himself, but those _other nine souls_ are concerned about him. But if
they be a hundred, the same thing will take place again, the _elements_
of power will be increased. Hast thou seen the excellence of charity?
How it causes one individual to be unconquerable and equal to many. How
the one person can be in different places. How the same person _may thus
be_ in Persia and in Rome, and how what nature cannot do, that, charity
can do. For one part of the man will be there, and one part here; or
rather, he will be altogether there and altogether here. Or if he have a
thousand friends, or two thousand, think to what a pitch his power will
advance. Dost thou see how productive _a thing_ is charity? For this is
a wonderful thing:
[Sidenote: An argument of joy]
to make the individual a thousand-fold. For what reason, therefore, do
we not take possession of this strength, and place ourselves in safety?
This is better than all power and virtue. This is more than health, more
than the light of _day_ itself. This is an argument of joy. How long
shall we confine our love to one or two? Learn the thing from its
opposite.
Let there be any one, who has no friend--a thing which is of the utmost
folly. For the fool will say, I have no friend. What manner of life does
such an one live? For even if he be ten thousand times rich; even if he
be in abundance and luxury, and possessing ten thousand good things, he
is absolutely deserted and naked. But in the case of friends this is not
so; but even though they be poor, they are better provided
[Sidenote: A friend the cause of all pleasure and enjoyment]
than the rich; and what a man will not venture to say for himself, those
things a friend will say for him. And the things which he is unable to
grant to himself, those he can grant through another, and many more
things than those, and thus he will be to us a cause of all pleasure and
enjoyment. For it is impossible that he should suffer hurt, being
protected by so many bodyguards, for neither are the bodyguards of the
Emperor as careful as those; for the former perform their guard through
necessity, but the latter through kindness and love. But those things
are much more commanding than fear. And he indeed (_the prince_) fears
his guards, but the friend trusts to them more than to himself, and,
through their means, fears none of those who plot against him. Let us,
therefore, procure
[Sidenote: Solitude to be avoided]
for ourselves this commodity--the poor man, that he may have a
consolation of his poverty; the rich man, in order that he may possess
his riches in safety; the ruler that he may rule with safety; the
subject, that he may have well-disposed rulers. This is an occasion of
benevolence; this is a cause of clemency. Since even amongst beasts,
those are the most savage and intractable which do not herd together;
for this reason we inhabit cities, and we hold markets, that we may have
intercourse with each other. This also Paul commanded, saying, ‘Not
forsaking our assembly.’ For there is nothing so bad as solitude, and
the absence of society and of access.
What, therefore, _are_ the monks, _some one_ says, and those who have
taken as _their residence_ the tops of the mountains? Neither
[Sidenote: It is not the place that makes the friend]
are they without friends; but they have fled from the tumult of the
market-place, and have many of one accord with them, and strictly bound
to each other. And it was in order that they might accomplish this that
they withdrew. For, inasmuch as the zeal of business begets many
disputes, for this reason, having left the world, they cultivate charity
with much strictness. What, therefore, he says, if a man be alone, may
he also have innumerable friends? I, indeed, would wish if it were
possible that we were all able to live together; but, in the meantime,
let friendship remain unmoved. For it is not the place that makes the
friend. They, therefore, have many who admire them; but those would not
admire unless they loved. And they again (the monks) pray for the entire
world,
[Sidenote: The greatest evidence of friendship]
which is the greatest evidence of friendship. For this reason also in
the _sacred_ mysteries, we embrace each other, in order that being many,
we may become one. And we make common prayer for the uninitiated,
imploring for the sick and for the fruits of the world, and for the
land, and for the sea. Dost thou see all the strength of charity, in the
prayers, in the _holy_ mysteries, in the admonitions? This is the cause
of all good things. If we apply, with due care, to those admonitions,
which shall both administer present things well, and shall obtain the
kingdom.
XIV
THE BLESSINGS OF FRIENDSHIP
ARISTOTLE
THE BLESSINGS OF FRIENDSHIP
[Sidenote: Friendship a virtue]
Friendship, in the first place, is either itself a virtue, or connected
with virtue; and next, it is a thing most necessary for life, since no
one would choose to live without friends, though he should have all the
other good things in the world: and, in fact, men who are rich or
possessed of authority and influence, are thought to have special need
of friends. For where is the use of such prosperity, if there be taken
away the doing of kindnesses, of which friends are the most usual and
most commendable objects? Or how can it be kept or preserved without
friends, because the greater it is, so much the more insecure and
hazardous: in poverty, moreover,
[Sidenote: The bond of social communities]
and all other adversities, men think friends to be their only refuge.
Furthermore, friendship helps the young to keep from error; the old, in
respect of attention and such deficiencies in action as their weakness
makes them liable to; and those who are in their prime, in respect of
noble deeds; ‘they _two_ together going,’ Homer says, because they are
thus more able to devise plans, and carry them out.
Friendship seems to be the bond of social communities, and legislators
seem to be more anxious to secure it than justice even. I mean,
unanimity is somewhat like to friendship, and this they certainly aim
at, and specially drive out faction as being inimical.
When people are in friendship, justice is not required; but, on the
other
[Sidenote: The object of friendship]
hand, though they are just, they need friendship in addition, and that
principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of the nature
of friendship. Not only is it a thing necessary, but honourable
likewise, since we praise those who are fond of friends, and the having
numerous friends is thought a matter of credit to a man; some even go so
far as to hold that a ‘good man’ and ‘friend’ are terms synonymous.
Each individual feels friendship, not for what it _is_, but for that
which _conveys to his mind the impression of being_ good to himself. But
this will make no real difference, because that which is truly the
object of friendship, will also convey this impression to his mind.
There are three causes from which men feel friendship; but the term is
not
[Sidenote: Friendship: its several motives]
applied to the case of fondness for things inanimate, because there is
no requital of the affection, nor desire for the good of these objects.
As the motives to friendship differ in kind, so do the respective
feelings and friendships. Now they who have friendship for one another
desire one another’s good, according to the motive of their friendship;
accordingly, they whose motive is utility have no real friendship for
one another, but only in so far as some good arises to them from one
another. They whose motive is pleasure are in like case: I mean, they
have friendship for men of easy pleasantry, not because they are of a
given character, but because they are pleasant to themselves. So they
whose motive to friendship is utility, love their friends for what is
good to themselves; they whose motive is
[Sidenote: Friendship among the old]
pleasure, do so for what is pleasurable to themselves; that is to say,
not in so far as the friend beloved _is_, but in so far as he is useful
or pleasurable. These friendships then are a matter of result, since the
object is not beloved in that he _is_, but in that he furnishes
advantage or pleasure, as the case may be. Such friendships are very
liable to dissolution if the parties do not continue alike; when they
are no longer pleasurable or useful. It is the nature of utility not to
be permanent, but constantly varying; thus when the motive which made
them friends is vanished, the friendship likewise dissolves, since it
existed only relatively to those circumstances.
Friendship of this kind is thought to exist principally among the old,
because men at that time of life pursue, not what
[Sidenote: The friendship of the young]
is pleasurable, but what is profitable. They that are such have no
intimate intercourse, for sometimes they are not even pleasurable to one
another. With these friendships is commonly ranked that of hospitality.
But the friendship of the young is thought to be based on the motive of
pleasure, because they live at the beck and call of passion, and
generally pursue what is pleasurable to themselves, and the object of
the present moment. Their age changes, so likewise their pleasures. This
the reason why they form and dissolve friendships rapidly, since the
friendship changes with the pleasurable object, and such pleasure
changes quickly.
Perfect friendship subsists between those who are good, and whose
similarity consists in their goodness; for these
[Sidenote: Perfect friendship]
men wish one another’s good in similar ways, in so far as they are good.
And those are specially friends who wish good to their friends for their
sakes, because they feel thus towards them on their own account, and not
as a mere matter of result. So the friendship between these men
continues to subsist so long as they are good, and goodness we know has
in it a principle of permanence. Each party is good abstractedly, and
also relatively to his friend, for all good men are not only
abstractedly good, but also useful to one another. Such friends are also
mutually pleasurable, because all good men are so abstractedly, and also
relatively to one another, inasmuch as to each individual these actions
are pleasurable which correspond to his nature, and all such as are like
them.
[Sidenote: Friendship is based upon good or pleasure]
Friendship under these circumstances is permanent, since it combines in
itself all the requisite qualifications of friends. Friendship, of
whatever kind, is based upon good or pleasure (either abstractedly or
relatively to the person entertaining the sentiment of friendship), and
results from a similarity of some sort; and to this kind belong all the
aforementioned requisites in the friends themselves, because in this
they are similar. In it there is abstractedly good, and the abstractedly
pleasant, and as these are specially the object-matter of friendship, so
the feeling and state of friendship is found most intense and excellent
in men thus qualified.
Rare it is probable friendships will be, because men of this kind are
rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being
[Sidenote: The desire for friendship]
presupposed, there is farther required time and intimacy. They cannot
admit one another to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has
appeared to the other and been proved to be a fit object of friendship.
They who speedily commence an interchange of friendly actions, may be
said to wish to be friends, but they are not so, unless they are also
proper objects of friendship and mutually known to be such. A desire for
friendship may arise quickly, but not friendship itself.
This friendship is perfect both in respect of the time and in all other
points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to each party
from the other, which ought to be the case between friends.
The friendship based upon the pleasurable is, so to say, a copy of this,
since the
[Sidenote: The most permanent friendships]
good are sources of pleasure to one another; that based on utility
likewise, the good being also useful to one another. Between men thus
connected, friendships are most permanent when the same result accrues
to both from one another, pleasure for instance. And not merely so, but
from the same source, as in the case of two men of easy pleasantry; and
not as it is in that of a lover and the object of his affection, these
not deriving their pleasure from the same causes, but the former from
seeing the latter, and the latter from receiving the attentions of the
former. When the bloom of youth fades the friendship sometimes ceases
also, because the lover derives no pleasure from seeing, and the object
of his affection ceases to receive the attentions which were paid
before. In many cases people
[Sidenote: The good alone can be friends]
so connected continue friends, if being of similar tempers they have
come from custom to like one another’s dispositions.
The good alone can be friends. The friendship of the good is alone
superior to calumny; it not being easy for men to believe a third person
respecting one whom they have long tried and proved. There is between
good men mutual confidence, and the feeling that one’s friend would
never have done one wrong, and all other such things as are expected in
friendship really worthy the name; but in the other kinds there is
nothing to prevent all such suspicions.
Distance has in itself no direct effect upon friendship, but only
prevents the acting it out. If the absence be protracted, it is thought
to cause a forgetfulness even of the friendship; and hence
[Sidenote: Mutual pleasures of friends]
it has been said, ‘Many and many a friendship hath want of intercourse
destroyed.’
Neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for friendship,
because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one can spend his
days in company with that which is positively painful or even not
pleasurable, since to avoid the painful and aim at the pleasurable is
one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature.
Those who get on with one another very fairly, but are not in habits of
intimacy, are rather like people having kindly feelings towards one
another, than friends. People cannot spend their time together unless
they are mutually pleasurable and take pleasure in the same objects, a
quality which is thought to appertain to the true friendship of
companionship.
[Sidenote: The greatest of external goods]
A question is raised whether the happy man needs friends. It is said
that they who are blessed and independent have no need of friends, for
they already have all that is good, and so, being independent, want
nothing further. The notion of a friend’s office is to be as it were a
second self and procure for a man what he cannot get by himself, hence
the saying: ‘When Fortune gives us good, what need we friends.’ On the
other hand it looks absurd, while we are assigning to the happy man all
other good things, not to give him friends, which after all are thought
to be the greatest of external goods. It is nonsense to make our happy
man a solitary, because no man would choose the possession of all goods
in the world on the condition of solitariness, man being a social animal
and formed by
[Sidenote: The happy man needs friends]
nature for living with others. The happy man has this qualification,
since he has all those things which are good by nature, and it is
obvious that the society of friends and good men must be preferable to
that of strangers and ordinary people, therefore the happy man does need
friends.
Are we to make our friends as numerous as possible? In respect of
acquaintance, it is thought to have been well said, ‘Have thou not many
acquaintances, yet be not without.’ In respect of friendship, may we not
adopt the precept, and say, that a man should not be without friends,
nor, again, have exceeding many friends? If they are more numerous than
what will suffice for one’s life they become officious, and are
hindrances in respect of living well.--We do not require them. Of those
who are to be for pleasure, a few are sufficient.
[Sidenote: Famous friendships are between _two_ persons]
Perhaps it is well not to endeavour to have very many friends, but so
many as are enough for intimacy. It would seem not to be possible to be
very much a friend to many at the same time, and for the same reason not
to be in love with many objects at the same time. Love is a kind of
excessive friendship, which implies but one object, and all strong
emotions must be limited in number towards whom they are felt. Not many
at a time become friends in the way of companionship; all the famous
friendships of the kind are between _two_ persons. They who have many
friends, and meet everybody on footing of intimacy, seem to be friends
really to no one except in the way of general society.
Are friends most needed in prosperity or in adversity? They are
required, we know, in both states, because the unfortunate
[Sidenote: The presence of friends]
need help, and the prosperous desire friends around them and to do
kindnesses to.
To have friends is more necessary in adversity, and therefore in this
case useful ones are needed. To have them in prosperity is more
honourable, and this is why the prosperous want good men for friends.
The presence of friends is pleasant even in adversity, since men when
grieved are comforted by their sympathy.
* * * * *
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End of Project Gutenberg's The gift of friendship, by Various