THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE
THE Tokugawa family traced its descent from Nitta Yoshishige of the
Minamoto sept (the Seiwa Genji) who flourished at the beginning of
the thirteenth century. His son's place of residence was at the
village of Tokugawa in Kotsuke province: hence the name, Tokugawa.
After a few generations, Chikauji, the then representative of the
family, had to fly to the village of Matsudaira in Mikawa province,
taking the name of Matsudaira. Gradually the family acquired
possession of about one-half of Mikawa province, and in the seventh
generation from Chikauji, the head of the house, Hirotada, crossing
swords with Oda Nobuhide, father of Nobunaga, sought succour from the
Imagawa family, to which he sent his son, Ieyasu, with fifty other
young samurai as hostages. This was in 1547, Ieyasu being then in his
fifth year.
On the way from Okazaki, which was the stronghold of Hirotada, the
party fell into the hands of Nobuhide's officers, and Ieyasu was
confined in a temple where he remained until 1559, when he obtained
permission to return to Okazaki, being then a vassal of the Imagawa
family. But when (1569) the Imagawa suffered defeat in the battle of
Okehazama, at the hands of Oda Nobunaga, Ieyasu allied himself with
the latter. In 1570, he removed to Hamamatsu, having subjugated the
provinces of Mikawa and Totomi. He was forty years old at the time of
Nobunaga's murder, and it has been shown above that he espoused the
cause of the Oda family in the campaign of Komak-yama. At forty-nine
he became master of the Kwanto and was in his fifty-sixth year when
Hideyoshi died. Ieyasu had nine sons: (1) Nobuyasu; (2) Hideyasu
(daimyo of Echizen); (3) Hidetada (second shoguri); (4) Tadayoshi
(daimyo of Kiyosu); (5) Nobuyoshi (daimyo of Mito); (6) Tadateru
(daimyo of Echigo); (7) Yoshinao (daimyo of Owari); (8) Yorinobu
(daimyo of Kii), and (9) Yorifusa (daimyo of Mito). He had also three
daughters; the first married to Okudaira Masanobu; the second to
Ikeda Terumasa, and the third to Asano Nagaakira.
EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE BATTLE OF SEKIGAHARA
The political complications that followed the death of the Taiko are
extremely difficult to unravel, and the result is not commensurate
with the trouble. Several annalists have sought to prove that Ieyasu
strenuously endeavoured to observe faithfully the oath of loyalty
made by him to Hideyoshi on the latter's death-bed. They claim for
him that until his hands were forced he steadfastly and faithfully
worked in the interests of Hideyoshi. But his acts do not lend
themselves to any such interpretation. The best that can be said of
him is that he believed himself to have been entrusted by the Taiko
with discretionary power to determine the expediency of Hideyori's
succession, and that he exercised that power in the interests of the
Tokugawa family, not of the Toyotomi.
Circumstances helped him as they do generally help great men. From
the time of the birth of the lady Yodo's second son, the official
world in Kyoto had been divided into two factions. The Hidetsugu
catastrophe accentuated the lines of division, and the Korean
campaign had a similar effect by affording a field for bitter rivalry
between the forces of Konishi Yukinaga, who belonged to the Yodo
faction, and Kato Kiyomasa, who was a protege of Hideyoshi's wife,
Yae. Further fuel was added to this fire of antagonism when the order
went forth that the army should leave Korea, for the Kato faction
protested against surrendering all the fruits of the campaign without
any tangible recompense, and the Konishi party insisted that the
Taiko's dying words must be obeyed implicitly. In this dispute,
Ishida Katsushige, the chief actor in the Hidetsugu tragedy, took a
prominent part. For, when in their capacity as belonging to the Board
of Five Administrators, Ishida and Asano Nagamasa were sent to Kyushu
to superintend the evacuation of the Korean peninsula, they, too,
fell into a controversy on the same subject. Ieyasu stood aloof from
both parties. His policy was to let the feud develop and to step in
himself at the supreme moment.
On the other hand, it was the aim of Ishida Katsushige to involve the
Tokugawa chief, thus compassing his downfall and opening an avenue
for the ascension of Ishida himself to the place of dictator. Allied
with Ishida in this plot was his colleague on the Board of Five
Administrators, Masuda Nagamori. Their method was to create enmity
between Ieyasu and Maeda Toshiiye, to whom the Taiko had entrusted
the guardianship of Hideyori and of the Osaka Castle. This design was
barely thwarted by the intervention of Hosokawa Tadaoki (ancestor of
the present Marquis Hosokawa). Ieyasu was well informed as to
Ishida's schemes on two other occasions; the first immediately
before, the second just after, the death of the Taiko. In each case
rumours of an armed outbreak were suddenly circulated in Fushimi for
the purpose of creating confusion such as might furnish an
opportunity to strike suddenly at Ieyasu. These essays failed in both
instances, and the Tokugawa chief, instead of retaliating by direct
impeachment of Ishida, applied himself to cementing close relations
with certain great daimyo by matrimonial alliances. Such unions had
been implicitly interdicted by the Taiko, and the procedure of Ieyasu
elicited a written protest from the boards of the Five Senior
Ministers and the Five Administrators. They threatened Ieyasu with
dismissal from the former board unless he furnished a satisfactory
explanation. This he declined to do and for some time a very strained
situation existed in Kyoto, an armed struggle being ultimately
averted by the good offices of the Three Middle Ministers.
It was evident, however, that the circumstances had become critical,
and it was further evident that, as long as Ishida Katsushige's
intrigues continued, a catastrophe might at any moment be
precipitated. Sensible of these things, a party of loyal men, spoken
of in history as the "seven generals"--Ikeda Terumasa (ancestor of
the present Marquis Ikeda); Kato Kiyomasa; Kuroda Nagamasa (son of
Kuroda Yoshitaka, and ancestor of the present Marquis Kuroda);
Fukushima Masanori, Asano Yukinaga (son of Asano Nagamasa and
ancestor of the present Marquis Asano); Hosokawa Tadaoki, and Kato
Yoshiaki (ancestor of the present Viscount Kato)--vowed to take
Ishida's life, while he was still in Osaka Castle, whither he had
gone (1599) to attend the death-bed of his friend, Maeda Toshiiye.
Ishida, finding himself powerless to resist such a combination after
the death of Maeda, took an extraordinary step; he appealed to the
protection of Ieyasu--that is to say, to the protection of the very
man against whom all his plots had been directed. And Ieyasu
protected him.
We are here confronted by a riddle which has never been clearly
interpreted. Why did Ishida seek asylum from Ieyasu whom he had
persistently intrigued to overthrow, and why did Ieyasu, having full
knowledge of these intrigues, grant asylum? Possibly an answer to the
former question can be furnished by the fact that Ishida was in sore
straits. Attending Maeda Toshiiye's death-bed, he had seen the
partisans of the deceased baron transfer their allegiance to Ieyasu
through the intervention of Hosokawa Tadaoki, and he had learned that
his own life was immediately threatened by the seven generals. Even
if he succeeded (which was very problematical) in escaping from Osaka
to his own castle of Sawa-yama, in Omi province, the respite could
have been but brief and such a step would have been equivalent to
abandoning the political arena. Only a very strong arm could save
him, and with consummate insight he may have appreciated the Tokugawa
chief's unreadiness to precipitate a crucial struggle by consenting
to his death.
But what is to be said of Ieyasu? Unwilling to admit that his
astuteness could ever have been at fault, some historians allege that
the Tokugawa chief saved Ishida's life with the deliberate purpose of
letting him discredit himself and his partisans by continued
intrigues. These annalists allege, in fact, that Ieyasu, acting on
the advice of Honda Masanobu, by whose profound shrewdness he was
largely guided, saved the life of Ishida in order that the latter's
subsequent intrigues might furnish a pretext for destroying Hideyori.
That, however, is scarcely conceivable, for Ishida had many powerful
confederates, and the direct outcome of the leniency shown by Ieyasu
on that occasion was an armed struggle from which he barely emerged
victorious. The truth seems to be that, for all his profound wisdom,
Ieyasu erred in this instance. Ishida Kotsushige outwitted him. For,
during the very days of his asylum in Fushimi, under the protection
of Ieyasu, Ishida opened secret communication with Uesugi Kagekatsu
and invited him to strike at the Tokugawa. Uesugi consented. It must
be observed that the character of Ishida has been portrayed for
posterity mainly by historians who were under Tokugawa influence.
Modern and impartial annalists are by no means so condemnatory in
their judgment of the man. In whatever arts of deception Ishida
excelled, Ieyasu was at least his equal; while in the matter of
loyalty to the Toyotomi family, Ishida's conduct compares favourably
with that of the Tokugawa leader; and if we look at the men who
attached themselves to Ishida's cause and fought by his side, we are
obliged to admit that he must have been highly esteemed by his
contemporaries, or, at any rate, that they recognized in him the
champion of Hideyori, at whose father's hands they had received such
benefits.
ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE AT THE CLOSE OF THE SIXTEENTH
CENTURY
The realm of Japan was then held by 214 feudatories, each having an
annual income of at least 10,000 koku (omitting minor landowners).
These 214 estates yielded to their holders a total income of nearly
nineteen million koku, and of that aggregate the domains of the five
noblemen forming the Board of Senior Statesmen constituted one-third.
Tokugawa Ieyasu was the wealthiest. His domains in the eight
provinces forming the Kwanto yielded an income of 2,557,000 koku.
Next on the list came Mori Terumoto with 2,205,000 koku, and Uesugi
Kagekatsu with 1,200,000 koku. The latter two were partisans of
Ishida. But direct communication between their forces was difficult,
for while the Mori domains covered the nine provinces on the extreme
west of the main island, Uesugi's lay on the north of the Kwanto,
whence they stretched to the shore of the Japan Sea. Fourth and fifth
on the Board of Senior Statesmen were Maeda Toshiiye, whose fief
(835,000 koku) occupied Kaga and Etchu; and Ukita Hideiye (574,000
koku), whose castle stood at Oka-yama, in Bizen. All these, except
Maeda embraced the anti-Tokugawa cause of Ishida Katsushige, and it
thus becomes easy to understand the desire of Ishida to win over
Maeda Toshinaga, son of Toshiiye, to his camp. On the side of
Ieyasu's foes were also marshalled Shimazu Yoshihisa, feudal chief of
Satsuma (700,000 koku); Satake Yoshinobu of Hitachi province (545,700
koku); Konishi Yukinaga in Higo (200,000 koku), who was counted one
of the greatest captains of the era, and, nominally, Kohayakawa
Hideaki in Chikuzen (522,500 koku). With Ieyasu were the powerful
daimyo: Date Masamune of Sendai (580,000 koku); Kato Kiyomasa of
Kumamoto (250,000 koku); Hosokawa Tadaoki of Tango (230,000 koku);
Ikeda Terumasa of Mikawa (152,000 koku), and Kuroda Nagamasa of
Chikuzen (250,000 koku). This analysis omits minor names.
BATTLE OF SEKIGAHARA
The plan of campaign formed by Ishida and his confederates was that
Uesugi and Satake should attack the Kwanto from the north and the
east simultaneously, while Mori and Ukita should move against Fushimi
and occupy Kyoto. In May, 1600, Ieyasu went through the form of
requiring Uesugi to repair to Kyoto and explain his obviously
disaffected preparations. The reply sent by Uesugi was defiant.
Therefore, the Tokugawa chief proceeded to mobilize his own and his
allies' forces. He seems to have clearly foreseen that if he himself
moved eastward to Yedo, Momo-yama would be assaulted in his absence.
But it being necessary to simulate trust in Mori and Ukita, then
nominally his supporters, he placed in Momo-yama Castle a garrison of
only two thousand men under his old and staunch friend, Torii
Mototada. Ieyasu planned that Uesugi should be attacked
simultaneously from five directions; namely from Sendai by Date; from
Kaga by Maeda; from Dewa by Mogami; from Echigo by Hori, and from
Hitachi by Satake. But among these five armies that of Satake
declared for Ishida, while those of Maeda and Hori were constrained
to adopt a defensive attitude by the menace of hostile barons in
their vicinity, and thus it fell out that Date and Mogami alone
operated effectively in the cause of Ieyasu.
The Tokugawa chief himself lost no time in putting his troops in
motion for Yedo, where, at the head of some sixty thousand men, he
arrived in August, 1600, his second in command being his third son,
Hidetada. Thence he pushed rapidly northward with the intention of
attacking Uesugi. But at Oyama in Shimotsuke news reached him that
Ishida and his partisans had drawn the sword in the west, and had
seized Osaka, together with the wives and families of several of the
captains who were with Ieyasu's army. A council was immediately held
and these captains were given the option of continuing to serve under
Ieyasu or retiring to join the western army and thus ensuring the
safety of their own families. They chose the former, and the council
further decided that, leaving Date and Mogami to deal with Uesugi and
Satake, and posting for the same purpose at Utsunomiya, Hideyasu,
second son of Ieyasu, the main army should countermarch to meet the
western forces at some point remote from Yedo.
The Tokugawa battalions, following two routes--the Tokaido and the
Nakasendo--made rapid progress westward, and on September 21st, the
van of the division under Fukushima and Ikeda reached Kiyosu. But the
Nakasendo column of thirty-eight thousand men under Hidetada
encountered such desperate resistance before the castle of Ueda, at
the hands of Sanada Masayuki, that it did not reach Sekigahara until
the great battle was over. Meanwhile, the western army had pushed
steadily eastward. Its first exploit was to capture and burn the
Momo-yama castle, which was splendidly defended by the veteran Torii
Mototada, then in his sixty-second year. With a garrison of only two
thousand men he held at bay during eleven days an investing force of
forty thousand. The torch was set to the castle on the 8th of
September by traitors in the garrison, and Mototada committed
suicide. Thereafter, the van of the western army advanced to Gifu
along the Nakasendo, and the main body, making a detour through Ise,
ultimately pushed forward into Mino.
With this army were no less than forty-three generals of renown, and
the number of feudal barons, great and small, who sent troops to
swell its ranks was thirty-one. Undoubtedly these barons were
partially influenced by the conception generally prevalent that the
fortunes of the two great families of Toyotomi and Tokugawa depended
on the issue of this struggle. But it must also be admitted that had
Ishida Katsushige been as black as the Tokugawa historians paint him,
he could never have served for the central figure of such an array.
He is seen inciting the besiegers of Momo-yama Castle to their
supreme and successful effort. He is seen winning over to the
Toyotomi cause baron after baron. He is seen leading the advance of
the western army's van. And he is seen fighting to the end in the
great battle which closed the campaign. Some heroic qualities must
have accompanied his gift of statesmanship. The nominal leader of the
western army, which mustered 128,000 strong, was Mori Terumoto, and
under him were ranged Ukita Hideiye, Mori Hidemoto, Shimazu
Yoshihiro, Konishi Yukinaga, and many other captains of repute. Under
the Tokugawa banners there marched 75,000 men, their van led by Ii
Naomasa and Honda Tadakatsu.
On October 21, 1600, the great battle of Sekigahara was fought. The
strategy on the side of the western forces was excellent. Their units
were disposed along a crescent-shaped line recessed from the enemy,
so that an attacking army, unless its numerical strength was greatly
superior, had to incur the risk of being enveloped from both
flanks--a risk much accentuated by the fact that these flanking
troops occupied high ground. But on the side of the western army
there was a feature of weakness which no strategy could remove: all
the battalions constituting the right wing were pledged to espouse
the cause of Ieyasu at the crisis of the struggle. There were six of
these battalions, large or small, and they were commanded by Akakura,
Ogawa, Kuchiki, Wakizaka, Kohayakawa, and Kikkawa. Thus, not only
were the eastern troops able to deliver their attack in full force
against the centre and left of their foes, but also the latter were
exposed to the most demoralizing of all eventualities, treachery.
After a fierce fight the western army was completely defeated. Some
accounts put its losses at 35,000 men; others, with greater
probability, estimating that only 100,000 men were actually engaged
on both sides--namely, 60,000 on the Tokugawa side, and 40,000 on the
Toyotomi--conclude that the losses were 6000 and 9000, respectively.
Shimazu of Satsuma, at the head of a handful of samurai, cut his way
through the lines of Ieyasu, and reaching Osaka, embarked hastily for
Kyushu. Ishida Katsushige lay concealed in a cave for a few days, but
was ultimately seized and beheaded, in company with Konishi Yukinaga
and Ankokuji Ekei, at the execution ground in Kyoto. This one battle
ended the struggle: there was no rally. Punishment followed quickly
for the feudatories who had fought against the Tokugawa. Thus Mori
Terumoto's domain, originally covering eight provinces and yielding a
revenue of 1,205,000 koku, was reduced to the two provinces of Suwo
and Nagato, yielding 300,000 koku. The three provinces of Ukita
Hideiye were entirely forfeited, and he himself was banished to the
island Hachijoshima. Oda Hidenobu, grandson of Nobunaga, Masuda
Nagamori, and Sanada Masayuki, with his son, were ordered to take the
tonsure and retire to the monastery of Koya-san. The fief of Uesugi
Kagekatsu was reduced from 1,200,000 koku in Aizu to 300,000 koku in
Yonezawa; and the 800,000 koku of the Satake family in Hitachi were
exchanged for 200,000 koku in Akita. Only the Shimazu family of
Satsuma remained without loss. Secured by inaccessibility, it
continued to hold the provinces of Satsuma, Osumi, and Hyuga, with a
revenue of 700,000 koku.
REDISTRIBUTION OF THE FIEFS
These measures represented only a fraction of the readjustments then
effected. Ieyasu, following the example, set on a small scale by the
Taiko, parcelled out the country in such a manner as to provide
security against future trouble. Dividing the feudatories into
hereditary vassals (fudai no kerai) and exterior nobles (tozama), he
assigned to the former small but greatly increased estates situated
so as to command the main highways as well as the great cities of
central Japan, and he located the exterior nobles--many of them with
largely reduced domains--in districts remote not only from Yedo and
Kyoto but also from each other, wherever such method of distribution
was possible. Moreover, in the most important places--as Osaka,
Fushimi, Sakai, Nagasaki, Yamada (in Ise), and Sado (the gold mines),
there were appointed administrators (bugyo), direct nominees of the
Tokugawa; while Kyoto was put under the sway of a deputy of the
shogun (shoshidai). Again, although the tozama daimyo received
tolerably munificent treatment in the matter of estates, their
resources were seriously crippled by the imposition of costly public
works. These works consisted mainly of restoring dilapidated castles
or building new ones on a scale so colossal as to be exceeded by only
the stronghold at Osaka. It is recorded that when Fukushima Masanori,
lord of Kiyosu in Owari, complained of the crippling effects of these
severe requisitions, Kato Kiyomasa told him that there was no
alternative except to retire to his castle and defy Yedo. The most
costly of the edifices that came into existence in these
circumstances was the castle of Nagoya, which is still one of the
wonders of Japan. Twenty great barons took part in erecting it; the
leading artists of the time were engaged in its interior decoration,
and the roof of its donjon was crowned with, two gold dolphins,
measuring nearly nine feet in height.
IEYASU BECOMES SHOGUN
On the 28th of March, 1603, the Emperor nominated Ieyasu to be
minister of the Right and sei-i tai-shogun, presenting to him at the
same time the conventional ox-chariot and military baton. Nine days
later, the Tokugawa chief repaired to the palace to return thanks for
these honours. The Emperor with his own hands gave him the
drinking-cup and expressed profound gratification that through his
military skill the wars which had convulsed the nation were ended,
and the foundations of the empire's peace securely laid. Ieyasu was
then in his sixty-second year. In the following May, Hideyori was
made nai-daijin, and in the same month a marriage was contracted
between him, then in his eleventh year, and Tenju-in, the
seven-year-old daughter of Hidetada, son and successor of Ieyasu.
YEDO AND KYOTO
Ieyasu now took up his residence at Momo-yama Castle and Hidetada was
ordered to live in Yedo. But the former made it a custom to go
eastward every autumn on the pretext of enjoying the sport of
falconry, and to remain in Yedo until the next spring. In February,
1605, the Tokugawa chief's return to Kyoto from the Kwanto capital
was made the occasion of a great military display. Both Ieyasu and
Hidetada travelled at the same time with a following of 170,000
soldiers, who were encamped outside the city whence they marched in,
ten thousand daily, during seventeen consecutive days. This martial
parade is said to have produced a great effect upon the nobles of the
Kinai and the western provinces. But Ieyasu did not long retain the
office of shogun. In 1605, he conveyed to the Imperial Court his
desire to be relieved of military functions, in favour of his son
Hidetada, and the Emperor at once consented, so that Hidetada
succeeded to all the offices of his father, and Ieyasu retired to the
castle of Sumpu, the capital of Suruga. His income was thenceforth
reduced to 120,000 koku annually, derived from estates in the
provinces of Mino, Ise, and Omi. But this retirement was in form
rather than in fact. All administrative affairs, great or small, were
managed in Sumpu, the shogun in Yedo exercising merely the power of
sanction. Ieyasu made, frequent journeys to Yedo under the pretext of
hawking but in reality for government purposes.
THE YEDO BAKUFU
It was on the 30th of August, 1590, that Ieyasu made his first formal
entry into Yedo from Sumpu. Yedo Castle had previously been occupied
by an agent of the Hojo clan. It was very small, and its surroundings
consisted of barren plains and a few fishing villages. On the
northwest was the moor of Musashi, and on the southeast a forest of
reeds marked the littoral of Yedo Bay. The first task that devolved
upon Ieyasu was the reclamation of land for building purposes. Some
substantial work was done, yet the place did not suggest any fitness
for the purpose of an administrative centre, and not until the battle
of Sekigahara placed him in command of immense resources, did Ieyasu
decide to make Yedo his capital. He then had large recourse to labour
requisitioned from the feudatories. By these means hills were
levelled, swamps reclaimed, and embankments built, so that the whole
aspect of the region was changed, and sites were provided for the
residences of various barons and for the establishment of shops and
stores whose owners flocked to the new city from Osaka, Kyoto, and
other towns. Thereafter, a castle of colossal dimensions, exceeding
even the Osaka fortress in magnitude and magnificence, was rapidly
constructed, the feudatories being required to supply labour and
materials in a measure which almost overtaxed their resources.
Historians differ as to the exact date of the establishment of the
Yedo Bakufu, but the best authorities are agreed that the event should
be reckoned from the battle of Sekigahara, since then, for the first
time, the administrative power came into the hand of the Tokugawa
baron, he having previously been simply the head of a board
instituted by the Taiko. There can be no doubt, that in choosing Yedo
for his capital, Ieyasu was largely guided by the example of Yoritomo
and by the experience of the Ashikaga. Kamakura had been a success as
signal as Muromachi had been a failure. In the former, Ieyasu had
much to imitate; in the latter, much to avoid. We have seen that he
distributed the estates of the feudatories so as to create a system
automatically unfavourable to disturbance, in which contrivance he
borrowed and extended the ideas of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. It remains
to note that what Hojo Tokimasa and Oye Hiromoto were to Minamoto
Yoritomo as advisers and organizers, and what Ashikaga Tadayoshi and
Kono Moronao were to Ashikaga Takauji in the same roles, such, also,
were Honda Masanobu and Honda Masazumi to Tokugawa Ieyasu.
HIDEYORI AND IEYASU
In May, 1605, Hideyori was nominated u-daijin. At that time the
nation was divided pretty evenly into two factors; one obedient to
the Tokugawa, the other disposed to await Hideyori's coming of age,
which event was expected to restore the authority of the Toyotomi
family. Fukushima Masanori and Kato Kiyomasa were the most
enthusiastic believers in the latter forecast. Up to that time Ieyasu
had not given any definite indication of the attitude he intended to
assume towards the Taiko's heir. It was not till the year 1611 that
he found an opportunity of forming a first-hand estimate of
Hideyori's character. He then had a meeting with the latter at Nijo
Castle, and is said to have been much struck with the bearing and
intelligence of Hideyori. In fact, whereas common report had spoken
in very disparaging terms of the young man's capacities--Hideyori was
then seventeen years old--the Tokugawa chief found a dignified and
alert lad whose aspect suggested that if he was suffered to remain in
possession of Osaka a few years longer, Yedo would run the risk of
being relegated to a secondary place.
Ieyasu after that interview is said to have felt like "a man who,
having still a long distance to travel, finds himself enveloped in
darkness." He saw that the time for considering justice and humanity
had passed, and he summoned Honda Masanobu to whom he said: "I see
that Hideyori is grown up to be a son worthy of his father. By and by
it will be difficult for such a man to remain subservient to
another." Masanobu, whom history describes as the "Tokugawa's
storehouse of wisdom," is recorded to have replied: "So I, too,
think, but there is no cause for anxiety. I have an idea." What this
idea was events soon disclosed. Summoning one of the officials in the
service of Hideyori's wife--Hidetada's daughter--Masanobu spoke as
follows: "Hideyori is the only son of the late Taiko and it is the
desire of the O-gosho" (the title given to Ieyasu after his
retirement from the shogunate) "that he, Hideyori, should have a
numerous and thriving family. Therefore, if any woman takes his
fancy, she must be enrolled among his attendants to whatever class
she may belong. Moreover, if there be among these ladies any who show
jealousies or make disturbances, no complaint need be preferred to
the O-gosho. I will undertake to settle the matter."
From that time Hideyori lived among women. A word may here be said
about the marriage between Hideyori and the granddaughter of Ieyasu,
the bride and the bridegroom alike being mere children. According to
a recognized historical authority, writing in the Tokugawa Jidaishi,
such marriages were inspired by one or more of the following motives:
(1) that the bride or bridegroom should serve as a hostage; (2) that
the wedding should contribute to cement an alliance between the
families of the bride and the bridegroom; (3) that the wedding should
become a means of spying into the affairs of one of the families; (4)
that it should be an instrument for sowing seeds of enmity between
the two families. The objects of Ieyasu in wedding his granddaughter
at seven years of age to Hideyori at eleven were doubtless of the
nature indicated in the third and fourth of the above definitions. On
the one hand, he seemed to the Osaka party to be conforming to the
will of the Taiko; on the other, he was able to introduce into the
household of Hideyori an unlimited number of spies among the retinue
of his granddaughter.
KATAGIRI KATSUMOTO
Just before his death, Hideyoshi specially conjured Koide Hidemasa
and Katagiri Katsumoto to labour for the safety of the Toyotomi
family. Hidemasa soon followed his patron to the grave, and the duty
of managing the affairs of the family devolved entirely upon
Katsumoto in his capacity of administrator (bugyo). He devoted
himself to the task with the utmost sincerity and earnestness, and he
made it the basic principle of his policy to preserve harmony between
the Tokugawa and the Toyotomi. His belief was that Ieyasu had not
many years more to live, and that on his demise the administrative
power would revert wholly to Hideyori as a natural consequence. Hence
the wisest course was to avoid any collision in the meanwhile.
THE OATH OF FEALTY
On the 14th of May, 1601, that is to say, shortly after the battle of
Sekigahara, all the feudatories were invited to subscribe a written
oath of loyalty to the Tokugawa. This oath consisted of three
articles. The first was a promise to observe strictly all
instructions issued by the Bakufu in Yedo. The second was an
engagement not to harbour or protect any person who had either
violated or opposed the will of the shogun. The third was a pledge
not to give employment to any samurai reported to be a traitor or an
assassin. By these stipulations the signatories swore to abide
strictly, and declared that any violation of the provisions of the
oath would render the violator liable to severe punishment. Among the
signatories there were not found any members of the Osaka party.
These put forward the last will of the Taiko as a reason for refusing
to sign, and from that time it became evident that the situation must
terminate in an armed struggle.
ONO HARUNAGA
Among the Osaka partisans was one called Ono Harunaga, the son of the
lady Yodo's nurse. This youth led a life of great profligacy, and
although not wanting in any of the attributes of the samurai, he
altogether lacked political insight. Thus, his relations with
Katsumoto were strained, and Harunaga constantly essayed to undermine
Katsumoto's influence. Hideyori himself did not want for ability, but
acting by the advice of his mother, Yodo, and of his friend,
Harunaga, he adopted a false policy of opposition to Ieyasu.
STATE OF OSAKA
The fact that the feudatories who called themselves friends of the
Osaka party had refused to sign the oath of fealty, and the fact that
the lady Yodo and Harunaga threw their influence into the
anti-Tokugawa scale, had the effect of isolating Osaka so far as the
laws of the Bakufu were concerned. Men who had broken those laws or
otherwise offended against the shogun took refuge in Osaka. Such was
the case with the son of Hosokawa Tadaoki; with Goto Matabei, chief
vassal of Kuroda Nagamasa, and with Nambu Saemon, principal retainer
of Nambu Nobunao. These three and many others repaired to the castle
of Osaka, and being there secure against any unarmed attempt of the
Tokugawa to arrest them, they virtually defied Ieyasu's control. By
degrees a constant stream of ronin, or free-lances, flowed into that
city, and a conspicuous element among its inhabitants consisted of
Christian feudatories, who, regardless of the edicts of the Bakufu,
openly preached their faith and were in no wise checked by the
Toyotomi rulers. Even the Buddhist and Shinto priests in Osaka and
its territories were independent of the Bakufu authority, and there
were cases of boundary disputes in which the Tokugawa officials
declined to give judgment since they were not in a position to
enforce it. It may well be supposed that this state of affairs grew
steadily more obnoxious to the Tokugawa. Ieyasu only awaited a
pretext to assert the supremacy of his authority.
INSCRIPTION ON THE BELL
It has already been stated that, in the year 1586, a colossal image
of Buddha was erected by Hideyoshi at the Hoko-ji in Kyoto. This idol
was made of wood, and the great earthquake of 1596 destroyed it.
Subsequently, Ieyasu advised Hideyori to replace the wooden idol with
a bronze one. Ono Harunaga stood opposed to this idea, but Katagiri
Katsumoto, constant to his policy of placating Ieyasu, threw his
influence into the other scale. It is impossible to tell whether, in
making this proposal, Ieyasu had already conceived the extraordinary
scheme which he ultimately carried out. It would appear more
probable, however, that his original policy was merely to impoverish
the Toyotomi family by imposing upon it the heavy outlay necessary
for constructing a huge bronze Buddha. Many thousands of ryo had to
be spent, and the money was obtained by converting into coin a number
of gold ingots in the form of horses, which Hideyoshi had stored in
the treasury of the Osaka castle as a war fund. Five years later,
that is to say, in 1614, the great image was completed and an
imposing ceremony of dedication was organized. A thousand priests
were to take part, and all the people in the capital, as well as many
from the surrounding provinces, assembled to witness the magnificent
fete. Suddenly an order was issued in the name of Ieyasu,
interdicting the consummation of the ceremony on the ground that the
inscription carried by the bell for the idol's temple was designedly
treasonable to the Tokugawa. This inscription had been composed and
written by a high Buddhist prelate, Seikan, reputed to be one of the
greatest scholars and most skilful calligraphists of his time.
It was inconceivable that such a man should err flagrantly in the use
of the ideographic script. Ieyasu, however, despatched to Kyoto two
rival prelates, Soden and Tengai, with instructions to convoke a
meeting of the priests of the Five Temples and invite them to express
an opinion about the inscription. Soden held the post of
administrator of temples. This placed him officially at the head of
all the other priests, and thus the opinions he expressed at the
instance of Ieyasu possessed special weight. It was in vain that
Seikan repudiated all intention of disrespect and pointed out that
the inscription did not for a moment lend itself to the
interpretation read into it by the Tokugawa chief. Only one priest,
Kaizan of Myoshin-ji, had sufficient courage to oppose Soden's view,
and the cause of the Tokugawa chief triumphed.
Without a full knowledge of the Chinese ideographic script it is
impossible to clearly understand either the charges preferred by the
Tokugawa or the arguments employed in rebuttal. Western readers may,
however, confidently accept the unanimous verdict of all modern
scholars, that the interpretation assigned to the inscription in the
first place by the Tokugawa officials, and in the second by Hayashi
Doshun, representing the Confucianists, and Soden and Tengai,
representing the Buddhists, was grossly unreasonable. That many
experts should be found to range themselves on the side of a ruler so
powerful as Ieyasu was not wonderful, but it says little for the
moral independence of the men of the time that only one Buddhist
priest among many thousand had the courage to withhold his consent to
a judgment which outraged truth and justice.
Naturally the news of the decision threw Osaka into a state of great
excitement. Lady Yodo hastened to despatch to Sumpu her principal
lady-in-waiting, Okura-no-Tsubone, accompanied by another dame of the
chamber. These two were received by Acha-no-Tsubone at the court of
Ieyasu, and through her they conveyed fervent apologies to the
Tokugawa chief. Ieyasu treated the whole matter lightly. He granted
an interview to the two ladies from Osaka and sent them on to Yedo to
visit the wife of Hidetada, the lady Yodo's younger sister. The Osaka
deputies naturally drew favourable inferences from this courteous
mood, and taking an opportunity to refer to the affair of the
inscription on the bell, elicited from Ieyasu an assurance that the
matter need not be regarded with concern.
Not for a moment suspecting any deception, Okura-no-Tsubone and her
companion took their way to Osaka. On the other hand, Honda Masanobu
and the priest, Tengai, were instructed to inform Katsumoto that the
umbrage of Ieyasu was deeply roused, and that some very strong
measure would be necessary to restore the Bakufu's confidence in
Hideyori. Katsumoto vainly sought some definite statement as to the
nature of the reparation required. He was merely told to answer the
question himself. He accordingly proposed one of three courses,
namely, that the lady Yodo should be sent to Yedo as a hostage; that
Hideyori should leave Osaka and settle at some other castle; or,
finally, that he should acknowledge himself a vassal of the Tokugawa.
To these proposals the only reply that could be elicited from Ieyasu
was that Yodo and her son should choose whichever course they
pleased, and, bearing that answer, the disquieting import of which he
well understood, Katsumoto set out from Sumpu for Osaka. Travelling
rapidly, he soon overtook Okwra-no-Tsubone and explained to her the
events and their import. But the lady was incredulous. She was more
ready to suspect Katsumoto's sincerity than to believe that Ieyasu
had meant to deceive her.
Had Katsumoto been free to continue his journey to Osaka, reaching it
in advance of Okura-no-Tsubone's party, the result might have been
different. But Ieyasu did not contemplate any such sequence of
events. He instructed Itakura Katsushige to invite Katsumoto to call
at Kyoto on the way to Osaka with the object of discussing an
important affair. Katsumoto had no choice but to delay his journey,
and Katsushige took care that the delay should be long enough to
afford time for Okura-no-Tsubone's party to reach Osaka, and to
present their report, together with their suspicions of Katsumoto's
disloyalty.
Lady Yodo was incensed when she learned the terms that Katsumoto had
offered. "I am Hideyori's mother," she is reported to have cried. "I
will never bend my knee to the Kwanto. Rather will I and my son make
this castle our death-pillow." Then, with Ono Harunaga, she formed a
plot to kill Katsumoto and to draw the sword against the Tokugawa.
Subsequently, when Katsumoto returned to Osaka and reported the
result of his mission, he stated his conviction that the only exit
from the dilemma was one of the three courses indicated above.
Yodogimi, on being informed of this opinion, intimated her desire to
see Katsumoto. But when the day named for the meeting came and
Katsumoto was on the point of leaving his residence for the purpose
of repairing to the conference, he received information that the
intention was to kill him en route. He therefore fled to his domain
in the remote province of Ibaraki. It is recorded that Katsumoto's
plan was to offer to send Yodo as a hostage to Yedo. Then the
question would arise as to a place of residence for her in the
eastern capital, and the processes of preparing a site and building a
house were to be supplemented by accidental conflagrations, so that
the septuagenarian, Ieyasu, might easily pass away before the actual
transfer of the hostage took place. Such was Katsumoto's device, but
he had to flee from Osaka before he could carry it into effect.
THE SIEGE OF OSAKA CASTLE
In the year 1614, Ieyasu issued orders for the attack of Osaka
Castle, on the ground that Katsumoto's promise had not been
fulfilled. The Tokugawa chief set out from Sumpu and his son,
Hidetada, from Yedo. Their armies, combined with the forces of
several of the feudatories, are said to have aggregated one hundred
and fifty thousand men. In Osaka, also, a great host was assembled,
and among its leaders were several renowned warriors, including
Sanada Yukimura, Goto Matabei, Hanawa Naotsugu, and others, who,
although not originally vassals of the Toyotomi, supported Hideyori
loyally. As for the castle, its enormous strength rendered it
well-nigh impregnable, and after weeks of effort the Tokugawa forces
had nothing to show for their repeated attacks except a long list of
casualties.
Ieyasu now had recourse to intrigue. The mother of Kyogoku Takatsugu,
daimyo of Obama, in Wakasa, was the younger sister of the lady Yodo.
Ieyasu induced her to open communications with Yodo, and to represent
to the latter the advisability of concluding peace with the Tokugawa
instead of remaining perpetually beleaguered in a fortress, thus
merely postponing an end which could not be finally averted. A
council was convened in the castle to consider this advice. Opinions
were divided. Some held that Ieyasu could not be believed, and that
if the struggle were maintained for a few years, the face of affairs
might change radically. Others urged that the loyalty of the garrison
was not above suspicion, and that if the fight went on much longer,
treachery might be practised, to which risk a speedy peace, even at
some cost, would be preferable. Ono Harunaga was among the advocates
of surrender, but Hideyori himself showed that his character had not
been mistaken by Ieyasu. He indignantly reminded Harunaga and the
latter's fellow thinkers that arms had been taken up by their advice
and in opposition to the loyal efforts of Katsumoto in the cause of
peace.
Lady Yodo, however, threw her influence into the scale with Ono
Harunaga, and finally peace was concluded on terms highly favourable
to the Toyotomi. It was agreed that Hideyori should remain in the
possession of the castle and of all his domains, and that the
garrison, as well as the unattached samurai who formed part of it,
should not be punished but should be provided for subsequently. It
might have occurred to the leaders of the Osaka party that these
lenient conditions covered some occult designs; nothing was less
likely than that a statesman like Ieyasu would be content with so
signal a failure. But a short-sighted sentiment of confidence seems
to have obscured the judgment of the Osaka folks. They actually gave
heed to Ieyasu's complaint that he, the o-gosho, and his son, the
shogun, must not be allowed to have taken so much trouble for
nothing; that it was customary to give hostages to an army which
agreed to raise a siege, and that at least a portion of the castle's
defences should be destroyed. As to the last point, the Tokugawa
chief was kind enough to say that the work of demolition should not
cost the garrison anything, since labour would be supplied gratis by
the shoguni.
After considerable correspondence it was agreed that Harunaga's son
should go to Yedo as a hostage, and that a portion of the outer moat
of Osaka Castle should be filled up. Ieyasu did not lose a moment in
giving effect to this latter provision. He ordered some of the fudai
daimyo of the Kwanto to proceed to Osaka with several thousands of
men, who should go to work forthwith to tear down the parapets and
fill up the moats of the castle. These orders were implicitly obeyed,
and as Ieyasu had omitted to indicate any limit for the work of
destruction, it went on without check, and presently the second line
of parapets began to follow the first. The Osaka leaders protested
and essayed to stay the destruction. But the officers who were in
command of the operation said that without a direct message from
Honda Masazumi, who represented Ieyasu, they could not suspend their
task. Efforts were then made to approach Honda, but he was
conveniently absent "on account of his health," and the ensuing
correspondence occupied several days, during which the pulling-down
and filling-up went on by day and by night. More than one-half of the
second moat had disappeared before Masazumi could be found. His
answer was that he had been merely told to fill up the moat. Possibly
he had mistaken the scope of his instructions and he would refer the
matter to Ieyasu. This involved further delay and more filling,
until, finally, Masazumi acknowledged that he had made a mistake,
declared himself prepared to undergo punishment, and withdrew his men
to Fushimi.
Ieyasu supplied the sequel of the farce. When complaint was made
against Masazumi, the Tokugawa leader simulated astonishment,
expressed much regret, and said that he would condemn Masazumi to
commit suicide were it permissible to mar this happy occasion by any
capital sentence. "Peace," declared the astute old statesman, "has
now been fortunately concluded. Let us not talk any more about the
castle's moats or parapets." Against such an attitude the Osaka men
could not enter any protest, and the farce ended there. Had the Osaka
leaders possessed any measure of the wisdom that marked all the
doings of Ieyasu, they would not have suffered matters to rest at
such a stage. But they foolishly imagined that some retaliation might
be effected by calling upon the Tokugawa to supplement that part of
the peace provisions which related to allowances for the samurai who
had fought on the side of the garrison. A demand in that sense was
preferred to Ieyasu. But he had now laid aside his transient suavity.
The Osaka people were brusquely informed that they must look to the
Toyotomi family for recompense, and that as for rewarding unattached
samurai who had drawn the sword against the shogun, the Osaka people,
were they obedient to the dictates of loyalty, would of their own
account peremptorily reject such an unwarranted proposition, even
though Ieyasu himself were disposed to consent to it.
Of course this answer profoundly enraged the Osaka party. They
appreciated for the first time that they had been deceived
throughout, and that by a series of adroit manoeuvres they had been
removed from an almost impregnable position to a practically helpless
plight. Not a few turned their backs on the castle, but a great
majority determined to renew the conflict and to die at their posts.
The circumstances, however, had now undergone a radical change. The
castle had been converted from the strongest fortress in Japan into a
mere semblance of strength, and no garrison, however brave and
however resolute, could have defended it successfully against the
forces that the Tokugawa were able to marshal.
As for Ieyasu, he knew that his task had been immensely lightened. On
the 3rd of May, 1615, he started from Sumpu for Osaka at the head of
an army numbering scarcely one-third of the force previously led
against the castle. Nevertheless, one contingency presented itself in
a dangerous light. It was always possible that Hideyori himself
should make a sortie from the fortress, and, in that event, the
prestige attaching to the memory of his father, Hideyoshi, might have
demoralized a large section of the Tokugawa troops. To avert this
danger, Ieyasu had recourse to his wonted methods of deception. It
has been shown that he held Harunaga's son, as a hostage. This youth
was required to write a letter to his father stating that collusion
existed between parties within and without the fortress, and that the
traitors had plotted to induce Hideyori to make a sortie, whereupon
the castle would be given up and Hideyori would be delivered into the
hands of his enemies. Harunaga does not appear to have entertained
any doubt as to the trustworthiness of this letter. He carried it
hastily to Hideyori, who was in the act of preparing to sally out of
the castle and throw himself upon the beleaguering forces.
The receipt of the letter naturally led to a change of plan, and
although desperate fighting subsequently took place, the castle was
finally set on fire by traitors and its fate was seen to be hopeless.
Hideyori's wife, granddaughter of Ieyasu, repaired to the Tokugawa
headquarters to plead for the life of her husband and his mother. But
Ieyasu was inexorable. He granted asylum to his granddaughter, but
replied to her prayer by ordering a renewal of the attack upon the
castle. On June 4th, Hideyori committed suicide, and his mother,
Yodo, was killed by one of his retainers. Some thirty men and women
killed themselves at the same time.
Men spoke of the first fruitless assault upon the castle as the
"Winter Campaign," and of the second and successful assault as
the "Summer Campaign." But the two operations were radically
different in their character. For, whereas in the first assault the
garrison--numbering something like one hundred and eighty thousand
men--stood strictly on the defensive, wisely relying on the immense
strength of the fortress, on the second occasion most of the fighting
took place outside the walls, the garrison preferring to rely upon
strategy and courage rather than on ruined parapets and half-filled
moats. Thus, the details of the second campaign occupy a large space
in Japanese histories, but these tedious features of strategy and
tactics are abbreviated here. There can be no doubt that Ieyasu, so
far from seeking to save Hideyori's life, deliberately planned his
destruction. Moreover, when it became known that an illegitimate son
of Hideyori, called Kunimatsu, had been carried from the castle by
some common soldiers and secreted at a farmhouse in Fushimi, Ieyasu
caused this child of six to be seized and beheaded by a common
executioner at Sanjo-kawara in Kyoto. This episode reflects no credit
whatever on the Tokugawa leader. That he should extirpate every scion
of the Toyotomi family was not inconsistent with the canons of the
tune or with the interests of his own security. But death at the
hands of a common executioner ought never to have been decreed for
the son of the u-daijin, and the cruelty of the order finds no
excuse. No tenet of bushido can be reconciled with such inhumanity.
To this chapter of history belongs the attitude of Ieyasu towards the
memory of his old friend and benefactor, Hideyoshi. He caused to be
levelled with the ground the temple of Toyokuni Daimyo-jin, where the
spirit of Hideyoshi was worshipped, and he ordered the removal of the
tomb of the Taiko from Amidagamine to a remote corner of the Daibutsu
enclosure. Finally, he sought and obtained the Emperor's sanction to
revoke the sacred title conferred posthumously on Hideyoshi. One
looks in vain for any fragment of magnanimity among such acts. Ieyasu
is reported to have avowedly adopted for guidance the precept,
"Before taking any step propound to your heart the query, how about
justice?" He certainly did not put any such query to his own
conscience in connexion with the castle of Osaka or its inmates.
THE GENNA YEAR-PERIOD (1615-1623)
The battle of Sekigahara is often spoken of as the last great
internecine campaign in Japanese history, but this is hardly borne
out by the facts. Indeed, from what has been said above, it will be
seen that Sekigahara was merely a prelude to Osaka, and that the
former stood to the latter almost in the relation of a preliminary
skirmish. It is from August, 1615, that we must date the commencement
of the long period of peace with which Japan was blessed under
Tokugawa rule. The year-name was then changed to Genna.
DEATH OF IEYASU
In February, 1616, Ieyasu fell sick, and in April the Emperor sent an
envoy to confer on him the title of dajo daijin. He expired a few
days afterwards at the age of seventy-five and was apotheosized as
Tosho Dai-Gongen (Light of the East and Great Incarnation). He was
buried on the summit of Mount Kuno in Suruga, and ultimately his
ashes were carried to Nikko for interment. It is recorded, though not
on independent authority, that when his end was drawing near he spoke
to those at his side in the folio whig terms: "My death is now in
sight, but happily the country is at peace, and Hidetada has already
discharged the duties of shogun for several years. I have, therefore,
no cause for anxiety. If, after I am gone, Hidetada should make any
failure in his administration of public affairs, or if he should lose
control of the people, any one of you to whom the Imperial order may
be addressed, should assume the functions of shogun, for, as you well
know, that post is not the property of this or that person in
particular, nor will my rest in the grave be disturbed though such an
event occurs."
Another record, however, represents Ieyasu as following the example
of the Taiko and conjuring his most trusted retainers to devote their
strength to the support of the Tokugawa family. To Hidetada he is
said to have suggested the advisability of compelling the daimyo to
remain in Yedo for three full years after his (Ieyasu's) demise, in
order to test thoroughly their attitude. Hidetada replied that while
most unwilling to reject his father's advice, his intention was to
allow the feudatories to leave Yedo at once, and if any one of them
evinced hostile feeling by shutting himself up in his castle, he,
Hidetada, would follow him thither and level his parapets with the
ground. Such an object lesson was, in his opinion, the best
stepping-stone to supremacy. Ieyasu is reported to have received this
answer with profound satisfaction, and to have declared that he was
now assured of the permanence of peace. He then had all his sons
called to his side and enjoined upon them the duty of serving the
shogun faithfully. To his grandson, Iemitsu, he specially addressed
himself, saying: "It will fall to your lot, some day, to govern the
country. On that day remember that benevolence should be the first
principle of a ruler."
CHARACTER OF IEYASU
Frugality is one of the virtues which Ieyasu certainly possessed.
Striking example of its display is connected with Yedo Castle. This
fortress, as built originally by Ota Dokwan, was not of imposing
dimensions even as a military stronghold, and the dwelling-house in
the keep presented most homely features, having a thatched roof and a
porch of rough boat-planks. Yet Ieyasu was content to make this
edifice his palace, and while he devoted much care to strengthening
the fortifications, he bestowed none on the enlargement and adornment
of the dwelling. The system he adopted to populate the city may be
said to have been colonial. He encouraged his vassals to settle
there, giving them lands to cultivate and breeding-grounds for
horses, so that within a brief time the city obtained numerous
inhabitants and developed a prosperous condition. It was in planning
the details of all enterprises that he particularly excelled. To
everything he brought an almost infinite capacity of patient study
and minute examination; his principle being that to achieve success
the first desideratum is to avoid mistakes. Doubtless he owed this
faculty of profound painstaking to the vicissitudes of his early
life. The years that he passed under the control of the Imagawa and
afterwards under that of Oda taught him patience and self-restraint,
and made the study of literature obligatory for him, at the same time
begetting in his mind a feeling of reverence for the Buddhist faith.
Japanese historians generally credit him with the virtues of
humanity, magnanimity, justice, and affability. That he was always
pleased to receive advice from others and that he set an example of
courtesy and zeal, there can be no doubt. Neither will anyone deny
that his resourcefulness amounted to genius. On the other hand, his
record shows that he was unscrupulous in utilizing opportunities,
whether created by himself or made accessible by fortune, and from
the same record we are compelled to infer that he could be cruel and
implacable on occasion. His favourite sayings afford perhaps the best
index that we possess to his disposition:--
Man's life is like a long journey toiling under a heavy burden.
Never be in a hurry.
He that regards destitution as his habitual lot will never feel
the pressure of want.
When the spirit of ambition arises in your bosom, recall the
days of your distress.
To forbear is the source of harmlessness and the road to
success.
Regard anger as an enemy.
He that knows how to win only and does not know how to lose,
will achieve nothing useful.
Blame yourself and acquit others.
To fall short is better than to exceed.
ENGRAVING: SIGNATURE OF ASHIKAGA TAKAUJI
ENGRAVING: THEATRICAL PLAY OF OLD JAPAN