DARWINISM AND DESIGN.
The influence of the hypothesis of evolution on religion was not long in
making itself felt. Professor Huxley explained the rapid success of
Darwinism by saying that the scientific world was ready for it. And much
the same thing may be said of the better representatives of the
intellectual world with regard to the bearing of evolution on religion.
In many directions the cultivated mind had for more than half a century
been getting familiar with the general conception of growth in human
life and thought. Where earlier generations had seen no more than a
pattern to unravel there had developed a conviction that there was a
history to trace and to understand. Distant parts of the world had been
brought together during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries,
readers and students were getting familiarized with the mass of customs
and religious ideas that were possessed by these peoples, and it was
perceived that beneath the bewildering variety of man's mental output
there were certain features which they had in common, and which might
hold in solution some common principle or principles.
This common principle was found in the conception of evolution. It was
the one thing which, if true, and apart from the impossible idea of a
revelation, nicely graduated to the capacities of different races,
offered an explanation of the religions of the world in terms more
satisfactory than those of deliberate invention or imposture. Once it
was accepted, if only as an instrument of investigation, its use was
soon justified. And the thorough-going nature of the conquest achieved
is in no wise more clearly manifested than in the fact that the
conception of growth is, to-day, not merely an accepted principle with
scientific investigators, it has sunk deeply into all our literature and
forms an unconscious part of popular thought.
One aspect of the influence of evolution on religious ideas has already
been noted. It made the religious idea but one of the many forms that
were assumed by man's attempt to reduce his experience of the world to
something like an orderly theory. But that carried with it, for
religion, the danger of reducing it to no more than one of the many
theories of things which man forms, with the prospect of its rejection
as a better knowledge of the world develops. Evolution certainly
divested religion of any authority save such as it might contain in
itself, and that is a position a religious mind can never contemplate
with equanimity.
But so far as the theory of Darwinism is concerned it exerted a marked
and rapid influence on the popular religious theory of design in nature.
This is one of the oldest arguments in favour of a reasoned belief in
God, and it is the one which was, and is still in one form or another,
held in the greatest popular esteem. To the popular mind--and religion
in a civilized country is not seriously concerned about its failing grip
on the cultured intelligence so long as it keeps control of the ordinary
man and woman--to the popular mind the argument from design appealed
with peculiar force. Anyone is capable of admiring the wonders of
nature, and in the earlier developments of popular science the marvels
of plant and animal structures served only to deepen the Theist's
admiration of the "divine wisdom." The examples of complexity of
structure, of the interdependence of parts, and of the thousand and one
cunning devices by which animal life maintains itself in the face of a
hostile environment were there for all to see and admire. And when man
compared these with his own conscious attempts to adapt means to ends,
there seemed as strong proof here as anywhere of some scheming
intelligence behind the natural process.
But the strength of the case was more apparent than real. It was weakest
at the very point where it should have been strongest. In the case of a
human product we know the purpose and can measure the extent of its
realization in the nature of the result. In the case of a natural
product we have no means of knowing what the purpose was, or even if any
purpose at all lies behind the product. The important element in the
argument from design--that of purpose--is thus pure assumption. In the
case of human productions we argue from purpose to production. In the
case of a natural object we are arguing from production to an assumed
purpose. The analogy breaks down just where it should be strongest and
clearest.
Now it is undeniable that to a very large number of the more thoughtful
the old form of the argument from design received its death blow from
the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection. In the light of this theory
there was no greater need to argue that intelligence was necessary to
produce animal adaptations than there was to assume intelligence for the
sifting of sand by the wind. As the lighter grains are carried farthest
because they are lightest, so natural selection, operating upon organic
variations, favoured the better adapted specimens by killing off the
less favoured ones. The fittest is not created, it survives. The world
is not what it is because the animal is what it is, the animal is what
it is because the world is as it is. It cannot be any different and
live--a truth demonstrated by the destruction of myriads of animal
forms, and by the disappearance of whole species. The case was so plain,
the evidence so conclusive, that the clearer headed religionists dropped
the old form of the argument from design as no longer tenable.
But the gentleman who exchanged the errors of the Church of Rome for
those of the Church of England is always with us. And the believer in
deity having dropped the argument from design in one form immediately
proceeded to revive it in another. This was, perhaps, inevitable. After
all, man lives in this world, and if proof of the existence of deity is
to be gathered from his works, it must be derived from the world we
know. So design _must_ be found somewhere, and it must be found here.
Only one chance was left. The general hypothesis of evolution--either
Darwinism alone, or Darwinism plus other factors--explained the
development of animal life. But that was _within_ the natural process.
What, then, of the process as a whole? If the hand of God could not be
seen in the particular adaptations of animal life, might it not be that
the whole of the process, in virtue of which these particular
adaptations occurred, might be the expression of the divine
intelligence? God did not create the particular parts directly, but may
he not have created the whole, leaving it for the forces he had set in
motion to work out his "plan." The suggestion was attractive. It
relieved religion from resting its case in a region where proof and
disproof are possible, and removed it to a region where they are
difficult, if not impossible. So, as it was not possible to uphold the
old teleology, one began to hear a great deal of the "wider teleology,"
which meant that the Theist was thinking vaguely when he imagined he was
thinking comprehensively, and that, because he had reached a region
where the laws of logic could not be applied, he concluded that he had
achieved demonstration. And, indeed, when one gets outside the region of
verification there is nothing to stop one theorizing--save a dose of
common-sense and a gracious gift of humour.
In another work (_Theism or Atheism_) I have dealt at length with the
argument from design. At present my aim is to take the presentation of
this "wider teleology" as given by a well-known writer on philosophical
subjects, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, in a volume published a few years ago
entitled _Humanism: Philosophical Essays_. And in doing so, it is
certain that the theologian will lose nothing by leaving himself in the
hands of so able a representative.
Mr. Schiller naturally accepts Darwinism as at least an important factor
in organic evolution, but he does not believe that it excludes design,
and he does believe that "our attitude towards life will be very
different, according as we believe it to be inspired and guided by
intelligence or hold it to be the fortuitous product of blind
mechanisms, whose working our helpless human intelligence can observe,
but cannot control."
Now within its scope Darwinism certainly does exclude design, and even
though the forces represented by natural selection may be directed
towards the end produced, yet so far as the play of these forces is
concerned they are really self-directing, or self-contained. The
argument really seems to be just mere theology masquerading as
philosophy. Theories do play some part in the determination of the
individual attitude towards life, but they do not play the important
part that Mr. Schiller assumes they play. It is easily observable that
the same theory of life held by a Christian in England and by another
Christian in Asia Minor has, so far as it affects conduct, different
results. And if it be said that even though the results be different
they are still there, the reply is that they differ because the facts of
life compel an adjustment in terms of the general environment. Mr.
Schiller admits that the "prevalent conduct and that adapted to the
conditions of life must coincide," and the admission is fatal to his
position. The truth of the matter is that the conditions of life being
what they are, and the consequences of conduct being also what they are,
speculative theories of life cannot, in the nature of the case, affect
life beyond a certain point; that is, if life is to continue. That is
why in the history of belief religious teachings have sooner or later to
accommodate themselves to persistent facts.
Mr. Schiller brings forward two arguments in favour of reconciling
Darwinism and Design, both of them ingenious, but neither of them
conclusive. With both of these I will deal later; but it is first
necessary to notice one or two of his arguments against a non-Theistic
Darwinism. The denial of the argument from design, he says, leads
farther than most people imagine:--
A complete denial of design in nature must deny the efficacy of all
intelligence as such. A consistently mechanical view has to regard
all intelligence as otiose, as an "epi-phenomenal by-product" or
fifth wheel to the cart, in the absence of which the given results
would no less have occurred. And so, if this view were the truth,
we should have to renounce all effort to direct our fated and
ill-fated course down the stream of time. Our consciousness would
be an unmeaning accident.
A complete reply to this would involve an examination of the meaning
that is and ought to be attached to "intelligence," and that is too
lengthy an enquiry to be attempted here. It is, perhaps, enough to
point out that Mr. Schiller's argument clearly moves on the assumption
that intelligence is a _thing_ or a quality which exists, so to speak,
in its own right and which interferes with the course of events as
something from without. It is quite probable that he would repudiate
this construction being placed on his words, but if he does not mean
that, then I fail to see what he does mean, or what force there is in
his argument. And it is enough for my purpose to point out that
"intelligence" or mind is not a thing, but a relation. It asserts of a
certain class of actions exactly what "gravitation" asserts of a certain
class of motion, and "thingness" is no more asserted in the one case
than it is in the other.
Intelligence, as a name given to a special class of facts or actions,
remains, whatever view we take of its nature, and it is puzzling to see
why the denial of extra natural intelligence--that is, intelligence
separated from all the conditions under which we know the phenomenon of
intelligence--should be taken as involving the denial of the existence
of intelligence as we know it. Intelligence as connoting purposive
action remains as much a fact as gravity or chemical attraction, and
continues valid concerning the phenomena it is intended to cover. All
that the evolutionist is committed to is the statement that it is as
much a product of evolution as is the shape or colouring of animals. It
is not at all a question of self-dependence. Every force in nature must
be taken for what it is worth, intelligence among them. Why, then, does
the view that intelligence is both a product of evolution and a cause of
another phase of evolution land us in self-contradiction, or make the
existence of itself meaningless? The truth is that intelligence
determines results exactly as every other force in nature determines
results, by acting as a link in an unending sequential chain. And the
question as to what intelligence is _per se_ is as meaningless as what
gravitation is _per se_. These are names which we give to groups of
phenomena displaying particular and differential characteristics, and
their purpose is served when they enable us to cognize and recognize
these phenomena and to give them their place and describe their function
in the series of changes that make up our world.
Mr. Schiller's reply to this line of criticism is the familiar one that
it reduces human beings to automata. He says:--
The ease with which the Darwinian argument dispenses with
intelligence as a factor in survival excites suspicion. It is
proving too much to show that adaptation might equally well have
arisen in automata. For we ourselves are strongly persuaded that we
are not automata and strive hard to adapt ourselves. In us at
least, therefore, intelligence _is_ a source of adaptation....
Intelligence therefore is a _vera causa_ as a source of adaptations
at least co-ordinate with Natural Selection, and this can be denied
only if it is declared inefficacious _everywhere_; if all living
beings, including ourselves, are declared to be automata.
One is compelled again to point out that Darwinism does not dispense
with intelligence as a factor in survival, except so far as the
intelligence which determines survival is declared to be operating apart
from the organisms which survive. The conduct of one of the lower
animals which reacts only to the immediate promptings of its environment
is of one order, but the response of another animal not merely to the
immediate promptings of the environment, but to remote conditions, as
in the selection of food or the building of a home of some sort, or to
the fashioning of a tool, does obviously give to the intelligence
displayed a distinct survival value. And that effectively replies to the
triumphant conclusion, "If intelligence has no efficacy in promoting
adaptations, _i.e._, if it has no survival value, how comes it to be
developed at all?"
Darwinism would never have been able to dispense with intelligence in
the way it did but for the fact that the opposite theory never stood for
more than a mere collection of words. That species are or were produced
by the operations of "Divine Intelligence" is merely a grandiloquent way
of saying nothing at all. It is absurd to pretend that such a formula
ever had any scientific value. It explains nothing. And it is quite
obvious that some adaptations do, so far as we know, arise without
intelligence, and are, therefore, to use Mr. Schiller's expression,
automata. (I do not like the word, since it conveys too much the notion
of someone behind the scenes pulling strings.) And it is on his theory
that animals actually are automata. For if there be a "Divine mind"
which stands as the active cause of the adaptations that meet us in the
animal world, and who arranges forces so that they shall work to their
pre-destined end, what is that but converting the whole of the animal
world into so many automata. One does not escape determinism in this
way; it is only getting rid of it in one direction in order to
reintroduce it in another.
And one would like to know what our conviction that we are not automata
has to do with it. Whether the most rigid determinism is true or not is
a matter to be settled by an examination of the facts and a careful
reflection as to their real significance. No one questions that there is
a persuasion to the contrary; if there were not there would be nothing
around which controversy could gather. But it is the conviction that is
challenged, and it is idle to reply to the challenge by asserting a
conviction to the contrary. The whole history of human thought is the
record of a challenge and a reversal of such convictions. There never
was a conviction which was held more strenuously than that the earth was
flat. The experience of all men in every hour of their lives seemed to
prove it. And yet to-day no one believes it. The affirmation that we are
"free" rests, as Spinoza said, ultimately on the fact that all men know
their actions and but few know the causes thereof. A feather endowed
with consciousness, falling to the ground in a zigzag manner, might be
equally convinced that it determined the exact spot on which it would
rest, yet its persuasion would be of no more value than the "vulgar"
conviction that we independently adapt ourselves to our environment.
Mr. Schiller's positive arguments in favour of reconciling Darwinism
with design--one of them is really negative;--are concerned with (1) the
question of variation, and (2) with the existence of progress. On the
first question it is pointed out that while Natural Selection operates
by way of favouring certain variations, the origin or cause of these
variations remains unknown. And although Mr. Schiller does not say so in
as many words, there is the implication, if I rightly discern his drift,
that there is room here for a directing intelligence, inasmuch as
science is at present quite unable to fully explain the causes of
variations. We are told that Darwin assumed for the purpose of his
theory that variations were indefinite both as to character and extent,
and it is upon these variations that Natural Selection depends. This
indefinite variation Mr. Schiller asserts to be a methodological device,
that is, it is something assumed as the groundwork of a theory, but
without any subsequent verification, and it is in virtue of this
assumption that intelligence is ruled out of evolution. And inasmuch as
Mr. Schiller sees no reason for believing that variations are of this
indefinite character, he asserts that there is in evolution room for a
teleological factor, in other words, "a purposive direction of
variations."
Now it hardly needs pointing out to students of Darwinism that
indefinite variation is the equivalent of "a variation to which no exact
limits can be placed," and in this sense the assumption is a perfectly
sound one. From one point of view the variations must be definite, that
is, they can only occur within certain limits. An elephant will not vary
in the direction of wings, nor will a bird in the direction of a rose
bush. But so long as we cannot fix the exact limits of variation we are
quite warranted in speaking of them as indefinite. That this is a
methodological device no one denies, but so are most of the other
distinctions that we frame. Scientific generalizations consist of
abstractions, and Mr. Schiller himself of necessity employs the same
device.
Mr. Schiller argues, quite properly, that while Natural Selection states
the conditions under which animal life evolves, it does not state any
reason why it should evolve. Selection may keep a species stationary or
it may even cause it to degenerate. Both are fairly common phenomena in
the animal and plant world. Moreover, if there are an indefinite number
of variations, and if they tend in an indefinite number of directions,
then the variation in any one direction can never be more than an
infinitesimal portion of the whole, and that this one should persist
supplies a still further reason for belief in "a purposive direction of
variations." Mr. Schiller overlooks an important point here, but a very
simple one. It is true that any one variation is small in relation to
the whole of the possible or actual number of variations. But it is not
in relation to quantity but quality that survival takes place, and in
proportion to the keenness of the struggle the variation that gives its
possessor an advantage need only be of the smaller kind. In a struggle
of endurance between two athletes it is the one capable of holding out
for an extra minute who carries off the prize.
Further, as Mr. Schiller afterwards admits, the very smallness of the
number of successful variations makes against intelligence rather than
for it, and he practically surrenders his position in the statement,
"the teleological and anti-teleological interpretation of events will
ever decide their conflict by appealing to the facts; for in the facts
each finds what it wills and comes prepared to see." After this lame
conclusion it is difficult to see what value there is in Mr. Schiller's
own examination of the "facts." Not that it is strictly correct to say
that the facts bear each view out equally. They do not, and Mr. Schiller
only justifies his statement by converting the Darwinian position, which
is teleologically negative, into an affirmative. The Darwinian, he says,
denies intelligence as a cause of evolution. What the Darwinian does is
to deny the validity of the evidence which the teleologist brings to
prove his case. The Theist asserts mind as a cause of evolution. The
Darwinian simply points out that the facts may be explained in quite
another way and without the appeal to a quite unknown factor.
And here one might reasonably ask, why, if there is a directive mind at
work, are there variations at all? Why should the "directive
intelligence" not get earlier to work, and instead of waiting until a
large number of specimens have been produced and then looking them over
with a view to "directing" the preservation of the better specimens, why
should it not set to work at the beginning and see that only the
desirable ones make their appearance? Certainly that is what a mere
human intelligence would do if it could. But it is characteristic of the
"Divine Intelligence" of the Theist that it never seems to operate with
a tenth part of the intelligence of an ordinary human being.
Moreover, Mr. Schiller writes quite ignoring the fact that the
"directive intelligence" does not direct the preservation of the better
specimens. What it does, if it does anything at all, is to kill off the
less favoured ones. Natural Selection--the point is generally overlooked
by the Theistic sentimentality of most of our writers--does not preserve
anything. Its positive action is not to keep alive but to kill. It does
not take the better ones in hand and help them. It seizes on all it can
and kills them. It is the difference between a local council that tried
to raise the standard of health by a general improvement of the
conditions of life, and one that aimed at the same end by killing off
all children that failed to come up to a certain standard. The actual
preservation of a better type is, so far as Natural Selection is
concerned, quite accidental. So far as Natural Selection operates it
does so by elimination, not by preservation.
Mr. Schiller's other plea in favour of Design is concerned with the
conception of progress. He points out that while degeneration and
stagnation both occur in nature, yet--
life has been on the whole progressive; but progress and
retrogression have both been effected under the same law of Natural
Selection. How, then, can the credit of that result be ascribed to
Natural Selection? Natural Selection is equally ready to bring
about degeneration or to leave things unchanged. How, then, can it
be that which determines which of the three possible (and actual)
cases shall be realized?... It cannot be Natural Selection that
causes one species to remain stationary, another to degenerate, a
third to develop into a higher form.... Some variable factor must
be added to Natural Selection.
But why? Evolution, as we have pointed out in a previous chapter, makes
for adaptation in terms of animal preservation. If the adaptation of an
animal to its environment is secured by "degenerating" or "developing"
or by remaining stationary, it will do one of the three. That is the
normal consequence of Natural Selection, and it is surprising that Mr.
Schiller does not see this. He is actually accusing Natural Selection of
not being able to do what it does on his own showing. The proof he
himself gives of this operation of Natural Selection in the examples he
cites of its ineffectiveness. If Natural Selection could not make for
degeneration or development, in what way would it be able to establish
an equilibrium between an animal and its surroundings? Really, there is
nothing that so strengthens one's conviction of the truth of the
Freethought position so much as a study of the arguments that are
brought against it.
Mr. Schiller is really misled, and so misleads his readers by an
unjustifiable use of the word "progress." He says that evolution has
been, on the whole, progressive, and appeals to "progress" as though it
were some objective fact. But that is not the case. There is no
"progress" in the animal world, there is only change. We have dealt with
this in a previous chapter, and there is no need to again labour the
point. "Progress" is a conception which we ourselves frame, and we
measure a movement towards or away from this arbitrary standard of ours
in terms of better or worse, higher or lower. But nature knows nothing
of a higher or a lower, it knows only of changing forms more or less
fitted to live in the existing environment. Scientifically, life has
not progressed, it has persisted, and a _sine qua non_ of its
persistence has been adaptation to environment.
Progress, then, is not a "natural" fact, but a methodological one. It is
a useful word and a valuable ideal. I am not protesting against its use,
only against its misuse. It is one of the many abstractions created by
thinkers, and then worshipped as a reality by those who forget the
origin and purpose of its existence. And in this we can see one of the
fatal legacies we have inherited from Theistic methods of thinking. The
belief that things are designed to be as they are comes to us from those
primitive methods of thinking which personify and vitalize all natural
phenomena. We have outgrown the crude frame of mind which saw direct
volitional action in a storm or in the movements of natural forces. The
development of civilized and scientific thinking has removed these
conceptions from the minds of educated men and women, but it has left
behind it as a residuum the habit of looking for purpose where none
exists, and of reading into nature as objective facts our own
generalizations and abstractions. And so long as we have not outgrown
that habit we are retaining a fatal bar to exact scientific thinking.
Finally, and this consideration is fatal to any theory of design such as
Mr. Schiller champions, adaptation is not a special quality of one form
of existence, but a universal quality of all. There is not a greater
degree of adaptation here and a less degree there, but the same degree
in every case. There is no other meaning to adaptation except that of
adjustment to surroundings. But whether an animal lives or dies, whether
it is higher or lower, deformed or perfect, the adjustment is the same.
That is, every form of existence represents the product of forces that
have made it what it is, and the same forces could not have produced
anything different. Every body in existence, organic or inorganic,
constitutes in ultimate analysis a balance of the forces represented by
it. It is not possible, therefore, for the Theist to say that design is
evidenced by adaptation in one case and its absence in another. There is
adaptation in every case, even though it may not be the adaptation we
should like to see. It is not possible for the Theist to say that the
_degree_ of adaptation is greater in the one case than in the other, for
_that_ is the same in every case. What needs to be done if design is to
be established is to prove that the forces we see at work could not have
produced the results that emerge without the introduction of a factor
not already given in our experience. Anything else is mere waste of
time.