CHAPTER XI. CHARLES VIII AND LOUIS XII--THE INVASION OF ITALY

There never was a period of history in which the efforts of

individual minds were more important in their effects than the

present. The inventions of one or two artisans on the banks

of the Rhine presented mankind with the art of printing; an

idea, a theory, springing up in the manly mind of Columbus, led

to the discovery of another hemisphere; a whim conceived by

Charles VIII, who, from hearing tales of Cæsar and Charlemagne,

suddenly became desirous of turning conqueror, had more effect

on the destinies of Europe than all those occult causes of

human progress which the philosopher of history loves to

fathom.--CROWE.[c]

CHARLES VIII (1483-1497 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1483-1515 A.D.]]

We now enter the epoch when, according to the usual computations of

modern writers, the Middle Ages are passing away and modern times are

being ushered in. Just at the time when Charles VIII is preparing to

establish a new order of things in Europe by invading Italy, Columbus

is sailing out into the western seas to discover the New World. This is

the age when the new forces of the Renaissance are making themselves

felt in Italy, and, to a less extent, all over Christendom. It is

the age of Lorenzo de’ Medici in Florence, and of Leonardo da Vinci

and Michelangelo; of Alexander VI, the Borgia, and of Savonarola; of

Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain; and of Edward V and Henry VII in

England. It is an age of new ideas, an age of discovery. The seat of the

new culture is Italy; the centres from which the explorers start out

in quest of new worlds are Spain and Portugal. France has little share

in either of these movements; but she shares with the other peoples a

spirit of unrest; and this spirit is to manifest itself in the attempt

of Charles VIII--Charles the Little as Brantôme[b] calls him--and his

immediate successors to make the conquest of Italy. A fatal ambition

that! It will cost France the lives of two millions of her best men; it

will gain her little else than bitter experiences. But the vain ambition

of a selfish prince never yet learned to count the cost; and in this case

it must be admitted that the dominant spirit of the people is in full

accord with the reckless ambition of the kings.

This idea of extending the domain of France was the one thought that

dominated the life of Charles VIII, after he came to maturity. Yet the

first years of his reign were devoted to a very different purpose. During

these earlier years, as we shall see, the weakly youth was under the

control of his sister Anne de Beaujeu, who had inherited many of the

traits of Louis XI, and who carried forward the policy of that crafty

monarch to its logical conclusion when she succeeded in bringing the last

of the great feudal fiefs under full control of the crown, through the

marriage of her brother Charles with Anne of Brittany. Thus the earlier

years of Charles VIII must be regarded, thanks to the influence of his

sister, as continuing and perfecting that policy of the unification of

France which Louis XI had carried forward so efficiently. The events

of the reign, therefore, divide themselves into two sharply defined

periods. The first of these, during which Charles though nominally king

is really subordinate to the influence of his sister, will now claim our

attention.[a]

_The Rule of Anne de Beaujeu_

Charles VIII, born June 30th, 1470, had entered his fourteenth year

when his father died, and he was consequently of age by the terms of

the famous ordinance of Charles V: it was therefore not necessary to

establish a regency. But the government of the realm and the direction of

council had been given to the first occupant, as the struggle which was

to begin between the ambitions of the rivals could not be foreseen. The

king, feeble of body, gave no hint of precocious talents; his minority in

fact if not in law seemed as if it should be prolonged beyond the usual

term.

[Sidenote: [1483-1484 A.D.]]

The true danger to the state lay less in public unrest, so easily

appeased by the reforms partially foreseen and indicated by Louis XI

himself, than in the pretensions of the princes of the blood to take

again their baleful power which had been crushed under Louis XI. The late

king, in dying, had confided his son and his authority to his daughter

Anne and his son-in-law Peter de Bourbon, sire de Beaujeu. His widow,

Charlotte of Savoy, trembling still at the memory of her tyrannical

spouse, made no objection to this exclusion. She survived Louis only a

few months. Anne of France had laboured in advance to gain the confidence

of the young king, whom she inspired with a timid deference, and had

attached to herself the greater part of the councillors as well as the

leaders and servitors of Louis XI. Anne, who was then twenty-two years

old, was the only one of the children of Louis XI who resembled him. She

had the tenacity, the dissimulation, and the iron will of the late king,

who had once said of her with his usual caustic manner that she was “the

least foolish of women, since there were no wise women.” She proved that

there was at least one, since she continued with admirable sagacity and

energy all that was national in the plans of Louis XI. “She would have

been worthy of the throne by her prudence and courage, if nature had

not denied to her the sex upon which empire devolves.” This opinion of

a contemporary is also that of posterity. Anne’s husband, a man of ripe

age, of upright judgment, and a certain practical capacity, was but the

first and most useful instrument of his wife. Through him she hoped to

conciliate the other princes of the house of Bourbon, the duke de Bourbon

and the archbishop of Lyons, brothers of the sire de Beaujeu; the old

count de Montpensier, their uncle; the count de Vendôme and his son,

their cousins; and the admiral de Bourbon, their bastard brother. The

natural rival of Anne and her husband was the other son-in-law of Louis

XI, the first prince of the blood, the duke Louis of Orleans, whose

birth gave him the place of honour in the council. The name of Orleans

awakened sad memories. But Duke Louis was hardly twenty-one years of

age; repressed during the whole of his first years under the iron hand

of his terrible father-in-law, bound from his infancy to a woman worthy

of esteem for her gentleness and kindness, but whose exterior repulsed

every other sentiment, it was not ambition to which he devoted the first

days of his liberty. He emancipated himself more like a schoolboy than

a prince, and broke rein only to throw himself body and soul into a

whirl of pleasure. Women, gambling, tournaments, horses, the pleasures

of the table, left him little inclination for the cares of politics. He

preferred courting women, breaking lances, jumping ditches “fifteen feet

wide,” to discussing royal edicts. Meanwhile he shared with the Bourbons

the semblance of power, and his cousin, Dunois, son and heritor of the

great count de Dunois, a most able man, and accustomed to diplomatic

intrigues, spared nothing to draw him in the direction of duty. All who

remained of the members and allies of the royal house had hastened to sit

in council, and the first letters and edicts of Charles VIII are signed

by several among them.

Some acts of indispensable reparation and amends signalised the beginning

of the new régime. All who had suffered, all who had been offended,

oppressed, justly or unjustly, under the late king--that is to say,

nearly everyone in the kingdom--urgently demanded justice. The people

clamoured loudly for the abolition of duties, and the punishment of the

“wicked councillors” of Louis XI. A host of great noblemen, the count du

Perche, the children of the duke de Nemours, the count de Bresse, the

brother of the last count d’Armagnac, the prince of Orange, and very many

others asked, some of them liberty, others restitution of property which

had been confiscated. The duke, René de Lorraine, came in his turn to

reclaim the duchy of Bar, and the county of Provence as the heritage of

his mother. Claims threatened to go very far.

From the 22nd of September, all alienations of the royal domain, made for

the benefit of either the church or private individuals, were revoked.

The necessity for that measure could not be contested. The count du

Perche was liberated from the cruel prison where he languished, and

recovered the duchy of Alençon, confiscated but lately in spite of the

just title of his father. The duke John de Bourbon, who had endured

many affronts and vexations from Louis XI during the last years, was

created lieutenant-general of the realm, and invested with the office of

constable, vacant since the death of the count of Saint-Pol. This was

the most powerful of the princes of the blood, by reason of the extent

of his domains, but his infirmities and love of repose made him hardly

equal to active participation in the government; his sister-in-law

asked of him only the support of his name. The count de Dunois acquired

a large pension with the governorship of Dauphiné, while the duke of

Orleans became lieutenant-general of the Île-de-France, Picardy, and

Champagne. The prince of Orange and the count de Bresse were again put

in possession of their lands. This was only justice--at least to the

prince of Orange, since the Treaty of Arras had stipulated reciprocal

amnesty for all events relating to the war of the Burgundian Succession.

The duke René of Lorraine, thanks to the support of the duke de Bourbon

and Madame de Beaujeu, who expected to make use of the hero of Nancy

against the princes of Orleans, obtained the restitution of Barrois,

without re-embursement of the sums for which the king held Bar in pledge,

a company of one hundred lancers, and 3,600 francs annually for four

years, “during which time the claims of the count of Provence should

be investigated.” Madame Anne did not intend to go further than the

concession of Barrois and wished only to gain time in regard to Provence.

According to feudal law, the pretensions of René were justified: female

succession was so thoroughly admitted in Provence that two women had

successively brought this county into the two houses of Anjou; but

another law, more conformable to reason and the nature of things, tending

to be substituted in place of feudal law, was that of French nationality

recognised and accepted by Provence.

These favours accorded to the princes were accompanied by harsh measures

against the most odious of the ministers of the former reign. Oliver le

Dain, count de Meulan, was sacrificed to popular vindictiveness, and

Doyat to the resentment of the duke de Bourbon, whose follower he had

been, and whom he had gravely offended. Oliver was condemned to death for

various crimes, among others for having secretly killed a prisoner whose

wife had sacrificed her honour to him as the price of her husband’s life;

the barber count de Meulan was hanged on the gibbet of Montfaucon, and

his properties were given to the duke of Orleans. Doyat was beaten with

rods at the pillory of the market-place, and lost both his ears, after

having had his tongue pierced by a hot iron--punishment reserved for

blasphemers and calumniators. One of his ears was cut off at Paris, the

other at Montferrand, where he had filled the office of royal bailiff.

The physician Coitier was relieved from the loss of his lands and castles

by a ransom of 50,000 crowns.

Public sentiment demanded more than the punishment of a few wretches.

The princes, divided among themselves, little known to the people, who

had for them hardly any affection or fear, felt the impossibility of

maintaining the despotic rule of Louis XI, and the necessity of having

recourse to a national authority to obtain the obedience of the masses.

The people would not have failed to resist universally the continuation

of arbitrary taxation. This law reacted with irresistible force against

the existing tyranny: a thousand voices repeated that “no king nor lord

had the power to levy one denier on his subjects and on the revenues of

his domain without the concession and consent of the people.” Comines,

the admirer of Louis XI, devotes a whole chapter to the discussion of

this principle, which he declares not only equitable but essential to

the prosperity of states, and regrets profoundly that the late king had

not respected it. “In England,” said he, “the kings can undertake no

great enterprise, nor levy any subsidies without assembling parliament,

which equals the three estates, and which is a just and holy thing.”

And he declares that “men who enjoy credit and authority without in the

least meriting them” are the only ones who fear the great assemblies,

since they will through them be known for the little they are worth. The

king’s council, on the proposition of the duke of Orleans, decided the

convocation of the states-general at Tours, for the 5th of January, 1484,

in spite of the outcries of some persons “of small importance, and little

virtue, who said it was a crime of _lèse majesté_ to talk of assembling

the estates, and would tend to diminish the authority of the king.”

The friends of “Madame” as Anne of France was called, and those of the

duke of Orleans, were agreed upon that important question. Each of the

two parties which began to outline itself in the council hoped for the

assistance of the estates against the other.

The record of state of 1484, drawn up by one of the most trustworthy

members of the order of the clergy, Jean Masselin, official of the

archbishopric of Rouen, has been preserved to us. It is the most explicit

account we possess of the national assemblies of France, before the

sixteenth century. It is of great interest, and it preserves for us

the memory of most important incidents. Nevertheless the states of 1484

became less remarkable for their actions than for their mode of action,

that is, innovations practised in the system of election. Louis XI, in

1468, had already overturned the old form of the estates, but without

substituting definitely a new form in the place of the old. The daughter

of Louis XI, and the members of the council who nursed the project

of the late king in the midst of a feudal reaction, effaced from the

elections all trace of feudality, completing and regulating the work of

Louis. Before Louis XI, the estates were composed only of the immediate

feudatories of the king--prelates, barons, representatives of the _bonnes

villes_, and the ecclesiastical or lay committees held by the crown.

In the estates of 1484 the elections were made after a uniform

regulation, by bailiwicks and _sénéchaussées_, by purely administrative

divisions; the electors were convoked not as feudatories of the king, but

as subjects of the realm; and for the first time the peasants, at least

the free peasants, were called upon to take part in operations of first

degree; they sent delegates from the villages to the lesser bailiwicks

or provostships, where the electors of the third degree were chosen, who

in the head-quarters of the bailiwick elected the deputies of the third

estate. The social importance of such a change needs no commentary. There

is now a real third estate, embracing the whole body of the people. The

peasant is no longer the chattel of the lord of the manor, the appendix

of the fief; he is the equal of the citizen, he is a member of the third

estate.

This is not all; the same spirit of unity and equality, at least

relative, is manifested in the regulation applied to the two privileged

orders. There, all vote directly and not by triple degree; and not only

do the lower clergy elect representatives, but the bishops are admitted

to the estates only when they have the votes of the ecclesiastical order,

and not by virtue of their episcopal title. In the nobility as well, no

great baron is member of the estates unless elected by the noblemen. The

three orders, under this régime, appear like three superimposed nations,

in which equality reigns. It is here the great difference appears between

the democratic spirit of France and the aristocratic spirit of England.

The only exceptions to the new rules were those provinces which were

administered by annual provincial estates, and which continued to

choose their deputies in their provincial estates, without resorting

to popular assemblies of three degrees. This is true at least of

Languedoc, and resulted, as a rule, in a veritable political inferiority

of those countries formerly so much in advance of the others, their

provincial estates retaining an oligarchical character in presence of a

transformation wholly democratic.[g]

The king’s minority and the factions at court seemed no unfavourable

omens for liberty. But a scheme was artfully contrived which had the

most direct tendency to break the force of a popular assembly. The

deputies were classed in six nations, who debated in separate chambers,

and consulted each other only upon the result of their respective

deliberations. It was easy for the court to foment the jealousies

natural to such a partition. Two nations, the Norman and the Burgundian,

asserted that the right of providing for the regency devolved, in the

king’s minority, upon the states-general; a claim of great boldness,

and certainly not much founded upon precedent. In virtue of this, they

proposed to form a council, not only of the princes, but of certain

deputies to be elected by the six nations who composed the states. But

the other four, those of Paris, Aquitaine, Languedoc, and Languedoïl

(which last comprised the central provinces), rejected this plan, from

which the two former ultimately desisted, and the choice of councillors

was left to the princes.

A firmer and more unanimous spirit was displayed upon the subject of

public reformation. The tyranny of Louis XI had been so unbounded that

all ranks agreed in calling for redress, and the new governors were

desirous at least, by punishing his favourites, to show their inclination

towards a change of system. They were very far, however, from approving

the propositions of the states-general. These went to points which no

court can bear to feel touched, though there is seldom any other mode of

redressing public abuses--the profuse expense of the royal household, the

number of pensions and improvident grants, the excessive establishment

of troops. The states explicitly demanded that the taille and all other

arbitrary imposts should be abolished; and that from thenceforward,

“according to the natural liberty of France,” no tax should be levied

in the kingdom without the consent of the states. It was with great

difficulty, and through the skilful management of the court, that they

consented to the collection of the taxes payable in the time of Charles

VII, with the addition of one-fourth, as a gift to the king upon his

accession. This subsidy they declare to be granted “by way of gift and

concession, and not otherwise, and so as no one should from thenceforward

call it a tax, but a gift and concession.” And this was only to be in

force for two years, after which they stipulated that another meeting

should be convoked. But it was little likely that the government would

encounter such a risk; and the princes, whose factious views the states

had by no means seconded, felt no temptation to urge again their

convocation. No assembly in the annals of France seems, notwithstanding

some party selfishness arising out of the division into nations, to have

conducted itself with so much public spirit and moderation; nor had that

country perhaps ever so fair a prospect of establishing a legitimate

constitution.[j]

The most serious question which the estates had to determine was that

of regulating the composition of the council and deciding to whom

the care and education of the king should be confided. The deputies

would have liked to conciliate the princes without clashing with them.

However, in the course of examining the various projects submitted to

them, they were led to inquire if the states-general were invested with

the constituent power. The opinion that this was so was shared by the

most eminent members of the assembly, especially by those belonging to

the order of the clergy, and had for interpreter an eloquent deputy of

the Burgundian nobility, the sire de la Roche. He demonstrated that no

absolute, fundamental rule for the administration of the kingdom during

the minority or childhood of the king existed in France; that neither was

the right of the princes in such circumstances in any way definite or

precise. In consequence he maintained that it was for the nation, that

is for the estates, to constitute the government in moments of crisis.

He presented a theoretical and philosophic analysis of the principle of

the sovereignty such as might be laid down in the schools; then he passed

in review the history of preceding assemblies and showed that several of

them, called together under exceptional circumstances, had exercised a

genuine constituent power.

In spite of the weight of this justly celebrated speech, the estates

shrank from the danger of entering into a struggle with the council

and the princes. They preferred to attempt an amiable conciliation of

the different claims. It was not easy to come to an understanding even

on this basis; for each day brought new difficulties. “It was,” says

Masselin, “the seven-headed hydra. Cut one and two grow in its place.”

Finally it was agreed that the duke of Orleans should have the first

place at the council and the presidency in the young king’s absence; the

duke de Bourbon and the sire de Beaujeu the second and third places; that

the other princes of the blood should have the right to take their seats

there after them; that all the existing councillors should be retained

and that twelve new councillors, taken from the six bureaux of the

estates, should be added to them.[k]

_The Struggle with the Duke of Orleans_

[Sidenote: [1484-1488 A.D.]]

The discontent of the duke of Orleans was not appeased by the decision

of the states. He was a handsome, frank, amiable man, not naturally

inclined to be turbulent; but as first prince of the blood, and heir

presumptive to the throne, it was derogatory to his pride and spirit to

remain tranquil, while deprived of all influence by a woman. Dunois, son

of the famous bastard of Orleans, was his chief friend and councillor--a

man as fond of intrigue, apparently, as his stout sire had been of

battle. The dukes of Lorraine and Bourbon seemed at first inclined to

join him, but both were won over by the lady Anne; Bourbon, the elder

brother of the lord of Beaujeu, being made constable. Orleans tried

every expedient to shake the authority of the king’s sister. He sought

to make himself popular in the capital, and to bring its citizens to

declare in his favour. He tried the parliament also; but its president,

La Vaquerie, replied that it was not their interest or duty to interfere

in a private struggle for power. Orleans was soon after closely pressed

by La Trémouille at the head of a superior army, and obliged to make

submission; Dunois being banished to Asti, a town in Italy which the duke

of Orleans inherited from his grandmother, Valentine of Milan.

Such a forced submission could not conduce to a lasting peace. Dunois

soon afterwards returned from exile. There was a plot for carrying

off the king, which failed, and the duke of Orleans was obliged to

take refuge in Brittany. The gay and fascinating manners of the French

prince entirely won the good will of Francis, the reigning duke. He was

without male heirs; and his daughter, as inheritor of the duchy, was a

rich prize for an ambitious prince. It is said that the duke of Orleans

became a suitor for the hand of Anne, and that Duke Francis favoured his

pretensions.[61] But the native nobles of the province were jealous of

the duke of Orleans and of his influence with their prince. They leagued

with the lady of Beaujeu against both; and a French army, supported

by a great body of Bretons, soon after besieged the dukes of Brittany

and Orleans in Nantes. There were two other pretenders to the hand of

the heiress of Brittany: the sire d’Albret, a rich lord of Gascony,

into whose family the crown of Navarre had passed from that of Fox.

The duke of Orleans, in prosecuting his own suit, affected to support

this competitor. The other was Maximilian, king of the Romans. A timely

succour sent by this prince obliged the French to raise the siege of

Nantes; and the lady of Beaujeu betraying a disposition to conquer the

duchy, and to garrison and appropriate its towns, the Bretons became

suspicious, abandoned her, and resumed their allegiance to the duke.

The war nevertheless continued. The troops on both sides met at St.

Aubin, and a battle ensued. The French were commanded by La Trémouille;

the prince of Orange and duke of Orleans led on the Bretons. The French

gendarmerie, having routed the cavalry opposed to them, took the Bretons

in flank and rear, and routed them. The duke of Orleans and the prince

of Orange were both taken prisoners. They were startled to perceive a

confessor enter their tent in the evening. La Trémouille, who saw and

enjoyed their consternation, reassured them by observing that it was only

for the inferior rebels to clear their consciences and prepare for death.

[Sidenote: [1488-1491 A.D.]]

An accommodation followed this defeat. The duke of Brittany made

submissions, and survived but a short time. He was the last duke of the

province, which now descended to his daughter Anne. There was another

sister, who, as she died soon after, need not be more than mentioned.

Affairs were now as unsettled as ever. The count d’Albret, seconded by a

strong party of Bretons, who above all things aimed at the independence

of their duchy, pushed his suit with the young heiress. The addresses

of this aged noble could not be agreeable to a princess of fourteen.

The duke of Orleans, the object of her predilection, was in prison. The

armies of France were invading the duchy, and it behoved her to espouse

a prince capable of defending her dominions. The resolution was taken

that she should be married to Maximilian, king of the Romans, and the

ceremony was accordingly performed by proxy; the archduke’s ambassador,

to conclude it, putting a naked leg into the couch of the young duchess.

Hitherto the aim of king Charles and his regent sister had been to

conquer the duchy by force of arms, laying claim to it as a male fief.

Charles had been long betrothed to Margaret of Austria, Maximilian’s

daughter, who was then receiving her education in the French court, and

awaiting the age of nubility. The stubbornness of the Bretons, however,

made the lady of Beaujeu despair of her project. The ever-ready Dunois,

in order to make his own peace and procure the liberty of the duke of

Orleans, proposed that Charles should espouse the young duchess himself,

and thus unite Brittany to the kingdom. Charles and his sister instantly

entered into this scheme. The king, with a kingly generosity, began by

setting the duke of Orleans, his secret rival, at liberty. This the

monarch did without consulting his sister; nor was his generosity abused,

for the duke remained ever after faithful to him, and even seconded his

purpose of espousing Anne. Dunois, on his side, laboured to render the

duchess less hostile to France. Anne still held with all the faithfulness

of a wife to Maximilian, to whom she was nominally betrothed. An

ostensible act of compulsion was deemed requisite to overcome her

reluctance. A royal army besieged her in Rennes. One of the conditions of

the capitulation was that she should espouse the king of France.[c]

[Illustration: CHARLES VIII

(From an old French engraving)]

The marriage festivities which united Brittany to France took place at

Langeais-Touraine. The pope declared the former marriage of Anne and

Maximilian null and void, and the new queen was conducted to Paris to be

crowned. All these negotiations took place in the greatest secrecy, as

it was desired to conceal them from the envoy of Maximilian. The king of

the Romans was doubly insulted. Charles VIII took from him a princess

whom he had already married by proxy, and sent back to him his daughter

Margaret, educated in Paris, since the Treaty of Arras, and destined to

the throne of France. When the time came to declare the marriage, it

was shown that Maximilian had been the first to violate the Treaty of

Arras, that he had never ceased to make war against France for fourteen

years, and that he had not respected the conventions of Frankfort or

Plessis-les-Tours.

[Sidenote: [1491-1492 A.D.]]

The contract was made with much artfulness. Charles VIII and Anne gave up

all their rights, their reciprocal pretensions which it was useless to

pronounce upon. It was stipulated that these rights should be combined

in the persons of the children born of this marriage; that if there were

none, and the king should die, the duchess could not contract a second

marriage except with his successor or the heir presumptive to the crown,

on pain of losing the duchy.

The province demanded the maintenance of its privileges, which were

confirmed (declaration of July 7th, 1492). It preserved its particular

estates, its supreme court of justice, which sixty years later became

the parliament of Rennes, and its independent administration. It was

assimilated in every respect with Dauphiné, Languedoc, Provence, and

Burgundy, but it ceased to be a sovereign state, to become like those

countries one of the members of the body of the monarchy. It is annoying

that we cannot to-day follow, step by step, the artful conduct of the

duchess of Bourbon. However that may be, she had at that time achieved

her ends, and scored a complete triumph. Brittany was joined permanently

to France; the princes were reconciled, in a definite manner this time.

Finally Charles VIII arrived at man’s estate, and having nothing to fear

of internal conspiracies, could defy those of foreign countries.

Meanwhile the coalition, which had shown too little activity to hinder

the reunion with Brittany, was too strongly opposed to it to accept it

without protest. A war might be expected, or at least great diplomatic

difficulties. Henry VII, Maximilian, and Ferdinand the Catholic protested

in common against an act which the latter called an unheard-of and

execrable fraud. They agreed to attack France on her different frontiers.

But the king of England was in a measure the only one to act. Ferdinand,

for the last twelve years, was directing all his forces against Granada,

and in spite of the triumph of his officers, who raised the Christian

flag there in February, 1492, he could undertake nothing against France,

unless it was to continue the hostilities on the frontier of Roussillon,

which had never been interrupted. Maximilian, obliged to submit to

Hungary, and to make war against the Turks, could the less wage war on

the frontier of Artois, as he continued to be hampered by the ill will

of the Flemish towns. Henry VII, on the contrary, had full liberty of

action, and, what made him more dangerous, he never acted on calculation

or on personal resentment. It was the national sentiment of England which

protested against the aggrandisement of France. The English rightly

regarded the union of Brittany with the rest of the monarchy as a fatal

blow to their hopes of some day regaining Normandy and Guienne. Henry

VII therefore declared war against Charles VIII; however, in yielding to

the enthusiasm of his subjects, he took very little part in it; for, if

the historian of his reign, the chancellor Bacon, is to be believed, he

proposed alone to obtain the subsidies from parliament by flattering

national vanity, and to sell to France as dearly as possible his

recognition of the acquisition of Brittany.

[Sidenote: [1492-1493 A.D.]]

Charles VIII had to oppose the English regular army, already increased,

whose augmentation had brought taxes up to the figure of 2,300,000

livres. He collected all his supporters and obliged the principal towns

of the realm to furnish him with men-at-arms. He called to his court also

Perkin Warbeck, whom the Yorkists of England represented as a pretended

son of Edward IV and a rival of Henry VII.

The latter passed the Channel, but not before October, after long delays,

and besieged Boulogne, which would have strengthened the position on

the continent which Calais already assured him. Arriving under the

walls of the fortress, he found there much stronger resistance than he

had expected; he received no aid from the Netherlands, and he heard

that the Spaniards had begun separate negotiations with Charles VIII.

These reasons decided him to sign a treaty at Étaples in the month of

November. He contented himself with the payment of large sums by France

as indemnity for the English troops which had served in Brittany, or as

amends for the rupture of the Treaty of Picquigny and interruption of the

payment of subsidies promised to Edward IV by Louis XI.

Charles VIII had undertaken separate negotiations with Ferdinand the

Catholic. Roussillon and Cerdagne were objects of litigation between

the crowns of Aragon and France, which had already lasted more than

thirty years. Charles VIII finished by purely and simply restoring those

two provinces, without even exacting reimbursement of the sums lent by

Louis XI. The treaty was signed at Barcelona in January, 1493. France

felt a certain astonishment at this abandonment of pretensions, on the

subject of which all former offers of compromise had been refused. But

notwithstanding that the question of law was not a simple one, and that

the different acts of Louis XI had greatly complicated it, Charles VIII

considered that, in buying the friendship of Spain at such a price, he

would attain the dissolution of the coalition, assure to himself the

possession of Brittany, and finally open an unobstructed road into Italy.

He then made preparations to force the realm of Naples to respect the

rights inherited by Louis XI through the princes of the house of Anjou.

The king of Spain promised at Barcelona not to hinder his march to Italy

in any way, and to furnish no aid to Ferdinand of Naples, who was of a

bastard branch of Aragon, and even to aid the pretensions of France at

the court of Rome, sovereign of the Two Sicilies.

There remained still Maximilian and his son, the archduke Philip, then

fourteen years of age. Although these princes were for the time not

redoubtable, a treaty with them presented more difficulties, as they

had been more personally offended, and in sending back the princess

Margaret it was not possible to preserve her dowry, stipulated in the

Treaty of Arras, that is to say of Artois and Franche-Comté. Already

disturbances had broken out in the two provinces. Arras, which remembered

the cruelties of Louis XI, had driven out her French garrison the day

after the Treaty of Étaples. Franche-Comté became insurgent in its

turn. Charles VIII by a last treaty signed May 23rd, 1493, at Senlis,

restored the counties of Burgundy, Artois, Charolais, and Noyon. He

contented himself by sequestrating the fortresses of Hesdin, Aire, and

Béthune, until the day when Philip, having reached his majority, paid

him homage; and to stipulate the restitution of Tournay, Mortagne, and

St. Amand, towns of the ancient domain of the crown. Maximilian finished

by accepting these conditions, which after all he was not in a position

to refuse; for although his ambition was cosmopolitan, the extensiveness

of his dominions and the multiplicity of interests which called him

every year to a new point of Europe never permitted him to pursue to

the end any enterprise of long duration. His thoughts were now turning

towards the imperial throne, which the death of his father Frederick III

allowed him to mount a few months later. The French government wished

that, following usage, the Peace of Senlis should be guaranteed by the

principal towns of Flanders, Hainault, and Artois, such as Ypres, Namur,

Arras, and Valenciennes.

Historians have often reproached Charles VIII with having signed

oppressive treaties at Étaples, Barcelona, and Senlis, and above all to

have partly restored by the last the power of the house of Burgundy,

which had been previously weakened by the Treaty of Arras. Here was in

effect a sad offset to the acquisition of Brittany; but the choice had to

be made between Anne and Margaret, between Brittany and Franche-Comté. If

Charles VIII made a blunder it was at least more excusable than that of

Louis XI, who had never been placed in the same position.

Charles VIII has also been reproached with having sacrificed the frontier

and French-speaking provinces in seeking aggrandisement and conquests in

a country so far removed as Italy. The conquests in Italy were bound to

be ephemeral. It had been necessary in the peninsula to battle for half a

century without retaining in the end a single inch of ground.

Much more would have been attained by extending the northern frontier,

which was too near Paris, and by attaching again to France the provinces

which gravitated around her. But it was forgotten that Charles VIII, in

sending back Margaret, had no claim worth considering on Franche-Comté or

the Netherlands; that he had consequently on this side no motive for war,

and that he could not undertake such a war without running foul of the

empire and of allied Europe.

Italy offered no such dangers. If prudence had, until now, hindered him

from interfering in her revolutions, Charles VIII, having no longer

any interior questions to regulate, was in a much better position than

his father or grandfather had ever been. It is thus the treaties of

1492 and 1493 should be understood. In France they were judged rather

unfavourably, which was natural, since they stipulated concessions and

restitutions; but they were not as has been said the result of the

heedless enthusiasm of a young king, sacrificing the manifest interests

of his realm to the passion for foreign conquest.[k]

_Charles VIII in Italy_

As already suggested, the acquisition of Brittany marks the conclusion

of the first period of the reign of Charles VIII. The king was now of an

age to shake off the leading-strings of his sister. He was old enough to

have a policy of his own, and he was soon to show that he had one. It was

a policy dominated by a single thought--the conquest of Italy. In putting

that sinister policy into effect, Charles VIII inaugurated a new era in

French history; a new era, indeed, in the history of all Europe. France

was now the most closely unified kingdom in all Europe; it aspired to

become an empire.

The idea of the invasion of Italy was no doubt suggested by the fact that

certain claims upon the kingdom of Naples had been bequeathed to Louis

XI by Charles II of Anjou. Solicited by disaffected Neapolitans and by

Lodovico Sforza, duke of Milan, Charles VIII now determined to go to

Italy and make good his hereditary claims.[62][a]

The thought of an expedition to Italy was most seductive to a prince as

young as Charles VIII, nourished on traditions of chivalry, in which the

study of antiquity was mingled with souvenirs of Cæsar and Alexander. It

was equally seductive to the nobility, the army, and the whole country,

as flattering to the national vanity. Since the Crusades no great foreign

enterprises had been undertaken by the kings in the name of the nation.

The campaigns of Du Guesclin in Spain, of John the Fearless at Nicopolis,

of the princes of Anjou at Naples, had been only private expeditions

and had not involved France. The war in Italy reopened the era of great

conquests.

In addition, this was an important epoch in French history as well

as in that of all Europe. The old political system was upset. The

empire was nothing more than a name at the head of what was still

called Christianity. France seeking aggrandisement, the result was the

prevalence of an idea of a necessary equilibrium among the great powers.

This idea was not entirely new. The growth of France under Louis XI,

the marriage of Maximilian of Austria to Mary of Burgundy, had already

conduced to its formation. The powers observed how the rôle of diplomacy

gradually grew, and conquests formed their necessary counterpoise in

coalitions.

Without going back to reminiscences of the brother of St. Louis, and the

protectorate assumed by France over the Guelfs of Italy two centuries

before, it may be well to recall the expeditions, undertaken by the

princes of the younger branch of Anjou, to seize the crown of Naples.

Louis II, René, John of Calabria, had, one after the other, claimed

a succession regarded in France as a legitimate inheritance. René of

Lorraine would again have followed that example in 1486, if the news that

the great Angevin barons were treating with the house of Aragon had not

stopped him, almost at the moment of departure. Men’s minds were occupied

with what Comines called “the smoke and glories of Italy.” Louis XI had

exercised some sort of a protectorate over the different states of the

peninsula, governing Savoy and Montferrat by French princes; all-powerful

at Milan; refusing the sovereignty of Genoa, which was offered to him;

intervening as mediator in the dispute between Rome and Tuscany. Pius II

has already stated that the greater part of the princes and people of

Italy were more French than the French themselves, _Gallis Galliores_.

The Orient was also thought of. The prediction of a crusade renewed

by Pius II and Sixtus IV, after the entrance of Muhammed II into

Constantinople, the terror with which the Turks inspired Europe, the

growth of their conquests which had not slackened, the recent heroic

defence of the walls of Rhodes by Pierre d’Aubusson, grand-master of

the knights of St. John, carried back public thoughts to memories

whose vividness time could not alter. Although times had changed, the

brilliancy and glory of the Crusades had not been forgotten. It was

indeed all that tradition had kept up after two centuries. Moreover the

military strength was much greater, and inspired another confidence than

that of former times. If the route of Charles of Anjou were followed,

the Ottoman empire could not be attacked before being sure of a base of

operations at Naples, and it was hoped that the Greek Christians would

rise at sight of the banners of the new crusaders.

In reality the oriental question had been asked; Europe was interested in

solving it. Preparations were being made for the expedition into Italy.

Each time that great events take place, public opinion is excited and the

dominant ideas of the times reveal themselves in one way or another. It

was now the first period of the Renaissance, in which the savants caused

a perpetual confusion of antiquity and modern society.

Ancient memories had therefore a peculiar influence. Guillaume de

Villeneuve, officer and historian of Charles VIII, Jean Bouchet, author

of _The Life of De la Trémouille_, Comines himself, in the latter part of

his memoirs--all abused ancient history, from which they borrowed a long

list of comparisons; they even took occasion to compare the crossing of

the Alps by the king to the similar feats of Hannibal and Cæsar.

Italy has always exercised a great and natural fascination, due to the

beauty of the land and its cities, the splendour of its civilisation. The

presence of so many monuments of antiquity, the study and appreciation

of which had begun, had so much attraction for the French nobility, whom

the Italians haughtily regarded as “barbarians,” but who were far from

meriting this title. The French had indeed an exaggerated idea of a

country less known than we should be inclined to suppose, since nations

were far from having the same intercourse that they have at the present

day.

Charles VIII was, according to the Italians, who have portraits of

him, small, of insignificant appearance, and expressed himself with

difficulty. The desire for pleasure seemed to dominate him, and he is

reproached with caring only for the chase, for dogs, falcons, and horses.

The Tuscan and Venetian envoys at his court refused for a long time to

believe that he could ever become a conqueror. They recognised, however,

that he showed a certain natural ardour, when he assisted regularly at

the reunions of his council, and reserved the decisions to himself.

Nearly two years were consecrated to the necessary preparations. The

enterprise, without being officially announced, was no secret to anyone.

The Italian states were engrossed in it, and, with the exception of

Milan, sent embassy after embassy to the court of France, to spy upon its

actions, divine its intentions, and avert a project which menaced them

all. The envoys, Florentines and others, whose correspondence has come

down to us, showed infinite ability and genius in a series of delicate

and difficult negotiations. But nothing proves more clearly the weakness

of the government they were trying to serve than their tendency to

intrigue, their perplexity, their suspicion, combined with self-deception

and the duplicity of some of them.

[Sidenote: [1493-1494 A.D.]]

Charles VIII, on his side also, sent envoys beyond the Alps. He wished

to isolate the king of Naples, to entangle the different states in an

offensive alliance against him, or at least obtain their neutrality,

but a neutrality favourable to free passage over their lands. Above

all he scrutinised closely the court of Rome. As he had had his rights

to southern Italy examined by the parliament and the parliament had

declared them valid, he demanded a similar declaration from the pope,

sovereign of the crown of Naples. Alexander VI could not be relied upon

very strongly--a Spaniard by birth whose election had been opposed by the

French; but it was hoped to frighten him by threatening to uphold his

personal enemies, who were many, and by demanding a general reform in the

church, a reform equally desired by France and demanded by Maximilian and

Ferdinand the Catholic.

Much as it was hoped also to find allies and resources in Italy, nothing

was neglected for raising a large army, well equipped, and which should

be sufficient in itself. Men-at-arms were not wanting. The difficulty was

in organising them--the artillery, the wagons, and the ships necessary.

Money was also needed, and to raise it every means in usage in such a

case was employed. The pensions paid to the king were reduced for half

a year; the treasurers were made to give advances; different loans were

obtained, and an assessment was made on the banks of Milan and Genoa, and

on Italian merchants; finally a particular tax was made on the clergy,

under the form of a forced loan, as well as on the states of Languedoc,

and several cities of the realm. All these negotiations required time,

and were not concluded without difficulty. Paris and the other cities

presented remonstrances, from which the Italian ambassadors concluded

that the war was not popular and would not materialise.

The pecuniary difficulties, the inevitable length of the preparations,

the boldness of the enterprise, the uncertainty of the political

situation in Europe gave rise to a natural opposition. Several of the

former councillors of Louis XI, such as M. d’Argenton (Comines), and the

sire de Graville, grand admiral, expressed their doubts and fears. The

duke de Bourbon saw with regret the abandonment of the prudent policy

which he had followed until then, but neither he nor the duchess was any

longer master of the government. Des Querdes maintained that, if it were

desirable to make conquests, it would be better to look for them in the

Netherlands rather than in Italy. Meanwhile the opponents generally held

themselves in reserve, and sought rather to moderate the enthusiasm than

to combat it.

The general rendezvous was to be at Lyons. Des Querdes, who was to have

the command, died before the departure. The king resolved therefore to

place himself in person at the head of his troops. He arrived at Lyons

in the month of April, 1494; but preparations were not completed, and

he had to wait several months before entering upon the campaign. Ships

were wanting, and it became necessary to construct a certain number

for transporting one division of artillery. At last the departure took

place in the month of September, although no tents, pavilions, nor other

necessaries were at hand.[k]

[Sidenote: [1494-1495 A.D.]]

The details of the incidents of this memorable tour[63] have already

been given in our history of Italy, and need not be repeated here. We

have there seen how Charles VIII was permitted to enter Florence as the

friend of the people, yet came with all the presumption of a conqueror;

how he went to Rome and was there received with the outward semblance

of friendship by Alexander VI; and how he entered Naples and took the

nominal kingship of that realm without striking a blow. It will be

recalled that while the king lingered in Naples, antagonistic princes

gathered in the north of Italy, and attempted to intercept the French

army on its return. The French army, fatigued from its long march, and

only about nineteen thousand strong, with five or six thousand servitors

or guards of the transport in its train, met the Italian army of at least

thirty thousand fresh and well-supplied men in the duchy of Parma near

the castle of Fornovo on the right bank of the Taro, on the 5th of July,

1495.[a]

It was a brief but sharply fought battle with alternations of success

and defeat for both armies. The two chief officers of the royal forces,

Louis de la Trémouille and Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, sustained without

wavering the shock of troops far more numerous than their own. “At

their throats--at their throats!” cried La Trémouille after the first

counter, and his three hundred men fell upon the enemy with sufficient

force to break their ranks. During the heat of the battle the French

baggage wagons were attacked by the _stradiots_, a Greek corps recruited

and paid by the Venetians. “Let them alone!” shouted Trivulzio to his

troops; “their ardour for pillage will make them forget everything else

and we can the more easily overcome them.” At one time the king was in

advance of the main body of his guard and had neglected to see if they

were closely following. He approached to within a hundred feet of the

marquis of Mantua, who, seeing him so slimly accompanied, charged at him

with all his cavalry. “It is not possible,” says Comines,[d] “to strike

harder blows than were given on both sides.” The king, closely pressed

and surrounded, defended himself valiantly against those who sought to

take him. The bastard Matthew de Bourbon, his brother-at-arms and one of

the bravest knights of the army, rushed forward twenty steps in advance

of the king to protect him, and had just been taken prisoner when a large

body of the royal troops came to the rescue of both and delivered them

from peril. It was in this engagement that Pierre du Terrail, Chevalier

de Bayard, at that time scarcely twenty years of age but destined later

to achieve such fame, performed his first feats of arms.[64] He had two

horses killed under him, and took one standard, which he presented to

the king, being rewarded by the latter after the battle with a gift of

500 crowns.[e]

[Sidenote: [1495-1498 A.D.]]

As a result of the battle Charles VIII and his troops were allowed to

continue their march unmolested; but their return to France partook

somewhat of the nature of a retreat. It was not to be expected that a

territory so distant as Naples could be held subordinate to the French

crown without difficulty; and while Charles himself and his followers

no doubt regarded the expedition as a great success, it was really in

the sober view of posterity a most lamentable enterprise. It was fraught

with all manner of deplorable sequels, as we shall see. But of course

the French people could not be expected to anticipate future events, and

for the moment they were able to welcome their king back to Paris as a

conqueror and a hero.[a]

_Death of Charles VIII_

The two years which elapsed from Charles’ return over the Alps to his

death were marked by no event of importance. The chief expenditure and

amusement that occupied him seemed to be the building and ornamenting

of the castle of Amboise, for which he had brought with him eminent

architects and artists from Italy. His sons perished in infancy one after

the other; the name of the last, Charles Orlando, marking the favourite

studies and thoughts of the monarch. In the spring of 1498 a game of

ball, which interested the king, was played in the fosse of the castle

of Amboise, where he resided. Charles, an affectionate husband, brought

the queen to witness it. Passing in haste through the low archway of a

gallery, he struck his head somewhat violently against it; for the moment

the blow did not seem to affect him, but soon after, he was seized with a

stroke of apoplexy, and died at the early age of twenty-seven. “Charles,”

says Comines,[d] “was of a small person, and little understanding; but a

better creature was not to be seen.”[c]

By the death of Charles VIII, the direct line of Valois was ended, and

the crown was transferred to the collateral branch of Valois-Orleans,

descended from Louis I, duke of Orleans, second son of Charles V.

LOUIS XII, “THE FATHER OF HIS PEOPLE” (1498-1515 A.D.)

The transmission of the crown of France to another branch of the royal

house had been effected without agitation and without an obstacle;

there were whispers, but in hushed voices, round Madame de Bourbon, the

ancient enemy of duke Louis, that that prince had forfeited his rights by

bearing arms against the crown of France in the Breton war; but no one

ventured to exhibit such ideas abroad, and the new king, by his prudent

and generous conduct, prevented any chance of disturbance. It would not

be becoming and to the honour of the king of France to avenge the wrongs

of the duke of Orleans--such was the maxim which guided the first acts of

Louis XII.

[Sidenote: [1498-1499 A.D.]]

He sent for the sire Louis de la Trémouille, that renowned captain who

had made him prisoner at the battle of St. Aubin, and confirmed him in

all his offices, rank, pensions, and advantages. He declared that he

would maintain every man in his full possessions and rights, and refused

to bear in mind which of the late king’s servants had persuaded Charles

VIII in the latter part of his life to keep the first prince of the blood

in a species of exile. Finally he invited Madame Anne of France and her

husband Duke Peter de Bourbon to come to him at Blois and lavished on

them marks of esteem and favour of every kind; his generosity towards

them even appeared to many people to go beyond the boundaries prescribed

by the interests of the state. Louis XI, in giving his daughter Anne in

marriage to the sire Peter de Beaujeu, had stipulated in the contract

that if Peter should inherit property from the ducal branch of the house

of Bourbon (which actually happened), those great domains, although

originally feminine fiefs, should return to the crown in case Peter

should die without male heirs. Now Duke Peter was old and had only

a daughter named Suzanne; the last great lordship (_seigneurie_) of

central France was thus about to be merged in that royal domain which had

successively absorbed all the great fiefs. The king allowed himself to

be drawn into sacrificing this final result of the labours of Louis XI,

and by letters patent of the 12th of May, 1498, he annulled the ancient

contracts and treaties which excluded Suzanne from the paternal fiefs.

The marriage of Suzanne with her cousin Charles de Bourbon, who like

herself was still a child, secured that the heritage should not pass from

that house. The parliament of Paris, accustomed to defend the permanent

interests of the crown against the kings themselves, only enregistered

the royal letters after a resistance of several months.

[Illustration: LOUIS XII]

Louis XII showed no less benevolence to the good towns than to the

princes and old servants of Charles VIII; he promised the citizen

deputies who had come to pay him their respects to give his attention

to improving the condition of the poor people; he published a severe

ordinance for the repression of robberies and violences committed by the

soldiers; he diminished the taxes (_tailles_) by two hundred thousand

livres, and dispensed Paris and the whole kingdom from the _don de joyeux

avènement_. Louis XII kept the promises of the opening of his reign: his

well-directed energy, his desire to do good did not fail. The frivolous

and libertine young prince had become a humane king, moderate, devoted to

his duties, an economical administrator, who kept a careful watch over

the public wealth, the protector of order and of justice, the equitable

rewarder of merit and honesty: unfortunately he had little initiative

and little breadth of mind, and the facility of his disposition placed

him to an inordinate degree under the influence of those he loved. It is

true that he often had the good sense and the good fortune to bestow his

affections in safe keeping: his principal minister and his best friend,

George d’Amboise, archbishop of Rouen, who had participated in his evil

fortune and who shared, not to say absorbed his power, was certainly

worthy to govern the king and the kingdom, if the internal administration

alone is taken into consideration; but abroad the blind and often

reprehensible policy in which George involved Louis afforded a melancholy

compensation for the services rendered at home.

_Marriage with Anne of Brittany_

The first months of the reign of Louis XII were filled with an important

matter which touched no less the most precious interests of the realm

than the private life of the king. By the marriage contract of Charles

VIII and Anne of Brittany the husband and wife had combined their

respective rights over Brittany to the advantage of the survivor; this

duchy therefore returned to the widow and was once more separated from

France. Madame Anne of Brittany had already returned to her town of

Nantes and had been reinstated in full possession of her sovereignty.

It is true that another article of the contract, in order to obviate

this separation, required the duchess not to marry again except with the

successor of Charles VIII or the heir presumptive to the crown; but for

twenty-two years the king had been married to the second daughter of

Louis XI and had no son. Louis resolved to push aside the obstacle which

separated him and the widowed queen and set to work to obtain a divorce

from the deformed Joan of France in order to marry the fair sovereign

of Brittany. It has been universally repeated, on the faith of certain

writers, contemporaries of Louis XII, that the duke of Orleans and the

duchess Anne had been previously attached to one another and that, during

the Breton war, Louis had secretly contended with the other suitors for

the hand of Anne. This tradition is confuted by a simple comparison

of dates: when the duke of Orleans withdrew to Brittany in 1484, the

princess was only eight years old: she was but twelve when he was taken

prisoner at St. Aubin-du-Cormier. What does seem certain was that

Landois, the intriguing favourite of Francis II, had even then suggested

to Duke Louis the idea of a divorce for purely political objects, and

that Duke Francis II had secretly promised his daughter to the duke

of Orleans. Be that as it may, the duke of Orleans, after leaving his

prison, figured without apparent repugnance in the negotiations which

brought about the union of Charles and Anne and was even one of the

king’s witnesses at Rennes and Langeais.

[Illustration: ANNE OF BRITTANY

(From an old French engraving)]

Whilst Charles VIII was still alive nothing indicated that the duke and

the queen had feelings of tenderness for one another; they were even at

one time on very bad terms--on the occasion of the death of the little

dauphin Charles Orlando, the death which had made Louis heir to the

crown. Anne bore a grudge against Louis for the slight sympathy he had

shown for her in her maternal grief. Finally Anne gave expression to a

somewhat theatrical despair on the death of Charles VIII, a husband very

far from faithful, but gentle and affectionate; she was the first queen

of France who wore black for mourning; hitherto the widows of kings had

dressed in white, which circumstance had procured for them the title of

“white queens” (_reines blanches_). Anne assumed black as the symbol of

constancy, because it cannot fade.

In spite of these demonstrations of a showy grief, the proud and

ambitious Anne graciously received the first advances of the new king

who proposed to her that she should not leave the throne of France,

and Louis had little difficulty in persuading her to sign on the 9th

of August a promise of marriage to be fulfilled as soon as might be.

The king, without loss of time, had presented to Pope Alexander VI an

application for the dissolution of his marriage. The circumstances were

favourable: the Roman pontiff wished to withdraw his son, the cardinal

De Valence (Cesare Borgia), from the ecclesiastical state that he might

make him a secular prince; he had asked for him the hand of a daughter

of Frederick, king of Naples. Frederick refused this shameful alliance.

Alexander in his anger threw himself on the French side and undertook not

only to authorise the king’s divorce but to second his plans in Italy on

condition that Cesare Borgia should have his share. A bull of the 29th

of July charged three ecclesiastical commissioners to inquire into and

take proceedings on the monarch’s application. Two of these delegates,

the cardinal De Luxemburg and the bishop of Albi, brother of George

d’Amboise, were devoted to the king. Louis recognised this service by

investing Cesare Borgia with the counties of Valentinois and Diois in

Dauphiné; besides this he gave him a company of one hundred lances and

a pension of 20,000 livres and promised to help the holy see to subdue

the petty princes of Romagna. George d’Amboise received the cardinal’s

hat from Alexander VI: such was the earnest of the odious alliance which

formed the ineffaceable stain on the reign of Louis XII. The excuse of

the public advantage, the necessity of gaining over the pope in order to

procure the divorce, closed the eyes of Louis and induced him to take

the first steps; he was then unable to stop and almost his whole reign

presented the aspect of two faces offering a strange contrast, the one of

uprightness, good sense, and humanity at home; the other of injustice,

violence, and folly abroad.

Joan of France, who had not been crowned with her husband and had not

been accorded the honours of a queen, was summoned to appear on the

30th of August at the deanery of Tours before the pope’s commissioners.

There is something sad and ignominious about the details of this trial.

Joan, resigned beforehand to a fate too clearly foreseen, defended

herself solely from a sense of duty: the dissolution of the marriage was

pronounced on the 17th of December and the repudiated wife withdrew to a

convent at Bourges.

Louis XII now only awaited the necessary dispensation of consanguinity

to marry Anne of Brittany: Cesare Borgia, whom the king had enticed into

France in order to make him an instrument and who had arrived at the

court in semi-royal state, was endeavouring to extort fresh favours from

Louis before complying with his wishes; the bishop of Ceuta, one of the

pope’s commissioners, revealed to the king that the dispensation had been

signed by Alexander VI and was now in Cesare’s possession. Louis made

ready to take further proceedings; Cesare then produced the bull which he

had no further interest in keeping; but the bishop of Ceuta died a few

days later--poisoned.

In the château of Nantes, three weeks after the granting of the divorce,

Louis XII married the widow of Charles VIII: the marriage treaty, signed

the 6th of January, 1499, by the chief nobles of France and Brittany,

was much less advantageous to the crown than the contract of Langeais

between Charles VIII and Anne. Anne and her subjects, having in view the

re-establishment of Breton independence,[65] required that the duchy of

Brittany should be destined to the second child, male or female, to be

born of the future marriage or, if the married couple had only one heir,

to the second child of that heir; if the duchess died childless before

the king, Louis was to retain Brittany during his life, but after him the

duchy was to return to the next heirs of Madame Anne. As yet it was but a

feeble bond which attached Brittany to France. The king swore to preserve

to Brittany all its rights and liberties, its own administration judicial

and political, its council, parliament, chamber of accounts (_chambre

des comptes_), general treasury, and assembly of the three estates for

the reform of the customs, tolls, and the levy of subsidies; he promised

that benefices should only be given to natives according to the exclusive

choice of the queen; that no new jurisdiction might be established and

that free episcopal electors should be defended against the pretensions

of the pope.

The whole conduct of Louis had shown that he desired this alliance

equally as man and king: whether he had or had not loved the queen during

the lifetime of Charles VIII he bore her during the whole period of their

union a constant and unique affection which formed a singular contrast to

the vulgar and licentious amours of his youth. It was doubtless by a kind

of delicate flattery that contemporary writers traced back the origin

of the king’s passion to the childhood of the heiress of Brittany. The

Breton duchess, who had the obstinacy rather than the sensibility of her

race, made but a feeble response to this tenderness and took advantage of

it to draw her docile husband into deplorable political errors.[g]

_Foreign Affairs_[66]

The domestic and internal affairs of the kingdom thus regulated, Louis

turned his views towards Italy. He was eager to renew the successes and

avenge the defeats of his predecessor. He had not only to support the

claims of the house of Anjou upon Naples, but to maintain his own private

right to the duchy of Milan. The Sforza, soldiers of fortune, had usurped

the duchy, and founded their right on the marriage of the first Sforza

with Blanche, the natural daughter of the last Visconti. Louis XI had

allied with them, and had refused to permit the duke of Orleans to insist

upon his heritage. No sooner did the latter become Louis XII than he

assumed the title of duke of Milan, and prepared, by arms and alliances,

to prosecute his claim.

Lodovico Sforza had usurped the duchy, and secured it by poisoning his

nephew: he was peculiarly hateful to the French, from having been the

first to entice Charles VIII into Italy, and afterwards the first to

betray him. His crimes made him equally odious to his countrymen. The

pope was won over by the gift of the duchy of Valentinois, which the king

gave to his notorious son, Cesare Borgia. The Florentines were in the

French interest, and the Venetians leagued with Louis in order to share

the spoils of Lodovico. In short, when a French army entered the Milanese

in the summer of 1499, it met with no resistance. The duchy submitted

almost without a blow, and Lodovico fled to Innsbruck, to his only ally,

Maximilian.

[Sidenote: [1500-1502 A.D.]]

Lodovico returned with an army in the ensuing year. The capital rose

in his favour. Trivulzio, who had been left governor of the duchy,

was besieged in the town-house, and was only rescued by the audacious

gallantry of some sixty knights, his followers. The French were obliged

to evacuate the province. At the first tidings of the insurrection, La

Trémouille marched from France to succour Trivulzio. Lodovico sought to

intercept this aid by posting himself at Novara. But when the outposts

of both armies touched, the Swiss in Lodovico’s service learned that

their comrades in the French army were better paid and treated. On the

eve of action these mercenaries declared their intention of deserting to

the French. Lodovico Sforza used the strongest entreaties to dissuade

them; but finding them determined, he merely begged not to be delivered

to the enemy. How was he to escape from Novara, in which he was in a

manner besieged? The Swiss consented to allow him to mingle in their

ranks, clothed as one of their soldiers. Their treachery, however, or

the vigilance of the French, discovered the unfortunate Lodovico in the

Swiss ranks, as they marched out of Novara. He was taken, and conveyed to

France, where he was confined in the castle of Chinon until he died. Thus

Louis subdued for the second time the duchy of Milan.

The conquest of Naples still remained to be achieved; but the present

enmity of Maximilian king of the Romans rendered it inexpedient to

undertake at present so distant an expedition, which would leave Milan

exposed to the hostility of the Germans. This inability to conquer,

joined with the impatience to possess, caused Louis to commit an

egregious blunder. He formed an alliance with Ferdinand king of Spain,

to divide between them the kingdom of Naples, to the exclusion of its

reigning monarch, who was of the illegitimate race of Aragon. Louis was

to have the better or northern half of the kingdom, the city of Naples

included. Ferdinand, who merely wanted a pretext to obtain a footing in

the peninsula, and introduce forces, was to content himself with Apulia

and Calabria. Accordingly, Ferdinand sent Gonsalvo de Cordova, and Louis

despatched Stuart d’Aubigny, each to conquer their respective portions,

which they effected; the reigning monarch at first confiding in Gonsalvo,

who of course betrayed him. Frederick of Naples, being driven from his

capital and kingdom, fled first to Ischia and thence to France, where

Louis gave him the duchy of Anjou as a compensation for the loss of his

crown.

Louis now turned his views towards the Venetians. They had obtained

Cremona, Bergamo, Brescia, the eastern territories of the duchy of Milan,

as the price of their co-operation against Sforza. The king envied them

this portion of his duchy, as they hated and feared the newly grown power

of a foreign monarch in Italy. He endeavoured to bring Maximilian of

Austria to join in an alliance against them; and a treaty was concluded,

by which Maximilian promised the investiture of the duchy of Milan to

Louis. Maximilian’s grandson Charles (afterwards emperor) was to marry

the princess Claude, the daughter of Louis. The designs, however, which

the monarchs entertained against Venice were interrupted by the bad

faith of Ferdinand of Spain, which began to manifest itself in Naples.

The agreement by which this kingdom was partitioned between two rival

powers, without any fixed line of demarcation, was necessarily rather

a source of war than a seal of peace. A great portion of the country’s

revenue proceeded from the tax on the herds of cattle, which were yearly

collected in the plains. Quarrels arose about this, and about the limits

of the provinces; and war soon broke out between Gonsalvo and the duke de

Nemours, who was viceroy for the French.

[Sidenote: [1502-1503 A.D.]]

He was now leagued with the Borgias--the father, the execrable pope

Alexander VI; his son, Cesare Borgia, one of the heroes of Macchiavelli.

They betrayed Louis at every turn; crushed and murdered his friends.

Still the French king temporised; and in a treaty concluded with them at

this period, he agreed to sacrifice to them several of the independent

nobility of Italy--among others, the Bentivoglios and the Orsini. One

of the causes of this blindness in Louis was the care which the pope

took to win the favour of the cardinal D’Amboise, the French minister,

whom he cajoled in a manner which was afterwards practised on Wolsey, by

flattering him with the hope of succeeding to the popedom. The French

were at first the strongest party in Naples. Gonsalvo retired before

D’Aubigny, and shut himself in Barletta. There were several combats: one,

in which the brave La Palisse was taken; another, of thirteen French

against thirteen Italians, in which the Italians had the best, although

their enemies assert that the advantage was won by treacherously stabbing

the horses of the French knights. The Spanish monarch had recourse to

artifice, his usual weapon. Seizing the opportunity of his son-in-law the

archduke Philip’s travelling through France, he proposed a new treaty

to Louis, by which Naples was to be brought as the princess Claude’s

dowry to young Charles, the grandson of Ferdinand and Maximilian. Louis

XII gladly and confidently agreed to these proposals. He relaxed in

his exertions for reinforcing his army in Naples, while Ferdinand made

use of the interval to send potent succours to Gonsalvo. The continued

hostilities and successes of this captain, notwithstanding the pacific

declaration and arrangement of his master, awakened Louis from his supine

confidence. But it was too late. D’Aubigny was beaten by the Spaniards

and taken prisoner at Seminara in Calabria, the scene of one of his

former victories. On the same day of the ensuing week, the hostile

commanders, Gonsalvo and the duke de Nemours, met at Cerignola. It was

towards evening, and the Spaniards threw up an entrenchment before their

position. The duke de Nemours would not tarry. He ordered an instant

attack, which was at first successful. He himself, leading on another to

support it, was slain by a bullet from an arquebuse; and his followers

failing in the assault, a rout ensued, in which the French army were

for the most part dispersed. Naples surrendered to Gonsalvo. Its castle

was taken by mining--a mode of offence invented in these wars. Shortly

afterwards, the fortress of Gaeta was the only post in the kingdom that

held for the French.

Louis raised armies to attack Ferdinand in the Pyrenees and in Italy; but

equally without result. The reign of the Borgias was immediately after

brought to a tragical close. The pope and his son had invited several

rich cardinals, their intimates, to sup with them in a vineyard. The

Borgias intended to poison them; and Cesare Borgia sent some bottles of

medicated wine, under the especial care of a domestic, to the spot. The

pope arrived first; he was thirsty, and called for drink. The poisoned

wine was poured out for him; and his son, coming in at the moment,

partook of it. Pope Alexander expired soon after, and his son’s life

was saved only by means of antidotes and a strong constitution. Great

intrigues agitated the conclave. An aged and infirm pope was elected by

way of compromise. In another conclave the cardinal D’Amboise was not

more successful. An Italian prelate was preferred, who soon displayed

his imperious, ambitious, and warlike spirit, under the name of Julius

II. Cesare Borgia had contributed to his election, in return for a

promise of protection; and Julius showed his gratitude by arresting

Borgia immediately afterwards. He escaped, however, and fled to Gonsalvo,

who, receiving him with friendship equally insincere, put an end to

the career of this prince of intrigue by sending him prisoner to Spain.

In the meantime the French army remained inactive for want of a chief.

Gonzaga had been driven from the command by the taunts of the French: the

marquis of Saluzzo succeeded him, but with no more success. The campaign

served but to display the valour of the brave Bayard, who alone defended

the passage of a bridge against a body of Spaniards for a considerable

time. Gonsalvo was everywhere successful; and Gaeta, the last fortress of

the French, surrendered in a panic.

[Sidenote: [1503-1506 A.D.]]

The tidings of this ill fortune, and especially of the loss of Gaeta,

so affected Louis that he fell into a dangerous illness. He was tended

with exemplary affection by his queen, Anne of Brittany. But that prudent

princess, seeing his death imminent, despatched much of her valuables

to be conveyed down the Loire to Brittany. The heir to the crown, young

Francis, Count d’Angoulême, then inhabited, with his mother, the château

of Amboise. The marshal De Gié was the chief counsellor and influential

man of this embryo court. Over zealous for the interests of the future

king, and deeming Louis past hope, De Gié stopped the valuables of the

queen as they descended the Loire past Amboise. Anne never forgave the

insult. Louis recovered, and the marshal De Gié was pursued by the

vengeance of the queen for years. He was tried; and it is a great proof

of the improvement of the judicature that he escaped with life from so

powerful an enemy. This circumstance increased the hatred between the

mother of Francis, Louise of Savoy, and Queen Anne. By the last treaty

with Maximilian it had been agreed that his grandson Charles should marry

Claude, the daughter of Louis, and with her inherit the Milanese. Some

time previous to the last illness of the king, Maximilian had sent an

embassy to conclude and enlarge this treaty. The monarch was at the time

sorely vexed by his disasters in Naples, and greatly enraged against the

fickleness and bad faith of the Italian powers. Above all he was incensed

against Venice; and in order to be avenged on this proud republic, he

granted to Maximilian all that he asked. The cessions then made or

stipulated by Louis are so enormous as to be incredible. The heirs of his

daughter Claude by Charles of Luxemburg were to possess not only Milan,

but the duchies of Burgundy and Brittany, thus dismembering the monarchy

of France, and reducing it almost by one-half.

De Seyssel,[h] the minister and biographer of Louis, excuses his

conduct on this occasion, by saying that the king merely wanted to gain

Maximilian’s aid against the Venetians, and that he never intended

to fulfil these conditions. It seems much more probable that these

stipulations were owing to the influence of Anne of Brittany; to the

love of that queen for her own daughter, whose exaltation she preferred

to that of France; and at the same time to Anne’s hatred of Louise of

Savoy, and of her son Francis, the heir to the throne. Every Frenchman

was shocked and terrified at the prospect of these provinces being

conveyed to a foreign power. Louis himself, listening to the advice

of his counsellors, was struck with remorse at the folly and want of

patriotism which characterised such measures. The states-general were

called together: they drew up a strong remonstrance against them, and

supplicated that the princess Claude should be given in marriage to

Francis. The king consented to this. But so long as Anne of Brittany

lived, she never allowed the marriage to take place.

Maximilian was of course extremely wroth on learning that the king of

France and the assembly of the nation refused to fulfil the treaty.

He resolved to attack the French in Italy. Genoa about this time had

rebelled against Louis. Louis, however, conquered and reduced it to

submission. Maximilian was too late to support the insurrection. The

Venetians, then allies of the king, barred the passage of the Austrians

into Italy. They defeated Maximilian, and compelled him to purchase a

treaty, resigning his conquests. They concluded it without awaiting the

consent of Louis, or allowing him to derive from it any advantage.

[Illustration: FRENCH PEASANT, REIGN OF LOUIS XII]

[Sidenote: [1506-1509 A.D.]]

This was a new grievance added to the many already entertained against

these republicans by the French. Maximilian was of course ready to join

against them. Pope Julius was at variance with them on account of Faenza,

and other towns, the wreck of the Borgian usurpations, which they held.

Between these powers and Ferdinand of Spain was formed the famous League

of Cambray for the destruction of Venice. It was called famous from

having nearly attained its aim--a distinction which could be applied to

few treaties of the time. In raising his army for this enterprise the

king made an important improvement in his levies. He began to mistrust

the Swiss, whose mercenary and turbulent spirit was scarcely recompensed

by their character for courage. Therefore, although he hired a corps

of them to the number of 6,000, he at the same time endeavoured to

resuscitate the French infantry. Louis XI had abandoned the good custom

of training the French peasants to arms, which had so contributed to

the victories of Charles VII. The despot dreaded a national army. The

armies of Charles VIII, and hitherto those of Louis XII, were composed of

mounted gentlemen, who formed the cavalry, and of hired Swiss, or perhaps

a few Gascons, for infantry. This was the principal reason of the first

success and subsequent defeats of the French in Naples. Cavalry force, so

superior when in good condition, is liable to be unhorsed, and is more

easily disorganised than infantry. Louis now levied a body of infantry in

France of from 12,000 to 14,000 men. To give spirit and respectability

to this force, he induced his bravest captains, Bayard, Molard, and

Chabannes, to fight on foot and command these new brigades; and it

required all his influence to make them submit to such degradation. The

French cavalry amounted to 12,000 men. With this army he marched against

the Venetians. Their army, nowise inferior, was commanded by the count

of Pitigliano, whose policy accorded with the orders of the senate to

avoid a battle. Alviano, the Venetian general second in command, risked

an attack in despite of this at Agnadello. An action took place, in

which the count feebly supported his lieutenant. Louis, who fought in

the thickest of the engagement, was victorious. The Venetian army was

utterly routed; and the French king, advancing to the brink of the

lagunes, enjoyed the satisfaction of sending from his cannon some vain

shots against the discomfited but still unsubdued queen of the Adriatic.

This success dissolved the league. Julius II, having obtained possession

of the towns which he coveted from the Venetians, leagued with them

against Louis; and a war, or a succession of skirmishes, ensued.

[Sidenote: [1509-1512 A.D.]]

Louis sent a powerful army against the pope, under the command of Gaston

de Foix, duke de Nemours, his sister’s son, then twenty-two years of age.

The battle of Ravenna ensued, and the French were victorious. The sack of

Ravenna was almost the only fruit reaped by this signal victory. Julius

II, undaunted by defeat, refused to yield. He raised up the English and

the Swiss against Louis, who threatened with invasion from both these

countries. Maximilian let loose upon Milan his namesake, Massimiliano

Sforza, son of Lodovico; and the Swiss espoused the youth’s pretensions.

The cantons were enraged against Louis for attempting to substitute

French soldiers for them. When he sent La Trémouille to negotiate with

them, they demanded that 15,000 Swiss should be yearly hired, and paid

by France in peace and war. They demanded also the Milanese for Sforza,

and the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction for the pope. It is said

they also resented some injurious words spoken by Louis. Whatever was

its cause, their resentment was but too well seconded by their force.

The French under La Palisse and Trivulzio were driven out of the

Milanese, and even Genoa again declared itself independent. The feats

of Bayard during this unfortunate campaign might be made to fill pages,

but they availed nothing. Haute-Navarre was at the same time wrested by

Ferdinand from Jean d’Albret. The province has ever since remained to the

Spaniards.[c]

_Internal Affairs_

[Sidenote: [1509-1510 A.D.]]

Neither the war of Genoa nor that of Venice had interrupted that

universal movement of internal improvement in France, which, begun under

Charles VIII, had gone on and increased under Louis XII. The foundation

of this progress lay, above all, in the vitality of the nation itself;

next in the good supervision given to the legislation, administration,

and finances by the appointed members of council and parliament; but to

the prime minister was due the merit of having given to all this activity

a united impulse, and to the king the merit of zealous participation

therein.

During the winter of 1509 Louis visited a large portion of his kingdom,

and did much good in regard to the execution of justice. Never at any

epoch of its history had France enjoyed so much prosperity; the twenty

years’ absence of all civil disorders, the maintenance of order by

an absolute and vigilant administration, the security of people and

property, the protection given to the weak against the stronger, to

the labourers against the nobles and soldiers, bore marvellous fruits.

The population increased rapidly, the cities in their ancient limits

constantly expanded into large suburbs; hamlets and villages rose up

as if by enchantment in the woods and waste places. The last vestiges

of the fatal wars that had depopulated France were completely effaced,

and Seyssel, a contemporary writer, states that a third of the kingdom

had again been put under cultivation during the last thirty years. The

produce of the land increased enormously; the excise taxes, tolls, fees,

etc., had increased more than two-thirds in many places, and the revenue

of the royal estate, augmenting like the private ones, allowed the king

to carry out his enterprises without oppressing the nation.

Industry and commerce received no less an impetus, communications were

endlessly extended, and merchants made less of going to Rome, Naples,

or London than formerly to Lyons or Geneva. The luxury and elegance of

buildings, furniture, and apparel displayed the progress of the arts and

public wealth. The condition of all classes was improved, and the poor,

unaccustomed to see the sovereigns take such care of their interests,

were deeply grateful to the king and his minister. “Let George do as he

thinks right,” had become a popular saying expressing the confidence

placed in Cardinal Amboise. Louis XII received striking testimonies of

the affection of the people on a journey he took from Paris to Lyons

through Champagne and Burgundy in the spring of 1510. “Wherever he went,

men and women assembled from all parts, following him for three or four

leagues, and when they were able to touch his mule or his dress, or

anything belonging to him, they kissed their hands with as much devotion

as they would show to a reliquary.” (Saint-Gelais.) The Burgundians

displayed as much enthusiasm as the ancient French.

Cardinal George did not reap his share in the popular homage. The

inseparable companion of Louis XII had not accompanied him on this

journey; whilst the health of the king was improving somewhat, that

of the minister was rapidly declining. George, weakened by gout and

other infirmities, had not the strength to resist an epidemic, called

“whooping cough” by contemporary historians. Louis XII found him dying

at Lyons, whither the cardinal had gone to await the king, and had only

the consolation of receiving the farewells of his “faithful friend.”

Cardinal Amboise expired May 25th, 1510. He had not yet reached the age

of forty-five. He was the first of those cardinal-ministers, almost

kings, who have played so large a part in the history of the monarchy.

The experiment was not encouraging, for the duties of Cardinal Amboise

were altogether foreign to his ecclesiastical dignity, and his faults, on

the contrary, largely proceeded from it. His dream of the papacy and his

dealings generally with the college of cardinals and the holy see were

very detrimental to the interest and the honour of France.

His home administration saves his memory. He does not shine therein by

disinterestedness, but that was never the distinguishing virtue of great

ministers, and is scarcely compatible with monarchical government. He

left a vast fortune, amassed rather at the expense of Italy than of

France; his use of it at least pleads for his memory. Many touching

anecdotes attest his goodness of heart; the fine remains of those

buildings mutilated by the hand of the Revolution show us the use to

which his wealth was put. Like all men of superior talents, whether

princes or ministers, who have left their mark upon the destinies of

nations, George was the centre of the art movement, and diffused a

vivifying influence around him. One of the most beautiful periods of

French art belongs to his ministry; it has been incorporated too long

with the reign of Francis I, who during his best years merely continued,

whilst enlarging it, and who took the first step towards decadence when

he departed from it.

The artistic history of France in the sixteenth century may be divided

into two periods: in the first, Italian art modifies French art by

some happy innovations, and incites it to a healthy emulation; in the

second, it stifles and absorbs it. In the first period, the Italian

artists summoned to France concur with native artists in raising

French monuments; in the second, the Italianised French build Italian

monuments--vanquished Italy conquers her conquerors.[g]

_Last Years of Louis XII_

[Sidenote: [1513-1515 A.D.]]

The internal prosperity of France contrasted strangely with the

conditions of interminable warfare that characterised the external policy

of Louis XII. The seat of these wars was not confined to Italy. In 1513

France became embroiled with her old enemy, England.

Henry VIII of England invaded France in concert with Maximilian. He laid

siege to Thérouanne. The French succeeded in throwing supplies into the

town; but being attacked suddenly some days after by the English and

imperialists, they were seized with a panic and fled. This has been

called the battle of Spurs. Bayard, who refused to join in the flight of

his compatriots, was made prisoner after a gallant defence. Thérouanne

was the sole conquest of Henry.[c] But almost simultaneously the French

arms were checked in Burgundy and in Italy. In fact, the year 1513 has

been pronounced (by Dareste[k]) one of the most disastrous in French

military annals. Yet no very important political sequels were attached to

these reverses.[a]

In January, 1514, Louis lost his queen, Anne of Brittany. She was a

woman of distinguished beauty, though she limped in her gait. She

possessed great influence over Louis: was proud, independent, and

obstinate--qualities characteristic of the Bretons. Anne was at the same

time a pious, chaste, and exemplary queen. It was through her influence

and importance that the female sex, hitherto excluded, was introduced

into society: she formed a court, and collected around her the principal

young ladies of rank in the kingdom, whose manners and principles she

loved to form. The establishment of a court, that is, of a court in which

woman’s presence was allowed and her influence felt, was, trifling as it

may seem, a most important innovation.

[Illustration: LOUIS XII

(From an old French print)]

Louis, attached as he had been to Anne, did not long delay to fill up the

place by her left vacant. Policy joined with other reasons to prompt this

step. As the seal of a reconciliation and alliance with Henry VIII, Louis

espoused that monarch’s sister Mary, a princess then in the flower of

her age. The gay habits of a bridegroom did not suit the constitution of

the king, then past fifty-four. In a few weeks after his marriage he was

seized with a fever and dysentery, which carried him off at the palace of

the Tournelles, in Paris, on the first day of the year 1515.

Never was monarch more lamented by the great mass of his subjects than

Louis XII. He was endeared to them principally by his economy and

forbearance in levying contributions, and by his strict administration of

justice, so different from the sanguinary executions which characterised

the reign of Louis XI, when no man could be certain of life. He reduced

the taxes more than one-third in the early part of his reign, and even

in his distresses preferred selling the crown lands to any of the usual

expedients for exaction. Hence Louis earned the appellation of “Father

of his people.” His popularity was much greater with the middle than

with the higher classes. The latter called his economy parsimony, and

his sympathy with the commons forgetfulness of his rank. Writers of the

reigns of Louis XIV and XV seek to depreciate the character of Louis

XII, and to elevate that of his successor. Louis XII they consider as

the _roi roturier_, “the plebeian king”; Francis as the aristocratic and

chevaleresque. The nobility certainly do not appear prominent in this

reign. New names arise and become illustrious as in the time of Charles

VII. The lesser noblesse or gentry were in fact treading on the heels

and taking the places of the higher aristocracy. The latter rallied or

were re-created in the days of Francis, but these tendencies were as

much the effect of opposite states and circumstances, as of the opposite

characters of the two monarchs.

The writers of the Revolution reverse the system of favouritism: they

choose Louis, the father of his people, to be their hero, and they

depreciate the kingly Francis. An author of this school, Roederer,[i] has

seen every perfection in Louis XII, and he considers that the commons

of France were in possession of perfect constitutional freedom during

his reign: history, however, does not present this view of the question.

Although Louis did certainly seem to allow in the parliament a power of

examining and objecting to his edicts, yet the assembly of states in his

reign was far from assuming or being allowed aught like a constitutional

control. The very virtues and moderation of Louis were inimical to

political freedom, since, by rendering the commons contented, they took

from them, with the wish, the right of remonstrance. Had a prodigal and

an unpopular king been reduced to the same distress as Louis was in

the latter years of his reign, the commons of France might opportunely

have made a stand for their privileges, and at least kept alive their

traditions of freedom.[c]

[Illustration]

FOOTNOTES

[61] [The exact attitude of the duke of Orleans, at this early period,

toward his future wife is not clearly established. Further reference to

the subject is made later in the present chapter.]

[62] The following table will make clear the bearings of the French claim

to the kingdom of Naples: Full face type denotes reigning kings of France

and Naples. Italics denote titular kings of Naples.

=Louis VIII=, 1223-1226

=CAPET= | =ANJOU=

| | |

+------------------+------------------------+

| |

=Louis IX=, =Charles I=,

1226-1270 count of Anjou and

| Provence, ancestor

+---------------------+ of the kings of

| | Naples, 1285

| | |

=Philip III=, Robert, count of =Charles II=, 1309

1270-1285 Clermont, ancestor |

| of the Bourbons |

| |

+---------------------+++-+ +---------+----+

| | | |

=Philip IV=, Charles =Robert=, 1343 John

1285-1314 of Valois | |

| | Charles Louis

+-------------+-------------+ | | |

| | | | | |

=Louis X=, =Philip V=, =Charles IV=, | =Joanna I=, =Charles III=,

1314-1316 1316-1322 1322-1328 | 1382 1386

| |

| +------------+

| | |

| =Ladislaus=, =Joanna II=,

| 1414 1435

|

=Philip VI=, 1328-1350

|

John, 1350-1364 =BURGUNDY=

| |

+----------------------------------+-----------+---------+

| | | |

=Charles V=, _Louis_, John, Philip,

1364-1380 duke of Anjou, duke de duke of

| founder of the Berri Burgundy,

+-----------------+ second royal 1404

| | house of Naples

=Charles VI=, Louis, duke |

1380-1422, of Orleans, |

m. Isabella founder of |

of Bavaria the line of |

| Valois-Orleans _Louis II_, 1417

+----+----+----------+ |

| | | |

Louis, John, =Charles VII=, |

Dauphin, Dauphin, 1422-1461 +------+----+-----------+

1415 1416 | | | |

=Louis XI=, _Louis III_, _René_, Charles I,

1461-1483 1434 1480 count du Maine

| |

=Charles VIII=, _Charles II_,

1483-1498 count du Maine, 1481

He bequeathed Anjou, Maine,

Provence, and his title to

Naples to Louis XI, king of

France.

[63] See vol. IX, pp. 409 _et seq._

[64] Champier gives the following portrait of Bayard: The noble Pierre

du Terrail was born at Bayard, a stronghold situated in a province of

Dauphiné, called Givosdam, near the royal castle of Avalon--which castle

is a fine mansion wherein were born and bred, in this fair and beautiful

spot, a family noble and ancient, in Dauphiné, by name Montenar, from

whom are descended many brave knights and valiant men skilled in the art

of warfare. This same Pierre was well named Terrail, for no page was a

better horseman, which same by his prowess did send many to their end

before their time, and in many places and on many occasions did truly

guard and defend the territories of his lord and sovereign prince, the

noble king of France.

The noble Bayard in his youth was kindly, gracious, and courteous to all

men; none ever beheld him wrathful; he was greater than all other pages;

he did harm to no woman, relinquishing intrigues with them, as being

unlawful; but little given to melancholy, he was cheerful towards all,

loving good company, jestings, and pleasant sport. As for his gravity, it

was always mingled with kindness and affability; he loved order in all

things, and was benign, merciful, and charitable.[f]

[65] [Anne had Brittany in dangerously good order; and it has even been

suggested that she intended by this move to make it almost a political

necessity for Louis to marry her.]

[66] [The ensuing pages should be read with constant reference to our

history of Italy, vol. IX, pp. 425 _et seq._, where a complementary

treatment of the subject is given. See also the history of the Holy Roman

Empire, vol. XIII.]

[Illustration]