CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IN THE EASTERN PARTS OF SPAIN.
[Sidenote: 1813. September.]
[Sidenote: Appendix 6.]
When general Clinton succeeded lord William Bentinck, his whole
force, composed of the Anglo-Sicilians, Whittingham’s and Sarzfield’s
Spaniards, and two battalions of Roche’s division, did not furnish
quite nineteen thousand men under arms. Copons, blockading Mequinenza
Lerida and Monzon and having garrisons in Cardona and the Seo
d’Urgel, the only places in his possession, could not bring more than
nine thousand men into the field. Elio had nominally twenty-five
thousand, but this included Sarzfield’s and Roche’s troops the
greater part of which were with Clinton. It included likewise the
bands of Villa Campa Duran and the Empecinado, all scattered in
Castile Aragon and Valencia, and acting according to the caprices
of their chiefs. His force, daily diminishing also from the extreme
unhealthiness of the country about Tortoza, was scarcely sufficient
to maintain the blockades of the French fortresses beyond the Ebro.
Copons’ army having no base but the mountains about Vich and
Monserrat, having no magazines or depôts or place of arms, having
very little artillery and scarcely any cavalry, lived as it could
from day to day; in like manner lived Sarzfield’s and Whittingham’s
troops, and Clinton’s army was chiefly fed on salt provisions from
the ships. The two former having no means of transport were unable
to make even one day’s march with ease, they were continually upon
the point of starvation and could never be reckoned as a moveable
force. Nor indeed could the Anglo-Sicilians, owing to their scanty
means of transport, make above two or three marches from the sea; and
they were at this time more than usually hampered, being without pay
and shut out from their principal depôts at Gibraltar and Malta, by
plague at the first and yellow fever at the second place. In fine,
the courage and discipline of the British and Germans set aside, it
would be difficult to find armies less efficient for an offensive
campaign than those of the allies in Catalonia. Moreover lord William
Bentinck had been invested with the command of all the Spanish
armies, but Clinton had only Whittingham’s and Sarzfield’s troops
under him, and notwithstanding his constant endeavours to conciliate
Copons, the indolence and incapacity of that general impeded or
baffled all useful operations: and to these disqualifications he
added an extreme jealousy of Eroles and Manso, men designated by the
public voice as the most worthy of command.
This analysis shows that Elio being entirely engaged in Valencia, and
Sarzfield and Whittingham unprovided with the means of movement, the
army of Copons and the Anglo-Sicilians, together furnishing, when the
posts and escorts and the labourers employed on the fortifications of
Taragona were deducted, not more than eighteen thousand men in line
of battle, were the only troops to be counted on to oppose Suchet,
who having sixty-five thousand men, of which fifty-six thousand were
present under arms, could without drawing a man from his garrisons
attack them with thirty thousand. But Copons and Clinton could not
act together above a few days because their bases and lines of
retreat were on different sides. The Spaniard depended upon the
mountains and plains of the interior for security and subsistence,
the Englishman’s base was Taragona and the fleet. Hence the only mode
of combining on a single line was to make Valencia a common base,
and throwing bridges over the Ebro construct works on both sides to
defend them. This was strongly recommended by lord Wellington to
lord William and to Clinton; but the former had several times lost
his bridges partly from the rapidity of the stream, partly from the
activity of the garrison of Tortoza. And for general Clinton the
difficulty was enhanced by distance, because Taragona, where all his
materials were deposited was sixty miles from Amposta, and all his
artificers were required to restore the defences of the former place.
The blockade of Tortoza was therefore always liable to be raised, and
the troops employed there exposed to a sudden and fatal attack, since
Suchet, sure to separate the Anglo-Sicilians from Copons when he
advanced, could penetrate between them; and while the former rallied
at Taragona and the latter at Igualada his march would be direct
upon Tortoza. He could thus either carry off his strong garrison, or
passing the Ebro by the bridge of the fortress, move without let or
hindrance upon Peniscola, Saguntum, and Valencia, and driving Elio
back upon Alicant collect his garrisons and return too powerful to be
meddled with.
In these circumstances lord Wellington’s opinion was, that the
blockade of Tortoza should be given up and the two armies acting on
their own peculiar lines, the one from Taragona the other from the
mountains, harass in concert the enemy’s flanks and rear, alternately
if he attacked either, but together if he moved upon Tortoza. To
besiege or blockade that place with safety it was necessary to throw
two bridges over the Ebro below, to enable the armies to avoid
Suchet, by either bank when he should succour the place, as he was
sure to do. But it was essential that Copons should not abandon
Catalonia and difficult for him to do so, wherefore it would be
advisable to make Taragona the point of retreat for both armies in
the first instance, after which they could separate and infest the
French rear.
The difficulties of besieging Tortoza he thought insuperable, and
he especially recommended that they should be well considered
before-hand, and if it was invested, that the troops should be
entrenched around it. In fine all his instructions tended towards
defence and were founded upon his conviction of the weak and
dangerous position of the allies, yet he believed them to have more
resources than they really had, and to be superior in number to the
French, a great error as I have already shewn. Nothing therefore
could be more preposterous than Suchet’s alarm for the frontier of
France at this time, and it is unquestionable that his personal
reluctance was the only bar to aiding Soult either indirectly by
marching on Tortoza and Valencia, or directly by adopting that
marshal’s great project of uniting the two armies in Aragon. So
certain indeed is this that general Clinton, seeing the difficulties
of his own situation, only retained the command from a strong sense
of duty, and lord Wellington despairing of any advantage in Catalonia
recommended that the Anglo-Sicilian army should be broken up and
employed in other places. The French general’s inactivity was the
more injurious to the interests of his sovereign, because any reverse
or appearance of reverse to the allies would at this time have gone
nigh to destroy the alliance between Spain and England; but personal
jealousy, the preference given to local and momentary interests
before general considerations, hurt the French cause at all periods
in the Peninsula and enabled the allies to conquer.
General Clinton had no thoughts of besieging Tortoza, his efforts
were directed to the obtaining a secure place of arms, yet,
despite of his intrinsic weakness, he resolved to show a confident
front, hoping thus to keep Suchet at arm’s length. In this view he
endeavoured to render Taragona once more defensible notwithstanding
the nineteen breaches which had been broken in its walls; the
progress of the work was however tedious and vexatious because
he depended for his materials upon the Spanish authorities. Thus
immersed in difficulties of all kinds he could make little change
in his positions which were generally about the Campo, Sarzfield’s
division only being pushed to Villafranca. Suchet meanwhile held the
line of the Llobregat, and apparently to colour his refusal to join
Soult, grounded on the great strength of the allies in Catalonia, he
suffered general Clinton to remain in tranquillity.
[Sidenote: October.]
Towards the end of October reports that the French were
concentrating, for what purpose was not known, caused the English
general, although Taragona was still indefensible to make a forward
movement. He dared not indeed provoke a battle, but unwilling to
yield the resources which Villafranca and other districts occupied
by the allies still offered, he adopted the resolution of pushing an
advanced guard to the former place. He even fixed his head-quarters
there, appearing ready to fight, yet his troops were so disposed
in succession at Arbos, Vendrills and Torredembarra that he could
retreat without dishonour if the French advanced in force, or could
concentrate at Villafranca in time to harass their flank and rear
if they attempted to carry off their garrisons on the Segre. In
this state of affairs Suchet made several demonstrations, sometimes
against Copons sometimes against Clinton, but the latter maintained
his offensive attitude with firmness, and even in opposition to lord
Wellington’s implied opinion that the line of the Ebro was the most
suitable to his weakness; for he liked not to abandon Taragona the
repairs of which were now advancing though slowly to completion. His
perseverance was crowned with success; he preserved the few resources
left for the support of the Spanish troops, and furnished Suchet with
that semblance of excuse which he desired for keeping aloof from
Soult.
[Sidenote: December.]
In this manner October and November were passed, but on the 1st
of December the French general attempted to surprise the allies’
cantonments at Villafranca, as he had before surprised them at Ordal.
He moved in the same order. One column marched by San Sadurni on his
right, another by Bejer and Avionet on his left, and the main body
kept the great road. But he did not find colonel Adam there. Clinton
had blocked the Ordal so as to render a night surprise impossible,
and the natural difficulties of the other roads delayed the flanking
columns. Hence when the French reached Villafranca, Sarzfield was
in full march for Igualada, and the Anglo-Sicilians, who had only
three men wounded at one of the advanced posts, were on the strong
ground about Arbos, where being joined by the supporting divisions
they offered battle; but Suchet retired to the Llobregat apparently
so mortified by his failure that he has not even mentioned it in his
Memoirs.
Clinton now resumed his former ground, yet his embarrassments
increased, and though he transferred two of Whittingham’s regiments
to Copons and sent Roche’s battalions back to Valencia, the country
was so exhausted that the enduring constancy of the Spanish soldiers
under privations alone enabled Sarzfield to remain in the field:
more than once, that general, a man of undoubted firmness and
courage, was upon the point of re-crossing the Ebro to save his
soldiers from perishing of famine. Here as in other parts, the
Spanish government not only starved their troops but would not
even provide a piece of ordnance or any stores for the defence of
Taragona, now, by the exertions of the English general, rendered
defensible. Nay! when admiral Hallowell in conjunction with Quesada
the Spanish commodore at Port Mahon, brought some ship-guns from that
place to the fortress, the minister of war, O’Donoju, expressed his
disapprobation, observing with a sneer that the English might provide
the guns wanting from the Spanish ordnance moved into Gibraltar by
general Campbell when he destroyed the lines of San Roque!
The 9th Suchet pushed a small corps by Bejer between the Ordal and
Sitjes, and on the 10th surprised at the Ostel of Ordal an officer
and thirty men of the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry. This disaster was the
result of negligence. The detachment after patroling to the front
had dismounted without examining the buildings of the inn, and some
French troopers who were concealed within immediately seized the
horses and captured the whole party.
On the 17th, French troops appeared at Martorel, the Ordal, and
Bejer, with a view to mask the march of a large convoy coming
from Upper Catalonia to Barcelona; they then resumed their former
positions, and at the same time Soult’s and lord Wellington’s
respective letters announcing the defection of the Nassau battalions
in front of Bayonne arrived. Lord Wellington’s came first, and
enclosed a communication from colonel Kruse to his countryman,
colonel Meder, who was serving in Barcelona and as Kruse supposed
willing to abandon the French. But when Clinton by the aid of Manso
transmitted the letter to Meder, that officer handed it to general
Habert who had succeeded Maurice Mathieu in the command of the city.
All the German regiments, principally cavalry, were immediately
disarmed and sent to France. Severoli’s Italians were at the same
time recalled to Italy and a number of French soldiers, selected to
fill the wasted ranks of the imperial guards, marched with them; two
thousand officers and soldiers were likewise detached to the depôts
of the interior to organize the conscripts of the new levy destined
to reinforce the army of Catalonia. Besides these drafts a thousand
gensd’armes hitherto employed on the Spanish frontier in aid of the
regular troops were withdrawn; Suchet thus lost seven thousand
veterans, yet he had still an overwhelming power compared to the
allies.
It was in this state of affairs that the duke of San Carlos, bearing
the treaty of Valençay, arrived secretly at the French head-quarters
on his way to Madrid. Copons knew this, and it seems certain was only
deterred from openly acceding to the views of the French emperor
and concluding a military convention, by the decided conduct of the
Cortez, and the ascendancy which lord Wellington had obtained over
him in common with the other Spanish officers: an ascendancy which
had not escaped Soult’s sagacity, for he early warned the French
minister that nothing could be expected from them while under the
powerful spell of the English general. Meanwhile Clinton, getting
information that the French troops were diminished in numbers,
especially in front of Barcelona and on the Llobregat, proposed
to pass that river and invest Barcelona if Copons, who was in the
mountains, would undertake to provision Sarzfield’s division and
keep the French troops between Barcelona and Gerona in check. For
this purpose he offered him the aid of a Spanish regiment of cavalry
which Elio had lent for the operations in Catalonia; but Copons,
whether influenced by San Carlos’ mission and his secret wishes for
its success, or knowing that the enemy were really stronger than
Clinton imagined, declared that he was unable to hold the French
troops between Gerona and Barcelona in check, and that he could not
provision either Sarzfield’s division or the regiment of cavalry.
He suggested instead of Clinton’s plan, a combined attack upon some
of Suchet’s posts on the Llobregat, promising to send Manso to
Villafranca to confer upon the execution. Clinton’s proposal was
made early in January yet it was the middle of that month before
Copons replied, and then he only sent Manso to offer the aid of his
brigade in a combined attack upon two thousand French who were at
Molino del Rey. It was however at last arranged that Manso should at
day-break on the 16th seize the high ground above Molino, on the left
of the Llobregat, to intercept the enemy’s retreat upon Barcelona,
while the Anglo-Sicilians fell upon them from the right bank.
[Sidenote: 1814. January.]
Success depended upon Clinton’s remaining quiet until the moment of
execution, wherefore he could only use the troops immediately in
hand about Villafranca, in all six thousand men with three pieces of
artillery; but with these he made a night march of eighteen miles,
and was close to the ford of San Vicente about two miles below the
fortified bridge of Molino del Rey before daylight. The French were
tranquil and unsuspicious, and he anxiously but vainly awaited the
signal of Manso’s arrival. When the day broke, the French piquets at
San Vicente descrying his troops commenced a skirmish, and at the
same time a column with a piece of artillery, coming from Molino,
advanced to attack him thinking there was only a patroling detachment
to deal with, for he had concealed his main body. Thus pressed he
opened his guns per force and crippled the French piece, whereupon
the reinforcements retired hastily to the entrenchments at Molino; he
could then easily have forced the passage at the ford and attacked
the enemy’s works in the rear, but this would not have ensured the
capture of their troops, wherefore he still awaited Manso’s arrival
relying on that partizan’s zeal and knowledge of the country. He
appeared at last, not, as agreed upon, at St. Filieu, between
Molino and Barcelona, but at Papiol above Molino, and the French
immediately retreated by San Filieu. Sarzfield, and the cavalry,
which Clinton now detached across the Llobregat, followed them hard,
but the country was difficult, the distance short, and they soon
gained a second entrenched camp above San Filieu. A small garrison
remained in the masonry-works at Molino, general Clinton endeavoured
to reduce them but his guns were not of a calibre to break the walls
and the enemy was strongly reinforced towards evening from Barcelona;
whereupon Manso went off to the mountains, and Clinton returned to
Villafranca having killed and wounded about one hundred and eighty
French, and lost only sixty-four men, all Spaniards.
Manso’s failure surprized the English general, because that officer,
unlike the generality of his countrymen, was zealous, skilful,
vigilant, modest, and humane, and a sincere co-operator with the
British officers. He however soon cleared himself of blame, assuring
Clinton that Copons, contrary to his previous declarations, had
joined him with four thousand men, and taking the controul of his
troops not only commenced the march two hours too late, but without
any reason halted for three hours on the way. Nor did that general
offer any excuse or explanation of his conduct, merely observing,
that the plan having failed nothing more could be done and he must
return to his mountainous asylum about Vich. A man of any other
nation would have been accused of treachery, but with the Spaniards
there is no limit to absurdity, and from their actions no conclusion
can be drawn as to their motives.
The great events of the general war were now beginning to affect the
struggle in Catalonia. Suchet finding that Copons dared not agree
to the military convention dependent upon the treaty of Valençay,
resigned all thoughts of carrying off his garrisons beyond the Ebro,
and secretly instructed the governor of Tortoza, that when his
provisions, calculated to last until April, were exhausted, he should
march upon Mequinenza and Lerida, unite the garrisons there to his
own, and make way by Venasque into France. Meanwhile he increased
the garrison of Barcelona to eight thousand men and prepared to take
the line of the Fluvia; for the allied sovereigns were in France
and Napoleon had recalled more of his cavalry and infantry, in all
ten thousand men with eighty pieces of artillery, from Catalonia,
desiring that they should march as soon as the results expected from
the mission of San Carlos were felt by the allies. Suchet prepared
the troops but proposed that instead of waiting for the uncertain
result of San Carlos’ mission, Ferdinand should himself be sent
to Spain through Catalonia and be trusted on his faith to restore
the garrisons in Valencia. Then he said he could march with his
whole army to Lyons which would be more efficacious than sending
detachments. The restoration of Ferdinand was the Emperor’s great
object, but this plausible proposition can only be viewed as a
colourable counter-project to Soult’s plan for a junction of the two
armies in Bearn, since the Emperor was undoubtedly the best judge of
what was required for the warfare immediately under his own direction.
It was in the midst of these operations that Clinton attacked Molino
del Rey and as we have seen would but for the interference of Copons
have stricken a great blow, which was however soon inflicted in
another manner.
[Sidenote: Memoir by Sir Wm. Clinton, MSS.]
There was at this time in the French service a Spaniard of Flemish
descent called Van Halen. This man, of fair complexion, handsome
person, and a natural genius for desperate treasons, appears to
have been at first attached to Joseph’s court. After that monarch’s
retreat from Spain he was placed by the duke de Feltre on Suchet’s
staff; but the French party was now a failing one and Van Halen
only sought by some notable treachery to make his peace with his
country. Through the medium of a young widow, who followed him
without suffering their connection to appear, he informed Eroles of
his object. He transmitted through the same channel regular returns
of Suchet’s force and other matters of interest, and at last having
secretly opened Suchet’s portfolio he copied the key of his cypher,
and transmitted that also, with an intimation that he would now
soon pass over and endeavour to perform some other service at the
same time. The opportunity soon offered. Suchet went to Gerona to
meet the duke of San Carlos, leaving Van Halen at Barcelona, and
the latter immediately taking an escort of three hussars went to
Granollers where the cuirassiers were quartered. Using the marshal’s
name he ordered them to escort him to the Spanish outposts, which
being in the mountains could only be approached by a long and narrow
pass where cavalry would be helpless. In this pass he ordered the
troops to bivouac for the night, and when their colonel expressed
his uneasiness, Van Halen quieted him and made a solitary mill their
common quarters. He had before this, however, sent the widow to
give Eroles information of the situation into which he would bring
the troops and now with anxiety awaited his attack; but the Spanish
general failed to come and at daybreak Van Halen, still pretending he
carried a flag of truce from Suchet, rode off with his first escort
of hussars and a trumpeter to the Spanish lines. There he ascertained
that the widow had been detained by the outposts and immediately
delivered over his escort to their enemies, giving notice also of the
situation of the cuirassiers with a view to their destruction, but
they escaped the danger.
Van Halen and Eroles now forged Suchet’s signature, and the former
addressed letters in cypher to the governors of Tortoza, Lerida,
Mequinenza, and Monzon, telling them that the emperor in consequence
of his reverses required large drafts of men from Catalonia, and had
given Suchet orders to negotiate a convention by which the garrisons
south of the Llobregat were to join the army with arms and baggage
and followers. The result was uncertain, but if the treaty could not
be effected the governors were to join the army by force, and they
were therefore immediately to mine their principal bastions and be
prepared to sally forth at an appointed time. The marches and points
of junction were all given in detail, yet they were told that if the
convention took place the marshal would immediately send an officer
of his staff to them, with such verbal instructions as might be
necessary. The document finished with deploring the necessity which
called for the sacrifice of conquests achieved by the valour of the
troops.
Spies and emissaries who act for both sides are common in all wars,
but in the Peninsula so many pretended to serve the French and were
yet true to the Spaniards, that to avoid the danger of betrayal
Suchet had recourse to the ingenious artifice of placing a very small
piece of light-coloured hair in the cyphered paper, the latter was
then enclosed in a quill sealed and wrapped in lead. When received,
the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of white paper and
if the hair was discovered the communication was good, if not, the
treachery was apparent because the hair would escape the vigilance
of uninitiated persons and be lost by any intermediate examination.
Van Halen knew this secret also, and when his emissaries had returned
after delivering the preparatory communication, he proceeded in
person with a forged convention, first to Tortoza, for Suchet has
erroneously stated in his Memoirs that the primary attempts were
made at Lerida and Mequinenza. He was accompanied by several Spanish
officers and by some French deserters dressed in the uniforms of the
hussars he had betrayed to the Spanish outposts. The governor Robert
though a vigilant officer was deceived and prepared to evacuate the
place. During the night however a true emissary arrived with a letter
from Suchet of later date than the forged convention. Robert then
endeavoured to entice Van Halen into the fortress, but the other was
too wary and proceeded at once to Mequinenza and Lerida where he
completely overreached the governors and then went to Monzon.
This small fortress had now been besieged since the 28th of September
1813, by detachments from the Catalan army and the bands from Aragon.
Its means of defence were slight, but there was within a man of
resolution and genius called St. Jacques. He was a Piedmontese by
birth and only a private soldier of engineers, but the commandant
appreciating his worth was so modest and prudent as to yield the
direction of the defence entirely to him. Abounding in resources, he
met, and at every point baffled the besiegers who worked principally
by mines, and being as brave as he was ingenious always led the
numerous counter-attacks which he contrived to check the approaches
above and below ground. The siege continued until the 18th of
February when the subtle Van Halen arrived, and by his Spanish wiles
obtained in a few hours what Spanish courage and perseverance had
vainly strived to gain for one hundred and forty days. The commandant
was suspicious at first, but when Van Halen suffered him to send an
officer to ascertain that Lerida and Mequinenza were evacuated, he
was beguiled like the others and marched to join the garrisons of
those places.
Sir William Clinton had been informed of this project by Eroles
as early as the 22d of January and though he did not expect any
French general would be so egregiously misled, readily promised the
assistance of his army to capture the garrisons on their march. But
Suchet was now falling back upon the Fluvia, and Clinton, seeing
the fortified line of the Llobregat weakened and being uncertain of
Suchet’s real strength and designs, renewed his former proposal to
Copons for a combined attack which should force the French general
to discover his real situation and projects. Ere he could obtain an
answer, the want of forage obliged him to refuse the assistance of
the Spanish cavalry lent to him by Elio, and Sarzfield’s division
was reduced to its last ration. The French thus made their retreat
unmolested, for Clinton’s project necessarily involved the investment
of Barcelona after passing the Llobregat, and the Anglo-Sicilian
cavalry, being mounted on small Egyptian animals the greatest part
of which were foundered or unserviceable from sand-cracks, a disease
very common amongst the horses of that country, were too weak to
act without the aid of Elio’s horsemen. Moreover as a division of
infantry was left at Taragona awaiting the effect of Van Halen’s
wiles against Tortoza the aid of Sarzfield’s troops was indispensable.
[Sidenote: February.]
Copons accepted the proposition towards the end of the month, the
Spanish cavalry was then gone to the rear, but Sarzfield having
with great difficulty obtained some provisions the army was put in
movement on the 3d of February, and as Suchet was now near Gerona,
it passed the Llobregat at the bridge of Molino del Rey without
resistance. On the 5th Sarzfield’s picquets were vigorously attacked
at San Filieu by the garrison of Barcelona, he however supported
them with his whole division and being reinforced with some cavalry
repulsed the French and pursued them to the walls. On the 7th the
city was invested on the land side by Copons who was soon aided by
Manso; on the sea-board by admiral Hallowell, who following the
movements of the army with the fleet blockaded the harbour with the
Castor frigate, and anchored the Fame a seventy-four off Mataro. On
the 8th intelligence arrived of Van Halen’s failure at Tortoza, but
the blockade of Barcelona continued uninterrupted until the 16th when
Clinton was informed by Copons of the success at Lerida, Mequinenza,
and Monzon. The garrisons, he said, would march upon Igualada, and
Eroles who, under pretence of causing the convention to be observed
by the Somatenes, was to follow in their rear, proposed to undeceive
and disarm them at that place. On the 17th however he sent notice
that Martorel had been fixed upon in preference to Igualada for
undeceiving and disarming the French, and as they would be at the
former place that evening general Clinton was desired to send some of
his troops there to ensure the success of the project.
This change of plan and the short warning, for Martorel was a long
march from Barcelona, together with the doubts and embarrassments
which Copons’ conduct always caused, inclined the English general
to avoid meddling with the matter at all; yet fearing that it would
fail in the Spaniard’s hands he finally drafted a strong division of
troops and marched in person to Martorel. There he met Copons who now
told him that the French would not pass Esparaguera that night, that
Eroles was close in their rear, and another division of the Catalan
army at Bispal blocking the bridge of Martorel. Clinton immediately
undertook to pass the Llobregat, meet the French column, and block
the road of San Sadurni; and he arranged with Copons the necessary
precautions and signals.
About nine o’clock general Isidore La Marque arrived with the
garrisons at Martorel, followed at a short distance by Eroles. No
other troops were to be seen and after a short halt the French
continued their march on the right bank of the Llobregat, where
the Barcelona road enters a narrow pass between the river and a
precipitous hill. When they were completely entangled Clinton sent
an officer to forbid their further progress and referred them to
Copons who was at Martorel for an explanation, then giving the signal
all the heights around were instantly covered with armed men. It was
in vain to offer resistance, and two generals, having two thousand
six hundred men, four guns, and a rich military chest, capitulated,
but upon conditions, which were granted and immediately violated with
circumstances of great harshness and insult to the prisoners. The
odium of this baseness which was quite gratuitous, since the French
helpless in the defile must have submitted to any terms, attaches
entirely to the Spaniards. Clinton refused to meddle in any manner
with the convention, he had not been a party to Van Halen’s deceit,
he appeared only to ensure the surrender of an armed force in the
field which the Spaniards could not have subdued without his aid,
he refused even to be present at any consultation previous to the
capitulation, and notwithstanding an assertion to the contrary in
Suchet’s Memoirs no appeal on the subject from that marshal ever
reached him.
During the whole of these transactions the infatuation of the
French leaders was extreme. The chief of one of the battalions more
sagacious than his general told Lamarque in the night of the 16th at
Igualada that he was betrayed, at the same time urging him vainly
to abandon his artillery and baggage and march in the direction of
Vich, to which place they could force their way in despite of the
Spaniards. It is remarkable also that Robert when he had detected
the imposture and failed to entice Van Halen into Tortoza did not
make a sudden sally upon him and the Spanish officers who were with
him, all close to the works. And still more notable is it that the
other governors, the more especially as Van Halen was a foreigner,
did not insist upon the bearer of such a convention remaining to
accompany their march. It has been well observed by Suchet that Van
Halen’s refusal to enter the gates was alone sufficient to prove his
treachery.
The detachment recalled by Napoleon now moved into France, and in
March was followed by a second column of equal force which was at
first directed upon Lyons, but the arrival of lord Wellington’s
troops on the Garonne caused, as we shall hereafter find, a change
in its destination. Meanwhile by order of the minister at war Suchet
entered into a fresh negociation with Copons, to deliver up all the
fortresses held by his troops except Figueras and Rosas, provided
the garrisons were allowed to rejoin the army. The Spanish commander
assented and the authorities generally were anxious to adopt the
proposal, but the regency referred the matter to lord Wellington
who rejected it without hesitation, as tending to increase the
force immediately opposed to him. Thus baffled and overreached at
all points, Suchet destroyed the works of Olot, Besalu, Bascara and
Palamos, dismantled Gerona and Rosas, and concentrated his forces
at Figueras. He was followed by Copons, but though he still had
twelve thousand veterans besides the national guards and depôts of
the French departments, he continued most obstinately to refuse any
aid to Soult, and yet remained inactive himself. The blockade of
Barcelona was therefore maintained by the allies without difficulty
or danger save what arose from their commissariat embarrassments and
the efforts of the garrison.
[Sidenote: March.]
On the 23d of February Habert made a sally with six battalions,
thinking to surprize Sarzfield, he was however beaten, and colonel
Meder the Nassau officer who had before shewn his attachment to the
French cause was killed. The blockade was thus continued until the
12th of March when Clinton received orders from lord Wellington to
break up his army, send the foreign troops to lord William Bentinck
in Sicily, and march with the British battalions by Tudela to join
the great army in France. Clinton at first prepared to obey but
Suchet was still in strength, Copons appeared to be provoking a
collision though he was quite unable to oppose the French in the
field; and to maintain the blockade of Barcelona in addition, after
the Anglo-Sicilians should depart, was quite impossible. The latter
therefore remained and on the 19th of March king Ferdinand reached
the French frontier.
This event, which happening five or even three months before would
probably have changed the fate of the war, was now of little
consequence. Suchet first proposed to Copons to escort Ferdinand
with the French army to Barcelona and put him in possession of that
place, but this the Spanish general dared not assent to, for he
feared lord Wellington and his own regency, and was closely watched
by colonel Coffin who had been placed near him by sir William
Clinton. The French general then proposed to the king a convention
for the recovery of his garrisons, to which Ferdinand agreed with the
facility of a false heart. His great anxiety was to reach Valencia,
because the determination of the Cortez to bind him to conditions
before he recovered his throne was evident, the Spanish generals were
apparently faithful to the Cortez, and the British influence was sure
to be opposed to him while he was burthened with French engagements.
[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]
[Sidenote: Memoirs by sir Wm. Clinton, MSS.]
Suchet had been ordered to demand securities for the restoration of
his garrisons previous to Ferdinand’s entry into Spain, but time
was precious and he determined to escort him at once with the whole
French army to the Fluvia, having first received a promise to restore
the garrisons. He also retained his brother Don Carlos as a hostage
for their return, but even this security he relinquished when the
king in a second letter written from Gerona solemnly confirmed his
first promise. On the 24th therefore in presence of the Catalan
and French armies, ranged in order of battle on either bank of the
Fluvia, Ferdinand passed that river and became once more king of
Spain. He had been a rebellious son in the palace, a plotting traitor
at Aranjuez, a dastard at Bayonne, an effeminate superstitious
fawning slave at Valençay, and now after six years’ captivity he
returned to his own country an ungrateful and cruel tyrant. He
would have been the most odious and contemptible of princes if his
favourite brother Don Carlos had not existed. Reaching the camp at
Barcelona on the 30th he dined with sir William Clinton, reviewed the
allied troops and then proceeded first to Zaragoza and finally to
Valencia. Marshal Suchet says the honours of war were paid to him by
all the French garrisons but this was not the case at Barcelona: no
man appeared, even on the walls. After this event the French marshal
repassed the Pyrenees leaving only one division at Figueras and
Clinton proceeded to break up his army, but was again stopped by the
vexatious conduct of Copons who would not relieve the Anglo-Sicilians
at the blockade, nor indeed take any notice of the English general’s
communications on the subject before the 11th of April. On the 14th
however the troops marched, part to embark at Taragona, part to join
lord Wellington. Copons then became terrified lest general Robert,
abandoning Tortoza, should join Habert at Barcelona, and enclose him
between them and the division at Figueras, wherefore Clinton once
more halted to protect the Spaniards.
[Sidenote: April.]
Copons had indeed some reason to fear, for Habert about this time
received, and transmitted to Robert, the emperor’s orders to break
out of Tortoza and gain Barcelona instead of passing by the valley
of Venasque as Suchet had before prescribed: the twelve thousand
men thus united were then to push into France. This letter was
intercepted, copied, and sent on to Robert, whose answer being
likewise intercepted shewed that he was not prepared and had
no inclination for the enterprise. This seen Clinton continued
his embarkation and thus completed his honourable but difficult
task. With a force weak in numbers, and nearly destitute of every
thing that constitutes strength in the field, he had maintained a
forward and dangerous position for eight months; and though Copons’
incapacity and ill-will, and other circumstances beyond control, did
not permit him to perform any brilliant actions, he occupied the
attention of a very superior army, suffered no disaster and gained
some advantages.
[Sidenote: Lafaille.]
While his troops were embarking, Habert, in furtherance of the
emperor’s project, made a vigorous sally on the 18th, and though
repulsed with loss he killed or wounded eight hundred Spaniards.
This was a lamentable combat. The war had terminated long before,
yet intelligence of the cessation of hostilities only arrived four
days later. Habert was now repeatedly ordered by Suchet and the duke
of Feltre to give up Barcelona, but warned by the breach of former
conventions he held it until he was assured that all the French
garrisons in Valencia had returned safely to France, which did not
happen until the 28th of May, when he yielded up the town and marched
to his own country. This event, the last operation of the whole war,
released the duchess of Bourbon. She and the old prince of Conti had
been retained prisoners in the city during the Spanish struggle, the
prince died early in 1814, the duchess survived, and now returned to
France.
How strong Napoleon’s hold of the Peninsula had been, how little the
Spaniards were able of their own strength to shake him off, was now
apparent to all the world. For notwithstanding lord Wellington’s
great victories, notwithstanding the invasion of France, six
fortresses, Figueras, Barcelona, Tortoza, Morella, Peniscola,
Saguntum and Denia were recovered, not by arms but by the general
peace. And but for the deceits of Van Halen there would have been
three others similarly situated in the eastern parts alone, while in
the north Santona was recovered in the same manner; for neither the
long blockade nor the active operations against that place, of which
some account shall now be given, caused it to surrender.
The site of Santona is one of those promontories frequent on the
coast of Spain which connected by low sandy necks with the main
land offer good harbours. Its waters deep and capacious furnished
two bays. The outer one or roadstead was commanded by the works of
Santona itself, and by those of Laredo, a considerable town lying at
the foot of a mountain on the opposite point of the harbour. A narrow
entrance to the inner port was between a spit of land, called the
Puntal, and the low isthmus on which the town of Santona is built.
The natural strength of the ground was very great, but the importance
of Santona arose from its peculiar situation as a harbour and fort of
support in the Montaña de Santander. By holding it the French shut
out the British shipping from the only place which being defensible
on the land side furnished a good harbour between San Sebastian and
Coruña; they thus protected the sea-flank of their long line of
invasion, obtained a port of refuge for their own coasting vessels,
and a post of support for the moveable columns sent to chase the
partidas which abounded in that rough district. And when the battle
of Vittoria placed the allies on the Bidassoa, from Santona issued
forth a number of privateers who, as we have seen, intercepted lord
Wellington’s supplies and interrupted his communication with Coruña,
Oporto, Lisbon, and even with England.
[Sidenote: Vol. 3. Book XI. Chapter V.]
[Sidenote: Ibid. Book XII. Chapter I.]
The advantages of possessing Santona were felt early by both parties;
the French seized it at once and although the Spaniards recovered
possession of it in 1810 they were driven out again immediately.
The English ministers then commenced deliberating and concocting
extensive and for that reason injudicious and impracticable plans of
offensive operations, to be based upon the possession of Santona;
meanwhile Napoleon fortified it and kept it to the end of the war. In
August 1812 its importance was better understood by the Spaniards,
and it was continually menaced by the numerous bands of Biscay, the
Asturias and the Montaña. Fourteen hundred men, including the crew
of a corvette, then formed its garrison, the works were not very
strong and only forty pieces of artillery were mounted. Napoleon
however, foreseeing the disasters which Marmont was provoking, sent
general Lameth, a chosen officer, to take charge of the defence. He
immediately augmented the works and constructed advanced redoubts on
two hills, called the Gromo and the Brusco, which like San Bartolomeo
at San Sebastian closed the isthmus inland. He also erected a strong
redoubt and blockhouse on the Puntal to command the straits, and to
sweep the roadstead in conjunction with the fort of Laredo which he
repaired. This done he formed several minor batteries and cast a
chain to secure the narrow entrance to the inner harbour, and then
covered the rocky promontory of Santona itself with defensive works.
Some dismounted guns remained in the arsenal, others which had been
thrown into the sea by the Spaniards when they took the place in 1810
were fished up, and the garrison felling trees in the vicinity made
carriages for them; by these means a hundred and twenty guns were
finally placed in battery and there was abundance of ammunition. The
corvette was not sea-worthy, but the governor established a flotilla
of gun-boats, and other small craft, which sallied forth whenever
the signal-posts on the head-land gave notice of the approach of
vessels liable to attack, or of French coasters bringing provisions
and stores. The garrison had previously lost many men, killed in
a barbarous manner by the partidas, and in revenge they never
gave quarter to their enemies. Lameth shocked at their inhumanity
resolutely forbad under pain of death any farther reprisals,
rewarded those men who brought in prisoners and treated the latter
with gentleness: the Spaniards discovering this also changed their
system and civilization resumed its rights. From this time military
operations were incessant, the garrison sometimes made sallies,
sometimes sustained partial attacks, sometimes aided the moveable
columns employed by the different generals of the army of the north
to put down the partizan warfare, which was seldom even lulled in the
Montaña.
[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.]
After the battle of Vittoria Santona being left to its own resources
was invested on the land side by a part of the troops composing
the Gallician or fourth Spanish army. It was blockaded on the
sea-board by the English ships of war, but only nominally, for the
garrison received supplies, and the flotilla vexed lord Wellington’s
communications, took many of his store-ships and other vessels,
delayed his convoys, and added greatly to the difficulties of his
situation. The land blockade thus also became a nullity and the
Spanish officers complained with reason that they suffered privations
and endured hardships without an object. These complaints and his
own embarassments, caused by lord Melville’s neglect, induced lord
Wellington in October, 1813, when he could ill spare troops, to
employ a British brigade under lord Aylmer in the attack of Santona;
the project for reasons already mentioned was not executed, but an
English engineer, captain Wells, was sent with some sappers and
miners to quicken the operations of the Spanish officers, and his
small detachment has been by a French writer magnified into a whole
battalion.
[Sidenote: 1814. February.]
Captain Wells remained six months, for the Spanish generals
though brave and willing were tainted with the national defect
of procrastination. The siege made no progress until the 13th of
February 1814 when general Barco the Spanish commander carried the
fort of Puntal in the night by escalade, killing thirty men and
taking twenty-three prisoners, yet the fort being under the heavy
fire of the Santona works was necessarily dismantled and abandoned
the next morning. A picquet was however left there and the French
opened their batteries, but as this did not dislodge the Spaniards
Lameth embarked a detachment and recovered his fort. However in the
night of the 21st general Barco ordered an attack to be made with a
part of his force upon the outposts of El Grumo and Brusco, on the
Santona side of the harbour, and led the remainder of his troops in
person to storm the fort and town of Laredo. He carried the latter
and also some outer defences of the fort, which being on a rock was
only to be approached by an isthmus so narrow as to be closed by a
single fortified house. In the assault of the body of this fort Barco
was killed and the attack ceased, but the troops retained what they
had won and established themselves at the foot of the rock where they
were covered from fire. The attack on the other side, conducted by
colonel Llorente, was successful; he carried the smallest of the two
outworks on the Brusco, and closely invested the largest after an
ineffectual attempt by mine and assault to take it. A large breach
was however made and the commandant seeing he could no longer defend
his post, valiantly broke through the investment and gained the work
of the Grumo. He was however aided by the appearance on the isthmus
of a strong column which sallied at the same time from the works
on the Santona promontory, and the next day the Grumo itself was
abandoned by the French.
[Sidenote: Professional papers by the royal engineers.]
[Sidenote: April.]
Captain Wells, who had been wounded at the Puntal escalade, now
strenuously urged the Spaniards to crown the counter-scarp of the
fort at Laredo and attack vigorously, but they preferred establishing
four field-pieces to batter it in form at the distance of six
hundred yards. These guns as might be expected were dismounted the
moment they began to fire, and thus corrected, the Spanish generals
committed the direction of the attack to Wells. He immediately
opened a heavy musquetry fire on the fort to stifle the noise
of his workmen, then pushing trenches up the hill close to the
counterscarp in the night, he was proceeding to burst open the gate
with a few field-pieces and to cut down the pallisades, when the
Italian garrison, whose musquets from constant use had become so foul
that few would go off, mutinied against their commander and making
him a prisoner surrendered the place. This event gave the allies
the command of the entrance to the harbour, and Lameth offered to
capitulate in April upon condition of returning to France with his
garrison. Lord Wellington refused the condition, Santona therefore
remained a few days longer in possession of the enemy, and was
finally evacuated at the general cessation of hostilities.
Having now terminated the narrative of all military and political
events which happened in the Peninsula, the reader will henceforth be
enabled to follow without interruption the events of the war in the
south of France which shall be continued in the next book.