THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
A new stage, and a very distinct and important stage, in the Allied
operations in the West was marked by the battle of the Somme.
It was at last understood, in the summer of 1916, that spasmodic
attacks on the German trenches did little to gain any real and
comprehensive success, and that, in order to prevent the enemy moving
his reserves from one front to another, a simultaneous assault by all
the Allies was necessary.
In accord with this view the Allies at the beginning of the year
accepted the principle of an offensive campaign, and as the objective
for the British and French advance Sir Douglas Haig and General Joffre
selected the Somme area. All idea of “breaking through” had by now
been abandoned. Such a thing was no longer regarded as possible in the
West, and the plan adopted was one more suited to modern conditions of
war and more economical of human life. The objects of the offensive
were to relieve Verdun, to prevent the transfer of German troops
elsewhere, and to wear down the resistance of the enemy on the Western
front.
Conditions had changed, too, in other ways. The British Army had been
slowly gaining strength, and the old Army had given place to the new.
There were now fifty divisions in the field. At the same time, the
supply of ammunition had been steadily increasing, and, thanks to the
patriotism of the trade unions and the splendid performances of the
workers, immense quantities of guns and shells were pouring into
France. Consequently there was no reason why a general attack should
not be made on the Western front, although, as Sir Douglas Haig
pointed out in his despatch, he considered it advisable to postpone it
as long as possible.
During the gigantic battle, which began on July 1 and lasted till
November 18, the fighting was continuous. The German positions were
amazingly strong. First came a network of trenches, well provided with
bomb-proof shelters and protected in front by wire entanglements, many
of which were in two belts forty yards broad and built of iron stakes,
interlaced with barbed wire, often as thick as a man’s finger. Behind
these lines the enemy’s strongholds had been reinforced with every
device of military ingenuity――woods and villages turned into
fortresses, cellars filled with machine-guns and trench mortars,
dug-outs connected by elaborate passages. The enormous power of modern
weapons of defence had been used to the utmost. In fact, the whole
line was as nearly impregnable as Nature, art, and the unstinted
labour of close on two years could make it. And undoubtedly the
Germans believed it impregnable.
The first phase of the battle took place at the beginning of July, and
although the attacks in the northern sector were unsuccessful, the
armour was pierced; while in the south our troops secured Mametz,
Montauban, Fricourt, Contalmaison, and Trônes Wood. On July 14 and the
three following days, the capture of the enemy’s second line on a
front of three miles gave us possession of the main plateau between
Delville Wood and Bazentin-le-Petit.
The long and severe struggle, which was the second phase, began on
July 18 and culminated on September 15 with the fall of Ginchy, after
Pozières, Delville Wood, Guillemont, Falfemont Farm, and Leuze Wood
had been taken in succession. But although the main ridge from
Delville Wood to the road above Mouquet Farm was secured, Morval on
the right and Thiepval on the left remained in German hands.
In the third phase Flers, High Wood, Martinpuich, Courcelette, and the
Quadrilateral came into our hands one after another, and on September
25 Morval, Lesbœufs, and Gueudecourt were secured by the British Army,
while the French took Combles. During October Thiepval was taken, and
also Eaucourt l’Abbaye and Le Sars, while in November, as the outcome
of an advance on both sides of the Ancre, we captured St. Pierre
Divion, Beaucourt, and Beaumont-Hamel.
Thus all our principal objects were achieved, in spite of the fact
that the Germans were able to mass more than half their army upon this
part of their front. The British Army took 38,000 prisoners, including
over 800 officers; also 29 heavy guns, 96 field-guns and
field-howitzers, 136 trench mortars, and 514 machine-guns.
The battle was marked by the sudden appearance of the Tanks. So well
had their secret been kept that until they came upon the battlefield
the Germans had no idea of their existence. “The Machine-gun Corps,
Heavy Section” was the official title of these heavy armoured cars
which could move anywhere, over trenches and through wire
entanglements, pushing down walls and even houses; they contained a
garrison of six men with machine-guns and 6-pdr. guns. So many legends
had grown up of their supernatural powers that their actual début
caused a certain disappointment. But although in some parts of the
battlefield they failed us, some of them did wonders, and many of the
strongholds in the German line could never have been taken without
their help.
The net result of the battle was a brilliant victory for the British
Army, for not only was a large tract of ground captured from the
enemy, but the three objects which we had set out to gain were fully
attained. Verdun was relieved of pressure, the main portion of the
German Army was detained on the Western front, and a crippling blow
was struck at the enemy forces. It was clearly shown that, on anything
like equal terms, the British could drive back the German Army,
sheltered even by the strongest entrenchments.
As the area and duration of modern battles are immense, a long time
naturally elapses before their effects are felt by the losing side.
Formerly battles lasted only a few days, and their results were seen
immediately in the retirement of the beaten army. After the battle of
the Somme, however, nothing happened at first, and it was not until
six months later that the Germans found that their positions had
become untenable, and a general retirement was advisable.
THE GUARDS DIVISION AT THE SOMME
[Sidenote: Sept.]
Nothing has ever been done by battalions of the Guards finer than the
part they took in the battle of the Somme. It was not until the
beginning of September that the Guards Division arrived in the Somme
area, so it was not present at the first two phases of the battle. But
in the attacks of September 15 and 25 the men covered themselves with
glory; their discipline and coolness under fire were magnificent, and
they captured lines which had up to then been considered impregnable.
The final assault of Lesbœufs was one of the most successful
operations of the war.
Not only were the staff arrangements admirable, but the co-operation
between infantry and artillery proved in every way perfect. Against
the unflinching attack of the Division nothing could stand; the mass
of shells poured over by the German artillery, the hail of bullets
from their machine-guns, and the rifle-fire of their infantry in the
trenches, were all powerless to check it. The men were splendid: it
made not a scrap of difference whether they had officers or not,
whether they were with their own units or mixed up with other
regiments. Nothing could stop them. When the 3rd Brigade went up, the
battle had already been raging for over two months; and the Germans
were then busily but vainly carrying out counter-attacks, in the hope
of re-taking some of the ground that had been wrested from them.
Consequently the two battalions sent forward came in for some very
stiff fighting, especially the Welsh Guards, who went through some
anxious moments owing to the advanced position they were occupying.
They were fiercely attacked by large bodies of the enemy, but, with
the help of one company of the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, managed to
hold their own. Meanwhile the 4th Battalion Grenadiers――the other
battalion sent up from the 3rd Brigade――held an uncomfortable position
near the Quadrilateral, to the right and in rear of the Welsh Guards.
Parts of the line had also to be straightened, and “pockets” of
Germans to be cleared away before the general attack of the 15th; and
for this task were detailed those battalions from the 1st and 2nd
Brigades which would not be in the front line on the 15th. There were
some closely-contested bombing fights, supported by artillery, in the
parts of the line that needed straightening, and these operations were
all successfully carried out.
On the 12th Major-General G. Feilding issued the following orders:
THE GUARDS DIVISION ORDER, NO. 76
1. The Fourth Army will attack the enemy’s defences between
Combles Ravine and Martinpuich on Z day with the object of
seizing Morval, Lesbœufs, Gueudecourt, and Flers, and to break
through the enemy’s system of defence.
The French are undertaking an offensive simultaneously on the
South and the Reserve Army on the North.
2. The attack will be pushed with the utmost vigour all along the
line until the most distant objectives are reached. The failure
of one unit on the flank is not to prevent other units pushing on
to their final objective, as it is by such means that those units
who have failed will be assisted to advance.
3. _Preliminary Bombardment._――(_a_) Commencing on the 12th
September a bombardment and wire-cutting on the hostile defensive
system will take place from 6 A.M. to 6.30 daily.
(_b_) The preliminary bombardment on the day of the attack will
be similar to that of previous days, there being no further
increase of fire previous to zero.
(_c_) At 6.30 each evening from the 12th September inclusive
night firing will commence, and continue till 6 A.M., lethal
shells being used.
4. (_a_) The Sixth Division is to attack on the right and the
Fourteenth Division on the left.
(_b_) The 2nd Guards Brigade will attack on the right of the
Division, the 1st Guards Brigade on the left. The 3rd Guards
Brigade will be in Divisional Reserve.
5. _Forming-up Areas._――Forming-up areas are shown on attached
maps. The 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades will allot a forming-up
area for the 75th and 76th Field Companies R.E. respectively in
their forming-up areas.
Instructions as to movements of troops to their forming-up areas
will be issued separately.
6. The objectives allotted to the Guards Division and
neighbouring divisions are shown on attached map.
First objective is marked Green.
Second ” ” Brown.
Third ” ” Blue.
Fourth ” ” Red.
7. (_a_) 50 per cent Field Artillery covering the Division will
be used for creeping barrage, and 50 per cent for stationary
barrage.
(_b_) Details of the stationary barrages will be issued later. In
all cases the stationary barrage will lift back when the creeping
barrage reaches it.
(_c_) At zero the creeping barrage will open 100 yards in front
of our front trenches, and will advance at the rate of 50 yards
per minute until it is 200 yards beyond the first objective, when
it will become stationary. At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage
will become intense on the line 200 yards in front of first
objective, and will creep forward at the rate of 50 yards per
minute in front of that portion of the 1st Guards Brigade which
is to advance to the second objective.
(_d_) At zero + 1 hour and 10 minutes the creeping barrage will
become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the first
objective as far north as T.86.4.6, thence on a line 200 yards in
front of the second objective, and will advance at the rate of 30
yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the third
objective, when it will become stationary.
This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks. There will be
no creeping barrage in front of infantry during their advance to
third objective, which commences at zero + 2 hours.
(_e_) At zero + 3 hours and 30 minutes the creeping barrage will
become intense on a line 200 yards in front of third objective,
and will advance at the rate of 30 yards per minute until it has
passed 200 yards beyond fourth objective, when it will become
stationary. This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks.
There will be no creeping barrage in front of the infantry during
the advance on the fourth objective, which commences at zero + 4
hours and 30 minutes.
(_f_) In the attack on the first and second objectives gaps of
100 yards wide will be left in the creeping barrage for the
routes of the tanks.
8. The flow of troops to the 2nd Guards Brigade and 1st Guards
Brigade must be maintained so as to ensure a strong attack being
pressed against each successive objective. Sufficient men will be
left in each line captured to clear it of the enemy. No troops of
the 2nd and 1st Guards Brigades will be detailed to remain behind
in objectives after they have been passed for purposes of
consolidation.
The task of the two leading Brigades is to press the attack
through to their ultimate objectives with every means at their
disposal.
9. The 3rd Guards Brigade will advance at zero + 1 hour and 30
minutes until its leading troops reach the south-western
outskirts of Ginchy, when the Brigade will halt and await orders.
Special instructions as to action of Reserve Brigade will be
issued.
10. Tanks will be employed to operate with the attack;
instructions as to their movements are attached.
(Remainder of orders related to R.E., R.A., Aircraft and
Transport.)
C. HEYWOOD, Lieut.-Col.,
General Staff, Guards Division.
_September 12, 1916._
So great was the danger of battalions being practically annihilated in
an attack that orders had been issued for a certain nucleus of
officers and N.C.O.’s to be left with the Transport, whenever a
battalion went into action, so as to make sure of a sufficient number
surviving to carry on the work. Accordingly on this occasion the
Second in Command, the junior Captains of companies, the Battalion and
Company Sergeant-Majors and Quartermaster-Sergeants in each battalion
were left behind.
At 6.20 on the morning of the 15th the artillery bombardment ceased,
and the Guards Division advanced, preceded by a creeping barrage, with
Pereira’s Brigade on the left and Ponsonby’s Brigade on the right,
while Corkran’s Brigade remained in reserve. In the front line were
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the Coldstream and the 3rd
Battalion Grenadiers. The advance of the three Coldstream battalions
was a wonderful sight, and they carried everything before them, but in
their eagerness to reach the enemy lost direction and went too far to
the left. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right kept
straight on, so there was a considerable gap between it and the three
battalions of Coldstream. Coming up through the German barrage, the
2nd Battalion Grenadiers, which was in support of the 2nd Coldstream,
completely lost sight of the Coldstream battalions. In accordance with
its orders it advanced with its right on the Ginchy――Lesbœufs road,
but on reaching the first objective it found it occupied by the enemy
instead of by the Coldstream, as it expected, and suffered heavy loss.
Under the impression that it was following in the wake of the 2nd
Battalion Coldstream, it was advancing in artillery formation, and had
to form line when within a few yards of the enemy’s trench, which was
untouched, as the Coldstream battalions had passed farther to the
left.
When the first objective was secured, the order from right to left was
as follows: the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, the 2nd Battalion
Grenadiers, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalion Coldstream. Between the
first two objectives there were several intermediate lines of
trenches, all of which were most confusing for the battalions in
front. The Coldstream battalions mistook these intermediate lines for
objectives, and thought that they had reached the third objective when
they were really between the first and second objectives. Their real
position, however, was correctly reported by the air scouts.
Meantime the Quadrilateral――a powerful system of redoubts――on the
right had made any advance by the Sixth Division impossible, and on
the left also the Fourteenth Division had been held up by some strong
points in the enemy’s line. The result was that the Guards Division
had both flanks in the air, and was subjected to a withering fire
almost from the start. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right and
the 3rd Battalion Coldstream on the left were obliged to throw out
protective flanks, and so had some difficulty in keeping pace with the
battalions in the centre.
It was some time before the two brigades were firmly established in
the first objective, as there were parts of the line in which some
Germans had been left, more especially in the space reserved for the
tanks, which unfortunately never arrived. However, the 1st and 2nd
Battalions Coldstream in the centre pushed on and gained the second
objective, while the battalions right and left threw back protective
flanks. The second objective was a trench running into the first
objective, and only concerned the Coldstream battalions on the left.
On the next day, the 16th, Corkran’s Brigade was ordered to advance
through the leading brigades and continue the attack. But it did not
start till the middle of the day, and after having gone some distance
was held up by machine-gun fire and the men were told to dig
themselves in where they were.
The whole Division was taken out of the line on the night of the 18th
and remained resting in bivouacs until the 20th, when each brigade
sent battalions into the front line to dig assembly trenches and
straighten parts of the line. On the 22nd Major-General G. Feilding
issued the following orders:
GUARDS DIVISION ORDER, NO. 82
1. (_a_) The Fourth Army will renew the attack on Z day in
combination with attacks by the French to the South and the
Reserve Army to the North.
(_b_) The objectives of the Fourteenth Corps include Morval and
Lesbœufs, and those of the Fifteenth Corps Gueudecourt.
(_c_) The attack of the Fourteenth Corps will be carried out by
the Fifth Division on the right, the Sixth Division in the
centre, and the Guards Division on the left. The Fifty-eighth
Division will form a defensive flank to the south of the Fifth
Division. The Twenty-first Division will be attacking on our
left.
2. The 1st Guards Brigade will attack on the right and the 3rd
Guards Brigade on the left.
The 2nd Guards Brigade (less one Battalion) will be in Divisional
Reserve.
1st Battalion 2nd Guards Brigade will be in Corps Reserve; 2nd
Guards Brigade will notify Divisional Headquarters the name of
the Battalion detailed.
3. _Preliminary Bombardment._――A steady bombardment of hostile
positions will be commenced at 7 A.M. on Z day, and will be
continued to 6.30 P.M.; it will recommence at 6.30 A.M. on Z day.
The ground in front and rear of the German trenches which are
being bombarded will be searched occasionally with 18-pdr.
shrapnel and H.E. shell.
There will be no intensive fire previous to the hour of zero.
Night firing will be carried out nightly between the hours of
6.30 P.M. and 6.30 A.M.
4. Forming-up areas are shown on the attached map. The 1st and
3rd Guards Brigades will allot forming-up areas to the 75th and
55th Field Companies R.E. respectively, within their areas.
Instructions for movements to forming-up areas will be issued
separately.
5. Objectives allotted to the Guards Brigades and neighbouring
Divisions, also the dividing lines, are shown on attached map.
First objective is marked Green.
Second ” ” Brown.
Third ” ” Blue.
6. The infantry will advance to the attack on the Green line at
zero; to the attack on the Brown line at zero + 1 hour, and to
the attack on the Blue line at zero + 2 hours.
7. _Barrages_――
(_a_) 50 per cent of the Field Artillery covering the Division
will be used for the creeping barrage and 50 per cent for
stationary barrage.
(_b_) In all cases the stationary barrage will lift when the
creeping barrage meets it.
8. (_a_) At zero the creeping barrage will commence 100 yards in
front of our front trenches. It will advance at the rate of 50
yards per minute until it is 200 yards beyond the Green line,
when it will become stationary.
(_b_) At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage will commence 200
yards in front of the Green line and will advance at the rate of
50 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the
Brown line, when it will become stationary.
(_c_) At zero + 2 hours the creeping barrage will commence 200
yards in front of the Brown line, and will advance at the rate of
50 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the Blue
line, when it will become stationary.
9. (_a_) The task of the two leading Guards Brigades is to press
the attack through to the Blue line. A sufficient flow of troops
must be maintained by the 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades from zero
onwards to ensure that the attack made from the Brown line is
strong and well supported.
(_b_) Special arrangements must be made to deal with resistance
in Lesbœufs and thus prevent any possibility of the enemy getting
round our troops who have gained the Blue line.
(_c_) The 1st and 3rd Guards Brigades will garrison and
consolidate the Brown line with a portion of their reserves when
the attack goes forward to the Blue line.
(_d_) On gaining the Blue line, Battalions will be sent forward
to any ground from which observation can be gained; such points
will be consolidated and eventually joined up with our line.
On the 24th the Battalions that were to lead the attack took their
place in the line ready for the next day. The order of attack was for
the Fifty-sixth Division to form the right flank guarding Combles, the
Fifth Division to capture Morval, the Sixth Division to occupy the
southern end of Lesbœufs, and the Guards Division to take Lesbœufs.
In Pereira’s Brigade, which attacked on the right, the 2nd Battalion
Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Irish Guards were in the front line, and
were supported by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream. In Corkran’s
Brigade on the left the 4th Battalion Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion
Scots Guards led, supported by the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and 1st
Battalion Welsh Guards. The orders of the two brigades differed. In
the 1st Guards Brigade the leading battalions were to take all the
objectives, and when they passed on the battalions in support were to
consolidate each line. In the 3rd Brigade the two leading battalions
were to take the first two objectives and then throw out a defensive
flank; the battalions in support were then to advance through them and
secure the third objective, one of these again throwing out a
defensive flank.
At 12.35 P.M. on the 25th the attack started, and in spite of the
wire, in some places intact, the first objective was secured. At 1.30
the advance to the second objective began. The battalions in front
suffered heavily, especially in officers, but by 1.45 the second
objective was in our hands. All this time the Twenty-first Division on
the left had been held up, and the left flank of the Guards Division
was consequently in the air. The 4th Grenadiers had therefore to throw
out a defensive flank to the left, which eventually became so long
that not only that battalion but also the Welsh Guards were employed
to guard it. Major-General Feilding regarded this defensive flank as
of the utmost importance, since it was from this quarter that a
counter-attack was expected. In some parts of the line the wire was
uncut, and the advance was retarded, but this did not prevent the
objectives being secured by the times specified in the orders.
As soon as we had gained the second objective, the 1st Battalion
Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards passed through the leading
battalions of Corkran’s Brigade and attacked Lesbœufs, while the 2nd
Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Irish Guards continued their
advance.
Thus with the 4th Battalion Grenadiers on the defensive flank there
were three Grenadier battalions engaged in the attack on the third
objective. The capture of Lesbœufs itself fell to the lot of the 1st
Battalion, and news was at once sent back that all the objectives had
been secured. The battalions in front appear to have been so elated by
their success that they asked for the cavalry to be allowed to go
through. But Lord Cavan, the Corps Commander, realised that it would
be madness to employ cavalry on such a limited front, and gave orders
that the leading battalions were to consolidate their position.
THE 2ND BATTALION
[Sidenote: 2nd Batt.]
Detached from the 1st Guards Brigade on August 31 the 2nd Battalion
Grenadiers had been sent up to Carnoy to dig in rear of the Twentieth
Division. It returned on September 3rd to Méaulte, where it underwent
a thorough course of training, something in the nature of a dress
rehearsal. Expert bombing officers gave instruction to every company
in the Brigade, so that each man had an opportunity of learning the
latest developments in bombing. All the battalions practised deploying
in artillery formation, attacking an imaginary line of trenches, and
then moving on immediately to a second objective. A great deal was
learned in the way of signalling, and trials were made of a system of
organising a single main trunk line, as central as possible, so as to
avoid having a number of defective lines to each unit. This line was
to consist of telephone or visual or relay posts――or, if possible, of
all three. Careful consideration was given to the difficult task of
getting the men across No Man’s Land, and every detail was rehearsed.
Later the whole Brigade was practised in the attack, and in
maintaining constant communication during an advance.
[Sidenote: Sept. 9.]
After a week the 1st Brigade received orders to proceed to Carnoy, and
all surplus kit and equipment were left behind in store. The 2nd
Battalion Grenadiers marched to Carnoy, and bivouacked not far from
the place where it had been at the beginning of the month.
[Sidenote: Sept. 11.]
On the 11th orders were received for the 1st Brigade to relieve the
left half of the 3rd Guards Brigade, while the 2nd Guards Brigade was
to take the place of the other half. These orders (given below) were
communicated to commanding officers at a conference held at Brigade
Headquarters.
Brigadier-General Pereira issued the following orders:
1ST GUARDS BRIGADE ORDER, NO. 73
1. The Fourth Army will attack the enemy’s defences between
Combles Ravine and Martinpuich on Z day with the object of
seizing Morval, Lesbœufs, Gueudecourt, and Flers, breaking
through the enemy’s system of defence.
The French are undertaking an offensive simultaneously on the
south and the Reserve Army on the north.
2. The attack will be pushed with the utmost vigour, all along
the line, until the most distant objectives are reached.
The failure of a unit on a flank is not to prevent other units
pushing on to their final objectives, as it is by such means that
these units, which have failed, will be assisted to advance.
3. _Preliminary Bombardment._――(_a_) Commencing on the 12th
September bombardment and wire-cutting on hostile defensive
system will take place from 6 A.M. to 6.30 P.M. daily.
(_b_) The preliminary bombardment on the day of the attack will
be similar to that on previous days, there being no increase of
fire previous to zero.
(_c_) At 6.30 P.M. each evening from the 12th September
inclusive, night firing will commence and continue till 6 A.M.
Lethal shells will be used.
4. (_a_) The 2nd Guards Brigade will attack on the right of the
Division――the 1st Guards Brigade the left, and the 3rd Guards
Brigade will be in divisional reserve.
(_b_) The 4th Brigade of the Fourteenth Division will attack on
the left of the 1st Guards Brigade.
(_c_) Boundaries are shown on attached map.
5. _Forming-up Areas._――Forming-up areas are shown on attached
maps.
Instructions as to movement of troops to their forming-up areas
will be issued separately.
6. Objectives allotted to Guards Brigades and neighbouring
Divisions are shown on attached map.
First objective is marked Green.
Second ” ” Brown.
Third ” ” Blue.
Fourth ” ” Red.
7. The infantry will advance to the attack of the Green line at
zero.
To the attack of the Brown line at zero + 1 hour.
To the attack of the Blue line at zero + 2 hours.
To the attack of the Red line at zero + 4 hours and 30 minutes.
8. _Artillery Barrages_――
(_a_) 50 per cent of Field Artillery covering the Division will
be used for creeping barrage, and 50 per cent for stationary
barrage.
(_b_) Details of stationary barrages will be issued later. In all
cases the stationary barrages will lift back when the creeping
barrage reaches it.
(_c_) At zero the creeping barrage will open 100 yards in front
of our trenches, and will advance at rate of 50 yards per minute
until it is 200 yards beyond the first objective, when it will
become stationary.
At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage will become intense on a
line 200 yards in front of the first objective, and will creep
forward at rate of 50 yards per minute in front of that portion
of the 1st Guards Brigade which is to advance to the second
objective.
(_d_) At zero + 1 hour and 10 minutes the creeping barrage will
become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the first
objective as far north as T.8.b.4.6, thence on a line 200 yards
in front of second objective, and will advance at rate of 30
yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the third
objective――when it will become stationary.
This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks.
There will be no creeping barrage in front of the infantry during
their advance to third objective, which commences at zero + 2
hours.
(_e_) At zero + 3 hours 30 minutes, the creeping barrage will
become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the third
objective――and will advance at rate of 30 yards per minute until
it has passed 200 yards beyond fourth objective, when it will
become stationary. This barrage is to cover the advance of the
tanks.
There will be no creeping barrage in front of the infantry during
the advance to the fourth objective, which commences at zero + 4
hours 30 minutes.
(_f_) In the attack on first and second objectives gaps of 100
yards wide will be left in the creeping barrage for the routes of
the tanks.
9. The attack will be carried out as follows:
(_a_) The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards will attack
and capture the first, second, and third objectives. The dividing
line between these battalions is shown on attached maps.
(_b_) The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards will move in rear of the
2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards. When the latter advance
to the assault of the second objective the 2nd Battalion
Grenadier Guards will occupy the first objective until the 1st
Battalion Irish Guards have passed through them; they will then
follow and support them in their attack on the fourth objective.
The rôle of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards is to form a
defensive flank, if necessary, and to support the attack of the
1st Battalion Irish Guards in their attack on the fourth
objective, with such troops as are not required for a defensive
flank.
(_c_) 1st Battalion Irish Guards will attack the fourth
objective.
(_d_) Machine-gun Coy. One section will accompany each battalion
in the assault, and will be under the orders of the O.C.
Battalion.
(_e_) Stokes T.M. Battery. Four guns will accompany the 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards in case it is necessary to form a
defensive flank. They will not go farther than the second
objective. They will act under the orders of the O.C. Battalion.
The remaining four guns will be in the trench in which advanced
Brigade Headquarters is situated, S.24.b.6.2.
(_f_) The 75th Field Coy. and the four work platoons will remain
in their forming-up area until further orders are received.
10. _Formation of Attack._――The formation for the carrying out of
the attack is shown on attached sketch.
The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 1st Battalion Irish Guards
will move into line or small columns according as to whether they
are under rifle-fire or not.
11. The flow of troops will be continuous. This is to ensure a
strong attack being pressed against each successive objective.
Officers commanding battalions will call for support, if
necessary, from the battalions immediately in rear of them. If
necessary, men will be left in each line captured to clear it of
the enemy, but troops will not be detailed to remain behind in
objectives for purposes of consolidation, except that the 2nd and
3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards will remain in the third
objective ready to support the troops attacking the fourth
objective.
The task of the Brigade is to press the attack through to their
ultimate objectives with every means at our disposal.
12. Tanks will be employed to co-operate with the attack.
Instructions as to their employment are attached.
Instructions will be issued as to movement of tanks to their
departure positions, and as to time of their advance to the
various objectives.
13. _Royal Flying Corps_――
(_a_) 9th Squadron, Royal Flying Corps will have one Contact
aeroplane in the air from zero to dark on Z day, and again from
6.30 A.M. to 9 A.M. on Z + 1 days.
(_b_) Flares will be lit as follows:
(1) On obtaining each objective.
(2) At 12 noon and 5 P.M. on Z day by leading troops.
(3) At 6.30 A.M. on Z + 1 day by leading troops.
Red flares will be used by infantry, Green flares by Cavalry.
14. An orderly with a watch will visit all Battalion H.Q. about 1
P.M. and 7 P.M. on Y day, so that time may be checked.
15. Special instructions will be issued on the following subjects:
(_a_) Medical arrangement.
(_b_) Supply of rations, water, S.A.A., Light T.M. ammunition
and hand grenades.
(_c_) Communications.
16. All transport will be packed up and ready to move forward at
one hour’s notice after zero + 4 hours.
The Brigade Transport officer will remain at Divisional
Headquarters, Minden Post, from zero + 2 hours onwards.
On Y day after 7.30 P.M. the road running north from cross-roads
S.28.d.4.2 will be clear of all wheeled traffic.
17. As soon as the final objectives have been captured by the
infantry the cavalry will advance and seize the high ground
Rocquigny――Villers-au-Flos――Riencourt-les-Bapaume――Bapaume.
The Fourteenth Corps will be prepared to support the cavalry on
the above line at the earliest possible moment.
18. Prisoners will be sent _via_ Brigade Headquarters to
Divisional Collecting Station at Crater Post A.8.a.6.3, where
they will be taken over and searched under A.P.M. arrangements.
Receipts will be given for prisoners and escorts will return to
their units.
All captured documents should be sent with prisoners to
Divisional Collecting Station, whence they will be forwarded
under Divisional arrangements.
19. _Dumps._――R.E. dumps of sand-bags and wire have been
established along the Guillemont――Waterlot Farm road in the
Brigade area. A water dump is being established at Advanced
Brigade Headquarters at S.24.b.6.1½.
Dumps of bombs and S.A.A. are also being established along the
Guillemont――Waterlot Farm road in the Brigade area.
20. Brigade Headquarters will be established at S.24.b.6.1½ from
9 P.M. to-night.
M. B. SMITH, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 1st Guards Brigade.
_September 13, 1916._
[Illustration:
_S.A. Chandler & Co. Southampton, photographers_ _Emery Walker ph. sc._
_Lieutenant-General The Earl of Cavan. K.P., K.C.B._]
[Sidenote: Sept. 12.]
By September 12 the whole Brigade was fully equipped. To every
battalion had been issued bombs, sand-bags, distinguishing arm-bands,
rockets, flares, wire-cutters, etc., and all that remained to be done
was to fix the hour and the day of attack.
The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers took over the left half of the line
occupied by the 3rd Guards Brigade on the night of the 12th, while the
1st Battalion Irish Guards moved up in support to Trônes Wood and
Bernafay Wood. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream, which were to
carry out the assault, remained resting at Carnoy till the last
moment, and the Brigade Headquarters moved up to a dummy trench
between Trônes and Bernafay Woods.
The following message from Lieut.-General Lord Cavan was circulated:
The Corps Commander knows that there are difficulties to be
cleared up on the left and in front of the 1st Guards
Brigade, and on the right of the 2nd Guards Brigade, but the
Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the general situation
is so favourable that every effort must be made to take
advantage of it and that tanks should carry out a special
programme before zero to deal with these unsatisfactory
positions. The Commander-in-chief states that there were
only two German divisions in reserve on a large front, and
that one of them had recently had enormous casualties, and
the other heavy casualties.
The French operations yesterday have been most successful,
and they have captured Bouchavesnes, which was their
objective.
[Sidenote: Sept. 13.]
Next night the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, which was holding the
northern sector of the Ginchy line, was instructed to go out and
straighten the line, so that the battalions which were to attack on
the following day should not be held up at the very start.
Lieut.-Colonel C. de Crespigny issued these orders:
1. In order to have a good “jumping-off” place for X day it is
essential to gain ground forward and dig a trench running from
T.13.b.4.9. to T.14.a.2½.2½. It will be necessary to establish a
post at the top of the cutting at T.13.b.4.9 and to drive the
Germans from the trench T.13.b.6.4. point of orchard T.14.a.5.5.
2. No. 4 will carry this out to-night. Time given later.
3. Two Stokes guns and one Lewis gun will report to you about 9
P.M. to-night. The Stokes gun will be used previous to the
attack. If possible a position will be chosen by O.C. No. 4 in
readiness.
4. No. 3 Company will be in readiness to move up to No. 4
Company’s present position, and the route should be reconnoitred
by daylight if possible. No. 2 Company will watch the left flank
of No. 4.
5. No. 3 Company will detail small parties after dark to carry up
fifty boxes of bombs from H.Q. to No. 4. A party will also be
required to carry up S.A.A., but this will be called for when
S.A.A. is available.
6. No. 2 Company will be prepared to dig through the sunken road
and join up with the new left of No. 4.
7. O.C. No. 2 Company will send up one Lewis gun after dark to
report to O.C. No. 4.
8. All companies will detail two men to report at H.Q. as guides
for ration parties after dark.
9. O.C. Nos. 2 and 3 Companies will meet C.O. at H.Q. of No. 4
Company at 8.0. P.M.
W. R. BAILEY, Captain and Adjutant,
2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards.
As it was known that the enemy held the point of the Ginchy orchard,
and that they had machine-guns in the Ginchy――Flers sunken road, about
four hundred yards north of that village, Captain G. Harcourt-Vernon,
who commanded No. 4 Company, detailed two platoons under Second
Lieutenant T. W. Minchin for the operation, while No. 2 was to protect
their left flank and keep touch with them. Lieutenant M. H. Macmillan
was ordered to bring up two platoons from No. 3 Company to support No.
4 Company and take over the line evacuated by Lieutenant Minchin’s
platoons.
The enterprise was difficult, as the left flank had to advance farther
than the right in order to form a line facing north-east. By way of
artillery preparation, thirty or forty shrapnel shells were fired at
the German trench just north of the orchard, but this had the effect
only of putting the enemy on his guard. Unfortunately, too, it was a
bright moonlight night, and the attacking party showed up distinctly.
The two platoons under Second Lieutenant Minchin advanced, and cleared
the orchard of all Germans, in spite of a heavy rifle and machine-gun
fire, which caused several casualties. Not content with this, they
tried to push on farther, but were fiercely resisted by the Germans,
and failed to make good any more ground. As it was imperatively
necessary to have a trench dug before daylight, Second Lieutenant
Minchin decided to hold a line on the edge of the orchard, and the
trench was completed by the next morning. The task assigned to the
party had been carried out, and there seemed no necessity to attempt
anything further.
That evening the following confidential message was received:
Day of attack (Z day) will be 15th Sept. Zero hours will
probably be in the early morning.
[Sidenote: Sept. 14.]
All next day the 2nd Battalion remained in the front trenches, where
it was very heavily shelled. One shell pitched on the headquarters of
No. 1 Company; Company Sergeant-Major Percival was mortally wounded
and died later, and Captain A. F. R. Wiggins was so severely shaken
that he retired suffering from shell shock. Company Sergeant-Major
Gudgeon of No. 3 Company was buried by another shell, and had to be
sent back. These losses were particularly regrettable, just as the
Battalion was going into action.
The Battalion was relieved in the evening by the 2nd and 3rd
Battalions Coldstream, and went into bivouac just behind Ginchy, where
rations and rum were served out. The men had been three days in the
trenches, and Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny and the Adjutant, Captain
Bailey, hardly had a moment’s sleep during that time. It was bitterly
cold at night, and the men, who had no greatcoats, suffered very much.
The time appointed for the attack was revealed during the afternoon,
in this message: “Zero hour to-morrow, September 15, will be at 6.20
A.M.” As shown in the above orders, four successive objectives had
been allotted to the Brigade. The first was about 1200 yards distant,
and the second 1500――but this concerned only the left battalion of the
Brigade. The third was 2500 yards off, while the fourth or final
objective, which included the northern outskirts of Lesbœufs, was no
less than 3500 yards away. The infantry were to advance to attack the
first objective at 6.20 A.M., to the second at 7.20, the third at
8.20, and the final objective at 10.50. The front allotted to the
Brigade was 500 yards.
The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream were to assault the first,
second, and third objectives. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was to
follow them, and form a defensive flank to either side, if required.
On reaching the first objective the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was to
remain there until the Irish Guards passed through them, and if the
flanks were all secure was to follow on and support them. The 1st
Battalion Irish Guards was to pass through the 2nd and 3rd Battalions
Coldstream at the third objective, and take and consolidate the fourth
objective.
Each battalion had a section of machine-guns attached to it, and was
told to place two guns on the flanks of the battalion and two at the
Battalion Headquarters. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers had four Stokes
guns, while four more were kept in reserve. Three tanks were to start
on the left outside the Brigade area, and were to pass into it north
of the cutting, which was known to be a troublesome place, on the left
flank.
Detailed instructions for the attack were issued in the following
operation orders by Lieut.-Colonel C. R. C. de Crespigny, Commanding
2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards:
1. The Battalion will be relieved to-night by the 2nd and 3rd
Battalions Coldstream Guards and part of the 41st Brigade on the
left, and will form up on the assembly area S.W. of Ginchy.
2. Companies will detail guides as follows to be at H.Q. at 7.30
P.M.:
No. 1 Company, 4 guides.
No. 2 ” 4 ”
No. 4 ” 8 ”
No. 3 Company will not wait to be relieved, but will move off to
place of assembly east of the Waterlot――Guillemont road. On
relief, Nos. 1, 2, and 4 Companies will march to H.Q. of No. 3
Company, where they will draw rations and water. They will then
move on to their positions in assembly area, where fresh meat,
sandwiches, and rum will be issued.
3. The assembly march will be carried out in absolute silence,
and there must be no smoking, and no lights shown. Between dawn
and zero (about 6 A.M.) there will be no movement.
4. Companies will each detail one N.C.O. to report at H.Q. of No.
3 Company at 6 P.M. to get rations ready for issue, also one
officer to be at H.Q. No. 3 Company at 4 P.M. to be shown
forming-up positions. Companies are responsible for reconnoitring
the route to H.Q. No. 3 from their present positions.
5. _Dress._――All men will carry two bandoliers S.A.A. and two
Mills bombs. This must be made up before leaving the trenches.
Every third man will carry a shovel, every fourth man a pick. Two
days’ rations will be carried.
6. _Forming-up._――Companies will form up as under on the assembly:
_350 Yards Frontage_
No. 1 Coy. No. 2 Coy. A.
100 yards.
No. 3 Coy. No. 4 Coy. B.
Line of platoons at forty yards’ intervals. G.G. lines are A and
B. Lateral pegs on the company frontage at ten yards apart.
Forward direction time boards are five yards apart, one central
line and two on tanks.
7. The Brigade will attack at zero on the morning of 15th on the
left of the Division. Six tanks will co-operate on this
Divisional front.
First objective T.8.a.2.5――T.8.d.3.7.
Second objective T.2.a.9.4――T.8.b.2.3.
Third objective T.3.a.5.9――T.3.L.2.6.
Fourth objective N.3.a.0.9――N.34.C.9.0.
8. Infantry will advance to the attack of――
The first objective at zero.
The second objective at zero + 1 hour.
The third objective at zero + 2 hours.
The fourth objective at zero + 4 hours 30 minutes.
9. The attack will be carried out as follows:
The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream will attack and capture the
first, second, and third objectives. The 2nd Battalion Grenadier
Guards will move in rear of the two Coldstream battalions. When
the latter advance to the assault of the second objective this
battalion will occupy the first objective until the 1st Battalion
Irish Guards has passed through them. They will then follow and
support the Irish Guards in their attack on the fourth objective.
The rôle of this Battalion is to form a defensive flank, if
necessary, and to support the attack of the Irish Guards. The
Irish Guards will attack the fourth objective.
10. The Battalion will advance in the same formation as it forms
up (two lines at 100 yards’ distance of two companies each in
lines of platoons at 40 yards’ interval). If it comes under rifle
or machine-gun fire it will deploy into extended order.
11. When the Coldstream have captured the first objective the
Battalion will halt until zero + 1 hour, probably in the old
British front line.
12. Battalion Headquarters will move about the centre of the two
rear companies. A dressing-station will probably be established
in the old British front line.
13. As soon as the final objectives have been captured by the
infantry, the cavalry will advance and seize the high ground
ahead.
14. The first line transport will be packed up and ready to move
forward at one hour’s notice after zero + 4 hours.
W. R. BAILEY, Capt. Adjt.,
2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards.
_September 14, 1916._
The officers of the 2nd Battalion who took part in the operations from
September 15 to 17 were:
Lieut.-Colonel C. R. C. de Crespigny, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. Viscount Lascelles Second in Command.
Capt. the Hon. W. R. Bailey Adjutant.
Capt. C. N. Newton No. 1 Company.
Lieut. P. M. Walker ” ”
Lieut. A. T. A. Ritchie, M.C. ” ”
2nd Lieut. C. C. Cubitt ” ”
Capt. A. K. S. Cunninghame No. 2 Company.
Capt. M. K. A. Lloyd ” ”
Lieut. T. Parker Jervis (Pioneer Platoon) ” ”
Lieut. N. McK. Jesper ” ”
Capt. W. H. Beaumont-Nesbitt No. 3 Company.
Lieut. H. F. C. Crookshank (Lewis Guns) ” ”
Lieut. M. H. Macmillan ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. Arbuthnott ” ”
2nd Lieut. A. Hasler ” ”
Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. T. W. Minchin ” ”
2nd Lieut. D. Harvey ” ”
Capt. J. Andrews, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
[Sidenote: Sept. 15.]
At 5 A.M. on the 15th the tanks were seen moving slowly forward on the
left flank of the Brigade, but they apparently aroused no suspicion,
and did not attract any fire. Punctually at 6.20, the zero hour, the
two Coldstream battalions started off, and immediately came under a
terrific fire from the enemy’s machine-guns. The unevenness of the
“jumping-off line,” and the total absence of any recognisable
landmarks in that desert of shell-holes, made a certain loss of
direction inevitable. The leaders of the assault were mown down, but
the remainder, undeterred by losses, pushed on until they were within
twenty yards of the sunken road. It was a red-letter day in the
history of the Coldstream, for with the 1st Battalion Coldstream from
the 2nd Brigade there were three battalions of Coldstream all in line.
When they reached the sunken road there was a momentary check, as the
leading companies had lost a large number of officers or
non-commissioned officers. Lieut.-Colonel J. Campbell saw that to
pause for a moment in the attack would mean failure, and dashed
forward. Knowing that in the infernal roar of rifle and machine-gun
fire no commands could possibly be heard, he had provided himself with
a hunting-horn, which he now blew. The familiar sound, piercing the
din, instantly arrested the attention of the men, and they at once
followed their Colonel. Straight into the midst of the enemy they went
with an irresistible rush, and got to work with the bayonet.
Large numbers of Germans were killed or taken prisoner, and four
machine-guns were captured, in addition to a number of trench mortars.
The casualties in the 2nd Battalion were considerably increased by the
fact that the tank, which should have passed over the place where the
machine-guns were posted, never reached its objective, and
consequently a gap of 100 yards was left where it should have gone.
On reaching the road the Coldstream battalions did not halt, but swept
on down the valley, where they found another entirely unexpected
German line. Their losses had been very heavy, especially among the
officers; in the 2nd Battalion Coldstream there were only two officers
left besides the Commanding Officer. Yet so splendid were the rank and
file that they “carried on” as if they still had officers at their
head. The fact that the whole Coldstream Regiment was in line leading
the Guards Division undoubtedly lent an additional impetus to the
whole attack. When they reached what they thought the third objective,
Lieut.-Colonel Campbell reported their position to General Feilding,
but Lord Cavan, who had received reports from aeroplanes, discovered
that it was not the third but the first objective that the Coldstream
were occupying, and sent back at once to say so.
Again the three Coldstream battalions had to go forward in the face of
a withering fire, and were joined soon after they started by No. 2
Company 2nd Battalion Grenadiers under Captain Cunninghame and parties
from the Irish Guards. But with a heavy barrage from the enemy’s
artillery, in addition to the machine-gun and rifle fire, an advance
was no easy matter. It was asking a great deal even of a regiment like
the Coldstream to face such a terrible ordeal a second time, but when
they were clear of the German barrage the note of the hunting-horn
once more rang out and warned them that Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was in
front, calling upon them to follow. Without hesitation the line again
swept forward, and the second objective was reached.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers started off, moving forward by
platoons in artillery formation some 350 yards in rear of the
Coldstream. With it came Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny, who was easily
distinguished as he marched along, for he wore a forage cap in place
of a helmet. When the Battalion reached Ginchy a heavy German barrage
came down on the men, who were almost blinded by the shells.
Fortunately, the bulk of the barrage was chiefly on the south side of
the village, but huge shells, bursting at the appalling rate of one a
second, were shooting up showers of mud in every direction, and the
noise was deafening. All this in addition to a fierce rifle fire,
which came from the right rear. Though the softness of the ground
prevented many shells from exploding, there were naturally a
considerable number of casualties. Captain M. K. A. Lloyd was killed
as he came along with his half company through the barrage, and
Lieutenant Macmillan was slightly wounded in the knee, but was able to
go on. Lieutenant Hasler, who was severely wounded in the stomach,
never recovered from his wound, and about the same time Second
Lieutenant J. Arbuthnott was also fatally wounded.
Twenty minutes later Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny decided to push on,
and the Battalion emerged from the barrage with its right on the
Ginchy――Lesbœufs road, but nothing could be seen of the two Coldstream
battalions. It turned out afterwards that the leading battalions of
the 2nd Guards Brigade, which were on the right, had started off in
the wrong direction, and had consequently pushed the Coldstream
battalions in the 1st Guards Brigade too far to the left, so that they
were no longer in front of their support. The orders given to the
Grenadiers were to keep their right on the Ginchy――Lesbœufs road, and
this they had managed to do in spite of the barrage. Lieut.-Colonel de
Crespigny knew he was in his right place, but was totally unable to
understand what had happened to the Coldstream battalions.
He sent a message to General Pereira and received the following reply:
Your pigeon message timed 7.45 A.M. not quite clear. Irish
Guards reported their Headquarters in Green line (first
objective) and in touch with 41st Brigade on left at 8.45
A.M. You state no signs of Coldstream. Presume they are
pushing on to next objective. Am sending bombs up.
Throughout the day it appears to have been assumed that the 2nd
Battalion Grenadiers was in touch with the two Coldstream battalions,
but although the Coldstream were fully aware of the position of the
Grenadiers, the Grenadiers had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the
Coldstream.
Almost immediately after the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers cleared the
barrage it came under machine-gun fire from the left front and rifle
fire from the right rear. Instead of finding itself, as it expected,
in rear of the Coldstream, it was suddenly confronted by a trench full
of the enemy. This was the first objective, which the men naturally
imagined had been taken by the Coldstream. Here they were in artillery
formation instead of in line, marching forward under the impression
that the two battalions of Coldstream were in front of them. To
approach the trench with any prospect of success it was necessary to
deploy into line, and in doing this they lost very heavily. Our
creeping barrage had, so to speak, run away, and there was now no
artillery support of any kind.
The companies on the right pushed on into the Green line, the first
objective, and there gained touch with the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers in
Ponsonby’s Brigade, which was attempting to stop the Germans turning
its right flank. Here Lieutenant Jesper was wounded, and Lieutenant
Macmillan, who had gone on in spite of the wound in his knee, was
struck a second time in the left thigh. The attack of the Division on
the right had failed, with the result that the right flank of the
Guards Division was dangerously in the air. On the left there was a
considerable gap, which caused great trouble, as it happened to be
opposite one of the enemy’s strong points. Lieutenant A. T. A. Ritchie
was wounded as he was trying to deal with this difficult situation,
and Sergeant Lyon, who took charge of his platoon, was soon afterwards
shot through the head.
One platoon of No. 1 Company with a machine-gun went out and succeeded
in forming a defensive flank, thus preventing the Germans, who were in
considerable strength, from working behind us. The greater part of the
casualties in the 2nd Battalion occurred about this time. Although
three of our machine-guns reached the first objective, two were
instantly required on the right flank, as the Sixth Division had
failed to take the Quadrilateral; this left only one to deal with the
Germans on the left. The centre of the Battalion then rushed a part of
the Green line and bayoneted all the Germans who did not surrender,
making prisoners of the rest. One German soldier who was taken in this
way thought it too dangerous to wait for an escort and ran off towards
our supports, holding up his hands as he went.
Meanwhile the left of the Battalion was still held up outside the wire
of the first objective, as the two Coldstream battalions had
apparently passed still farther to the left. As soon as the companies
in the centre entered the trench which was the first objective, the
enemy started bombing down it from the left. The Grenadier bombers ran
short of bombs and were powerless to stop the rush. The situation
looked ugly, when Company Sergeant-Major J. Norton, who was lying
outside the wire, gathered some men together and led a bayonet attack
against the German bombers. This momentarily relieved the situation.
All available bombs were then collected, and a party began to work up
the trench, but on reaching the enemy they were driven back with great
loss. The situation again became critical, as the Germans were slowly
driving our men back. Captain Harcourt-Vernon, finding that the supply
of bombs had given out, determined not to waste any more men’s lives
in what must necessarily be a one-sided contest, and organised a
bayonet charge over the top.
Calling on the Adjutant, Captain Bailey, to come with him, he led the
charge and took the German bombers completely by surprise. Many of
them were killed before they realised what had happened, and forty to
fifty more in rear all surrendered. Captain Harcourt-Vernon himself,
on arrival at the enemy’s trench, was confronted by a stalwart German
who immediately held up both hands and was made a prisoner, but
Captain Bailey’s man proved a fighter although, happily, a bad shot.
Captain Bailey missed him with the first three shots of his automatic
pistol, but despatched him with the fourth.
The Grenadier bombers, having managed to find some more bombs, now
worked along the trench to the left, and the Germans who had escaped
from Captain Harcourt-Vernon’s bayonet attack broke and ran across the
open to their support trench. Having cleared the line for some
distance, the Grenadiers began to consolidate. Two small parties of
the enemy tried to return but were dealt with by Lewis guns.
Lieutenant Crookshank, who was in charge of these guns, was wounded by
a H.E. shell which exploded a few yards in front of him, and Captain
Lord Lascelles, who was explaining to Captain Beaumont-Nesbitt what he
wanted him to do, and had just sent for a runner, was hit by a bullet
and had his arm broken.
Meanwhile No. 2 Company under Captain Cunninghame had pushed forward,
and got into line with the 3rd Coldstream, some 500 yards to the left
front of the remainder of the Grenadiers, who were in the first
objective, with the 3rd Grenadiers on their right and a mixture of men
from the Guards Division on their left. The Irish Guards had followed
the Coldstream, and had been able to send up some platoons to support
them.
When the aeroplanes reported that the two Coldstream battalions were
not at the third but between the first and second objectives, General
Feilding despatched the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards from the 3rd
Brigade, which was in reserve, to support them. But their position was
not accurately known, and only one company with two Lewis guns reached
them.
During the afternoon Lord Cavan had issued orders for the third
objective to be bombarded by heavy artillery. On hearing this, General
Pereira strongly protested, as he believed that two of his battalions
were already occupying that position. But Lord Cavan was so well
satisfied that the aeroplane reports were correct that he overruled
the protests, and the bombardment took place.
Further and costly attempts to retake the lost ground were made by the
enemy during the evening, but all their counter-attacks were easily
repulsed. The position in the evening was this: the remnants of the
2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream and the Irish Guards, with one
company of the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and one company of the 2nd
Battalion Scots Guards, were holding the second objective. The 2nd
Battalion Grenadiers was holding the first objective to the right,
with its right flank on the Ginchy――Lesbœufs road and in touch with
the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers.
[Sidenote: Sept. 16.]
Nothing of importance happened during the night of the 15th, and the
1st Guards Brigade remained in the same position throughout the 16th,
when it was subjected to a terrific shelling. That evening the troops
in the first objective were relieved by the 59th Brigade, and those in
the second objective by the 62nd Brigade. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers
was relieved by the 15th King’s Royal Rifles and retired about five
miles to bivouacs, where it arrived dead-beat, having had practically
no sleep for five days. It slept through the whole day on the 17th.
The casualties throughout the 13th, 14th, and 15th were: killed and
died of wounds 108, 235 wounded, and 12 missing――total 365, excluding
officers. Amongst the officers, Captain M. K. A. Lloyd was killed, and
Lieutenant H. Hasler and Second Lieutenant J. Arbuthnott were
seriously wounded and died a few days later, while the following were
wounded: Captain Lord Lascelles, Lieutenant T. Parker Jervis,
Lieutenant M. H. Macmillan, Lieutenant A. T. A. Ritchie, Lieutenant H.
F. C. Crookshank, Second Lieutenant T. W. Minchin, Second Lieutenant
N. McK. Jesper, Second Lieutenant D. Harvey, and Second Lieutenant C.
C. Cubitt.
Captain J. Andrews, R.A.M.C., was also wounded, but insisted on
remaining at duty. His gallant conduct throughout these three days
elicited much praise from the Commanding Officer.
General Pereira addressed the following message to the 2nd Battalion:
2ND BATTALION GRENADIER GUARDS.
As your Brigadier I wish to say in a few words how deeply I
appreciate the gallant work done by you in the recent
operations at Ginchy.
On the 12th September you took over Ginchy trenches, and the
following night you drove the German out of Ginchy Orchard;
this work caused you one hundred casualties, but by your
fine work you cleared the ground for the advance on
September 15, and ensured that it would not be held up at
the very beginning.
On September 15 your first advance was through a heavy
artillery barrage, but owing to the splendid discipline of
your Regiment, you went through it as if on parade.
Your opportunity came later on when you cleared trenches at
the point of the bayonet, having run out of bombs, and when
you charged a trench strongly held and in the face of
machine-gun fire.
You have shown the Germans what they have to expect when
they meet the pick of the British Army.
In the near future you may be called upon to do as much
again, and I know that you will not fail.
C. E. PEREIRA, Brigadier-General,
Commanding 1st Guards Brigade.
IN THE FIELD,
_September 18, 1916_.
[Sidenote: Sept. 17-20.]
The 2nd Battalion remained at the Citadel from September 17 to 20
with the rest of Pereira’s Brigade. The weather was wet and cold,
and the Brigade was busily employed in absorbing drafts. On the
19th a conference of Commanding Officers was held at Brigade
Headquarters, when the frontage and objectives for the attack
which was to take place on the 25th were outlined. As the front
allotted to the Brigade was 700 yards, it was decided to attack
with three battalions in front and one in support; but when this
scheme was subsequently changed, and the frontage decreased to
500 yards, it was proposed to entrust the next attack to the 2nd
Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Irish Guards, with the 2nd
and 3rd Battalions Coldstream in support.
On the 20th the Brigade began moving in companies from the
Citadel to relieve the 61st Brigade. It was still very wet, and
the roads were blocked by transport in a sea of mud. The weather
had now broken, and owing to the cold nights the men took their
greatcoats with them, though the rest of their spare equipment
was stored as before.
[Sidenote: Sept. 20-24.]
The two Coldstream battalions remained in the front line from the 20th
to the 24th, while the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion
Irish Guards, who were to undertake the attack, were bivouacked in
Bernafay and Trônes Woods. The 3rd Guards Brigade was employed in
digging an assembly trench about 150 yards in rear of our front line.
The fact that the trench was completed only the night before the
attack accounted for the Germans being, apparently, ignorant of its
exact situation, for although they shelled all the other trenches this
one escaped their notice. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was put on to
salvage work and carrying during the days that preceded the attack.
On the 21st the following orders were issued by Brigadier-General
Pereira:
SECRET.
1ST GUARDS BRIGADE ORDER, NO. 77
_21st September 1916._
1. The Fourth Army will renew the attack on Z day, in combination
with the attacks by the French to the south and Reserve Army to
the north.
2. (_a_) The Guards Division will form part of the attack of the
Fourteenth Corps.
(_b_) 1st Guards Brigade will attack on the right and 3rd Guards
Brigade on left of Guards Division.
(_c_) 18th Infantry Brigade of Sixth Division will be attacking
on the right of 1st Guards Brigade.
_Attacking Troops_――
3. The attack of 1st Guards Brigade will be carried out by 2nd
Bn. Grenadier Guards on the right and 1st Bn. Irish Guards on the
left.
The 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards will be in support on the right and
3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards in support on the left.
_Preliminary Bombardment_――
4. A steady bombardment of hostile positions will begin at 7 A.M.
on Y day and will be continued to 6.30 P.M. It will begin again
at 6.30 A.M. on Z day.
Night firing will be carried out nightly from 6.30 P.M. to 6.30
A.M.
There will be no intensive fire previous to zero hour.
_Forming-up Areas_――
5. Forming-up areas, boundaries, and objectives are shown on the
attached map.
The first objective is marked Green.
The second objective is marked Brown.
The third objective is marked Blue.
_Formation for Attack_――
6. The 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards will
form up in two lines――one in the firing line and one in the
support line.
The 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards will form up in the communication
trench from T.8.a.9.4 to T.3.c.3.8.
The 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards will form up in the trench from
T.8.a.9.4 to T.8.d.5.5.
The 1st Guards Brigade Machine-gun Coy. will assemble with one
section at the head of 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards――one section in
rear of 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards and one section on right of 3rd
Bn. Coldstream Guards.
The 1st Guards Brigade Trench Mortar Battery will form up with
two guns on right of front line and two guns on right of support
line.
The 75th Field R.E. and work platoons will form up in trenches
T.8.d.
7. The infantry will advance to the attack of the Green line at
zero――to the attack of the Brown line at zero + 1 hour. To the
attack of the Blue line at zero + 2 hours.
_Barrages_――
8. (_a_) 50 per cent of Field Artillery barrage will be used for
creeping barrage, and 50 per cent for stationary barrage.
(_b_) In all cases the stationary barrage will lift back when the
creeping barrage meets it.
9. (_a_) At zero the creeping barrage will start 100 yards in
front of our front-line trenches. It will advance at the rate of
50 yards a minute until it is 200 yards beyond the Green line,
when it will become stationary.
(_b_) At zero + 1 hour, the creeping barrage will start 200 yards
in front of the Green line, and will advance at the rate of 50
yards a minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the Brown
line, when it will become stationary.
(_c_) At zero + 2 hours the creeping barrage will start 100 yards
in front of the Brown line, and will advance at the rate of 50
yards a minute until it has passed 100 yards beyond the Blue
line, when it will become stationary.
(_d_) Other permanent barrages are being arranged along certain
sunken roads.
_Tasks_――
10. (_a_) The task of the Division is to press the attack through
to the Blue line. A sufficient flow of troops will be maintained
from zero onwards to ensure that the Brown line is strong and
well supported.
(_b_) The attack on all objectives will be carried out by 2nd Bn.
Grenadier Guards on the right and 1st Bn. Irish Guards on the
left.
The 2nd and 3rd Bns. Coldstream Guards will be in support under
command of Lieut.-Colonel J. V. Campbell, D.S.O.
_Method of Assault_――
11. The assault will be carried out by leading battalions in two
waves of 75 yards’ distance.
_Action of Support Battalions_――
12. As soon as the front and support lines are vacated by 2nd Bn.
Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards the 2nd Bn. Coldstream
Guards and 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards will occupy them.
All movement to these lines by supporting units should be by the
communication trench from T.8.a.9.4 to T.8.c.3.8.
Similarly 2nd and 3rd Bns. Coldstream Guards will occupy the
Green and Brown lines as soon as they are vacated by 2nd Bn.
Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards.
As soon as the 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards
have gained the Brown line, 2nd and 3rd Bns. Coldstream Guards
will each send a company as clearing-up parties in Lesbœufs.
These two companies must shelter in shell-holes behind the Brown
line during the pause on that line. They must on no account be
mixed up with 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards.
They will carry a special supply of P. bombs and Mills grenades
for dealing with cellars.
The 2nd and 3rd Bns. Coldstream Guards are responsible for making
good each objective as captured, and for guarding either flank if
threatened, paying special attention to the right flank.
Lieut.-Colonel J. V. Campbell, D.S.O., commanding supporting
battalions, will be prepared to give such additional support as
may be required to carry out the attack on the final
objective――bearing in mind the necessity for holding positions
already captured.
_Machine-guns_――
13. (_a_) At the first favourable opportunity after the Green
line has been captured, O.C. Machine-gun Coy. will send one
section forward to it. In this line and in his subsequent move to
the Brown line two guns will always be on the right flank, ready
to assist in the formation of a defensive flank.
(_b_) Similarly, when the Brown and Blue lines have been
captured, one section will be sent forward to help in the
consolidation of each of these lines.
Thus when the final objective has been captured there should be
four guns in the Blue line and eight in reserve in the Brown
line.
_Stokes T.M._――
14. (_a_) Previous to the assault two guns will be established on
the right of the Brigade area. These two guns will move forward
at the first favourable opportunity and establish themselves on
the right of the Green line.
(_b_) Two other guns will be in reserve in the front line, and
will only move forward to the Green line if ordered to do so by
Lieut.-Colonel J. V. Campbell, D.S.O., or by the Brigadier.
_R.E. and Work Platoons_――
15. 75th Field Coy. R.E. and Work Platoons will move forward from
their assembly area to the trench about T.8.b.3.0, as soon as
this trench is clear of 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards. They will be
ready to move forward on receipt of orders from Brigade H.Q. and
consolidate ground gained. O.C. 75th Field Coy. R.E. will detail
one officer and three orderlies in liaison with O.C. supporting
battalions.
_Patrols_――
16. When the Blue line has been gained, patrols will be sent
forward, and any ground from which good observation can be gained
will be occupied.
Such points will be consolidated and eventually joined up with
our line.
_Contact Patrol and Flares_――
17. One contact aeroplane will be in the air from zero till 6.30
P.M. on Z day. Flares will be lit by leading infantry lines on
obtaining each objective and also at 6 _P.M._ on Z day.
18. Watches will be synchronised at 7 P.M. on Y day and at 9 A.M.
on Z day.
_First Line Transport_――
19. Ammunition portions of first line Transport will be collected
on the south-west side of Bernafay Wood to the south of the
Guillemont――Montauban Road, and remainder of first line Transport
in the neighbourhood of Minden Post by 12 noon on Z day.
Brigade Transport Officer will detail an orderly to be in waiting
at Advanced Divisional H.Q. Bernafay Wood, and will himself be at
Minden Post from 12 noon on Z day to receive instructions.
_Prisoners_――
20. Prisoners will be sent back to the Corps Cage at the Craters
A.8.a under escort. In future correspondence will not be taken
off prisoners except off officers. Officers’ documents will be
removed as soon as they are captured and sent to the Corps Cage
with their escort.
_Dumps_――
21. An advanced Brigade Dump of bombs――S.A.A.――Stokes mortar
ammunition――R.E. material and rations has been established about
T.8.c central.
_Equipment_――
22. The equipment to be carried by assaulting troops will be the
same as that laid down for the attack on September 15.
23. Arrangements have been made for the Brigade on our right to
open enfilade machine-gun and trench-mortar fire on the Green
line from about T.9.d.3.9 at zero. This fire will be continued
until the creeping barrage passes beyond the Green line.
_Medical Arrangements_――
24. Medical arrangements will be notified later.
_Brigade Headquarters_――
25. Brigade Headquarters will be at T.19.a.½.3½. An advanced
Brigade Report Centre will be established in the communication
trench T.8.b――T.3.c on September 22.
Pigeons will be supplied to the battalions on Z day as follows:
3 to 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards.
3 to 1st Bn. Irish Guards.
6 to 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards.
As soon as all pigeons have been released pigeon men must return
at once to Brigade Headquarters.
26. Z day will be September 23. Zero hour will be notified later.
It will probably be in the afternoon.
Acknowledge.
M. B. SMITH, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 1st Guards Brigade.
A Memorandum from the Brigade-Major on the lie of the land followed.
1ST GUARDS BRIGADE, NO. 262
2ND BATT. GRENADIER GUARDS――
The forthcoming attack differs from the last in that the whole
scheme is not such an ambitious one. The distance to the first
objective is about 300 yards, to the second objective 800 yards,
and to the last objective about 1300 yards. In each case the
objective is a clearly defined one, and not merely a line drawn
across the map.
Between our present front line and the first objective there is
only “No Man’s Land.” During the next two nights this should be
actively patrolled to ensure that our attack is not taken by
surprise by some unknown trench, and in order that Officers and
N.C.O.’s may have a knowledge of the ground.
It would also be of great assistance to the Artillery if reports
as to the actual distance to the Green line were sent in.
The ground slopes down to Lesbœufs, beyond which there is a
distinct hollow with a plateau the same level as Lesbœufs beyond.
On reaching the final objective Officers and N.C.O.’s should
understand the necessity for pushing patrols out to command this
hollow and give warning or prevent counter-attacks forming up
here.
Large-scale maps of Lesbœufs have been sent to all battalions.
These should be carefully studied by all Officers and N.C.O.’s,
and especially by those of the companies detailed for the
cleaning up of Lesbœufs.
All runners and signallers should know the position of the
advanced Brigade Report Centre, and that the best means of
approach to it will probably be down the communication trench
T.3.c and T.8.b.
Finally, it cannot be too much impressed on assaulting troops the
necessity for clinging to our own barrage. It will be an attack
in which this should be comparatively easy and on which the
success of the whole operation may depend.
M. B. SMITH, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 1st Guards Brigade.
_September 22, 1916._
The Operation Order by Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny, Commanding 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards, was as follows:
22/9/16. _Map Ref. 57.c.S.W._
1. _Intention._――The Fourth Army will renew the attack on Z day
in combination with the attacks by the French to the south and
Reserve Army to the north.
1st Guards Brigade will attack on the right of the Division.
3rd Guards Brigade will attack on our left.
18th Infantry Brigade will attack on our right.
2. This Battalion will be on the right of the 1st Guards Brigade.
1st Bn. Irish Guards will be on the left.
2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards will be in support on the right.
3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards will be in support on the left.
3. _Formation of Attack._――The Battalion will form up in two
lines, one in the firing line and one in the support line, care
being taken that bayonets do not show on the top of the trenches
before zero.
_Front Line._――No. 1 Coy. on left, No. 2 Coy. on the right.
_Support Line._――No. 3 Coy. on left, No. 4 Coy. on the right.
Forming-up areas, boundaries, and objective as shown on map at
Headquarters, to be copied in.
4. First objective is marked Green. Second objective Brown. Third
objective Blue.
5. _Task._――To press the attack through to the Blue line, a
sufficient flow of troops being maintained to ensure that the
Brown line is strong and well supported.
6. (_a_) At zero the creeping barrage will start 100 yards in
front of our front-line trenches. It will advance at the rate of
50 yards a minute until it is 200 yards beyond the Green line,
when it will become stationary.
At zero Nos. 1 and 2 Coys. will advance to the attack of the
Green line, followed at 75 yards’ distance by Nos. 3 and 4 Coys.,
who will not stop at our old front line but will push on into the
Green line. On reaching the Green line companies will at once
reorganise.
(_b_) At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage will start 200 yards
in front of the Green line, and will advance at the rate of 50
yards a minute until it is 200 yards beyond the Brown line, when
it will become stationary. At zero + 1 hour Nos. 3 and 4 Coys.
will advance to the attack of the Brown line, followed by Nos. 1
and 2 Coys. at 75 yards’ interval.
(_c_) At zero + 2 hours the creeping barrage will start 100 yards
in front of the Brown line and will advance at the rate of 50
yards a minute until it has passed 100 yards beyond the Blue
line.
At zero + 2 hours Nos. 1 and 2 Coys. will attack the Blue line,
followed by Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. at 75 yards’ distance. The
Battalion will consolidate on the Blue line and hold it at all
costs.
(_d_) Other permanent barrages are being arranged along certain
sunken roads.
When the Blue line has been gained, patrols will be pushed
forward at once to seize and hold any point from which good
observation can be obtained.
7. _Lewis Guns._――Each company will have one Lewis gun: the
remainder (four) under Lieut. Knatchbull-Hugessen will move up
with the second wave and be prepared to act against hostile
machine-guns in the village or forward objectives or against
counter-attacks. They will also be ready to form a defensive
flank to the right or left.
8. _Mopping Up._――The dug-outs in the first and second objectives
will be promptly dealt with by Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. As soon as the
Battalion has gained the Brown line, the 2nd and 3rd Batts.
Coldstream will occupy the Green line, and will each send
clearing parties of 1 Coy. to clear the village of Lesbœufs.
9. _Dress and Equipment._――Greatcoats will not be carried, and
arrangements will be made for them to be collected before moving
up.
Following will be carried: Per man――three sand-bags, two
bandoliers, two Mills bombs, one day’s rations, one iron ration.
A large percentage of each company will carry slung shovels.
Flares will be carried by every officer and platoon sergeant, and
the remainder of the flares and rockets will be distributed among
the companies. V.P. lights should be distributed among companies,
men carrying one or two in their pockets.
Water-bottles must be filled before starting, and men must be
very sparing in their drinking.
10. All S.A.A. and bombs to be taken off casualties, whenever
possible, and dumped in the nearest objective.
11. One contact aeroplane will be in the air from zero till 6.30
P.M. on Z day. Flares will be lit by leading troops on obtaining
each objective, and also at 6 P.M. on Z day.
12. _Communication._――A party of signallers will accompany the
second wave and lay a telephone line from the jumping-off place
to the Green line, afterwards extending it to Brown and Blue
lines.
Battalion Headquarters will not move from the jumping-off place
until the Green line has been captured.
13. _Watches_ will be synchronised at 7 P.M. on Y day and at 9
A.M. on Z day.
14. _Prisoners._――If prisoners are taken they must be sent out of
the way, to prevent blockage in the trenches.
The Corps Cage is at the Crater A.8.a.
In future correspondence will _not_ be taken off prisoners except
off officers. Officers’ documents will be removed as soon as they
are captured, and sent to the Corps Cage with their escort.
15. _Dumps._――An advanced Brigade Dump is at T.8.c central.
16. The Brigade on our right will open enfilade machine-gun and
mortar fire on the Green line from about T.9.d.3.9 at zero, and
continue until the creeping barrage has passed Green line.
17. Z day and zero will be notified later, but zero will probably
be in the afternoon.
18. _Miscellaneous._――(_a_) Assaulting troops should keep as
close behind our creeping barrage as possible.
(_b_) There will be no intense artillery fire before zero.
(_c_) All troops should watch for any messages which aeroplanes
may drop.
W. R. BAILEY, Capt. and Adjt.,
2nd Batt. Grenadier Guards.
[Sidenote: Sept. 25.]
The following officers of the 2nd Battalion took part in the attack on
the 25th:
Lieut.-Colonel C. R. C. de Crespigny, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. the Hon. W. R. Bailey Adjutant.
Lieut. M. A. Knatchbull-Hugessen Lewis Gun Officer.
Lieut. A. F. Irvine No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. G. A. Arbuthnot ” ”
Capt. A. K. S. Cunninghame No. 2 Company.
Lieut. H. G. Wiggins ” ”
2nd Lieut. F. H. G. Layland-Barratt ” ”
Capt. W. H. Beaumont-Nesbitt No. 3 Company.
Lieut. A. McW. Lawson-Johnston ” ”
Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon No. 4 Company.
Lieutenant the Hon. W. A. D. Parnell ” ”
Lieut. R. B. B. Wright ” ”
Capt. J. Andrews, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
The remainder of the officers remained with the transport.
Late on the night of the 24th the Brigade was informed that zero hour
would be 12.35 P.M. the next day. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers moved
up that night from Bernafay Wood to relieve the 2nd Battalion
Coldstream in the trenches preparatory to the attack, with its right
on the Ginchy――Lesbœufs road. On arrival at the assembly trench No. 1
Company was placed on the right and No. 2 on the left, with No. 3 and
No. 4 in support. The trenches were so narrow that the men were unable
to sit or lie down, and had to remain standing all the next morning,
shoulder to shoulder.
Punctually at 12.35 P.M. the attack was launched, and immediately the
creeping barrage was put down by our artillery with great accuracy 200
yards in front of the attacking force. The necessity of getting men
across No Man’s Land as promptly as possible after zero had been found
from experience to be of paramount importance, and the Grenadier and
Irish Guards therefore did not hesitate for a moment, but dashed
forward in two waves. The enemy must have had some very accurate
information about our intentions, for the attackers had hardly left
their trench (it was three-quarters of a minute after zero) when they
put down a heavy barrage on our front trenches, as well as on the
support and communication trenches.
The leading wave of men was able to get close up under our creeping
barrage, and the Irish Guards found no difficulty in capturing the
first objective at the point of the bayonet. The 2nd Battalion
Grenadiers would have had an equally simple task but for the fact that
the wire in front of them, which was in standing crops and therefore
hidden, had been very little damaged by our artillery fire. There
seemed no possibility of getting through it, with the Germans so
close, and for the moment the whole advance of the Grenadiers was held
up.
Captain A. Cunninghame, Second Lieutenant G. A. Arbuthnot, Lieutenant
W. Parnell, and Lieutenant Irvine at once ordered their men to lie
down, and the four gallantly advancing by themselves proceeded with
the utmost coolness to cut gaps in the wire. Their one thought seems
to have been that the attack must not be checked on any account, and
as the task of cutting the wire meant almost certain death, they never
thought of sending on any of their men, but decided to do it
themselves. Captain Cunninghame, Second Lieutenant G. Arbuthnot, and
Lieutenant Parnell were killed, and Lieutenant Irvine was wounded, but
sufficient room was made for the men to go through, and the Grenadiers
swept forward into the first objective.
Apparently the line was strongly held by the enemy, and a large number
were killed and one man taken prisoner, while three machine-guns fell
into our hands. Lieutenant H. Wiggins, who was on the extreme right,
was trying to creep down the fire-swept sunken road when he was struck
by a fragment of a shell which burst near him. Lieutenant
Knatchbull-Hugessen brought up the Lewis guns by the sunken road and
did great execution with them. He was still directing the fire of his
guns, although wounded and covered with blood, when a shell pitched on
the road near him and killed him.
[Illustration:
_J. Weston & Sons photographers_ _Emery Walker ph. sc._
_Major-General G. D. Jeffreys, C.M.G._]
By 1.30 the first objective was entirely in our hands, and five
minutes later the advance to the second objective began, close up
under our barrage. This was a complete success, as the barrage kept
the enemy in their trenches, and they had not even shown themselves
when the Grenadiers and Irish Guards were on them with the bayonet.
After the capture of the first objective there were only two company
officers left, Lieutenant A. Lawson-Johnston and Second Lieutenant
Layland-Barratt, and the attack on the second objective was
practically carried out by the non-commissioned officers. Never have
the sergeants of the regiment showed to better advantage. The skill
with which they handled their companies or platoons, their quick grasp
of an order conveyed to them, and the intelligent way in which they
carried out their instructions elicited the warmest praise from the
Commanding Officer.
By 1.45 P.M. the second objective was secured, and many of the enemy
killed. The dug-outs in the sunken road on the right of the Grenadiers
were all searched, and a large number of prisoners taken. The
following message was received from Brigade Headquarters:
Prisoner you sent down states that the rest of his Company
are in dug-outs or subterranean passages about 250 yards
east of Lesbœufs and south of the sunken road. He appears to
think they are anxious to surrender, but gives no reasons.
In thinking this he seems to be more talkative than reliable.
The prisoner proved to be right, though, by the time the search of
these dug-outs started, all their occupants had already run out,
holding up their hands. During this second phase of the attack, the
enemy appear to have offered little resistance, and many more were
captured than killed.
Meanwhile the company of Coldstream under Captain Verelst which had
been detailed for clearing Lesbœufs closed up in rear of the
Grenadiers, according to the programme, and at 2.35 P.M. the advance
on the third objective began. To this also there was little
resistance, and soon the Grenadiers and Irish Guards were established
in a line 100 yards east of Lesbœufs village. During the whole of
their advance the Grenadiers had kept in perfect touch with the Irish
Guards on their left and the 1st West Yorks on their right, and the
orders were carried out almost to the minute. However, the situation
on the left of the 1st Guards Brigade seemed doubtful, and General
Pereira therefore sent up a company from the 3rd Battalion Coldstream
to strengthen that flank.
Thus Lesbœufs passed into our hands, and these positions, which had
been considered quite impregnable, were taken by the combination of
the creeping barrage and a simultaneous infantry attack.
It was about this time that the only real hitch in the attack
occurred. Arrangements had been made for the artillery barrage to be
put down 200 yards east of the final objective, but the position of
the trench was marked differently on the artillery and infantry maps,
and the shells fell short. This not only caused a good many casualties
amongst the men who were digging in, but also prevented the attacking
force from pushing forward patrols and occupying the best ground for
observation. A furious message was sent back by Captain Bailey: ”Our
artillery are blowing us out. Please stop it at once,” but whether the
messages miscarried or whether the maps were so inaccurate that the
orders were not understood, the shelling continued for nearly two
hours.
Meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream moved up by the new
communication trench to the support line and thence across the open to
the first objective, where they remained in support.
When the barrage eventually cleared away it was found that there were
practically no Germans in front, although a good many of them could be
seen running towards Le Transloy without rifles or equipment, and the
enemy were not shelling us at all, no doubt because they had been
obliged to move their guns. It seemed to Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny
that some advantage should be taken of this situation, and he sent a
message back that it was a splendid opportunity for the cavalry to go
through. Lord Cavan, however, decided that the circumstances did not
permit of such a move, as the front was too narrow.
Lord Cavan sent the following message to General Pereira:
Hearty thanks and sincere congratulations to you all. A very
fine achievement, splendidly executed.
To which General Pereira replied:
Your old Brigade very proud to be able to present you with
Lesbœufs. All ranks most gratified by your kind
congratulations.
Later this message was received from General Ponsonby, commanding the
2nd Guards Brigade: