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THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
BY
A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.
CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY
AUTHOR OF 'THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783,'
'THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE,
1783-1812,' 'THE RELATIONS OF SEA POWER TO THE WAR OF 1812,' 'NAVAL
STRATEGY' ETC.
_WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND BATTLE PLANS_
LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, LIMITED
OVERY HOUSE, 100 SOUTHWARK STREET, S.E.
[Illustration: (frontispiece)]
_Copyright, 1913_, By A.T. MAHAN
_All rights reserved_
Published, October, 1913
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., U.S.A.
PREFACE
The contents of this volume were first contributed as a chapter, under
the title of "Major Operations, 1762-1783," to the "History of the
Royal Navy," in seven volumes, published by Messrs. Sampson Low,
Marston, and Company, under the general editorship of the late Sir
William Laird Clowes. For permission to republish now in this separate
form, the author has to express his thanks to the publishers of that
work.
In the Introduction following this Preface, the author has summarized
the general lesson to be derived from the course of this War of
American Independence, as distinct from the particular discussion
and narration of the several events which constitute the body of the
treatment. These lessons he conceives to carry admonition for the
present and future based upon the surest foundations; namely, upon
the experience of the past as applicable to present conditions. The
essential similarity between the two is evident in a common dependence
upon naval strength.
There has been a careful rereading and revision of the whole text; but
the changes found necessary to be made are much fewer than might have
been anticipated after the lapse of fifteen years. Numerous footnotes
in the History, specifying the names of ships in fleets, and of their
commanders in various battles, have been omitted, as not necessary to
the present purpose, though eminently proper and indeed indispensable
to an extensive work of general reference and of encyclopædic scope,
such as the History is. Certain notes retained with the initials
W.L.C. are due to the editor of that work.
A.T. MAHAN.
DECEMBER, 1912.
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xix
LIST OF MAPS xxi
LIST OF BATTLE-PLANS xxiii
INTRODUCTION
THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD
Macaulay quoted on the action of Frederick the Great 1
Illustration from Conditions of the Turkish Empire 2
Lesson from the Recent War in the Balkans, 1912-1913 2
The War of American Independence a striking example of the
Tendency of Wars to Spread 3
Origin and Train of Events in that War, Traced 3
Inference as to possible Train of Future Events in the History of
the United States 4
The Monroe Doctrine Simply a Formulated Precaution against the
Tendency of Wars to Spread 4
National Policy as to Asiatic Immigration 4
Necessity of an Adequate Navy if these two National Policies are
to be sustained 4
Dependence on Navy Illustrated in the Two Great National Crises;
in the War of Independence and in the War of Secession
4
The United States not great in Population in proportion to
Territory 5
Nor Wealthy in Proportion to exposed Coast-Line 5
Special Fitness of a Navy to meet these particular conditions 5
The Pacific a great World Problem, dependent mainly on Naval Power
5
CHAPTER I
THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN
1775-1776
Preponderant effect of Control of the Water upon the Struggle for
American Independence 6
Deducible then from Reason and from Experience 6
Consequent Necessity to the Americans of a Counterpoise to British
Navy 6
This obtained through Burgoyne's Surrender 6
The Surrender of Burgoyne traceable directly to the Naval
Campaigns on Lake Champlain, 1775, 1776 7
The subsequent Course of the War in all Quarters of the world due
to that decisive Campaign 7
The Strategic Problem of Lake Champlain familiar to Americans from
the Wars between France and Great Britain prior to 1775
8
Consequent prompt Initiative by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold
8
Energetic Pursuit of first Successes by Arnold 9
Complete Control of Lake Champlain thus secured 9
Invasion of Canada by Montgomery, 1775 9
Arnold marches through Maine Wilderness and joins Montgomery
before Quebec 10
Assault on Quebec. Failure, and Death of Montgomery 10
Arnold maintains Blockade of Quebec, 1776 10
Relief of the Place by British Navy 11
Arnold Retreats to Crown Point 12
Arnold's Schemes and Diligence to create a Lake Navy, 1776 13
Difficulties to be overcome 13
Superior Advantages of the British 13
The British by building acquire Superiority, but too late for
effect in 1776 13
Ultimate Consequences from this Retardation 14
Constitution of the Naval Force raised by Arnold 14
He moves with it to the foot of Lake Champlain 15
Takes position for Defence at Valcour Island 15
Particular Difficulties encountered by British 15
Constitution of the British Lake Navy 16
Land Forces of the Opponents 17
Naval Forces of the Two at the Battle of Valcour Island 17
Magnitude of the Stake at Issue 18
Arnold's Purposes and Plans 18
Advance of the British 19
Arnold's Disposition of his Flotilla to receive Attack 20
The Battle of Valcour Island 21
The Americans Worsted 22
Arnold Retreats by night Undetected 23
Pursuit by the British 24
Destruction of the American Vessels 25
British Appreciation of the Importance of the Action, as shown
26
Criticism of the conduct of the Opposing Leaders 26
Arnold's Merit and Gallantry 27
End of the Naval Story of the Lakes 27
Effect of the Campaign upon the Decisive Events of 1777 28
CHAPTER II
NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETT
BAY--ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS, TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON
1776
Necessity that Force, if resorted to, be from the first Adequate
29
Application to National Policy in peace 29
To the Monroe Doctrine 29
Failure of the British Government of 1775 in this respect 30
Consequences of such failure 30
General Howe evacuates Boston and retires to Halifax. Extent of
his Command 30
Dissemination of Effort by British Government 30
Expedition against South Carolina 31
Local Conditions about Charleston 32
Description of Fort Moultrie 33
Plan of British Naval Attack 33
The Battle of Fort Moultrie 34
Failure of the Attack. British Losses 36
Comment upon the Action 37
The Expedition retires to New York 38
The Howes, Admiral and General, arrive in New York Bay 39
Operations about the City 39
Continuous and Decisive, but Inconspicuous, Part played by the
British Navy 40
Description of Local Conditions about New York 40
American Preparations for Defence 41
Crucial Weakness of the Scheme 42
The Advance of the British 42
Washington withdraws his Army from the Brooklyn side 43
Success of this Withdrawal due to British Negligence 44
Subsequent Operations, and Retreat of Washington to New Jersey
45
Retreat continued to Pennsylvania, where he receives
reinforcements 46
Slackness of Sir William Howe's actions 47
The British take possession of Narragansett Bay. Importance of
that position 48
Washington suddenly takes the Offensive. Battle of Trenton 48
He recovers most of the State of New Jersey 49
CHAPTER III
THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE WAR. SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AND CAPTURE OF
PHILADELPHIA BY HOWE. THE NAVAL PART IN EACH OPERATION
1777
British Object in Campaign of 1777 the same as that in 1776 50
Part assigned to Burgoyne 50
Slowness of his Progress at the beginning 51
Sir William Howe, instead of coöperating, takes his Army to the
Chesapeake 52
Criticism of this Course 52
Howe's Progress to Philadelphia, and Capture of that City 53
Admiral Lord Howe takes the Fleet from the Chesapeake to the
Delaware 53
Surrender of Burgoyne and his Army 53
British Naval Operations in Delaware Bay 54
Brief Tenure--Nine Months--of Philadelphia by British 55
The general Failure of the British Campaign determined by Howe's
move to the Chesapeake 55
General Results of the Campaign 56
Part played by the British Navy. Analogous to that in Spain,
1808-1812, and in many other instances 57
CHAPTER IV
WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATE
PHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D'ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK,
NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICAN
DISAPPOINTMENT IN D'ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND
1778
France recognizes the Independence of the United States, and makes
with them a defensive Alliance 58
A French Fleet sails for America under Comte d'Estaing 59
Unprepared condition of the British Navy 59
Admiral Byron sails with a Reinforcement for America 59
Ill effect of Naval Unreadiness upon British Commerce; and
especially on the West Indies 60
Admiral Keppel puts to Sea with the British Channel Fleet 61
First Guns of the War with France 62
Extreme Length of Byron's Passage 62
He turns back to Halifax 62
D'Estaing's slowness allows Howe to escape from Delaware Bay.
Howe's Celerity 62
Evacuation of Philadelphia by British Army, and its precipitate
Retreat to New York 63
Escape of both Army and Fleet due to d'Estaing's Delays 63
Rapid Action of Lord Howe 64
D'Estaing Arrives off New York 64
Howe's elaborate Dispositions for the Defence of New York Bay
65
Statement of British and French Naval Force 66
D'Estaing decides not to attempt Passage of the Bar, and puts to
Sea 67
Anchors off Narragansett Bay 69
Forces the Entrance to Newport and Anchors inside the Bay 70
The British garrison besieged by superior American and French
forces 70
Howe appears with his Fleet and anchors off the entrance, at Point
Judith 71
Sustained Rapidity of his action at New York 71
D'Estaing Withdraws from Siege of Newport and puts to Sea 73
Manoeuvres of the two Opponents 74
D'Estaing quits the Field, and both Fleets are scattered by a
heavy Gale 75
Howe returns to New York and collects his Fleet 76
D'Estaing calls oft Newport; but abandons the Siege finally,
taking his Fleet to Boston 77
Critical Condition of British garrison in Newport. D'Estaing's
withdrawal compels Americans to raise the siege 77
Howe follows d'Estaing to Boston 77
Discussion of the Conduct of the opposing Admirals 78
Howe gives up his Command and returns to England 80
CHAPTER V
THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT
1778
Admirals Keppel and D'Orvilliers put to Sea from Portsmouth and
Brest 82
Instructions given to the French Admiral 83
Preliminary Manoeuvres after the two Fleets had sighted one
another 83
The Battle of Ushant 84
A Drawn Battle. The respective Losses 91
The Significance of the Battle in the fighting Development of the
British Navy 93
The "Order of Battle" 93
The Disputes and Courts Martial in Great Britain arising from the
Battle of Ushant 94
Keppel Resigns his Command 97
CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1778-1779. THE BRITISH INVASION OF
GEORGIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA
Influence of Seasonal Conditions upon Naval Operations in America
98
Commercial Importance of the West Indies 98
The French seize Dominica 99
D'Estaing Sails with his Fleet from Boston for Martinique 100
A British Squadron under Hotham sails the same day for Barbados,
with Five Thousand Troops 100
Admiral Barrington's Seizure of Santa Lucia 101
D'Estaing sails to Recapture it 102
Rapidity and Skill shown in Barrington's Movements and
Dispositions 102
D'Estaing's attacks Foiled, both on Sea and on Shore 103
He Abandons the attempt and Returns to Martinique 104
Importance of Santa Lucia in Subsequent Operations 104
Byron Reaches Barbados, and takes over Command from Barrington
105
D'Estaing Captures the British Island Grenada 105
Byron goes to its Relief 106
The Action between the two Fleets, of Byron and d'Estaing, July 6,
1779 106
Criticism of the two Commanders-in-Chief 110
D'Estaing returns to Grenada, which remains French 112
Byron returns to England. British North American Station assigned
to Admiral Arbuthnot, Leeward Islands to Rodney 113
British Operations in Georgia and South Carolina. Capture of
Savannah 113
Fatal Strategic Error in these Operations 114
D'Estaing's attempt to Retake Savannah Foiled 115
His appearance on the coast, however, causes the British to
abandon Narragansett Bay 115
D'Estaing succeeded by de Guichen in North America. Rodney also
arrives 115
CHAPTER VII
THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1779. ALLIED FLEETS INVADE THE
ENGLISH CHANNEL. RODNEY DESTROYS TWO SPANISH SQUADRONS AND RELIEVES
GIBRALTAR
Spain declares War against Great Britain 116
Delays in Junction of French and Spanish Fleets 116
They enter the Channel. Alarm in England 117
Plans of the French Government 118
Their Change and Failure. The Allied Fleets return to Brest 119
Criticism of the British Ministry 120
Divergent views of France and Spain 120
Prominence given to Gibraltar, and the resulting Effect upon the
general War 121
Exhaustion of Supplies at Gibraltar 121
Rodney with the Channel Fleet Sails for its Relief, with ultimate
Destination to Leeward Islands Command 121
He Captures a large Spanish Convoy 122
And Destroys a Second Spanish Squadron of Eleven Sail-of-the-Line
123
Distinction of this Engagement 124
Gibraltar and Minorca Relieved 125
Rodney proceeds to the West Indies 126
The Channel Fleet returns to England 126
CHAPTER VIII
RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN'S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHEN
RETURNS TO EUROPE AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THE
CAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNS
TO WEST INDIES
1780
Rodney's Force upon arrival in West Indies 128
Action between British and French Squadrons prior to his arrival
129
Rodney and de Guichen put to sea 130
Action between them of April 17, 1780 131
Cause of Failure of Rodney's Attack 133
His Disappointment in his Subordinates 135
His Expression of his Feelings 135
Discussion of the Incidents and Principles involved 137
The Losses of the Respective Fleets 140
They Continue to Cruise 141
The Action of May 15, 1780 142
That of May 19, 1780 144
The Results Indecisive 144
Contrary Personal Effect produced upon the two Admirals by the
encounters 145
De Guichen asks to be Relieved 145
Rodney's Chary Approval of his Subordinates in these two instances
145
Suspicion and Distrust rife in the British Navy at this period
146
Twelve Spanish Sail-of-the-Line, with Ten Thousand Troops, Arrive
at Guadeloupe 147
They refuse Coöperation with de Guichen in the Windward Islands
147
De Guichen Accompanies them to Haïti with his Fleet 147
He declines to Coöperate on the Continent with the Americans, and
sails for Europe 148
Rodney Arranges for the protection of the Homeward West India
Trade, and then proceeds to New York 149
Effect of his coming 150
The Year 1780 one of great Discouragement to Americans 151
Summary of the Operations in the Carolinas and Virginia, 1780,
which led to Lord Cornwallis's Surrender in 1781 151
Two Naval Actions sustained by Commodore Cornwallis against
superior French forces, 1780 153
The Year 1780 Uneventful in European seas 157
Capture of a great British Convoy 157
The Armed Neutrality of the Baltic Powers 158
The Accession of Holland to this followed by a Declaration of War
by Great Britain 158
The French Government withdraws all its Ships of War from before
Gibraltar 158
CHAPTER IX
NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES IN 1781. CAPTURE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BY
RODNEY. DE GRASSE ARRIVES IN PLACE OF DE GUICHEN. TOBAGO SURRENDERS TO
DE GRASSE
Effects of the Great Hurricanes of 1780 in West Indies 159
Rodney's Diminished Force. Arrival of Sir Samuel Hood with
reinforcements 160
Rodney receives Orders to seize Dutch Possessions in Caribbean
160
Capture of St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba 161
The large Booty and Defenceless state of St. Eustatius 161
Effect of these Conditions upon Rodney 161
Hood detached to cruise before Martinique 162
De Grasse arrives there with Twenty Ships-of-the-Line 163
Indecisive Action between de Grasse and Hood 164
Criticism of the two Commanders 166
Junction of Rodney and Hood 166
De Grasse attempts Santa Lucia, and Fails 167
He captures Tobago 168
He decides to take his Meet to the American Continent 168
CHAPTER X
NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN.
CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS
1781
Summary of Land Operations in Virginia early in 1781 169
Portsmouth Occupied 170
A French Squadron from Newport, and a British from Gardiner's Bay,
proceed to the Scene 170
They meet off the Chesapeake 171
Action between Arbuthnot and des Touches, March 16, 1781 171
The Advantage rests with the French, but they return to Newport.
Arbuthnot enters the Chesapeake 174
Cornwallis reaches Petersburg, Virginia, May 20 175
Under the directions of Sir Henry Clinton he evacuates Portsmouth
and concentrates his forces at Yorktown, August 22
175
The French Fleet under de Grasse Anchors in the Chesapeake, August
30 176
British Naval Movements, in July and August, affecting conditions
in the Chesapeake 176
Admiral Graves, successor to Arbuthnot at New York, joined there
by Sir Samuel Hood, August 28 177
Washington and Rochambeau move upon Cornwallis 178
The British Fleet under Graves arrives off the Chesapeake 179
Action between de Grasse and Graves, September 5 179
Hood's Criticism of Graves's Conduct 181
The British, worsted, return to New York. De Grasse, reinforced,
re-enters the Chesapeake, September 11 184
Cornwallis Surrenders, October 19 184
De Grasse and Hood Return to West Indies 185
CHAPTER XI
NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THE
BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK
Leading Objects of the Belligerents in 1781 186
The Relief of Gibraltar by Admiral Darby 186
Capture of British Convoy with the spoils of St. Eustatius 188
The French and Spanish Fleet under Admiral de Cordova again enters
the English Channel 188
Darby in inferior Force shut up in Tor Bay 188
The Allies Decide not to attack him, but to turn their Efforts
against British Commerce 189
Minorca Lost by British 189
The Battle of the Dogger Bank, between British and Dutch Fleets
190
CHAPTER XII
THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRASSE.
RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782
Capture and Destruction near Ushant of a great French Convoy for
the West Indies opens the Naval Campaign of 1782 195
Attack upon the Island of St. Kitts by de Grasse and de Bouillé
197
Hood sails for its Relief from Barbados 197
His Plan of procedure 198
Balked by an Accident 199
He Succeeds in dislodging de Grasse and taking the Anchorage left
by the French 200
Unsuccessful Attempt by de Grasse to shake Hood's position 203
St. Kitts nevertheless compelled to Surrender owing to having
insufficient Land Force 205
Hood Extricates himself from de Grasse's Superior Force and
Retires 205
Rodney arrives from England and joins Hood 205
Project of French and Spaniards against Jamaica 206
De Grasse sails from Martinique with his whole Fleet and a large
Convoy 207
Rodney's Pursuit 208
Partial Actions of April 9, 1782 209
British Pursuit continues 211
It is favored by the Lagging of two Ships in the French Fleet,
April 11 211
An Accident that night induces de Grasse to bear down, and enables
Rodney to force Action 212
The Battle of April 12 begins 214
A Shift of Wind enables the British to Break the French Order in
three places 217
Consequences of this Movement 218
Resultant Advantages to the British 219
Practices of the opposing Navies in regard to the Aims of Firing
219
Consequences Illustrated in the Injuries received respectively
220
Inadequate Use made by Rodney of the Advantage gained by his Fleet
220
Hood's Criticisms 220
Hood's Opinion shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's
Chief-of-Staff 222
Rodney's own Reasons for his Course after the Battle 222
His Assumptions not accordant with the Facts 223
Actual Prolonged Dispersion of the French Fleet 224
Hood, Detached in Pursuit, Captures a small French Squadron 224
Rodney Superseded in Command before the news of the victory
reached England 225
The general War Approaches its End 226
CHAPTER XIII
HOWE AGAIN GOES AFLOAT. THE FINAL RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR
1782
Howe appointed to Command Channel Fleet 227
Cruises first in North Sea and in Channel 228
The Allied Fleets in much superior force take Position in the
Chops of the Channel, but are successfully evaded by Howe
229
The British Jamaica Convoy also escapes them 229
Howe ordered to Relieve Gibraltar 229
Loss of the _Royal George_, with Kempenfelt 229
Howe Sails 229
Slow but Successful Progress 230
Great Allied Fleet in Bay of Gibraltar 230
Howe's Success in Introducing the Supplies 231
Negligent Mismanagement of the Allies 231
Partial Engagement when Howe leaves Gibraltar 232
Estimate of Howe's Conduct, and of his Professional Character
232
French Eulogies 232
CHAPTER XIV
THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THE
BAILLI DE SUFFREN
Isolation characteristic of Military and Naval Operations in India
234
Occurrences in 1778 234
Sir Edward Hughes sent to India with a Fleet, 1779 235
The Years prior to 1781 Uneventful 235
A British Squadron under Commodore Johnstone sent in 1781 to seize
Cape of Good Hope 236
A Week Later, a French Squadron under Suffren sails for India
236
Suffren finds Johnstone Anchored in Porto Praya, and attacks at
once 237
The immediate Result Indecisive, but the Cape of Good Hope is
saved by Suffren arriving first 238
Suffren reaches Mauritius, and the French Squadron sails for India
under Comte d'Orves 239
D'Orves dies, leaving Suffren in Command 240
Trincomalee, in Ceylon, captured by Hughes 240
First Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782
240
Second Engagement, April 12 242
Third Engagement, July 6 244
Suffren captures Trincomalee 247
Hughes arrives, but too late to save the place 247
Fourth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, September 3 248
Having lost Trincomalee, Hughes on the change of monsoon is
compelled to go to Bombay 251
Reinforced there by Bickerton 251
Suffren winters in Sumatra, but regains Trincomalee before Hughes
returns. Also receives Reinforcements 251
The British Besiege Cuddalore 252
Suffren Relieves the Place 253
Fifth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, June 20, 1783 253
Comparison between Hughes and Suffren 254
News of the Peace being received, June 29, Hostilities in India
cease 255
GLOSSARY OF NAUTICAL AND NAVAL TERMS USED IN THIS BOOK 257
INDEX 267
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Remains of the _Revenge_, one of Benedict Arnold's Schooners on
Lake Champlain in 1776. Now in Fort Ticonderoga. _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
Major-General Philip Schuyler 12
Edward Pellew, afterwards Admiral, Lord Exmouth 12
Benedict Arnold 27
Attack on Fort Moultrie in 1776 33
Richard, Earl Howe 78
Charles Henri, Comte d'Estaing 78
Admiral, the Honourable Samuel Barrington 104
Comte de Guichen 144
George Brydges, Lord Rodney 144
François-Joseph-Paul, Comte de Grasse, Marquis de Tilly 204
Admiral, Lord Hood 204
Sir Edward Hughes, K.B. 254
Pierre André de Suffren de Saint Tropez 254
LIST OF MAPS
FACING PAGE
Lake Champlain and Connected Waters 8
New York and New Jersey: to illustrate Operations of 1776,
1777, and 1778 40
Narragansett Bay 70
Leeward Islands (West Indies) Station 99
Island of Santa Lucia 101
Island of Martinique 164
Peninsula of India, and Ceylon 234
North Atlantic Ocean. General Map to illustrate Operations in
the War of American Independence 280
LIST OF BATTLE-PLANS
FACING PAGE
D'Orvilliers and Keppel, off Ushant, July 27, 1778
Figure 1 86
Figures 2 and 3 90
D'Estaing and Byron, July 6, 1779 106
Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780, Figures 1 and 2 132
Rodney and De Guichen, May 15, 1780 143
Cornwallis and De Ternay, June 20, 1780 156
Arbuthnot and Des Touches, March 16, 1781 172
Graves and De Grasse, September 5, 1781 180
Hood and De Grasse, January 25, 1782, Figures 1 and 2 201
Hood and De Grasse, January 26, 1782, Figure 3 203
Rodney and De Grasse, April 9 and 12, 1782
Figures 1 and 2 210
Figure 3 212
Figures 4 and 5 215
Figure 6 218
Johnstone and Suffren, Porto Praya, April 16, 1781 237
Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782 240
Hughes and Suffren, April 12, 1782 243
Hughes and Suffren, July 6, 1782 243
Hughes and Suffren, September 3, 1782 249
* * * * *
THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD
Macaulay, in a striking passage of his Essay on Frederick the Great,
wrote, "The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in lands
where the name of Prussia was unknown. In order that he might rob
a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the
coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes
of North America."
Wars, like conflagrations, tend to spread; more than ever perhaps
in these days of close international entanglements and rapid
communications. Hence the anxiety aroused and the care exercised by
the governments of Europe, the most closely associated and the
most sensitive on the earth, to forestall the kindling of even the
slightest flame in regions where all alike are interested, though with
diverse objects; regions such as the Balkan group of States in their
exasperating relations with the Turkish empire, under which the Balkan
peoples see constantly the bitter oppression of men of their own blood
and religious faith by the tyranny of a government which can neither
assimilate nor protect. The condition of Turkish European provinces
is a perpetual lesson to those disposed to ignore or to depreciate
the immense difficulties of administering politically, under one
government, peoples traditionally and racially distinct, yet living
side by side; not that the situation is much better anywhere in the
Turkish empire. This still survives, though in an advanced state of
decay, simply because other States are not prepared to encounter the
risks of a disturbance which might end in a general bonfire, extending
its ravages to districts very far remote from the scene of the
original trouble.
Since these words were written, actual war has broken out in the
Balkans. The Powers, anxious each as to the effect upon its own
ambitions of any disturbance in European Turkey, have steadily
abstained from efficient interference in behalf of the downtrodden
Christians of Macedonia, surrounded by sympathetic kinsfolk.
Consequently, in thirty years past this underbrush has grown drier
and drier, fit kindling for fuel. In the Treaty of Berlin, in 1877,
stipulation was made for their betterment in governance, and we
are now told that in 1880 Turkey framed a scheme for such,--and
pigeonholed it. At last, under unendurable conditions, spontaneous
combustion has followed. There can be no assured peace until it is
recognised practically that Christianity, by the respect which it
alone among religions inculcates for the welfare of the individual,
is an essential factor in developing in nations the faculty of
self-government, apart from which fitness to govern others does not
exist. To keep Christian peoples under the rule of a non-Christian
race, is, therefore, to perpetuate a state hopeless of reconcilement
and pregnant of sure explosion. Explosions always happen
inconveniently. _Obsta principiis_ is the only safe rule; the
application of which is not suppression of overt discontent but relief
of grievances.
The War of American Independence was no exception to the general rule
of propagation that has been noted. When our forefathers began to
agitate against the Stamp Act and the other measures that succeeded
it, they as little foresaw the spread of their action to the East and
West Indies, to the English Channel and Gibraltar, as did the British
ministry which in framing the Stamp Act struck the match from which
these consequences followed. When Benedict Arnold on Lake Champlain by
vigorous use of small means obtained a year's delay for the colonists,
he compassed the surrender of Burgoyne in 1777. The surrender of
Burgoyne, justly estimated as the decisive event of the war, was due
to Arnold's previous action, gaining the delay which is a first object
for all defence, and which to the unprepared colonists was a vital
necessity. The surrender of Burgoyne determined the intervention of
France, in 1778; the intervention of France the accession of Spain
thereto, in 1779. The war with these two Powers led to the maritime
occurrences, the interferences with neutral trade, that gave rise to
the Armed Neutrality; the concurrence of Holland in which brought war
between that country and Great Britain, in 1780. This extension of
hostilities affected not only the West Indies but the East, through
the possessions of the Dutch in both quarters and at the Cape of
Good Hope. If not the occasion of Suffren being sent to India, the
involvement of Holland in the general war had a powerful effect upon
the brilliant operations which he conducted there; as well as at, and
for, the Cape of Good Hope, then a Dutch possession, on his outward
voyage.
In the separate publication of these pages, my intention and hope are
to bring home incidentally to American readers this vast extent of
the struggle to which our own Declaration of Independence was but the
prelude; with perchance the further needed lesson for the future,
that questions the most remote from our own shores may involve us
in unforeseen difficulties, especially if we permit a train of
communication to be laid by which the outside fire can leap step by
step to the American continents. How great a matter a little fire
kindleth! Our Monroe Doctrine is in final analysis merely the
formulation of national precaution that, as far as in its power
to prevent, there shall not lie scattered about the material which
foreign possessions in these continents might supply for the extension
of combustion originating elsewhere; and the objection to Asiatic
immigration, however debased by less worthy feelings or motives, is
on the part of thinking men simply a recognition of the same danger
arising from the presence of an inassimilable mass of population,
racially and traditionally distinct in characteristics, behind which
would lie the sympathies and energy of a powerful military and naval
Asiatic empire.
Conducive as each of these policies is to national safety and peace
amid international conflagration, neither the one nor the other can be
sustained without the creation and maintenance of a preponderant navy.
In the struggle with which this book deals, Washington at the
time said that the navies had the casting vote. To Arnold on Lake
Champlain, to DeGrasse at Yorktown, fell the privilege of exercising
that prerogative at the two great decisive moments of the War. To the
Navy also, beyond any other single instrumentality, was due eighty
years later the successful suppression of the movement of Secession.
The effect of the blockade of the Southern coasts upon the financial
and military efficiency of the Confederate Government has never
been closely calculated, and probably is incalculable. At these
two principal national epochs control of the water was the most
determinative factor. In the future, upon the Navy will depend the
successful maintenance of the two leading national policies mentioned;
the two most essential to the part this country is to play in the
progress of the world.
For, while numerically great in population, the United States is
not so in proportion to territory; nor, though wealthy, is she so in
proportion to her exposure. That Japan at four thousand miles distance
has a population of over three hundred to the square mile, while our
three great Pacific States average less than twenty, is a portentous
fact. The immense aggregate numbers resident elsewhere in the
United States cannot be transfered thither to meet an emergency, nor
contribute effectively to remedy this insufficiency; neither can a
land force on the defensive protect, if the way of the sea is open.
In such opposition of smaller numbers against larger, nowhere do
organisation and development count as much as in navies. Nowhere so
well as on the sea can a general numerical inferiority be compensated
by specific numerical superiority, resulting from the correspondence
between the force employed and the nature of the ground. It follows
strictly, by logic and by inference, that by no other means can safety
be insured as economically and as efficiently. Indeed, in matters of
national security, economy and efficiency are equivalent terms. The
question of the Pacific is probably the greatest world problem of
the twentieth century, in which no great country is so largely and
directly interested as is the United States. For the reason given it
is essentially a naval question, the third in which the United States
finds its well-being staked upon naval adequacy.
CHAPTER I
THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 1775-1776
At the time when hostilities began between Great Britain and her
American Colonies, the fact was realised generally, being evident to
reason and taught by experience, that control of the water, both ocean
and inland, would have a preponderant effect upon the contest. It was
clear to reason, for there was a long seaboard with numerous interior
navigable watercourses, and at the same time scanty and indifferent
communications by land. Critical portions of the territory involved
were yet an unimproved wilderness. Experience, the rude but efficient
schoolmaster of that large portion of mankind which gains knowledge
only by hard knocks, had confirmed through the preceding French wars
the inferences of the thoughtful. Therefore, conscious of the great
superiority of the British Navy, which, however, had not then attained
the unchallenged supremacy of a later day, the American leaders early
sought the alliance of the Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, the
hereditary enemies of Great Britain. There alone could be found the
counterpoise to a power which, if unchecked, must ultimately prevail.
Nearly three years elapsed before the Colonists accomplished this
object, by giving a demonstration of their strength in the enforced
surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. This event has merited
the epithet "decisive," because, and only because, it decided the
intervention of France. It may be affirmed, with little hesitation,
that this victory of the colonists was directly the result of naval
force,--that of the colonists themselves. It was the cause that naval
force from abroad, entering into the contest, transformed it from
a local to a universal war, and assured the independence of the
Colonies. That the Americans were strong enough to impose the
capitulation of Saratoga, was due to the invaluable year of delay
secured to them by their little navy on Lake Champlain, created by the
indomitable energy, and handled with the indomitable courage, of the
traitor, Benedict Arnold. That the war spread from America to Europe,
from the English Channel to the Baltic, from the Bay of Biscay to the
Mediterranean, from the West Indies to the Mississippi, and ultimately
involved the waters of the remote peninsula of Hindustan, is
traceable, through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla which in 1776
anticipated its enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain. The events
which thus culminated merit therefore a clearer understanding, and
a fuller treatment, than their intrinsic importance and petty scale
would justify otherwise.
In 1775, only fifteen years had elapsed since the expulsion of the
French from the North American continent. The concentration of their
power, during its continuance, in the valley of the St. Lawrence, had
given direction to the local conflict, and had impressed upon men's
minds the importance of Lake Champlain, of its tributary Lake
George, and of the Hudson River, as forming a consecutive, though not
continuous, water line of communications from the St. Lawrence to
New York. The strength of Canada against attack by land lay in its
remoteness, in the wilderness to be traversed before it was reached,
and in the strength of the line of the St. Lawrence, with the
fortified posts of Montreal and Quebec on its northern bank. The
wilderness, it is true, interposed its passive resistance to attacks
from Canada as well as to attacks upon it; but when it had been
traversed, there were to the southward no such strong natural
positions confronting the assailant. Attacks from the south fell upon
the front, or at best upon the flank, of the line of the St. Lawrence.
Attacks from Canada took New York and its dependencies in the rear.
[Illustration]
These elements of natural strength, in the military conditions of the
North, were impressed upon the minds of the Americans by the prolonged
resistance of Canada to the greatly superior numbers of the British
Colonists in the previous wars. Regarded, therefore, as a base for
attacks, of a kind with which they were painfully familiar, but to be
undergone now under disadvantages of numbers and power never before
experienced, it was desirable to gain possession of the St. Lawrence
and its posts before they were strengthened and garrisoned. At this
outset of hostilities, the American insurgents, knowing clearly their
own minds, possessed the advantage of the initiative over the British
government, which still hesitated to use against those whom it styled
rebels the preventive measures it would have taken at once against a
recognised enemy.
Under these circumstances, in May, 1775, a body of two hundred and
seventy Americans, led by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, seized
the posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which were inadequately
garrisoned. These are on the upper waters of Lake Champlain, where it
is less than a third of a mile wide; Ticonderoga being on a peninsula
formed by the lake and the inlet from Lake George, Crown Point on
a promontory twelve miles lower down.[1] They were positions of
recognised importance, and had been advanced posts of the British in
previous wars. A schooner being found there, Arnold, who had been a
seaman, embarked in her and hurried to the foot of the lake. The wind
failed him when still thirty miles from St. John's, another fortified
post on the lower narrows, where the lake gradually tapers down to
the Richelieu River, its outlet to the St. Lawrence. Unable to advance
otherwise, Arnold took to his boats with thirty men, pulled through
the night, and at six o'clock on the following morning surprised the
post, in which were only a sergeant and a dozen men. He reaped the
rewards of celerity. The prisoners informed him that a considerable
body of troops was expected from Canada, on its way to Ticonderoga;
and this force in fact reached St. John's on the next day. When it
arrived, Arnold was gone, having carried off a sloop which he found
there and destroyed everything else that could float. By such trifling
means two active officers had secured the temporary control of the
lake itself and of the approaches to it from the south. There being
no roads, the British, debarred from the water line, were unable to
advance. Sir Guy Carleton, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Canada,
strengthened the works at St. John's, and built a schooner; but his
force was inadequate to meet that of the Americans.
The seizure of the two posts, being an act of offensive war, was not
at once pleasing to the American Congress, which still clung to the
hope of reconciliation; but events were marching rapidly, and
ere summer was over the invasion of Canada was ordered. General
Montgomery, appointed to that enterprise, embarked at Crown Point with
two thousand men on September 4th, and soon afterwards appeared before
St. John's, which after prolonged operations capitulated on the 3d of
November. On the 13th Montgomery entered Montreal, and thence pressed
down the St. Lawrence to Pointe aux Trembles, twenty miles above
Quebec. There he joined Arnold, who in the month of October had
crossed the northern wilderness, between the head waters of the
Kennebec River and St. Lawrence. On the way he had endured immense
privations, losing five hundred men of the twelve hundred with whom he
started; and upon arriving opposite Quebec, on the 10th of November,
three days had been unavoidably spent in collecting boats to pass the
river. Crossing on the night of the 13th, this adventurous soldier
and his little command climbed the Heights of Abraham by the same
path that had served Wolfe so well sixteen years before. With
characteristic audacity he summoned the place. The demand of course
was refused; but that Carleton did not fall at once upon the little
band of seven hundred that bearded him shows by how feeble a tenure
Great Britain then held Canada. Immediately after the junction
Montgomery advanced on Quebec, where he appeared on the 5th of
December. Winter having already begun, and neither his numbers nor
his equipments being adequate to regular siege operations, he very
properly decided to try the desperate chance of an assault upon the
strongest fortress in America. This was made on the night of December
31st, 1775. Whatever possibility of success there may have been
vanished with the death of Montgomery, who fell at the head of his
men.
The American army retired three miles up the river, went into
winter-quarters, and established a land blockade of Quebec, which was
cut off from the sea by the ice. "For five months," wrote Carleton to
the Secretary for War, on the 14th of May, 1776, "this town has been
closely invested by the rebels." From this unpleasant position it was
relieved on the 6th of May, when signals were exchanged between it and
the _Surprise_, the advance ship of a squadron under Captain Charles
Douglas,[2] which had sailed from England on the 11th of March.
Arriving off the mouth of the St. Lawrence, on the morning of April
12th, Douglas found ice extending nearly twenty miles to sea, and
packed too closely to admit of working through it by dexterous
steering. The urgency of the case not admitting delay, he ran his
ship, the _Isis_, 50, with a speed of five knots, against a large
piece of ice about ten or twelve feet thick, to test the effect. The
ice, probably softened by salt water and salt air, went to pieces.
"Encouraged by this experiment," continues Douglas, somewhat
magnificently, "we thought it an enterprise worthy an English ship of
the line in our King and country's sacred cause, and an effort due to
the gallant defenders of Quebec, to make the attempt of pressing her
by force of sail, through the thick, broad, and closely connected
fields of ice, to which we saw no bounds towards the western part of
our horizon. Before night (when blowing a snow-storm, we brought-to,
or rather stopped), we had penetrated about eight leagues into it,
describing our path all the way with bits of the sheathing of the
ship's bottom, and sometimes pieces of the cutwater, but none of the
oak plank; and it was pleasant enough at times, when we stuck fast,
to see Lord Petersham exercising his troops on the crusted surface
of that fluid through which the ship had so recently sailed." It took
nine days of this work to reach Anticosti Island, after which the ice
seems to have given no more trouble; but further delay was occasioned
by fogs, calms, and head winds.
Upon the arrival of the ships of war, the Americans at once retreated.
During the winter, though reinforcements must have been received from
time to time, they had wasted from exposure, and from small-pox,
which ravaged the camp. On the 1st of May the returns showed nineteen
hundred men present, of whom only a thousand were fit for duty. There
were then on hand but three days' provisions, and none other nearer
than St. John's. The inhabitants would of course render no further
assistance to the Americans after the ships arrived. The Navy had
again decided the fate of Canada, and was soon also to determine that
of Lake Champlain.
[Illustration]
When two hundred troops had landed from the ships, Carleton marched
out, "to see," he said, "what these mighty boasters were about." The
sneer was unworthy a man of his generous character, for the boasters
had endured much for faint chances of success; and the smallness of
the reinforcement which encouraged him to act shows either an extreme
prudence on his part, or the narrow margin by which Quebec escaped.
He found the enemy busy with preparations for retreat, and upon his
appearance they abandoned their camp. Their forces on the two sides of
the river being now separated by the enemy's shipping, the Americans
retired first to Sorel, where the Richelieu enters the St. Lawrence,
and thence continued to fall back by gradual stages. It was not until
June 15th that Arnold quitted Montreal; and at the end of June the
united force was still on the Canadian side of the present border
line. On the 3d of July it reached Crown Point, in a pitiable state
from small-pox and destitution.
Both parties began at once to prepare for a contest upon Lake
Champlain. The Americans, small as their flotilla was, still kept the
superiority obtained for them by Arnold's promptitude a year before.
On the 25th of June the American General Schuyler, commanding the
Northern Department, wrote: "We have happily such a naval superiority
on Lake Champlain, that I have a confident hope the enemy will not
appear upon it this campaign, especially as our force is increasing
by the addition of gondolas, two nearly finished. Arnold,
however,"--whose technical knowledge caused him to be intrusted with
the naval preparations,--"says that 300 carpenters should be employed
and a large number of gondolas, row-galleys, etc., be built, twenty or
thirty at least. There is great difficulty in getting the carpenters
needed." Arnold's ideas were indeed on a scale worthy of the momentous
issues at stake. "To augment our navy on the lake appears to me of the
utmost importance. There is water between Crown Point and Pointe au
Fer for vessels of the largest size. I am of opinion that row-galleys
are the best construction and cheapest for this lake. Perhaps it may
be well to have one frigate of 36 guns. She may carry 18-pounders on
the Lake, and be superior to any vessel that can be built or floated
from St. John's."
Unfortunately for the Americans, their resources in men and means were
far inferior to those of their opponents, who were able eventually
to carry out, though on a somewhat smaller scale, Arnold's idea of a
sailing ship, strictly so called, of force as yet unknown in inland
waters. Such a ship, aided as she was by two consorts of somewhat
similar character, dominated the Lake as soon as she was afloat,
reversing all the conditions. To place and equip her, however,
required time, invaluable time, during which Arnold's two schooners
exercised control. Baron Riedesel, the commander of the German
contingent with Carleton, after examining the American position at
Ticonderoga, wrote, "If we could have begun our expedition four weeks
earlier, I am satisfied that everything would have been ended this
year (1776); but, not having shelter nor other necessary things, we
were unable to remain at the other [southern] end of Champlain." So
delay favors the defence, and changes issues. What would have been the
effect upon the American cause if, simultaneously with the loss of
New York, August 20th-September 15th, had come news of the fall of
Ticonderoga, the repute of which for strength stood high? Nor was
this all; for in that event, the plan which was wrecked in 1777 by
Sir William Howe's ill-conceived expedition to the Chesapeake would
doubtless have been carried out in 1776. In a contemporary English
paper occurs the following significant item: "London, September 26th,
1776. Advices have been received here from Canada, dated August 12th,
that General Burgoyne's army has found it impracticable to get across
the lakes this season. The naval force of the Provincials is too great
for them to contend with at present. They must build larger vessels
for this purpose, and these cannot be ready before next summer. The
design _was_[3] that the two armies commanded by Generals Howe and
Burgoyne should coöperate; that they should both be on the Hudson
River at the same time; that they should join about Albany, and
thereby cut off all communication between the northern and southern
Colonies."[4]
As Arnold's more ambitious scheme could not be realised, he had to
content himself with gondolas and galleys, for the force he was to
command as well as to build. The precise difference between the two
kinds of rowing vessels thus distinguished by name, the writer has
not been able to ascertain. The gondola was a flat-bottomed boat,
and inferior in nautical qualities--speed, handiness, and
seaworthiness--to the galleys, which probably were keeled. The latter
certainly carried sails, and may have been capable of beating to
windward. Arnold preferred them, and stopped the building of gondolas.
"The galleys," he wrote, "are quick moving, which will give us a
great advantage in the open lake." The complements of the galleys were
eighty men, of the gondolas forty-five; from which, and from their
batteries, it may be inferred that the latter were between one third
and one half the size of the former. The armaments of the two were
alike in character, but those of the gondolas much lighter. American
accounts agree with Captain Douglas's report of one galley captured
by the British. In the bows, an 18 and a 12-pounder; in the stern, two
9's; in broadside, from four to six 6's. There is in this a somewhat
droll reminder of the disputed merits of bow, stern, and broadside
fire, in a modern iron-clad; and the practical conclusion is much the
same. The gondolas had one 12-pounder and two 6's. All the vessels of
both parties carried a number of swivel guns.
Amid the many difficulties which lack of resources imposed upon all
American undertakings, Arnold succeeded in getting afloat with three
schooners, a sloop, and five gondolas, on the 20th of August. He
cruised at the upper end of Champlain till the 1st of September, when
he moved rapidly north, and on the 3d anchored in the lower narrows,
twenty-five miles above St. John's, stretching his line from shore
to shore. Scouts had kept him informed of the progress of the British
naval preparations, so that he knew that there was no immediate
danger; while an advanced position, maintained with a bold front,
would certainly prevent reconnoissances by water, and possibly might
impose somewhat upon the enemy. The latter, however, erected batteries
on each side of the anchorage, compelling Arnold to fall back to the
broader lake. He then had soundings taken about Valcour Island, and
between it and the western shore; that being the position in which he
intended to make a stand. He retired thither on the 23rd of September.
The British on their side had contended with no less obstacles than
their adversaries, though of a somewhat different character. To get
carpenters and materials to build, and seamen to man, were the
chief difficulties of the Americans, the necessities of the seaboard
conceding but partially the demands made upon it; but their vessels
were built upon the shores of the Lake, and launched into navigable
waters. A large fleet of transports and ships of war in the St.
Lawrence supplied the British with adequate resources, which were
utilized judiciously and energetically by Captain Douglas; but to get
these to the Lake was a long and arduous task. A great part of the
Richelieu River was shoal, and obstructed by rapids. The point
where lake navigation began was at St. John's, to which the nearest
approach, by a hundred-ton schooner, from the St. Lawrence, was
Chambly, ten miles below. Flat-boats and long-boats could be dragged
up stream, but vessels of any size had to be transported by land; and
the engineers found the roadbed too soft in places to bear the weight
of a hundred tons. Under Douglas's directions, the planking and frames
of two schooners were taken down at Chambly, and carried round by road
to St. John's, where they were again put together. At Quebec he found
building a new hull, of one hundred and eighty tons. This he took
apart nearly to the keel, shipping the frames in thirty long-boats,
which the transport captains consented to surrender, together with
their carpenters, for service on the Lake. Drafts from the ships of
war, and volunteers from the transports, furnished a body of seven
hundred seamen for the same employment,--a force to which the
Americans could oppose nothing equal, commanded as it was by regular
naval officers. The largest vessel was ship-rigged, and had a battery
of eighteen 12-pounders; she was called the _Inflexible_, and was
commanded by Lieutenant John Schanck. The two schooners, _Maria_,
Lieutenant Starke, and _Carleton_, Lieutenant James Richard Dacres,
carried respectively fourteen and twelve 6-pounders. These were
the backbone of the British flotilla. There were also a radeau, the
_Thunderer_, and a large gondola, the _Loyal Convert_, both heavily
armed; but, being equally heavy of movement, they do not appear to
have played any important part. Besides these, when the expedition
started, there were twenty gunboats, each carrying one fieldpiece,
from 24's to 9-pounders; or, in some cases, howitzers.[5]
"By all these means," wrote Douglas on July 21st, "our acquiring
an absolute dominion over Lake Champlain is not doubted of."
The expectation was perfectly sound. With a working breeze, the
_Inflexible_ alone could sweep the Lake clear of all that floated on
it. But the element of time remained. From the day of this writing
till that on which he saw the _Inflexible_ leave St. John's, October
4th, was over ten weeks; and it was not until the 9th that Carleton
was ready to advance with the squadron. By that time the American
troops at the head of the Lake had increased to eight or ten thousand.
The British land force is reported[6] as thirteen thousand, of which
six thousand were in garrison at St. John's and elsewhere.
Arnold's last reinforcements reached him at Valcour on the 6th of
October. On that day, and in the action of the 11th, he had with him
all the American vessels on the Lake, except one schooner and one
galley. His force, thus, was two schooners and a sloop, broadside
vessels, besides four galleys and eight gondolas, which may be assumed
reasonably to have depended on their bow guns; there, at least, was
their heaviest fire. Thus reckoned, his flotilla, disposed to the best
advantage, could bring into action at one time, two 18's, thirteen
12's, one 9, two 6's, twelve 4's, and two 2-pounders, independent of
swivels; total thirty-two guns, out of eighty-four that were mounted
in fifteen vessels. To this the British had to oppose, in three
broadside vessels, nine 12's and thirteen 6's, and in twenty gunboats,
twenty other brass guns, "from twenty-four to nines, some with
howitzers;"[7] total forty-two guns. In this statement the radeau and
gondola have not been included, because of their unmanageableness.
Included as broadside vessels, they would raise the British
armament--by three 24's, three 12's, four 9's, and a howitzer--to a
total of fifty-three guns. Actually, they could be brought into action
only under exceptional circumstances, and are more properly omitted.
These minutiæ are necessary for the proper appreciation of what
Captain Douglas justly called "a momentous event." It was a strife of
pigmies for the prize of a continent, and the leaders are entitled
to full credit both for their antecedent energy and for their
dispositions in the contest; not least the unhappy man who, having
done so much to save his country, afterwards blasted his name by a
treason unsurpassed in modern war. Energy and audacity had so far
preserved the Lake to the Americans; Arnold determined to have one
more try of the chances. He did not know the full force of the enemy,
but he expected that "it would be very formidable, if not equal to
ours."[8] The season, however, was so near its end that a severe check
would equal a defeat, and would postpone Carleton's further advance
to the next spring. Besides, what was the worth of such a force as
the American, such a flotilla, under the guns of Ticonderoga, the Lake
being lost? It was eminently a case for taking chances, even if the
detachment should be sacrificed, as it was.
Arnold's original purpose had been to fight under way; and it was
from this point of view that he valued the galleys, because of their
mobility. It is uncertain when he first learned of the rig and battery
of the _Inflexible_; but a good look-out was kept, and the British
squadron was sighted from Valcour when it quitted the narrows. It
may have been seen even earlier; for Carleton had been informed,
erroneously, that the Americans were near Grand Island, which led him
to incline to that side, and so open out Valcour sooner. The British
anchored for the night of October 10th, between Grand and Long[9]
Islands. Getting under way next morning, they stood up the Lake with
a strong north-east wind, keeping along Grand Island, upon which their
attention doubtless was fastened by the intelligence which they had
received; but it was a singular negligence thus to run to leeward with
a fair wind, without thorough scouting on both hands. The consequence
was that the American flotilla was not discovered until Valcour
Island, which is from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty
feet high throughout its two miles of length, was so far passed that
the attack had to be made from the south,--from leeward.
When the British were first made out, Arnold's second in command,
Waterbury, urged that in view of the enemy's superiority the flotilla
should get under way at once, and fight them "on a retreat in the main
lake;" the harbour being disadvantageous "to fight a number so much
superior, and the enemy being able to surround us on every side, we
lying between an island and the main." Waterbury's advice evidently
found its origin in that fruitful source of military errors of design,
which reckons the preservation of a force first of objects, making the
results of its action secondary. With sounder judgment, Arnold decided
to hold on. A retreat before square-rigged sailing vessels having a
fair wind, by a heterogeneous force like his own, of unequal speeds
and batteries, could result only in disaster. Concerted fire and
successful escape were alike improbable; and besides, escape, if
feasible, was but throwing up the game. Better trust to a steady,
well-ordered position, developing the utmost fire. If the enemy
discovered him, and came in by the northern entrance, there was a
five-foot knoll in mid-channel which might fetch the biggest of them
up; if, as proved to be the case, the island should be passed, and the
attack should be made from leeward, it probably would be partial and
in disorder, as also happened. The correctness of Arnold's decision
not to chance a retreat was shown in the retreat of two days later.
Valcour is on the west side of the Lake, about three quarters of a
mile from the main; but a peninsula projecting from the island at
mid-length narrows this interval to a half-mile. From the accounts,
it is clear that the American flotilla lay south of this peninsula.
Arnold therefore had a reasonable hope that it might be passed
undetected. Writing to Gates, the Commander-in-Chief at Ticonderoga,
he said: "There is a good harbour, and if the enemy venture up
the Lake it will be impossible for them to take advantage of
our situation. If we succeed in our attack upon them, it will be
impossible for any to escape. If we are worsted, our retreat is open
and free. In case of wind, which generally blows fresh at this season,
our craft will make good weather, while theirs cannot keep the Lake."
It is apparent from this, written three weeks before the battle, that
he then was not expecting a force materially different from his own.
Later, he describes his position as being "in a small bay on the west
side of the island, as near together as possible, and in such a form
that few vessels can attack us at the same time, and those will be
exposed to the fire of the whole fleet." Though he unfortunately gives
no details, he evidently had sound tactical ideas. The formation
of the anchored vessels is described by the British officers as a
half-moon.
When the British discovered the enemy, they hauled up for them.
Arnold ordered one of his schooners, the _Royal Savage_, and the
four galleys, to get under way; the two other schooners and the eight
gondolas remaining at their anchors. The _Royal Savage_, dropping
to leeward,--by bad management, Arnold says,--came, apparently
unsupported, under the distant fire of the _Inflexible_, as she drew
under the lee of Valcour at 11 A.M., followed by the _Carleton_, and
at greater distance by the _Maria_ and the gunboats. Three shots
from the ship's 12-pounders struck the _Royal Savage_, which then ran
ashore on the southern point of the island. The _Inflexible_, followed
closely by the _Carleton_, continued on, but fired only occasionally;
showing that Arnold was keeping his galleys in hand, at long
bowls,--as small vessels with one eighteen should be kept, when
confronted with a broadside of nine guns. Between the island and the
main the north-east wind doubtless drew more northerly, adverse to the
ship's approach; but, a flaw off the cliffs taking the fore and aft
sails of the _Carleton_, she fetched "nearly into the middle of the
rebel half-moon, where Lieutenant J.R. Dacres intrepidly anchored
with a spring on her cable." The _Maria_, on board which was Carleton,
together with Commander Thomas Pringle, commanding the flotilla, was
to leeward when the chase began, and could not get into close action
that day. By this time, seventeen of the twenty gunboats had come
up, and, after silencing the _Royal Savage_, pulled up to within
point-blank range of the American flotilla. "The cannonade was
tremendous," wrote Baron Riedesel. Lieutenant Edward Longcroft, of the
radeau _Thunderer_, not being able to get his raft into action, went
with a boat's crew on board the _Royal Savage_, and for a time turned
her guns upon her former friends; but the fire of the latter forced
him again to abandon her, and it seemed so likely that she might be
re-taken that she was set on fire by Lieutenant Starke of the _Maria_,
when already "two rebel boats were very near her. She soon after blew
up." The American guns converging on the _Carleton_ in her central
position, she suffered severely. Her commander, Lieutenant Dacres,
was knocked senseless; another officer lost an arm; only Mr. Edward
Pellew, afterwards Lord Exmouth, remained fit for duty. The spring
being shot away, she swung bows on to the enemy, and her fire was thus
silenced. Captain Pringle signalled to her to withdraw; but she was
unable to obey. To pay her head off the right way, Pellew himself had
to get out on the bowsprit under a heavy fire of musketry, to bear the
jib over to windward; but to make sail seems to have been impossible.
Two artillery boats were sent to her assistance, "which towed her off
through a very thick fire, until out of farther reach, much to the
honour of Mr. John Curling and Mr. Patrick Carnegy, master's mate
and midshipman of the _Isis_, who conducted them; and of Mr. Edward
Pellew, mate of the _Blonde_, who threw the tow-rope from the
_Carleton's_ bowsprit."[10] This service on board the _Carleton_
started Pellew on his road to fortune; but, singularly enough, the
lieutenancy promised him in consequence, by both the First Lord
and Lord Howe, was delayed by the fact that he stayed at the front,
instead of going to the rear, where he would have been "within their
jurisdiction."[11] The _Carleton_ had two feet of water in the hold,
and had lost eight killed and six wounded,--about half her crew,--when
she anchored out of fire. In this small but stirring business, the
Americans, in addition to the _Royal Savage_, had lost one gondola.
Besides the injuries to the _Carleton_, a British artillery boat,
commanded by a German lieutenant, was sunk. Towards evening the
_Inflexible_ got within point-blank shot of the Americans, "when five
broadsides," wrote Douglas, "silenced their whole line." One fresh
ship, with scantling for sea-going, and a concentrated battery, has an
unquestioned advantage over a dozen light-built craft, carrying one or
two guns each, and already several hours engaged.
At nightfall the _Inflexible_ dropped out of range, and the British
squadron anchored in line of battle across the southern end of the
passage between the island and the main; some vessels were extended
also to the eastward, into the open Lake. "The best part of my
intelligence," wrote Burgoyne next day from St. John's, to Douglas at
Quebec, "is that our whole fleet was formed in line above the enemy,
and consequently they must have surrendered this morning, or given us
battle on our own terms. The Indians and light troops are abreast
with the fleet; they cannot, therefore, escape by land." The British
squadron sharing this confidence, a proper look-out was not kept. The
American leader immediately held a conference with his officers, and
decided to attempt a retreat, "which was done with such secrecy,"
writes Waterbury, "that we went through them entirely undiscovered."
The movement began at 7 P.M., a galley leading, the gondolas and
schooners following, and Arnold and his second bringing up the rear
in the two heaviest galleys. This delicate operation was favoured by
a heavy fog, which did not clear till next morning at eight. As the
Americans stole by, they could not see any of the hostile ships. By
daylight they were out of sight of the British. Riedesel, speaking of
this event, says, "The ships anchored, secure of the enemy, who stole
off during the night, and sailing round the left wing, aided by
a favourable wind, escaped under darkness." The astonishment next
morning, he continues, was great, as was Carleton's rage. The latter
started to pursue in such a hurry that he forgot to leave orders
for the troops which had been landed; but, failing to discover the
fugitives, he returned and remained at Valcour till nightfall, when
scouts brought word that the enemy were at Schuyler's Island, eight
miles above.
The retreat of the Americans had been embarrassed by their injuries,
and by the wind coming out ahead. They were obliged to anchor on the
12th to repair damages, both hulls and sails having suffered severely.
Arnold took the precaution to write to Crown Point for bateaux, to tow
in case of a southerly wind; but time did not allow these to arrive.
Two gondolas had to be sunk on account of their injuries, making three
of that class so far lost. The retreat was resumed at 2 P.M., but the
breeze was fresh from the southward, and the gondolas made very
little way. At evening the British chased again. That night the wind
moderated, and at daybreak the American flotilla was twenty-eight
miles from Crown Point,--fourteen from Valcour,--having still five
miles' start. Later, however, by Arnold's report, "the wind again
breezed up to the southward, so that we gained very little either by
beating or rowing. At the same time the enemy took a fresh breeze from
northeast, and, by the time we had reached Split Rock, were alongside
of us." The galleys of Arnold and Waterbury, the _Congress_ and the
_Washington_, had throughout kept in the rear, and now received the
brunt of the attack, made by the _Inflexible_ and the two schooners,
which had entirely distanced their sluggish consorts. This fight was
in the upper narrows, where the Lake is from one to three miles wide;
and it lasted, by Arnold's report, for five glasses (two hours and a
half),[12] the Americans continually retreating, until about ten miles
from Crown Point. There, the _Washington_ having struck some time
before, and final escape being impossible, Arnold ran the _Congress_
and four gondolas ashore in a small creek on the east side; pulling to
windward, with the cool judgment that had marked all his conduct, so
that the enemy could not follow him--except in small boats with which
he could deal. There he set his vessels on fire, and stood by them
until assured that they would blow up with their flags flying. He then
retreated to Crown Point through the woods, "despite the savages;"
a phrase which concludes this singular aquatic contest with a quaint
touch of local colour.
In three days of fighting and retreating the Americans had lost one
schooner, two galleys, and seven gondolas,--in all, ten vessels out of
fifteen. The killed and wounded amounted to over eighty, twenty odd
of whom were in Arnold's galley. The original force, numbering seven
hundred, had been decimated. Considering its raw material and the
recency of its organisation, words can scarcely exaggerate the
heroism of the resistance, which undoubtedly depended chiefly upon the
personal military qualities of the leader. The British loss in killed
and wounded did not exceed forty.
The little American navy on Champlain was wiped out; but never had any
force, big or small, lived to better purpose or died more gloriously,
for it had saved the Lake for that year. Whatever deductions may be
made for blunders, and for circumstances of every character which made
the British campaign of 1777 abortive and disastrous, thus leading
directly to the American alliance with France in 1778, the delay, with
all that it involved, was obtained by the Lake campaign of 1776. On
October 15th, two days after Arnold's final defeat, Carleton dated
a letter to Douglas from before Crown Point, whence the American
garrison was withdrawn. A week later Riedesel arrived, and wrote that,
"were our whole army here it would be an easy matter to drive the
enemy from their entrenchments," at Ticonderoga, and--as has been
quoted already--four weeks sooner would have insured its fall. It is
but a coincidence that just four weeks had been required to set up the
_Inflexible_ at St. John's; but it typifies the whole story. Save for
Arnold's flotilla, the two British schooners would have settled the
business. "Upon the whole, Sir," wrote Douglas in his final letter
from Quebec before sailing for England, "I scruple not to say, that
had not General Carleton authorized me to take the extraordinary
measure of sending up the _Inflexible_ from Quebec, things could
not this year have been brought to so glorious a conclusion on Lake
Champlain." Douglas further showed the importance attached to this
success by men of that day, by sending a special message to the
British ambassador at Madrid, "presuming that the early knowledge of
this great event in the southern parts of Europe may be of advantage
to His Majesty's service." That the opinion of the government was
similar may be inferred from the numerous rewards bestowed. Carleton
was made a Knight of the Bath, and Douglas a baronet.
The gallantry shown by both sides upon Lake Champlain in 1776 is
evident from the foregoing narrative. With regard to the direction
of movements,--the skill of the two leaders,--the same equal credit
cannot be assigned. It was a very serious blunder, on October 11th, to
run to leeward, passing a concealed enemy, undetected, upon waters so
perfectly well known as those of Champlain were; it having been the
scene of frequent British operations in previous wars. Owing to
this, "the _Maria_, because of her distant situation (from which the
_Inflexible_ and _Carleton_ had chased by signal) when the rebels
were first discovered, and baffling winds, could not get into close
action."[13] For the same reason the _Inflexible_ could not support
the _Carleton_. The Americans, in the aggregate distinctly inferior,
were thus permitted a concentration of superior force upon part of
their enemies. It is needless to enlarge upon the mortifying
incident of Arnold's escape that evening. To liken small things to
great,--always profitable in military analysis,--it resembled Hood's
slipping away from de Grasse at St. Kitts.[14]
[Illustration]
In conduct and courage, Arnold's behavior was excellent throughout.
Without enlarging upon the energy which created the flotilla, and
the breadth of view which suggested preparations that he could not
enforce, admiration is due to his recognition of the fact--implicit
in deed, if unexpressed in word--that the one use of the Navy was to
contest the control of the water; to impose delay, even if it could
not secure ultimate victory. No words could say more clearly than do
his actions that, under the existing conditions, the navy was useless,
except as it contributed to that end; valueless, if buried in port.
Upon this rests the merit of his bold advance into the lower narrows;
upon this his choice of the strong defensive position of Valcour;
upon this his refusal to retreat, as urged by Waterbury, when the full
force of the enemy was disclosed,--a decision justified, or rather,
illustrated, by the advantages which the accidents of the day threw
into his hands. His personal gallantry was conspicuous there as at
all times of his life. "His countrymen," said a generous enemy of that
day, "chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention which he paid to a
nice point of honour, in keeping his flag flying, and not quitting his
galley till she was in flames, lest the enemy should have boarded, and
struck it." It is not the least of the injuries done to his nation in
after years, that he should have silenced this boast and effaced this
glorious record by so black an infamy.
With the destruction of the flotilla ends the naval story of the Lakes
during the War of the American Revolution. Satisfied that it was too
late to proceed against Ticonderoga that year, Carleton withdrew
to St. John's and went into winter-quarters. The following year the
enterprise was resumed under General Burgoyne; but Sir William Howe,
instead of coöperating by an advance up the Hudson, which was the plan
of 1776, carried his army to Chesapeake Bay, to act thence against
Philadelphia. Burgoyne took Ticonderoga and forced his way as far as
Saratoga, sixty miles from Ticonderoga and thirty from Albany, where
Howe should have met him. There he was brought to a stand by the army
which the Americans had collected, found himself unable to advance or
to retreat, and was forced to lay down his arms on October 17th, 1777.
The garrison left by him at Ticonderoga and Crown Point retired to
Canada, and the posts were re-occupied by the Americans. No further
contest took place on the Lake, though the British vessels remained
in control of it, and showed themselves from time to time up to 1781.
With the outbreak of war between Great Britain and France, in 1778,
the scene of maritime interest shifted to salt water, and there
remained till the end.
[Footnote 1: In customary representation of maps, North is upper,
and movement northward is commonly spoken of as up. It is necessary
therefore to bear in mind that the flow of water from Lake George to
the St. Lawrence, though northward, is _down_.]
[Footnote 2: Afterwards Captain of the Fleet (Chief of Staff) to
Rodney in his great campaign of 1782. _Post_, p. 222. He died a
Rear-Admiral and Baronet in 1789.]
[Footnote 3: Author's italics.]
[Footnote 4: _Remembrancer_, iv. 291.]
[Footnote 5: The radeau had six 24-pounders, six 12's, and two
howitzers; the gondola, seven 9-pounders. The particulars of armament
are from Douglas's letters.]
[Footnote 6: By American reports. Beatson gives the force sent out, in
the spring of 1776, as 13,357. ("Mil. and Nav. Memoirs," vi. 44.)]
[Footnote 7: Douglas's letters.]
[Footnote 8: Douglas thought that the appearance of the _Inflexible_
was a complete surprise; but Arnold had been informed that a third
vessel, larger than the schooners, was being set up. With a man of
his character, it is impossible to be sure, from his letters to his
superior, how much he knew, or what he withheld.]
[Footnote 9: called North Hero.]
[Footnote 10: Douglas's letter. The _Isis_ and the _Blonde_ were
vessels of the British squadron under Douglas, then lying in the St.
Lawrence. The officers named were temporarily on the lake service.]
[Footnote 11: Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, to Pellew.]
[Footnote 12: Beatson, "Nav. and Mil. Memoirs," says two hours.]
[Footnote 13: Douglas's letters. The sentence is awkward, but
carefully compared with the copy in the author's hands. Douglas says,
of the details he gives, that "they have been collected with the most
scrupulous circumspection."]
[Footnote 14: _Post_, p. 205.]