WARS WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA
THE SAGHALIEN COMPLICATION
ONE of the problems which invited the attention of the new Government
early in the Meiji era had been handed down from the days of
feudalism. In those days, neither Yezo nor Saghalien nor the Kurile
Islands were under effective Japanese administration. The feudatory
of Matsumae had his castle at the extreme south of Yezo, but the
jurisdiction he exercised was only nominal. Yet the earliest
explorers of Saghalien were certainly Japanese. As far back as 1620,
some vassals of the Matsumae feudatory landed on the island and
remained there throughout a winter. The supposition then was that
Saghalien formed part of the Asiatic mainland. But, in 1806, Mamiya
Rinzo, a Japanese traveller, voyaged up and down the Amur, and,
crossing to Saghalien, discovered that a narrow strait separated it
from the continent. There still exists in Europe a theory that
Saghalien's insular character was discovered first by a Russian,
Captain Nevelskoy, in 1849, but in Japan the fact had already been
known.
Saghalien commands the estuary of the Amur, and Muravieff, the
distinguished Russian commander in East Asia, appreciated the
necessity of acquiring the island for his country. In 1858, he
visited Japan with a squadron and demanded that the Strait of La
Pérouse, which separates Saghalien from Yezo, should be regarded as
the Russo-Japanese frontier. Japan naturally refused a proposal which
would have given the whole of Saghalien to Russia, and Muravieff then
resorted to the policy of sending emigrants to settle on the island.
Two futile attempts to prevent this process of gradual absorption
were made by the Japanese Government; they first proposed a division
of the island, and afterwards they offered to purchase the Russian
portion for a sum of about £400,000--$2,000,000. St. Petersburg
seemed inclined to acquiesce, but the bargain provoked opposition in
Tokyo, and not until 1875 was a final settlement reached, the
conditions being that Japan should recognize Russia's title to the
whole of Saghalien and Russia should recognize Japan's title to the
Kuriles. These latter islands had always been regarded as Japanese
property, and therefore the arrangement now effected amounted to the
purchase of an area of Japanese territory by Russia, who paid for it
with a part of Japan's belongings. An interesting sequel to this
chapter of history is that, thirty years later, Saghalien became the
scene of a Japanese invasion and was ultimately divided between the
two nations along the fiftieth parallel, which was precisely what the
Bakufu statesmen had originally proposed.
THE FORMOSAN EXPEDITION
The expedition of Formosa in 1874 has already been spoken of.
Insignificant in itself, the incident derived vicarious interest from
its effect upon the relations between Japan and China in connexion
with the ownership of the Ryukyu Islands. Lying a little south of
Japan, these islands had for some centuries been regarded as an
appanage of the Satsuma fief, and the language spoken by their
inhabitants showed unmistakable traces of affinity with the Japanese
tongue. Therefore when, in 1873, the crew of a wrecked Ryukyuan junk
was barbarously treated by the Formosan aborigines, the Yedo
Government at once sought redress from Peking. But the Chinese paid
no attention to this demand until a force of Japanese troops had made
a punitory visit to Formosa, and China, recognizing that her
territory had been invaded, lodged a protest which would probably
have involved the two empires in a war had not the British minister
in Peking intervened. The arrangement made was that China should
indemnify Japan to the extent of the expenses incurred by the latter
in punishing the aborigines.
THE RYUKYU COMPLICATION
A fact collaterally established by the Formosan affair was that the
Ryukyu Islands belonged to Japan, and, in 1876, the system of local
government already inaugurated in Japan proper was extended to
Ryukyu, the ruler of the latter being pensioned. China now formulated
a protest. She claimed that Ryukyu had always been a tributary of her
empire. But China's interpretation of "tribute" was essentially
unpractical. "So long as her own advantage could be promoted, she
regarded as a token of vassalage the presents periodically carried to
her Court from neighbouring States, but so soon as there arose any
question of discharging a suzerain's duties, she classed these
offerings as an insignificant interchange of neighbourly courtesy."
Undoubtedly Ryukyu, from time to time, had followed the custom of
despatching gift-bearing envoys to Peking, just as Japan herself had
done. But it was on clear record that Ryukyu had been subdued by
Satsuma without any attempt whatever on China's part to save the
islands from that fate; that thereafter, during two centuries, they
had been included in the Satsuma fief, and that China, in the
settlement of the Formosan complication, had constructively
acknowledged Japan's title to the group. Each empire asserted its
claims with equal assurance, and things remained thus until 1880,
when General Grant, who visited Japan in the course of a tour round
the world, suggested a peaceful compromise. A conference met in
Peking, and it was agreed that the islands should be divided, Japan
taking the northern part and China the southern. But at the moment of
signing the convention, China drew back, and the discussion ended in
Japan retaining the islands, China's protests being pigeonholed.
KOREAN COMPLICATION
Sufficient reference has already been made in these pages to the
series of events that terminated in 1875, when Japan, by a display of
partly fictitious force, drew Korea out of international isolation
and signed with the Peninsular Kingdom a treaty acknowledging the
latter's independence.
WAR WITH CHINA
During the centuries when China occupied the undisputed position of
first in might and first in civilization on the Asiatic continent,
her habit was to use as buffer states the small countries lying
immediately beyond her borders. But she always took care to avoid any
responsibilities that might grow out of this arrangement. In a word,
the tide of foreign aggression was to be checked by an understanding
that these little countries shared the inviolability of great China,
but it was understood, at the same time, that the consequences of
their own acts must rest upon their own heads. Such a system, having
no bases except sentiment and prestige, soon proved futile in the
face of Occidental practicality. Burma, Siam, Annam, and Tonking, one
by one, ceased to be dependent on China and independent towards all
other nations.
In Korea's case, however, the fiction proved more tenacious, since
the peninsula furnished easy access to Manchuria, the cradle of the
Manchu dynasty. But while seeking to maintain the old-time relations
with Korea, Chinese statesmen clung uniformly to traditional methods.
They refrained from declaring Korea a dependency of China, yet they
sought to keep up "the romance of ultimate dependency and
intermediate sovereignty." It was thus that, in 1876, Korea was
allowed to conclude with Japan a treaty describing the former as "an
independent State enjoying the same rights as Japan," nor did the
Peking Government make any protest when the United States, Great
Britain, and other powers concluded similar treaties.
To exercise independence in practice, however, was not permitted to
Korea. A Chinese resident was stationed in Seoul, the Korean capital,
and he quickly became an imperium in imperio. Thenceforth Japan, in
all her dealings with the Peninsular Kingdom, found the latter
behaving as a Chinese dependency, obeying the Chinese resident in
everything. Again and again, Japanese patience was tried by these
anomalous conditions, and although nothing occurred of sufficient
magnitude to warrant official protest, the Tokyo Government became
sensible of perpetual rebuffs and humiliating interferences at
China's hands. Korea herself suffered seriously from this state of
national irresponsibility. There was no security of life and
property, or any effective desire to develop the country's resources.
If the victims of oppression appealed to force, China readily lent
military assistance to suppress them, and thus the royal family of
Korea learned to regard its tenure of power as dependent on ability
to conciliate China.
On Japan's side, also, the Korean question caused much anxiety. It
was impossible for the Tokyo statesmen to ignore the fact that their
country's safety depended largely on preserving Korea from the grasp
of a Western power. They saw plainly that such a result might at any
moment be expected if Korea was suffered to drift into a state of
administrative incompetence. Once, in 1882, and again, in 1884, when
Chinese soldiers were employed to suppress reform movements which
would have impaired the interests of the Korean monarch, the latter's
people, counting Japan to be the source of progressive tendencies in
the East, destroyed her legation in Seoul, driving its inmates out of
the city. Japan was not yet prepared to assert herself forcibly in
redress of such outrages, but in the ensuing negotiations she
acquired titles that "touched the core of China's alleged
Suzerainty." Thus, in 1882, Japan obtained recognition of her right
to protect her legation with troops; and, in 1885, a convention,
signed at Tientsin, pledged each of the contracting parties not to
send a military force to Korea without notifying the other.
In spite of these agreements China's arbitrary and unfriendly
interference in Korean affairs continued to be demonstrated to Japan.
Efforts to obtain redress proved futile, and even provoked threats of
Chinese armed intervention. Finally, in the spring of 1894, an
insurrection of some magnitude broke out in Korea, and in response to
an appeal from the Royal family, China sent twenty-five hundred
troops, who went into camp at Asan, on the southwest coast of the
peninsula. Notice was duly given to the Tokyo Government, which now
decided that Japan's vital interests as well as the cause of
civilization in the East required that an end must be put to Korea's
dangerous misrule and to China's arbitrary interference. Japan did
not claim for herself anything that she was not willing to accord to
China. But the Tokyo statesmen were sensible that to ask their
conservative neighbour to promote in the Peninsular Kingdom a
progressive programme which she had always steadily rejected and
despised in her own case, must prove a chimerical attempt, if
ordinary diplomatic methods alone were used. Accordingly, on receipt
of Peking's notice as to the sending of troops to the peninsula,
Japan gave corresponding notice on her own part, and thus July, 1894,
saw a Chinese force encamped at Asan and a Japanese force in the
vicinity of Seoul.
In having recourse to military aid, China's nominal purpose was to
quell the Tonghak insurrection, and Japan's motive was to obtain a
position such as would strengthen her demand for drastic treatment of
Korea's malady. In giving notice of the despatch of troops, China
described Korea as her "tributary State," thus emphasizing a
contention which at once created an impossible situation. During
nearly twenty years Japan had treated Korea as her own equal, in
accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1876, and she could not
now agree that the Peninsular Kingdom should be officially classed as
a tributary of China. Her protests, however, were contemptuously
ignored, and Chinese statesmen continued to apply the offensive
appellation to Korea, while at the same time they asserted the right
of limiting the number of troops sent by Japan to the peninsula as
well as the manner of their employment.
Still desirous of preserving the peace, Japan proposed a union
between herself and China for the purpose of restoring order in Korea
and amending that country's administration. China refused. She even
expressed supercilious surprise that Japan, while asserting Korea's
independence, should suggest the idea of peremptorily reforming its
administration. The Tokyo Cabinet now announced that the Japanese
troops should not be withdrawn without "some understanding that would
guarantee the future peace, order, and good government of Korea," and
as China still refused to come to such an understanding, Japan
undertook the work single-handed.
The Tonghak rebellion, which Chinese troops were originally sent to
quell, had died of inanition before they landed. The troops,
therefore, had been withdrawn. But China kept them in Korea, her
avowed reason being the presence of the Japanese military force near
Seoul. In these circumstances, Peking was notified that a despatch of
re-enforcements on China's side must be construed as an act of
hostility. Notwithstanding this notice, China not only sent a further
body of troops by sea to encamp at Asan, but also despatched an army
overland across the Yalu. These proceedings precipitated hostilities.
Three Chinese warships, convoying a transport with twelve hundred
soldiers on board, met and opened fire on two Japanese cruisers. The
result was signal. One of the Chinese warships was captured, another
was so riddled with shot that she had to be beached and abandoned;
the third escaped in a dilapidated condition, and the transport,
refusing to surrender, was sent to the bottom. These things happened
on the 25th of July, 1894, and war was declared by each empire six
days subsequently.
The Japanese took the initiative. They despatched from Seoul a column
of troops and routed the Chinese entrenched at Asan, many of whom
fled northward to Pyong-yang, a town on the Tadong River, memorable
as the scene of a battle between a Chinese and a Japanese army in
1592. Pyong-yang offered great facilities for defence. The Chinese
massed there a force of seventeen thousand men, and made preparations
for a decisive contest, building parapets, mounting guns, and
strengthening the position by every device of modern warfare. Their
infantry had the advantage of being armed with repeating rifles, and
the configuration of the ground offered little cover for an attacking
army. Against this strong position the Japanese moved in two columns;
one marching northward from Seoul, the other striking westward from
Yuensan. Forty days elapsed before the Japanese forces came into
action, and one day's fighting sufficed to carry all the Chinese
positions, the attacking armies having only seven hundred casualties
and the defenders, six thousand.
The next day, September 17th, Japan achieved an equally conspicuous
success at sea. Fourteen Chinese warships and six torpedo-boats,
steering homeward after convoying a fleet of transports to the mouth
of the Yalu River, fell in with eleven Japanese war-vessels cruising
in the Yellow Sea. The Chinese squadron was not seeking an encounter.
Their commanding officer did not appear to appreciate the value of
sea-power. His fleet included two armoured battle-ships of over seven
thousand tons' displacement, whereas the Japanese had nothing
stronger than belted cruisers of four thousand. Therefore a little
enterprise on China's part might have severed Japan's maritime
communications and compelled her to evacuate Korea. The Chinese,
however, used their war-vessels as convoys only, keeping them
carefully in port when no such duty was to be performed. It is
evident that, as a matter of choice, they would have avoided the
battle of the Yalu, though when compelled to fight they fought
stoutly. After a sharp engagement, four of their vessels were sunk,
and the remainder steamed into Weihaiwei, their retreat being covered
by torpedo-boats.
By this victory the maritime route to China lay open to Japan. She
could now attack Talien, Port Arthur, and Weihaiwei, naval stations
on the Liaotung and Shantung peninsulas, where strong permanent
fortifications had been built under the direction of European
experts. These forts fell one by one before the assaults of the
Japanese troops as easily as the castle of Pyong-yang had fallen.
Only by the remains of the Chinese fleet at Weihaiwei was a stubborn
resistance made, under the command of Admiral Ting. But, after the
entire squadron of torpedo craft had been captured, and after three
of the largest Chinese ships had been sent to the bottom by Japanese
torpedoes, and one had met the same fate by gunfire, the remainder
surrendered, and their gallant commander, Admiral Ting, rejecting all
overtures from the Japanese, committed suicide.
The fall of Weihaiwei ended the war. It had lasted seven and a half
months, and during that time the Japanese had operated with five
columns aggregating 120,000 men. "One of these columns marched
northward from Seoul, won the battle of Pyong-yang, advanced to the
Yalu, forced its way into Manchuria, and moved towards Mukden by
Feng-hwang, fighting several minor engagements, and conducting the
greater part of its operations amid deep snow in midwinter. The
second column diverged westward from the Yalu, and, marching through
southern Manchuria, reached Haicheng, whence it advanced to the
capture of Niuchwang. The third landed on the Liaotung peninsula,
and, turning southward, carried Talien and Port Arthur by assault.
The fourth moved up the Liaotung peninsula, and, having seized
Kaiping, advanced against Niuchwang, where it joined hands with the
second column. The fifth crossed from Port Arthur to Weihaiwei, which
it captured." In all these operations the Japanese casualties
totalled 1005 killed and 4922 wounded; the deaths from disease
aggregated 16,866, and the monetary expenditure amounted to twenty
millions sterling, about $100,000,000. It had been almost universally
believed that, although Japan might have some success at the outset,
she would ultimately be shattered by impact with the enormous mass
and the overwhelming resources of China. Never was forecast more
signally contradicted by events.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE
Li Hung-chang, viceroy of Pehchili, whose troops had been chiefly
engaged during the war, and who had been mainly responsible for the
diplomacy that had led up to it, was sent by China as plenipotentiary
to discuss terms of peace. The conference took place at Shimonoseki,
Japan being represented by Marquis (afterwards Prince) Ito, and on
the 17th of April, 1895, the treaty was signed. It recognized the
independence of Korea; ceded to Japan the littoral of Manchuria lying
south of a line drawn from the mouth of the river Anping to the
estuary of the Liao, together with the islands of Formosa and the
Pescadores; pledged China to pay an indemnity of two hundred million
taels; provided for the occupation of Weihaiwei by Japan pending
payment of that sum; secured the opening of four new places to
foreign trade and the right of foreigners to engage in manufacturing
enterprises in China, and provided for a treaty of commerce and amity
between the two empires, based on the lines of China's treaty with
Occidental powers.
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE
Scarcely was the ink dry upon this agreement when Russia, Germany,
and France presented a joint note to the Tokyo Government, urging
that the permanent occupation of the Manchurian littoral by Japan
would endanger peace. Japan had no choice but to bow to this mandate.
The Chinese campaign had exhausted her treasury as well as her
supplies of war material, and it would have been hopeless to oppose a
coalition of three great European powers. She showed no sign of
hesitation. On the very day of the ratified treaty's publication, the
Emperor of Japan issued a rescript, in which, after avowing his
devotion to the cause of peace, he "yielded to the dictates of
magnanimity, and accepted the advice of the three powers."
But although the Tokyo Government sought to soften the situation by
the grace of speedy acquiescence, the effect produced upon the nation
was profound. There was no difficulty in appreciating the motives of
Russia and France. It was natural that the former should object to
the propinquity of a warlike people like the Japanese, and it was
natural that France should remain true to her ally. But Germany's
case defied interpretation. She had no interest in the ownership of
Manchuria, and she professed herself a warm friend of Japan. It
seemed, therefore, that she had joined in snatching from the lips of
the Japanese the fruits of their victory simply for the sake of
establishing some shadowy title to Russia's good-will.
THE CHINESE CRISIS OF 1900
In the second half of the year 1900 an anti-foreign outbreak, known
as the "Boxer Rebellion," broke out in the province of Shantung, and,
spreading thence to Pehchili, produced a situation of imminent peril
for the foreign communities of Peking and Tientsin. No Western power
could intervene with sufficient promptness. Japan alone was within
easy reach of the commotion. But Japan held back. She had fully
fathomed the distrust with which the growth of her military strength
had inspired some European nations, and she appreciated the wisdom of
not seeming to grasp at an opportunity for armed display. In fact,
she awaited a clear mandate from Europe and America, and, on
receiving it, she rapidly sent a division (20,000 men) to Pehchili.
Tientsin was relieved first, and then a column of troops provided by
several powers, the Japanese in the van, marched to the succour of
Peking. In this campaign the Japanese greatly enhanced their
belligerent reputation as they fought under the eyes of competent
military critics. Moreover, after the relief of the legations in
Peking, they withdrew one-half of their forces, and they subsequently
cooperated heartily with Western powers in negotiating peace terms,
thus disarming the suspicions with which they had been regarded at
first.
WAR WITH RUSSIA
From the time (1895) when the three-power mandate dictated to Japan a
cardinal alteration of the Shimonoseki treaty, Japanese statesmen
concluded that their country must one day cross swords with Russia.
Not a few Occidental publicists shared that view, but the great
majority, arguing that the little Island Empire of the Far East would
never risk annihilation by such an encounter, believed that
forbearance sufficient to avert serious trouble would always be
forthcoming on Japan's side. Yet neither geographical nor historical
conditions warranted that confidence. The Sea of Japan, which, on the
east, washes the shores of the Japanese islands and on the west those
of Russia and Korea, has virtually only two routes communicating with
the Pacific Ocean. One is in the north, namely, the Tsugaru Strait;
the other is in the south, namely, the channel between the Korean
peninsula and the Japanese island of Kyushu. Tsugaru Strait is
practically under Japan's complete control; she can close it at any
moment with mines. But the channel between the Korean peninsula and
Kyushu has a width of 102 miles, and would therefore be a fine open
seaway were it free from islands. Midway in this channel, however,
lie the twin islands of Tsushima, and the space that separates them
from Japan is narrowed by another island, Iki. Tsushima and Iki have
belonged to Japan from time immemorial, and thus the avenues from the
Pacific Ocean to the Sea of Japan are controlled by the Japanese
empire. In other words, access to the Pacific from Korea's eastern
and southern coasts, and access to the Pacific from Russia's Maritime
Province depend upon Japan's good-will.
These geographical conditions had no great concern for Korea in
former days. But with Russia the case was different. Vladivostok, the
principal port in the Far East, lay at the southern extremity of the
Maritime Province. Freedom of passage by the Tsushima Strait was
therefore a matter of vital importance, and to secure it one of two
things was essential, namely, that she herself should possess a
fortified port on the Korean side, or that Japan should be restrained
from acquiring such a port. Here, then, was a strong inducement for
Russian aggression in Korea. When the eastward movement of the great
northern power brought it to the mouth of the Amur, the acquisition
of Nikolaievsk for a naval basis was the immediate reward. But
Nikolaievsk, lying in an inhospitable region, far away from all the
main routes of the world's commerce, offered itself only as a
stepping-stone to further acquisitions. To push southward from this
new port became an immediate object.
There lay an obstacle in the way. The long strip of seacoast from the
mouth of the Amur to the Korean frontier--an area then called the
Usuri region because that river forms part of its western
boundary--belonged to China, and she, having conceded much to Russia
in the way of the Amur, showed no inclination to make further
concessions in the matter of the Usuri. She was persuaded to agree,
however, that the region should be regarded as common property,
pending a convenient opportunity for clear delimitation. That
opportunity soon came. Seizing the moment (1860) when China had been
beaten to her knees by England and France, Russia secured the final
cession of the Usuri region, which then became the Maritime Province
of Siberia. Then Russia shifted her naval basis in the Pacific to a
point ten degrees south from Nikolaievsk, namely, Vladivostok.
Immediately after this transfer an attempt was made to obtain
possession of Tsushima. A Russian man-of-war proceeded thither, and
quietly began to establish a settlement which would soon have
constituted a title of ownership had not Great Britain interfered.
The same instinct that led Russia from the mouth of the Amur to
Vladivostok prompted the acquisition of Saghalien also, which, as
already related, was accomplished in 1875.
But all this effort did not procure for Russia an unobstructed avenue
from Vladivostok to the Pacific or an ice-free port in the Far East.
In Korea seemed to lie a facile hope of saving the maritime results
of Russia's great trans-Asian march from Lake Baikal to the Maritime
Province and to Saghalien. Korea seemed to offer every facility for
such an enterprise. Her people were unprogressive; her resources
undeveloped; her self-defensive capacities insignificant; her
government corrupt. On the other hand, it could not be expected that
Japan and China would acquiesce in any aggressions against their
neighbour, Korea, and it became necessary that Russia should seek
some other line of communication supplementing the Amur waterway and
the long ocean route. Therefore she set about the construction of a
railway across Asia. This railway had to be carried along the
northern bank of the Amur where engineering and economic difficulties
abound. Moreover, the river makes a huge semicircular sweep
northward, and a railway following its northern bank to Vladivostok
must make the same detour. If, on the contrary, the road could be
carried south of the river along the diameter of the semicircle, it
would be a straight, and therefore a shorter, line, technically
easier and economically better. To follow this diameter, however,
would involve passing through Chinese territory, namely, Manchuria,
and an excuse for soliciting China's permission was not in sight. In
1894, however, war broke out between Japan and China, and in its
sequel Japan passed into possession of the southern littoral of
Manchuria, which meant that Russia could never get nearer to the
Pacific than Vladivostok, unless she swept Japan from her path. It is
here, doubtless, that we must find Russia's true motive in inducing
Germany and France to unite with her for the purpose of ousting Japan
from Manchuria. The "notice to quit" gave for reasons that the tenure
of the Manchurian littoral by Japan would menace the security of the
Chinese capital, would render the independence of Korea illusory, and
would constitute an obstacle to the peace of the Orient. Only one
saving clause offered for Japan--to obtain from China a guarantee
that no portion of Manchuria should thereafter be leased or ceded to
a foreign State. But France warned the Tokyo Government that to press
for such a guarantee would offend Russia, and Russia declared that,
for her part, she entertained no design of trespassing in Manchuria.
Thus, Japan had no choice but to surrender quietly the main fruits of
her victory. She did so, and proceeded to double her army and treble
her navy.
RUSSIA'S AND GERMANY'S REWARDS
As a recompense for the assistance nominally rendered to China in the
above matter, Russia obtained permission in Peking to divert her
trans-Asian railway from the huge bend of the Amur to the straight
line through Manchuria. Neither Germany nor France received any
immediate compensation. But three years later, by way of indemnity
for the murder of two missionaries by a Chinese mob, Germany seized a
portion of the province of Shantung, and forthwith Russia obtained a
lease of the Liaotung peninsula, from which she had driven Japan in
1895. This act she followed by extorting from China permission to
construct a branch of the trans-Asian railway from north to south,
that is to say from Harbin through Mukden to Talien and Port Arthur.
Russia's maritime aspirations had now assumed a radically altered
phase. Hitherto her programme had been to push southward from
Vladivostok along the coast of Korea, but she had now suddenly leaped
Korea and found access to the Pacific by the Liaotung peninsula.
Nothing was wanting to establish her as practical mistress of
Manchuria except a plausible excuse for garrisoning the place. Such
an excuse was furnished by the Boxer rising, in 1900. The conclusion
of that complication found her in practical occupation of the whole
region. But here her diplomacy fell somewhat from its usually high
standard. Imagining that the Chinese could be persuaded, or
intimidated, to any concession, she proposed a convention virtually
recognizing her title to Manchuria.
JAPAN'S ATTITUDE
Japan watched all these things with profound anxiety. If there
were any reality in the dangers which Russia, Germany, and France
had declared to be incidental to Japanese occupation of a part
of Manchuria, the same dangers must be doubly incidental to
Russian occupation of the whole of Manchuria. There were other
considerations, also. The reasons already adduced show that the
independence of Korea was an object of supreme solicitude to Japan.
It was to establish that independence that she fought with China,
in 1894, and the same motive led her after the war to annex the
Manchurian littoral adjacent to Korea's northern frontier. If Russia
came into possession of all Manchuria, her subsequent absorption of
Korea would be almost inevitable. Manchuria is larger than France and
the United Kingdom put together. The addition of such an immense area
to Russia's East Asiatic dominions, together with its littoral on the
Gulf of Pehchili and the Yellow Sea, would necessitate a
corresponding expansion of her naval force in the Far East. With the
exception of Port Arthur and Talien, however, the Manchurian coast
does not offer any convenient naval base. It is only in the harbours
of southern Korea that such bases can be found. In short, without
Korea, Russia's East Asian extension would have been economically
incomplete and strategically defective.
If it be asked why, apart from history and national sentiment, Japan
should object to Russia in Korea, the answer is, first, because there
would thus be planted almost within cannon-shot of her shores a power
of enormous strength and traditional ambition; secondly, because
whatever voice in Manchuria's destiny Russia derived from her
railway, the same voice in Korea's destiny was possessed by Japan, as
the sole owner of the railways in the Korean peninsula; thirdly, that
whereas Russia had an altogether insignificant share in the foreign
commerce of Korea and scarcely ten bona fide settlers, Japan did the
greater part of the oversea trade and had tens of thousands of
settlers; fourthly, that if Russia's dominions stretched
uninterruptedly from the sea of Okhotsk to the Gulf of Pehchili, her
ultimate absorption of northern China would be inevitable, and
fifthly, that such domination and such absorption would involve the
practical closure of all that immense region to the commerce and
industry of every Western nation except Russia.
This last proposition did not rest solely on the fact that in
opposing artificial barriers to free competition lies Russia's sole
hope of utilizing, to her own benefit, any commercial opportunities
brought within her reach. It rested, also, on the fact that Russia
had objected to foreign settlement at the Manchurian marts recently
opened, by Japan's treaty with China, to American and Japanese
subjects. Without settlements, trade at those marts would be
impossible, and thus Russia had constructively announced that there
should be no trade but the Russian, if she could prevent it. Against
such dangers Japan would have been justified in adopting any measure
of self-protection. She had foreseen them for six years and had been
strengthening herself to avert them. But she wanted peace. She wanted
to develop her material resources and to accumulate some measure of
wealth without which she must remain insignificant among the nations.
Two pacific programmes offered and she adopted them both. Russia,
instead of trusting time to consolidate her tenure of Manchuria, had
made the mistake of pragmatically importuning China for a
conventional title. If, then, Peking could be strengthened to resist
this demand, some arrangement of a distinctly terminable nature might
be made. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan, joining hands
for that purpose, did succeed in so far stiffening China's backbone
that her show of resolution finally induced Russia to sign a treaty
pledging herself to withdraw her troops from Manchuria in three
installments, each step of evacuation to be accomplished by a fixed
date. That was one of the pacific programmes. The other suggested
itself in connexion with the new commercial treaties which China had
agreed to negotiate in the sequel of the Boxer troubles. These
documents contained clauses providing for the opening of three places
in Manchuria to foreign trade. It seemed a reasonable hope that the
powers, having secured commercial access to Manchuria by covenant
with its sovereign, would not allow Russia to restrict arbitrarily
their privileges. Both of these hopes were disappointed. When the
time came for evacuation, Russia behaved as though no promise had
been given. She proposed new conditions which would have strengthened
her grasp of Manchuria instead of loosening it.
NEGOTIATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN
China being powerless to offer any practical protest, and Japan's
interest ranking next in order of importance, the Tokyo Government
approached Russia direct. They did not ask for anything that could
hurt her pride or impair her position. Appreciating fully the
economical status she had acquired in Manchuria by large outlays of
capital, they offered to recognize that status, provided that Russia
would extend similar recognition to Japan's status in Korea; would
promise, in common with Japan, to respect the sovereignty and the
territorial integrity of China and Korea, and would be a party to a
mutual engagement that all nations should have equal commercial and
industrial opportunities in Manchuria and in the Korean peninsula. In
a word, they invited Russia to subscribe the policy originally
enunciated by the United States and Great Britain, the policy of the
open door and of the integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.
Thus commenced negotiations which lasted five and a half months.
Japan gradually reduced her demands to a minimum. Russia never made
any appreciable reduction of hers. She refused to listen to Japan for
one moment about Manchuria. Eight years previously, Japan had been in
military possession of the littoral of Manchuria when Russia, with
the assistance of Germany and France, had expelled her for reasons
which concerned Japan much more than they concerned any of these
three powers. Now, Russia had the assurance to declare that none of
these things concerned Japan at all. The utmost she would admit was
Japan's partial right to be heard about Korea. At the same time, she
herself commenced a series of aggressions in northern Korea. That was
not all. While she studiously deferred her answers to Japan's
proposals, and while she protracted the negotiations to an extent
visibly contemptuous, she hastened to make substantial additions to
her fleet and her army in far-eastern Asia. It was impossible to
mistake her purpose. She intended to yield nothing, but to prepare
such a parade of force that her obduracy would command submission.
The only alternatives for Japan were war or permanent effacement in
Asia. She chose war.
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Before passing to the story of this war, it is necessary to refer to
two incidents of Japan's foreign relations, both of which preceded
her struggle with Russia. The first was the restoration of her
judicial autonomy. It has always been regarded as axiomatic that the
subjects or citizens of Western countries, when they travel or reside
in Oriental territories, should be exempted from the penalties and
processes of the latter's criminal laws. In other words, there is
reserved to a Christian the privilege, when within the territories of
a pagan State, of being tried for penal offences by Christian judges.
In civil cases the jurisdiction is divided, the question at issue
being adjudicated by a tribunal of the defendant's nationality;
but in criminal cases jurisdiction is wholly reserved. Therefore
powers making treaties with Oriental nations establish within
the latter's borders consular courts which exercise what is called
"extraterritorial jurisdiction." This system was, of course, pursued
in Japan's case. It involved the confinement of the foreign residents
to settlements grouped around the sites of their consular courts; for
it would plainly have been imprudent that such residents should have
free access to provincial districts remote from the only tribunals
competent to control them.
This provision, though inserted without difficulty in the early
treaties with Japan, provoked much indignation among the conservative
statesmen in Kyoto. Accordingly, no sooner had the Meiji Restoration
been effected than an embassy was despatched to the Occident to
negotiate for a revision of the treaties so as to remove the clause
about consular jurisdiction, and to restore the customs tariff to the
figure at which it had stood prior to Sir Harry Parkes' naval
demonstration at Hyogo. The Japanese Government was entitled to raise
this question in 1871, for the treaties were textually subject to
revision in that year. No time was lost in despatching the embassy.
But its failure was a foregone conclusion. The conditions originally
necessitating extraterritorial jurisdiction had not, by 1871
undergone any change justifying its abolition. It is not to be
denied, on the other hand, that the consular courts themselves
invited criticism. Some of the great Western powers had organized
competent tribunals with expert judicial officials, but others, whose
trade with Japan was comparatively insignificant, were content to
entrust consular duties to merchants, who not only lacked legal
training but were also themselves engaged in the commercial
transactions upon which they might, at any moment, be required to
adjudicate magisterially.
ENGRAVING: DANJURO, A FAMOUS ACTOR, AS BENKEI IN KANJINCHO (A PLAY)
It cannot be contended that this obviously imperfect system was
disfigured by many abuses. On the whole, it worked passably well, and
if its organic faults helped to discredit it, there is no denying
that it saved the Japanese from complications which would inevitably
have arisen had they been entrusted with jurisdiction which they were
not prepared to exercise satisfactorily. Moreover, the system had
vicarious usefulness; for the ardent desire of Japanese patriots to
recover the judicial autonomy, which is a fundamental attribute of
every sovereign State, impelled them to recast their laws and
reorganize their law courts with a degree of diligence which would
otherwise have probably been less conspicuous. Twelve years of this
work, carried on with the aid of thoroughly competent foreign
jurists, placed Japan in possession of codes of criminal and civil
law in which the best features of European jurisprudence were applied
to the conditions and usages of Japan. Then, in 1883, Japan renewed
her proposal for the abolition of consular jurisdiction, and by way
of compensation she promised to throw the country completely open and
to remove all restrictions hitherto imposed on foreign trade, travel,
and residence within her realm.
But this was a problem against whose liberal solution the
international prejudice of the West was strongly enlisted. No
Oriental State had ever previously sought such recognition, and the
Occident, without exception, was extremely reluctant to entrust the
lives and properties of its subjects and citizens to the keeping of a
"pagan" people. Not unnaturally the foreigners resident in Japan, who
would have been directly affected by the change, protested against it
with great vehemence. Many of them, though not averse to trusting
Japan, saw that her reforms had been consummated with celerity
amounting to haste, and a great majority fought simply for consular
jurisdiction as a privilege of inestimable value, not to be
surrendered without the utmost deliberation. The struggle that ensued
between foreign distrust and Japanese aspirations often developed
painful phases, and did much to intensify the feeling of antagonism
which had existed between the Japanese and the foreign residents at
the outset and which even to-day has not wholly disappeared. The
Government and citizens of the United States of America never failed
to show sympathy with Japanese aspirations in this matter, and, as a
general rule, "foreign tourists and publicists discussed the problem
liberally and fairly, perhaps because, unlike the foreign communities
resident in Japan, they had no direct interest in its solution."
The end was not reached until 1894. Then Great Britain agreed that
from July, 1899, jurisdiction over all British subjects within the
confines of Japan should be entrusted to Japanese tribunals, provided
that the new Japanese codes of law should have been in operation
during at least one year before the surrender of jurisdiction. Japan,
on her side, promised to throw the whole country open from the same
date, removing all limitations upon trade, travel, and residence of
foreigners.
Tariff autonomy had been an almost equal object of Japanese ambition,
and it was arranged that she should recover it after a period of
twelve years, an increased scale of import duties being applied in
the interval. It will be observed that Great Britain took the lead in
abandoning the old system. It was meet that she should do so; for, in
consequence of her preponderating commercial interests, she had stood
at the head of the combination of powers by which the irksome
conditions were originally imposed upon Japan. The other Occidental
States followed her example with more or less celerity, and the
foreign residents, now that nothing was to be gained by continuing
the struggle, showed clearly that they intended to bow gracefully to
the inevitable. The Japanese also took some conspicuous steps.
"An Imperial rescript declared in unequivocal terms that it was the
sovereign's policy and desire to abolish all distinctions between
natives and foreigners, and that, by fully carrying out the friendly
purpose of the treaties, his people would best consult his wishes,
maintain the character of the nation, and promote its prestige. The
premier and other ministers of State issued instructions to the
effect that the responsibility now devolved on the Government, and
the duty on the people, of enabling foreigners to reside confidently
and contentedly in every part of the country. Even the chief Buddhist
prelates addressed to the priests and parishioners of their dioceses
injunctions pointing out that freedom of conscience being now
guaranteed by the Constitution, men professing alien creeds must be
treated as courteously as the disciples of Buddhism and must enjoy
the same privileges."*
*Brinkley, article "Japan," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition.
It may here be stated once for all that Japan's recovery of her
judicial autonomy has not been attended by any of the disastrous
results freely predicted at one time. Her laws are excellent, and her
judiciary is competent and just.
FIRST ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
The second of the two incidents alluded to above was an alliance
between England and Japan, signed on January 30, 1902. The preamble
of this agreement--the first of its kind ever concluded between
England and an Oriental power--affirmed that the contracting parties
were solely actuated by a desire to preserve the status quo and the
general peace of the Far East; that they were both specially
interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity
of the empires of China and Korea, and in securing equal
opportunities in these countries for all nations; that they mutually
recognized it as admissible for either of the contracting parties to
take such measures as might be indispensable to safeguard these
interests against a threat of aggressive action by any other power,
or against disturbances in China or Korea, and that, if one of the
contracting parties became involved in war in defence of these
interests, the other should maintain strict neutrality and endeavour
to prevent any third power from joining in hostilities against its
ally. Finally, should a third power join in such hostilities, then
the other contracting party promised to come to the assistance of its
ally, to conduct the war in common, and to make peace by mutual
agreement only. The alliance was to hold good for five years from the
date of signature, but if either ally was engaged in war at such
time, the alliance was to continue until the conclusion of peace.
It is unnecessary to dwell upon the influence exerted by this compact
on the Russo-Japanese war. It kept the field clear for Japan and
guaranteed her against a repetition of such a combination as that
which must be regarded as the remote cause of the struggle.
THE EARLY PHASES OF THE WAR
Japan's great problem in crossing swords with Russia was to obtain a
safe avenue for her troops over the sea. Russia might at once have
gained an overwhelming advantage had she seized and controlled the
lines of communication between the Japanese islands and the continent
of Asia. Her strategists can scarcely have failed to appreciate that
fact, and would doubtless have acted accordingly had they obtained a
few months' leisure to mass an overwhelmingly strong fleet in the
seas of China and Japan. They had such a fleet actually in esse; for,
at the moment when war broke out, the Russian squadrons assembled in
the East, or en route thither, comprised no less than fifty-nine
fighting ships, mounting 1350 guns and manned by 18,000 men. But
these figures included the Mediterranean squadron which, surprised by
the outbreak of hostilities, abandoned its journey to the Pacific.
Obviously, Japan's wisest course was to anticipate the combination of
Russia's sea forces, and consciousness of that fact operated to
hasten the current of events.
Port Arthur, where the bulk of the Russian Pacific squadron lay, is
somewhat difficult of ingress and egress. On January 31, 1904, the
operation of extracting the ships and parading them outside was
commenced, being brought to a conclusion on February 3rd, whereafter
the squadron steamed out to sea, and, having made a short cruise off
the coast of the Shantung promontory, returned to its position on the
following day. The fleet taking part in this manoeuvre consisted of
twenty-six ships, and the whole Russian naval force then in eastern
Asia comprised seven battle-ships, four armoured cruisers, seven
protected cruisers, four gunboats, six sloops, twenty-five
destroyers, two mining transports, and fourteen first-class
torpedo-boats.
The Japanese, on their side, had six battle-ships, eight armoured
cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers, fourteen small cruisers,
nineteen destroyers, and eighty-five torpedo-boats. This enumeration
shows a numerical superiority on the Japanese side, but in fighting
capacity the two fleets were nearly equal. For, though the Russians
possessed seven battle-ships to six Japanese, the latter had better
gun-protection and greater weight of broadside fire than the former;
and though Japan could muster eight armoured cruisers against
Russia's four, the latter were supplemented by five protected
cruisers which ranked far above anything of the same class on the
Japanese side.
THE FIRST NAVAL OPERATION
When the Russian ships returned on the 4th of February from their
cruise off the Shantung promontory, they took up their stations
outside Port Arthur, all the harbour lights and beacons being left in
position, and no special precaution being taken except that a patrol
of three torpedo-boats was sent out. Yet the Russians should have
appreciated the presence of danger. For, on the 6th of February,
Japan had broken off the negotiations in St. Petersburg, and had
given official information of her intention to take measures for
protecting her menaced interests. That signified war and nothing but
war, and the "Official Messenger" of the same evening published the
intimation, which was immediately communicated to Admiral Alexieff at
Port Arthur.
The Russian fleet was then divided into three squadrons. The largest
body lay off Port Arthur, and two very much smaller squadrons were
posted, one at Chemulpo on the west coast of Korea, and another at
Vladivostok. It is obvious that such division of the fleet on the eve
of hostilities should have been carefully avoided. The ships should
all have been held together with an extensive network of scouts so as
to enable them swiftly and strongly to fall upon any Japanese
transports carrying troops to the mainland, or to meet effectually
and crush any attempt of the Japanese squadrons to obtain command of
the sea.
On the night of February 8th-9th, three Japanese squadrons of
destroyers, aggregating ten vessels, steamed across a calm, moonlit
sea and delivered a torpedo attack on the Russian squadron at Port
Arthur, the result being that the battle-ships Retvisan and
Tsarevitch together with the cruiser Pallada were holed. These
battle-ships were the most powerful vessels in the Russian squadron,
and the Pallada was a first-class protected cruiser of 6630 tons'
displacement. The Japanese destroyers had left Sasebo on the 6th of
February and they returned thither uninjured, having materially
weakened the Russian fleet. On the day following this surprise,
Admiral Togo, the Japanese commander-in-chief, engaged the remains of
the Russian squadron with the heavy guns of his battle-ships at a
range of eight thousand yards, and succeeded in inflicting some
injury on the battle-ship Poltava, the protected cruisers Diana and
Askold, and a second-class cruiser Novik. The Russians ultimately
retreated towards the harbour with the intention of drawing the
Japanese under closer fire of the land batteries, but the Japanese
fleet declined to follow after them, and, instead, steamed away.
Three days later (February 11th) another disaster overtook the
Russians. The Yenisei, one of the two mining-transports included in
their fleet, struck a mine and sank so rapidly in Talien Bay that
ninety-six of her crew perished. The Japanese had no part at all in
this catastrophe. It was purely accidental.
THE CHEMULPO AFFAIR
While these things were happening at Port Arthur, a squadron of the
Japanese navy, under Admiral Uryu, escorted a number of transports to
Chemulpo, the port of the Korean capital, Seoul. There the Russian
protected cruiser Variag (6500 tons) together with the gunboat
Korietz and the transport Sungari were lying. It does not appear that
Admiral Uryu's prime object was to engage these Russian ships. But
Chemulpo having been chosen as the principal landing-place of the
Japanese army corps which was to operate in Korea, it was, of course,
imperative that the harbour should be cleared of Russian war-vessels.
On February 8th, the Russians at Chemulpo were surprised by a summons
from Admiral Uryu to leave the port or undergo bombardment at their
anchorage. The vessels stood out bravely to sea, and after an
engagement lasting thirty-five minutes at ranges varying from five to
ten thousand yards, they were so badly injured that they returned to
the port and were sunk by their own crews, together with the
transport Sungari. The moral effect of the destruction of these
vessels was incalculable.
DECLARATION OF WAR
On the 10th of February, the Czar and the Mikado respectively issued
declarations of war. The former laid stress upon Russia's pacific
intentions in proposing revision of the agreements already existing
between the two empires with regard to Korean affairs, and accused
the Japanese of making a sudden attack on the Russian squadron at
Port Arthur "without previously notifying that the rupture of
diplomatic relations implied the beginning of warlike action." The
Japanese declaration insisted that the integrity of Korea was a
matter of the gravest concern to Japan, inasmuch as the separate
existence of the former was essential to the safety of the latter,
and charged that "Russia, in disrespect of her solemn treaty pledges
to China and of her repeated assurances to other powers, was still in
occupation of Manchuria, had consolidated and strengthened her hold
upon those provinces, and was bent upon their final annexation." With
regard to Russia's accusation against Japan of drawing the sword
without due notice, a distinguished British publicist made the
following comment in the columns of The Times (London):
"Far from thinking the Japanese attack on the night of February 8th,
two full days after the announcement of the intention to take action,
was an exception to, or a deviation from, tradition and precedent, we
should rather count ourselves fortunate if our enemy, in the next
naval war we have to wage, does not strike two days before blazoning
forth his intention, instead of two days after. The tremendous and
decisive results of success for the national cause are enough to
break down all the restraining influences of the code of
international law and Christian morality."
THE FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS
From the moment when war became inevitable, the problem of absorbing
interest was to determine Russia's strategy, and it was ultimately
seen that the two main groups of her forces were to be posted at Port
Arthur and on the Yalu; the latter to resist an advance from Korea,
and the former to defend the Liaotung peninsula, which constituted
the key of the Russian position. Between the mouth of the Yalu and
the Liaotung peninsula, a distance of 120 miles, there were many
points where raiding parties might have been landed to cut the
Russian railway. Against this danger, flying squadrons of Cossacks
were employed. After the destruction of the three Russian vessels in
Chemulpo and the crippling of the Port Arthur squadron, Japanese
transports entered the former port and quietly landed some three
thousand troops, which advanced immediately upon Seoul and took
possession of it.
From that time there could be no doubt that the intention of the
Japanese was to make their first attack upon the enemy by marching up
the Korean peninsula, and that the capital of Korea was chosen for a
base of operations because of climatic considerations. Chemulpo,
however, was not the only landing-place. Fusan also served for that
purpose, as subsequently did also Chinnampo, an inlet on the west
coast of the peninsula. The distance from the port of Fusan to the
Yalu River is four hundred miles, in round numbers, and the roads are
very bad throughout the whole country. Hence the advance of the
Japanese, which was made in a leisurely manner with the utmost
circumspection and attention to detail, involved so much time that
April had drawn to its close before the troops deployed on the banks
of the Yalu. They consisted of three divisions constituting an army
corps, and each division had a ration-strength of 19,000 men with a
combatant strength of 14,000 sabres and rifles and thirty-six
field-guns. It may be assumed, therefore, that when the Japanese
First Army under General (afterwards Count) Kuroki reached the Yalu,
it had a fighting-strength of between forty and fifty thousand men.
There had practically been no collision during the interval of the
advance from the southern extremity of the peninsula to its northern
boundary. It is true that, on March 28th, a squadron of Cossacks
attempted to surprise the Japanese cavalry at Chong-ju, but the essay
proved a failure, and the Cossacks were driven back upon Wiju, which
they evacuated without any further struggle.
The Russian plan of operations did not originally contemplate a
serious stand at the Yalu. The idea was to retire gradually, drawing
the Japanese into Manchuria towards the railway, and engaging them in
the exceedingly difficult country crowned by the Motien Mountains.
But at the last moment General Kuropatkin, Russian commander-in-chief
in Manchuria, issued orders to General Sassulitch, commander of the
Second Siberian Army Corps, to hold the line of the Yalu with all his
strength. Sassulitch could muster for this purpose only five
regiments and one battalion of infantry; forty field-guns; eight
machine-guns, and some Cossacks--twenty thousand combatants,
approximately. Kuroki disposed his troops so that their front
extended some twenty miles along the Yalu, the centre being at
Kiuliencheng, a walled town standing about 180 feet above the river.
From this point southward, the right, or Manchurian, bank has a
considerable command over the left, and at Kiuliencheng a tributary
stream, called the Ai, joins the main river, "which thenceforth
widens from 4000 to 7000 yards and runs in three channels between the
islands and the mainland. The central channel is navigable by small
craft, and the other channels are fordable waist-deep. The Ai River
is also fordable in many places during the spring." On the right bank
of the Yalu, at the point of its junction with the Ai, the ground
rises so as to command the position taken by the Russians.
The plan of the Japanese commander was to threaten an attack on the
lower radius of the river; to throw two divisions against
Kiuliencheng, and to use the remaining division in a wide flanking
movement, crossing the river higher up. The battle took place on
Sunday, the 1st of May. During the preceding nights, the Japanese
placed a strong force of artillery in cleverly masked batteries, and
under cover of these guns, threw seven bridges across the river, the
highest upstream being thirteen miles above Kiuliencheng and the
lower two being directed to the centre of the Russian position.
General Kuroki then telegraphed to Tokyo that he proposed to attack
at dawn on Sunday, his plan being to march one division across the
fords of the Ai River, and to employ the other two, one in crumpling
up the Russian left, the other in attacking Antung, where a large
Russian force was in position. This programme was accurately carried
out. The Japanese infantry forded the Ai breast-deep, and, swarming
up the heights, drove the Russians from these strong positions.
Meanwhile, the Japanese guards' division had crossed on the left and
directed its march upon Antung, while the remaining division had
completely turned the Russian left flank. The fiercest struggle
occurred at Homutang, where a Russian regiment and a battery of
artillery made a splendid stand to save their comrades at Antung from
being cut off.
The casualties on the Japanese side were 318 killed, including five
officers, and 783 wounded, including thirty-three officers. The
Russian casualties numbered 1363 killed and 613 prisoners, but the
detail of wounded was not published. The Japanese captured twenty-one
quick-firing field-guns, eight machine-guns, 1021 rifles and a
quantity of ammunition, etc. The moral result of this battle can
hardly be overestimated. It had never been seriously believed in
Europe that a Russian army could be conquered by a Japanese in a fair
fight, and probably that incredulity influenced Kuropatkin when he
ordered Sassulitch to defy strategical principles by attempting to
hold a radically defective position against a greatly superior force.
In a moment, the Japanese were crowned with military laurels and
placed on a pedestal for the world to admire. But the Japanese
themselves were not deceived. They saw clearly that the contest had
been between six battalions of Russians and two divisions of
Japanese, a disparity of strength amply sufficient to account for the
result in any circumstances.
NAVAL OPERATIONS
During the period of eleven weeks immediately subsequent to the
battle of the Yalu, there were no military operations of a striking
character. Japan was preparing to despatch a second army to
Manchuria, and pending its shipment the chief duty to be discharged
devolved upon the fleet, namely, the further crippling of the Port
Arthur squadron in order to secure the transports against its
enterprises. The object was promoted on the 13th of April by the loss
of the Russian battle-ship Petropavlovsk. She struck one of the mines
laid by the Japanese and sank in a few minutes, carrying the Russian
admiral, Makaroff, together with about six hundred sailors, to the
bottom.
This event, although it materially weakened the Port Arthur squadron,
had nothing to do with the fixed programme of Admiral Togo, which
programme was to block the narrow channel forming the entrance of
Port Arthur by sinking merchant vessels in the fairway. Three
attempts to accomplish this were made. The first was on February
24th; the second, on March 2nd-3rd. In the first essay, five steamers
were employed, their crews consisting of seventy-seven volunteers.
They failed. On the second occasion four steamers of at least two
thousand tons each were sent in under the orders of Commander Hirose.
On this occasion, again, the steamers failed to reach vital points in
the channel, and their experience alone remained to compensate the
loss of many lives. These two attempts were watched by the public
with keen interest and high admiration. The courage and coolness
displayed by officers and men alike elicited universal applause. But
it was generally believed that the successful prosecution of such a
design was impossible and that no further essay would be made. The
Japanese, however, are not easily deterred. On the night of May 2nd,
eight steamers, aggregating some 17,000 tons, were driven into the
channel in the face of mines, batteries, and torpedoes, and five of
them reached their allotted positions, so that the blocking of the
harbour for the passage of large vessels was accomplished. The list
of casualties proved very heavy. Out of 159 persons only eight
officers and thirty-six men returned unhurt. The whole of the
remainder, including twenty officers, were killed, wounded, or
missing.
LANDING OF THE SECOND ARMY
On the very night after the accomplishment of this third blocking
operation, a second Japanese army commenced to land at Pitszewo,
eastward of the Liaotung peninsula. This was precisely the point
chosen for a similar purpose by the Japanese in the war with China,
ten years previously, and such close adherence to the former
programme was condemned by some critics, especially as transports
cannot get close to the shore at Pitszewo, but have to lie four miles
distant, the intervening space consisting, for the most part, of mud
flats. But the Japanese were perfectly familiar with every inch of
the coast from the mouth of the Yalu to Port Arthur, and had the
Russian commanders possessed equally accurate knowledge, they would
have recognized that Pitszewo was designated by natural features as
the best available landing-place, and knowing that, they might have
made effective dispositions to oppose the Japanese there, whereas ten
thousand men had been put on shore before any suspicion seems to have
been roused in the Russian camp.
BATTLE OF KINCHOU
After its landing at Pitszewo, on May 5th and the following days, the
Second Japanese Army, consisting of three divisions under General
(afterwards Count) Oku, pushed westward, driving away the Russian
detachments in the vicinity and securing the control of the Port
Arthur railway. Then, at Kinchou, on the 26th of May, a great battle
was fought. A little south of Kinchou lies a narrow neck of land
connecting the Kwangtung promontory with the mainland. It is a neck
only a mile and three-quarters broad, having Kinchou Bay on the
northwest and Hand Bay on the southeast. On each side the ground near
the sea is low, but along the centre of the neck a ridge rises, which
culminates in a point about 350 feet above the sea. This point is
known as Nanshan, and its commanding position is such that an army
holding it blocks all access to the Kwangtung peninsula.
The problem for the Japanese was to obtain possession of this neck as
the sole road of access to Port Arthur; while General Stossel, who
commanded the Russian troops, knew that if the neck fell into
Japanese hands, Port Arthur would become unapproachable by land. "The
Nanshan position offered unusual advantages for defence, and had been
diligently prepared for permanent occupation during many weeks. Ten
forts of semi-permanent character had been built, and their armament
showed that, on this occasion, the Russian artillery was vastly
superior, both in calibre and in range, to the Japanese guns. Forts,
trenches, and rifle-pits, covered by mines and wire entanglements,
were constructed on every point of vantage and in separate tiers.
Searchlights were also employed, and every advantage was taken of the
proximity of a great fortress and its ample plant."*
*The War in the Far East, by the Military Correspondent of "The
Times."
It will occur to the reader that war-vessels might have been
advantageously used for the attack and defence of such a position,
and, as a matter of fact, Russian gunboats manoeuvred in Hand Bay on
the southeastern shore of the neck. But, on the western side, the
shoal waters of Kinchou Bay prevented access by Japanese vessels in
the face of the heavy batteries erected by the Russians on dominating
sites. This splendid position was held by a Russian army mustering
ten thousand strong with fifty siege-guns and sixteen quick-firers. A
frontal attack seemed suicidal but was deliberately chosen. At
daybreak the battle commenced, and, after sixteen hours of incessant
fighting, a Japanese infantry force turned the left flank of the
Russian line and the day was won. Over seven hundred Russian dead
were buried by the Japanese, and into the latter's hands fell
sixty-eight cannon of all calibres with ten machine-guns. The
Japanese casualties totalled 4912.
This battle finally solved the problem as to whether Japanese
infantry could hold its own against Russian. "With almost everything
in its favour, a strong, fresh, and confident Russian army, solidly
entrenched behind almost inaccessible fortifications and supported by
a formidable and superior artillery, was, in a single day, fairly
swept out of its trenches."* The victorious Japanese pressed forward
rapidly, and on the 30th of May obtained possession of Dalny, a base
presenting incalculable advantages for the prosecution of an attack
upon Port Arthur, which fortress it was now evident that the Japanese
had determined to capture.
*The War in the Far East, by the Military Correspondent of "The
Times."
THE BATTLE OF TELISSU
To have left the Japanese in undisturbed possession of the neck of
the Liaotung peninsula would have been to abandon Port Arthur to its
fate. On the other hand, the Russians ought not to have entertained
any hope of their own ability to carry such a position by assault
after they had signally failed to hold it in the face of attack.
Nevertheless, finding it intolerable, alike to their prestige and to
their sense of camaraderie, to take no measure in behalf of the great
fortress and its thirty thousand defenders, they determined to march
at once to its assistance. To that end celerity was all important,
and on June 14th, that is to say, only eighteen days after the battle
of Kinchou, a Russian army of some thirty-five thousand combatants,
under the command of General Baron Stackelberg, moving down the
railway to recover Kinchou and Nanshan, came into collision with the
Japanese and fought the battle of Telissu. The Russian general,
clinging always to the railway, advanced with such a restricted front
that the Japanese, under General Oku, outflanked him, and he was
driven back with a loss of about ten thousand, killed and wounded,
fourteen guns, and four hundred prisoners.
NAVAL INCIDENTS
On June 15th, the very day after the Telissu victory, the Japanese
met their only naval catastrophe. While their fleet was watching the
enemy off Port Arthur, the battleships Hatsuse and Yashima struck
mines and sank immediately. Moreover, on the same day, the cruisers
Kasuga and Yoshino collided in a dense fog, and the latter vessel was
sent to the bottom. As the Japanese possessed only six battle-ships,
the loss of two was a serious blow, and might have emboldened the
Russians to despatch a squadron from the Baltic to take the earliest
possible advantage of this incident. Foreseeing this, the Japanese
took care to conceal the loss of the Hatsuse and Yashima, and the
fact did not become known until after the battle of Tsushima, a year
later, when the Russian fleet had been practically annihilated.
Meanwhile, the Russian squadron at Vladivostok had accomplished
little. This squadron consisted originally of three armoured
cruisers, Gromovoi, Rossia, and Rurik, with one protected cruiser,
Bogatyr. But the last-named ship ran on a rock near Vladivostok and
became a total wreck in the middle of May, a month marked by many
heavy losses. These cruisers made several excursions into the Sea of
Japan, sinking or capturing a few Japanese merchantmen, and cleverly
evading a Japanese squadron under Admiral Kamimura, detailed to watch
them. But their only achievement of practical importance was the
destruction of two large Japanese transports, the Hitachi Maru and
the Sado Maru. In achieving this feat the Russians appeared off
Tsushima in the Straits of Korea, on June 15th, and the transports
which they sunk or disabled carried heavy guns for the bombardment of
Port Arthur.
Of course, nothing was publicly known about the cargo of the Hitachi
and her consort, but there could be no question that, in timing their
attack with such remarkable accuracy, the Russians must have obtained
secret information as to the movements of the transports and the
nature of their cargo. Considerable criticism was uttered against
Admiral Kamimura for failure to get into touch with the Vladivostok
vessels during such a long interval. But much of the censure was
superficial. Kamimura redeemed his reputation on the 14th of August
when, in a running fight between Fusan and Vladivostok, the Rurik was
sunk and the Gromovoi and Rossia were so seriously damaged as to be
unable to take any further part in the war. On this occasion six
hundred Russians were rescued by the Japanese from the sinking Rurik,
and it was noted at the time that the Russians had made no attempt to
save Japanese life at the sinking of the Hitachi Maru.
THE JAPANESE FORCES
Immediately after the landing of the army corps under General Oku and
the capture of Dalny in the sequel of the battle of Kinchou, the
Japanese began to pour troops into Dalny, and soon they had there
three divisions under the command of General (afterwards Count) Nogi.
This force was henceforth known as the Third Army, that of General
Kuroki being the First, and that under General Oku, the Second. The
next operation was to land another army at Takushan, which lies on
the south coast of Manchuria, between Pitszewo and the estuary of the
Yalu. This army was under the command of General (afterwards Count)
Nozu, and its purpose was to fill the gap between the First Army and
the Second. Nozu's corps thus became the Fourth Army. In fact, the
Japanese repeated, in every respect, the plan of campaign pursued by
them ten years previously in the war with China.
There was one ultimate difference, however. In the latter war, the
force which captured Port Arthur was subsequently carried oversea to
the Shantung province, where it assaulted and took the great Chinese
naval port at Weihaiwei. But the army sent against Port Arthur, in
1904, was intended to march up the Liaotung peninsula after the
capture of the fortress, so, as to fall into line with the other
three armies and to manoeuvre on their left flank during the general
advance northward. Thus considered, the plan of campaign suggests
that General Nogi and his three divisions were expected to capture
Port Arthur without much delay, and indeed their early operations
against the fortress were conducted on that hypothesis. But, as a
matter of fact, in spite of heroic efforts and unlimited bravery on
the Japanese side, Port Arthur, with its garrison of thirty thousand
men, its splendid fortifications, and its powerful artillery, backed
by the indomitable resolution and stubborn resistance of Russian
soldiers, did not fall until the last day of 1904, and Nogi's army
was unable to take part in the great field-battles which marked the
advance of the three other Japanese armies from the seacoast to the
capital of Manchuria.
Step by step, however, though at heavy sacrifice of life, the
Japanese fought their way through the outer lines of the Russian
defences, and the end of July saw the besiegers in such a position
that they were able to mount guns partly commanding the anchorage
within the port. An intolerable situation being thus created for the
Russian squadron, it determined to put to sea, and on August 10th
this was attempted. Without entering into details of the fight that
ensued, it will suffice to state briefly that the result of the
sortie was to deprive the Russian squadron of the services of one
battle-ship, three cruisers, and five torpedo craft, leaving to
Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtonsky, who commanded the vessels in Port
Arthur, only five battle-ships, two cruisers (of which one was
injured), and three destroyers. On August 18th, a gunboat; on August
23d, another battle-ship, and on August 24th another destroyer were
sunk or disabled by striking Japanese mines, and it may be said
briefly that the Russian squadron thenceforth ceased to be a menace
to the Japanese, and that only the land forces had to be counted
with.
FIELD OPERATIONS PRIOR TO BATTLE OF LIAOYANG
By the close of June the three Japanese armies under Generals Kuroki,
Nozu, and Oku were fully deployed and ready to advance in unison. The
task before them was to clear the Russians from the littoral of the
Korean Sea and force them through the mountains of Manchuria into the
valley of the Liao River. In these operations the Japanese acted
uniformly on the offensive, whereas the Russians occupied positions
carefully chosen and strictly fortified, where they stood always on
the defensive. Five heavy engagements, beginning with Fenshuiling on
the 26th of June and ending with Yangtzuling on July 31st, were
fought in these circumstances, and in every instance the Japanese
emerged victorious. From the commencement of the land campaign until
the end of July the invading army's casualties were 12,000, while the
Russian losses, exclusive of those at Port Arthur, aggregated 28,000
killed and wounded, and 113 light siege-and field-guns, together with
eighteen machine-guns, captured.
THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG
The first great phase of the field-operations may be said to have
terminated with the battle of Liaoyang, which commenced on August
25th and continued almost without interruption for nine days,
terminating on the 3rd of September. In this historic contest the
Russians had 220,000 men engaged. They were deployed over a front of
about forty miles, every part of which had been entrenched and
fortified with the utmost care and ingenuity. In fact, the position
seemed impregnable, and as the Japanese could muster only some
200,000 men for the attack, their chances of success appeared very
small. Desperate fighting ensued, but no sensible impression could be
made on the Russian lines, and finally, as a last resource, a strong
force of Kuroki's army was sent across the Taitsz River to turn the
enemy's left flank. The Russian general, Kuropatkin, rightly
estimated that the troops detached by General Kuroki for this purpose
were not commensurate with the task assigned to them, whereas the
Russians could meet this flanking movement with overwhelming
strength. Therefore, Kuropatkin sent three army corps across the
river, and by September 1st, the Japanese flanking forces were
confronted by a powerful body.
Strategists are agreed that, had Kuropatkin's plans found competent
agents to execute them, the Japanese advance would have been at least
checked at Liaoyang. In fact, the Japanese, in drafting their
original programme, had always expected that Nogi's army would be in
a position on the left flank in the field long before there was any
question of fighting at Liaoyang. It was thus due to the splendid
defence made by the garrison of the great fortress that Kuropatkin
found himself in such a favourable position at the end of August. But
unfortunately for the Russians, one of their generals, Orloff, who
had thirteen battalions under his command, showed incompetence, and
falling into an ambuscade in the course of the counter-flanking
operation, suffered defeat with heavy losses. The Japanese took full
advantage of this error, and Kuropatkin, with perhaps excessive
caution, decided to abandon his counter-movement and withdraw from
Liaoyang. He effected his retreat in a manner that bore testimony to
the excellence of his generalship. The casualties in this great
battle were very heavy. From August 25th, when the preliminary
operations may be said to have commenced, to September 3rd, when the
field remained in the possession of the Japanese, their losses were
17,539, namely, 4866 in the First Army, 4992 in the Fourth, and 7681
in the Second, while the Russian casualties were estimated at 25,000.
BATTLES OF SHAHO AND OF HEIKAUTAI
On the 2nd of October, General Kuropatkin issued from his
headquarters in Mukden an order declaring that the "moment for the
attack, ardently desired by the army, had at last arrived, and that
the Japanese were now to be compelled to do Russia's will." Barely a
month had elapsed since the great battle at Liaoyang, and it still
remains uncertain what had happened in that interval to justify the
issue of such an order. But the most probable explanation is that
Kuropatkin had received re-enforcements, so that he could marshal
250,000 to 260,000 troops for the proposed offensive, and that his
news from Port Arthur suggested the necessity of immediate and
strenuous efforts to relieve the fortress. His plan was to throw
forward his right so as to outflank the Japanese, recover possession
of Liaoyang, and obtain command of the railway.
He set his troops in motion on the 9th of October, but he was driven
back after more than a week's fighting. No less than 13,333 Russian
dead were left on the field, and at the lowest calculation,
Kuropatkin's casualties must have exceeded 60,000 men exclusive of
prisoners. There can be no doubt whatever that the Russian army had
suffered one of the most overwhelming defeats in its history, and
that after a fortnight's hard marching and nine days' hard fighting,
with little food or sleep, it had been reduced by terrible losses and
depressing fatigues to a condition bordering on extermination. Such
was the result of Kuropatkin's first attempt to assume the offensive.
Thereafter, fully three months of complete inaction ensued, and the
onlooking world occupied itself with conjectures as to the
explanation of this apparent loss of time.
Yet the chief reason was very simple. The weather in central
Manchuria at the close of the year is such as to render military
manoeuvres almost impossible on a large scale, and this difficulty is
greatly accentuated by the almost complete absence of roads. In fact,
the reasons which induced Kuropatkin to defy these obstacles, and
renew his outflanking attempts after the beginning of the cold
weather, have never been fully explained. The most probable theory is
that held by Japanese strategists, namely, that he desired to find
some opening for the vigorous campaign which he intended to pursue in
the spring, and that his attention was naturally directed to the
region between the Hun and the Liao rivers, a region unoccupied by
either army and yet within striking distance of the bases of both.
Moreover, he had received nearly three whole divisions from Europe,
and he looked to these fresh troops with much confidence. He set his
forces in motion on the 25th of January, 1905. Seven Russian
divisions were engaged, and the brunt of the fighting was borne by
two Japanese divisions and a brigade of cavalry. Two other divisions
were engaged, but the part they acted in the fight was so subordinate
that it need scarcely be taken into account. The Russians were
finally driven back with a loss of some twenty thousand killed,
wounded, or prisoners. This battle of Heikautai was the last
engagement that took place before the final encounter.
PORT ARTHUR
The relief of Port Arthur had ceased to be an important objective of
Kuropatkin before he planned his Heikautai attack. The great fortress
fell on the last day of 1904. It was not until the middle of May that
the Kinchou isthmus and Dalny came into Japanese hands, nor was the
siege army under General Nogi marshalled until the close of June.
During that interval, General Stossel, who commanded, on the Russian
side, availed himself of all possible means of defence, and the
investing force had to fight for every inch of ground. The attack on
the outlying positions occupied fully a month, and not till the end
of July had the Japanese advanced close enough to attempt a coup de
main. There can be no doubt that they had contemplated success by
that method of procedure, but they met with such a severe repulse,
during August, that they recognized the necessity of recourse to the
comparatively slow arts of the engineer. Thereafter, the story of the
siege followed stereotyped lines except that the colossal nature of
the fortifications entailed unprecedented sacrifice of life on the
besiegers' part. The crucial point of the siege-operations was the
capture of a position called 203-Metre Hill. This took place on
November 30th after several days of the most terrible fighting ever
witnessed, fighting which cost the Japanese ten thousand casualties.
The importance of the hill was that it furnished a post of
observation whence indications could be given to guide the heavy
Japanese artillery in its cannonade of the remaining Russian ships in
the harbour.
Nothing then remained for the Russians except to sink the ships, and
this they did, so that Russia lost a squadron which, all told,
represented an outlay of over thirty millions sterling--$150,000,000.
In a telegram despatched to his own Government on January 1st,
General Stossel said: "Great Sovereign, forgive! We have done all
that was humanly possible. Judge us; but be merciful. Eleven months
have exhausted our strength. A quarter only of the defenders, and
one-half of them invalids, occupy twenty-seven versts of
fortifications without supports and without intervals for even the
briefest repose. The men are reduced to shadows!" On the previous day
Stossel had written to General Nogi, declaring that further
resistance would merely entail useless loss of life considering the
conditions within the fortress. The total number of prisoners who
surrendered at the fall of the fortress was 878 officers and 23,491
men, and the captured material included 546 guns; 35,252 rifles; 60
torpedoes; 30,000 kilograms of powder; 82,670 rounds of
gun-ammunition; two and a quarter million rounds of small-arm
ammunition; a number of wagons; 1,920 horses; four battle-ships; two
cruisers; fourteen gunboats and torpedo-craft; ten steamers;
thirty-three steam launches, and various other vessels. These figures
are worthy of study, as one of General Stossel's alleged reasons for
surrendering was scarcity of ammunition.
MISHCHENKO'S RAID
The capture of Port Arthur meant something more than the fall of a
fortress which had been counted impregnable and which had dominated
the strategical situation for fully seven months. It meant, also,
that General Nogi's army would now be free to join their comrades
beyond the Liao River, and that Kuropatkin would find his opponents'
strength increased by four divisions. It became, therefore, important
to ascertain how soon this transfer was likely to be effected, and,
if possible, to interrupt it by tearing up the railway. Accordingly,
on January 8th, General Mishchenko's division of Cossacks,
Caucasians, and Dragoons, mustering six thousand sabres, with six
batteries of light artillery, crossed the Hun River and marched south
on a five-mile front. Throughout the war the Cossacks, of whom a very
large force was with the Russian army, had hitherto failed to
demonstrate their usefulness, and this raid in force was regarded
with much curiosity. It accomplished very little. Its leading
squadrons penetrated as far south as Old Niuchwang, and five hundred
metres of the railway north of Haicheng were destroyed, a bridge also
being blown up. But this damage was speedily restored, and as for the
reconnoitring results of the raid, they seem to have been very
trifling.
THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN
After the battle of Heikautai, which cost the Russians twenty
thousand casualties and exposed the troops to terrible hardships,
Kuropatkin's army did not number more than 260,000 effectives. On the
other hand, he could rely upon a constant stream of re-enforcements
from Europe, as the efficiency of the railway service had been
enormously increased by the genius and energy of Prince Khilkoff,
Russian minister of Ways and Communications. In fact, when all the
forces under orders for Manchuria had reached their destination,
Kuropatkin would have under his command twelve army corps, six
rifle-brigades, and nine divisions of mounted troops, a total of
something like half a million men. Evidently the Japanese would not
have acted wisely in patiently awaiting the coming of these troops.
Moreover, since the break-up of winter would soon render temporarily
impossible all operations in the field, to have deferred any forward
movement beyond the month of March would have merely facilitated the
massing of Russian re-enforcements in the lines on the Shaho, where
the enemy had taken up his position after his defeat at Heikautai.
These considerations induced Marshal Oyama to deliver an attack with
his whole force during the second half of February, and there
resulted a conflict which, under the name of the "battle of Mukden,"
will go down in the pages of history as the greatest fight on record.
It has been claimed by the Russians that Kuropatkin was thinking of
assuming the offensive when the Japanese forced his hand; but however
that may be, the fact is that he fought on the defensive as he had
done throughout the whole war with two exceptions. Nevertheless, we
may confidently assert that at no previous period had the Russians
been so confident and so strong. According to the Japanese estimate,
the accuracy of which may be trusted, Kuropatkin had 376 battalions,
171 batteries, and 178 squadrons; representing 300,000 rifles, 26,000
sabres and 1368 guns, while the defences behind which these troops
were sheltered were of the most elaborate character, superior to
anything that the Japanese had encountered during the previous
battles of the field-campaign. On the other hand, the Japanese also
were in unprecedented strength. Up to the battle of Heikautai,
Kuropatkin had been confronted by only three armies, namely, the
First, Second, and Fourth, under Generals Kuroki, Oku, and Nozu,
respectively. In the middle of February, these numbered three, four,
and two divisions, respectively. But there had now been added a
considerable number of reserve brigades, bringing up the average
strength of most of the divisions to from 22,000 to 25,000 men.
Further, in addition to these armies, two others were in the field,
namely, the Third, under General Nogi, and the Fifth, under General
Kawamura. General Nogi's force had marched up from Port Arthur, but
General Kawamura's was a new army formed of special reservists and
now put in the field for the first time.
The Russians occupied a front forty-four miles in extent and from
five to six miles in depth. They did not know, apparently, that
General Kawamura's army had joined Oyama's forces, nor did they know
where Nogi's army was operating. The Japanese programme was to hold
the Russian centre; to attack their left flank with Kawamura's army,
and to sweep round their right flank with Nogi's forces. The latter
were therefore kept in the rear until Kawamura's attack had developed
fully on the east and until the two centres were hotly engaged. Then
"under cover of the smoke and heat generated by the conflict of the
other armies on an immense front, and specially screened by the
violent activity of the Second Army, Nogi marched in echelon of
columns from the west on a wide, circling movement; swept up the Liao
valley, and bending thence eastward, descended on Mukden from the
west and northwest, giving the finishing blow of this gigantic
encounter; severing the enemy's main line of retreat, and forcing him
to choose between surrender and flight. To launch, direct, and
support four hundred thousand men engaged at such a season over a
front one hundred miles in length was one of the most remarkable
tasks ever undertaken on the field of battle by a modern staff."
Of course, all these events did not move exactly as planned, but the
main feature of the great fight was that Kuropatkin, deceived by
Kawamura's movement, detached a large force to oppose him, and then
recalled these troops too late for the purpose of checking General
Nogi's flanking operation. The fighting was continuous for almost two
weeks, and on the morning of March 16th, the Russians had been driven
out of Mukden and forced northward beyond Tiehling. In fact, they did
not pause until March 20th, when Linievitch, who had succeeded
Kuropatkin in the chief command, was able to order a halt at
Supingchieh, seventy miles to the north of Mukden. "The Russian
losses in this most disastrous battle included, according to Marshal
Oyama's reports, 27,700 killed and 110,000 wounded," while an immense
quantity of war material fell into the hands of the victors. The
Japanese losses, up to the morning of March 12th, were estimated at
41,222.
THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA
From the outset, both sides had appreciated the enormous
preponderance that would be conferred by command of the sea. It was
in obedience to this conviction that the Russian authorities were in
the act of taking steps to increase largely their Pacific squadron
when the outbreak of war compelled them to suspend the despatch of
re-enforcements. They did not, however, relinquish their
preparations. Evidently, any vessels sent to the scene of combat
after fighting had begun must be competent to defend themselves
against attack, which condition entailed strength to form an
independent squadron. The preparations to acquire this competence
involved a long delay, and it was not until the 16th of October,
1904, that Admiral Rozhdestvensky left Libau with some forty ships.
The world watched this adventure with astonished eyes. Thitherto
Great Britain, equipped as she is with coaling-stations all round the
globe, had been the only power thought capable of sending a large
fleet on an ocean voyage. Rozhdestvensky's squadron consumed over
three thousand tons of coal daily when steaming at a reduced speed,
and how this supply was to be kept up in the absence of ports of
call, no one was able to conjecture. The difficulty was ultimately
overcome by the very benevolent character which the neutrality of
certain powers assumed, and in May, 1905, the Baltic squadron, as the
vessels under Rozhdestvensky were called, made its appearance in Far
Eastern waters.
It had been supposed that the Russians would seek to envelop their
movements in obscurity, but they seem to have appreciated, from the
outset, the absurdity of endeavouring to conceal the traces of a
fleet of forty vessels steaming along the routes of the world's
commerce. They therefore proceeded boldly on their way, slowly but
indomitably overcoming all obstacles. It will be observed that the
date of their departure from Libau was just two months after the
last attempt of the Port Arthur squadron to escape to Vladivostok.
Doubtless, this sortie, which ended so disastrously for the
Russians, was prompted in part by anticipation of the Baltic
fleet's approaching departure, and had the Port Arthur squadron,
or any considerable portion of it, reached Vladivostok before
Rozhdestvensky's coming, Admiral Togo might have been caught between
two fires. The result of the sortie, however, dispelled that hope.
Long before Rozhdestvensky reached the Far East, he fell into touch
with Japanese scouts, and every movement of his ships was flashed to
the enemy. That Vladivostok was his objective and that he would try
to reach that place if possible without fighting, were unquestionable
facts. But by what avenue would he enter the Sea of Japan? The query
occupied attention in all the capitals of the world during several
days, and conjectures were as numerous as they were conflicting. But
Admiral Togo had no moment of hesitation. He knew that only two
routes were possible, and that one of them, the Tsugaru Strait, could
be strewn with mines at very brief notice. The Russians dare not take
that risk. Therefore Togo waited quietly at his base in the Korean
Strait and on the 27th of May his scouts reported by wireless
telegraphy at 5 A.M., "Enemy's fleet sighted in 203 section. He seems
to be steering for the east channel."
In the historic action which ensued, Rozhdestvensky had under his
command eight battle-ships, nine cruisers, three coast-defence ships,
nine destroyers, an auxiliary cruiser, six special-service steamers,
and two hospital ships. Togo's fleet consisted of five battle-ships
(one of them practically valueless), one coast-defence vessel, eight
armoured cruisers, ten protected cruisers, twenty destroyers, and
sixty-seven torpedo-boats. Numerically, the advantage was on the
Japanese side, although in first-class fighting material the
disparity was not remarkable. As for the result, it can only be
called annihilation for the Russian squadron. Out of the thirty-eight
ships composing it, twenty were sunk; six captured; two went to the
bottom or were shattered while escaping; six were disarmed and
interned in neutral ports to which they had fled; one was released
after capture, and of one the fate is unknown. Only two escaped out
of the whole squadron. This wonderful result justifies the comment of
a competent authority:
"We can recognize that Togo is great--great in the patience he
exercised in the face of much provocation to enter upon the fight
under conditions less favourable to the success of his cause; great
in his determination to give decisive battle despite advice offered
to him to resort to methods of evasion, subterfuge, and finesse;
great in his use of not one but every means in his power to crush his
enemy, and great, greatest perhaps of all, in his moderation after
victory unparalleled in the annals of modern naval war.
"The attitude of the Japanese people in the presence of this
epoch-making triumph is a sight for men and gods. They have the grand
manner of the ancients, and their invariable attitude throughout the
war, whether in the hour of victory or in that of disappointment, has
been worthy of a great people. No noisy and vulgar clamour, no
self-laudation, no triumph over a fallen enemy, but deep
thankfulness, calm satisfaction, and reference of the cause of
victory to the illustrious virtue of their Emperor."*
*The War in the Far East, by the Military Correspondent of "The
Times."
The Japanese losses in the two-days' fighting were three
torpedo-boats, and they had 116 killed and 538 wounded.
PEACE RESTORED
After the battles of Mukden and Tsushima, which were great enough to
terminate the greatest war, the Russians and the Japanese alike found
themselves in a position which must either prelude another stupendous
effort on both sides or be utilized to negotiate peace. Here the
President of the United States of America intervened, and, on the 9th
of June, 1905, the American minister in Tokyo and the ambassador in
St. Petersburg, instructed from Washington, handed an identical note
to the Japanese and the Russian Governments respectively, urging the
two countries to approach each other direct. On the following day,
Japan intimated her frank acquiescence, and Russia lost no time in
taking a similar step. Two months nevertheless elapsed before the
plenipotentiaries of the two powers met, on August 10th, at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Russia sent M. (afterwards Count) de Witte
and Baron Rosen; Japan, Baron (afterwards Marquis) Komura, who had
held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs throughout the war, and Mr.
(afterwards Baron) Takahira. The Japanese statesmen well understood
that much of the credit accruing to them for their successful conduct
of the war must be forfeited in the sequel of the negotiations. For
the people of Japan had accustomed themselves to expect that Russia
would recoup a great part, if not the whole, of the expenses incurred
by their country in the contest, whereas the ministry in Tokyo knew
that to look for payment of indemnity by a great State whose
territory has not been invaded effectively or its existence menaced
must be futile.
Nevertheless, diplomacy required that this conviction should be
concealed, and thus Russia carried to the conference a belief that
the financial phase of the discussion would be crucial. Baron
Komura's mandate was, however, that the only radically essential
terms were those formulated by Japan prior to the war. She must
insist on securing the ends for which she had fought, since she
believed them to be indispensable to the peace of the Far East, but
beyond that she would not go. The Japanese plenipotentiaries,
therefore, judged it wise to submit their terms in the order of the
real importance, leaving their Russian colleagues to imagine, as they
probably would, that the converse method had been adopted, and that
everything prefatory to questions of finance and territory was of
minor consequence.
The negotiations, commencing on the 10th of August, were not
concluded until the 5th of September, when a treaty of peace was
signed. There had been a moment when the onlooking world believed
that unless Russia agreed to ransom the island of Saghalien by paying
to Japan a sum of 120 millions sterling,--$580,000,000, the
conference would be broken off. Nor did such an exchange seem
unreasonable, for were Russia expelled from the northern part of
Saghalien, which commands the estuary of the Amur, her position in
Siberia would have been compromised. But Japan's statesmen were not
disposed to make any display of territorial aggression. The southern
half of Saghalien had originally belonged to Japan and had passed
into Russia's possession by an arrangement which the Japanese nation
strongly resented. To recover that portion of the island seemed,
therefore, a legitimate ambition. Japan did not contemplate any
larger demand, nor did she seriously insist on an indemnity. Thus,
the negotiations were never in real danger of failure.
The Treaty of Portsmouth recognized Japan's "paramount political,
military, and economic interests" in Korea; provided for the
simultaneous evacuation of Manchuria by the contracting parties;
transferred to Japan the lease of the Liaotung peninsula, held by
Russia from China, together with that of the Russian railways south
of Kwanchengtsz and all collateral mining or other privileges; ceded
to Japan the southern half of Saghalien, the fiftieth parallel of
latitude to be the boundary between the two parties; secured
fishing-rights for Japanese subjects along the coasts of the seas of
Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering; laid down that the expense incurred by
the Japanese for the maintenance of the Russian prisoners during the
war should be reimbursed by Russia, less the outlays made by the
latter on account of Japanese prisoners, by which arrangement Japan
obtained a payment of some four million sterling $20,000,000, and
provided that the contracting parties, while withdrawing their
military force from Manchuria, might maintain guards to protect their
respective railways, the number of such guards not to exceed fifteen
per kilometre of line. There were other important restrictions:
first, the contracting parties were to abstain from taking, on the
Russo-Korean frontier, any military measures which might menace the
security of Russian or Korean territory; secondly, the two powers
pledged themselves not to exploit the Manchurian railways for
strategic purposes, and thirdly, they promised not to build on
Saghalien or its adjacent islands any fortifications or other similar
works, or to take any military measures which might impede the free
navigation of the Strait of La Pérouse and the Gulf of Tatary.
The above provisions concerned the two contracting parties only. But
China's interests also were considered. Thus, it was agreed to
"restore entirely and completely to her exclusive administration" all
portions of Manchuria then in the occupation, or under the control,
of Japanese or Russian troops, except the leased territory; that her
consent must be obtained for the transfer to Japan of the leases and
concessions held by the Russians in Manchuria; that the Russian
Government should disavow the possession of "any territorial
advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of
Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal
opportunity in Manchuria," and that Japan and Russia "engaged
reciprocally not to obstruct any general measures common to all
countries which China might take for the development of the commerce
and industry of Manchuria."
This distinction between the special interests of the contracting
parties and the interests of China herself, as well as of foreign
nations generally, is essential to clear understanding of a situation
which subsequently attracted much attention. From the time of the
Opium War (1857) to the Boxer rising (1900), each of the great
Western powers struggled for its own hand in China, and each sought
to gain for itself exclusive concessions and privileges with
comparatively little regard for the interests of others and with no
regard whatsoever for China's sovereign rights. The fruits of this
period were permanently ceded territories (Hongkong and Macao);
leases temporarily establishing foreign sovereignty in various
districts (Kiao-chou, Weihaiwei, and Kwang-chow); railway and mining
concessions, and the establishment of settlements at open ports where
foreign jurisdiction was supreme. But when, in 1900, the Boxer rising
forced all the powers into a common camp, they awoke to full
appreciation of a principle which had been growing current for the
past two or three years, namely, that concerted action on the lines
of maintaining China's integrity and securing to all alike equality
of opportunity and a similarly open door, was the only feasible
method of preventing the partition of the Chinese empire and averting
a clash of rival interests which might have disastrous results. This,
of course, did not mean that there was to be any abandonment of
special privileges already acquired or any surrender of existing
concessions. The arrangement was not to be retrospective in any
sense. Vested interests were to be strictly guarded until the lapse
of the periods for which they had been granted, or until the maturity
of China's competence to be really autonomous.
A curious situation was thus created. International professions of
respect for China's sovereignty, for the integrity of her empire, and
for the enforcement of the open door and equal opportunity co-existed
with legacies from an entirely different past. Russia endorsed this
new policy, but not unnaturally declined to abate any of the
advantages previously enjoyed by her in Manchuria. Those advantages
were very substantial. They included a twenty-five-year lease--with
provision for renewal--of the Liaotung peninsula, within which area
of 1220 square miles Chinese troops might not penetrate, whereas
Russia would not only exercise full administrative authority, but
also take military and naval action of any kind; they included
the creation of a neutral territory on the immediate north of the
former and still more extensive, which remained under Chinese
administration, and where neither Chinese nor Russian troops might
enter, nor might China, without Russia's consent, cede land, open
trading marts, or grant concessions to any third nationality; and
they included the right to build some sixteen hundred miles of
railway (which China would have the opportunity of purchasing at cost
price in the year 1938, and would be entitled to receive gratis in
1982), as well as the right to hold extensive zones on either side of
the railway, to administer these zones in the fullest sense, and to
work all mines lying along the lines.
Under the Portsmouth treaty these advantages were transferred to
Japan by Russia, the railway, however, being divided so that only the
portion (521.5 miles) to the south of Kwanchengtsz fell to Japan's
share, while the portion (1077 miles) to the north of that place
remained in Russia's hands. China's consent to the above transfers
and assignments was obtained in a treaty signed at Peking on the 22nd
of December, 1905. Thus, Japan came to hold in Manchuria a position
somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, she figured as the champion
of the Chinese empire's integrity and as an exponent of the new
principle of equal opportunity and the open door. On the other, she
appeared as the legatee of many privileges more or less inconsistent
with that principle. But, at the same time, nearly all the great
powers of Europe were similarly circumstanced. In their cases, also,
the same incongruity was observed between the newly professed policy
and the aftermath of the old practice. It was scarcely to be expected
that Japan alone should make a large sacrifice on the altar of a
theory to which no other State thought of yielding any retrospective
obedience whatever. She did, indeed, furnish a clear proof of
deference to the open-door doctrine, for instead of reserving the
railway zones to her own exclusive use, as she was fully entitled to
do, she sought and obtained from China a pledge to open to foreign
trade sixteen places within these zones.
For the rest, however, the inconsistency between the past and the
present, though existing throughout the whole of China, was nowhere
so conspicuous as in the three eastern provinces (Manchuria); not
because there was any real difference of degree, but because
Manchuria had been the scene of the greatest war of modern times;
because that war had been fought by Japan in the cause of the new
policy, and because the principles of the equally open door and of
China's integrity had been the main bases of the Portsmouth treaty,
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and of the subsequently concluded
ententes with France and Russia. In short, the world's eyes were
fixed on Manchuria and diverted from China proper, so that every act
of Japan was subjected to an exceptionally rigorous scrutiny, and the
nations behaved as though they expected her to live up to a standard
of almost ideal altitude. China's mood, too, greatly complicated the
situation. She had the choice between two moderate and natural
courses; either to wait quietly until the various concessions granted
by her to foreign powers in the evil past should lapse by maturity,
or to qualify herself by earnest reforms and industrious developments
for their earlier recovery. Nominally she adopted the latter course,
but in reality she fell into a mood of much impatience. Under the
name of a "rights-recovery campaign" her people began to protest
vehemently against the continuance of any conditions which impaired
her sovereignty, and as this temper coloured her attitude towards the
various questions which inevitably grew out of the situation in
Manchuria, her relations with Japan became somewhat strained in the
early part of 1909.
JAPAN IN KOREA AFTER THE WAR WITH RUSSIA
Having waged two wars on account of Korea, Japan emerged from the
second conflict with the conviction that the policy of maintaining
the independence of that country must be modified, and that since the
identity of Korean and Japanese interests in the Far East and the
paramount character of Japanese interests in Korea would not permit
Japan to leave Korea to the care of any third power, she must assume
the charge herself. Europe and America also recognized that view of
the situation, and consented to withdraw their legations from Seoul,
thus leaving the control of Korean foreign affairs entirely in the
hands of Japan, who further undertook to assume military direction in
the event of aggression from without or disturbance from within. But
in the matter of internal administration, she continued to limit
herself to advisory supervision. Thus, though a Japanese
resident-general in Seoul, with subordinate residents throughout the
provinces, assumed the functions hitherto discharged by foreign
ministers and consuls, the Korean Government was merely asked to
employ Japanese experts in the position of counsellors, the right to
accept or reject their counsels being left to their employers.
Once again, however, the futility of looking for any real reforms
under this optional system was demonstrated. Japan sent her most
renowned statesman, Prince Ito, to discharge the duties of
resident-general; but even he, in spite of patience and tact, found
that some less optional methods must be resorted to. Hence, on the
24th of July, 1907, a new agreement was signed, by which the
resident-general acquired initiative as well as consultative
competence to enact and enforce laws and ordinances; to appoint and
remove Korean officials, and to place capable Japanese subjects in
the ranks of the administration. That this constituted a heavy blow
to Korea's independence could not be gainsaid. That it was inevitable
seemed to be equally obvious. For there existed in Korea nearly all
the worst abuses of medieval systems. The administration of justice
depended solely on favour or interest. The police contributed by
corruption and incompetence to the insecurity of life and property.
The troops were a body of useless mercenaries. Offices being allotted
by sale, thousands of incapables thronged the ranks of the executive.
The Emperor's Court was crowded by diviners and plotters of all
kinds, male and female. The finances of the Throne and those of the
State were hopelessly confused. There was nothing like an organized
judiciary. A witness was in many cases considered particeps criminis;
torture was commonly employed to obtain evidence, and defendants in
civil cases were placed under arrest. Imprisonment meant death or
permanent disablement for a man of means. Flogging so severe as to
cripple, if not to kill, was a common punishment; every major offence
from robbery upwards was capital, and female criminals were
frequently executed by administering shockingly painful poisons. The
currency was in a state of the utmost confusion. Extreme corruption
and extortion were practised in connexion with taxation. Finally,
while nothing showed that the average Korean lacked the elementary
virtue of patriotism, there had been repeated proofs that the safety
and independence of the empire counted for little with political
intriguers. Japan must step out of Korea altogether or effect drastic
reforms there.
She necessarily chose the latter alternative, and the things which
she accomplished between the beginning of 1906 and the close of 1908
may be briefly described as the elaboration of a proper system of
taxation; the organization of a staff to administer annual budgets;
the re-assessment of taxable property; the floating of public loans
for productive enterprises; the reform of the currency; the
establishment of banks of various kinds, including agricultural and
commercial; the creation of associations for putting bank-notes into
circulation; the introduction of a warehousing system to supply
capital to farmers; the lighting and buoying of the coasts; the
provision of posts, telegraphs, roads, and railways; the erection of
public buildings; the starting of various industrial enterprises
(such as printing, brick making, forestry and coal mining); the
laying out of model farms; the beginning of cotton cultivation; the
building and equipping of an industrial training school; the
inauguration of sanitary works; the opening of hospitals and medical
schools; the organization of an excellent educational system; the
construction of waterworks in several towns; the complete
remodelling of the Central Government; the differentiation of the
Court and the executive, as well as of the administrative and the
judiciary; the formation of an efficient body of police; the
organization of law-courts with a majority of Japanese jurists on the
bench; the enactment of a new penal code, and drastic reforms in the
taxation system.
In the summer of 1907, the resident-general advised the Throne to
disband the standing army as an unserviceable and expensive force.
The measure was, doubtless desirable, but the docility of the troops
had been overrated. Some of them resisted vehemently, and many became
the nucleus of an insurrection which lasted in a desultory manner for
nearly two years; cost the lives of 21,000 insurgents and 1300
Japanese, and entailed upon Japan an outlay of nearly a million
sterling. Altogether, what with building 642 miles of railway, making
loans to Korea, providing funds for useful purposes and quelling the
insurrection, Japan was fifteen millions sterling $72,000,000 out of
pocket on Korea's account by the end of 1909. She had also lost the
veteran statesman, Prince Ito, who was assassinated at Harbin by a
Korean fanatic on the 26th of October, 1909.*
*Encylopaedia Britannica, (11th Edition); article "Japan," by
Brinkley.
ANNEXATION OF KOREA
Japan finally resolved that nothing short of annexation would suit
the situation, and that step was taken on August 22, 1910. At what
precise moment this conviction forced itself upon Japan's judgment it
is impossible to say, She knows how to keep her counsel. But it was
certainly with great reluctance that she, hitherto the exponent and
champion of Korean independence, accepted the role of annexation. The
explanation given by her own Government is as follows:
-"In its solicitude to put an end to disturbing conditions, the
Japanese Government made an arrangement, in 1905, for establishing a
protectorate over Korea and they have ever since been assiduously
engaged in works of reform, looking forward to the consummation of
the desired end. But they have failed to find in the regime of a
protectorate sufficient hope for a realization of the object which
they had in view, and a condition of unrest and disquietude still
prevails throughout the whole peninsula. In these circumstances, the
necessity of introducing fundamental changes in the system of
government in Korea has become entirely manifest, and an earnest and
careful examination of the Korean problem has convinced the Japanese
Government that the regime of a protectorate cannot be made to adapt
itself to the actual condition of affairs in Korea, and that the
responsibilities devolving upon Japan for the due administration of
the country cannot be justly fulfilled without the complete
annexation of Korea to the Empire."
"Thus the dynasty of sovereigns, which had continued in an unbroken
line from 1392, came to an end with the independence of this country,
whose national traditions and history had extended over four thousand
years, whose foundation as a kingdom was coeval with that of the
Assyrian empire; and the two last living representatives of the
dynasty exchanged their positions as Imperial dignitaries for those
of princes and pensioners of Japan."* Since that drastic step was
taken, events seem to have fully justified it. Under the able
management of Count Terauchi, the evil conditions inimical to the
prosperity and happiness of the people are fast disappearing.
Comparative peace and order reign; and there appears to be no reason
why the fruits of progressive civilization should not ultimately be
gathered in Japan's new province as plentifully as they are in Japan
herself.
*The Story of Korea, by Longford.
SITUATION IN 1911
The unstable element of the East Asian situation to-day is the
position occupied by Japan and Russia in Manchuria. Both powers
possess privileges there which will not be easily surrendered, and
which are likely, sooner or later, to prove incompatible with China's
autonomy. It was apprehended at the outset that Russia would not long
consent to occupy the place assigned to her by the Treaty of
Portsmouth, and that she would quickly prepare for a war of revenge.
Her statesmen, however, showed as much magnanimity as wisdom. On July
30, 1906, they signed with Japan a convention pledging the
contracting parties to respect all the rights accruing to one or the
other under the Portsmouth Treaty. If international promises can be
trusted, continuous peace is assured between the two powers. Russia,
however, is not only doubling the track of her Siberian Railway, but
is also building a second line along the Amur; while Japan will soon
command access to central Manchuria by three lines; one from Dalny to
Kwanchengtsz; another from Fusan via Wiju to Mukden, and a third from
the northeastern coast of Korea via Hoiryong, on the Tumen, to Kilin.
These developments do not suggest that when the lease of Liaotung and
the charter of the railways mature--in twenty-five years and thirty
years, respectively, from the date of their signature--either Japan
or Russia will be found ready to surrender these properties.
Meanwhile, the United States of America is gradually constituting
itself the guardian of China's integrity in Manchuria, and the
citizens of the Pacific slope, under the influence of the labour
question, are writing and speaking as though war between the great
republic and the Far Eastern empire were an inevitable outcome of the
future. This chimera is unthinkable by anyone really familiar with
the trend of Japanese sentiment, but it may encourage in China a
dangerous mood, and it helps always to foster an unquiet feeling. On
the whole, when we add the chaotic condition into which China is
apparently falling, it has to be admitted that the second decade of
the twentieth century does not open a peaceful vista in the Far East.
STEADY-POINTS
There are, however, two steady-points upon the horizon. One is the
Anglo-Japanese treaty: not the treaty of 1902, spoken of already
above, but a treaty which replaced it and which was concluded on
August 12, 1905. The latter document goes much further than the
former. For, whereas the treaty of 1902 merely pledged each of the
contracting parties to observe neutrality in the event of the other
being engaged in defence of its interests, and to come to that
other's assistance in the event of any third power intervening
belligerently, the treaty of 1905 provides that:
"Whenever in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the
rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement
are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one
another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures
which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or
interests."
"If, by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever
arising, on the part of any other power or powers, either contracting
party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights
or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the
other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its
ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual
agreement with it."
The "rights and interests" here referred to are defined as follows
in the preamble:
"The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the
regions of eastern Asia and of India."
"The preservation of the common interests of all powers in China by
insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese empire and the
principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all
nations in China."
"The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting
parties in the regions of eastern Asia and of India, and the defence
of their special interests in the said regions."
This remarkable agreement came into force from the date of its
signature, and its period of duration was fixed at ten years. During
its existence the two powers, England and Japan, are pledged to use
all endeavours for maintaining not only peace in the East, but also
the independence and integrity of China. The significance of such a
pledge is appreciated when we recall the dimensions of the British
navy supplemented by the Japanese, and when we further recall that
Japan, with her base of operations within easy reach of the Asiatic
continent, can place half a million of men in the field at any
moment. The second steady-point is China's financial condition. She
is the debtor of several Western nations, and they may be trusted to
avert from her any vicissitude that would impair her credit as a
borrower. Prominent among such vicissitudes is the dismemberment of
the country.
ENGRAVING: SEAL OF SESSHO, THE PAINTER
APPENDIX
1. CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN
TOKYO, FEBRUARY 11, 1889
CHAPTER I. THE EMPEROR
Article I. The Empire of Japan shall be ruled over by Emperors of the
dynasty, which has reigned in an unbroken line of descent for ages
past.
Article II. The succession to the throne shall devolve upon male
descendants of the Imperial House, according to the provisions of the
Imperial House Law.
Article III. The person of the Emperor is sacred and inviolable.
Article IV. The Emperor being the Head of the Empire the rights of
sovereignty are invested in him, and he exercises them in accordance
with the provisions of the present Constitution.
Article V. The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the
consent of the Imperial Diet.
Article VI. The Emperor gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be
promulgated and put into force.
Article VII. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes,
and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives.
Article VIII. In case of urgent necessity, when the Imperial Diet is
not sitting, the Emperor, in order to maintain the public safety or
to avert a public danger, has the power to issue Imperial Ordinances,
which shall take the place of laws. Such Imperial Ordinances shall,
however, be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and
should the Diet disapprove of the said Ordinances, the Government
shall declare them to be henceforth invalid.
Article IX. The Emperor issues, or causes to be issued, the
ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the
maintenance of public peace and order, and for the promotion of the
welfare of his subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any
of the existing laws.
Article X. The Emperor determines the organisation of the different
branches of the Administration; he fixes the salaries of all civil
and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same.
Exceptions specially provided for in the present Constitution or in
other laws shall be in accordance with the respective provisions
bearing thereon.
Article XI. The Emperor has the supreme command of the army and navy.
Article XII. The Emperor determines the organisation and peace
standing of the army and navy.
Article XIII. The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes
treaties.
Article XIV. The Emperor proclaims the law of siege. The conditions
and operation of the law of siege shall be determined by law.
Article XV. The Emperor confers titles of nobility, rank, orders, and
other marks of honour.
Article XVI. The Emperor orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of
punishments, and rehabilitation.
Article XVII. The institution of a Regency shall take place in
conformity with the provisions of the Imperial House Law.*
The Regent shall exercise the supreme powers which belong to the
Emperor in his name.
*Law of succession, coronation, ascension, majority, style of
address, regency, imperial governor, imperial family, hereditary
estates, imperial expenditures, etc., of Feb. 11, 1889.
CHAPTER II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF SUBJECTS
Article XVIII. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject
shall be determined by law.
Article XIX. Japanese subjects shall all equally be eligible for
civil and military appointments, and any other public offices,
subject only to the conditions prescribed and Laws and Ordinances.
Article XX. Japanese subjects are amenable to service in the army or
navy, according to the provisions of law.
Article XXI. Japanese subjects are amenable to the duty of paying
taxes, according to the provisions of law.
Article XXII. Subject to the limitations imposed by law, Japanese
subjects shall enjoy full liberty in regard to residence and change
of abode.
Article XXIII. No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried
or punished, except according to law.
Article XXIV. No Japanese subject shall be deprived of his right of
being tried by judges determined by law.
Article XXV. Except in the cases provided for in the law, the house
of no Japanese subject shall be entered or searched without his
permission.
Article XXVI. Except in cases provided for in the law, the secrecy of
the letters of Japanese subjects shall not be violated.
Article XXVII. The rights of property of Japanese subjects shall not
be violated. Such measures, however, as may be rendered necessary in
the interests of the public welfare shall be taken in accordance with
the provisions of the law.
Article XXVIII. Japanese subjects shall, within limits not
prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties
as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.
Article XXIX. Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of the law,
enjoy liberty in regard to speech, writing, publication, public
meetings, and associations.
Article XXX. Japanese subjects may present petitions, provided that
they observe the proper form of respect, and comply with the rules
specially provided for such matters.
Article XXXI. The provisions contained in the present chapter shall
not interfere with the exercise, in times of war or in case of
national emergency, of the supreme powers which belong to the
Emperor.
Article XXXII. Each and every one of the provisions contained in the
preceding articles of the present chapter shall, in so far as they do
not conflict with the laws or the rules and discipline of the army
and navy, apply to the officers and men of the army and of the navy.
CHAPTER III. THE IMPERIAL DIET
Article XXXIII. The Imperial Diet shall consist of two Houses: the
House of Peers and the House of Representatives.
Article XXXIV. The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the
Ordinance concerning the House of Peers, be composed of members of
the Imperial Family, of Nobles, and of Deputies who have been
nominated by the Emperor.
Article XXXV. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the Law
of Election.
Article XXXVI. No one can at one and the same time be a member of
both Houses.
Article XXXVII. Every law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet.
Article XXXVIII. Both Houses shall vote upon projects of law brought
forward by the Government, and may respectively bring forward
projects of law.
Article XXXIX. A bill which has been rejected by either of the Houses
shall not be again brought in during the same session.
Article XL. Both Houses can make recommendations to the Government in
regard to laws, or upon any other subject. When, however, such
recommendations are not adopted, they cannot be made a second time
during the same session.
Article XLI. The Imperial Diet shall be convoked every year.
Article XLII. A session of the Imperial Diet shall last during three
months. In case of necessity, a duration of a session may be
prolonged by Imperial order.
Article XLIII. When urgent necessity arises, an extraordinary session
may be convoked, in addition to the ordinary one. The duration of an
extraordinary session shall be determined by Imperial order.
Article XLIV. With regard to the opening, closing, and prorogation of
the Imperial Diet, and the prolongation of its sessions, these shall
take place simultaneously in both Houses. Should the House of
Representatives be ordered to dissolve, the House of Peers shall at
the same time be prorogued.
Article XLV. When the House of Representatives has been ordered to
dissolve, the election of new members shall be ordered by Imperial
decree, and the new House shall be convoked within five months from
the day of dissolution.
Article XLVI. No debate can be opened and no vote can be taken in
either House of the Imperial Diet unless not less than one-third of
the whole number of the members thereof is present.
Article XLVII. Votes shall be taken in both Houses by absolute
majority. In the case of a tie vote, the President shall have the
casting vote.
Article XLVIII. The deliberation of both Houses shall be held in
public. The deliberations may, however, upon demand of the Government
or by resolution of the House, be held in secret sitting.
Article XLIX. Both Houses of the Imperial Diet may respectively
present addresses to the Emperor.
Article L. Both Houses may receive petitions presented by subjects.
Article LI. Both Houses may enact, besides what is provided for in
the present constitution and in the law of the Houses, rules
necessary for the management of their internal affairs.
Article LII. No member of either House shall be held responsible
outside the respective Houses for any opinion uttered or for any vote
given by him in the House. When, however, a member himself has given
publicity to his opinions, by public speech, by documents in print,
or in writing, or by any other means, he shall, as regards such
actions, be amenable to the general law.
Article LIII. The members of both Houses shall, during the session,
be free from arrest, unless with the permission of the House, except
in cases of flagrant delicts, or of offences connected with civil war
or foreign troubles.
Article LIV. The Ministers of State, and persons deputed for that
purpose by the Government, may at any time take seats and speak in
either House.
CHAPTER IV. THE MINISTERS OF STATE AND THE PRIVY COUNCIL
Article LV. The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice
to the Emperor, and be responsible for it.
All laws, public ordinances, and imperial rescripts, of whatever
kind, that relate to the affairs of the state, require the
counter-signature of a Minister of State.
Article LVI. The Privy Council shall, in accordance with the
provisions for the organisation of the Privy Council, deliberate upon
the important matters of State, when they have been consulted by the
Emperor.
CHAPTER V. THE JUDICATURE
Article LVII. Judicial powers shall be exercised by the courts of
law, according to law, in the name of the Emperor. The organisation
of the courts of law shall be determined by law.
Article LVIII. The judges shall be appointed from among those who
possess the proper qualifications determined by law. No judge shall
be dismissed from his post except on the ground of sentence having
been passed upon him for a criminal act, or by reason of his having
been subjected to punishment for disciplinary offence. Rules for
disciplinary punishment shall be determined by law.
Article LIX. Trials shall be conducted and judgments rendered
publicly. When, however, there exists any fear that such publicity
may be prejudicial to peace and order, or to the maintenance of
public morality, the public trial may be suspended, either in
accordance with the law bearing on the subject or by the decision of
the court concerned.
Article LX. Matters which fall within the competency of the special
courts shall be specially determined by law.
Article LXI. The courts of law shall not take cognizance of any suits
which arise out of the allegations that rights have been infringed by
illegal action on the part of the executive authorities, and which
fall within the competency of the court of administrative litigation,
specially established by law.
CHAPTER VI. FINANCE
Article LXII. The imposition of a new tax or the modification of the
rates (of an existing one) shall be determined by law.
However, all such administrative fees or other revenue as are in the
nature of compensation for services rendered shall not fall within
the category of the above clause.
The raising of national loans and the contracting of other
liabilities to the charge of the National Treasury, except those that
are provided in the Budget, shall require the consent of the Imperial
Diet.
Article LXIII. Existing taxes shall, in so far as they are not
altered by new laws, continue to be collected as heretofore.
Article LXIV. The annual expenditure and revenue of the State shall,
in the form of an annual Budget, receive the consent of the Imperial
Diet. Any expenditure which exceeds the appropriations set forth
under the various heads of the Budget, or those not provided for in
the Budget, shall be referred subsequently to the Imperial Diet for
its approval.
Article LXV. The Budget shall be first laid before the House of
Representatives.
Article LXVI. The expenditure in respect of the Imperial House shall
be defrayed every year out of the National Treasury, according to the
present fixed amount for the same, and shall not hereafter require
the consent thereto of the Imperial Diet, except in case an increase
thereof is found necessary.
Article LXVII. The fixed expenditure based upon the supreme powers of
the Emperor and set forth in this Constitution, and such expenditure
as may have arisen by the effect of law, or as appertains to the
legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor
reduced by the Imperial Diet, without the concurrence of the
Government.
Article LXVIII. In order to meet special requirements the Government
may ask the consent of the Imperial Diet to a certain amount as a
continuing expenditure fund, for a previously fixed number of years.
Article LXIX. In order to supply unavoidable deficits in the Budget,
and to meet requirements unprovided for in the same, a reserve fund
shall be established.
Article LXX. When there is urgent need for the adoption of measures
for the maintenance of the public safety, and when in consequence of
the state either of the domestic affairs or of the foreign relations,
the Imperial Diet cannot be convoked, the necessary financial
measures may be taken by means of an Imperial Ordinance. In such
cases as those mentioned in the preceding clause the matter shall be
submitted to the Imperial Diet at its next session for its approval.
Article LXXI. When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or
when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the
Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year.
Article LXXII. The final account of the expenditure and revenue of
the State shall be verified and confirmed by the Board of Audit, and
it shall be submitted by the Government to the Imperial Diet,
together with the report of verification of the said Board.
The organisation and competency of the Board of Audit shall be
determined by law separately.
CHAPTER VII SUPPLEMENTARY RULES
Article LXXIII. Should, hereafter, the necessity arise for the
amendment of the provisions of the present Constitution, A project to
that effect shall be submitted for the deliberation of the Imperial
Diet by Imperial Order. In the above case, neither House can open a
debate, unless not less than two-thirds of the whole number of
members are present; and no amendment can be passed unless a majority
of not less than two-thirds of the members present is obtained.
Article LXXIV. No modification of the Imperial House Law shall be
required to be submitted for the deliberation of the Imperial Diet.
No provision of the present Constitution can be modified by the
Imperial House Law.
Article LXXV. No modification can be introduced into the
Constitution, or into the Imperial House Law, during the time of a
Regency.
Article LXXVI. Existing legal enactments, such as laws, regulations,
and ordinances, and all other such enactments, by whatever names they
may be called, which do not conflict with the present constitution,
shall continue in force. All existing contracts or orders which
entail obligations upon the Government, and which are connected with
the expenditure, shall come within the scope of Article LXVII.
2. AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, SIGNED AT LONDON,
AUGUST 12, 1905
Preamble. The Governments of Japan and Great Britain, being desirous
of replacing the agreement concluded between them on the 30th
January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following
articles, which have for their object:
(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the
regions of Eastern Asia and of India;
(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China
by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and
the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of
all nations in China;
(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting
Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence
of their special interests in the said regions:
Article I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great
Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the
preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will
communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in
common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced
rights or interests. (671)
Article II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action,
wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers either
Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its
territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of
this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the
assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make
peace in mutual agreement with it. (672)
Article III. Japan possessing paramount political, military, and
economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of
Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in
Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance
those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary
to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry
of all nations. (672)
Article IV. Great Britain having a special interest in all that
concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her
right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she
may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions. (672)
Article V. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them
will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements
with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the
preamble of this Agreement. (672)
Article VI. As regards the present war between Japan and Russia,
Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some
other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in
which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and
will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement
with Japan. (672)
Article VII. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be
afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned
in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is
to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military
authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time
consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual
interest. (673)
Article VIII. The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions
of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its
signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.
In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified
twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the
intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the
expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High
Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But, if when the date
fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in
war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is
concluded. (673)
In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto
their Seals.
Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.
(L.S.) TADASU HAYASHI
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the
Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.
(L.S.) LANSDOWNE
His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.
3. TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA SIGNED AT PORTSMOUTH,
SEPTEMBER 5, 1905
Article I. There shall henceforth be peace and amity between Their
Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias and
between Their respective States and subjects. (783)
Article II. The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan
possesses in Corea paramount political, military and economical
interests, engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures
of guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of
Japan may find it necessary to take in Corea.
It is understood that Russian subjects in Corea shall be treated
exactly in the same manner as the subjects or citizens of other
foreign Powers, that is to say, they shall be placed on the same
footing as the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation.
It is also agreed that, in order to avoid all cause of
misunderstanding, the two High Contracting Parties will abstain, on
the Russo-Corean frontier, from taking any military measure which may
menace the security of Russian or Corean territory. (783)
Article III. Japan and Russia mutually engage:
1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the
territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula, in
conformity with the provisions of additional Article I, annexed to
this Treaty: and
2. To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration
of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the
control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the
territory above mentioned.
The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in
Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive
concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with
the principle of equal opportunity. (784)
Article IV. Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any
general measures common to all countries, which China may take for
the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria. (784)
Article V. The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to the
Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of
China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territory, and
territorial waters and all rights, privileges and concessions
connected with or forming part of such lease and they also transfer
and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and
properties in the territory affected by the above mentioned lease.
The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the
consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing
stipulation.
The Imperial Government of Japan on their part undertake that the
proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above
referred to shall be perfectly respected. (784)
Article VI. The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and
assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and
with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between
Chang-chun (Kuan-cheng-tzu) and Port Arthur and all its branches,
together with all rights, privileges and properties appertaining
thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in the said region
belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.
The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the
consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing
stipulation. (785)
Article VII. Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective
railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial
purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes.
It is understood that that restriction does not apply to the railway
in the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula.
(785)
Article VIII. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia, with a
view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will, as soon
as possible, conclude a separate convention for the regulation of
their connecting railway services in Manchuria. (785)
Article IX. The Imperial Russian Government cede to the Imperial
Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the southern
portion of the Island of Saghalien and all islands adjacent thereto,
and all public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of
north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded
territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined
in accordance with the provisions of additional Article II, annexed
to this Treaty.
Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective
possessions on the Island of Saghalien or the adjacent islands, any
fortifications or other similar military works. They also
respectively engage not to take any military measures which may
impede the free navigation of the Straits of La Pérouse and Tartary.
(785)
Article X. It is reserved to the Russian subjects, inhabitants of the
territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to
their country; but, if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory,
they will be maintained and protected in the full exercise of their
industries and rights of property, on condition of submitting to
Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to
withdraw the right of residence in, or to deport from, such
territory, any inhabitants who labour under political or
administrative disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary
rights of such individuals shall be fully respected. (786)
Article XL. Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to
Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian
possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk and Behring Seas.
It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights
already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.
(786)
Article XII. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and
Russia having been annulled by the war, the Imperial Governments of
Japan and Russia engage to adopt as the basis of their commercial
relations, pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and
navigation on the basis of the Treaty which was in force previous to
the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of
the most favoured nation, in which are included import and export
duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues, and the
admission and treatment of the agents, subjects and vessels of one
country in the territories of the other. (786)
Article XIII. As soon as possible after the present Treaty comes into
force, all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The
Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special
Commissioner to take charge of prisoners. All prisoners in the hands
of the Government shall be delivered to and received by the
Commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized
representative, in such convenient numbers and at such convenient
ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify
in advance to the Commissioner of the receiving State.
The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present to each other, as
soon as possible after the delivery of prisoners has been completed,
a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them
for the care and maintainance of prisoners from the date of capture
or surrender up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to
repay Japan, as soon as possible after the exchange of the statements
as above provided, the difference between the actual amount so
expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by
Russia. (787)
Article XIV. The present Treaty shall be ratified by Their Majesties
the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias. Such
ratification shall, with as little delay as possible and in any case
not later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the
Treaty, be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia
respectively through the French Minister in Tokio and the Ambassador
of the United States in Saint Petersburg and from the date of the
later of such announcements this Treaty shall in all its parts come
into full force.
The formal exchange of the ratification shall take place at
Washington as soon as possible. (787)
Article XV. The present Treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both
the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute
conformity, but in case of discrepancy in interpretation, the French
text shall prevail.
In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and
affixed their seals to the present Treaty of Peace. (788)
Done at Portsmouth (New Hampshire) this fifth day of the ninth month
of the thirty-eighth year of Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-third
day of August (fifth September), one thousand nine hundred and five.
(Signed) JUTARO KOMURA (L.S.)
(Signed) K. TAKAHIRA (L.S.)
(Signed) SERGE WITTE (L.S.)
(Signed) ROSEN (L.S.)
In conformity with the provisions of Articles III and IX of the
Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia of this date, the
undersigned Plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional
Articles:
I. To Article III. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia
mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces
from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after
the Treaty of Peace comes into operation, and within a period of
eighteen months from that date, the Armies of the two countries shall
be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased
territory of the Liaotung Peninsula.
The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall
be first withdrawn.
The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to
maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in
Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per
kilometre and within that maximum number, the commanders of the
Japanese and Russian Armies shall, by common accord, fix the number
of such guards to be employed, as small as possible having in view
the actual requirements.
The Commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall
agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above
principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to
carry out the evacuation as soon as possible and in any case not
later than the period of eighteen months. (789)
II. To Article IX. As soon as possible after the present Treaty comes
into force, a Commission of Delimitation, composed of an equal number
of members to be appointed respectively by the two High Contracting
Parties, shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner the exact
boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island
of Saghalien. The Commissions shall be bound, so far as topographical
considerations permit, to follow the fiftieth parallel of north
latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that
line at any points are found to be necessary, compensation will be
made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the
duty of the said Commission to prepare a list and description of the
adjacent islands included in the cession and finally the Commission
shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded
territory. The work of the Commission shall be subject to the
approval of the High Contracting Parties.
The foregoing additional Articles are to be considered as ratified
with the ratification of the Treaty of Peace to which they are
annexed. (789)
Portsmouth the 5th day, 9th month, 38th year of Meiji corresponding
to the 23rd August, 5th September, 1905.
(Signed) JUTARO KOMURA (L.S.)
(Signed) K. TAKAHIRA (L.S.)
(Signed) SERGE WITTE (L.S.)
(Signed) ROSEN (L.S.)
INDEX
Abdication, Shomu; Fujiwara policy
Abe, Princess, becomes Empress Koken
Abe family and Nine Years' Commotion; Minister of the Left
--Kozo, on moral influence of Chinese classics
--Masahiro, policy in 1853; attempts to strengthen Tokugawa
--Muneto, brother of Sadato, war in Mutsu
--Nakamaro (701-70), studies in China
--Sadato (1019-1062), in Nine Years' Commotion
--Seimei, astronomer, his descendants in Gakashujo
--Shigetsugu (1600-51)
--Tadaaki (1583-1644), minister of Iemitsu
Abutsu-ni (d. 1283), author of Izayoi-nikki
Academies for youth of uji, Gaku-in; temple-schools, iera-koya;
established by Yoshinao; the Honga school; schools in Yedo and Osaka;
for court nobles
Acha-no-Tsubone
Achi, Chinese prince, migrates to Japan (289 A.D.) with weavers;
carpenters; and Saka-no-ye no Tamuramaro
Adachi family, connexion with Hojo, Miura plot against; crushed
(1286)
Adahiko, son of Omi, befriends Oke and Woke
Adams, Will (d. 1520), English pilot on Liefde, adviser of Ieyasu;
Saris distrusts; tomb (ill.)
Adoption, law of, in Court Laws; in Tokugawa fiefs; laws of
After-Han dynasty (211-65) of China
Aganoko, lands confiscated
Agglutinative language
Agriculture, early development of; and religion; encouraged by Sujin;
in reign of Suinin; on state revenue lands; in years 540-640; in Nara
epoch; in Heian; in Kamakura period; under Yoshimune; Americans in
remodelling methods of; growth in 19th century
Ai river, fighting on
Ainu, nature-worship of; language; subdivision of yellow race; ill.
Aizu, meeting-plan of armies in Shido shogun campaign; clan loyal to
shogun at Restoration
Akabashi Moritoki
Akagashira, "red head," Akahige, "red beard," Yemishi leader in 8th
century
Akahito see Yamabe Akahito
Akakura at Sekigahara
Akamatsu, large land-holdings of; Ashikaga Yoshinori plots against
--Mitsusuke (1381-1441), rebels against Yoshimochl; defeated
--Norimura (1277-1350), defender of Go-Daigo; turns against Crown;
captures Kyoto (1336); and Ashikaga
--Norishige, revolts in Kyushu
--Sadamura, among generals attacking Mitsusuke
--Yoshimura, guardian of Ashikaga Yoshiharu
Aka-Nyudo, "Red Monk,"; see Yamana Mochitoyo
Akasaka taken by Hojo
Akazome Emon, authoress of Eigwa Monogatari
Akechi Mitsuhide (1526-82), soldier under Nobunaga; goes over to the
Mori; shogun; tries to kill Ieyasu; death
Aki, province
Aki, daughter of Kiyo and Fujiwara Yoshifusa, Montoku's empress
Akimoto Yasutomo (1580-1642) rebuilds Ieyasu's shrine
Akitoki see Kanazawa Akitoki
Akizuki of Kyushu, defeated by Otomo
Ako, "reliance on equity," quibble over word
Ako, vendetta of
Akunoura, foundry
Akuro-o, Yemishi leader in 8th century wars, possibly Oro-o, i.e.
Russian
Alcock, Sir Rutherford (1809-97), on aliens in Japan
Alderman, over homestead of 50 houses
Alexieff, E. I. (b. 1843), Russian admiral, in command at Port Arthur
Aliens, in prehistoric ban or bambetsu; naturalized, skilled
artisans, the tamibe; see Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Altaic myth; group of languages
Amako family crushed in Izumo by the Mori
--Tsunehisa (1458-1540), rivalry with Ouchi
--Yoshihisa (1545-1610), defeated by Mori
--Amakusa, Portuguese trade and Christianity in; Shimabara revolt
Ama-no-Hihoko, prince of Shiragi, Korea, settles in Tajima
Amaterasu-o-mi-Kami, Sungoddess
Amida, the Saviour; Amida-ga-mine, shrine, near Kyoto, tomb of
Hideyoshi
Amur river, battle on, (660 A.D.) with Sushen; Russia's position on
Amusements, prehistoric; in early historic times; in Heian epoch; at
Kamakura; in Muromachi epoch; (ills.)
Anahobe, Prince, rival of Yomei for throne; to succeed Yomei
Anato now Nagato
Ancestor-worship, apotheosis of distinguished mortals; grafted on
Buddhism
Ando family revolt
--Shoshu, suicide (1333)
Andrew, Prince, Arima Yoshisada
Ane-gawa, battle (1570)
Ane-no-koji family
Animals, killing, forbidden in reign (741) of Koken; earlier; in time
of Tsunayoshi; result in stock farming; worship of; mythical and
terrible beasts in early records; pets
Anjin-Zuka, tomb of Will Adams, (ill.)
"Anjiro," Japanese interpreter of Xavier
Ankan, 27th Emperor (534-535)
Anko, 20th Emperor (454-456), 111-12; palace
Ankokuji Ekei see Ekei
Annam, trade with
Annen, priest, compiles Doji-kyo
Annual Letter of Jesuits
Anotsu, Ise, China trade
Anra, province Mimana
Ansatsu-shi, inspectors of provincial government
Anthology, first Japanese, "Myriad Leaves,"; of poems in Chinese
style, Kwaifu-so; the Kokin-shu, 10th century; the three, of the
Ho-en epoch; the Hyakunin-isshu of Teika; in the Kyoto school
Antoku, 81st Emperor (1181-1183); drowned at Dan-no-ura; perhaps a
girl
Antung, on Yalu, Russians defeated
Aoki Kaneiye, metal-worker of Muromachi period
Konyo, scholar, studies Dutch (1744); introduces sweet potato
Aoto Fujitsuna criticizes Hojo Tokiyori
Ape, worship of
Apotheosis, one class of Kami formed by
Aqueducts in irrigation
Arai Hakuseki (1656-1726), Confucianist, author of Sotran I gen
(ill.); retired; opposes forcing Imperial princes into priesthood
Arakahi, defeats Iwai in Chikugo (528 A.D.)
Archaeological relics
Archery, early development of; in reign of Temmu; equestrian, in Nara
epoch; (ill.)
Architecture, in proto-historic times; influenced by Buddhism; in
Heian epoch; Kamakura period; Muromachi
Are see Hiyeda Are
Ariga, Dr., on Korean influence on early relations with China; on
supposed moral influence of Chinese classics; on false attribution to
Shotoku of estimate of Buddhism; on Joei code
Arii, adherents of Southern Court in Sanyo-do
Arima, in Settsu, thermal spring; Jesuits and Buddhists in;
represented in embassy to Europe
Arima Yostosada (d. 1577), brother of Omura Sumitada, baptized as
Andrew
--Yoshizumi rebels
Arisugawa, one of four princely houses
--Prince (1835-95), leader of anti-foreign party
Arita, porcelain manufacture
Ariwara, uji of princely descent; Takaoka's family in; academy;
eligible to high office
--Narihira (825-882), poet; (ill.)
--Yukihira (818-893), poet; founds academy, (881)
Armour, Yamato, in sepulchral remains; in Muromachi epoch; early arms
and armour; after Daiho; in Heian epoch
Army see Military Affairs
Army and Navy, Department in Meiji government
Army inspector
Arrow-heads
Artillery, early use
Artisans, in prehistoric tamibe; Korean and Chinese immigrants
Arts and Crafts, promoted by Yuryaku; Chinese and Korean influence;
in Kamakura period; in Heian epoch; patronized by Yoshimasa; first
books on; in Muromachi epoch; in time of Hideyoshi; patronized by
Tsunayoshi
Asahina Saburo (or Yoshihide) son of Wada Yoshimori
Asai family control Omi province; Nobunaga's struggle with; helped by
Buddhists
--Nagamasa (1545-73), won over to Nobunaga; joins Asakura, defeated
Asaka Kaku, contributor to Dai Nihon-shi
Asakura family in Echizen; struggle with Nobunaga; helped by
Buddhist priests
--Yoshikage (1533-73), defeated by Hideyoshi
Asama, eruption (1783)
Asan, Korea, occupied by Chinese (1894)
Asano Nagamasa (1546-1610); in charge of commissariat; sent to Korea
(1598)
--Naganori, daimyo of Ako, exile, suicide, avenged by "47 Ronins,"
--Yukinaga (1576-1613), against Ishida
Ashikaga family favour Yoritomo; revolt of; shogun of Northern court;
government; internal quarrels; estimate by Rai Sanyo; fall of;
government; scholarship; school; Buddhism; against Hojo; end of
shogunate of
--Chachamaru, kills his father Masatomo
--gakko, great school, under patronage of Uesugi
--Haruuji (d. 1560), kubo
--Masatomo (1436-91), kubo; builds fort at Horigoe; succession
--Mitsukane (1376-1409), kwanryo; assists the Ouchi
--Mochinaka, brother of Mochiuji, sides with Ogigayatsu
--Mochisada, intrigue to make him high constable
--Mochiuji (1398-1439), kwanryo; sides with Yamanouchi branch of
Uesugi; suicide
--Motouji (1340-67), son of Takauji; kwanryo; urged to become shogun
--Shigeuji (1434-97), kubo
Ashikaga Tadafuyu (1326-1400), son of Takauji, rebels in Kyushu;
joins Southern party in 1353; takes and loses Kyoto
--Tadayoshi (1307-52), assistant governor-general of Kwanto;
governor of Totomi; kills Morinaga; practically regent; in Ashikaga
revolt; chief of general staff; plots against the Ko brothers,
defeated, joins Southern party; suicide
--Takamoto, kubo
--Takauji (1305-58), joins Go-Daigo; provincial governor; plots
against Morinaga; declares himself shogun; captures Kyoto; changes
plans; crushes Tadayoshi; defeated; death, estimate; shogun
(1338-58); distributes estates; letters; shrine of Hachiman; Buddhist
temples; signature (ill.)
--Ujimitsu (1357-98), kwanryo; wishes to be shogun; strengthens family
in Kwanto; literature
--Yoshiaki (1537-97), shogun; turns to Mori, defeated; Hideyoshi
intrigues with
--Yoshiakira (1330-67), kwanryo of Kwanto; succeeds Tadayoshi;
de-thrones Suko; defeats Tadafuyu; shogun; surrender and death; plot
against
--Yoshiharu (1510-50), shogun (1521-45)
--Yoshihide (1565-8), shogun
--Yoshihisa (1465-89), shogun (1474-89); Onin war; declared heir;
administration; scholarship
--Yoshikatsu (1433-43), shogun
--Yoshikazu (1407-25) shogun (1423-5)
--Yoshikiyo, advances on Tamba; killed
--Yoshikore
--Yoshimasa (1435-90), shogun; succession; retires; fosters letters
--Yoshimi (1439-91), called Gijin, heir of Yoshimasa; deserted by
Yamana (1469); retires (1477)
--Yoshimichi see Ashikaga Yoshizumi
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358-1408), shogun at Muromachi (1367-95);
extravagant administration; foreign policy; dies, receives rank of
ex-Emperor; treatment of Crown; and piracy; favours Zen priests
--Yoshimochi (1386-1428), shogun; succeeds his father Yoshimitsu in
military offices; rebellion against; excesses
--Yoshinori (1394-41), shogun (1428-41); abbot, called Gien; rule;
killed; relations with China; grants Ryukyu to Shimazu
--Yoshitane (1465-1523), shogun; rule; defeated by Hatakeyama
Yoshitoyo; death
--Yoshiteru (1535-65), shogun, (1545-65); suicide; receives Vilela
--Yoshitsugu, killed by his brother Yoshimochi
--Yoshiuji, last kubo
--Yoshizumi, originally Yoshimichi (1478-1511), shogun; nominal rule;
death
Ashina of Aizu
Asiatic yellow race
Askold, Russian protected cruiser at Port Arthur
Asbmaro, governor of Dazaifu, wins favor of Dokyo
Assumption, De l', martyrdom (1617)
Aston, W. G., on dates in "Chronicles,"; Korean origin of Kumaso;
purification service; neolithic boats; chronology; invasions of
Korea; Japanese authority in Korea; local records; 17-Article
Constitution; women in Heian epoch; Yoshitsune's letter; invasion of
Korea
Asuka, Empress Komyo
Asuka, capital moved to; palace built by Kogyoku
Asuka-yama, groves
Asukara Norikige, high constable, crushes revolt
Asylum established by Fujiwara Fuyutsugu
Ata rebels against Sujin
Ataka Maru, great ship of Bakufu, broken up by Tsunayoshi
Atalanta Izanagi
Atogi, Korean scribe
Atsumi Hirafu, defeated by Chinese in Korea (662)
Atsunaga, brother of Atsvnari; see Go-Shujaku
Atsunari, Prince, son of Ichijo; see Go-Ichijo
Atsuta, Hachiman's shrine
Auditor of accounts
Auguries
Augustins in Japan
Avatars of Buddha, Kami
Awa, mythical first island; culture of mulberry and hemp in; overrun
by Taira Tadatsune; invaded by Yoritomo; won from Satomi by Hojo
Ujitsuna; Miyoshi in; indigo growing
Awada, Mahito, on committee for Daiho laws (701)
Awadaguchi, swordsmith
Awaji, island, in early myth; Izanagi goddess of; Sagara exiled to;
reduced by Hideyoshi
Awo, Princess, sister of Woke, rules in interregnum
Axe, in fire ordeal
Ayala (d. 1617), Augustin vice-provincial, executed
Azuchi, in Omi, fort built by Nobunaga; church and residence for
priests
Azuke, placing in custody of feudatory
Azuma, eastern provinces, origin of name
--Kagami, 13th century history, on Hojo Yasutoki
Azumi, temple of
Babylonian myth
Backgammon or sugoroku
Badges; and crests
Baelz, Dr. E., on stature and race of Japanese; on shape of eye
Bakin, on last years of Minamoto Tametomo
Bakufu, camp government, military control, Yoritomo's system of
shogunate; three divisions; entrusted with choice of emperor (1272 &
1274); power weakened by Mongol invasion; and rapidly fails;
Go-Fushimi appeals to; re-created at Kyoto by Takauji; in Muromachi
period; at Yedo; oath of loyalty, to; Tokugawa B.; appointing power,
and other powers; exiles Yamaga Soko for heterodoxy; power lessened
by Chinese learning; B. party in Kyoto; relations with Court;
organization; decline of power; Court nobles and Emperor begin to
oppose; puts through Harris commercial treaty; and foreign
representatives; pledged (1861) to drive out foreigners in 10 years;
further interference of Crown and Court party; power ended
Baltic squadron, Russian, defeated by Togo
Bambelsu or Ban, aboriginal class
Bandits commanded by Buddhist priests in 10th century; their outrages
Bando or Kwanto provinces, army raised in, during 8th century; see
Kwanto
Banishment; edict of 1587, against Christians
Banzai, "10,000 years," viva
Baptismal flags
Barley, cultivation of, urged as substitute for rice
Basho see Matsuo Basho
Batchelor, Rev. John, on pit-dwellers
Battering-engine
Battle Era, Sengoku Jidai, 1490-1600
Be, guilds or corporations; hereditary, not changed by Daika;
property of Crown; of armourers; fishermen
Bekki Shoemon, in plot of 1652
Bell, of Hoko-ji, "treasonable" inscription on; on public-service
horses; bronze bells; Nanban (ill.); bell-tower (ill.); suzu
Benkei, halberdier
Betto superintendent of uji schools; president of samurai-dokoro;
regent, shikken, head of man-dokoro, office hereditary in Hojo
family; head of monju-dokoro, becomes finance minister of shogun
(1225)
Bidatsu, 30th Emperor (572-85)
Biddle, James. (1783-1848), Commodore, U.S.N., in Japan (1846)
Bifuku-mon-in, consort of Toba, mother of Konoe
Bin, Buddhist priest, "national doctor"; death
Bingo, woman ruler, in
Bingo, Saburo, see Kojima Takanori
Birth customs
Bison, fossil remains
Bita-sen, copper coins
Bitchu, province, Yoshinaka's force defeated in; invaded by Hideyoshi
Biwa, 4-stringed lute; biwabozu, players; (ill.)
Biwa, Lake
Bizen, swordsmith
Bizen transferred from Akamatsu to Yamana family
Black, early colour of mourning
Black Current see Kuro-shio
Boards of Religion and Privy Council under Daiho code
Bogatyr, Russian protected cruiser wrecked
Bondmen and Freemen, division by Daika; by Jito's edict
Bonita, curing, industry
Bonotsu, Satsuma
Borneo, possible source of Kumaso
Boxer Rebellion, Japanese troops in China during
Brack, Dutch ship
Bramsen, William, on early dates in "Chronicles"
Branding
Braziers
Brewing
Bribery and sale of office, attempts to abolish
Bridges, (ill.)
Brine in cosmogony
Brinkley, Capt. Frank (1841-1912), article in Encyclopaedia
Britannica quoted; Oriental Series referred to
Bronze culture in South; traces before the Yamato; bells; mirrors,
bowls, vases in Yamato tombs; great statue of Buddha
Buddha, early images of; copper images ordered in 605; golden image
of, from Shiragi (616 and 621); great bronze Nara image (750 A.D.);
Kami incarnations of, theory of Mixed Shinto; bronze image (1252) at
Karnakura; great image at Kyoto; replaced by bronze
Buddhism introduced 552 A.D.; use of writing; early politics; rapid
spread; priests above law; architecture; music; Empresses; disasters
and signs check spread; in Xara epoch; abdications; decline of
Yamato; industry; funeral of Shomu; time of Kwammu; official
advancement; vices of priests; superstition; in Heian epoch; in
Yorimasa uprising; Hojo regents: sects; Korean and Chinese; three
Vehicles; soldier priests; crushed by Yoshinori; amulets; Chinese
priests; combined with Confucianism and Shinto; Ashikaga; wars of
monks; revolt in Settsu; oppose Nobunaga; in Komaki war; spies in
Kyushu; Hideyoshi; priests of Kagoshima; in Choshu; in Yamaguchi;
persecuted in Hirado by Christians; priests converted by Vilela;
Ieyasu's laws; gains by suppression of Christianity
Bugyo, commissioners of Muromachi; 5 administrators under Hideyoshi;
special appointees to rich fiefs; under Babufu; in Emperor's and
ex-Emperor's court
Building-land, tenure
Buke, see Military houses.
Bukyo Shogaku, "Military Primer," by Yamaga Soko
Bummei Ittpki, work of Ichijo Kaneyoshi
Bungo, Tsuchi-gumo in; Xavier in; Jesuit headquarters; Christian
success among nobles; in embassy of 1582
Bunji-kin, debased coins of 1736-40
Bunka, period, 1804-17
Bunroku, period, 1592-5
Bunsei, period, 1818-29
Bureaux, under Daika
Burial, jars of Yamato; primitive methods; coffins; honour of tombs;
mounds, limited in size; funeral customs
Bushi; originated in N.E. Japan; name first used of guards; virtues
of, typified in leaders of Nine Years' Commotion; general
description; of Kwanto described; fighting against Mongols; outrages
in provinces
Bushido, way of the warrior; cult developed by Yamaga Soko; and by
Yoshimune
Butsu Sorai see Ogyu Sorai
Butter, tribute to Court
Buzen, Tsuehi-gumo in
Byodo-in, Tendai temple; prison of Go-Daigo
Cabinet under Restoration rule; crisis over Korea (1873); of 1885;
dependent on Crown
Cabral; Francis (1529-1609), Jesuit Vice-provincial, on early
missions, hospitals, Buddhists
Calendar, Prince Shotoku; revision of 1683; further revision planned
by Yoshimune
Calligraphy
Calthrop, Capt., on Oriental tactics
Cambodia, trade with