P. 45, § 23. 'Fichte' _Werke,_ ii, 404: 'Philosophy

(Wissenschaftslehre), besides (for the reason above noted that it has

no auxiliary, no vehicle of the intuition at all, except the intuition

itself), elevates the human mind higher than any geometry can It gives

the mind not only attentiveness, dexterity, stability, but at the same

time absolute independence, forcing it to be alone with itself, and

to live and manage by itself. Compared with it, every other mental

operation is infinitely easy; and to one who has been exercised in

it nothing comes hard. Besides as it prosecutes all objects of human

lore to the centre it accustoms the eye to hit the proper point at

first glance' in everything presented to it, and to prosecute it

undeviatingly For such a practical philosopher therefore there can be

nothing dark, complicated, and confused, if only he is acquainted with

the object of discussion. It comes always easiest to him to construct

everything afresh and _ab initio,_ because he carries within him plans

for every scientific edifice. He finds his way easily, therefore, in

any complicated structure. Add to this the security and confidence of

glance which he has acquired in philosophy--the guide which conducts in

all _raisonnement_ and the imperturbability with which his eye meets

every divergence from the accustomed path and every paradox. It would

be quite different with all human concerns, if men could only resolve

to believe their eyes. At present they inquire at their neighbours and

at antiquity what they really see, and by this distrust in themselves

errors are eternalised. Against this distrust the possessor of

philosophy is for ever protected. In a word, by philosophy the mind

of man comes to itself, and from henceforth rests on itself without

foreign aid, and is completely master of itself, as the dancer of his

feet, or the boxer of his hands.'

P. 45, § 23. Aristotle, _Metaph._ i. 2, 19 (cf. _Eth._ x. 7). See also

_Werke,_ xiv. 280 _seqq._

P. 46, § 24. Schelling's expression, 'petrified intelligence.' The

reference is to some verses of Schelling in _Werke,_ iv. 546 (first

published in _Zeitschrift für speculative Physik,_ 1800). We have no

reason to stand in awe of the world, he says, which is a tame and quiet

beast--

Sterft zwar ein Riesengeist darinnen,

Ist aber versteinert mit allen Sinnen;

In todten und lebendigen Dingen

Thut nach Bewustseyn mächtig ringen.

In human shape he at length awakes from the iron sleep, from the long

dream: but as man he feels himself a stranger and exile; he would

fain return to great Nature; he fears what surrounds him and imagines

spectres, not knowing he might say of Nature to himself--

Ich bin der Gott, den sie im Busen hegt,

Der Geist, der sich in allem bewegt:

Vom frühsten Ringen dunkler Kräfte

Bis zum Erguss der ersten Lebenssäfte,

. . . . . . .

herauf zu des Gedankens Jugendkraft

Wodurch Natur verjüngt sich wieder schafft,

Ist eine kraft, ein Wechselspiel und Weben,

Ein Trieb und Drang nach immer höherm Leben.

Cf. Oken, _Naturphilosophie,_§ 2913: 'A natural body is a thought of

the primal act, turned rigid and crystallised,--a word of God.'

Phrases of like import are not infrequent in Schelling's works (about

1800-1), _e.g. Werke,_1. Abth. iii. 341: 'The dead and unconscious

products of nature are only unsuccessful attempts to "reflect" itself;

so-called dead nature is in all cases an immature intelligence'

(unreife Intelligenz), or iv. 77, 'Nature itself is an intelligence,

as it were, turned to rigidity (erstarrte) with all its sensations and

perceptions'; and ii. 226 (_Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur,_

1797), 'Hence nature is only intelligence turned into the rigidity of

being; its qualities are sensations extinguished to being; bodies are

its perceptions, so to speak, killed.'

A close approach to the phrase quoted is found in the words of another

of the 'Romantic' philosophers: 'Nature is a petrified magic-city'

(versteinerte Zauberstadt). (Novalis, _Schriften,_ ii. 149.)

P. 48, § 24. Cf. Fichte to Jacobi: (Jacobi's _Briefwechsel,_ ii. 208)

'My absolute Ego is obviously not the individual: that explanation

comes from injured snobs and peevish philosophers, seeking to

impute to me the disgraceful doctrine of practical egoism. But the

_individual must be deduced from the absolute ego._ To that task my

philosophy will proceed in the "Natural Law." A finite being--it may

be deductively shown--can only think itself as a sense-being in a

sphere of sense-beings,--on one part of which (that which has no power

of origination) it has causality, while with the other part (to which

it attributes a subjectivity like its own) it stands in reciprocal

relations. In such circumstances it is called an individual, and the

conditions of individuality are called rights. As surely as it affirms

its individuality, so surely does it affirm such a sphere the two

conceptions indeed are convertible. So long as we look upon ourselves

as individuals--and we always so regard ourselves in life, though not

in philosophy and abstract imagination--we stand on what I call the

"practical" point of view in our reflections (while to the standpoint

of the absolute ego I give the name "speculative"). From the former

point of view there exists for us a world independent of us,--a world

we can only modify; whilst the pure ego (which even on this altitude

does not altogether disappear from us,) is put outside us and called

God. How else could we get the properties we ascribe to God and deny to

ourselves, did we not after all find them within us, and only refuse

them to ourselves in a certain respect, i.e., as individuals? When this

"practical" point of view predominates in our reflections, realism

is supreme: when speculation itself deduces and recognises that

standpoint, there results a complete reconciliation between philosophy

and common sense as premised in my system.

'For what good, then, is the speculative standpoint and the whole of

philosophy therewith, if it be not for life? Had humanity not tasted

of this forbidden fruit, it might dispense with all philosophy. But in

humanity there is a wish implanted to behold that region lying beyond

the individual; and to behold it not merely in a reflected light but

face to face. The first who raised a question about God's existence

broke through the barriers, he shook humanity in its main foundation

pillars, and threw it out of joint into an intestine strife which is

not yet settled, and which can only be settled by advancing boldly

to that supreme point from which the speculative and the practical

appear to be at one. We began to philosophise from pride of heart, and

thus lost our innocence: we beheld our nakedness, and ever since we

philosophise from the need of our redemption.'

P. 50. Physics and Philosophy of Nature: cf. _Werke,_ vii. i, p. 18:

'The Philosophy of Nature takes up the material, prepared for it by

physics out of experience, at the point to which physics has brought

it, and again transforms it, without basing it ultimately on the

authority of experience. Physics therefore must work into the hands of

philosophy, so that the latter may translate into a true comprehension

(Begriff) the abstract universal transmitted to it, showing how it

issues from that comprehension as an intrinsically necessary whole. The

philosophic way of putting the facts is no mere whim once in a way,

by way of change, to walk on the head, after walking a long while on

the legs, or once in a way to see our every-day face besmeared with

paint. No; it is because the method of physics does not satisfy the

comprehension, that we have to go on further.'

P. 51, § 24. The distinction of ordinary and speculative Logic

is partly like that made by Fichte (i. 68) between Logic and

Wissenschaftslehre. 'The former,' says Fichte, 'is conditioned and

determined by the latter.' Logic deals only with form; epistomology

with import as well.

P. 54, § 24. The Mosaic legend of the Fall; cf. similar interpretations

in Kant: _Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft_,

1ster Stück; and Schelling, _Werke,_ i. (1. Abth.) 34.

CHAPTER III.

P. 61, § 28. Fichte--to emphasise the experiential truth of his

system--says (_Werke,_ ii. 331): 'There was a philosophy which

professed to be able to expand by mere _inference_ the range thus

indicated for philosophy. According to it, thinking was--not, as we

have described it, the analysis of what was given and the recombining

of it in other forms, but at the same time--a production and creation

of something quite new. In this system the philosopher found himself

in the exclusive possession of certain pieces of knowledge which the

vulgar understanding had to do without. In it the philosopher could

reason out for himself a God and an immortality and talk himself into

the conclusion that he was wise and good.'

Wolfs definition of philosophy is 'the Science of the possible in so

far as it can be'; and the possible = the non-contradictory.

P. 64, § 29. The oriental sage corresponds (cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ xii.

229) to the writer known as Dionysius the Areopagite (_De Mystica

Theologia,_ and _De Divitus Nominibus._)--The same problem as to the

relation of the Infinite (God) to the Finite (world) is discussed in

Jewish speculation (by Saadia, Mamuni, _&c._) as the question of the

divine names,--a dogma founded on the thirteen names (or attributes)

applied to God in Exodus xxxiv. 6. (Cf. D. Kaufmann, _Geschichte der

Attributenlehre._) The same spirit has led to the list of ninety-nine

'excellent names' of Allah in Islam, a list which tradition derives

from Mohammed.

P. 65, § 31. Cf. _Werke,_ ii. 47 _seqq.:_ 'The nature of the judgment

or proposition--involving as it does a distinction of subject and

predicate--is destroyed by the "speculative" proposition. This conflict

of the propositional form with the unity of comprehension which

destroys it is like the antagonism in rhythm between metre and accent.

The rhythm results from the floating "mean" and unification of the two.

Hence even in the "philosophical" proposition the identity of subject

and predicate is not meant to annihilate their difference (expressed by

the propositional form): their unity is meant to issue as a _harmony._

The propositional form lets appear the definite shade or accent

pointing to a distinction in its fulfilment: whereas in the predicate

giving expression to the substance, and the subject itself falling

into the universal, we have the unity in which that accent is heard no

more. Thus in the proposition "God is Being" the predicate is Being; it

represents the substance in which the subject is dissolved away. Being

is here meant not to be predicate but essence: and in that way God

seems to cease to be what he is--by his place in the proposition--viz.

the permanent subject. The mind--far from getting further forward in

the passage from subject to predicate--feels itself rather checked,

through the loss of the subject, and thrown back, from a sense of its

loss, to the thought of the subject. Or,--since the predicate itself

is enunciated as a subject (as Being or as Essence) which exhausts the

nature of the subject, it again comes face to face with the subject

even in the predicate.--Thought thus loses its solid objective ground

which it had on the subject: yet at the same time in the predicate it

is thrown back upon it, and instead of getting to rest in itself it

returns upon the subject of the content.--To this unusual check and

arrest are in the main due the complaints as to the unintelligibility

of philosophical works,--supposing the individual to possess any other

conditions of education needed for understanding them.'

P. 66, § 32. On the relation of dogmatism and scepticism see the

introduction to Kant's _Criticism of Pure Reason,_ and compare Caird's

_Critical Philosophy of I. Kant,_ vol. i. chap. i.

P. 67, § 33. The subdivision of 'theoretical' philosophy or metaphysics

into the four branches, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology (rational and

empirical), and Natural Theology, is more or less common to the whole

Wolfian School. Wolf's special addition to the preceding scholastic

systems is found in the conception of a general Cosmology. Metaphysics

precedes physics, and the departments of practical philosophy. In

front of all stands logic or rational philosophy. Empirical psychology

belongs properly to physics, but reasons of practical convenience put

it elsewhere.

P. 69, § 34. The question of the 'Seat of the Soul' is well known in

the writings of Lotze (_e.g. Metaphysic,_ § 291).

Absolute actuosity. The _Notio Dei_ according to Thomas Aquinas, as

well as the dogmatics of post-Reformation times, is _actus purus_

(or _actus purissimus_). For God _nihil potentialitatis habet._ Cf.

_Werke, xii._228: 'Aristotle especially has conceived God under the

abstract category of activity. Pure activity is knowledge (Wissen)--in

the scholastic age, _actus purus_--: but in order to be put as

activity, it must be put in its "moments." For knowledge we require

another thing which is known: and which, when knowledge knows it, is

thereby appropriated. It is implied in this that God--the eternal and

self-subsistent--eternally begets himself as his Son,--distinguishes

himself from himself. But what he thus distinguishes from himself,

has not the shape of an otherness: but what is distinguished is

_ipso facto_ identical with what it is parted from. God is spirit:

no darkness, no colouring or mixture enters this pure light. The

relationship of father and son is taken from organic life and used

metaphorically--the natural relation is only pictorial and hence does

not quite correspond to what is to be expressed. We say, God eternally

begets his Son, God distinguishes himself from himself: and thus we

begin from God, saying he does this, and in the other he creates is

utterly with himself (the form of Love): but we must be well aware

that God is this _whole action itself_ God is the beginning; he does

this: but equally is he only the end, the totality: and as such

totality he is spirit. God as merely the Father is not yet the true

(it is the Jewish religion where he is thus without the Son): He is

rather beginning and end: He is his presupposition, makes himself a

presupposition (this is only another form of distinguishing): He is the

eternal process.'

Nicolaus Cusanus speaks of God (_De docta Ignorantia,_ ii. I) as

_infinita actualitas quae est actu omnis essendi possibilitas._ The

term 'actuosity' seems doubtful.

P. 73, § 36. _Sensus eminentior._ Theology distinguishes three modes in

which the human intelligence can attain a knowledge of God. By the _via

causalitatis_ it argues that God is; by the _via negationis,_ what he

is not; by the _via eminentiae,_ it gets a glimpse of the relation in

which he stands to us. It regards God _i.e._ as the cause of the finite

universe; but as God is infinite, all that is predicated of him must be

taken as merely approximative (_sensu eminentiori_) and there is left

a vast remainder which can only be filled up with negations [Durandus

de S. Porciano on the Sentent, i. 3. I]. The _sensus eminentior_ is

the subject of Spinoza's strictures, Ep. 6 (56 in Opp. ii. 202): while

Leibniz adopts it in the preface to _Théodicée,_ 'Les perfections de

Dieu sont celles de nos âmes, mais il les possède sans bornes: il est

un océan, dont nous n'avons reçu que les gouttes; il y a en nous

quelque puissance, quelque connaissance, quelque bonté; mais elles sont

toutes entières en Dieu.'

The _via causalitatis_ infers _e.g.,_ from the existence of morality

and intelligence here, a Being whose will finds expression therein: the

_via eminentiae_ infers that that will is good, and that intelligence

wise in the highest measure, and the _via negationis_ sets aside in the

conception of God all the limitations and conditions to which human

intelligence and will are subject.

CHAPTER IV.

P. 80, § 38. The verses (forming part of the advice which

Mephistopheles, personating Faust, gives to the recently-arrived

pupil) stand in the original in a different order: beginning "Dann hat

er die Theile in seiner Hand," &c. The meaning of these and the two

preceding lines is somewhat as follows, in versification even laxer

than Goethe's:--

If you want to describe life and gather its meaning,

To drive out its spirit most be your beginning,

Then though fast in your hand lie the parts one by one

The spirit that linked them, alas! is gone.

And 'Nature's Laboratory' is only a name

That the chemist bestows on't to hide his own shame.

One may compare _Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre,_ iii. 3, where it is

remarked, in reference to some anatomical exercises: 'You will learn

ere long that building-up is more instructive than tearing-down,

combining more than separating, animating the dead more than killing

again what was killed already.... Combining means more than separating:

reconstructing more than onlooking.' The first part of _Faust_ appeared

1808: the _Wanderjahre,_ 1828-9.

P. 82, § 39. The article on the 'Relation of scepticism to philosophy,

an exposition of its various modifications, and comparison of the

latest with the ancient'--in form a review of G. E. Schulze's

_Criticism of Theoretical Philosophy_'--was republished in vol. xvi. of

Hegel's _Werke_ (vol. i. of the _Vermischte Schriften_).

P. 87, § 42. In an earlier review of Kant's work (_Werke,_ i. 83) on

Glauben und Wissen (an article in Sendling and Hegel's _Journal_)

Hegel attaches more weight to a factor in the critical theory of

knowledge, here neglected. Kant, he says, has--within the limits

allowed by his psychological terms of thought--'put (in an excellent

way) the _à priori_ of sensibility into the original identity and

multiplicity, and that as transcendental imagination in the "higher

power" of an immersion of unity in multiplicity: whilst Understanding

(Verstand) he makes to consist in the elevation to universality of this

_à priori_ synthetic unity of sensibility,--whereby this identity is

invested with a comparative antithesis to the sensibility: and Reason

(Vernunft) is presented as a still higher power over the preceding

comparative antithesis, without however this universality and infinity

being allowed to go beyond the stereotyped formal pure infinity.

This genuinely rational construction by which, though the bad name

"faculties" is left, there is in truth presented a single identity

of them all, is transformed by Jacobi into a series of faculties,

_resting_ one upon another.'

P. 87, § 42. Fichte: cf. _Werke,_ i. 420: 'I have said before, and

say it here again, that my system is no other than the Kantian. That

means: it contains the same view of facts, but in its method is quite

independent of the Kantian exposition.' 'Kant, up to now, is a closed

book.'--i. 442. There are two ways of critical idealism. 'Either' (as

Fichte) 'it actually deduces from the fundamental laws of intelligence,

that system of necessary modes of action, and with it, at the same

time, the objective conceptions thus arising, and thus lets the whole

compass of our conceptions gradually arise under the eyes of the reader

or hearer; or' (like Kant and his unprogressive disciples) 'it gets

hold of these laws from anywhere and anyhow, as they are immediately

applied to objects, therefore on their lowest grade (--on this grade

they are called _categories),_ and then asseverates that it is by

these that objects are determined and arranged.' And i. 478: 'I know

that the categories which Kant laid down are in no way _proved_ by

him to be conditions of self-consciousness, but only said to be so:

I know that space and time and what in the original consciousness is

inseparable from them and fills them both, are still less deduced as

such conditions, for of them it is not even said expressly--as of the

categories--that they are so, but only inferentially. But I believe

quite as surely that I know that Kant had the thought of such a system:

that everything he actually propounds are fragments and results of this

system; and that his statements have meaning and coherence only on this

presupposition.' Cf. viii. 362.

P. 89, § 42. Transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Kant's _Kritik

der reinen Vernunft,_ § 16: 'The _I think_ must be able to accompany

all my ideas.... This idea is an act of spontaneity. ... I name it

pure apperception ... or original apperception ... because it is that

self-consciousness which can be accompanied by none further. The unity

of it I also call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in

order to denote the possibility of cognition _à priori_ from it.'

P. 92, § 44. _Caput mortuum:_ a term of the Alchemists to denote the

non-volatile precipitate left in the retort after the spirit had been

extracted: the fixed or dead remains, 'quando spiritus animam sursum

vexit.'

P. 92, § 45. Reason and Understanding. In the Wolfian School (_e.g._

in Baumgarten's _Metaphysik,_ § 468) the term intellect (Verstand)

is used of the general faculty of higher cognition, while _ratio_

(Vernunft) specially denotes the power of seeing distinctly the

connexions of things. So Wolff (_Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, &c._ §

277) defines Verstand as 'the faculty of distinctly representing the

possible,' and Vernunft (§ 368) as 'the faculty of seeing into the

connexion of truths.' It is on this use of _Reason_ as the faculty of

inference that Kant's use of the term is founded: though it soon widely

departs from its origin. For upon the 'formal' use of reason as the

faculty of syllogising, Kant superinduces a transcendental use as a

'faculty of _principles_,' while the understanding is only 'a faculty

of _rules.'_ 'Reason,' in other words, 'itself begets conceptions,'

and 'maxims, which it borrows neither from the senses nor from the

understanding.' (_Kritik d. r. Vern., Dialektik,_ Einleit. ii. A.) And

the essential aim of Reason is to give unity to the various cognitions

of understanding. While the unity given by understanding is 'unity of

a possible experience,' that sought by reason is the discovery of an

unconditioned which will complete the unity of the former (_Dial._

Einleit. iv), or of 'the totality of the conditions to a given

conditioned.' (_Dial,_ vii.)

It is this distinction of the terms which is dominant in Fichte and

Hegel, where Verstand is the more practical intellect which seeks

definite and restricted results and knowledges, while Vernunft is

a deeper and higher power which aims at completeness. In Goethe's

more reflective prose we see illustrations of this usage: _e.g.

Wilh. Meister's Wanderjahre,_ i. it is said to be the object of

the 'reasonable' man 'das entgegengesetzte zu überschauen und in

Uebereinstimmung zu bringen': or Bk. ii. Reasonable men when they have

devised something verständig to get this or that difficulty out of the

way, &c. Goethe, in his _Sprüche in Prosa_ (896), _Werke,_ iii. 281,

says 'Reason has for its province the thing in process (das Werdende),

understanding the thing completed (das Gewordene): the former does not

trouble itself about the purpose, the latter asks not whence. Reason

takes delight in developing; understanding wishes to keep everything as

it is, so as to use it.' (Similarly in Eckermann's Convers. Feb. 13,

1829.) Cf. Oken, Naturphilosophie, § 2914. Verstand ist Microcosmus,

Vernunft Macrocosmus.

Kant's use of the term Reason, coupled with his special view of

Practical Reason and his use of the term Faith (Glaube), leads on to

the terminology of Jacobi. In earlier writings Jacobi had insisted on

the contrast between the superior authority of feeling and faith (which

are in touch with truth) and the mechanical method of intelligence and

reasoning (Verstand and Vernunft). At a later period however he changed

and fixed the nomenclature of his distinction. What he had first called

Glaube he latterly called Vernunft,--which is in brief a 'sense for

the supersensible'--an intuition giving higher and complete or total

knowledge--an immediate apprehension of the real and the true. As

contrasted with this reasonable faith or feeling, he regards Verstand

as a mere faculty of inference or derivative knowledge, referring one

thing to another by the rule of identity.

This distinction which is substantially reproduced by Coleridge

(though with certain clauses that show traces of Schellingian

influence) has connexions--like so much else in Jacobi--with the

usage of Schopenhauer, 'Nobody,' says Jacobi, 'has ever spoken of an

animal Vernunft: a mere animal Verstand however we all know and speak

of.' (Jacobi's _Werke,_ iii. 8.) Schopenhauer repeats and enforces

the remark. All animals possess, says Schopenhauer, the power of

apprehending causality, of cognising objects: a power of immediate and

intuitive knowledge of real things: this is Verstand. But Vernunft,

which is peculiar to man, is the cognition of _truth_ (not of reality):

it is an abstract judgment with a sufficient reason (_Welt als W._ i. §

6).

One is tempted to connect the modern distinction with an older one

which goes back in its origin to Plato and Aristotle, but takes form in

the Neo-Platonist School, and enters the Latin world through Boëthius.

_Consol. Phil._ iv. 6: _Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio,

ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus,_ and in v.

4 there is a full distinction of _sensus, imaginatio, ratio_ and

_intelligentia_ in ascending order. _Ratio_ is the discursive knowledge

of the idea (_universali consideratione perpendit): intelligentia_

apprehends it at once, and as a simple _forma (pura mentis acie

contuetur)_: [cf. Stob. _Ed._ i. 826-832: Porphyr. _Sentent._15].

Reasoning belongs to the human species, just as intelligence to the

divine alone. Yet it is assumed--in an attempt to explain divine

foreknowledge and defend freedom--that man may in some measure place

himself on the divine standpoint (v. 5).

This contrast between a higher mental faculty (_mens_) and a lower

(_ratio_) which even Aquinas adopts from the interpretation of

Aristotle (_Summa Theol._ i. 79, 9) is the favourite weapon in the

hands of mysticism. After the example of Dionysius Areop., Nicolaus of

Cusa, Reuchlin, and other thinkers of the Renaissance depreciate mere

discursive thought and logical reasoning. It is the inner _mens_--like

a simple ray of light--penetrating by an immediate and indivisible

act to the divine--which gives us access to the supreme science. This

_simplex intelligentia,--_ superior to imagination or reasoning--as

Gerson says, _Consid. de Th._ 10, is sometimes named _mens,_ sometimes

_Spiritus,_ the light of intelligence, the shadow of the angelical

intellect, the divine light. From Scotus Erigena to Nicolas of Cusa

one tradition is handed down: it is taken up by men like Everard Digby

(in his _Theoria Analytica_) and the group of Cambridge Platonists and

by Spinoza in the seventeenth century, and it reappears, profoundly

modified, in the German idealism between 1790 and 1820.

P. 99, § 48. 'Science of Logic'; Hegel's large work on the subject,

published between 1812-16. The discussions on the Antinomies belong

chiefly to the first part of it.

P. 102, § 50. 'Natural Theology,' here to be taken in a narrower sense

than in p. 73, where it is equivalent to Rational Theology in general.

Here it means 'Physico-theology'--the argument from design in nature.

P. 103, § 50. Spinoza--defining God as 'the union of thought with

extension.' This is not verbally accurate; for according to _Ethica,_

i. pr. 11, God, or the substance, consists of infinite attributes,

each of which expresses the eternal and infinite essence. But Spinoza

mentions of 'attributes' only two: _Ethica,_ ii. pr. 1. I Thought is

an attribute of God: pr. 2, Extension is an attribute of God. And he

adds, _Ethica,_ i. pr. 10, Schol. 'All the attributes substance has

were always in it together, nor can one be produced by another.' And

in _Ethica,_ ii. 7. Sch. it is said: 'Thinking substance and extended

substance is one and the same substance which is comprehended now under

this, now under that attribute.'

P. 110, § 54. 'Practical in the true sense of the word.' Cf. Kant,

_Werke,_ Ros. and Sch. i. 581: 'A great misunderstanding, exerting an

injurious influence on scientific methods, prevails with regard to what

should be considered "practical" in such sense as to justify its place

in practical philosophy. Diplomacy and finance, rules of economy no

less than rules of social intercourse, precepts of health and dietetic

of the soul no less than the body, have been classed as practical

philosophy on the mere ground that they all contain a collection of

practical propositions. Hut although such practical propositions

differ in mode of statement from the theoretical propositions which

have for import the possibility of things and the exposition of their

nature, they have the same content. "Practical," properly so called,

are only those propositions which relate to _Liberty_ under laws. All

others whatever are nothing but the theory of what pertains to the

_nature_ of things--only that theory is brought to bear on the way in

which the things may be produced by us in conformity with a principle;

_i.e._ the possibility of the things is presented as the result of

a voluntary action which itself too may be counted among physical

causes.' And Kant, _Werke,_ iv. 10. 'Hence a sum of practical precepts

given by philosophy does not form a special part of it (co-ordinate

with the theoretical) merely because they are practical. Practical

they might be, even though their principle were wholly derived from

the theoretical knowledge of nature,--as _technico-practical_ rules.

They are practical in the true sense, when and because their principle

is not borrowed from the nature-conception (which is always sensuously

conditioned) and rests therefore on the supersensible, which the

conception of liberty alone makes knowable by formal laws. They are

therefore ethico-practical, _i.e._ not merely _precepts and rules_ with

this or that intention, but laws without antecedent reference to ends

and intentions.'

P. 111, § 54. Eudaemonism. But there is Eudaemonism and Eudaemonism;

as Cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ i. 8. 4 The time had come when the infinite

longing away beyond the body and the world had reconciled itself

with the reality of existence. Yet the reality which the soul was

reconciled to--the objective which the subjectivity recognised--was

actually only empirical existence, common world and actuality.... And

though the reconciliation was in its heart and ground sure and fast,

it still needed an objective form for this ground: the very necessity

of nature made the blind certitude of immersion in the reality of

empirical existence seek to provide itself with a justification and a

good conscience. This reconciliation for consciousness was found in the

Happiness-doctrine: the fixed point it started from being the empirical

subject, and what it was reconciled to, the vulgar actuality, whereon

it might now confide, and to which it might surrender itself without

sin. The profound coarseness and utter vulgarity, which is at the basis

of this happiness-doctrine, has its only elevation in its striving

after justification and a good conscience, which however can get no

further than the objectivity of mere intellectualism.

'The dogmatism of eudaemonism and of popular philosophy (Aufklärung)

therefore did not consist in the fact that it made happiness and

enjoyment the supreme good. For if Happiness be comprehended as an

_Idea,_ it ceases to be something empirical and casual--as also to be

anything sensuous. In the supreme existence, reasonable act (Thun) and

supreme enjoyment are one. So long as supreme blessedness is supreme

_Idea_ it matters not whether we try to apprehend the supreme existence

on the side of its ideality,--which, as isolated may be first called

reasonable act--or on the side of its reality--which as isolated may

be first called enjoyment and feeling. For reasonable act and supreme

enjoyment, ideality and reality are both alike in it and identical.

Every philosophy has only one problem--to construe supreme blessedness

as supreme Idea. So long as it is by reason that supreme enjoyment is

ascertained, the distinguishability of the two at once disappears:

for this comprehension and the infinity which is dominant in act, and

the reality and finitude which is dominant in enjoyment, are taken up

into one another. The controversy with happiness becomes a meaningless

chatter, when happiness is known as the blessed enjoyment of the

eternal intuition. But what was called eudaemonism meant--it must

be said--an empirical happiness, an enjoyment of sensation, not the

eternal intuition and blessedness.'

P. 112, § 55. Schiller. _Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des

Menschen_(1795), 18th letter. 'Through beauty the sensuous man is led

to form and to thought; through beauty the intellectual man is led back

to matter and restored to the sense-world. Beauty combines two states

which are opposed to one another.' Letter 25. 'We need not then have

any difficulty about finding a way from sensuous dependence to moral

liberty, after beauty has given a case where liberty can completely

co-exist with dependence, and where man in order to show himself an

intelligence need not make his escape from matter. If--as the fact

of beauty teaches--man is free even in association with the senses,

and if--as the conception necessarily involves--liberty is something

absolute and supersensible, there can no longer be any question how

he comes to elevate himself from limitations to the absolute: for

in beauty this has already come to pass.' Cf. _Ueber Anmuth und

Würde_(1793). 'It is in a beautiful soul, then, that sense and reason,

duty and inclination harmonize; and grace is their expression in the

appearance. Only in the service of a beautiful soul can nature at the

same time possess liberty.' (See Bosanquet's _History of Aesthetic._)

P. 115, § 60. The quotation in the note comes from § 87 of the _Kritik

der Urtheilskraft_ (_Werke,_ ed. Ros. and Sch. iv. 357).

P. 120, § 60. Fichte, _Werke,_ i. 279. 'The principle of life and

consciousness, the ground of its possibility, is (as has been shown)

certainly contained in the Ego: yet by this means there arises no

actual life, no empirical life in time--and another life is for us

utterly unthinkable. If such an actual life is to be possible, there

is still needed for that a special impulse (Aufstoss) striking the

Ego from the Non-ego. According to my system, therefore, the ultimate

ground of all actuality for the Ego is an original action and re-action

between the Ego and something outside it, of which all that can be said

is that it must be completely opposed to the Ego. In this reciprocal

action nothing is brought into the Ego, nothing foreign imported;

everything that is developed from it _ad infinitum_ is developed from

it solely according to its own laws. The Ego is merely put in motion by

that opposite, so as to act; and without such a first mover it would

never have acted; and, as its existence consists merely in action, it

would not even have existed. But the source of motion has no further

attributes than to set in motion, to be an opposing force which as such

is only felt.

'My philosophy therefore is realistic. It shows that the consciousness

of finite natures cannot at all be explained, unless we assume a force

existing independently of them, and completely opposed to them;--on

which as regards their empirical existence they are dependent. But

it asserts nothing further than such an opposed force, which is

merely _felt,_ but not _cognised,_ by finite beings. All possible

specifications of this force or non-ego, which may present themselves

_ad infinitum_ in our consciousness, my system engages to deduce from

the specifying faculty of the Ego....

'That the finite mind must necessarily assume outside it something

absolute (a Ding:an:sich), and yet must on the other hand acknowledge

that this something only exists for the mind (is a necessary noümenon):

this is the circle which may be infinitely expanded, but from which the

finite mind can never issue.' Cf. Fichte's _Werke,_ i. 248, ii. 478.

CHAPTER V.

P. 121, § 62. F. H. Jacobi (_Werke,_ v. 82) in his _Woldemar_ (a

romance contained in a series of letters, first published _as a whole_

in 1781) writes: 'The philosophical understanding (Verstand) is jealous

of everything unique, everything immediately certain which makes itself

true, without proofs, solely by its existence. It persecutes this

faith of reason even into our inmost consciousness, where it tries to

make us distrust the feeling of our identity and personality.' 'What

is absolutely and intrinsically true,' he adds (v. 122), 'is not got

by way of reasoning and comparison: both our immediate consciousness

(Wissen)--I am--and our conscience (Gewissen) are the work of a secret

something in which heart, understanding, and sense combine.' 'Notions

(Begriffe), far from embalming the living, really turn it into a

corpse' (v. 380).

Cf. Fichte's words (_Werke,_ ii. 255), Aus dem Gewissen allein stammt

die Wahrheit, &c.

P. 122, § 62. The Letters on the doctrine of Spinoza, published in

1785, were re-issued in 1789 with eight supplements.

'A science,' says Jacobi in his latest utterance (_Werke,_ iv. pref.

xxx.) 'is only a systematic register of cognitions mutually referring

to one another--the first and last point in the series is wanting.'

P. 123, § 62. Lalande's dictum is referred to by Fries (_Populäre

Vorlesungen über Sternkunde,_ 1813) quoted by Jacobi in his _Werke,_

ii. 55. What Lalande has actually written in the preface to his work on

astronomy is that the science as he understands it has no relation to

natural theology--in other words, that he is not writing a Bridgewater

treatise.

P. 123, § 63. Jacobi, _Werke,_ ii. 222. 'For my part, I regard the

principle of reason as all one with the principle of life.' And ii.

343: 'Evidently reason is the true and proper life of our nature.'

It is in virtue of our inner tendency and instinct towards the

eternal (Richtung und Trieb auf das Ewige),--of our sense for the

supersensible--that we, human beings, really subsist (iv. 6. 152). And

this Organ der Vernehmung des Uebersinnlichen is Reason (iii. 203, &c).

The language of Jacobi fluctuates, not merely in words, but in the

intensity of his intuitionalism. Thus, _e.g._ iii. 32: 'The reason man

has is no faculty giving the science of the true, but only a presage'

(Ahndung des Wahren). 'The belief in a God,' he says, at one time (iii.

206) 'is as natural to man as his upright position': but that belief

is, he says elsewhere, only 'an inborn devotion (Andacht) before an

unknown God.' Thus, if we have an immediate awareness (Wissen) of

God, this is not knowledge or science (Wissenschaft). Such intuition

of reason is described (ii. 9) as 'the faculty of _presupposing_ the

intrinsically (an sich) true, good, and beautiful, with full confidence

in the objective validity of the presupposition.' But that object we

are let see only in feeling (ii. 61). 'Our philosophy,' he says (iii.

6) 'starts from feeling--of course an objective and pure feeling.'

P. 124, § 63. Jacobi (_Werke,_ iv. a, p. 211): 'Through faith (Glaube)

we know that we have a body.' Such immediate knowledge of our own

activity--'the feeling of I am, I act' (iii. 411)--the sense of

'absolute self-activity' or freedom (of which the 'possibility cannot

be cognised,' because logically a contradiction) is what Jacobi calls

Anschauung (Intuition). He distinguishes a sensuous, and a rational

intuition (iii. 59).

P. 125, § 63. Jacobi expressly disclaims identification of his Glaube

with the faith of Christian doctrine (_Werke,_ iv. a, p. 210). In

defence he quotes from Hume, Inquiry V, and from Reid, passages to

illustrate his usage of the term 'belief--by the distinction between

which and faith certain ambiguities are no doubt avoided.

P. 129, § 66. Kant had said _'Concepts without intuitions are empty'_

It is an exaggeration of this half-truth (the other half is _Intuitions

without concepts are blind_) that is the basis of these statements of

Jacobi (and of Schopenhauer)--a view of which the following passage

from Schelling (_Werke,_ ii. 125) is representative. 'Concepts

(Begriffe) are only silhouettes of reality. They are projected by

a serviceable faculty, the understanding, which only comes into

action when reality is already on the scene,--which only comprehends,

conceives, retains what it required a creative faculty to produce....

The mere concept is a word without meaning.... All reality that can

attach to it is lent to it merely by the intuition (Anschauung) which

preceded it. ... Nothing is real for us except what is _immediately

given_ us, without any mediation by concepts, without our feeling at

liberty. But nothing reaches us immediately except through intuition.'

He adds, however, 'Intuition is due to the activity of mind (Sein):

it demands a disengaged sense (freier Sinn) and an intellectual organ

(geistiges Organ).'

P. 134. Cicero: _De Natura Deorum,_ i. 16; ii. 4, _De quo autem omnium

natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est_; cf. Seneca, Epist. cxvii.

6. The principle is common to Stoics and Epicureans: it is the maxim

of Catholic truth _Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum

est_--equivalent to Aristotle's ὄ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἷναι φάμεν--But as

Aristotle remarks (_An. Post._ i. 31) τὸ καθόλον καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδίνατον

αἰσθάνεσθαι.

Jacobi: _Werke,_ vi. 145. 'The general opinion about what is true and

good must have an authority equal to reason.'

P. 136, § 72. Cf. _Encyclop._ § 400: 'That the heart and the feeling

is not the form by which anything is justified as religious, moral,

true, and just, and that an appeal to heart and feeling either means

nothing or means something bad, should hardly need enforcing. Can any

experience be more trite than that hearts and feelings are also bad,

evil, godless, mean, &c.? Ay, that the heart is the source of such

feelings only, is directly said in the words: Out of the heart proceed

evil thoughts, &c. In times when the heart and the sentiment are, by

scientific theology and philosophy, made the criterion of goodness,

religion, and morality, it is necessary to recall these trivial

experiences.'

CHAPTER VI.

P. 145, § 80. Goethe; the reference is to _Werke,_ ii. 268 (Natur und

Kunst):

Wer Groszes will, muß sich zusammenraffen:

In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister,

Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben.

Such 'limitation' of aim and work is a frequent lesson in _Wilhelm

Meister's Wanderjahre, e.g._ i. ch. 4. 'Many-sidedness prepares,

properly speaking, only the element in which the one-sided can act....

The best thing is to restrict oneself to a handi-work.' And i. ch. 12:

'To be acquainted with and to exercise one thing rightly gives higher

training than mere tolerableness (halfness) in a hundred sorts of

things.' And ii. ch. 12: 'Your general training and all establishments

for the purpose are fool's farces.'

P. 147, § 81. Cf. Fichte, _Werke,_ ii. 37. 'Yet it is not _we_ who

analyse: but knowledge analyses itself, and can do so, because in all

its being it is a _for-self_ (Für:sich),' &c.

P. 149, § 81. Plato, the inventor of Dialectic. Sometimes on the

authority of Aristotle, as reported by _Diog. Laert._ ix. 25, Zeno of

Elea gets this title; but Hegel refers to such statements as _Diog.

Laer,',_ ii. 34 τρίτον δὲ Πλάτων προσέθηκε τὸν διαλεκτικὸν λόγον, καὶ

ἐτελεσιουργῆσε φιλοσοφίαν.

Protagoras. But it is rather in the dialogue _Meno,_ pp. 81-97,

that Plato exhibits this view of knowledge. Cf. _Phaedo,_72 E, and

_Phaedrus,_ 245.

Parmenides; especially see Plat. _Parmen._ pp. 142, 166; cf. Hegel,

_Werke,_ xi v. 204.

With Aristotle dialectic is set in contrast to apodictic, and treated

as (in the modern sense) a quasi-inductive process (Ar. _Top._ Lib.

viii.): with the Stoics, dialectic is the name of the half-rhetorical

logic which they, rather than Aristotle, handed on to the schoolmen of

the Middle Ages.

P. 150, § 81. The physical elements are fire, air, earth, and water.

Earthquakes, storms, &c, are examples of the 'meteorological process.'

Cf. _Encyclop._ §§ 281-289.

P. 152, § 82. Dialectic; cf: _Werke,_ v. 326 seqq.

P. 154, § 82. Mysticism; cf. Mill's _Logic,_ bk. v, ch. 3, § 4:

'Mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence

to the subjective creations of the mind's own faculties, to mere ideas

of the intellect; and believing that by watching and contemplating

these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in

the world without.' Mill thus takes it as equivalent to an ontological

mythology--probably a rare use of the term.

CHAPTER VII.

P. 156, § 85. The Absolute. The term, in something like its modern

usage, is at least as old as Nicolaus Cusanus. God, according to him,

is the _absoluta omnium quidditas (Apol._406), the _esse absolutum,_ or

_ipsum esse in existentibus_ (_De ludo Globi,_ ii. 161 a), the _unum

absolutum,_ the _vis absoluta,_ or _possibilitas absoluta,_ or _valor

absolutus: absoluta vita, absoluta ratio: absoluta essendi forma._ On

this term and its companion _infinities_ he rings perpetual changes.

But its distinct employment to denote the 'metaphysical God' is much

more modern. In Kant, _e.g._ the 'Unconditioned' (Das Unbedingte)

is the metaphysical, corresponding to the religious, conception of

deity; and the same is the case with Fichte, who however often makes

use of the adjective 'absolute.' It is with Schelling that the term

is naturalised in philosophy: it already appears in his works of 1793

and 1795: and from him apparently it finds its way into Fichte's

_Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre_ of 1801 (_Werke,_ ii. 13) 'The

absolute is neither knowing nor being; nor is it identity, nor is it

indifference of the two; but it is throughout merely and solely the

absolute.'

The term comes into English philosophical language through Coleridge

and later borrowers from the German. See Ferrier's _Institutes of

Metaphysic,_ Prop. xx, and Mill's _Examination of Hamilton,_ chap. iv.

P. 158, § 86. Cf. Schelling, iii. 372: I = I expresses the identity

between the 'I,' in so far as it is the producing, and the 'I' as the

produced; the original synthetical and yet identical proposition: the

_cogito=sum_ of Schelling.

P. 159. Definition of God as _Ens realissimum, e.g._ Meier's

_Baumgarten's Metaphysic,_ § 605.

Jacobi, _Werke,_ iv. 6, thus describes Spinoza's God.

As to the beginning cf. Fichte, _Werke,_ ii. 14 (speaking of 'absolute

knowing'): 'It is not a knowing of something, nor is it a knowing of

nothing (so that it would be a knowing of somewhat, but this somewhat

be nothing): it is not even a knowing of itself, for it is no knowledge

at all _of_;--nor is it _a_ knowing (quantitatively and in relation),

but it is (the) knowing (absolutely qualitatively). It is no act, no

event, or that somewhat is in knowing; but it is just the knowing, in

which alone all acts and all events, which are there set down, can be

set down.'

History of Philosophy; cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ i. 165. 'If the Absolute,

like its phenomenon Reason, be (as it is) eternally one and the same,

then each reason, which has turned itself upon and cognised itself,

has produced a true philosophy and solved the problem which, like its

solution, is at all times the same. The reason, which cognises itself,

has in philosophy to do only with itself: hence in itself too lies

its whole work and its activity; and as regards the inward essence of

philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors.

'Just as little, as of constant improvements, can there be talk of

"peculiar views" of philosophy.... The true peculiarity of a philosophy

is the interesting individuality, in which reason has organised itself

a form from the materials of a particular age; in it the particular

speculative reason finds spirit of its spirit, flesh of its flesh; it

beholds itself in it as one and the same, as another living being.

Each philosophy is perfect in itself, and possesses totality, like a

work of genuine art. As little as the works of Apelles and Sophocles,

if Raphael and Shakespeare had known them, could have seemed to them

mere preliminary exercises for themselves--but as cognate spiritual

powers;--so little can reason in its own earlier formations perceive

only useful preparatory exercises.' Cf. Schelling, iv. 401.

P. 160, § 86. Parmenides (ap. Simplic. _Phys._): of the two ways of

investigation the first is that _it is,_ and that not-to-be is not.

ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἓστι τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἓστι μὴ εἶναι

P. 161, § 87. The Buddhists. Cf. Hegel, _Werke,_ xi. 387. Modern

histories of Buddhism insist upon the purely ethico-religious character

of the teaching. Writers like von Hartmann (_Religionsphilosophie,_ p.

320) on the contrary hold that Buddhism carried out the esoteric theory

of Brahmanism to the consequence that the abstract one is nothing.

According to Vassilief, _Le Bouddhisme,_ p. 318 seqq., one of the

Buddhist metaphysical schools, the Madhyamikas, founded by Nâgârdjuna

400 years after Buddha, taught that All is Void.--Such metaphysics were

probably reactions of the underlying Brahmanist idea.

But generally Buddhism (as was not unnatural 60 years ago) is hardly

taken here in its characteristic historical features.

P. 167, § 88. Aristotle, _Phys,_ i. 8 (191 a. 26): 'Those philosophers

who first sought the truth and the real substance of things got on a

false track, like inexperienced travellers who fail to discover the

way, and declared that nothing can either come into being or disappear,

because it is necessary that what comes into being should come into

being either from what is or from what is not, and that it is from both

of these impossible: for what is does not become (it already is), and

nothing would become from what is not.'

(5) is an addition of ed. 3 (1830); cf. _Werke,_ xvii. 181.

P. 168, § 88. The view of Heraclitus here taken is founded on the

interpretation given by Plato (in the _Theaetetus,_152; _Cratylus,_

401) and by Aristotle, of a fundamental doctrine of the Ephesian--which

however is expressed in the fragments by the name of the everliving

fire. The other phrase (Ar. _Met._ i. 4) is used by Aristotle to

describe the position, not of Heraclitus, but of Leucippus and

Democritus. Cf. Plutarch, _adv. Colotem,_ 4. 2 Δημόκριτος διορίζεται μὴ

μᾱλλον τὸ δὲν ἥ τὸ μηδν εἶναι; cf. Simplic. in Ar. _Phys._ fol. 7.

P. 169, § 89. Daseyn: Determinate being. Cf. Schelling, i. 209.

'Being (Seyn) expresses the absolute, Determinate being (Daseyn) a

conditional, 'positing': Actuality, one conditioned in a definite sort

by a definite condition. The single phenomenon in the whole system

of the world has _actuality;_ the world of phenomena in general has

Daseyn; but the absolutely-posited, the Ego, _is. I am_ is all the Ego

can say of itself.'

P. 171, § 91. Being-by-self: An:sich:seyn.

Spinoza, _Epist._ 50, _figura non aliud quam determinatio et

determinatio negatio est._

P. 172, § 92. Grenze (limit or boundary), and Schranke (barrier or

check) are distinguished in _Werke,_ iii. 128-139 (see Stirling's

_Secret of Hegel,_ i. 377 seqq.). Cf. Kant's remark, _Krit. d. r.

Vernunft,_ p. 795, that Hume only erschränkt our intellect, ohne ihn zu

begrenzen.

P. 173, § 92. Plato, _Timaeus,_ c. 35 (formation of the world-soul):

'From the individual and ever-identical essence (ὀυσία) and the

divisible which is corporeal, he compounded a third intermediate

species of essence.... And taking these, being three, he compounded

them all into one form (ἰδέα), adjusting perforce the unmixable nature

of the other and the same, and mingling them all with the essence, and

making of three one again, he again distributed this total into as many

portions as were fitting, but each of them mingled out of the same and

the other and the essence.'

P. 175, § 94. Philosophy. Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ ii. 377. 'A various

experience has taught me that for most men the greatest obstacle to the

understanding and vital apprehension of philosophy is their invincible

opinion that its object is to be sought at an infinite distance.

The consequence is, that while they should fix their eye on what is

present (das Gegenwärtige), every effort of their mind is called out

to get hold of an object which is not in question through the whole

inquiry.' ... 'The aim of the sublimest science can only be to show the

actuality,--in the strictest sense the actuality, the presence, the

vital existence (Daseyn)--of a God in the whole of things and in each

one.... Here we deal no longer with an extra-natural or supernatural

thing, but with the immediately near, the alone-actual to which we

ourselves also belong, and in which we are.'

P. 177, § 95. Plato's _Philebus,_ ch. xii-xxiii (pp. 23-38): cf.

_Werke,_ xiv. 214 seqq.: 'The absolute is therefore what in one unity

is finite and infinite.'

P. 178. Idealism of Philosophy: cf. Schelling, ii. 67. 'Every

philosophy therefore is and remains Idealism; and it is only under

itself that it embraces realism and idealism; only that the former

Idealism should not be confused with the latter, which is of a merely

relative kind.'

Hegel, _Werke,_ iii. 163. 'The proposition that the finite is "ideal"

constitutes Idealism. In nothing else consists the Idealism of

philosophy than in recognising that the finite has no genuine being....

The contrast of idealistic and realistic philosophy is therefore of

no importance. A philosophy that attributed to finite existences as

such a genuine ultimate absolute being would not deserve the name

philosophy.... By "ideal" is meant existing as a representation in

consciousness: whatever is in a mental concept, idea or imagination is

"ideal": "ideal" is just another word for "in imagination,"--something

not merely distinct from the real, but essentially not real. The mind

indeed is the great idealist: in the sensation, representation, thought

of the mind the fact has not what is called _real_ existence; in the

simplicity of the Ego such external being is only suppressed, existing

_for me,_ and "ideally" in me. This subjective idealism refers only to

the representational form, by which an import is mine.'

P. 180, § 96. The distinction of nature and mind as real and ideal is

especially Schelling's: See _e.g._ his _Einleitung,_ &c. iii. 272. 'If

it is the problem of Transcendental Philosophy to subordinate the real

to the ideal, it is on the contrary the problem of the philosophy of

nature to explain the ideal from the real.'

P. 183, § 98. Newton: see _Scholium_ at the end of the _Principia,_ and

cf. _Optics,_ iii. qu. 28.

Modern Atomism, besides the conception of particles or molecules, has

that of mathematical centres of force.

Kant, _Werke,_ v. 379 (ed. Rosenk.). 'The general principle of the

_dynamic_ of material nature is that all reality in the objects of the

external senses must be regarded as moving force: whereby accordingly

so-called solid or absolute impenetrability is banished from natural

science as a meaningless concept, and repellent force put in its

stead; whereas true and immediate attraction is defended against all

the subtleties of a self-misconceiving metaphysic and declared to be a

fundamental force necessary for the very possibility of the concept of

matter.'

P. 184, § 98. Abraham Gottheit Kästner (1719-1800), professor

forty-four years at Göttingen, enjoyed in the latter half of the

eighteenth century a considerable repute, both in literature and in

mathematical science. Some of, his epigrams are still quoted.

P. 190, § 102. The two 'moments' of number Unity, and Sum (Anzahl),

may be compared with the Greek distinction between one and ἀριθμός

(cf. Arist. _Phys._ iv. 12 ἐλάχίστος ἀριθμός ἡ δυάς). According

to Rosenkranz (_Leben Hegels_) the classification of arithmetical

operations often engaged Hegel's research. Note the relation in Greek

between λογικόν and λογιστικόν. Cf. Kant's view of the 'synthesis' in

arithmetic.

P. 193, § 103. Intensive magnitude. Cf. Kant, _Kritik der reinen

Vernunft,_ p. 207, on Anticipation of Perception (Wahrnehmung), and p.

414, in application to the question of the soul's persistence.

P. 195, § 104. Not Aristotle, but rather Simplicius on the _Physics_

of Aristotle, fol. 306: giving Zeno's argument against the alleged

composition of the line from a series of points. What you can say of

one supposed small real unit, you can say of a smaller, and so on _ad

infinitum._ (Cf. Burnet's _Early Greek Philosophy,_ p. 329.)

P. 196, § 104. The distinction between imagination and intellect made

by Spinoza in _Ep._ xii. (olim xxix.) in _Opp._ ed. Land vol. ii. 40

seqq. is analogous to that already noted (p. 402) between _ratio_ and

_intellegentia,_ and is connected, as by Boëthius, with the distinction

which Plato, _Timaeus,_ 37, draws between eternity (αἰών) and time.

The infinite (_Eth._ i. prop. 8. Schol. I) is the 'absolute affirmation

of a certain nature's existence,' as opposed to finitude which is

really _ex parte negatio._ 'The problem has always been held extremely

difficult, if not inextricable, because people did not distinguish

between what is concluded to be infinite by its own nature and the

force of its definition, and what has no ends, not in virtue of its

essence, but in virtue of its cause. It was difficult also because

they did not distinguish between what is called infinite because it

has no ends, and that whose parts (though we may have a maximum and

minimum of it) we cannot equate or explicate by any number. Lastly

because they lid not distinguish between what we can only understand

(_intelligere,_) but not imagine, and what we can also imagine.'

To illustrate his meaning, Spinoza calls attention to the distinction

of substance from mode, of eternity from duration. We can 'explicate'

the existence only of modes by duration: that of substance, 'by

eternity, _i.e._ by an infinite fruition of existence or being' (_per

aeternitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate,

essendi fruitionem._) The attempt therefore to show that extended

_substance_ is composed of parts is an illusion,--which arises because

we look at quantity 'abstractly or superficially, as we have it in

imagination by means of the senses.' So looking at it, as we are liable

to do, a quantity will be found divisible, finite, composed of parts

and manifold. But if we look at it as it really is,--as a Substance

--as it is in the intellect alone--(which is a work of difficulty), it

will be found infinite, indivisible, and unique. 'It is only therefore

when we abstract duration and quantity from substance, that we use

time to determine duration and measure to determine quantity, so as to

be able to imagine them. Eternity and substance, on the other hand,

are no objects of imagination but only of intellect; and to try to

explicate them by such notions as measure, time, and number--which are

only modes of thinking or rather of imagining--is no better than to

fall into imaginative raving.' 'Nor will even the modes of Substance

ever be rightly understood, should they be confounded with this sort

of _entia rationis_' (_i.e. modi cogitandi_ subserving the easier

retention, explication and _imagination_ of things _understood_)'

or aids to imagination. For when we do so, we separate them from

substance, and from the mode in which they flow from eternity, without

which they cannot be properly understood.' (Cf. Hegel's _Werke,_ i. 63.)

The verses from Albr. von Haller come from his poem on Eternity (1736).

Hegel seems to quote from an edition before 1776, when the fourth line

was added in the stanza as it thus finally stood:--

Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen,

Gebürge Millionen auf,

Ich welze Zeit auf Zeit und Welt auf Welten hin,

Und wenn ich auf der March des endlichen nun bin,

Und von der fürchterlichen Höhe

Mit Schwindeln wieder nach dir sehe,

Ist alle Macht der Zahl, vermehrt mit tausend Malen,

Noch nicht ein Theil von dir.

Ich tilge sie, und du liegst ganz vor mir.

Kant, _Kritik d. r. Vernunft,_ p. 641. 'Even Eternity, however _eerily_

sublime may be its description by Haller,' &c.

P. 197, § 104. Pythagoras in order of time probably comes between

Anaximenes (of Ionia) and Xenophanes (of Elea). But the mathematical

and metaphysical doctrines attributed to the Pythagorean are known

to us only in the form in which they are represented in Plato and

Aristotle, _i.e._ in a later stage of development. The Platonists (cf.

Arist. _Met._ i. 6; xi. 1. 12; xii. 1. 7; cf. Plat. _Rep._ p. 510)

treated mathematical fact as mid-way between 'sensibles' and 'ideas';

and Aristotle himself places mathematics as a science between physical

and metaphysical (theological) philosophy.

The tradition (referred to p. 198) about Pythagoras is given by

Iamblichus, _Vita Pyth._ §115 seqq.: it forms part of the later

Neo-Pythagorean legend, which entered literature in the first centuries

of the Christian era.

P. 201, § 107. Hebrew hymns: _e.g. Psalms_ lxxiv. and civ.; Proverbs

viii. and Job xxxviii. _Vetus verbum est,_ says Leibniz (ed. Erdmann,

p. 162), _Deum omnia pondere, mensura, numero, fecisse._

P. 202, § 108. The antinomy of measure. These logical puzzles

are the so-called fallacy of Sorites (a different thing from the

chain-syllogism of the logic-books); cf. Cic. _Acad._ ii. 28, 29; _De

Divin._ ii. 4--and the φαλακρός cf. Horace, _Epist._ ii. 1-45.

CHAPTER VIII.

P. 211, § 113. Self-relation--(sich) auf sich beziehen.

P. 213, § 115. The 'laws of thought' is the magniloquent title given

in the Formal Logic since Kant's day to the principles or maxims

(_principia_, Grundsätze) which Kant himself described as 'general and

formal criteria of truth.' They include the so-called principle of

contradiction, with its developments, the principle of identity and

excluded middle: to which, with a desire for completeness, eclectic

logicians have added the Leibnizian principle of the reason. Hegel

has probably an eye to Krug and Fries in some of his remarks. The

three laws may be compared and contrasted with the three principles,

--homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms, in Kant's

_Kritik d. r. Vern._ p. 686.

P. 217, § 117. Leibniz, _Nouveaux Essais,_ Liv. ii. ch. 27, § 3 (ed.

Erdmann, p. 273: cf. fourth Letter to Clarke). _Il n'y a point deux

individus indiscernables. Un gentilhomme d'esprit de mes amis, en

parlant avec moi en présence de Madame l'Electrice dans le jardin de

Herrenhausen, crut qu'il trouverait bien deux feuilles entièrement

semblables. Madame l'Electrice l'en défia, et il courut longtems en

vain pour en chercher._

The principle of individuation or indiscernibility is: 'If two

individuals were perfectly alike and equal and, in a word,

indistinguishable by themselves, there would be no principle of

individuation: (Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 277) _Poser deux choses

indiscernables est poser la même chose sous deux noms_ (p. 756).

_Principium individuationis idem est quod absolutae specificationis quâ

res ita sit determinata, ut ab aliis omnibus distingui possit._

P. 221, § 119. Polarity. Schelling, ii. 489. 'The law of Polarity is a

universal law of nature'; cf. ii. 459: 'It is a first principle of a

philosophic theory of nature to have a view (in the whole of nature),

on polarity and dualism.' But he adds (476), 'It is time to define

more accurately the concept of polarity.' So Oken, _Naturphilosophie_:

§76: 'A force consisting of two principles is called Polarity.' § 77:

'Polarity is the first force which makes its appearance in the world.'

§ 81: 'The original movement is a result of the original polarity.'

P. 223, § 119. Cf. Fichte, ii. 53. 'To everything but this the

logically trained thinker can rise. He is on his guard against

contradiction. But, in that case, how about the possibility of the

maxim of his own logic that we can think no contradiction. In some way

he must have got hold of contradiction and thought it, or he could

make no communications about it. Had such people only once regularly

asked themselves how they came to think the _merely_ possible or

contingent (the not-necessary), and how they actually do so! Evidently

they here leap through a not-being, not-thinking, &c, into the utterly

unmediated, self-initiating, free,--into beënt non-being,--in short,

the above contradiction, as it was laid down. With consistent thinkers

the result of this incapacity is nothing but the utter abolition of

freedom,--the most absolute fatalism and Spinozism.

P. 227, §121. Leibniz (ed. Erdmann, p. 515). 'The principle of _la

raison déterminante_ is that nothing ever occurs without there being a

cause for it, or at least a determinant reason, _i.e._ something which

may serve to render a reason _à priori_ why that is existent rather

than in any other way. This great principle holds good in all events.'

Cf. p. 707. 'The principle of "sufficient reason" is that in virtue

of which we consider that no fact could be found true or consistent,

no enunciation truthful, without there being a sufficient reason why

it is so and not otherwise.... When a truth is necessary, we can find

the reason of it by analysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and

truths, until we come to primitive ideas.... But the sufficient reason

ought also to be found in contingent truths or truths of fact, _i.e._

in the series of things spread through the universe of creatures,

or the resolution into particular reasons might go into a limitless

detail: ... and as all this detail embraces only other antecedent, or

more detailed contingencies, ... the sufficient or final (_dernière_)

reason must be outside the succession or series of this detail of

contingencies, however infinite it might be. And it is thus that the

final reason of things must be in a "necessary substance," in which the

detail of the changes exists only _eminenter,_ as in the source,--and

it is what we call God.' _(Monadology_ §§ 32-38.)

Hence the supremacy of final causes. Thus _Opp._ ed. Erdmann, p. 678:

_Ita fit ut efficientes causae pendeant a finalibus, et spiritualia

sint natura priora materialibus._ Accordingly he urges, p. 155, that

final cause has not merely a moral and religious value in ethics and

theology, but is useful even in physics for the detection of deep-laid

truths. Cf. p. 106: _C'est sanctifier la Philosophie que de faire

couler ses ruisseaux de la fontaine des attributs de Dieu. Bien loin

d'exclure les causes finales et la considération d'un être agissant

avec sagesse, c'est de là qu'il faut tout déduire en Physique._ Cf.

also _Principes de la Nature_ (Leibn. ed. Erdm. p. 716): 'It is

surprising that by the sole consideration of efficient causes or

of matter, we could not render a reason for those laws of movement

discovered in our time. _Il y faut recourir aux causes finales_.'

P. 228, § 121 Socrates. The antitheses between Socrates and the

Sophists belongs in the main to the Platonic dialogues,--not co the

historical Socrates. It is the literary form in which the philosophy of

Plato works out its development through the criticism of contemporary

opinions and doctrines. And even in Plato's writings the antagonism is

very unlike what later interpretations have made out of it.

P. 231, § 124. Thing by itself (thing in itself) the Ding:an:sich.

P. 235, § 126. Cf. _Encycl._ § 334 (_Werke,_ viii. 1. p. 411). 'In

empirical chemistry the chief object is the _particularity_ of the

matters and products, which are grouped by superficial abstract

features which make impossible any system in the special detail. In

these lists, metals, oxygen, hydrogen, &c.--metalloids, sulphur,

phosphorus appear side by side as _simple_ chemical bodies on the same

level. The great physical variety of these bodies must of itself create

a prepossession against such coordination; and their chemical origin,

the process from which they issue, is clearly no less various. But

in an equally chaotic way, more abstract and more real processes are

put on the same level. If all this is to get scientific form, every

product ought to be determined according to the grade of the concrete

and completely developed process from which it essentially issues, and

which gives it its peculiar significance; and for that purpose it is

not less essential to distinguish grades in abstractness or reality

of the process. Animal and vegetable substances in any case belong

to a quite other order: so little can their nature be understood from

the chemical process, that they are rather destroyed in it, and only

the way of their death is apprehended. These substances, however,

ought above all to serve to counter-act the metaphysic predominant

in chemistry as in physics,--the ideas or rather wild fancies of the

_unalterability of matters_ under all circumstances, as well as the

categories of the _composition_ and the _consistence_ of bodies from

such matters. We see it generally admitted that chemical matters lose

in combination the _properties_ which they show in separation: and yet

we find the idea prevailing that they are the same things _without_ the

properties as they are _with_ them,--so that as things _with_ these

properties they are not results of the process.'--Cf. _Werke,_ vii. a.

372: 'Air does not consist of oxygen and nitrogen: but these are the

forms under which air is put,' cf. _ib._403.

P. 241, § 131. Fichte's _Sonnenklarer Bericht_ appeared in 1801.

P. 247, § 136. Herder's _Gott: Gespräche über Spinoza's System,_ 1787,

2nd ed. 1800. 'God is, in the highest and unique sense of the word,

Force, _i.e._ the primal force of all forces, the soul of all souls'

(p. 63), 'All that we call matter, therefore, is more or less animate:

it is a realm of efficient forces. One force predominates: otherwise

there were no _one,_ no whole' (p. 207). 'The supreme being (Daseyn)

could give its creatures nothing higher than being. (_Theophron._) But,

my friend, being and being, however simple in the concept, are in their

estate very different; and what do you suppose, Philolaus, marks its

grades and differences? (_Phil._) Nothing but forces. In God himself

we found no higher conception; but all his forces were only one. The

supreme force could not be other than supreme goodness and wisdom,

ever-living, ever-active. (_Theoph._) Now you yourself see, Philolaus,

that the supreme, or rather the All (for God is not a supreme unit in

a scale of beings like himself), could not reveal himself otherwise

than in the universe as active. In him nothing could slumber, and what

he expressed was himself. He is before everything, and everything

subsists in him: the whole world an expression, an appearance of his

ever-living, ever-acting forces' (p. 200).

'It was the mistake of Spinoza,' says Herder, 'to be unduly influenced

by the Cartesian phraseology. Had he chosen the conception of force and

effect, everything would have gone easier, and his system become much

more distinct and coherent. 'Had he developed the conception of power,

and the conception of matter, he must in conformity with his system

necessarily have come to the conception of forces, which work as well

in matter as in organs of thinking: he would in that case have regarded

power and thought as forces, _e.g._ as one.' (Cf. H. Spencer, 'Force,

the Ultimate of Ultimates.' First Princ. p 169)

According to Rosenkranz (_Leben Hegels,_ p. 223) there exists in

manuscript a criticism by Hegel on the second edition of Herder's

_God._ Herder's Dialogue belongs to the controversy aroused by Jacobi's

letters on Spinoza.

P. 250, § 136. Newton. Leibniz charges him with the view that God needs

from time to time _remonter sa montre,_ otherwise it would cease going:

that his machine requires to be cleaned (_décrasser_) by extraordinary

aid' (ed. Erdm. p. 746).

P. 252, § 140. The verses quoted occur in Goethe's _Werke_ ii. 376,

under the heading Allerdings. Originally the first four lines appeared

in Haller's poem _Die menschlichen Tugenden_ thus--

Ins Innre der Natur bringt sein erschaffner Geist:

Zu glücklich, wenn sie noch die äußre Schale weist!

(To nature's heart there penetrates no mere created mind:

Too happy if she but display the outside of her rind.)

Hegel--reading weizt for weist--takes the second line as

Too happy, if he can but know the outside of her rind.

Goethe's attack upon a vulgar misuse of the lines belongs to his

dispute with the scientists. His verses appeared in 1820 as _Heiteres

Reimstück_ at the end of Heft 3 _zur Morphologie,_--of which the

closing section is entitled _Freundlicher Zuruf_ (_Werke_ xxvii. 161),

as follows:--

"Ins Innre der Natur,"

O du Philister!--

"Dringt kein erschaffner Geist."

. . . . . .

"Glückselig! wem sie nur

Die äußre Schale weis't."

Das hör' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen,

Ich fluche drauf, aber verstohlen:

Sage mir taufend tausendmale:

Alles giebt sie reichlich und gern;

Natur hat weder Stern

Noch Schale,

Alles ist sie mit einem Male.

[The last seven lines may be thus paraphrased in continuation:

I swear--of course but to myself--as rings within my ears

That same old warning o'er and o'er again for sixty years,

And thus a thousand thousand times I answer in my mind:

--With gladsome and ungrudging hand metes nature from her store:

She keeps not back the core,

Nor separates the rind,

But all in each both rind and core has evermore combined.]

P. 254, § 140. Plato and Aristotle: cf. Plato, _Phaedrus,_ 247 A

(φθόνoς γὰρ ξω θείον χόρoυ ἴσταται); _Timaeus,_ 29 E; and Aristotle,

_Metaph._ i. 2. 22.

P. 256, § 140. Goethe: _Sämmtl. Werke,_ iii. 203 (_Maxime und

Reflexionen_). Gegen große Vorzüge eines Andern giebt es kein

Rettungsmittel als die Liebe. Cf. Schiller to Goethe, 2 July, 1796.

'How vividly I have felt on this occasion ... that against surpassing

merit nothing but Love gives liberty' (daß es dem Vortrefflichen

gegenüber seine Freiheit giebt als die Liebe).

'Pragmatic.' This word, denoting a meddlesome busybody in older English

and sometimes made a vague term of abuse, has been in the present

century used in English as it is here employed in German.

According to Polybius, ix. I. 2, the πραγματικὸς τρόπος τῆς ἱστορίας

is that which has a directly utilitarian aim. So Kant, _Foundation of

Metaph. of Ethic (Werke,_ viii. 41, note): 'A history is pragmatically

composed when it renders prudent, _i.e._ instructs the world how it may

secure its advantage better or at least as well as the ages preceding.'

Schelling (v. 308) quotes in illustration of pragmatic history-writing

the words of Faust to Wagner (Goethe, xi. 26):

Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst,

Das ist im Grund der herren eigner Geist,,

In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.

Cf. also Hegel, _Werke,_ ix. 8. 'A second kind of reflectional history

is the pragmatic. When we have to do with the past and are engaged

with a distant world, the mind sees rising before it a present, which

it has from its own action as a reward for its trouble. The events are

different; but their central and universal fact, their structural

plan is identical. This abolishes the past and makes the event

present. Pragmatic reflections, however abstract they be, are thus in

reality the present, and vivify the tales of the past with the life of

to-day.--Here too a word should specially be given to the moralising

and the moral instructions to be gained through history,--for which it

was often studied.... Rulers, statesmen, nations, are especially bidden

learn from the experience of history. But what experience and history

teach is that nations and governments never have learned anything from

history, or acted upon teaching which could have been drawn from it.'

Cf. Froude: _Divorce of Catherine,_ p. 2. 'The student (of history)

looks for an explanation (of political conduct) in elements which he

thinks he understands--in pride, ambition, fear, avarice, jealousy, or

sensuality.'

P. 257, § 141. Cf. Goethe, xxiii, 298. 'What is the outside of an

organic nature but the ever-varied phenomenon of the inside? This

outside, this surface is so exactly adapted to a varied, complex,

delicate, inward structure that it thus itself becomes an inside:

both aspects, the outside and the inside, standing in most direct

correlation alike in the quietest existence and in the most violent

movement.'

P. 260, § 143. Kant, _Kritik der reinen Vernunft,_ 2nd ed. p. 266.

P. 269, § 147. Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ v. 290 (cf. iii. 603). 'There

are three periods of history, that of nature, of destiny, and of

providence. These three ideas express the same identity, but in a

different way. Destiny too is providence, but recognised in the real,

as providence, is also destiny, but beheld (angeschaut) in the ideal.'

P. 275, § 151. On the relation between Spinoza and Leibniz cf. Hegel,

_Werke,_ iv. 187-193. It would be a mistake, however, to represent

Leibniz as mainly engaged in a work of conscious antagonism to Spinoza.

P. 277, § 153. Jacobi.--Jacobi (like Schopenhauer) insists specially on

the distinction between grounds (Gründe)--which are formal, logical,

and verbal, and causes (Ursachen)--which carry us into reality and

life and nature. To transform the mere _Because_ into the _cause_

we must (he says) pass from logic and the analytical understanding

to experience and the inner life. Instead of the timelessness of

simultaneity which characterises the logical relation cf ground and

consequent, the nexus of cause and effect introduces the element

of time,--thereby acquiring reality (Jacobi, _Werke,_ iii. 452).

The conception of Cause--meaningless as a mere category of abstract

thought--gets reality as a factor in experience, ein Erfahrungsbegriff,

and is immediately given to us in the consciousness of our own

causality (Jacobi, _Werke,_ iv. 145-158). Cf. Kant, _Kritik der reinen

Vern._ p. 116.

P. 283, § 158. The _Amor intellectualis Dei_ (Spinoza, _Eth._ v. 32)

is described as a consequence of the third grade of cognition, viz.

the _scientia intuitiva_ which 'proceeds from an adequate idea of the

formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate cognition

of the essence of things (ii. 40, Schol. 2). From it arises (v.

27), the highest possible _acquiescentia mentis,_ in which the mind

contemplates all things _sub specie aeternitatis_ (v. 29), knows itself

to be in God and sees itself and all things in their divine essence.

But this intellectual love of mind towards God is part of the infinite

love wherewith God loves himself (v. 36) 'From these things we clearly

understand in what our salvation or blessedness or liberty consists: to

wit, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of

God towards men' (Schol. to v. 36).

CHAPTER IX.

Page 289, § 161. Evolution and development in the stricter sense

in which these terms were originally used in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries imply a theory of preformation, according

to which the growth of an organic being is simply a process of

enlarging and filling out a miniature organism, actual but invisible,

because too inconspicuous. Such was the doctrine adopted by Leibniz

(_Considérations sur le principe de vie; Système nouveau de la Nature_,

&c). According to it development is no real generation of new parts,

but only an augmentation into bulk and visibility of parts already

outlined. This doctrine of preformation (as opposed to epigenesis)

is carried out by Charles Bonnet, who in his _Considérations sur les

corps organisés_ (1762) propounds the further hypothesis that the

'germs' from which living beings proceed contain, enclosed one within

another, the germs of all creatures yet to be. This is the hypothesis

of '_Emboîtement._' 'The system which regards generations as mere

educts' says Kant (_Kritik der Urteilskraft,_ § 80; _Werke,_ iv. 318)

'is called that of _individual_ preformation or the evolution theory:

the system which regards them as products is called Epigenesis.--which

might also be called the theory of _generic_ preformation, considering

that the productive powers of the générants follow the inherent

tendencies belonging to the family characteristics, and that the

specific form is therefore a 'virtual' preformation, in this way the

opposing theory of individual preformation might be better called

the involution theory, or theory of Einschachtelung (_Emboîtement._)

Cf. Leibniz (_Werke,_ Erdmann, 715). 'As animals generally are not

entirely born at conception or _generation,_ no more do they entirely

perish at what we call _death_; for it is reasonable that what does

not commence naturally, does not finish either in the order of nature.

Thus quitting their mask or their rags, they only return to a subtler

theatre, where however they can be as sensible and well regulated as

in the greater.... Thus not only the souls, but even the animals are

neither generable nor perishable: they are only developed, enveloped,

re-clothed, unclothed,--transformed. The souls never altogether quit

their body, and do not pass from one body into another body which is

entirely new to them. There is therefore no metempsychosis, but there

is metamorphosis. The animals change, take and quit only parts: which

takes place little by little and by small imperceptible parcels, but

continually, in nutrition: and takes place suddenly notably but rarely,

at conception, or at death, which make them gain or lose much all at

once.'

The theory of _Emboîtement_ or _Envelopment,_ according to Bonnet

(_Considérations,_ &c. ch. I) is that 'the germs of all the organised

bodies of one species were inclosed (_renfermés_) one in another,

and have been developed successively.' So according to Haller

(_Physiology,_ Tome vii. § 2) 'it is evident that in plants the

mother-plant contains the germs of several generations; and there is

therefore no inherent improbability in the view that _tous les enfans,

excepté un, fussent renfermés dans l'ovaire de la première Fille

d'Eve.'_ Cf. Weismann's _Continuity of the Germ-plasma._ Yet Bonnet

(_Contemplation de la Nature,_ part vii. ch. 9, note 2), says, 'The

germs are not enclosed like boxes or cases one in another, but a germ

forms part of another germ, as a grain forms part of the plant in which

it is developed.'

P. 293, § 163. Rousseau, _Contrat Social,_ liv. ii. ch. 3.

P. 296, § 165. The 'adequate' idea is a sub-species of the 'distinct.'

When an idea does not merely distinguish a thing from others (when

it is _clear),_ or in addition represent the characteristic marks

belonging to the object so distinguished (when it is _distinct),_ but

also brings out the farther characteristics of these characteristics,

the idea is _adequate._ Thus adequate is a sort of second power of

distinct. (Cf. Baumeister's _Instit. Philos. Ration._ 1765, §§ 64-94.)

Hegel's description rather agrees with the 'complete idea' 'by which

I put before my mind singly marks sufficient to discern the thing

represented from all other things in every case, state, and time'

(Baumeister, _ib._ § 88). But cf. Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 79: _notitia

adaequata._

P. 298, § 166. Cf. Baumeister, _Instit. Phil. Rat._ § 185: _Judicium

est idearum conjunctio vel separatio._

P. 299, § 166. _Punctum saliens:_ the _punctum sanguineum saliens_ of

Harvey (_de Generat. Animal, exercit._ 17), or first appearance of the

heart: the _στιγμὴ αἱματίνη_ in the egg, of which Aristotle (_Hist.

Anim._ vi. 3) says τoῡτο τὸ σημεῖον πηδᾷ καὶ κινεῖται ὥσπερ ἓμψυχον.

P. 301, § 169. Cf. Whately, _Logic_ (Bk. ii. ch. I, § 2), 'Of these

terms that which is spoken of is called the _subject;_ that which is

said of it, the _predicate._'

P. 303, § 171. Kant, _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ (p. 95, 2nd ed.) § 9.

P. 304, § 172. Cf. Jevons, _Principles of Science,_ ch. 3, 'on limited

identities' and 'negative propositions.'

P. 309. Ear-lobes. The remark is due to Blumenbach: cf. Hegel's

_Werke,_ v. 285.

P. 312. Colours, _i.e._ painters' colours; cf. _Werke,_ vii. 1. 314

(lecture-note). 'Painters are not such fools as to be Newtonians: they

have red, yellow, and blue, and out of these they make their other

colours.'

P. 315, § 181. For the genetic classification of judgments and

syllogisms and the passage from the former to the latter compare

especially Lotze's _Logic,_ Book i. And for the comprehensive

exhibition of the systematic process of judgment and inference see B.

Bosanquet's _Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge._ The passage from

Hegel's _Werke,_ v. 139, quoted at the head of that work is parallel to

the sentence in p. 318, 'The interest, therefore,' &c.

P. 320, § 186. The letters I-P-U, of course, stand for Individual,

Particular, and Universal.

P. 321, § 187. Fourth figure. This so-called Galenian figure was

differentiated from the first figure by the separation of the five

moods, which (after Arist. _An._ pr. i. 7 and ii. I) Theophrastus and

the later pupils, down at least to Boëthius, had subjoined to the four

recognised types of perfect syllogism. But its Galenian origin is more

than doubtful.

P. 325, § 190. Cf. Mill's _Logic,_ Bk. ii. ch. 3. 'In every syllogism

considered as an argument to prove the conclusion there is a _petitio

principii._'

Hegel's Induction is that strictly so called or complete induction, the

argument from the sum of actual experiences--that _per enumerationem

simplicem,_ and _διὰ πάντων._ Of course except by accident or by

artificial arrangement such completeness is impossible _in rerum

natura._

P. 326, § 190. The 'philosophy of Nature' referred to here is probably

that of Oken and the Schellingians; but later critics (_e.g._ Riehl,

_Philosoph. Criticismus,_ iii. 120) have accused Hegel himself of even

greater enormities in this department.

P. 328, § 192. _Elementarlehre:_ Theory of the Elements, called by

Hamilton (_Lectures on Logic,_ i. 65) Stoicheiology as opposed to

methodology. Cf. the Port Royal Logic. Kant's _Kritik_ observes the

same division of the subject.

P. 332, § 193. Anselm, _Proslogium,_ c. 2. In the _Monologium_ Anselm

expounds the usual argument from conditioned to unconditioned (_Est

igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est; per quod

est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, el omnino quidquid aliquid est.

Monol._ c. 3). But in the Proslogium he seeks an argument _quod nullo

ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret--i.e._ from the conception of

(God as) the highest and greatest that can be (_aliquid quo nihil majus

cogitari potest_) he infers its being (_sic ergo vere_ EST _aliquid

quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse._) The

absolute would not be absolute if the idea of it did not _ipso facto_

imply existence.

Gaunilo of Marmoutier in the _Liber pro insipiente_ made the objection

that the fact of such argument being needed showed that idea and

reality were _prima facie_ different. And in fact the argument of

Anselm deals with an Absolute which is object rather than subject,

thought rather than thinker; in human consciousness realised, but

not essentially self-affirming--implicit (an:sich) only, as said in

pp. 331, 333. And Anselm admits c. 15 _Domine, non solum es, quo

majus cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam majus quam cogitari potest_

(transcending our thought).

P. 333, line 2. This sentence has been transposed in the translation.

In the original it occurs after the quotation from the Latin in p. 332.

P. 334, § 194. Leibniz: for a brief account of the Monads see Caird's

_Crit. Philosophy of J. Kant,_ i. 86-95.

A monad is the simple substance or indivisible unity corresponding

to a body. It is as simple what the world is as a multiplicity: it

'represents,' _i.e._ concentrates into unity, the variety of phenomena:

is the expression of the material in the immaterial, of the compound in

the simple, of the extended outward in the inward. Its unity and its

representative capacity go together (cf. Lotze, _Mikrokosmus._) It is

the 'present which is full of the future and laden with the past' (ed.

Erdm. p. 197); the point which is all-embracing, the totality of the

universe. And yet there are monads--in the plural.

P. 334, § 194. Fichte, _Werke,_ i. 430. 'Every thorough-going dogmatic

philosopher is necessarily a fatalist.'

P. 338, § 195. Cf. _Encyclop._ § 463. 'This supreme inwardising of

ideation (Vorstellung) is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence,

reducing itself to the mere being, the general space of mere names and

meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because

subjectivity, at the same time the power over the different names, the

empty link which fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in fixed

order.'

Contemporaneously with Hegel, Herbart turned psychology in the line of

a 'statics and dynamics of the mind.' See (besides earlier suggestions)

his _De Attentionis mensura causisque primariis_ (1822) and his

_Ueber die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie

anzuwenden_ (1822).

P. 340, § 198. _Civil_ society: distinguished as the social

and economical organisation of the _bourgeoisie,_ with their

particularist-universal aims, from the true universal unity of

_citoyens_ in the state or ethico-political organism.

P. 345, § 204. Inner design: see Kant's _Kritik der Urtheilskraft,_ §

62.

Aristotle, _De Anima,_ ii. 4 (415. b. 7) φανερὸν δ' ὠς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ

ψυχὴ ατία: ii. 2 ζωὴν λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ

φθίσιν.

P. 347, § 206. Neutral first water, cf. _Encyclop._§ 284, 'without

independent individuality, without rigidity and intrinsic

determination, a thorough-going equilibrium.' Cf. _Werke,_ vii. 6.

168. 'Water is absolute neutrality, not like salt, an individualised

neutrality; and hence it was at an early date called the mother of

everything particular.' 'As the neutral it is the solvent of acids and

alkalis.' Cf. Oken's _Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie,_ §§ 294 and 432.

P. 348, § 206. Conclude = beschliessen: Resolve = entschliessen. Cf.

Chr. Sigwart, _Kleine Schriften,_ ii. 115, _seqq._

P. 359, § 216. Aristotle, _De Anim. Generat._ i. (726. b. 24) ἡ χεὶρ

ἄνεν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἔστι χεὶρ ἀλλὰ μόνον ὁμώνυμον.

Arist. _Metaph._ viii. 6 (1045. b. 11) ο δὲ (λέγoυσi) σύνθεσιν ἥ

σύνδεσμον ψυχῆς σώματι τὸ ζῆν.

P. 360, § 218. Sensibility, &c. This triplicity (as partly

distinguished by Haller after Glisson) of the functions of organic life

is largely worked out in Schelling, ii. 491.

P. 361, § 219. Cf. Schelling, ii. 540. As walking is a constantly

prevented falling, so life is a constantly prevented extinction of the

vital process.

P. 367, § 229. Spinoza (_Eth._ i. def. I) defines _causa sui_ as

_id cujus essentia involvit existentiam,_ and (in def. 3) defines

_substantia_ as _id quod in se est et per se concipitur._

Schelling: _e.g. Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie_ (1801),

(_Werke,_ iv. 114): 'I call reason the absolute reason, or reason,

in so far as it is thought as total indifference of subjective and

objective.'

P. 367, § 230. 'Mammals distinguish themselves': unter; unter:scheiden,

instead of scheiden: cf. _Werke,_ ii. 181. 'The distinctive marks of

animals, _e.g._ are taken from the claws and teeth: for in fact it

is not merely cognition which by this means distinguishes one animal

from another: but the animal thereby separates itself off: by these

weapons it keeps itself to itself and separate from the universal.'

Cf. _Werke,_ vii. a. 651 _seqq._ (_Encycl._ § 370) where reference is

made to Cuvier, _Recherches sur les ossements fossiles des quadrupèdes_

(1812), &c.

P. 368, § 230. Kant, _Kritik der Urtheilskraft:_ Einleitung, § 9

(note), (_Werke,_ ed. Ros. iv. 39); see Caird's _Critical Philosophy of

I. Kant,_ Book i. ch. 5; also Hegel's _Werke,_ ii. 3.

P. 369, § 231. An example of Wolfs pedantry is given in Hegel, _Werke,_

v. 307, from Wolfs _Rudiments of Architecture,_ Theorem viii. 'A window

must be broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably in it, side

by side. _Proof._ It is customary to recline with another person on the

window to look about. But as the architect ought to satisfy the main

views of the owner (§ I) he must make the window broad enough for two

persons to recline comfortably side by side.'

'Construction': cf. _Werke,_ ii. 38. 'Instead of its own internal life

and spontaneous movement, such a simple mode (as subject, object,

cause, substance, &c.) has expression given to it by perception (here

= sense-consciousness) on some superficial analogy: and this external

and empty application of the formula is called "Construction." The

procedure shares the qualities of all such formalism. How stupid-headed

must be the man, who could not in a quarter of an hour master the

theory of asthenic, sthenic and indirectly asthenic diseases' (this is

pointed at Schelling's _Werke,_ iii. 236) 'and the three corresponding

curative methods, and who, when, no long time since, such instruction

was sufficient, could not in this short period be transformed from

a mere practitioner into a "scientific" physician? The formalism of

_Naturphilosophie_ may teach _e.g._ that understanding is electricity,

or that the animal is nitrogen, or even that it is _like_ the South or

the North, or that it represents it,--as baldly as is here expressed

or with greater elaboration in terminology. At such teachings the

inexperienced may fall into a rapture of admiration, may reverence the

profound genius it implies,--may take delight in the sprightliness

of language which instead of the abstract _concept_ gives the more

pleasing _perceptual_ image, and may congratulate itself on feeling its

soul akin to such splendid achievement. The trick of such a wisdom is

as soon learnt as it is easy to practice; its repetition, when it grows

familiar, becomes as intolerable as the repetition of juggling once

detected. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is not harder to

manipulate than a painter's palette with two colours on it, say red and

green, the former to dye the surface if a historic piece, the latter if

a landscape is asked for.'

Kant (_Werke,_ iii. 36) in the 'Prolegomena to every future

Metaphysic,' § 7, says: 'We find, however, it is the peculiarity

of mathematical science that it must first exhibit its concept in

a percept, and do so _à priori_,--hence in a pure percept. This

observation with regard to the nature of mathematics gives a hint as to

the first and supreme condition of its possibility: it must be based

on some pure percept in which it can exhibit all its concepts _in

concreto_ and yet _à priori,_ or, as it is called, _construe_ them.'

The phrase, and the emphasis on the doctrine, that perception must be

taken as an auxiliary in mathematics,' belong specially to the second

edition of the _Kritik, e.g._ Pref. xii. To learn the properties of

the isosceles triangle the mathematical student must 'produce (by

'construction') what he himself thought into it and exhibited _à

priori_ according to concepts.'

'Construction, in general,' says Schelling (_Werke,_ v. 252:

cf. iv. 407) 'is the exhibition of the universal and particular

in unity':--'absolute unity of the ideal and the real.' v. 225.

Darstellung in intellektueller Anschauung ist philosophische

Konstruktion.

P. 372. 'Recollection' = Erinnerung: _e.g._ the return from

differentiation and externality to simplicity and inwardness:

distinguished from Gedächtniss = memory (specially of words).

P. 373, § 236. Cf. Schelling, _Werke,_ iv. 405. 'Every particular

object is in its absoluteness the Idea; and accordingly the Idea is

also the absolute object (Gegenstand) itself,--as the absolutely ideal

also the absolutely real.'

P. 374, § 236. Aristotle, _Metaphys._ xi. 9 (1074. 6. 34) αὑτὸν ἅρα

νοεῖ (ὁ νοῦς = θεος), εἵπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἐστιν ἡ νόησις

νοήσεως νόησις. Cf. Arist. _Metaph._ xii. 7.

P. 377, §239. 'Supposes a correlative' = ist für Eines. On Seyn: für

Eines, cf. _Werke,_ iii. 168. Das Ideëlle ist notwendig für:Eines, aber

es ist nicht für ein Anderes: das Eine für welches es ist, ist nur es

selbst.... God is therefore for-self (to himself) in so far as he

himself is that which is for him.

P. 379, § 244. The percipient idea (anschauende Idee), of course both

object and subject of intuition, is opposed to the Idea (as logical)

in the element of _Thought_: but still _as Idea_ and not--to use

Kant's phrase (_Kritik der r. Vern._ § 26)--as _natura materialiter

spectata._

THE END.