CHAPTER X.

THIS WORLD AND THE NEXT.

In the preceding chapter I have only discussed the fact of death in

relation to a certain attitude of mind. The question of the survival of

the human personality after death is a distinct question and calls for

separate treatment. Nor is the present work one in which that topic can

be treated at adequate length. The most that can now be attempted is a

bird's eye view of a large field of controversy, although it may be

possible in the course of that survey to say something on the more

important aspects of the subject.

And first we may notice the curious assumption that the man who argues

for immortality is taking a lofty view of human nature, while he who

argues against it is taking a low one. In sober truth it is the other

way about. Consider the position. It is tacitly admitted that if human

motive, considered with reference to this world alone, is adequate as an

incentive to action, and the consequences of actions, again considered

with reference to this world, are an adequate reward for endeavour, then

it is agreed that the main argument for the belief in immortality breaks

down. To support or to establish the argument it is necessary to show

that life divorced from the conception of a future life can never reach

the highest possible level. Natural human society is powerless in itself

to realize its highest possibilities. It remains barren of what it might

be, a thing that may frame ideals, but can never realize them.

Now that is quite an intelligible, and, therefore, an arguable

proposition. But whether true or not, there should be no question that

it involves a lower view of human nature than the one taken by the

Freethinker. He does at least pay human nature the compliment of

believing it capable, not alone of framing high ideals, but also of

realizing them. He says that by itself it is capable of realizing all

that may be legitimately demanded from it. He does not believe that

supernatural hopes or fears are necessary to induce man to live cleanly,

or die serenely, or to carry out properly his duties to his fellows. The

religionist denies this, and asserts that some form of supernaturalism

is essential to the moral health of men and women. If the Freethinker is

wrong, it is plain that his fault consists in taking a too optimistic

view of human nature. His mistake consists in taking not a low view of

human nature, but a lofty one. Substantially, the difference between the

two positions is the difference between the man who is honest from a

conviction of the value of honesty, and the one who refrains from

stealing because he feels certain of detection, or because he is afraid

of losing something that he might otherwise gain. Thus, we are told by

one writer that:--

If human life is but a by-product of the unconscious play of

physical force, like a candle flame soon to be blown out or burnt

out, what a paltry thing it is!

But the questions of where human life came from, or where it will end,

are quite apart from the question of the value and capabilities of human

life now. That there are immense possibilities in this life none but a

fool will deny. The world is full of strange and curious things, and its

pleasures undoubtedly outweigh its pains in the experience of normal man

or woman. But the relations between ourselves and others remain

completely unaffected by the termination of existence at the grave, or

its continuation beyond. It is quite a defensible proposition that life

is not worth living. So is the reverse of the proposition. But it is

nonsense to say that life is a "paltry thing" merely because it ends at

the grave. It is unrestricted egotism manifesting itself in the form of

religious conviction. One might as well argue that a sunset ceases to be

beautiful because it does not continue all night.

If I cannot live for ever, then is the universe a failure! That is

really all that the religious argument amounts to. And so to state it,

to reduce it to plain terms, and divest it of its disguising verbiage,

almost removes the need for further refutation. But it is seldom stated

in so plain and so unequivocal a manner. It is accompanied with much

talk of growth, of an evolutionary purpose, of ruined lives made good,

thus:

Seeing that man is the goal towards which everything has tended

from the beginning, seeing that the same eternal and infinite

Energy has laboured through the ages at the production of man, and

man is the heir of the ages, nothing conceivable seems too great or

glorious to believe concerning his destiny.... If there is no limit

to human growth in knowledge and wisdom, in love and constructive

power, in beauty and joy, we are invested with a magnificent worth

and dignity.

So fallacy and folly run on. What, for example, does anyone mean by man

as the goal towards which everything has tended since the beginning?

Whatever truth there is in the statement applies to all things without

exception. It is as true of the microbe as it is of man. If the

"infinite and eternal Energy" laboured to produce man, it laboured also

to produce the microbe which destroys him. The one is here as well as

the other; and one can conceive a religious microbe thanking an almighty

one for having created it, and declaring that unless it is to live for

ever in some microbic heaven, with a proper supply of human beings for

its nourishment, the whole scheme of creation is a failure. It is quite

a question of the point of view. As a matter of fact there are no "ends"

in nature. There are only results, and each result becomes a factor in

some further result. It is human folly and ignorance which makes an end

of a consequence.

After all, what reason is there for anyone assuming that the survival of

man beyond the grave is even probably true? We do not know man as a

"soul" first and a body afterwards. Neither do we know him as a detached

"mind" which afterwards takes possession of a body. Our knowledge of man

commences with him, as does our knowledge of any animal, as a body

possessing certain definite functions of which we call one group mental.

And the two things are so indissolubly linked that we cannot even think

of them as separate. If anyone doubts this let him try and picture to

himself what a man is like in the absence of a body. He will find the

thing simply inconceivable. In the absence of the material organism, to

which the mind unquestionably stands in the relation of function to

organ, what remains is a mere blank. To the informed mind, that is. To

the intelligence of the savage, who is led, owing to his erroneous

conception of things, to think of something inside the body which leaves

it during sleep, wanders about, and then returns on awakening, and who

because of this affiliates sleep to death, the case may be different.

But to a modern mind, one which is acquainted with something of what

science has to say on the subject, the conception of a mind existing

apart from organization is simply unthinkable. All our knowledge is

against it. The development of mind side by side with the development of

the brain and the nervous system is one of the commonplaces of

scientific knowledge. The treatment of states of mind as functions of

the brain and the nervous system is a common-place of medical practice.

And the fact that diet, temperature, health and disease, accidents and

old age, all have their effects on mental manifestations is matter of

everyday observation. The whole range of positive science may safely be

challenged to produce a single indisputable fact in favour of the

assumption that there exists anything about man independent of the

material organism.

All that can be urged in favour of such a belief is that there are still

many obscure facts which we are not altogether able to explain on a

purely mechanistic theory. But that is a confession of ignorance, not an

affirmation of knowledge. At any rate, there does not exist a single

fact against the functional theory of mind. All we _know_ is decidedly

in its favour, and a theory must be tested by what we know and by what

it explains, not by what we do not know or by what it cannot explain.

And there is here the additional truth that the only ground upon which

the theory can be opposed is upon certain metaphysical assumptions which

are made in order to bolster up an already existing belief. If the

belief in survival had not been already in existence these assumptions

would never have been made. They are not suggested by the facts, they

are invented to support an already established theory, which can no

longer appeal to the circumstances which gave it birth.

And about those circumstance there is no longer the slightest reason for

justifiable doubt. We can trace the belief in survival after death

until we see it commencing in the savage belief in a double that takes

its origin in the phenomena of dreaming and unusual mental states. It is

from that starting point that the belief in survival takes its place as

an invariable element in the religions of the world. And as we trace the

evolution of knowledge we see every fact upon which was built the belief

in a double that survived death gradually losing its hold on the human

intelligence, owing to the fact that the experiences that gave it birth

are interpreted in a manner which allows no room for the religious

theory. The fatal fact about the belief in survival is its history. That

history shows us how it began, as surely as the course of its evolution

indicates the way in which it will end.

So, as with the idea of God, what we have left in modern times are not

the reasons why such a belief is held, but only excuses why those who

hold it should not be disturbed. That and a number of arguments which

only present an air of plausibility because they succeed in jumbling

together things that have no connection with each other. As an example

of this we may take the favourite modern plea that a future life is

required to permit the growth and development of the individual. We find

this expressed in the quotation above given in the sentence "if there is

no limit to human growth, etc.," the inference being that unless there

is a future life there is a very sharp limit set to human growth, and

one that makes this life a mockery. This plea is presented in so many

forms that it is worth while analysing it a little, if only to bring out

more clearly the distinction between the religious and the Freethought

view of life.

What now is meant by there being no limit to human growth? If by it is

meant individual growth, the reply is that there is actually a very

sharp limit set to growth, much sharper than the average person seems

to be aware of. It is quite clear that the individual is not capable of

unlimited growth in this world. There are degrees of capacity in

different individuals which will determine what amount of development

each is capable of. Capacity is not an acquired thing, it is an

endowment, and the child born with the brain capacity of a fool will

remain a fool to the end, however much his folly may be disguised or

lost amid the folly of others. And with each one, whether he be fool or

genius, acquisitions are made more easily and more rapidly in youth, the

power of mental adaptation is much greater in early than in later life,

while in old age the capacities of adaptation and acquisition become

negligible quantities. And provided one lives long enough, the last

stage sees, not a promise of further progress if life were continued,

but a process of degradation. The old saying that one can't put a quart

into a pint pot is strictly applicable here. Growth assumes acquisition;

acquisition is determined by capacity, and this while an indefinite

quantity (indefinite here is strictly referable to our ignorance, not to

the actual fact) is certainly not an unlimited one. Life, then, so far

as the individual is concerned, does not point to unlimited growth. It

indicates, so far as it indicates anything at all, that there is a limit

to growth as to all other things.

Well, but suppose we say that man is capable of indefinite growth, what

do we mean? Let us also bear in mind at this point that we are strictly

concerned with the individual. For if man survives death he must do it

as an individual. To merely survive as a part of the chemical and other

elements of the world, or, to follow some mystical theologians, as an

indistinguishable part of a "world-soul," is not what people mean when

they talk of living beyond the grave. Here, again, it will be found

that we have confused two quite distinct things, even though the one

thing borrows its meaning from the other.

When we compare the individual, as such, with the individual of three or

four thousand years ago, can we say with truth that the man of to-day is

actually superior to the man of the earlier date? To test the question

let us put it in this way. Does the man of to-day do anything or think

anything that is beyond the capacity of an ancient Egyptian or an

ancient Greek, if it were possible to suddenly revive one and to enable

him to pass through the same education that each one of us passes

through? I do not think that anyone will answer that question in the

affirmative. Reverse the process. Suppose that a modern man, with

exactly the same capacity that he now has had lived in the days of the

ancient Egyptians or the ancient Greeks, can we say that his capacity is

so much greater than theirs, that he would have done better than they

did? I do not think that anyone will answer that question in the

affirmative either. Is the soldier of to-day a better soldier, or the

sailor a better sailor than those who lived three thousand years ago?

Once more the answer will not be in the affirmative. And yet there are

certain things that are obvious. It is plain that we all know more than

did the people of long ago, we can do more, we understand the past

better, and we can see farther into the future. A schoolboy to-day

carries in his head what would have been a philosopher's outfit once

upon a time. Our soldiers and sailors utilize, single-handed, forces

greater than a whole army or navy wielded in the far-off days of the

Ptolemies. We call ourselves greater, we think ourselves greater, and in

a sense we are greater than the people of old. What, then, is the

explanation of the apparent paradox?

The explanation lies in the simple fact that progress is not a

phenomenon of individual life at all. It is a phenomenon of social

existence. If each generation had to commence at the exact point at

which its predecessors started it would get no farther than they got. It

would be an eternal round, with each generation starting from and

reaching the same point, and progress would be an inconceivable thing.

But that we know is not the case. Instead of each generation starting

from precisely the same point, one inherits at least something of the

labours and discoveries of its predecessors. A thing discovered by the

individual is discovered for the race. A thought struck out by the

individual is a thought for the race. By language, by tradition, and by

institutions the advances of each generation are conserved, handed on,

and made part of our racial possessions. The strength, the knowledge, of

the modern is thus due not to any innate superiority over the ancient,

but because one is modern and the other ancient. If we could have

surrounded the ancient Assyrians with all the inventions, and given them

all the knowledge that we possess, they would have used that knowledge

and those inventions as wisely, or as unwisely as we use them. Progress

is thus not a fact of individual but of racial life. The individual

inherits more than he creates, and it is in virtue of this racial

inheritance that he is what he is.

It is a mere trick of the imagination that converts this fact of social

growth into an essential characteristic of individual life. We speak of

"man" without clearly distinguishing between man as a biological unit

and man as a member of a social group developing in correspondence with

a true social medium. But if that is so, it follows that this capacity

for growth is, so to speak, a function of the social medium. It is

conditioned by it, it has relevance only in relation to it. Our

feelings, our sentiments, even our desires, have reference to this life,

and in a far deeper sense than is usually imagined. And removed from its

relation to this life human nature would be without meaning or value.

There is nothing in any of the functions of man, in any of his

capacities, or in any of his properly understood desires that has the

slightest reference to any life but this. It is unthinkable that there

should be. An organ or an organism develops in relation to a special

medium, not in relation to one that--even though it exists--is not also

in relation with it. This is quite an obvious truth in regard to

structures, but it is not always so clearly recognized, or so carefully

borne in mind, that it is equally true of every feeling and desire. For

these are developed in relation to their special medium, in this case,

the existence of fellow beings with their actions and reactions on each

other. And man is not only a member of a social group, that much is an

obvious fact; but he is a product of the group in the sense that all his

characteristic human qualities have resulted from the interactions of

group life. Take man out of relation to that fact, and he is an enigma,

presenting fit opportunities for the wild theorizing of religious

philosophers. Take him in connection with it, and his whole nature

becomes susceptible of understanding in relation to the only existence

he knows and desires.

The twin facts of growth and progress, upon which so much of the

argument for a future life turns nowadays, have not the slightest

possible reference to a life beyond the grave. They are fundamentally

not even personal, but social. It is the race that grows, not the

individual, he becomes more powerful precisely because the products of

racial acquisition are inherited by him. Remove, if only in thought, the

individual from all association with his fellows, strip him of all that

he inherits from association with them, and he loses all the qualities

we indicate when we speak of him as a civilized being. Remove him, in

fact, from that association, as when a man is marooned on a desert

island, and the more civilized qualities of his character begin to

weaken and in time disappear. Man, as an individual, becomes more

powerful with the passing of each generation, precisely because he is

thus dependent upon the life of the race. The secret of his weakness is

at the same time the source of his strength. We are what we are because

of the generations of men and women who lived and toiled and died before

we were born. We inherit the fruits of their labours, as those who come

after us will inherit the fruits of our struggles and conquests. It is

thus in the life of the race that man achieves immortality. None other

is possible, or conceivable. And to those whose minds are not distorted

by religious teaching, and who have taken the trouble to analyse and

understand their own mental states, it may be said that none other is

even desirable.

A Grammar of Freethought · 第 10 / 18 章