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The Augustan Reprint Society

HENRY MORE

_Democritus

Platonissans_

(1646)

_Introduction by_

P. G. STANWOOD

Publication Number 130

WILLIAM ANDREWS CLARK MEMORIAL LIBRARY

University of California, Los Angeles

1968

GENERAL EDITORS

George Robert Guffey, _University of California, Los Angeles_

Maximillian E. Novak, _University of California, Los Angeles_

Robert Vosper, _William Andrews Clark Memorial Library_

ADVISORY EDITORS

Richard C. Boys, _University of Michigan_

James L. Clifford, _Columbia University_

Ralph Cohen, _University of Virginia_

Vinton A. Dearing, _University of California, Los Angeles_

Arthur Friedman, _University of Chicago_

Louis A. Landa, _Princeton University_

Earl Miner, _University of California, Los Angeles_

Samuel H. Monk, _University of Minnesota_

Everett T. Moore, _University of California, Los Angeles_

Lawrence Clark Powell, _William Andrews Clark Memorial Library_

James Sutherland, _University College, London_

H. T. Swedenberg, Jr., _University of California, Los Angeles_

CORRESPONDING SECRETARY

Edna C. Davis, _William Andrews Clark Memorial Library_

INTRODUCTION

Henry More (1614-1687), the most interesting member of that group

traditionally known as the Cambridge Platonists, lived conscientiously

and well. Having early set out on one course, he never thought to change

it; he devoted his whole life to the joy of celebrating, again and

again, “a firm and unshaken Belief of the Existence of GOD . . . , a God

infinitely Good, as well as infinitely Great . . . .”[1] Such faith was

for More the starting point of his rational understanding: “with the

most fervent Prayers” he beseeched God, in his autobiographical

“Praefatio Generalissima,” “to set me free from the dark Chains, and

this so sordid Captivity of my own Will.” More offered to faith all

which his reason could know, and so it happened that he “was got into a

most Joyous and Lucid State of Mind,” something quite ineffable; to

preserve these “Sensations and Experiences of my own Soul,” he wrote

“a pretty full Poem call’d _Psychozoia_” (or _A Christiano-Platonicall

display of Life_), an exercise begun about 1640 and designed for no

audience but himself. There were times, More continued in his

autobiographical remarks, when he thought of destroying _Psychozoia_

because its style is rough and its language filled with archaisms. His

principal purpose in that poem was to demonstrate in detail the

spiritual foundation of all existence; Psyche, his heroine, is the

daughter of the Absolute, the general Soul who holds together the

metaphysical universe, against whom he sees reflected his own soul’s

mystical progress. More must, nevertheless, have been pleased with his

labor, for he next wrote _Psychathanasia Platonica: or Platonicall Poem

of the Immortality of Souls, especially Mans Soul_, in which he attempts

to demonstrate the immortality of the soul as a corrective to his age.

Then, he joined to that _Antipsychopannychia, or A Confutation of the

sleep of the Soul after death_, and _Antimonopsychia, or That all Souls

are not one_; at the urging of friends, he published the poems in

1642--his first literary work--as _Psychodia Platonica_.

In his argument for the soul’s immortality toward the end of

_Psychathanasia_ (III.4), More had urged that there was no need to plead

for any extension of the infinite (“a contradiction,” and also, it would

seem, a fruitless inquiry); but he soon changed his mind. The preface to

_Democritus Platonissans_ reproduces those stanzas of the earlier poem

which deny infinity (34 to the end of the canto) with a new (formerly

concluding) stanza 39 and three further stanzas “for a more easie and

naturall leading to the present Canto,” _i.e._, _Democritus

Platonissans_, which More clearly intended to be an addition, a fifth

canto to _Psychathanasia_ (Book III); and although _Democritus

Platonissans_ first appeared separately, More appended it to

_Psychathanasia_ in the second edition of his collected poems, this time

with English titles, the whole being called _A Platonick Song of the

Soul_ (1647).

There is little relationship between _Democritus Platonissans_ and the

rest of More’s poetry; even the main work to which it supposedly forms a

final and conclusive canto provides only the slightest excuse for such a

continuation. Certainly, in _Psychathanasia_, More is excited by the new

astronomy; he praises the Copernican system throughout Book III, giving

an account of it according to the lessons of his study of Galileo’s

_Dialogo_, which he may have been reading even as he wrote.[2] Indeed,

More tries to harmonize the two poems--his habit was always to look for

unity. But even though _Democritus Platonissans_ explores an

astronomical subject, just as the third part of _Psychathanasia_ also

does, its attitude and theme are quite different; for More had meanwhile

been reading Descartes.

More’s theory of the infinity of worlds and God’s plenitude evidently

owed a great deal to Descartes’ recent example; More responds

exuberantly to him, especially to his _Principes de la Philosophie_

(1644); for in him he fancied having found a true ally. Steeped in

Platonic and neo-Platonic thought, and determined to reconcile Spirit

with the rational mind of man, More thought he had discovered in

Cartesian ‘intuition’ what was not necessarily there. Descartes had

enjoyed an ecstatic illumination, and so had Plotinus; but this was not

enough, as More may have wanted to imagine, to make Descartes a

neo-Platonist.[3] But the Platonic element implicit in Descartes, his

theory of innate ideas, and his proof of the existence of God from the

idea of God, all helped to make More so receptive to him. Nevertheless,

More did not really need Descartes, nor, as he himself was later to

discover, had he even understood him properly, for More had looked at

him only to find his own reflection.

But there was nothing really new about the idea of infinite worlds which

More described in _Democritus Platonissans_; it surely was not a

conception unique to Descartes. The theory was a common one in Greek and

Renaissance thought. Democritus and the Epicureans, of course, advocated

the theme of infinite worlds in an infinite universe which More

accepted; but at the same time, he rejected their view of a mechanistic

and fortuitous creation. Although Plato specifically rejects the idea of

infinite worlds (in _Timaeus_), More imagines, as the title of his poem

implies, a Platonic universe, by which he really means neo-Platonic,

combined with a Democritean plurality of worlds. More filled space, not

with the infinite void of the Atomists, but with the Divine, ever active

immanence. More, in fact, in an early philosophic work, _An Antidote

against Atheisme_ (1652), and again in _Divine Dialogues_ (1668),

refutes Lucretius by asserting the usefulness of all created things in

God’s Providence and the essential design in Nature. His reference in

_Democritus Platonissans_ (st. 20) is typical: “though I detest the

sect/ of Epicurus for their manners vile,/ Yet what is true I may not

well reject.” In bringing together Democritus’ theories and neo-Platonic

thought, More obviously has attempted reconciliation of two exclusive

world views, but with dubious success.

While More stands firmly before a familiar tradition, his belief in an

infinity of worlds evidently has little immediate connection with any

predecessors. Even Bruno’s work, or Thomas Digges,’ which could have

occupied an important place, seems to have had little, if any, direct

influence on More. It was Descartes who stimulated his thought at the

most receptive moment: in 1642 to have denied a theory which in 1646 he

proclaimed with such force evidently argues in favor of a most powerful

attachment. More responded enthusiastically to what he deemed a

congenial metaphysical system; as a champion of Descartes, he was first

to make him known in England and first in England to praise the infinity

of worlds, yet Descartes’ system could give to him little real solace.

More embraces God’s plenitude and infinity of worlds, he rejoices in the

variety and grandeur of the universe, and he worships it as he might God

Himself; but Descartes was fundamentally uninterested in such

enthusiasms and found them even repellant--as well as unnecessary--to

his thought. For More the doctrine of infinity was a proper corollary of

Copernican astronomy and neo-Platonism (as well as Cabbalistic

mysticism) and therefore a necessity to his whole elaborate and eclectic

view of the world.

In introducing Cartesian thought into England, More emphasized

particular physical doctrines mainly described in _The Principles of

Philosophy_; he shows little interest in the _Discourse on the Method of

Rightly Conducting the Reason_ (1637), or in the _Meditations_ (1641),

both of which were also available to him when he wrote _Democritus

Platonissans_. In the preface to his poem, he refers to Descartes whom

he seems to have read hopefully: surely “infinitude” is the same as the

Cartesian “indefinite.” “_For what is his =mundus indefinitè extensus=,

but =extensus infinitè=? Else it sounds onely =infinitus quoad nos=, but

=simpliciter finitus=_,” for there can be no space “_unstuffd with

Atoms_.” More thinks that Descartes seems “to mince it,” that difficulty

lies in the interpretation of a word, not in an essential idea. He is

referring to Part II, xxi, of _The Principles_, but he quotes, with

tacit approval, from Part III, i and ii, in the motto to the poem. More

undoubtedly knows the specific discussion of ‘infinity’ in Part I,

xxvi-xxviii, where he must first have felt uneasy delight on reading

“that it is not needful to enter into disputes regarding the infinite,

but merely to hold all that in which we can find no limits as

indefinite, such as the extension of the world . . . .”[4] More asked

Descartes to clarify his language in their correspondence of 1648-49,

the last year of Descartes’ life.

_Democritus Platonissans_ is More’s earliest statement about absolute

space and time; by introducing these themes into English philosophy, he

contributed significantly to the intellectual history of the seventeenth

century. Newton, indeed, was able to make use of More’s forging efforts;

but of relative time or space and their measurement, which so much

concerned Newton, More had little to say. He was preoccupied with the

development of a theory which would show that immaterial substance, with

space and time as attributes, is as real and as absolute as the

Cartesian geometrical and spatial account of matter which he felt was

true but much in need of amplification.

In his first letter to Descartes, of 11 December 1648, More wrote:

“. . . this indefinite extension is either _simpliciter_ infinite, or

only in respect to us. If you understand extension to be infinite

_simpliciter_, why do you obscure your thought by too low and too modest

words? If it is infinite only in respect to us, extension, in reality,

will be finite; for our mind is the measure neither of the things nor of

truth. . . .” Unsatisfied by his first answer from Descartes (5 February

1649), he urges his point again (5 March): if extension can describe

matter, the same quality must apply to the immaterial and yet be only

one of many attributes of Spirit. In his second letter to More

(15 April), Descartes answers firmly: “It is repugnant to my concept to

attribute any limit to the world, and I have no other measure than my

perception for what I have to assert or to deny. I say, therefore, that

the world is indeterminate or indefinite, because I do not recognize in

it any limits. But I dare not call it infinite as I perceive that God is

greater than the world, not in respect to His extension, because, as I

have already said, I do not acknowledge in God any proper [extension],

but in respect to His perfection . . . . It is repugnant to my mind

. . . it implies a contradiction, that the world be finite or limited,

because I cannot but conceive a space outside the boundaries of the

world wherever I presuppose them.” More plainly fails to understand the

basic dualism inherent in Cartesian philosophy and to sense the

irrelevance of his questions. While Descartes is really disposing of the

spiritual world in order to get on with his analysis of finite

experience, More is keenly attempting to reconcile neo-Platonism with

the lively claims of matter. His effort can be read as the brave attempt

to harmonize an older mode of thought with the urgency of the ‘new

philosophy’ which called the rest in doubt. More saw this conflict and

the implications of it with a kind of clarity that other men of his age

hardly possessed. But the way of Descartes, which at first seemed to him

so promising, certainly did not lead to the kind of harmony which he

sought.

More’s original enthusiasm for Descartes declined as he understood

better that the Cartesian world in practice excluded spirits and souls.

Because Descartes could find no necessary place even for God Himself,

More styled him, in _Enchiridion Metaphysicum_ (1671), the “Prince of

the Nullibists”; these men “readily acknowledge there are such things as

_Incorporeal Beings_ or _Spirits_, yet do very peremptorily contend,

that they are _no where_ in the whole World [;] . . . because they so

boldly affirm that a Spirit is _Nullibi_, that is to say, _no where_,”

they deserve to be called _Nullibists_.[5] In contrast to these false

teachers, More describes absolute space by listing twenty epithets which

can be applied either to God or to pure extension, such as “Unum,

Simplex, Immobile . . . Incomprehensible ”[6] There is, however,

a great difficulty here; for while Space and Spirit are eternal and

uncreated, they yet contain material substance which has been created by

God. If the material world possesses infinite extension, as More

generally believes, that would preclude any need of its having a

creator. In order to avoid this dilemma, which _Democritus Platonissans_

ignores, More must at last separate matter and space, seeing the latter

as an attribute of God through which He is able to contain a finite

world limited in space as well as in time. In writing that “this

infinite space because of its infinity is distinct from matter,”[7] More

reveals the direction of his conclusion; the dichotomy it embodies is

Cartesianism in reverse.

While More always labored to describe the ineffable, his earliest work,

the poetry, may have succeeded in this wish most of all. Although he

felt that his poetry was aiming toward truths which his “_later and

better concocted Prose_”[8] reached, the effort cost him the

suggestiveness of figurative speech. In urging himself on toward an ever

more consistent statement of belief, he lost much of his beginning

exuberance (best expressed in the brief “Philosopher’s Devotion”) and

the joy of intellectual discovery. In the search “_to find out Words

which will prove faithful witnesses of the peculiarities of my

Thoughts_,” he staggers under the unsupportable burden of too many

words. In trying so desperately to clarify his thought, he rejected

poetic discourse as “slight”; only a language free of metaphor and

symbol could, he supposed, lead toward correctness. Indeed, More soon

renounced poetry; he apparently wrote no more after collecting it in

_Philosophical Poems_ (1647), when he gave up poetry for “more seeming

Substantial performances in solid _Prose_.”[9] “Cupids Conflict,” which

is “annexed” to _Democritus Platonissans_, is an interesting revelation

of the failure of poetry, as More felt it: he justifies his “rude rugged

uncouth style” by suggesting that sweet verses avoid telling important

truths; harshness and obscurity may at least remind one that there is a

significance beyond mere words. His lament is characteristic: “How ill

alas! with wisdome it accords/ To sell my living sense for liveless

words.”

In spite of these downcast complaints, More was quite capable of lively

and meaningful poetic ideas. One is the striking image of the cone which

occurs in _Democritus Platonissans_ (especially in stanzas 7-8, 66-67,

and 88) and becomes the most essential symbol to More’s expression

of infinitude and extension. The figure first appears in

_Antipsychopannychia_ (II.9) where his purpose is to reconcile the world

Soul with Christian eschatology. In _Democritus Platonissans_, the cone

enables More to adapt the familiar Hermetic paradox:

A Circle whose circumference no where

Is circumscrib’d, whose Centre’s each where set,

But the low Cusp’s a figure circular,

Whose compasse is ybound, but centre’s every where. (st. 8)

Every point on the circumference, or base of the cone, relates to the

single point at the top. The world, More wants to say, has no limits, no

center, yet there are bounds in its not having any. More recognizes the

contradiction when he fancies “some strong arm’d Archer” at the wide

world’s edge (st. 37). Where shall he send his shafts? Into “mere

vacuity”? But More hardly seems aware of the inappropriateness of the

cone: he uses a geometrical figure to locate space, time, and numberless

worlds within the universal sight of God, but matter is infinite,

“distinct/ And yet proceeding from the Deitie” (st. 68). Obviously, the

archer must forever be sending his arrows through an infinitely

expanding surface. Nevertheless, the cone has great value as a metaphor,

as a richly suggestive and fascinating conception. More, however, does

not want to speak metaphorically; he is attempting to disclose truths,

literal and plain, where pretty words and metaphors have no place. Even

as he is writing his most effective poetry, we are aware that More is

denying his poetic office; for he is pleading a reasoned case where the

words crack and strain, where poetic meaning gathers, only to be denied.

But these objections momentarily disappear when More forgets himself

enough to let us feel his imagination and does not worry that we might

miss the proofs of his philosophy. _Democritus Platonissans_ concludes

with an apocalyptic vision wherein the poet imagines the reconciliation

of infinite worlds and time within God’s immensity. He is also

attempting to harmonize _Psychathanasia_, where he rejected infinitude,

with its sequel, _Democritus Platonissans_, where he has everywhere been

declaring it; thus we should think of endless worlds as we should think

of Nature and the Phoenix, dying yet ever regenerative, sustained by a

“centrall power/ Of hid spermatick life” which sucks “sweet heavenly

juice” from above (st. 101). More closes his poem on a vision of harmony

and ceaseless energy, a most fit ending for one who dared to believe

that the new philosophy sustained the old, that all coherence had not

gone out of the world, but was always there, only waiting to be

discovered afresh in this latter age.

The University of British Columbia

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

[Footnote 1: The quotations from More’s Latin autobiography occur in the

_Opera Omnia_ (London, 1675-79), portions of which Richard Ward

translated in _The Life of . . . Henry More_ (London, 1710). Cf. the

modern edition of this work, ed. M. F. Howard (London, 1911), pp. 61,

67-68, the text followed here. There is a recent reprint of the _Opera

Omnia_ in 3 volumes (Hildesheim, 1966) with an introduction by Serge

Hutin. The “Praefatio Generalissima” begins vol. II. 1. One passage in

it which Ward did not translate describes the genesis of _Democritus

Platonissans_. More writes that after finishing _Psychathanasia_, he

felt a change of heart: “Postea vero mutata sententia furore nescio quo

Poetico incitatus supra dictum Poema scripsi, ea potissimum innixus

ratione quod liquido constaret extensionem spacii dari infinitam, nec

majores absurditates pluresve contingere posse in Materia infinita,

infinitaque; Mundi duratione, quam in infinita Extensione spacii”

(p. ix).]

[Footnote 2: Cf. Lee Haring’s unpub. diss., “Henry More’s

_Psychathanasia_ and _Democritus Platonissans_: A Critical Edition,”

(Columbia Univ., 1961), pp. 33-57.]

[Footnote 3: Marjorie Hope Nicolson’s various articles and books which

in part deal with More are important to the discussion that follows, and

especially “The Early Stage of Cartesianism in England,” SP, XXVI

(1929), 356-379; _Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory_ (Ithaca, 1959), pp.

113-143, and _The Breaking of the Circle_ (New York, 1960), pp.

158-165.]

[Footnote 4: Cf. _The Meditations and Selections from the Principles of

René Descartes_, trans. John Veitch (Chicago, 1908), p. 143. The

quotations from the letters which follow occur in Alexandre Koyré’s very

helpful book, _From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe_

(Baltimore, 1957), pp. 114, 122-123, but the complete and original texts

can be consulted in Descartes, _Correspondance avec Arnaud et Morus_,

ed. G. Lewis (Paris, 1953).]

[Footnote 5: This passage occurs at the beginning of “The Easie, True,

and Genuine Notion, And consistent Explication Of the Nature of a

Spirit,” a free translation of _Enchiridion Metaphysicum_, I. 27-28, by

John Collins which he included in Joseph Glanvil’s _Saducismus

Triumphatus_ (London, 1681). I quote from the text as given in

_Philosophical Writings of Henry More_, ed. F. I. MacKinnon (New York,

1925), p. 183.]

[Footnote 6: Cf. _Enchiridion Metaphysicum_, VIII. 8, trans. Mary Whiton

Calkins and included in John Tull Baker, _An Historical and Critical

Examination of English Space and Time Theories_ . . . (Bronxville, N.Y.,

1930), p. 12. For the original, cf. _Opera Omnia_, II. 1, p. 167.]

[Footnote 7: “_Infinitum_ igitur hoc _Extensum_ à Materia distinctum,”

_Enchiridion Metaphysicum_, VIII. 9, in _Opera Omnia, loc. cit._ Quoted

by MacKinnon, p. 262.]

[Footnote 8: This and the following reference appear in _An Explanation

of the grand Mystery of Godliness_ (London, 1660), “To the Reader,” pp.

vi and v.]

[Footnote 9: _Ibid._, II. xi. 5 (p. 52).]

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The text of this edition is reproduced from a copy in the Henry E.

Huntington Library.

Democritus Platonissans,

Or,

_AN ESSAY_

Upon The

INFINITY OF WORLDS

Out Of

PLATONICK PRINCIPLES.

Hereunto is annexed

CUPIDS CONFLICT

together with

THE PHILOSOPHERS DEVOTION:

And a Particular Interpretation

appertaining to the three last books of the

_Song of the Soul_.

By _H. More_ Master of Arts, and Fellow of

Christs Colledge in Cambridge.

Ἀγαθὸς ἦν τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς

οὐδέποτε ἐγγίνεται φθόνος. Τούτου δ’ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὁτι μάλιστα

ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὑτῷ. Plat.

_Pythagoras Terram Planetam quendam esse censuit qui circa solem

in centro mundi defixum converteretur, Pythagorans secuti sunt

Philolaus, Seleucus, Cleanthes, &c. imò PLATO jam senex, ut

narrat Theophrastus._ Libert. Fromond, de Orbe terræ immobili.

_CAMBRIDGE_

Printed by ROGER DANIEL, Printer to

the UNIVERSITIE. 1646.

To the Reader.

READER,

_If thou standest not to the judgement of thine eye more then of thy

reason, this fragment may passe favourably, though in the neglectfull

disguise of a fragment; if the strangenesse of the argument prove no

hinderance. INFINITIE of WORLDS! A thing monstrous if assented to, and

to be startled at, especially by them, whose thoughts this one have

alwayes so engaged, that they can find no leisure to think of any thing

else. But I onely make a bare proposall to more acute judgements, of

what my sportfull fancie, with pleasure hath suggested: following my old

designe of furnishing mens minds with varietie of apprehensions

concerning the most weightie points of Philosophie, that they may not

seem rashly to have settled in the truth, though it be the truth:

a thing as ill beseeming Philosophers, as hastie prejudicative sentence

Politicall Judges. But if I had relinquishd here my wonted self, in

proving Dogmaticall, I should have found very noble Patronage for the

cause among the ancients, =Epicurus=, =Democritus=, =Lucretius=, =&c.=

Or if justice may reach the dead, do them the right, as to shew, that

though they be hooted at, by the Rout of the learned, as men of

monstrous conceits, they were either very wise or exceeding fortunate to

light on so probable and specious an opinion, in which notwithstanding

there is so much difficultie and seeming inconsistencie._

_Nay and that sublime and subtil Mechanick too, =DesChartes=, though he

seem to mince it must hold infinitude of worlds, or which is as harsh

one infinite one. For what is his =mundus indefinitè extensus=, but

=extensus infinitè=? Else it sounds onely =infinitus quoad nos= but

=simpliciter finitus=. But if any space be left out unstuffd with Atoms,

it will hazard the dissipation of the whole frame of Nature into

disjoynted dust. As may be proved by the Principles of his own

Philosophie. And that there is space whereever God is, or any actuall

and self-subsistent Being, seems to me no plainer then one of the κοιναί

ἔννοιαι._

_For mine own part I must confesse these apprehensions do plainly oppose

what heretofore I have conceived; but I have sworn more faithfull

friendship with Truth then with myself. And therefore without all

remorse lay batterie against mine own edifice: not sparing to shew how

weak that is, that my self now deems not impregnably strong. I have at

the latter end of the last Canto of =Psychathanasia=, not without

triumph concluded, that the world hath not continued =ab æterno=, from

this ground:_

Extension

That’s infinite implies a contradiction.

_And this is in answer to an objection against my last argument of the

souls Immortalitie, =viz.= divine goodnesse, which I there make the

measure of his providence. That ground limits the essence of the world

as well as its duration, and satisfies the curiositie of the Opposer, by

shewing the incompossibilitie in the Creature, not want of goodnesse in

the Creatour to have staid the framing of the Universe. But now roused

up by a new Philosophick furie, I answer that difficultie by taking away

the Hypothesis of either the world or time being finite: defending the

infinitude of both, which though I had done with a great deal of vigour

and life, and semblance of assent, it would have agreed well enough with

the free beat of Poesie, and might have passed for a pleasant flourish:

but the severitie of my own judgement, and sad Genius hath cast in many

correctives and coolers into the Canto it self; so that it cannot amount

to more then a discussion. And discussion is no prejudice but an honour

to the truth: for then and never but then is she Victorious. And what a

glorious Trophee shall the finite world erect when it hath vanquished

the Infinite; a Pygmee a Giant._

_For the better understanding of the connexion of this Appendix, with

the Poem of the souls Immortalitie; I have taken off the last stanza’s

thereof, and added some few new ones to them for a more easie and

naturall leading to the present Canto. =Psychathan. lib. 3. Cant. 4.=_

_Stanz._ 33d.

But thou who ere thou art that thus dost strive

With fierce assault my groundwork to subvert,

And boldly dost into Gods secrets dive,

Base fear my manly face note make m’ avert.

In that odde question which thou first didst stert,

I’ll plainly prove thine incapacitie,

And force thy feeble feet back to revert,

That cannot climb so high a mysterie,

I’le shew thee strange perplexed inconsistencie.

Why was this world from all infinitie

Not made? say’st thou: why? could it be so made

Say I. For well observe the sequencie:

If this Out-world continually hath wade

Through a long long-spun-time that never had

Beginning, then there as few circulings

Have been in the quick Moon as Saturn sad;

And still more plainly this clear truth to sing,

As many years as dayes or flitting houres have been.

For things that we conceive are infinite,

One th’ other no’te surpasse in quantitie.

So I have prov’d with clear convincing light,

This world could never from infinitie

Been made. Certain deficiencie

Doth alwayes follow evolution:

Nought’s infinite but tight eternitie

Close thrust into itself: extension

That’s infinite implies a contradiction.

So then for ought we know this world was made

So soon as such a Nature could exist;

And though that it continue, never fade,

Yet never will it be that that long twist

Of time prove infinite, though ner’e desist

From running still. But we may safely say

Time past compar’d with this long future list

Doth show as if the world but yesterday

Were made, and in due time Gods glory out may ray.

Then this short night and ignorant dull ages

Will quite be swallowed in oblivion;

And though this hope by many surly Sages

Be now derided, yet they’ll all be gone

In a short time, like Bats and Owls yflone

At dayes approch. This will hap certainly

At this worlds shining conflagration.

Fayes, Satyrs, Goblins the night merrily

May spend, but ruddy Sol shall make them all to flie.

The roaring Lions and drad beasts of prey

Rule in the dark with pitious crueltie;

But harmlesse Man is matter of the day,

Which doth his work in pure simplicitie.

God blesse his honest usefull industrie.

But pride and covetize, ambition,

Riot, revenge, self-love, hypocrisie,

Contempt of goodnesse, forc’d opinion;

These and such like do breed the worlds confusion.

But sooth to say though my triumphant Muse

Seemeth to vant as in got victorie,

And with puissant stroke the head to bruize

Of her stiff so, and daze his phantasie,

Captive his reason, dead each facultie:

Yet in her self so strong a force withstands

That of her self afraid, she’ll not aby,

Nor keep the field. She’ll fall by her own hand

As _Ajax_ once laid _Ajax_ dead upon the strand.

For thus her-self by her own self’s oppos’d;

The Heavens the Earth the universall Frame

Of living Nature God so soon disclos’d

As He could do, or she receive the same.

All times delay since that must turn to blame,

And what cannot He do that can be done?

And what might let but by th’ all-powerfull Name

Or Word of God, the Worlds Creation

More suddenly were made then mans swift thought can run?

Wherefore that Heavenly Power or is as young

As this Worlds date; or else some needlesse space

Of time was spent, before the Earth did clung

So close unto her-self and seas embrace

Her hollow breast, and if that time surpasse

A finite number then Infinitie

Of years before this Worlds Creation passe.

So that the durance of the Deitie

We must contract or strait his full Benignitie.

But for the cradle of the _Cretian Jove_,

And guardians of his vagient Infancie

What sober man but sagely will reprove?

Or drown the noise of the fond _Dactyli_

By laughter loud? Dated Divinitie

Certes is but the dream of a drie brain:

God maim’d in goodnesse, inconsistencie;

Wherefore my troubled mind is now in pain

Of a new birth, which this one Canto’ll not contain.

_Now Reader, thou art arrived to the Canto it self, from which I have

kept thee off by too tedious Preface and Apologie, which is seldome made

without consciousnesse of some fault, which I professe I find not in my

self, unlesse this be it, that I am more tender of thy satisfaction then

mine own credit. As for that high sullen Poem, =Cupids Conflict=, I must

leave it to thy candour and favourable censure. The =Philosophers

Devotion= I cast in onely, that the latter pages should not be

unfurnished._

H. M.

_Nihil tamen frequentius inter Autores occurrit, quám ut omnia adeò ex

moduli ferè sensuum suorum æstiment, ut ea quæ insuper infinitis rerum

spatiis extare possunt, sive superbè sive imprudenter rejiciant; quin &

ea omnia in usum suum fabricata fuisse glorientur, perinde facientes ac

si pediculi humanum caput, aut pulices sinum muliebrem propter se solos

condita existimarent, eáque demum ex gradibus saltibúsve suis

metirentur. =The Lord Herbert in his De Causis Errorum.=_

_De generali totius hujus mundi aspectabilis constructione ut rectè

Philosophemur duo sunt imprimis observanda: Unum ut attendentes ad

infinitam Dei potentiam & bonitatem nè vereamur nimis ampla & pulchra &

absoluta ejus opera imaginari: sed è contra caveamus, nè si quos fortè

limites nobis non certò cognitos, in ipsis supponamus, non satìs

magnificè de creatoris potentia sentire videamur._

_Alterum, ut etiam caveamus, nè nimis superbè de nobis ipsis sentiamus.

Quod fieret non modò, si quos limites nobis nullâ cognitos ratione, nec

divinà revelatione, mundo vellemus affingere, tanquam si vis nostra

cogitationis, ultra id quod à Deo revera factum est ferri posset; sed

etiam maximè, si res omnes propter nos solos, ab illo creatas esse

fingeremus. =Renatus DesCartes in his Princip. Philosoph. the third

part.=_

THE ARGUMENT.

_’Gainst boundlesse time th’ objections made,

And wast infinity

Of worlds, are with new reasons weigh’d,

Mens judgements are left free._

Hence, hence unhallowed ears and hearts more hard

Then Winter clods fast froze with Northern wind.

But most of all, foul tongue I thee discard

That blamest all that thy dark strait’ned mind,

Can not conceive: But that no blame thou find;

What e’re my pregnant Muse brings forth to light,

She’l not acknowledge to be of her kind,

Till Eagle-like she turn them to the sight

Of the eternall Word all deckt with glory bright.

Strange sights do straggle in my restlesse thoughts,

And lively forms with orient colours clad

Walk in my boundlesse mind, as men ybrought

Into some spacious room, who when they’ve had

A turn or two, go out, although unbad.

All these I see and know, but entertain

None to my friend but who’s most sober sad;

Although the time my roof doth them contain

Their pretence doth possesse me till they out again.

And thus possest in silver trump I found

Their guise, their shape, their gesture and array.

But as in silver trumpet nought is found

When once the piercing sound is past away,

(Though while the mighty blast therein did stay,

Its tearing noise so terribly did shrill,

That it the heavens did shake, and earth dismay)

As empty I of what my flowing quill

In heedlesse hast elswhere, or here, may hap to spill.

For ’tis of force and not of a set will.

Ne dare my wary mind afford assent

To what is plac’d above all mortall skill.

But yet our various thoughts to represent

Each gentle wight will deem of good intent.

Wherefore with leave th’ infinitie I’ll sing

Of time, Of Space: or without leave; I’m brent

With eagre rage, my heart for joy doth spring,

And all my spirits move with pleasant trembeling.

An inward triumph doth my soul up-heave

And spread abroad through endlesse ’spersed aire.

My nimble mind this clammie clod doth leave,

And lightly stepping on from starre to starre

Swifter then lightning, passeth wide and farre,

Measuring th’ unbounded Heavens and wastfull skie;

Ne ought she finds her passage to debarre,

For still the azure Orb as she draws nigh

Gives back, new starres appear, the worlds walls ’fore her flie.

For what can stand that is so badly staid?

Well may that fall whose ground-work is unsure.

And what hath wall’d the world but thoughts unweigh’d

In freer reason? That antiquate, secure,

And easie dull conceit of corporature;

Of matter; quantitie, and such like gear

Hath made this needlesse, thanklesse inclosure,

Which I in full disdain quite up will tear

And lay all ope, that as things are they may appear.

For other they appear from what they are

By reason that their Circulation

Cannot well represent entire from farre

Each portion of the _Cuspis_ of the Cone

(Whose nature is elsewhere more clearly shown)

I mean each globe, whether of glaring light

Or else opake, of which the earth is one.

If circulation could them well transmit

Numbers infinite of each would strike our ’stonishd sight;

All in just bignesse and right colours dight

But totall presence without all defect

’Longs onely to that Trinitie by right,

_Ahad_, _Æon_, _Psyche_ with all graces deckt,

Whose nature well this riddle will detect;

A Circle whose circumference no where

Is circumscrib’d, whose Centre’s each where set,

But the low Cusp’s a figure circular,

Whose compasse is ybound, but centre’s every where.

Wherefore who’ll judge the limits of the world

By what appears unto our failing sight

Appeals to sense, reason down headlong hurld

Out of her throne by giddie vulgar might.

But here base senses dictates they will dight

With specious title of Philosophie,

And stiffly will contend their cause is right

From rotten rolls of school antiquitie,

Who constantly denie corporall Infinitie.

But who can prove their corporalitie

Since matter which thereto’s essentiall

If rightly sifted ’s but a phantasie.

And quantitie who’s deem’d Originall

Is matter, must with matter likewise fall.

What ever is, is Life and Energie

From God, who is th’ Originall of all;

Who being everywhere doth multiplie

His own broad shade that endlesse throughout all doth lie.

He from the last projection of light

Ycleep’d _Shamajim_, which is liquid fire

(It _Æther_ eke and centrall _Tasis_ hight)

Hath made each shining globe and clumperd mire

Of dimmer Orbs. For Nature doth inspire

Spermatick life, but of a different kind.

Hence those congenit splendour doth attire

And lively heat, these darknesse dead doth bind,

And without borrowed rayes they be both cold and blind.

All these be knots of th’ universall stole

Of sacred _Psyche_; which at first was fine,

Pure, thin, and pervious till hid powers did pull

Together in severall points and did encline

The nearer parts in one clod to combine.

Those centrall spirits that the parts did draw

The measure of each globe did then define,

Made things impenetrable here below,

Gave colour, figure, motion, and each usuall law.

And what is done in this Terrestriall starre

The same is done in every Orb beside.

Each flaming Circle that we see from farre

Is but a knot in _Psyches_ garment tide.

From that lax shadow cast throughout the wide

And endlesse world, that low’st projection

Of universall life each thing’s deriv’d

What e’re appeareth in corporeall fashion;

For body’s but this spirit, fixt, grosse by conspissation.

And that which doth conspissate active is;

Wherefore not matter but some living sprite

Of nimble Nature which this lower mist

And immense field of Atoms doth excite,

And wake into such life as best doth fit

With his own self. As we change phantasies

The essence of our soul not chang’d a whit,

So do these Atoms change their energies

Themselves unchanged into new Centreïties.

And as our soul’s not superficially

Colourd by phantasms, nor doth them reflect

As doth a looking-glasse such imag’rie

As it to the beholder doth detect:

No more are these lightly or smear’d or deckt

With form or motion which in them we see,

But from their inmost Centre they project

Their vitall rayes, not merely passive be,

But by occasion wak’d rouze up themselves on high.

So that they’re life, form, sprite, not matter pure,

For matter pure is a pure nullitie,

What nought can act is nothing, I am sure;

And if all act, that is they’ll not denie

But all that is is form: so easily

By what is true, and by what they embrace

For truth, their feigned Corporalitie

Will vanish into smoke, but on I’ll passe,

More fully we have sung this in another place.

Wherefore more boldly now to represent

The nature of the world, how first things were

How now they are: This endlesse large Extent

Of lowest life (which I styled whileere

The _Cuspis_ of the _Cone_ that’s every where)

Was first all dark, till in this spacious Hall

Hideous through silent horrour torches clear

And lamping lights bright shining over all

Were set up in due distances proportionall.

Innumerable numbers of fair Lamps

Were rightly ranged in this hollow hole,

To warm the world and chace the shady damps

Of immense darknesse, rend her pitchie stole

Into short rags more dustie dimme then coal.

Which pieces then in severall were cast

(Abhorred reliques of that vesture foul)

Upon the Globes that round those torches trac’d,

Which still fast on them stick for all they run so fast.

Such an one is that which mortall men call Night,

A little shred of that unbounded shade.

And such a Globe is that which Earth is hight;

By witlesse Wizzards the sole centre made

Of all the world, and on strong pillars staid.

And such a lamp or light is this our Sun,

Whose firie beams the scortched Earth invade.

But infinite such as he, in heaven won,

And more then infinite Earths about those Suns do run;

And to speak out: though I detest the sect

Of _Epicurus_ for their manners vile,

Yet what is true I may not well reject.

Truth’s incorruptible, ne can the style

Of vitious pen her sacred worth defile.

If we no more of truth should deign t’ embrace

Then what unworthy mouths did never soyl,

No truths at all mongst men would finden place

But make them speedie wings and back to Heaven apace.

I will not say our world is infinite,

But that infinitie of worlds ther be.

The Centre of our world’s the lively light

Of the warm sunne, the visible Deitie

Of this externall Temple. _Mercurie_

Next plac’d and warm’d more throughly by his rayes,

Right nimbly ’bout his golden head doth flie:

Then _Venus_ nothing slow about him strayes,

And next our _Earth_ though seeming sad full spritely playes.

And after her _Mars_ rangeth in a round

With firie locks and angry flaming eye,

And next to him mild _Jupiter_ is found,

But Saturn cold wons in our utmost skie.

The skirts of his large Kingdome surely lie

Near to the confines of some other worlds

Whose Centres are the fixed starres on high,

’Bout which as their own proper Suns are hurld

_Joves_, _Earths_ and _Saturns_; round on their own axes twurld.

Little or nothing are those starres to us

Which in the azure Evening gay appear

(I mean for influence) but judicious

Nature and carefull Providence her dear

And matchlesse work did so contrive whileere,

That th’ Hearts or Centres in the wide world pight

Should such a distance each to other bear,

That the dull Planets with collated light

By neighbour suns might cheared be in dampish night.

And as the Planets in our world (of which

The sun’s the heart and kernell) do receive

Their nightly light from suns that do enrich

Their sable mantle with bright gemmes, and give

A goodly splendour, and sad men relieve

With their fair twinkling rayes, so our worlds sunne

Becomes a starre elsewhere, and doth derive

Joynt light with others, cheareth all that won

In those dim duskish Orbs round other suns that run.

This is the parergon of each noble fire

Of neighbour worlds to be the nightly starre,

But their main work is vitall heat t’ inspire

Into the frigid spheres that ’bout them fare,

Which of themselves quite dead and barren are.

But by the wakening warmth of kindly dayes,

And the sweet dewie nights they well declare

Their seminall virtue in due courses raise

Long hidden shapes and life, to their great Makers praise.

These with their suns I severall worlds do call,

Whereof the number I deem infinite:

Else infinite darknesse were in this great Hall

Of th’ endlesse Universe; For nothing finite

Could put that immense shadow unto flight.

But if that infinite Suns we shall admit,

Then infinite worlds follow in reason right.

For every Sun with Planets must be fit,

And have some mark for his farre-shining shafts to hit.

But if he shine all solitarie, alone,

What mark is left,? what aimed scope or end

Of his existence? wherefore every one

Hath a due number of dim Orbs that wend

Around their centrall fire. But wrath will rend

This strange composure back’d with reason stout

And rasher tongues right speedily will spend

Their forward censure, that my wits run out

On wool-gathering, through infinite spaces all about.

What sober man will dare once to avouch

An infinite number of dispersed starres?

This one absurdity will make him crouch

And eat his words; Division nought impairs

The former whole, nor he augments that spares.

Strike every tenth out, that which doth remain,

An equall number with the former shares,

And let the tenth alone, th’ whole nought doth gain,

For infinite to infinite is ever the same.

The tenth is infinite as the other nine,

Or else, nor they, nor all the ten entire

Are infinite. Thus one infinite doth adjoyn

Others unto it and still riseth higher.

And if those single lights hither aspire,

This strange prodigious inconsistencie

Groweth still stranger, if each fixed fire

(I mean each starre) prove Sunnes, and Planets flie

About their flaming heads amid the thronged skie.

For whatsoever that their number be

Whether by seavens, or eighths, or fives, or nines,

They round each fixed lamp; Infinity

Will be redoubled thus by many times.

Besides each greater Planet th’ attendance finds

Of lesser. Our _Earths_ handmaid is the Moon,

Which to her darkned side right duly shines,

And _Jove_ hath foure, as hath been said aboven,

And _Saturn_ more then foure if the plain truth were known.

And if these globes be regions of life

And severall kinds of plants therein do grow,

Grasse, flowers, hearbs, trees, which the impartiall knife

Of all consuming Time still down doth mow,

And new again doth in succession show:

Which also ’s done in flies, birds, men and beasts;

Adde sand, pearls, pebbles, that the ground do strow

Leaves, quills, hairs, thorns, blooms, you may think the rest

Their kinds by mortall penne can not well be exprest:

And if their kinds no man may reckon well,

The summe of successive particulars

No mind conceive nor tongue can ever tell.

And yet this mist of numbers (as appears)

Belongs to one of these opacous sphears.

Suppose this _Earth_; what then will all those Rounds

Produce? No _Atlas_ such a load upbears.

In this huge endlesse heap o’rewhelmed, drownd,

Choak’d, stifled, lo! I lie, breathlesse, even quite confound.

Yet give me space a while but to respire,

And I my self shal fairly well out-wind;

Keep this position true, unhurt, entire,

That you no greater difficulty find

In this new old opinion here defin’d

Of infinite worlds, then one world doth imply.

For if we do with steddy patience mind

All is resolv’d int’ one absurdity,

The grant of something greater then infinitie.

That God is infinite all men confesse,

And that the Creature is some realty

Besides Gods self, though infinitely lesse.

Joyn now the world unto the Deity.

What? is there added no more entitie

By this conjunction, then there was before?

Is the broad breasted earth? the spacious skie

Spangled with silver light, and burning Ore?

And the wide bellowing seas, whose boyling billows roar,

Are all these nothing? But you will reply;

As is the question so we ought restrain

Our answer unto Corporeity.

But that the phantasie of the body’s vain

I did before unto you maken plain.

But that no man depart unsatisfi’d

A while this Universe here will we feigne

_Corporeall_, till we have gainly tride.

If ought that’s bodily may infinite abide.