BOESINGHE, JULY 1917
_Diary of the War_
[Sidenote: July 1917.]
During this month the Germans made a determined attack on Nieuport in
the Dune country near the coast, and succeeded in penetrating 600
yards into the British line, in spite of the stout resistance of the
British troops; but a counter-attack was successfully launched, and
restored the line to its original position. At the end of July a
combined attack by the British and French troops in Flanders commenced
in the neighbourhood of Ypres.
On the French front the Germans made strong attacks on the Chemin des
Dames and gained some ground after severe fighting, but a week later
the French were able to regain all the lost ground.
The Russians, under General Korniloff, advanced in Galicia, and even
gained some victories over the Austrians, but disaffection was
beginning to show itself among the men, and the Germans found no
difficulty in driving them back over the frontier. This retirement on
the part of the Russians ended in an ignominious retreat and open
mutiny.
London was raided by a large number of German aeroplanes, and many
people were killed and wounded by the bombs which were dropped.
THE GUARDS DIVISION
When the attack on the Boesinghe Sector was decided upon, the great
difficulty of crossing the Canal under the enemy’s artillery fire at
once presented itself to the Corps and Divisional Commanders. It would
be necessary to construct bridges, and under an accurate barrage the
loss of life entailed in crossing the Canal would certainly be very
heavy. Lord Cavan thoroughly appreciated the drawbacks, but thought a
well-organised attack would succeed. He ordered every detail of the
attack to be carefully rehearsed over dummy representations of the
Canal and the German trenches, and by the end of July every officer,
N.C.O., and even every man knew exactly what he had to do. During this
time the enemy seem to have been completely ignorant of the
preparations that were being made, and imagined that so long as their
positions farther south remained intact there was small probability of
an attack on this sector of the line.
[Illustration: _Boesinghe
July 31st 1917_
_Emery Walker Ltd._]
The date of the attack, or zero day, was originally fixed for the
28th, but on the 24th it was postponed until the 31st. About a week
before zero day British aeroplanes reported that, although the German
trenches were fully manned at dawn, the greater part of the garrison
was withdrawn during the day to avoid the shells. A small incident
occurred which left no doubt in General Feilding’s mind on this point.
Two wounded British soldiers who had been left behind during a night
raid were observed on the far side of the Canal, and Lieutenant C. J.
Hambro and Private Smith of the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards
volunteered to go across the Canal and bring them in. This they
succeeded in doing, and Lieutenant Hambro reported that not only had
he not been fired on during his successful venture, but that he had
seen no signs of the enemy at all.
General Feilding thereupon conceived the audacious plan of seizing the
Canal in broad daylight without the aid of an artillery barrage. If
the information which he had gained was correct, the enterprise would
certainly succeed, but if on the other hand the absence of the Germans
was only momentary, as had so often happened, it might prove a costly
failure. He decided not to wait but to strike at once, and accordingly
sent for Lieut.-Colonel Crawfurd commanding the 3rd Battalion
Coldstream Guards, and told him to send out strong patrols properly
supported at 5 P.M. as far as Baboon Support Trench, Artillery Wood,
and Cactus Junction. As the matter was urgent, these orders were given
verbally, and were later confirmed in writing, but it was not found
possible to start before 5.20. The whole scheme, although planned at a
moment’s notice, was well thought out. The patrols pushed forward
closely followed by supporting platoons and moppers-up, and succeeded
without difficulty in reaching their objectives, where they surprised
the Germans who had been left in charge of the trenches. Many
prisoners were made, but so quickly and unobtrusively was the raid
carried out that the Germans in rear were totally ignorant of what was
happening in front. The Division on the right attempted a similar raid
somewhat later, but owing to no moppers-up having been ordered to
accompany the raiders, the patrols were captured or killed by Germans
who emerged from dug-outs in rear of them. The following day, however,
it succeeded in gaining a foothold on the farther bank of the Canal.
For the best part of two days the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards
remained in its advanced positions unmolested. When the men of a
German patrol advanced on their usual rounds, they were allowed to
enter the trench, and were then quietly made prisoners. On the 29th an
officers’ patrol sauntered along down a communication trench quite
unconscious of the danger it was approaching; the officer himself and
the leading men were made prisoners, but the N.C.O. in rear escaped,
although he was fired upon. Presumably he dashed off, and telephoned
that the front German trenches were in our hands. It was not long
before enemy aeroplanes came soaring over at a comparatively low
height to investigate the situation, and then the enemy’s artillery
deluged these trenches unmercifully with shells.
However, the Canal had been gained, and the enormous advantage of this
could not well be over-estimated. The attack was started on the far
bank, and thus hundreds of men were saved from being killed in the
initial stages.
On the night of the 29th the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards and 1st
Battalion Irish Guards were relieved by battalions from the 2nd and
3rd Guards Brigades. On the left the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and 1st
Battalion Welsh Guards from the 3rd Guards Brigade, and on the right
the 1st Scots Guards and 2nd Irish Guards from the 2nd Guards Brigade,
moved up to take over their attack frontages.
The order of battle of the Guards Division was as follows:
3RD GUARDS BRIGADE
(SEYMOUR)
1st Welsh Gds. 1st Gren. Gds.
(Gordon) (Maitland)
2nd Scots Gds. 4th Gren. Gds.
(Orr-Ewing) (Gort)
2ND GUARDS BRIGADE
(PONSONBY)
2nd Irish Gds. 1st Scots Gds.
(Greer) (Ross)
1st Cold. Gds. 3rd Gren. Gds.
(Brand) (Thorne)
1ST GUARDS BRIGADE
(JEFFREYS)
2nd Cold. Gds. 2nd Gren. Gds.
(Follett) (De Crespigny)
3rd Cold. Gds. 1st Irish Gds.
(Crawfurd) (Pollock)
The first objective, or Blue line, consisted of Cariboo Trench, Wood
15 Trench, and Wood 15.
The second objective, or Black line, some 600 yards farther on, ran
parallel to the Pilckem road.
The third objective, or Green line, was not a line of trenches, but an
imaginary line 100 yards beyond the Iron Cross――Kortekeer Cabaret
road.
The fourth objective, or Dotted Green line, was not parallel to the
others, and while it crossed the Steenbeek on the right joined up with
the Green line on the left. The total depth was about 1¾ miles from
the Canal.
The French First Division was on the left, and the Thirty-eighth Welsh
Division on the right of the Guards Division.
The 2nd and 3rd Guards Brigades were to take the first three
objectives, and the 1st Guards Brigade was then to pass through and
secure the fourth. In the 2nd and 3rd Brigades the leading Battalions
were responsible for the first and second objectives, and the
Battalions in support for the third.
So carefully had the whole attack been rehearsed that from the first
there was never a moment’s hesitation: each Company knew exactly what
was expected of it. If General Feilding with his staff had thought out
every eventuality, he could not have asked for more prompt execution
of his orders. Each successive objective was captured exactly
according to the time stated in the orders. The creeping barrage was
perfect. The Field Companies of the Royal Engineers did admirable
work, and nothing could have been better than the arrangements for
bringing up ammunition, water, and rations. There appears to have been
no hitch throughout the attack.
Ponsonby’s Brigade on the right occupied the frontage from the railway
to Boesinghe Bridge, while Seymour’s Brigade continued the line to the
left for 600 yards. The frontage of Ponsonby’s Brigade, although much
smaller than that of Seymour’s, included more enclosed and difficult
country with many strong points. Whether it was wise to have the
railway as a boundary between the Guards and the Thirty-eighth
Division is open to doubt. There was a number of concrete block-houses
on the railway which gave a great deal of trouble, and required the
united efforts of the troops on the flanks of both Divisions. Now the
junction of two Divisions is admittedly the weakest part in the line,
and therefore it would have been better had the difficult task of
capturing these block-houses been entrusted wholly to one Division.
These concrete block-houses or “pill-boxes” were built in the ruins of
the numerous farms scattered about the country. They were cunningly
concealed under old roofs and screened from frontal view by bricks and
rubble, and the tops were often covered with old tiles, grass, or
earth. They were generally built to accommodate eight or twelve men,
and were strong enough to resist a direct hit from a field-gun or
light howitzer, but their weakness seems to have been the restricted
field of fire from the loopholes. This enabled troops to work round
them and often close up to them without difficulty.
The morning was excessively dark and cloudy, although it was not
raining. Zero hour was at 3.50, but it was not until 4.10 A.M. that
the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards and 1st Battalion Scots Guards advanced
in four waves, with an interval of 100 yards between each wave, moving
at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes behind the creeping barrage.
The first objective was captured at 4.30. During the barrage which the
enemy’s artillery put down on the Canal, the Scots Guards had the
misfortune to lose the services of their Commanding Officer,
Lieut.-Colonel Romilly, who was wounded by a shell, and soon after the
attack started Lieut.-Colonel E. B. Greer commanding the 2nd Battalion
Irish Guards was killed. This was a serious loss to the Guards
Division, as he had proved himself a most able officer.
Punctually the attack on the second objective started, and although
the pill-boxes proved hard nuts to crack, the Black line was
successfully taken. The Scots Guards had their right flank constantly
exposed to enfilade fire from the railway, and were consequently
obliged to throw back a defensive flank, so that when they reached the
Black line they had hardly sufficient men for the front allotted to
them. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Coldstream in
support, however, made good the deficiency when they advanced to the
third objective. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers which passed through the
Scots Guards had to contend with precisely the same difficulty, and as
it advanced was continually obliged to leave men to guard its right
flank. In spite of all this, the Green line fell into our hands, and
was at once consolidated.
Meanwhile the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards
in Seymour’s Brigade had the advantage of starting the attack from
Baboon Reserve Trench some 500 yards on the far side of the Canal, and
had to wait some time to enable Ponsonby’s Brigade to come up on their
right. They advanced behind the creeping barrage and had no difficulty
in reaching the first objective. Nor did the Black line present any
great stumbling-block, although the casualties here were heavier. As
soon as this line was consolidated, the 4th Battalion Grenadiers and
2nd Battalion Scots Guards passed through and attacked the Green line.
Here there was a slight delay, as the French Division on the left was
held up near Colonel’s Farm. It was only a momentary check, and as the
2nd Battalion Scots Guards passed this farm the French were able to
capture it. So the Green line was reached.
The moment had now arrived for Jeffreys’ Brigade to pass through, and
the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers on the right, and the 2nd Battalion
Coldstream on the left, taking up the whole Divisional frontage, swept
over the ground in perfect formation. The task of the Grenadiers
involved the more severe fighting, since they were confronted with a
large number of “pill-boxes.” They also had the same difficulty as
their predecessors with the railway, but after severe fighting
succeeded in one place in gaining a foothold on the farther side of
the Steenbeek River. No. 2 Company of the 2nd Grenadiers, on the
extreme right, reached the river, but found it impossible to cross it.
Although the Coldstream did not encounter so much opposition, they had
to wheel to the left in the course of the advance――by no means an easy
manœuvre when the shells were falling thick; but they carried out
their task most successfully, and joined up with the Grenadiers. By 11
A.M. Brigadier-General Jeffreys was able to report that, except by the
extreme right Company, all the objectives had been secured. No
counter-attack was attempted against the front held by the Guards
Division, no doubt because the Germans were thoroughly disorganised.
At the end of the attack our barrage became thin and uncertain, making
it impossible for the companies in front to send out patrols; but when
it became dark the barrage ceased, and the 2nd Battalion Coldstream
Guards succeeded in establishing advanced posts at Pinson and Sentier
Farms.
During the advance the dash and gallantry displayed by the 201st
French Regiment on the left, often in circumstances of exceptional
difficulty, gained the admiration of the whole Guards Division. The
ground over which it passed was covered with block-houses; there were
several strong posts which had to be reckoned with; but in spite of
all this it managed to keep pace with the Division.
The total casualties in the Guards Division during these operations
were 59 officers and 1876 men, while 750 Germans were taken prisoner,
and 30 machine-guns and 1 howitzer were captured.
THE 3RD BATTALION
[Sidenote: 3rd Batt.]
On the evening of the 30th of July the 3rd Battalion left Forest Area,
and moved up with the remainder of the 2nd Brigade to the assembly
area on the western side of the Canal. On the way it halted in a field
just east of Elverdinghe, and the men were provided with hot tea and
rum. This halt had a very good effect, for not only did it give the
men rest on a long and tiring march, but it saved them from the
nervous tension of a long period of waiting in the line for the battle
to begin.
The east side of the Canal had fallen into our hands a few days
previously, and it was therefore possible to hold that side lightly.
On the right of the Guards Division the Thirty-eighth Division had
been equally successful, and had established itself on the east bank;
but it had not been able to push its line any farther forward.
The 1st Battalion Scots Guards and the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards were
to be in the front line, and their leading companies were to start
from the farther side of the Canal, which had fallen into our hands a
few days previously. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion
Coldstream were in reserve some 400 yards from the Canal. The two
leading Battalions were to take the first and second objectives, and
the two Battalions in reserve were then to pass through and secure the
third objective. The final objective was left to the 1st Guards
Brigade, which formed the Divisional Reserve.
The following officers took part in the attack:
Lieut.-Colonel A. F. A. N. Thorne, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Lieut. K. Henderson Acting Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. L. Holbech Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. E. R. M. Fryer No. 1 Company.
Lieut. F. J. Siltzer ” ”
2nd Lieut. A. G. Elliott ” ”
Capt. the Hon. F. O. H. Eaton No. 2 Company.
Lieut. F. W. R. Greenhill ” ”
Lieut. J. F. Worsley ” ”
Capt. W. W. S. C. Neville, M.C. No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. the Hon. A. M. Borthwick ” ”
2nd Lieut. B. J. Dunlop ” ”
Lieut. F. J. Heasman No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. C. W. Carrington ” ”
_Attached_――Capt. G. W. East, R.A.M.C.
The whole Brigade took up its battle positions without any difficulty:
the two leading Battalions each placed two companies less two platoons
on the farther bank, and left two platoons as moppers-up on the
western bank. The shelling of the Canal by the German artillery never
ceased for a moment, and caused a good many casualties. The attack was
timed to start at 3.50 A.M., but in order to conform with the creeping
barrage the actual advance of the Brigade did not take place till
twenty minutes later. The leading Battalions advanced behind the
creeping barrage in four waves, with an interval of over 100 yards
between each wave. The attack was assisted by a machine-gun barrage:
eight guns from the Divisional Machine-Gun Company were detailed for
this work, as well as the 4th Guards and the 29th Machine-Gun
Companies. Both by the attacking troops, and by prisoners who were
subsequently taken in the advance, this barrage was reported to have
been most effective.
The attack was completely successful, and the first objective or Blue
line was secured at 4.30 A.M., but there was naturally a considerable
number of casualties, especially on the right, where the Scots Guards
were exposed to enfilade fire. The 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards
waited in its trenches until 5 A.M., by which time it was light; and
although the enemy continued with all the German thoroughness to shell
the Canal itself, it never seems to have occurred to him to put
barrages down farther back. This was undoubtedly a bad mistake on his
part.
At 5 A.M., according to orders, the 3rd Battalion started off with No.
1 Company under Lieutenant E. R. Fryer on the right, and No. 2 Company
under Captain the Hon. F. Eaton on the left. In support came No. 3
Company, commanded by Captain W. Neville, while No. 4 Company under
Lieutenant F. Heasman was employed in carrying up material to the
various objectives, and was directly under the orders of the Brigade.
The passage across the Canal was successfully accomplished, though
owing to the broken bridges there was a certain amount of delay. In
some places, indeed, these bridges, consisting of petrol tins, had
been so much damaged that there was practically nothing to walk upon.
However, the barrage thrown on the Canal was by no means continuous,
and as a certain amount of latitude was allowed in the choice of a
crossing, officers were able to select comparatively safe courses,
with the result that there were no casualties. Having crossed the
Canal, the Battalion advanced in artillery formation towards Artillery
Wood over the most difficult ground, while the German artillery sent
high-explosive shells over, directing them to any strong points that
might be made use of by the attacking force. So the 3rd Battalion
arrived at the Blue line.
Meanwhile the battalions in front had been pushing on to the second
objective or Black line. This phase of the attack was more
complicated, for the enemy’s machine-guns were scattered about in
“pill-boxes,” which were difficult to capture, and a great many
casualties occurred not only from the machine-guns, but also from the
German infantry, which was holding positions in the shell-holes in
front of its trenches.
When the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards approached the Black line it
found that there were hardly any British troops in front of it, as the
Scots Guards, having suffered heavy casualties, were mostly employed
in dealing with the “pill-boxes” on their right. Captain Eaton at once
disengaged No. 2 Company, and brought it up on the left of No. 1. The
enemy’s machine-guns at Maison Tambour had been very troublesome, and
had caused twenty casualties in No. 1 Company on the way up. Leaving
Captain Neville to deal with this difficulty, Captain Eaton and
Lieutenant Fryer extended their companies in two waves, and with the
help of the Scots Guards, who were now freed from guarding the right
flank, rushed on, and seized the second objective or Black line. At
the same time Captain Neville brought up Lewis guns and rifle
grenades, and with the help of hand grenades succeeded in silencing
the obstructive enemy post. The Adjutant, Lieutenant Henderson,
finding that the Division on the right was not keeping pace, went out
to find the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, but before he was able to
accomplish his mission he was shot through the body, and eventually
carried back into safety.
Although the Black line had been captured, the situation on the right
was still unsatisfactory, and part of No. 1 Company had to face to
that flank. The duty of reporting the position of the Battalion to the
contact aeroplanes was then accomplished by waving large flappers
above sheets laid on the ground.
The advance to the third objective or Green line was now timed to
begin, and this was entrusted to the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st
Battalion Coldstream. As the advance progressed considerable
opposition was met with from the block-houses on the railway. These
block-houses were also holding up the Thirty-eighth Division. Nor was
No. 2 Company on the left of the Grenadiers free to advance, as there
were several “pill-boxes” in front of it to be disposed of. Captain
Eaton began to deal with these methodically, and with the aid of Lewis
guns and bombs demolished each in turn. As No. 1 Company approached a
house which it had surrounded, a large white flag was seen to be waved
frantically from one of the apertures, and eventually three German
officers and fifty men emerged and surrendered.
Captain Neville was occupied in dealing with the situation on the
right, while Nos. 1 and 2 Companies continued their advance. Just
beyond Wood House he brought up two machine-guns and got them into
action under cover of the low railway embankment. Lieutenant Dunlop
was told to advance with No. 9 Platoon, and started off most gallantly
in the face of a withering fire when he was shot dead. Captain Neville
at once brought up No. 12 Platoon, while Lieutenant Borthwick, with
No. 11 Platoon, guarded the right flank. This enabled Nos. 1 and 2
Companies to push on and secure the Green line. During the last
advance Captain Eaton had been unable to keep touch with the 1st
Battalion Coldstream Guards, who had had to bear to the left to retain
touch with the 3rd Guards Brigade, but on reaching the Green line
every unit was at its allotted post. While Captain Eaton and
Lieutenant Fryer were ordering their Companies to consolidate the
position, Captain Neville noticed that the Thirty-eighth Division was
still being held up by three “pill-boxes” which were situated in rear
of his Company on the other side of the railway line. Rifle-fire was
quite useless against 2 feet of ferro-concrete, and he therefore
determined to make a bombing attack. Though there was, of course,
considerable danger of the attackers being shot by the Thirty-eighth
Division, it seemed the only way of dealing with this obstruction. The
attack was led by Sergeant Browning and Private Baker, both of whom
were wounded, and was wonderfully successful, the enemy being
completely dislodged from their position, and losing 20 killed and 42
captured. Lieut.-Colonel Thorne came up soon after, and expressed his
approval of all the dispositions that had been made. In order to
adhere strictly to the orders, he told Captain Neville to take his men
from the front line into support, and Lieut. Fryer to occupy the whole
of the front-line trench. At this moment, however, the 2nd Battalion
Grenadier Guards, of the 1st Brigade, was seen advancing to pass
through, and in order to prevent any confusion Captain Neville decided
to wait until it had passed before sorting out his men. Having carried
out his orders he was just looking round to see if there were no more
men of his Company in the front line when he was hit by a bullet.
During the whole attack No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant Heasman, acted
as a carrying party for the whole Brigade, and was split up into five
small parties of about twenty men, each under a Sergeant. Yukon packs
which the men wore were of great service for carrying shells and
water-bottles. Each man carried four Stokes-gun shells and a coil of
French wire during the initial stages of the attack, but later in the
day two or three tins of water were carried instead. One party made no
less than five journeys to the Blue line, a distance of 1000 yards,
and the average number of journeys was three. After the third
objective had been taken Lieutenant Heasman received orders to go
himself to Battalion Headquarters, and to send Second Lieutenant
Carrington with the whole of No. 4 Company up to the second objective
to relieve the Scots Guards.
The total casualties in the 3rd Battalion were 2 officers killed
(Second Lieutenant B. J. Dunlop and Captain G. W. East, R.A.M.C.), 4
officers wounded (Lieutenant K. Henderson, Lieutenant J. F. Worsley,
Second Lieutenant A. G. Elliott, and Captain W. Neville, M.C.), whilst
among other ranks there were 26 killed, 113 wounded, and 12 missing.
THE 1ST BATTALION
[Sidenote: 1st Batt.]
Although the attack at Boesinghe was, comparatively speaking, a simple
operation, since the Germans had brought in the “crater zone” theory
of defence, and the ground therefore was not strongly defended, it was
most successful, and the manner in which the distances between the
various waves were maintained during the attack, and the promptitude
with which the fire positions were taken up and consolidated, won the
warmest praise from the Brigadier, Lord Henry Seymour. The morning of
the 31st was very misty, and the enemy’s aeroplanes were unable to
locate the attacking troops and incapable of directing the barrage.
The comparatively light casualties may therefore be attributed to this
fortunate state of the atmosphere.
The dispositions of the 3rd Guards Brigade were as follows: The 1st
Battalion Grenadier Guards on the right, and the 1st Battalion Welsh
Guards on the left, were to take the first two objectives, the Blue
and Black lines, while the 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards and 2nd
Battalion Scots Guards were to capture the third objective. The 1st
Guards Brigade was then to pass through and take the fourth objective
or Dotted Green line.
On July 29 the King’s Company under Lieutenant Pauling and No. 2
Company under Captain Baker left Forest Camp to take over from the
Irish Guards their battle front, while the officers and men who were
not to take part in the battle returned to Herzeele under Captain L.
Fisher-Rowe. Owing to a most fortunate reconnaissance by the 1st
Guards Brigade, some days before, advanced positions on the eastern
side of the Canal had been seized by the 3rd Battalion Coldstream
Guards, and had since been maintained. This proved of the greatest
value to the 1st Battalion, since it enabled the leading companies to
start the attack on the farther bank, instead of having to cross the
Canal under fire.
As soon as it was dark the King’s and No. 2 Companies crossed the
Canal by means of petrol tin bridges, which swayed so much that
several men fell into the water, until orders were given that not more
than four men at a time were to cross. Each company pushed forward two
platoons as far as Baboon Reserve Trench, leaving one platoon in
Baboon Support Trench and the remaining platoon on the Canal bank.
This movement was naturally not carried out without a certain number
of casualties. Captain Baker and his servant were killed by a direct
hit from a shell, and Acting Company Sergeant-Major Wheatley of No. 2
Company was wounded in addition to a number of other ranks. The
Battalion Headquarters, which was on the west side of the Canal at the
end of Bridge Street, was also constantly shelled, but as Nos. 3 and 4
Companies remained in Forest Area till the 30th, the greater part of
the German shells were wasted.
On the 30th, subsections of the 3rd Guards Brigade Machine-Gun Company
and the Trench Mortar Battery moved up to their assembly positions.
No. 3 Company under Lieutenant Dashwood and No. 4 under Captain
Lawford moved up into the trenches known as X line, just short of the
Canal. Brigadier-General Lord Henry Seymour came round as soon as
these positions were taken up to see that everything was ready. All
through the day the two leading companies in their advanced position
came in for a great deal of shelling, although mercifully the German
artillery did not seem to know their precise position. Lieutenant
Pauling, in command of the King’s Company, and Lieutenant Lawrence,
who had been sent up to command No. 2 after Captain Baker had been
killed, were both wounded, and the two Company Sergeant-Majors, who
had replaced those wounded the day before, were both killed. These
losses were particularly unfortunate just as the attack was about to
start. It rained intermittently all day, and the trenches were
consequently in a marshy condition. On the night of the 30th the
Battalion was formed up ready to attack the following morning.
The officers who took part in this attack were as follows:
Lieut.-Colonel M. E. Makgill-Crichton-
Maitland, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. P. J. S. Pearson-Gregory Adjutant.
Lieut. W. H. Lovell Lewis Gun Officer.
Capt. P. M. Spence Attached to Batt.
Headquarters.
Lieut. M. Thrupp King’s Company.
2nd Lieut. O. F. Stein ” ”
Lieut. T. P. M. Bevan No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. S. Y. P. Gardner ” ”
Lieut. W. J. Dashwood No. 3 Company.
Lieut. P. G. Simmons ” ”
2nd Lieut. H. G. Johnson ” ”
Capt. R. D. Lawford No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. A. S. Chambers ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. W. Chapple ” ”
Capt. J. C. B. Grant, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
During the night of the 30th our artillery bombarded the German
artillery with gas shells. The result was very satisfactory, for,
although the British front line received a good proportion of shells,
the assembly was carried out without a hitch, and almost without a
casualty. Zero hour was at 3.50 A.M., but, as the 3rd Guards Brigade
was so far in advance of the rest of the line, the 1st Battalion
Grenadiers had to wait till 4.28 A.M. before advancing behind the
barrage. The enemy put down a heavy barrage on the Canal, but seeing
no attack start on our front evidently assumed that none was intended,
and lifted the barrage to another sector. During this preliminary
bombardment Lieutenant Thrupp had his wrist smashed by a splinter of a
shell, but after he had had it bound up by his runner he joined the
advance, when a bullet through his leg stopped him a second time.
Although he was carried down to the dressing-station, he never
recovered, and died that evening.
The order of the advance was as follows:
First Wave. 2 Platoons of the King’s Company.
2 Platoons of No. 2 Company.
Moppers-up. 2 Platoons of No. 4 Company.
2 Sections of the King’s Company.
2 Sections of No. 2 Company.
Second Wave. No. 3 Company in support.
Third Wave. 2 Platoons of the King’s Company (less 2 sections).
2 Platoons of No. 2 Company (less 2 sections).
Remainder of No. 4 Company.
There were ten paces between the lines and seventy-five paces between
the waves.
At 4.36 a protective barrage was put down on the southern half of the
Blue line, and a quarter of an hour later it was continued on the
northern half. The King’s and No. 2 Companies advanced in perfect
order, but so eager were they to get at the enemy that the officers
and N.C.O.’s found it difficult to prevent the men going too fast, and
getting dangerously near the creeping barrage. Owing to the mist the
1st Battalion went a little too much to the right, but this tendency
was easily corrected later on. At first the moppers-up did not make
many prisoners, but as the advance continued they found dug-outs full
of Germans, and captured about fifty. The first objective or Blue line
was taken with comparative case, but just as the Battalion reached it
Captain Lawford and Lieutenant Dashwood were wounded. The former
recovered, but Lieutenant Dashwood died two days afterwards in
hospital. Within twenty minutes of the capture of this line the
consolidation was complete. French wire was run out and strong points
were dug. While this was being done the attack on the second objective
or Black line was started by the third wave followed by the second
wave. Everything went like clockwork, and there was no hitch of any
kind. At zero + 3 hours and 24 minutes the 4th Battalion passed
through to assault the Green line. No. 3 Company was placed under the
direct orders of the officer commanding the 4th Battalion, and was
ordered to make a strong point just north of Abri Farm. The 101st
French Regiment on the left was held up for a time, but the 4th
Battalion Grenadiers by its advance lessened the pressure on the
French front and enabled them to seize the enemy’s strong point at
Colonel’s Farm. While No. 4 Company was consolidating the Black line
Second Lieutenant Chapple was seriously wounded, and died a few days
later in hospital. As the advance to the third objective started, the
two platoons of the King’s Company, which had reached the Black line,
returned to the Battalion in the Blue line, and at 9.50 A.M.
Lieut.-Colonel Maitland received orders to withdraw his Battalion.
During the attack the 1st Battalion captured four machine-guns and two
Minenwerfers. The casualties in the Battalion were 2 officers and 24
other ranks killed, 2 officers and 3 other ranks died of wounds, and 3
officers and 85 other ranks wounded. The medical arrangements were
perfect, and the whole battlefield was cleared by 10 A.M.
THE 4TH BATTALION
[Sidenote: 4th Batt.]
At 9 o’clock on the night of the 30th the 4th Battalion left Forest
Bivouac Area, and marched _via_ Artillery Track 12, Bridge Street, and
Clarges Street through Boesinghe to its forming-up areas, which it
reached without suffering any casualties. By 1.20 A.M. all companies
were reported to be in their places. No. 1 under Lieut. Pixley and No.
4 under Captain Paton, with two mopping-up platoons from No. 2
Company, were in the front trench, with the rest of the Battalion some
distance in rear. The 4th Battalion was to follow the 1st Battalion
until the first two objectives, the Blue and Black lines, had been
secured. It was then to pass through that Battalion, and attack the
Green line. After this had been taken the 1st Guards Brigade would
pass through and go on to the Dotted line over the Steenbeek River.
The following officers took part in the attack:
Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O.,
M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer.
Capt. C. R. Gerard Adjutant.
Lieut. J. B. M. Burke Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. I. H. Ingleby Act.-Quartermaster.
2nd Lieut. N. A. Pearce Transport Officer.
Lieut. J. N. F. Pixley No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. G. R. Green ” ”
2nd Lieut. E. H. Tuckwell ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. M. Chitty ” ”
Capt. the Hon. F. E. Needham No. 2 Company.
Lieut. R. G. West ” ”
2nd Lieut. H. W. Windeler ” ”
2nd Lieut. F. R. Oliver ” ”
Capt. C. H. Greville No. 3 Company.
Lieut. R. Farquhar, M.C. ” ”
Lieut. C. S. Nash ” ”
Capt. G. H. T. Paton, M.C. No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. B. J. Hubbard ” ”
Lieut. C. E. Irby ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. J. M. Veitch ” ”
Capt. N. Grellier, M.C., R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
At 3.50 A.M. the barrage began, and the noise was terrific. The whole
sky blazed, and it seemed as if every gun that had ever been made was
firing. Nos. 1 and 4 Companies, followed by the Battalion Forward
Command Party and the moppers-up, crossed the Canal, moving in
artillery formation. The left of No. 4 Company was heavily shelled as
it crossed, and two platoons became rather scattered and lost
direction. Second Lieutenant Hubbard with great coolness succeeded in
rallying them and bringing them back to their correct position. There
was at the time a considerable amount of machine-gun fire from
Crapouillot Wood, and in the terrific noise and semi-darkness it was
not easy to keep the platoons together. During the first stages of the
advance both companies found it difficult to recognise landmarks, and
compass bearings had to be used. There was a marked tendency to
mistake Artillery Wood for Wood 15, which in the circumstances was
hardly to be wondered at. Some loss of direction was inevitable, and
at one time Grenadier, Irish, and Scots Guards seemed inextricably
mixed south of Artillery Wood. But the private soldier of to-day is
extremely intelligent, and if he can only see his officer he will
disentangle himself, and get into his right place. Captain Pixley soon
managed to re-form his Company, and take it on in the right direction,
while the companies and platoons from the other Battalions sorted
themselves out in an incredibly short time. No. 4 Company had also
lost direction, and had come in for very heavy shelling, but Captain
Paton was able by the aid of his compass to bring it back to the
correct line of advance. A 5·9 shell fell right among the Battalion
Forward Command Party, wounding many men and throwing it into great
confusion. Lieutenant J. B. Burke quickly reorganised the party with
the few remaining men, and was able to maintain the chain of
communications.
When the Black line was reached, the 4th Battalion deployed into line.
The hostile shelling had completely died down, and except for some
machine-gun fire from the direction of Abri Wood the deployment was
not interfered with. A smoke barrage proved most effective, and
completely covered the Battalion as it deployed. The 1st Battalion had
succeeded in capturing the Blue and Black lines in accordance with the
scheduled time, and the advance on the Green line now commenced. On
the right of the 4th Battalion was the 1st Battalion Coldstream, and
on the left the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards. No. 1 Company was delayed
for a short time by the water surrounding Lapin Farm, but managed to
catch up the barrage again before entering Abri Wood. The creeping
barrage was perfect, and gave the men great confidence. On the left of
the 3rd Guards Brigade the 101st French Regiment had been held up by
machine-guns, with the result that the left flank of the Brigade was
in the air. The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards had to throw back a
defensive flank, so as to keep touch with its neighbours.
There was a considerable amount of machine-gun fire from “pill-boxes”
in Abri Wood, and also enfilade fire from the right, but the advance
was not delayed on this account. The “pill-boxes” were rapidly
surrounded, and the occupants of dug-outs immediately emerged and
surrendered; only in a few cases was it necessary to bomb them. Three
trench mortars were captured in a position near Abri Farm, and the
whole attack was most successful.
As soon as the Green line was secured, consolidation was begun. The
front occupied by the Battalion extended from Captain’s Farm to
Fourche Farm, with strong points at both these places, and a support
line consisting of fortified shell-holes fifty yards in rear.
Machine-guns, Stokes mortars, and Lewis guns were brought up and
posted at different points in the front line. No. 3 Company of the 1st
Battalion, which had been placed under Lord Gort’s orders, dug a large
cruciform post in rear of the support trench, and by 2 P.M. the whole
of the defences were complete and efficiently wired.
Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards had passed through, and
had succeeded in reaching the Green Dotted line, with its left on
Fourche Farm and its right on Signal Farm. For the first two hours
after the Green line had been captured the shelling was negligible,
but when three German contact aeroplanes flew very low over the line,
and located the Battalion, every one feared the worst. It was not long
before a heavy bombardment took place, and the shells fell with
alarming rapidity. Captain Pixley had a somewhat lucky escape: he had
selected a concrete dug-out in Captain’s Farm for his headquarters
when he was requested by the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards to hand
it over to be used as its Battalion Headquarters. He had hardly left
it when it was blown to pieces by a shell. He then changed his
quarters to a hut, but had to move farther to the left when the
Battalion took over the whole line, and soon after he vacated it the
hut was demolished by a shell.
Orders were now received for the 4th Battalion to take over the whole
frontage, from Captain’s Farm to Colonel’s Farm, so that the 2nd Scots
Guards might be withdrawn. This operation was carried out in pouring
rain, and the Battalion spent a miserable night, being soaked to the
skin and continually shelled. The next morning, August 1, the trenches
were in a shocking condition owing to the rain, and the shell-holes
were full of water. A heavy bombardment took place in the morning, and
died down later. At 7 that evening the 4th Battalion was relieved by
the 3rd Battalion Coldstream, and returned to Forest Area Bivouac
Camp. Both officers and men were dead-beat, having had no sleep for
three days: they were so wet that everything they had with them was
ruined by the rain, and any paper or book was like pulp.
There were 2 officers wounded (Lieut.-Colonel Lord Gort and Captain C.
H. Greville), while the casualties amongst the other ranks were:
killed 15, wounded 94, gassed 1, shell-shock 3, died of wounds 4,
missing 5. On Lord Gort being sent to hospital, Captain the Hon. F. E.
Needham took over the command of the Battalion.
THE 2ND BATTALION
[Sidenote: 2nd Batt.]
The assembly march on the night of the 30th of July was carried out by
the 1st Guards Brigade without any difficulty, and all units were in
position by 1 A.M. The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards moved from
bivouacs in the Forest Area, 2½ miles west of Elverdinghe, to a field
near Roussel Farm, where cookers, sent on with the platoon guides,
provided tea and rum for the men before they bivouacked in the open.
The following officers of the 2nd Battalion took part in the attack on
the 31st:
Lieut.-Colonel C. R. C. de Crespigny,
D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. C. F. A. Walker, M.C. Acting Second in
Command.
Lieut. A. H. Penn Adjutant.
Capt. J. N. Buchanan No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. G. Briscoe ” ”
2nd Lieut. P. A. A. Harbord ” ”
Capt. A. T. A. Ritchie, M.C. No. 2 Company.
Lieut. A. S. L. St. J. Mildmay ” ”
Lieut. F. H. G. Layland-Barratt, M.C. ” ”
Lieut. R. G. C. Napier ” ”
Capt. Sir A. L. M. Napier, Bart. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. K. O’G. Harvard ” ”
2nd Lieut. H. Minto-Wilson ” ”
Lieut. J. H. Jacob No. 4 Company.
Lieut. R. M. Oliver ” ”
2nd Lieut. F. H. J. Drummond ” ”
Capt. J. A. Andrews, M.C., R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
The task assigned to the 1st Guards Brigade was the capture of the
farthest objective, after the first three objectives had been secured
by the 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades. During the first phases of the
attack the 1st Guards Brigade was therefore in reserve, advancing in
rear so as to be prepared to pass through the leading Brigades when
the moment arrived.
Zero hour was fixed for 3.50 A.M., and at 4 A.M. the 1st Guards
Brigade advanced with the 2nd Battalion Coldstream on the left and the
2nd Battalion Grenadiers on the right, moving in artillery formation.
The 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards and 1st Battalion Irish Guards
were under the direct orders of the G.O.C. Guards Division. On the
right of the Guards Division, the battalion which had to undertake the
attack on the last objective was the 17th Battalion Royal Welsh
Fusiliers in the Thirty-eighth Division.
During the early stages of the advance the shelling was very slight,
and it was not until the Canal was reached that the 2nd Battalion
began to suffer casualties. A considerable amount of shelling was met
with on both sides of the Canal, but the crossing was effected without
serious difficulty, although in places the bridges were broken, and
some of the men fell into the mud. The Battalion advanced in very good
order, the intervals and distances being kept with great precision.
Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny, finding that he was gaining on the time
allotted to him, and noticing that the German barrage was irregular,
gave orders that commanders of platoons might use their discretion,
and halt occasionally in shell-holes, in order to avoid any zones
which appeared to be receiving particular attention from the German
artillery. The enemy was continually shortening his range, and there
is no doubt that, by avoiding the shelling as necessity demanded, many
casualties were avoided.
After going on in this way for about 2000 yards the leading companies,
No. 1 under Captain Buchanan, and No. 2 under Captain Ritchie, M.C.,
having come under machine-gun fire, deployed into line, their example
being followed by the companies in rear. The German barrage seemed to
follow the Battalion as it advanced, but without ever reaching it. One
howitzer shell, however, fell among the men of the Battalion
Headquarters, knocking over no less than five. When the Battalion
reached a point 500 yards south-west of the Green line, some 3000
yards from our old front line, it halted in accordance with orders,
and Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny went forward to confer with
Lieut.-Colonel Thorne, commanding the 3rd Battalion. In the meantime
the 2nd and 3rd Guards Brigades had captured the Green line, which was
not a line of trenches but a line on the map, 100 yards beyond the
Iron Cross――Korteker Cabaret road, and therefore easily recognisable
as a landmark. At 8.20 A.M. the 1st Guards Brigade advanced through
the leading Brigades, which were to dig in and consolidate the Green
line.
When the leading companies of the 2nd Battalion reached the Green
line, Captain Ritchie with No. 2 Company found, as he expected, the
3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards digging itself in, and consolidating
the line; but Captain Buchanan with No. 1 Company could find no trace
of the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, which should have been on the
left of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers. As he had arrived somewhat ahead
of his time he commenced to dig in, as the position was on the crest
of a hill and exposed to a considerable amount of machine-gun fire.
The Company soon began to suffer heavy casualties. Captain Ritchie on
the right sent word to say that he was being held up by machine-gun
fire from the right, and was being subjected to enfilade fire from a
partially destroyed house on the east of the Boesinghe-Staden Railway.
He added that he could see no trace of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers on
his right. The whole line was under machine-gun and rifle fire, and
not long afterwards Captain Ritchie and Lieutenant Napier were hit by
machine-gun bullets, so that the command of No. 2 Company now devolved
on Lieutenant A. St. J. Mildmay.
Captain Buchanan considered that while it was possible to push on he
should do so, even if the Company on his right was unable to advance.
He therefore decided to move forward, and sent back to Captain Sir A.
L. Napier, commanding No. 3 Company, asking him to garrison the Green
line. As the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, which, it was afterwards
discovered, had gone too far to the right, did not appear, and as the
Royal Welsh Fusiliers were unable to reach their objective, the
advance was delayed and not continued until fifteen minutes after the
creeping barrage was timed to move on. However, our barrage had now
become uncertain, shells falling sometimes far ahead and sometimes
alarmingly close, so that the two leading companies could not well
have advanced any sooner. Captain Buchanan, regardless of the
situation on his flanks, continued to advance with No. 1 Company in
the most gallant manner, and succeeded in reaching Signal and Ruisseau
Farms, where thirty of the enemy were captured, including a battalion
commander and a number of officers. A platoon of No. 3 Company, under
the command of Lieutenant Harvard, who showed considerable ability in
handling his men in exceptionally difficult circumstances, was now
sent up as reinforcements. No. 1 Company dashed on, and managed to
cross the Steenbeek River, on the farther side of which it dug itself
in.
Meanwhile the position on the right was full of difficulties. The 17th
Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers had been held up, and the usual
problem demanded solution: how to keep pace with the advance, and at
the same time to guard the exposed flank? A platoon of No. 4 Company,
under Lieutenant Oliver, at once formed a defensive flank to the
right; but this was an insufficient safeguard, and as No. 2 Company
continued to advance, Lieutenant Mildmay, now in command, was forced
to waste half his strength in protecting the right flank. Lieutenant
Jacob, who commanded No. 4 Company, sent forward one platoon to assist
No. 2 in their advance, and after consultation with Captain Buchanan
despatched a third platoon under Second Lieutenant Drummond to prolong
the left of No. 3 Company, which was now advancing in support of No.
1. This platoon had not gone far before Lieutenant Drummond was
wounded by a shell, but in spite of this, and even another wound in
the neck from a bullet, he insisted on remaining with his Company
until the Battalion was relieved, dealing coolly with every situation
which arose. During the advance Sergeant Sharpe and two men captured a
block-house 150 yards west of the railway, securing no less than
twenty-one prisoners.
By now the Royal Welsh Fusiliers had succeeded in demolishing the
block-houses which impeded their advance, and had gained ground on the
right. This enabled Lieutenant Mildmay to push on with No. 2 Company
to within 80 yards of the Steenbeek, but there he was held up by
machine-gun fire from Langemarck village. Any endeavour to cross the
river in the circumstances would be doomed to failure, nor was there
any advantage to be gained by the attempt, since the men now occupied
a position with a good field of fire dominating the approaches to the
river.
The section of the Machine-Gun Company which followed the 2nd
Battalion during this advance suffered very much from shell-fire.
Lieutenant Cottle, the officer in command, was killed whilst going
forward to reconnoitre, and shortly afterwards one of the guns of this
section with its entire team was knocked out by a shell. The remaining
guns, however, were brought up into good positions in the front line.
Three German aeroplanes made a complete and leisurely reconnaissance
of our position, although they were freely engaged with Lewis guns and
rifle-fire. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion Coldstream on the left, which
had not experienced much opposition, but had had a very difficult
wheel to perform, had succeeded in reaching its objective, and was
established with its left on the Green line and its right in touch
with the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers on the Steenbeek. As soon as it was
dark, the line was straightened and strengthened, and touch was
established between all units. A steady downpour of rain commenced
that night and continued unceasingly until the Battalion was relieved
two days later. The ground became one large morass, and the trenches
were mere ditches, in which the men had to stand up to their knees in
water. The hardships which the men had to endure cannot be
over-estimated. Not only were they soaked through and covered with
mud, but they were under continual shell-fire. Being for the most part
on the forward slope of a hill, they were unable to move about in
daylight to keep warm, and no hot food of any description could be
brought up to them. The only way to ensure warmth was to dig a new
trench at dusk and dawn every day. The advanced position of the
trenches made it a precarious line to hold, more especially as it was
impossible to dig down very deep on account of the water. There were
consequently many casualties, amongst whom was Lieutenant K. Harvard,
who was so badly wounded that he never recovered. He died the same
evening at the dressing-station. The situation was not made easier by
the Thirty-eighth Division on the right, which continually sent up
S.O.S. signals without any apparent reason. This not only brought down
our barrage, some shells of which fell in the Battalion’s own advanced
trenches, but it also caused retaliation from the enemy’s artillery.
On the night of August 2 the 2nd Battalion was relieved, and marched
to Bluet, where hot tea was provided. It was a very trying march;
every one was knee-deep in mud, and the weight of the mud and soaked
equipment was almost intolerable. Later the Battalion moved on to
Elverdinghe in order to entrain for Proven, but a shell had blown up a
part of the line, and no train was therefore available. A move was
made instead into bivouacs near Cardoen Farm, where the Battalion
remained until lorries arrived to convey it to Proven.
The casualties amongst the officers were: Lieutenant K. O’G. Harvard,
killed; Lieutenant R. G. C. Napier, died of wounds; Captain A. T. A.
Ritchie, M.C., Lieutenant J. H. Jacob, Lieutenant A. S. L. St. J.
Mildmay, and Second Lieutenant F. H. J. Drummond, wounded. Amongst
other ranks: 44 killed, 191 wounded, 15 missing, 11 slightly wounded.