still large
numbers of those who, unable to picture the true nature of the
evolutionary process owing to their own defective education, yet think
of the world in terms of a few centuries ago, and still wave the flag of
a political nationalism as though that were the end of social growth,
instead of its being an early and transient expression of it. But this
conflict is inevitable, and the persistence of that type can no more
ensure its permanent domination than the persistence of the medicine man
in the person of the existing clergyman can give permanence to the
religious idea.
There is, then, no mystery about the fact of morality. It is no more of
a mystery than is the compilation of the multiplication table, and it
has no greater need of a supernatural sanction than has the law of
gravitation. Morality is a natural fact, and its enforcement and growth
are brought about by natural means. In its lower form, morality is no
more than an expression of those conditions under which social life is
possible, and in its higher one, an expression of those ideal conditions
under which corporate life is desirable. In studying morality we are
really studying the physiology of associated life, and that study aims
at the determination of the conditions under which the best form of
living is possible. It is thus that here, as elsewhere, man is thrown
back upon himself for enlightenment and help. And if the process is a
slow one we may at least console ourselves with the reflection that the
labours of each generation are making the weapons which we bring to the
fight keener and better able to do their work.