_Right_[129] is the _spirit of society_. If society has a _will_, this
will is simply right: society exists only through right. But, as it
endures only by exercising a _sovereignty_ over individuals, right is
its SOVEREIGN WILL. Aristotle says justice is the advantage of
_society_.
All existing right is--_foreign law_; some one makes me out to be in the
right, "does right by me." But should I therefore be in the right if all
the world made me out so? And yet what else is the right that I obtain
in the State, in society, but a right of those _foreign_ to me? When a
blockhead makes me out in the right, I grow distrustful of my rightness;
I don't like to receive it from him. But, even when a wise man makes me
out in the right, I nevertheless am not in the right on that account.
Whether _I_ am in the right is completely independent of the fool's
making out and of the wise man's.
All the same, we have coveted this right till now. We seek for right,
and turn to the court for that purpose. To what? To a royal, a papal, a
popular court, etc. Can a sultanic court declare another right than that
which the sultan has ordained to be right? Can it make me out in the
right if I seek for a right that does not agree with the sultan's law?
Can it, _e. g._, concede to me high treason as a right, since it is
assuredly not a right according to the sultan's mind? Can it as a court
of censorship allow me the free utterance of opinion as a right, since
the sultan will hear nothing of this _my_ right? What am I seeking for
in this court, then? I am seeking for sultanic right, not _my_ right; I
am seeking for--_foreign_ right. As long as this foreign right
harmonizes with mine, to be sure, I shall find in it the latter too.
The State does not permit pitching into each other man to man; it
opposes the _duel_. Even every ordinary appeal to blows, notwithstanding
that neither of the fighters calls the police to it, is punished; except
when it is not an I whacking away at a you, but, say, the _head of a
family_ at the child. The _family_ is entitled to this, and in its name
the father; I as Ego am not.
The "_Vossische Zeitung_" presents to us the "commonwealth of right."
There everything is to be decided by the judge and a _court_. It ranks
the supreme court of censorship as a "court" where "right is declared"
What sort of a right? The right of the censorship. To recognize the
sentences of that court as right one must regard the censorship as
right. But it is thought nevertheless that this court offers a
protection. Yes, protection against an individual censor's error: it
protects only the censorship-legislator against false interpretation of
his will, at the same time making his statute, by the "sacred power of
right," all the firmer against writers.
Whether I am in the right or not there is no judge but myself. Others
can judge only whether they endorse my right, and whether it exists as
right for them too.
In the meantime let us take the matter yet another way. I am to
reverence sultanic law in the sultanate, popular law in republics, canon
law in Catholic communities, etc. To these laws I am to subordinate
myself; I am to regard them as sacred. A "sense of right" and
"law-abiding mind" of such a sort is so firmly planted in people's heads
that the most revolutionary persons of our days want to subject us to a
new "sacred law," the "law of society," the law of mankind, the "right
of all," and the like. The right of "all" is to go before _my_ right. As
a right of all it would indeed be my right among the rest, since I, with
the rest, am included in all; but that it is at the same time a right of
others, or even of all others, does not move me to its upholding. Not as
a _right of all_ will I defend it, but as _my_ right; and then every
other may see to it how he shall likewise maintain it for himself. The
right of all (_e. g._ to eat) is a right of every individual. Let each
keep this right unabridged for _himself_, then all exercise it
spontaneously; let him not take care for all though,--let him not grow
zealous for it as for a right of all.
But the social reformers preach to us a "_law of society_." There the
individual becomes society's slave, and is in the right only when
society _makes him out_ in the right, _i. e._ when he lives according to
society's _statutes_ and so is--_loyal_. Whether I am loyal under a
despotism or in a "society" _à la_ Weitling, it is the same absence of
right in so far as in both cases I have not _my_ right but _foreign_
right.
In considerations of right the question is always asked, "What or who
gives me the right to it?" Answer: God, love, reason, nature, humanity,
etc. No, only _your might_, _your_ power gives you the right (your
reason, _e. g._, may give it to you).
Communism, which assumes that men "have equal rights by nature,"
contradicts its own proposition till it comes to this, that men have no
right at all by nature. For it is not willing to recognize, _e. g._,
that parents have "by nature" rights as against their children, or the
children as against the parents: it abolishes the family. Nature gives
parents, brothers, etc., no right at all. Altogether, this entire
revolutionary or Babouvist principle[130] rests on a religious, _i. e._
false, view of things. Who can ask after "right" if he does not occupy
the religious standpoint himself? Is not "right" a religious concept,
_i. e._ something sacred? Why, "_equality of rights_," as the Revolution
propounded it, is only another name for "Christian equality," the
"equality of the brethren," "of God's children," "of Christians," etc.:
in short _fraternité_. Each and every inquiry after right deserves to be
lashed with Schillers words:
Many a year I've used my nose
To smell the onion and the rose;
Is there any proof which shows
That I've a right to that same nose?
When the Revolution stamped equality as a "right," it took flight into
the religious domain, into the region of the sacred, of the ideal.
Hence, since then, the fight for the "sacred, inalienable rights of
man." Against the "eternal rights of man" the "well-earned rights of the
established order" are quite naturally, and with equal right, brought to
bear: right against right, where of course one is decried by the other
as "wrong." This has been the _contest of rights_[131] since the
Revolution.
You want to be "in the right" as against the rest. That you cannot; as
against them you remain forever "in the wrong"; for they surely would
not be your opponents if they were not in "their right" too; they will
always make you out "in the wrong." But, as against the right of the
rest, yours is a higher, greater, _more powerful_ right, is it not? No
such thing! Your right is not more powerful if you are not more
powerful. Have Chinese subjects a right to freedom? Just bestow it on
them, and then look how far you have gone wrong in your attempt: because
they do not know how to use freedom they have no right to it, or, in
clearer terms, because they have not freedom they have not the right to
it. Children have no right to the condition of majority because they are
not of age, _i. e._ because they are children. Peoples that let
themselves be kept in nonage have no right to the condition of majority;
if they ceased to be in nonage, then only would they have the right to
be of age. This means nothing else than "What you have the _power_ to be
you have the _right_ to." I derive all right and all warrant from _me_;
I am _entitled_ to everything that I have in my power. I am entitled to
overthrow Zeus, Jehovah, God, etc., if I _can_; if I cannot, then these
gods will always remain in the right and in power as against me, and
what I do will be to fear their right and their power in impotent
"god-fearingness," to keep their commandments and believe that I do
right in everything that I do according to _their_ right, about as the
Russian boundary-sentinels think themselves rightfully entitled to shoot
dead the suspicious persons who are escaping, since they murder "by
superior authority," _i. e._ "with right." But I am entitled by myself
to murder if I myself do not forbid it to myself, if I myself do not
fear murder as a "wrong." This view of things lies at the foundation of
Chamisso's poem, "The Valley of Murder," where the gray-haired Indian
murderer compels reverence from the white man whose brethren he has
murdered. The only thing I am not entitled to is what I do not do with
a free cheer, _i. e._ what _I_ do not entitle myself to.
_I_ decide whether it is the _right thing_ in _me_; there is no right
_outside_ me. If it is right for _me_,[132] it is right. Possibly this
may not suffice to make it right for the rest; that is their care, not
mine: let them defend themselves. And if for the whole world something
were not right, but it were right for me, _i. e._ I wanted it, then I
would ask nothing about the whole world. So every one does who knows how
to value _himself_, every one in the degree that he is an egoist; for
might goes before right, and that--with perfect right.
Because I am "by nature" a man I have an equal right to the enjoyment of
all goods, says Babeuf. Must he not also say: because I am "by nature" a
first-born prince I have a right to the throne? The rights of man and
the "well-earned rights" come to the same thing in the end, to wit, to
_nature_, which _gives_ me a right, _i. e._ to _birth_ (and, further,
inheritance, etc.). "I am born as a man" is equal to "I am born as a
king's son." The natural man has only a natural right (because he has
only a natural power) and natural claims: he has right of birth and
claims of birth. But _nature_ cannot entitle me, _i. e._ give me
capacity or might, to that to which only my act entitles me. That the
king's child sets himself above other children, even this is his act,
which secures to him the precedence; and that the other children approve
and recognize this act is their act, which makes them worthy to
be--subjects.
Whether nature gives me a right, or whether God, the people's choice,
etc., does so, all of that is the same _foreign_ right, a right that _I_
do not give or take to myself.
Thus the Communists say, equal labor entitles man to equal enjoyment.
Formerly the question was raised whether the "virtuous" man must not be
"happy" on earth. The Jews actually drew this inference: "That it may go
well with thee on earth." No, equal labor does not entitle you to it,
but equal enjoyment alone entitles you to equal enjoyment. Enjoy, then
you are entitled to enjoyment. But, if you have labored and let the
enjoyment be taken from you, then--"it serves you right."
If you _take_ the enjoyment, it is your right; if, on the contrary, you
only pine for it without laying hands on it, it remains as before, a
"well-earned right" of those who are privileged for enjoyment. It is
_their_ right, as by laying hands on it it would become _your_ right.
The conflict over the "right of property" wavers in vehement commotion.
The Communists affirm[133] that "the earth belongs rightfully to him who
tills it, and its products to those who bring them out." I think it
belongs to him who knows how to take it, or who does not let it be taken
from him, does not let himself be deprived of it. If he appropriates it,
then not only the earth, but the right to it too, belongs to him. This
is _egoistic right_: _i. e._, it is right for _me_, therefore it is
right.
Aside from this, right does have "a wax nose." The tiger that assails me
is in the right, and I who strike him down am also in the right. I
defend against him not my _right_, but _myself_.
As human right is always something given, it always in reality reduces
to the right which men give. _i. e._ "concede," to each other. If the
right to existence is conceded to new-born children, then they have the
right; if it is not conceded to them, as was the case among the Spartans
and ancient Romans, then they do not have it. For only society can give
or concede it to them; they themselves cannot take it, or give it to
themselves. It will be objected, the children had nevertheless "by
nature" the right to exist; only the Spartans refused _recognition_ to
this right. But then they simply had no right to this recognition,--no
more than they had to recognition of their life by the wild beasts to
which they were thrown.
People talk so much about _birthright_, and complain:
There is--alas!--no mention of the rights
That were born with us.[134]
What sort of right, then, is there that was born with me? The right to
receive an entailed estate, to inherit a throne, to enjoy a princely or
noble education; or, again, because poor parents begot me, to--get free
schooling, be clothed out of contributions of alms, and at last earn my
bread and my herring in the coal-mines or at the loom? Are these not
birthrights, rights that have come down to me from my parents through
_birth_? You think--no; you think these are only rights improperly so
called, it is just these rights that you aim to abolish through the
_real birthright_. To give a basis for this you go back to the simplest
thing and affirm that every one is by birth _equal_ to another,--to wit,
a _man_. I will grant you that every one is born as man, hence the
new-born are therein _equal_ to each other. Why are they? Only because
they do not yet show and exert themselves as anything but
bare--_children of men_, naked little human beings. But thereby they are
at once different from those who have already made something out of
themselves, who thus are no longer bare "children of men," but--children
of their own creation. The latter possess more than bare birthrights:
they have _earned_ rights. What an antithesis, what a field of combat!
The old combat of the birthrights of man and well-earned rights. Go
right on appealing to your birthrights; people will not fail to oppose
to you the well-earned. Both stand on the "ground of right"; for each of
the two has a "right" against the other, the one the birthright or
natural right, the other the earned or "well-earned" right.
If you remain on the ground of right, you remain
in--_Rechthaberei_.[135] The other cannot give you your right; he cannot
"mete out right" to you. He who has might has--right; if you have not
the former, neither have you the latter. Is this wisdom so hard to
attain? Just look at the mighty and their doings! We are talking here
only of China and Japan, of course. Just try it once, you Chinese and
Japanese, to make them out in the wrong, and learn by experience how
they throw you into jail. (Only do not confuse with this the
"well-meaning counsels" which--in China and Japan--are permitted,
because they do not hinder the mighty one, but possibly _help him on_.)
For him who should want to make them out in the wrong there would stand
open only one way thereto, that of might. If he deprives them of their
_might_, then he has _really_ made them out in the wrong, deprived them
of their right; in any other case he can do nothing but clench his
little fist in his pocket, or fall a victim as an obtrusive fool.
In short, if you Chinese and Japanese did not ask after right, and in
particular if you did not ask after the rights "that were born with
you," then you would not need to ask at all after the well-earned rights
either.
You start back in fright before others, because you think you see beside
them the _ghost of right_, which, as in the Homeric combats, seems to
fight as a goddess at their side, helping them. What do you do? Do you
throw the spear? No, you creep around to gain the spook over to
yourselves, that it may fight on your side: you woo for the ghost's
favor. Another would simply ask thus: Do I will what my opponent wills?
"No!" Now then, there may fight for him a thousand devils or gods, I go
at him all the same!
The "commonwealth of right," as the "_Vossische Zeitung_" among others
stands for it, asks that office-holders be removable only by the
_judge_, not by the _administration_. Vain illusion! If it were settled
by law that an office-holder who is once seen drunken shall lose his
office, then the judges would have to condemn him on the word of the
witnesses, etc. In short, the lawgiver would only have to state
precisely all the possible grounds which entail the loss of office,
however laughable they might be (_e. g._ he who laughs in his superiors'
faces, who does not go to church every Sunday, who does not take the
communion every four weeks, who runs in debt, who has disreputable
associates, who shows no determination, etc., shall be removed. These
things the lawgiver might take it into his head to prescribe, _e. g._,
for a court of honor); then the judge would solely have to investigate
whether the accused had "become guilty" of those "offences," and, on
presentation of the proof, pronounce sentence of removal against him "in
the name of the law."
The judge is lost when he ceases to be _mechanical_, when he "is
forsaken by the rules of evidence." Then he no longer has anything but
an opinion like everybody else; and, if he decides according to this
_opinion_, his action is _no longer an official action_. As judge he
must decide only according to the law. Commend me rather to the old
French parliaments, which wanted to examine for themselves what was to
be matter of right, and to register it only after their own approval.
They at least judged according to a right of their own, and were not
willing to give themselves up to be machines of the lawgiver, although
as judges they must, to be sure, become their own machines.
It is said that punishment is the criminal's right. But impunity is just
as much his right. If his undertaking succeeds, it serves him right,
and, if it does not succeed, it likewise serves him right. You make your
bed and lie in it. If some one goes foolhardily into dangers and
perishes in them, we are apt to say, "It serves him right; he would have
it so." But, if he conquered the dangers, _i. e._ if his _might_ was
victorious, then he would be in the _right_ too. If a child plays with
the knife and gets cut, it is served right; but, if it doesn't get cut,
it is served right too. Hence right befalls the criminal, doubtless,
when he suffers what he risked; why, what did he risk it for, since he
knew the possible consequences? But the punishment that we decree
against him is only our right, not his. Our right reacts against his,
and he is "in the wrong at last" because--we get the upper hand.
* * * * *
But what is right, what is matter of right in a society, is voiced
too--in the _law_.[136]
Whatever the law may be, it must be respected by the--loyal citizen.
Thus the law-abiding mind of Old England is eulogized. To this that
Euripidean sentiment (Orestes, 418) entirely corresponds: "We serve the
gods, whatever the gods are." _Law as such, God as such_, thus far we
are to-day.
People are at pains to distinguish _law_ from arbitrary _orders_, from
an ordinance: the former comes from a duly entitled authority. But a law
over human action (ethical law, State law, etc.) is always a
_declaration of will_, and so an order. Yes, even if I myself gave
myself the law, it would yet be only my order, to which in the next
moment I can refuse obedience. One may well enough declare what he will
put up with, and so deprecate the opposite by a law, making known that
in the contrary case he will treat the transgressor as his enemy; but no
one has any business to command _my_ actions, to say what course I shall
pursue and set up a code to govern it. I must put up with it that he
treats me as his _enemy_, but never that he makes free with me as his
_creature_, and that he makes _his_ reason, or even unreason, my
plumb-line.
States last only so long as there is a _ruling will_ and this ruling
will is looked upon as tantamount to the own will. The lord's will
is--law. What do your laws amount to if no one obeys them? what your
orders, if nobody lets himself be ordered? The State cannot forbear the
claim to determine the individual's will, to speculate and count on
this. For the State it is indispensable that nobody have an _own will_;
if one had, the State would have to exclude (lock up, banish, etc.) this
one; if all had, they would do away with the State. The State is not
thinkable without lordship and servitude (subjection); for the State
must will to be the lord of all that it embraces, and this will is
called the "will of the State."
He who, to hold his own, must count on the absence of will in others is
a thing made by these others, as the master is a thing made by the
servant. If submissiveness ceased, it would be all over with lordship.
The _own will_ of Me is the State's destroyer; it is therefore branded
by the State as "self-will." Own will and the State are powers in deadly
hostility, between which no "eternal peace" is possible. As long as the
State asserts itself, it represents own will, its ever-hostile opponent,
as unreasonable, evil, etc.; and the latter lets itself be talked into
believing this,--nay, it really is such, for no more reason than this,
that it still lets itself be talked into such belief: it has not yet
come to itself and to the consciousness of its dignity; hence it is
still incomplete, still amenable to fine words, etc.
Every State is a _despotism_, be the despot one or many, or (as one is
likely to imagine about a republic) if all be lords, _i. e._ despotize
one over another. For this is the case when the law given at any time,
the expressed volition of (it may be) a popular assembly, is thenceforth
to be _law_ for the individual, to which _obedience is due_ from him, or
toward which he has the _duty_ of obedience. If one were even to
conceive the case that every individual in the people had expressed the
same will, and hereby a complete "collective will" had come into being,
the matter would still remain the same. Would I not be bound to-day and
henceforth to my will of yesterday? My will would in this case be
_frozen_. Wretched _stability_! My creature--to wit, a particular
expression of will--would have become my commander. But I in my will, I
the creator, should be hindered in my flow and my dissolution. Because I
was a fool yesterday I must remain such my life long. So in the
State-life I am at best--I might just as well say, at worst--a bondman
of myself. Because I was a willer yesterday, I am to-day without will:
yesterday voluntary, to-day involuntary.
How change it? Only by recognizing no _duty_, _i. e._ not _binding_
myself nor letting myself be bound. If I have no duty, then I know no
law either.
"But they will bind me!" My will nobody can bind, and my disinclination
remains free.
"Why, everything must go topsy-turvy if every one could do what he
would!" Well, who says that every one can do everything? What are you
there for, pray, you who do not need to put up with everything? Defend
yourself, and no one will do anything to you! He who would break your
will has to do with you, and is your _enemy_. Deal with him as such. If
there stand behind you for your protection some millions more, then you
are an imposing power and will have an easy victory. But, even if as a
power you overawe your opponent, still you are not on that account a
hallowed authority to him, unless he be a simpleton. He does not owe you
respect and regard, even though he will have to consider your might.
We are accustomed to classify States according to the different ways in
which "the supreme might" is distributed. If an individual has
it--monarchy; if all have it--democracy; etc. Supreme might then! Might
against whom? Against the individual and his "self-will." The State
practises "violence," the individual must not do so. The State's
behavior is violence, and it calls its violence "law"; that of the
individual, "crime." Crime,[137] then,--so the individual's violence is
called; and only by crime does he overcome[138] the State's violence
when he thinks that the State is not above him, but he above the State.
Now, if I wanted to act ridiculously, I might, as a well-meaning person,
admonish you not to make laws which impair my self-development,
self-activity, self-creation. I do not give this advice. For, if you
should follow it, you would be unwise, and I should have been cheated of
my entire profit. I request nothing at all from you; for, whatever I
might demand, you would still be dictatorial lawgivers, and must be so,
because a raven cannot sing, nor a robber live without robbery. Rather
do I ask those who would be egoists what they think the more
egoistic,--to let laws be given them by you, and to respect those that
are given, or to practise _refractoriness_, yes, complete disobedience.
Good-hearted people think the laws ought to prescribe only what is
accepted in the people's feeling as right and proper. But what concern
is it of mine what is accepted in the nation and by the nation? The
nation will perhaps be against the blasphemer; therefore a law against
blasphemy. Am I not to blaspheme on that account? Is this law to be more
than an "order" to me? I put the question.
Solely from the principle that all _right_ and all _authority_ belong to
the _collectivity of the people_ do all forms of government arise. For
none of them lacks this appeal to the collectivity, and the despot, as
well as the president or any aristocracy, etc., acts and commands "in
the name of the State." They are in possession of the "authority of the
State," and it is perfectly indifferent whether, were this possible, the
people as a _collectivity_ (all individuals) exercise this
State-_authority_, or whether it is only the representatives of this
collectivity, be there many of them as in aristocracies or one as in
monarchies. Always the collectivity is above the individual, and has a
power which is called _legitimate_, _i. e._ which is _law_.
Over against the sacredness of the State, the individual is only a
vessel of dishonor, in which "exuberance, malevolence, mania for
ridicule and slander, frivolity," etc., are left as soon as he does not
deem that object of veneration, the State, to be worthy of recognition.
The spiritual _haughtiness_ of the servants and subjects of the State
has fine penalties against unspiritual "exuberance."
When the government designates as punishable an play of mind _against_
the State, the moderate liberals come and opine that fun, satire, wit,
humor, etc., must have free play anyhow, and _genius_ must enjoy
freedom. So not the _individual man_ indeed, but still _genius_, is to
be free. Here the State, or in its name the government, says with
perfect right: He who is not for me is against me. Fun, wit, etc.,--in
short, the turning of State affairs into a comedy,--have undermined
States from of old: they are not "innocent." And, further, what
boundaries are to be drawn between guilty and innocent wit, etc.? At
this question the moderates fall into great perplexity, and everything
reduces itself to the prayer that the State (government) would please
not be so _sensitive_, so _ticklish_; that it would not immediately
scent malevolence in "harmless" things, and would in general be a little
"more tolerant." Exaggerated sensitiveness is certainly a weakness, its
avoidance may be a praiseworthy virtue; but in time of war one cannot be
sparing, and what may be allowed under peaceable circumstances ceases to
be permitted as soon as a state of siege is declared. Because the
well-meaning liberals feel this plainly, they hasten to declare that,
considering "the devotion of the people," there is assuredly no danger
to be feared. But the government will be wiser, and not let itself be
talked into believing anything of that sort. It knows too well how
people stuff one with fine words, and will not let itself be satisfied
with this Barmecide dish.
But they are bound to have their play-ground, for they are children, you
know, and cannot be so staid as old folks; boys will be boys.
Only for this play-ground, only for a few hours of jolly running about,
they bargain. They ask only that the State should not, like a splenetic
papa, be too cross. It should permit some Processions of the Ass and
plays of fools, as the church allowed them in the Middle Ages. But the
times when it could grant this without danger are past. Children that
now once come _into the open_, and live through an hour without the rod
of discipline, are no longer willing to go into the _cell_. For the open
is now no longer a _supplement_ to the cell, no longer a refreshing
_recreation_, but its _opposite_, an _aut--aut_. In short, the State
must either no longer put up with anything, or put up with everything
and perish; it must be either sensitive through and through, or, like a
dead man, insensitive. Tolerance is done with. If the State but gives a
finger, they take the whole hand at once. There can be no more
"jesting," and all jest, such as fun, wit, humor, etc., becomes bitter
earnest.
The clamor of the Liberals for freedom of the press runs counter to
their own principle, their proper _will_. They will what they _do not
will_, _i. e._ they wish, they would like. Hence it is too that they
fall away so easily when once so-called freedom of the press appears;
then they would like censorship. Quite naturally. The State is sacred
even to them; likewise morals, etc. They behave toward it only as
ill-bred brats, as tricky children who seek to utilize the weaknesses of
their parents. Papa State is to permit them to say many things that do
not please him, but papa has the right, by a stern look, to blue-pencil
their impertinent gabble. If they recognize in him their papa, they must
in his presence put up with the censorship of speech, like every child.
* * * * *
If you let yourself be made out in the right by another, you must no
less let yourself be made out in the wrong by him; if justification and
reward come to you from him, expect also his arraignment and punishment.
Alongside right goes wrong, alongside legality _crime_. What are
_you_?--_You_ are a----_criminal_!
"The criminal is in the utmost degree the State's own crime!" says
Bettina.[139] One may let this sentiment pass, even if Bettina herself
does not understand it exactly so. For in the State the unbridled I--I,
as I belong to myself alone--cannot come to my fulfilment and
realization. Every ego is from birth a criminal to begin with against
the people, the State. Hence it is that it does really keep watch over
all; it sees in each one an--egoist, and it is afraid of the egoist. It
presumes the worst about each one, and takes care, police-care, that "no
harm happens to the State," _ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat_. The
unbridled ego--and this we originally are, and in our secret inward
parts we remain so always--is the never-ceasing criminal in the State.
The man whom his boldness, his will, his inconsiderateness and
fearlessness lead is surrounded with spies by the State, by the people.
I say, by the people! The people (think it something wonderful, you
good-hearted folks, what you have in the people)--the people is full of
police sentiments through and through.--Only he who renounces his ego,
who practises "self-renunciation," is acceptable to the people.
In the book cited Bettina is throughout good-natured enough to regard
the State as only sick, and to hope for its recovery, a recovery which
she would bring about through the "demagogues";[140] but it is not sick;
rather is it in its full strength, when it puts from it the demagogues
who want to acquire something for the individuals, for "all." In its
believers it is provided with the best demagogues (leaders of the
people). According to Bettina, the State is to[141] "develop mankind's
germ of freedom; otherwise it is a raven-mother[142] and caring for
raven-fodder!" It cannot do otherwise, for in its very caring for
"mankind" (which, besides, would have to be the "humane" or "free" State
to begin with) the "individual" is raven-fodder for it. How rightly
speaks the burgomaster, on the other hand:[143] "What? the State has no
other duty than to be merely the attendant of incurable invalids?--That
isn't to the point. From of old the healthy State has relieved itself of
the diseased matter, and not mixed itself with it. It does not need to
be so economical with its juices. Cut off the robber-branches without
hesitation, that the others may bloom.--Do not shiver at the State's
harshness; its morality, its policy and religion, point it to that.
Accuse it of no want of feeling; its sympathy revolts against this, but
its experience finds safety only in this severity! There are diseases in
which only drastic remedies will help. The physician who recognizes the
disease as such, but timidly turns to palliatives, will never remove the
disease, but may well cause the patient to succumb after a shorter or
longer sickness!" Frau Rat's question, "If you apply death as a drastic
remedy, how is the cure to be wrought then?" isn't to the point. Why,
the State does not apply death against itself, but against an offensive
member; it tears out an eye that offends it, etc.
"For the invalid State the only way of salvation is to make man flourish
in it."[144] If one here, like Bettina, understands by man the concept
"Man," she is right; the "invalid" State will recover by the
flourishing of "Man," for, the more infatuated the individuals are with
"Man," the better it serves the State's turn. But, if one referred it to
the individuals, to "all" (and the authoress half does this too, because
about "Man" she is still involved in vagueness), then it would sound
somewhat like the following: For an invalid band of robbers the only way
of salvation is to make the loyal citizen flourish in it! Why, thereby
the band of robbers would simply go to ruin as a band of robbers; and,
because it perceives this, it prefers to shoot every one who has a
leaning toward becoming a "steady man."
In this book Bettina is a patriot, or, what is little more, a
philanthropist, a worker for human happiness. She is discontented with
the existing order in quite the same way as is the title-ghost of her
book, along with all who would like to bring back the good old faith and
what goes with it. Only she thinks, contrariwise, that the politicians,
place-holders, and diplomats ruined the State, while those lay it at the
door of the malevolent, the "seducers of the people."
What is the ordinary criminal but one who has committed the fatal
mistake of endeavoring after what is the people's instead of seeking for
what is his? He has sought despicable _alien_ goods, has done what
believers do who seek after what is God's. What does the priest who
admonishes the criminal do? He sets before him the great wrong of having
desecrated by his act what was hallowed by the State, its property (in
which, of course, must be included even the life of those who belong to
the State); instead of this, he might rather hold up to him the fact
that he has befouled _himself_ in not _despising_ the alien thing, but
thinking it worth stealing; he could, if he were not a parson. Talk with
the so-called criminal as with an egoist, and he will be ashamed, not
that he transgressed against your laws and goods, but that he considered
your laws worth evading, your goods worth desiring; he will be ashamed
that he did not--despise you and yours together, that he was too little
an egoist. But you cannot talk egoistically with him, for you are not so
great as a criminal, you--commit no crime! You do not know that an ego
who is his own cannot desist from being a criminal, that crime is his
life. And yet you should know it, since you believe that "we are all
miserable sinners"; but you think surreptitiously to get beyond sin, you
do not comprehend--for you are devil-fearing--that guilt is the value of
a man. Oh, if you were guilty! But now you are "righteous."[145]
Well,--just put every thing nicely to rights[146] for your master!
When the Christian consciousness, or the Christian man, draws up a
criminal code, what can the concept of _crime_ be there but
simply--_heartlessness_? Each severing and wounding of a _heart
relation_, each _heartless behavior_ toward a sacred being, is crime.
The more heartfelt the relation is supposed to be, the more scandalous
is the deriding of it, and the more worthy of punishment the crime.
Every one who is subject to the lord should love him; to deny this love
is a high treason worthy of death. Adultery is a heartlessness worthy
of punishment; one has no heart, no enthusiasm, no pathetic feeling for
the sacredness of marriage. So long as the heart or soul dictates laws,
only the heartful or soulful man enjoys the protection of the laws. That
the man of soul makes laws means properly only that the _moral_ man
makes them: what contradicts these men's "moral feeling," this they
penalize. How, _e. g._, should disloyalty, secession, breach of
oaths,--in short, all _radical breaking off_, all tearing asunder of
venerable _ties_,--not be flagitious and criminal in their eyes? He who
breaks with these demands of the soul has for enemies all the moral, all
the men of soul. Only Krummacher and his mates are the right people to
set up consistently a penal code of the heart, as a certain bill
sufficiently proves. The consistent legislation of the Christian State
must be placed wholly in the hands of the--_parsons_, and will not
become pure and coherent so long as it is worked out only by--the
_parson-ridden_, who are always only _half-parsons_. Only then will
every lack of soulfulness, every heartlessness, be certified as an
unpardonable crime, only then will every agitation of the soul become
condemnable, every objection of criticism and doubt be anathematized;
only then is the own man, before the Christian consciousness, a
convicted--_criminal_ to begin with.
The men of the Revolution often talked of the people's "just revenge" as
its "right." Revenge and right coincide here. Is this an attitude of an
ego to an ego? The people cries that the opposite party has committed
"crimes" against it. Can I assume that one commits a crime against me,
without assuming that he has to act as I see fit? And this action I
call the right, the good, etc.; the divergent action, a crime. So I
think that the others must aim at the _same_ goal with me; _i. e._, I do
not treat them as unique beings[147] who bear their law in themselves
and live according to it, but as beings who are to obey some "rational"
law. I set up what "Man" is and what acting in a "truly human" way is,
and I demand of every one that this law become norm and ideal to him;
otherwise he will expose himself as a "sinner and criminal." But upon
the "guilty" falls the "penalty of the law"!
One sees here how it is "Man" again who sets on foot even the concept of
crime, of sin, and therewith that of right. A man in whom I do not
recognize "Man" is "a sinner, a guilty one."
Only against a sacred thing are there criminals; you against me can
never be a criminal, but only an opponent. But not to hate him who
injures a sacred thing is in itself a crime, as St. Just cries out
against Danton: "Are you not a criminal and responsible for not having
hated the enemies of the fatherland?"--
If, as in the Revolution, what "Man" is is apprehended as "good
citizen," then from this concept of "Man" we have the well-known
"political offences and crimes."
In all this the individual, the individual man, is regarded as refuse,
and on the other hand the general man, "Man," is honored. Now, according
to how this ghost is named,--as Christian, Jew, Mussulman, good
citizen, loyal subject, freeman, patriot, etc.,--just so do those who
would like to carry through a divergent concept of man, as well as those
who want to put _themselves_ through, fall before victorious "Man."
And with what unction the butchery goes on here in the name of the law,
of the sovereign people, of God, etc.!
Now, if the persecuted trickily conceal and protect themselves from the
stern parsonical judges, people stigmatize them as "hypocrites," as St.
Just, _e. g._, does those whom he accuses in the speech against
Danton.[148] One is to be a fool, and deliver himself up to their
Moloch.
Crimes spring from _fixed ideas_. The sacredness of marriage is a fixed
idea. From the sacredness it follows that infidelity is a _crime_, and
therefore a certain marriage law imposes upon it a shorter or longer
_penalty_. But by those who proclaim "freedom as sacred" this penalty
must be regarded as a crime against freedom, and only in this sense has
public opinion in fact branded the marriage law.
Society would have _every one_ come to his right indeed, but yet only to
that which is sanctioned by society, to the society-right, not really to
_his_ right. But _I_ give or take to myself the right out of my own
plenitude of power, and against every superior power I am the most
impenitent criminal. Owner and creator of my right, I recognize no other
source of right than--me, neither God nor the State nor nature nor even
man himself with his "eternal rights of man," neither divine nor human
right.
Right "in and for itself." Without relation to me, therefore! "Absolute
right." Separated from me, therefore! A thing that exists in and for
itself! An absolute! An eternal right, like an eternal truth!
According to the liberal way of thinking, right is to be obligatory for
me because it is thus established by _human reason_, against which _my
reason_ is "unreason." Formerly people inveighed in the name of divine
reason against weak human reason; now, in the name of strong human
reason, against egoistic reason, which is rejected as "unreason." And
yet none is real but this very "unreason." Neither divine nor human
reason, but only your and my reason existing at any given time, is real,
as and because you and I are real.
The thought of right is originally my thought; or, it has its origin in
me. But, when it has sprung from me, when the "Word" is out, then it has
"become flesh," it is a _fixed idea_. Now I no longer get rid of the
thought; however I turn, it stands before me. Thus men have not become
masters again of the thought "right," which they themselves created;
their creature is running away with them. This is absolute right, that
which is absolved or unfastened from me. We, revering it as absolute,
cannot devour it again, and it takes from us the creative power; the
creature is more than the creator, it is "in and for itself."
Once you no longer let right run around free, once you draw it back into
its origin, into you, it is _your_ right; and that is right which suits
you.
* * * * *
Right has had to suffer an attack within itself, i. e. from the
standpoint of right; war being declared on the part of liberalism
against "privilege."[149]
_Privileged_ and _endowed with equal rights_--on these two concepts
turns a stubborn fight. Excluded or admitted--would mean the same. But
where should there be a power--be it an imaginary one like God, law, or
a real one like I, you--of which it should not be true that before it
all are "endowed with equal rights," _i. e._ no respect of persons
holds? Every one is equally dear to God if he adores him, equally
agreeable to the law if only he is a law-abiding person; whether the
lover of God and the law is humpbacked and lame, whether poor or rich,
and the like, that amounts to nothing for God and the law; just so, when
you are at the point of drowning, you like a negro as rescuer as well as
the most excellent Caucasian,--yes, in this situation you esteem a dog
not less than a man. But to whom will not every one be also,
contrariwise, a preferred or disregarded person? God punishes the wicked
with his wrath, the law chastises the lawless, you let one visit you
every moment and show the other the door.
The "equality of right" is a phantom just because right is nothing more
and nothing less than admission, _i. e._ a _matter of grace_, which, be
it said, one may also acquire by his desert; for desert and grace are
not contradictory, since even grace wishes to be "deserved" and our
gracious smile falls only to him who knows how to force it from us.
So people dream of "all citizens of the State having to stand side by
side, with equal rights." As citizens of the State they are certainly
all equal for the State. But it will divide them, and advance them or
put them in the rear, according to its special ends, if on no other
account; and still more must it distinguish them from one another as
good and bad citizens.
Bruno Bauer disposes of the Jew question from the standpoint that
"privilege" is not justified. Because Jew and Christian have each some
point of advantage over the other, and in having this point of advantage
are exclusive, therefore before the critic's gaze they crumble into
nothingness. With them the State lies under the like blame, since it
justifies their having advantages and stamps it as a "privilege" or
prerogative, but thereby derogates from its calling to become a "free
State."
But now every one has something of advantage over another,--_viz._,
himself or his individuality; in this everybody remains exclusive.
And, again, before a third party every one makes his peculiarity count
for as much as possible, and (if he wants to win him at all) tries to
make it appear attractive before him.
Now, is the third party to be insensible to the difference of the one
from the other? Do they ask that of the free State or of humanity? Then
these would have to be absolutely without self-interest, and incapable
of taking an interest in any one whatever. Neither God (who divides his
own from the wicked) nor the State (which knows how to separate good
citizens from bad) was thought of as so indifferent.
But they are looking for this very third party that bestows no more
"privilege." Then it is called perhaps the free State, or humanity, or
whatever else it may be.
As Christian and Jew are ranked low by Br. Bauer on account of their
asserting privileges, it must be that they could and should free
themselves from their narrow standpoint by self-renunciation or
unselfishness. If they threw off their "egoism," the mutual wrong would
cease, and with it Christian and Jewish religiousness in general; it
would be necessary only that neither of them should any longer want to
be anything peculiar.
But, if they gave up this exclusiveness, with that the ground on which
their hostilities were waged would in truth not yet be forsaken. In case
of need they would indeed find a third thing on which they could unite,
a "general religion," a "religion of humanity," and the like; in short,
an equalization, which need not be better than that which would result
if all Jews became Christians, by which likewise the "privilege" of one
over the other would have an end. The _tension_[150] would indeed be
done away, but in this consisted not the essence of the two, but only
their neighborhood. As being distinguished from each other they must
necessarily be mutually resistant,[151] and the disparity will always
remain. Truly it is not a failing in you that you stiffen[152] yourself
against me and assert your distinctness or peculiarity: you need not
give way or renounce yourself.
People conceive the significance of the opposition too _formally_ and
weakly when they want only to "dissolve" it in order to make room for a
third thing that shall "unite." The opposition deserves rather to be
_sharpened_. As Jew and Christian you are in too slight an opposition,
and are contending only about religion, as it were about the emperor's
beard, about a fiddlestick's end. Enemies in religion indeed, _in the
rest_ you still remain good friends, and equal to each other, _e. g_. as
men. Nevertheless the rest too is unlike in each; and the time when you
no longer merely _dissemble_ your opposition will be only when you
entirely recognize it, and everybody asserts himself from top to toe as
_unique_.[153] Then the former opposition will assuredly be dissolved,
but only because a stronger has taken it up into itself.
Our weakness consists not in this, that we are in opposition to others,
but in this, that we are not completely so; _i. e._ that we are not
entirely _severed_ from them, or that we seek a "communion," a "bond,"
that in communion we have an ideal. One faith, one God, one idea, one
hat, for all! If all were brought under one hat, certainly no one would
any longer need to take off his hat before another.
The last and most decided opposition, that of unique against unique, is
at bottom beyond what is called opposition, but without having sunk back
into "unity" and unison. As unique you have nothing in common with the
other any longer, and therefore nothing divisive or hostile either; you
are not seeking to be in the right against him before a _third_ party,
and are standing with him neither "on the ground of right" nor on any
other common ground. The opposition vanishes in complete--_severance_ or
singleness.[154] This might indeed be regarded as the new point in
common or a new parity, but here the parity consists precisely in the
disparity, and is itself nothing but disparity, a par of disparity, and
that only for him who institutes a "comparison."
The polemic against privilege forms a characteristic feature of
liberalism, which fumes against "privilege" because it itself appeals to
"right." Further than to fuming it cannot carry this; for privileges do
not fall before right falls, as they are only forms of right. But right
falls apart into its nothingness when it is swallowed up by might,
_i. e._ when one understands what is meant by "Might goes before right."
All right explains itself then as privilege, and privilege itself as
power, as--_superior power_.
But must not the mighty combat against superior power show quite another
face than the modest combat against privilege, which is to be fought out
before a first judge, "Right," according to the judge's mind?
* * * * *
Now, in conclusion, I have still to take back the half-way form of
expression of which I was willing to make use only so long as I was
still rooting among the entrails of right, and letting the word at least
stand. But, in fact, with the concept the word too loses its meaning.
What I called "my right" is no longer "right" at all, because right can
be bestowed only by a spirit, be it the spirit of nature or that of the
species, of mankind, the Spirit of God or that of His Holiness or His
Highness, etc. What I have without an entitling spirit I have without
right; I have it solely and alone through my _power_.
I do not demand any right, therefore I need not recognize any either.
What I can get by force I get by force, and what I do not get by force I
have no right to, nor do I give myself airs, or consolation, with my
imprescriptible right.
With absolute right, right itself passes away; the dominion of the
"concept of right" is canceled at the same time. For it is not to be
forgotten that hitherto concepts, ideas, or principles ruled us, and
that among these rulers the concept of right, or of justice, played one
of the most important parts.
Entitled or unentitled--that does not concern me; if I am only
_powerful_, I am of myself _empowered_, and need no other empowering or
entitling.
Right--is a wheel in the head, put there by a spook; power--that am I
myself, I am the powerful one and owner of power. Right is above me, is
absolute, and exists in one higher, as whose grace it flows to me: right
is a gift of grace from the judge; power and might exist only in me the
powerful and mighty.