THE HOJO
THE HOJO IN KYOTO
THERE was nothing perfunctory in the administration of the "Two
Rokuhara" (Ryo-Rokuhara) in Kyoto. The northern and the southern
offices were presided over by the most prominent members of the Hojo
family, men destined to fill the post of regent (shikkeri)
subsequently in Kamakura. Thus, when Hojo Yoshitoki died suddenly, in
1224, his son, Yasutoki, returned at once to Kamakura to succeed to
the regency, transferring to his son, Tokiuji, the charge of northern
Rokuhara, and a short time afterwards the control of southern
Rokuhara was similarly transferred from Yoshitoki is brother,
Tokifusa, to the latter's son, Tokimori. Nominally, the jurisdiction
of the two Rokuhara was confined to military affairs, but in reality
their influence extended to every sphere within Kyoto and to the
Kinai and the Saikai-do without.
THE HYOJOSHU
So long as the lady Masa lived, the administrative machinery at
Kamakura suggested no sense of deficiency. That great woman accepted
all the responsibility herself. But in the year (1225) of her death,
Yasutoki, who had just succeeded to the regency, made an important
reform. He organized within the Man-dokoro a council of fifteen or
sixteen members, which was called the Hyojo-shu, and which virtually
constituted the Bakufu cabinet. The Samurai-dokoro and the
Monju-dokoro remained unchanged, but the political administration
passed from the Monju-dokoro to the Hyojoshu, and the betto of the
former became in effect the finance minister of the shogun.
THE GOOD ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOJO
Commencing with Yasutoki (1225), down to the close of the thirteenth
century, Japan was admirably ruled by a succession of Hojo regents.
Among them, Yasutoki deserves the highest credit, for he established
a standard with the aid of very few guiding precedents. When he came
into power he found the people suffering grievously from the
extortions of manorial chiefs. It was not an uncommon practice for
the owner of an estate to hold in custody the wives and daughters of
defaulting tenants until the latter paid their rents, however
exorbitant, and seldom indeed did the holder of a manor recognize any
duty of succouring the peasants in time of distress. The former cruel
practice was strictly forbidden by Yasutoki, and, to correct the
latter defect, he adopted the plan of setting a fine example himself.
It is recorded that in the Kwanki era (1229-1232), when certain
places were suffering from crop failure, the regent distributed nine
thousand koku of rice (45,000 bushels approximately) among the
inhabitants and remitted all taxes throughout more than one thousand
districts.
In the Azuma Kagami, a contemporaneous history generally trustworthy,
we find various anecdotes illustrative at once of the men and the
ethics of the time. Thus, it is related that the farmers of a village
called Hojo being in an embarrassed condition, seed-rice was lent to
them in the spring by the regent's order, they undertaking to repay
it in the autumn. But a storm having devastated their fields, they
were unable to keep their pledge. Nothing seemed to offer except
flight. When they were on the eve of decamping, however, they
received from Yasutoki an invitation to a feast at which their bonds
were burned in their presence and every debtor was given half a
bushel of rice. Elsewhere, we read that the regent himself lived in a
house so unpretentious that the interior was visible from the
highroad, owing to the rude nature of the surrounding fence. Urged to
make the fence solid, if only as a protection against fire, his reply
was: "However economically a new wall and fence be constructed, the
outlay would be at the cost of the people. As for me, if I do my duty
to the State, my life and my house will be safe. If I fail, the
strongest fence will not avail."
In estimating what his bountiful assistance to the farmers meant, it
is necessary to remember that he was very poor, The greater part of
the comparatively small estates bequeathed to him by his father he
divided among his half-brothers by a Fujiwara mother, reserving to
himself only a little, for, said he: "I am the regent. What more do I
desire?" One day, while attending a meeting of the Hyojoshu, he
received news that the house of his brother, Tomotoki, was attacked.
Immediately he hastened to the rescue with a small band of followers.
Subsequently, one of his principal retainers remonstrated with him
for risking his life in an affair so insignificant. Yasutoki
answered: "How can you call an incident insignificant when my
brother's safety was concerned? To me it seemed as important as the
Shokyu struggle. If I had lost my brother, what consolation would my
rank have furnished?"
Yasutoki never made his rank a pretext for avoiding military service;
he kept his watch in turn with the other guards, remaining up all
night and attending to all his duties. When he periodically visited
the temple of Yoritomo, he always worshipped without ascending to the
aisle, his reason being that, were the shogun, Yoritomo, alive, the
regent would not venture to sit on the dais by his side. Thrifty and
eminently practical, he ridiculed a priest who proposed to
tranquillize the nation by building fanes. "How can peace be brought
to the people," he asked, "by tormenting them to subscribe for such a
purpose?" He revered learning, regarded administration as a literary
art rather than a military, and set no store whatever by his own
ability or competence.
THE JOEI CODE
The most memorable achievement during Yasutoki's regency was the
compilation of a code of law called the Joei Shikimoku* after the
name of the era (Joei, 1232-1233) when it was promulgated. What
rendered this legislation essentially necessary was that the Daiho
code of the eighth century and all the laws founded on it were
inspired primarily by the purpose of centralizing the administrative
power and establishing the Throne's title of ownership in all the
land throughout the realm, a system diametrically opposed to the
spirit of feudalism. This incongruity had made itself felt in
Yoritomo's time, and had suggested the compilation of certain "Rules
for Decisions" (Hanketsu-rei), which became the basis of the Joei
code in Yasutoki's days. Another objection to the Daiho code and its
correlated enactments was that, being written with Chinese ideographs
solely, they were unintelligible to the bulk of those they concerned.
Confucius laid down as a fundamental maxim of government that men
should be taught to obey, not to understand, and that principle was
adopted by the Tokugawa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
But in the thirteenth, the aim of Yasutoki and his fellow legislators
was to render the laws intelligible to all, and with that object they
were indited mostly in the kana syllabary.
*Called also the Kwanto Goseibai Shikimoku.
The actual work of compilation was done by Hokkyo Enzen (a renowned
bonze), but the idea originated with Hojo Yasutoki and Miyoshi
Yasutsura, and every provision was carefully scanned and debated by
the Bakufu's State council (Hyojoshu). There was no intention of
suppressing the Daiho code. The latter was to remain operative in all
regions to which the sway of the Kyoto Court extended direct. But in
proportion as the influence of the Bakufu grew, the Joei laws
received new adherents and finally became universally effective. A
great modern authority, Dr. Ariga, has opined that the motive of the
Bakufu legislation was not solely right for right's sake. He thinks
that political expediency figured in the business, the Kamakura
rulers being shrewd enough to foresee that a reputation for
administering justice would prove a potent factor in extending their
influence. If so, the scheme was admirably worked out, for every
member of the council had to sign a pledge, inserted at the end of
the Shikimoku, invoking* the vengeance of heaven on his head if he
departed from the laws or violated their spirit in rendering
judgment. Nothing, indeed, stands more signally to the credit of the
Bakufu rulers from the days of Yoritomo and his wife, Masa,
downwards, than their constant endeavour to do justice between man
and man.
*"This oath indicates, among other things, the deep sense of the
importance of unanimity, of a united front, of the individual sharing
fully in the collective responsibility, that was cherished by the
Bakufu councillors. This was, indeed, one of the chief secrets of the
wonderful stability and efficiency of the machine." (Murdoch.)
NATURE OF THE CODE
The Joei Shikimoku is not a voluminous document: it contains only
fifty-one brief articles, which the poet Basho compares to the
luminosity of the full moon. It has been excellently translated and
annotated by Mr. Consul-General J. C. Hall in the "Transactions of
the Asiatic Society of Japan" (Vol. XXXIV, Part I), and Mr. J.
Murdoch, in his admirable History of Japan, summarizes its provisions
lucidly. We learn that slavery still existed in the thirteenth
century in Japan; but the farmer was guarded against cruel processes
of tax-collecting and enjoyed freedom of domicile when his dues were
paid. Fiefs might not be sold, but a peasant might dispose of his
holding. "Village headmen, while held to a strict discharge of their
duties and severely punished for various malpractices, were
safeguarded against all aggression or undue interference on the part
of the jito. The law of property was almost entirely synonymous with
that of fiefs. These, if originally conferred for public services
rendered by the grantee, could not be sold. On the death of the
holder it was not necessarily the eldest son--even though
legitimate--that succeeded. The only provision affecting the father's
complete liberty of bequest or gift to his widow--or concubine, in
one article--or children, was that a thoroughly deserving eldest son,
whether of wife or concubine, could claim one-fifth of the estate.
"Not only could women be dowered with, or inherit, fiefs, and
transmit a legal title to them to their own children, but a childless
woman was even fully empowered to adopt an heir. Yoritomo had been
the first to sanction this broadminded and liberal principle. In
Kamakura, an adulterer was stripped of half of his fief if he held
one; and if he had none, he was banished. For an adulteress the
punishment was no severer, except that if she possessed a fief, the
whole of it was confiscated. A good many sections of the code deal
with legal procedure and the conduct and duty of magistrates, the
great objects being to make the administration of justice simple,
prompt, and pure, while repressing everything in the shape of
pettifogging or factious litigation.
"The penalties were neither cruel nor ferocious. Death for the worst
offences--among which theft is specially mentioned--confiscation of
fief, and banishment, these exhaust the list. The only other
punishment mentioned is that of branding on the face, inflicted on a
commoner for the crime of forgery, a bushi's punishment in this case
being banishment, or simply confiscation of his fief, if possessed of
one.
"Bakufu vassals were strictly forbidden directly to solicit the
Imperial Court for rank or office; they must be provided with a
special recommendation from Kamakura. But once invested with Court
rank, they might be promoted in grade without any further
recommendation, while they were free to accept the position of
hebiishi. Analogous restrictions were placed on the Kwanto clergy,
who were to be summarily removed from their benefices if found
appealing to Kyoto for promotion, the only exception being in favour
of Zen-shu priests. In their case the erring brother guilty of such
an offence got off comparatively lightly--'an influential member of
the same sect will be directed to administer a gentle admonition.'
The clergy within the Bakufu domains were to be kept strictly in
hand; if they squandered the revenues of their incumbency and
neglected the fabric and the established services therein, they were
to be displaced. As regards the monasteries and priests outside the
Bakufu domain, the case was entirely different; they were virtually
independent, and Kamakura interfered there only when instructed to do
so by Imperial decree."*
*Murdoch's History of Japan.
FURTHER LEGISLATION
It is not to be supposed that the Joei Shikimoku represents the whole
outcome of Kamakura legislation. Many additions were made to the code
during the fourteenth century, but they were all in the nature of
amplifications or modifications. Kyoto also was busy with enactments
in those times--busier, indeed, than Kamakura, but with smaller
practical results.
FALL OF THE MIURA
Yasutoki died in 1242, having held the regency (shikken) for eighteen
years. His two sons had preceded him to the grave, and therefore his
grandson, Tsune-toki, became shikken. Tsunetoki resembled his
grandfather in many respects, but, as he died in 1246, he had little
opportunity of distinguishing himself. Nevertheless, during his brief
tenure of power, he took a step which had momentous consequences. It
will be remembered that after the murder of Minamoto Sanetomo by his
nephew Kugyo, in 1219, some difficulty was experienced in persuading
the Imperial Court to appoint a successor to the shogunate, and
finally the choice fell upon Fujiwara Yoritsune, then a child of two,
who was not actually nominated shogun until 1226. This noble, when
(1244) in the twenty-seventh year of his age and the eighteenth of
his shogunate, was induced by the regent, Tsunetoki, to resign, the
alleged reason being portents in the sky, and a successor was found
for him in his son, Yoritsugu.
Now, for many years past the Miura family had ranked next to the Hojo
in power and above it in wealth, but the two had always been loyal
friends. Some umbrage was given to the Miura at this time, however,
owing to the favours enjoyed at the regency by the Adachi family, one
of whose ladies was the mother of the two shikken, Tsunetoki and
Tokiyori. The situation thus created had its issue in a plot to kill
Tokiyori, and to replace him by an uncle unconnected with the Adachi.
Whether the Miura family were really involved in this plot, history
gives no definite indication; but certainly the ex-shogun, Yoritsune,
was involved, and his very marked friendship with Miura Mitsumura
could scarcely fail to bring the latter under suspicion. In the end,
the Miura mansion was suddenly invested by a Hojo force. Mitsumura
and his elder brother, Yasumura, escaped to a temple where, after a
stubborn resistance, they and 270 of their vassals committed suicide.
No mercy was shown. The Miura were hunted and slaughtered everywhere,
their wide, landed estates being confiscated and divided among the
Bakufu, the fanes, and the courtiers at Kyoto.
The terribly drastic sequel of this affair illustrates the vast power
wielded by the Hojo throughout the empire in the thirteenth century.
Yoritomo's system of high constables and land-stewards brought almost
every part of the country under the effective sway of Kamakura. It is
not to be supposed, however, that these high constables and
land-stewards were suffered to subject the people within their
jurisdiction to arbitrary or extortionate treatment. Not only could
complaints of any such abuses count on a fair hearing and prompt
redress at the hands of the Bakufu, but also inspectors were
despatched, periodically or at uncertain dates, to scrutinize with
the utmost vigilance the conduct of the shugo and jito, who, in their
turn, had a staff of specially trained men to examine the land survey
and adjust the assessment and incidence of taxation.
ENGRAVING: HOJO TOKIYORI
HOJO TOKIYORI
Tokiyori, younger brother of Tsunetoki, held the post of shikken at
the time of the Miura tragedy. He had succeeded to the position, in
1246, on the death of Tsunetoki, and he nominally abdicated in 1256,
when, in the sequel of a severe illness, he took the tonsure. A
zealous believer, from his youth upwards, in the doctrines of the Zen
sect of Buddhism, he built a temple called Saimyo-ji among the hills
of Kamakura, and retired thither to tend his health--entrusting the
office of shikken to a relative, Nagatoki, as his own son, Tokimune,
was still of tender age--but continuing himself to administer
military and judicial affairs, especially when any criminal or civil
case of a complicated or difficult nature occurred. Thus, there was a
cloistered regent at Kamakura, just as there had so often been a
cloistered Emperor in Kyoto. Tradition has busied itself much with
Tokiyori's life. He carried to extreme lengths the virtue of economy
so greatly extolled by his grandfather, Yasutoki. Such was the
frugality of his mode of life that we read of him searching for
fragments of food among the remnants of a meal, so that he might
serve them to a friend, and we read, also, of his mother repairing
with her own hands the paper covering of a shoji in expectation of a
visit from him. He is further said to have disguised himself as an
itinerent bonze and to have travelled about the provinces, observing
the state of the people and learning their complaints. His
experiences, on this pilgrimage read like a romance. Lodging at one
time with an aged widow, he learns that she has been robbed of her
estate and reduced to painful poverty, a wrong which Tokiyori hastens
to redress; at another time his host is an old samurai whose loyal
record comes thus to the knowledge of the shikken and is subsequently
recognized.
But it must be confessed that these tales rest on very slender
evidence. Better attested is the story of Aoto Fujitsuna, which
illustrates at once the character of Tokiyori and the customs of the
time. This Fujitsuna was a man of humble origin but considerable
learning. One year, the country being visited by drought, Tokiyori
gave rice and money to priests for religious services, and himself
worshipped at the shrine of Mishima. These measures were vehemently
criticized by Fujitsuna, who described them as enriching the wealthy
to help the impoverished. When informed of this, Tokiyori, instead of
resenting it, sent for Fujitsuna and nominated him a member of the
Court of Recorders,* where he earned the reputation of being one of
Japan's greatest judges.** It is related of him that he devoted his
whole fortune to objects of charity, and that when Tokiyori, claiming
a revelation from heaven, proposed to increase his endowments, his
answer was, "Supposing heaven revealed to you that you should put me
to death, would you obey?" ***
*The Hikitsuke-shii, a body of men who kept the archives of the
Man-dokoro and conducted preliminary judicial investigations. It was
organized in Tokiyori's, time and from its members the Hyojoshu was
recruited.
**The other was Ooka Tadasuke of the Tokugawa period.
***It is related of this Aoto Fujitsuna that, having dropped a few
cash into the Namera River at night, he expended many times the
amount in paying torch-bearers to recover the lost coins, his
argument being that the money thus expended was merely put into
circulation, whereas the dropped money would have been irrevocably
lost.
Tokiyori, as already related, though he nominally resigned and
entered religion in 1256, really held the reins of power until his
death, in 1263. Thus the Insei (camera administration) came into
being in Kamakura, as it had done previously in Kyoto. There were
altogether nine of the Hojo regents, as shown below:
(1) Tokimasa 1203-1205
(2) Yoshitoki 1205-1224
(3) Yasutoki 1224-1242
(4) Tsunetoki 1242-1246
(5) Tokiyori 1246-1256 Retired in 1256, but ruled in camera till
1263
(6) Tokimune 1256-1284
(7) Sadatoki 1284-1301 Retired in 1301, but ruled in camera till
1311
(8) Morotoki 1301-1311
(9) Takatoki 1311-1333
The first six of these were men of genius, but neither Tokimasa nor
Yoshitoki can be called really great administrators, if in the
science of administration its moral aspects be included. The next
four, however, from Yasutoki down to Tokimune, are distinctly
entitled to a high place in the pages of history. Throughout the
sixty years of their sway (1224-1284), the Japanese nation was
governed with justice* and clemency rarely found in the records of
any medieval State, and it is a strange fact that Japan's debt to
these Hojo rulers remained unrecognized until modern times.
*It is recorded that the first half of every month in Kamakura was
devoted to judicial proceedings, and that at the gate of the Record
Office there was hung a bell, by striking which a suitor or
petitioner could count on immediate attention.
THE SHOGUNS IN KAMAKURA
In the Minamoto's original scheme of government the office of shogun
was an administrative reality. Its purpose was to invest the Bakufu
chief with permanent authority to command all the military and naval
forces throughout the empire for the defence and tranquillization of
the country. In that light the shogunate was regarded while it
remained in the hands of Yoritomo and his two sons, Yoriie and
Sanetomo. But with the death of Sanetomo, in 1219, and the political
extinction of the Minamoto family, the shogunate assumed a different
character in the eyes of the Minamoto's successors, the Hojo. These
latter, not qualified to hold the office themselves, regarded it as a
link between Kamakura and Kyoto, and even as a source from which
might be derived lawful sanction for opposing the Throne should
occasion arise. Therefore they asked the Emperor Go-Toba to nominate
one of his younger sons, and on receiving a refusal, they were fain
to be content with a member of the Fujiwara family, who had long held
the Court in the hollow of their hands. This nomination was never
intended to carry with it any real authority. The shoguns were mere
puppets. During the interval of 114 years between the death of
Sanetomo (1219) and the fall of the Hojo (1333), there were six of
these fainéant officials:
Age at Age at
Appn't Depos'n
Fujiwara Yoritsune, 1219-1244 2 27
Yoritsugu 1244-1252 5 13
Prince Munetaka, 1252-1266 10 24
elder brother of Go-Fukakusa
Prince Koreyasu, son of Munetaka 1266-1289 3 26
Prince Hisaakira, son of Go-Fukakusa 1289-1308 13 32
Prince Morikuni, son of Hisaakira 1308-1333 7 32
The record shows that all these officials were appointed at an age
when independent thought had not yet become possible, and that they
were removed as soon as they began to think for themselves. It will
be observed that there is a palpable break in the uniformity of the
list. Yoritsugu alone was stripped of office while still in his
teens. That was because his father, the ex-shogun, engaged in a plot
to overthrow the Hojo. But the incident was also opportune. It
occurred just at the time when other circumstances combined to
promote the ambition of the Hojo in the matter of obtaining an
Imperial prince for shogun. The throne was then occupied by
Go-Fukakusa (the eighty-ninth sovereign), a son of Go-Saga (the
eighty-eighth sovereign), who, as we shall see, owed his elevation to
the influence exercised by Hojo Yasutoki after the Shokyu war. Now it
happened that, in 1252, a conspiracy against Go-Saga was found to
have been fomented by the head of that branch of the Fujiwara family
from which the Kamakura shoguns were taken. The conspiracy was a
thing of the past and so were its principal fomenters, but it served
as a conclusive reason for not creating another Fujiwara shogun.
Prince Munetaka, an elder brother of the reigning Emperor, was
chosen, and thus the last four Bakufu shoguns were all of Imperial
blood.
Their lineage, however, did not avail much as against Bakufu
arbitrariness. The Hojo adopted towards the shoguns the same
policy as that previously pursued by the Fujiwara towards the
sovereigns--appointment during the years of childhood and removal
on reaching full manhood.* But the shoguns were not unavenged.
*It is related that when the regent, Sadatoki, in 1289, removed
Prince Koreyasu from the office of shogun, he ordered that the bamboo
palanquin in which the prince journeyed to Kyoto should be carried
with the back in front. The people said that the prince was banished
to Kyoto.
It was owing to the social influence exercised by their entourage
that the frugal and industrious habits of the bushi at Kamakura were
gradually replaced by the effeminate pastimes and enervating
accomplishments of the Imperial capital. For the personnel and
equipage of a shogun's palace at Kamakura differed essentially from
those of Hojo regents (shikken) like Yasutoki and his three immediate
successors. In the former were seen a multitude of highly paid
officials whose duties did not extend to anything more serious than
the conservation of forms of etiquette; the custody of gates, doors,
and shutters; the care of pavilions and villas; the practice and
teaching of polite accomplishments, such as music and versification;
dancing, handball, and football; the cultivation of refined archery
and equestrianism, and the guarding of the shogun's person.*
*The officials of the shogun's court were collectively called banshu.
At the regency, on the other hand, functions of the most arduous
character were continuously discharged by a small staff of earnest,
unpretentious men, strangers to luxury or leisure and solicitous,
primarily, to promote the cause of justice and to satisfy the canons
of efficiency. The contrast could not but be demoralizing. Not
rapidly or without a struggle, but slowly and inevitably, the poison
of bad example permeated Kamakura society, and the sinecures in the
shogun's household came to be coveted by the veterans of the Bakufu,
who, throughout the peaceful times secured by Hojo rule, found no
means of gaining honours or riches in the field, and who saw
themselves obliged to mortgage their estates in order to meet the
cost of living, augmented by extravagant banquets, fine buildings,
and rich garments. Eight times between 1252 and 1330, edicts were
issued by the Bakufu fixing the prices of commodities, vetoing costly
residences, prohibiting expensive garments, censuring neglect of
military arts, and ordering resumption of the old-time sports and
exercises. These attempts to check the evil had only very partial
success. The vices spread, and "in the complex of factors that led to
the downfall of the Bakufu, the ultimate ascendancy of Kyoto's social
standards in Kamakura must probably be regarded as the most
important."*
*Murdoch's History of Japan.
THE TWO LINES OF EMPERORS
It is necessary now to turn for a moment to the story of the Imperial
city, which, since the appearance of the Bakufu upon the scene, has
occupied a very subordinate place in these pages, as it did in fact.
Not that there was any outward or visible sign of diminishing
importance. All the old administrative machinery remained operative,
the old codes of etiquette continued to claim strict observance, and
the old functions of government were discharged. But only the shadow
of authority existed at Kyoto; the substance had passed effectually
to Kamakura. As for the throne, its chiefly remarkable feature was
the brevity of its occupation by successive sovereigns:
Order of Succession Name Date
77th Sovereign Go-Shirakawa 1156-1158
78th " Nijo 1159-1166
79th " Rokuju 1166-1168
80th " Takakura 1169-1180
81st " Antoku 1181-1183
82nd " Go-Toba 1184-1198
83rd " Tsuchimikado 1199-1210
84th " Juntoku 1211-1221
85th " Chukyo 1221
86th " Go-Horikawa 1221-1232
87th " Shijo 1233-1242
88th " Go-Saga 1243-1246
Here are seen twelve consecutive Emperors whose united reigns covered
a period of ninety-one years, being an average of seven and one-half
years, approximately. It has been shown that Go-Horikawa received the
purple practically from the hands of the Hojo in the sequel of the
Shokyu disturbance, and the same is true of Go-Saga, he having been
nominated from Kamakura in preference to a son of Juntoku, whose
complicity in that disturbance had been notorious. Hence Go-Saga's
attitude towards Kamakura was always one of deference, increased by
the fact that his eldest son, Munetaka, went to Kamakura as shogun,
in 1252. Vacating the throne in 1246, he named his second son,
Go-Fukakusa, to succeed; and his third, Kameyama, to be Prince
Imperial. The former was only three years old when (1246) he became
nominal sovereign, and, after a reign of thirteen years, he was
compelled (1259) to make way for his father's favourite, Kameyama,
who reigned from 1259 to 1274.
To understand what followed, a short genealogical table will assist:
88th Sovereign, Go-Saga (1243-1246)
|
+--------------+-------------+
| |
89th, Go-Fukakusa (1246-1259) 90th, Kameyama (1259-1274)
| |
92nd, Fushimi (1287-1298) 91st, Go-Uda (1274-1287)
| |
+-----+----+ +-----+-----+
| | | |
93rd, 95th, 94th, 96th,
Go-Fushimi Hanazono Go-Nijo Go-Daigo
(1298-1301) (1307-1318) (1301-1307) (1318-1339)
| | | |
+-----+----+ +-----+-----+
| |
Jimyo-in family Daikagu-ji Family
(called afterwards Hoku-cho, (called afterwards Nan-cho,
or the Northern Court) or the Southern Court)
The cloistered Emperor, Go-Saga, abdicating after a reign of four
years, conducted the administration according to the camera system
during twenty-six years. It will be observed from the above table
that he essayed to hold the balance equally between the families of
his two sons, the occupant of the throne being chosen from each
alternately. But everything goes to show that he favoured the
Kameyama branch. Like Go-Toba, he cherished the hope of seeing the
Imperial Court released from the Bakufu shackles, and to that end the
alert, enterprising Kameyama seemed better suited than the dull,
resourceless Takakura, just as in Go-Toba's eyes Juntoku had appeared
preferable to Tsuchimikado.
Dying in 1272, Go-Saga left a will with injunctions that it should be
opened in fifty days. It contained provisions destined to have
disastrous consequences. One clause entrusted to the Bakufu the duty
of deciding whether the administrative power should be placed in the
hands of the cloistered Emperor, Go-Fukakusa, or in those of the
reigning sovereign, Kameyama. Another provided that a very large
property, known as the Chokodo estates, should be inherited by the
monarch thus deposed from authority; while a comparatively small
bequest went to the depository of power. In framing this curious
instrument, Go-Saga doubtless designed to gild the pill of permanent
exclusion from the seats of power, believing confidently that the
Imperial succession would be secured to Kameyama and his direct
descendants. This anticipation proved correct. The Bakufu had
recourse to a Court lady to determine the trend of the deceased
sovereign's wishes, and the result was that Kameyama triumphed.
In the normal order of things the cloistered Emperor Go-Fukakusa
would have succeeded to the administrative place occupied by Go-Saga,
and a large body of courtiers, whose chances of promotion and
emolument depended upon that arrangement, bitterly resented the
innovation. The palace became divided into two parties, the Naiho
(interior section) and the Inho (camera section), a division which
grew more accentuated when Kameyama's son ascended the throne as
Go-Uda, in 1274. Go-Fukakusa declared that he would leave his palace
and enter a monastery were such a wrong done to his children.
Thereupon Kameyama--now cloistered Emperor--submitted the matter to
the Bakufu, who, after grave deliberation, decided that Go-Fukakusa's
son should be named Crown Prince and should reign in succession to
Go-Uda. This ruler is known in history as Fushimi.
Shortly after his accession a sensational event occurred. A bandit
made his way during the night into the palace and seizing one of the
court ladies, ordered her to disclose the Emperor's whereabouts. The
sagacious woman misdirected him, and then hastened to inform the
sovereign, who disguised himself as a female and escaped. Arrested by
the guards, the bandit committed suicide with a sword which proved to
be a precious heirloom of the Sanjo family. Sanjo Sanemori, a former
councillor of State, was arrested on suspicion, but his examination
disclosed nothing. Then a grand councillor (dainagori) charged the
cloistered Emperor, Kameyama, with being privy to the attempt, and
Fushimi showed a disposition to credit the charge. Kameyama, however,
conveyed to the Bakufu a solemn oath of innocence, with which Fushimi
was fain to be ostensibly content. But his Majesty remained
unconvinced at heart. He sent to Kamakura a secret envoy with
instructions to attribute to Kameyama an abiding desire to avenge the
wrongs of Go-Toba and wipe out the Shokyu humiliation. This vengeful
mood might find practical expression at anytime, and Fushimi, warned
the Bakufu to be on their guard. "As for me," he concluded, "I leave
my descendants entirely in the hands of the Hojo. With Kamakura we
stand or fall."
How much of this was sincere, how much diplomatic, it is not possible
to determine. In Kamakura, however, it found credence. Sadatoki, then
regent (shikken), took prompt measures to have Fushimi's son
proclaimed Prince Imperial, and, in 1298, he was enthroned as
Go-Fushimi. This evoked an indignant protest from the then cloistered
Emperor, Go-Uda, and after some consideration the Kamakura regent,
Sadatoki, suggested--"directed" would perhaps be a more correct form
of speech--that thenceforth the succession to the throne should
alternate between the two families descended from Go-Fukakusa and
Kameyama, the length of a reign being limited to ten years.
Nominally, this arrangement was a mark of deference to the testament
of Go-Saga, but in reality it was an astute device to weaken the
authority of the Court by dividing it into rival factions. Kamakura's
fiat received peaceful acquiescence at first. Go-Uda's eldest son
took the sceptre in 1301, under the name of Go-Nijo, and, after seven
years, he was succeeded by Fushimi's son, Hanazono, who, in twelve
years, made way for Go-Uda's second son, Go-Daigo.
The descendants of Kameyama were called the "Daigaku-ji family," and
the descendants of Go-Fukakusa received the name of the "Jimyo-in
family." When a member of the latter occupied the throne, the Court
enjoyed opulence, owing to its possession of the extensive Chokodo
estates; but when the sovereign was of the Daigaku-ji line
comparative penury was experienced. There can be little doubt that,
throughout the complications antecedent to this dual system, the
Fushimi princes acted practically as spies for the Bakufu. After all,
the two Imperial families were descended from a common ancestor and
should have shrunk from the disgrace of publishing their rivalries.
It is true, as we shall presently see, that the resulting
complications involved the destruction of the Hojo; but it is also
true that they plunged the nation into a fifty years' war.
THE FIVE REGENT FAMILIES
It has already been related how, by Yoritomo's contrivance, the post
of family--descended from Fujiwara Kanezane--and scions of the Konoe
family--descended from Fujiwara Motomichi. This system was
subsequently extended at the instance of the Hojo. The second and
third sons of Michiiye, grandson of Kanezane, founded the houses of
Nijo and Ichijo, respectively; while Kanehira, the second of two
grandsons of Motomichi, established the house of Takatsukasa. These
five families--Konoe, Kujo, Nijo, Ichijo, and Takatsukasa--were
collectively called Go-sekke (the Five Regent Houses) in recognition
of the fact that the regent in Kyoto was supposed to be taken from
them in succession. The arrangement led to frequent strife with
resulting weakness, thus excellently achieving the purpose of its
contrivers, the Hojo.
THE FIRST MONGOL INVASION
The rule of the Hojo synchronized with two events of prime importance
the invasion of Japan by a Mongolian army, first in 1274, and
subsequently in 1281. Early in the twelfth century, the Emperor of
China, which was then under the sway of the Sung dynasty, invited the
Golden Tatars to deal with the Khitan Tatars, who held Manchuria, and
who, in spite of heavy tribute paid annually by the Sung Court,
continually raided northeastern China. The Golden Tatars responded to
the invitation by not only expelling the Khitans but also taking
their place in Manchuria and subsequently overrunning China, where
they established a dynasty of their own from 1115 to 1234.
These struggles and dynastic changes did not sensibly affect Japan.
Her intercourse with the Asiatic continent in those ages was confined
mainly to an interchange of visits by Buddhist priests, to industrial
enterprise, and to a fitful exchange of commodities. It does not
appear that any branch of the Tatars concerned themselves practically
about Japan or the Japanese. Ultimately, however, in the first part
of the thirteenth century, the Mongols began to sweep down on the
Middle Kingdom under the leadership of Jenghiz Khan. They crushed the
Golden Tatars, transferred (1264) the Mongol capital from central
Asia to Peking (Cambaluc), and, in 1279, under Kublai, completely
conquered China. Nearly thirty years before the transfer of the
capital to Peking, the Mongols invaded the Korean peninsula, and
brought it completely under their sway in 1263, receiving the final
submission of the kingdom of Koma, which alone had offered any
stubborn resistance.
It is probable that Kublai's ambition, whetted by extensive
conquests, would have turned in the direction of Japan sooner or
later, but tradition indicates that the idea of obtaining the homage
of the Island Empire was suggested to the great Khan by a Korean
traveller in 1265. Kublai immediately acted on the suggestion. He
sent an embassy by way of Korea, ordering the Koma sovereign to make
arrangements for the transport of the envoys and to re-enforce them
with a Korean colleague. A tempest interrupted this essay, and it was
not repeated until 1268, when the Khan's messengers, accompanied by a
Korean suite, crossed safely to Chikuzen and delivered to the
Dazai-fu a letter from Kublai with a covering despatch from the
Korean King. The Korean sovereign's despatch was plainly inspired by
a desire to avert responsibility from himself. He explained that in
transporting the embassy he acted unavoidably, but that, in sending
it, the Khan was not actuated by any hostile feeling, his sole
purpose being to include Japan in the circle of his friendly
tributaries.
In short, the Koma prince--he no longer could properly be called a
monarch--would have been only too pleased to see Japan pass under the
Mongol yoke as his own kingdom had already done. Kublai's letter,
however, though not deliberately arrogant, could not be construed in
any sense except as a summons to send tribute-bearing envoys to
Peking. He called himself "Emperor" and addressed the Japanese ruler
as "King;" instanced, for fitting example, the relation between China
and Korea, which he described at once as that of lord and vassal and
that of parent and child, and predicated that refusal of intercourse
would "lead to war."
The Japanese interpreted this to be an offer of suzerainty or
subjugation. Two courses were advocated; one by Kyoto, the other by
Kamakura. The former favoured a policy of conciliation and delay; the
latter, an attitude of contemptuous silence. Kamakura, of course,
triumphed. After six months' retention the envoys were sent away
without so much as a written acknowledgment. The records contain
nothing to show whether this bold course on the part of the Bakufu
had its origin in ignorance of the Mongol's might or in a conviction
of the bushi's fighting superiority. Probably both factors were
operative; for Japan's knowledge of Jenghiz and his resources reached
her chiefly through religious channels, and the fact that Koreans
were associated with Mongols in the mission must have tended to lower
the affair in her estimation. Further, the Japanese had been taught
by experience the immense difficulties of conducting oversea
campaigns, and if they understood anything about the Mongols, it
should have been the essentially non-maritime character of the
mid-Asian conquerors.
By Kublai himself that defect was well appreciated. He saw that to
carry a body of troops to Japan, the seagoing resources of the
Koreans must be requisitioned, and on the bootless return of his
first embassy, he immediately issued orders to the Koma King to build
one thousand ships and mobilize forty thousand troops. In vain the
recipient of these orders pleaded inability to execute them. The Khan
insisted, and supplemented his first command with instructions that
agricultural operations should be undertaken on a large scale in the
peninsula to supply food for the projected army of invasion.
Meanwhile he despatched embassy after embassy to Japan, evidently
being desirous of carrying his point by persuasion rather than by
force. The envoys invariably returned re infecta. On one occasion
(1269), a Korean vessel carried off two Japanese from Tsushima and
sent them to Peking. There, Kublai treated them kindly, showed them
his palace as well as a parade of his troops, and sent them home to
tell what they had seen. But the Japanese remained obdurate, and
finally the Khan sent an ultimatum, to which Tokimune, the Hojo
regent, replied by dismissing the envoys forthwith.
War was now inevitable. Kublai massed 25,000 Mongol braves in Korea,
supplemented them with 15,000 Korean troops, and embarking them in a
flotilla of 900 vessels manned by 8000 Koreans, launched this paltry
army against Japan in November, 1274. The armada began by attacking
Tsushima and Iki, islands lying in the strait that separates the
Korean peninsula from Japan. In Tsushima, the governor, So Sukekuni,*
could not muster more than two hundred bushi. But these two hundred
fought to the death, as did also the still smaller garrison of Iki.
Before the passage of the narrow strait was achieved, the invaders
must have lost something of their faith in the whole enterprise. On
November 20th, they landed at Hako-zaki Gulf in the province of
Chikuzen There they were immediately assailed by the troops of five
Kyushu chieftains. What force the latter represented there is no
record, but they were certainly less numerous than the enemy.
Moreover, the Yuan army possessed a greatly superior tactical system.
By a Japanese bushi the battle-field was regarded as an arena for the
display of individual prowess, not of combined force. The Mongols, on
the contrary, fought in solid co-operation, their movements directed
by sound of drum from some eminence where the commander-in-chief
watched the progress of the fight. If a Japanese approached to defy
one of them to single combat, they enveloped and slew him. Further,
at close quarters they used light arms dipped in poison, and for
long-range purposes they had powerful crossbows, which quite
outclassed the Japanese weapons. They were equipped also with
explosives which they fired from metal tubes, inflicting heavy loss
on the Japanese, who were demoralized by such an unwonted weapon.
Finally, they were incomparable horsemen, and in the early encounters
they put the Japanese cavalry out of action by raising with drums and
gongs a din that terrified the latter's horses. But, in spite of all
these disadvantages, the Japanese fought stubbornly. Whenever they
got within striking distance of the foe, they struck desperately, and
towards evening they were able to retire in good order into cover
"behind the primitive fortifications of Mizuki raised for Tenchi
Tenno by Korean engineers six centuries before."
*Grandson of Taira no Tomomori, admiral of the Hei fleet in the
battle of Dan-no-ura.
ENGRAVING: REPULSE OF THE MONGOL INVADERS (From a scroll painting in
possession of the Imperial Household)
That night the west coast of Kyushu was menaced by one of those
fierce gales that rage from time to time in sub-tropical zones. The
Korean pilots knew that their ships could find safety in the open sea
only. But what was to be done with the troops which had debarked? Had
their commanders seen any certain hope of victory, they would not
have hesitated to part temporarily from the ships. The day's
fighting, however, appears to have inspired a new estimate of the
bushi's combatant qualities. It was decided to embark the Yuan forces
and start out to sea. For the purpose of covering this movement, the
Hakozaki shrine and some adjacent hamlets were fired, and when
morning dawned the invaders' flotilla was seen beating out of the
bay. One of their vessels ran aground on Shiga spit at the north of
the haven and several others foundered at sea, so that when a tally
was finally called, 13,200 men did not answer to their names. As to
what the Japanese casualties were, there is no information.
THE SECOND MONGOL INVASION
Of course Kublai did not acknowledge this as a defeat at the hands of
the Japanese. On the contrary, he seems to have imagined that the
fight had struck terror into the hearts of the islanders by
disclosing their faulty tactics and inferior weapons. He therefore
sent another embassy, which was charged to summon the King of Japan
to Peking, there to do obeisance to the Yuan Emperor. Kamakura's
answer was to decapitate the five leaders of the mission and to
pillory their heads outside the city. Nothing, indeed, is more
remarkable than the calm confidence shown at this crisis by the
Bakufu regent, Tokimune. His country's annalists ascribe that mood to
faith in the doctrines of the Zen sect of Buddhism; faith which he
shared with his father, Tokiyori, during the latter's life. The Zen
priests taught an introspective philosophy. They preached that life
springs from not-living, indestructibility from destruction, and that
existence and non-existence are one in reality. No creed could better
inspire a soldier.
It has been suggested that Tokimune was not guided in this matter
solely by religious instincts: he used the Zen-shu bonzes as a
channel for obtaining information about China. Some plausibility is
given to that theory by the fact that he sat, first, at the feet of
Doryu, originally a Chinese priest named Tao Lung, and that on
Doryu's death he invited (1278) from China a famous bonze, Chu Yuan
(Japanese, Sogen), for whose ministrations the afterwards celebrated
temple Yengaku-ji was erected. Sogen himself, when officiating at the
temple of Nengjen, in Wenchow, had barely escaped massacre at the
hands of the Mongols, and he may not have been averse to acting as a
medium of information between China and Kamakura.
Tokimune's religious fervour, however, did not interfere with his
secular preparations. In 1280, he issued an injunction exhorting
local officials and vassals (go-kenin) to compose all their
dissensions and work in unison. There could be no greater crime, the
document declared, then to sacrifice the country's interests on the
altar of personal enmities at a time of national crisis. Loyal
obedience on the part of vassals, and strict impartiality on the side
of high constables--these were the virtues which the safety of the
State demanded, and any neglect to practise them should be punished
with the utmost severity. This injunction was issued in 1280, and
already steps had been taken to construct defensive works at all
places where the Mongols might effect a landing--at Hakozaki Bay in
Kyushu; at Nagato, on the northern side of the Shimonoseki Strait; at
Harima, on the southern shore of the Inland Sea; and at Tsuruga, on
the northwest of the main island. Among these places, Hakozaki and
Nagato were judged to be the most menaced, and special offices, after
the nature of the Kyoto tandai, were established there.
ENGRAVING: HOJO TOKIMUNE
Seven years separated the first invasion from the second. It was not
of deliberate choice that Kublai allowed so long an interval to
elapse. The subjugation of the last supporters of the Sung dynasty in
southern China had engrossed his attention, and with their fall he
acquired new competence to prosecute this expedition to Japan,
because while the Mongolian boats were fit only for plying on inland
waters, the ships of the southern Chinese were large, ocean-going
craft. It was arranged that an army of 100,000 Chinese and Mongols
should embark at a port in Fuhkien opposite the island of Formosa,
and should ultimately form a junction in Tsushima Strait with an
armada of 1000 Korean ships, carrying, in addition to their crews, a
force of 50,000 Mongols and 20,000 Koreans.
But before launching this formidable host, Kublai made a final effort
to compass his end without fighting. In 1280, he sent another embassy
to Japan, announcing the complete overthrow of the Sung dynasty, and
summoning the Island Empire to enter into friendly relations.
Kamakura's answer was to order the execution of the envoys at the
place where they had landed, Hakata in Chikuzen. Nothing now remained
except an appeal to force. A weak point in the Yuan strategy was that
the two armadas were not operated in unison. The Korean fleet sailed
nearly a month before that from China. It would seem that the
tardiness of the latter was not due wholly to its larger dimensions,
but must be attributed in part to its composition. A great portion of
the troops transported from China were not Mongols, but Chinese, who
had been recently fighting against the Yuan, and whose despatch on a
foreign campaign in the service of their victors suggested itself as
a politic measure. These men were probably not averse to delay and
certainly cannot have been very enthusiastic.
In May, 1281, the flotilla from Korea appeared off Tsushima.
Unfortunately, the annals of medieval Japan are singularly reticent
as to the details of battles. There are no materials for constructing
a story of the events that occurred on the Tsushima shores, more than
six centuries ago. We do not even know what force the defenders of
the island mustered. But that they were much more numerous than on
the previous occasion, seven years before, is certain. Already, in
1280, Tokimune had obtained from Buddhist sources information of the
Mongol preparations--preparations so extensive that the felling of
timber to make ships inspired a Chinese poem in which the green hills
were depicted as mourning for their trees--and he would not have
failed to garrison strongly a position so cardinal as the midchannel
island of Tsushima. It was not reduced. The enemy were able to effect
a lodgement, but could not overrun the island or put its defenders to
the sword, as had been done in 1274. The Korean ships remained at
Tsushima awaiting the arrival of the Chinese flotilla. They lost
three thousand men from sickness during this interval, and were
talking of retreat when the van of the southern armada hove in sight.
A junction was effected off the coast of Iki island, and the garrison
of this little place having been destroyed on June 10th, the combined
forces stood over towards Kyushu and landed at various places along
the coast of Chikuzen, making Hakozaki Bay their base.
Such a choice of locality was bad, for it was precisely along the
shores of this bay that the Japanese had erected fortifications. They
were not very formidable fortifications, it is true. The bushi of
these days knew nothing about bastions, curtains, glacis, or cognate
refinements of military engineering. They simply built a stone wall
to block the foe's advance, and did not even adopt the precaution of
protecting their flanks. But neither did they fall into the error of
acting entirely on the defensive. On the contrary, they attacked
alike on shore and at sea. Their boats were much smaller than those
of the invaders, but the advantage in dash and daring was all on the
side of the Japanese. So furious were their onsets, and so deadly was
the execution they wrought with their trenchant swords at close
quarters, that the enemy were fain to lash their ships together and
lay planks between them for purposes of speedy concentration. It is
most improbable that either the Korean or the Chinese elements of the
invading army had any heart for the work, whereas on the side of the
defenders there are records of whole families volunteering to serve
at the front. During fifty-three days the campaign continued; that is
to say, from June 23rd, when the first landing was effected, until
August 14th, when a tornado swept off the face of the sea the main
part of the Yuan armada.
No account has been preserved, either traditionally or historically,
of the incidents or phases of the long fight. We know that the
invaders occupied the island of Hirado and landed in Hizen a strong
force intended to turn the flank of the Hakozaki Bay parapet. We
know, inferentially, that they never succeeded in turning it. We know
that, after nearly two months of incessant combat, the Yuan armies
had made no sensible impression on the Japanese resistance or
established any footing upon Japanese soil. We know that, on August
the 14th and 15th, there burst on the shores of Kyushu a tempest
which shattered nearly the whole of the Chinese flotilla. And we know
that the brunt of the loss fell on the Chinese contingent, some
twelve thousand of whom were made slaves. But no such momentous
chapter of history has ever been traced in rougher outlines. The
annalist is compelled to confine himself to marshalling general
results. It was certainly a stupendous disaster for the Yuan arms.
Yet Kublai was not content; he would have essayed the task again had
not trouble nearer home diverted his attention from Japan. The Island
Empire had thus the honour of being practically the only state in the
Orient that did not present tribute to the all-conquering Mongols.
But, by a strangely wayward fate, these victories over a foreign
invader brought embarrassment to the Hojo rulers rather than renown.
In the first place, there could not be any relaxation of the
extraordinary preparations which such incidents dictated. Kublai's
successor, Timur, lost no time in countermanding all measures for a
renewed attack on Japan, and even adopted the plan of commissioning
Buddhist priests to persuade the Bakufu of China's pacific
intentions. One of these emissaries, Nei-issan (Chinese
pronunciation, Ning I-shan), settled permanently in Japan, and his
holy ministrations as a Zen-shu propagandist won universal respect.
But the Bakufu did not relax their precautions, and for more than a
score of years a heavy burden of expense had to be borne on this
account.
Further, when the wave of invasion broke on the shores of Kyushu, the
Court in Kyoto set the example of appealing to the assistance of
heaven. Prayers were offered, liturgies were chanted, and incense was
burned at many temples and shrines throughout the empire. Several of
the priests did not hesitate to assert that their supplications had
elicited signs and portents indicating supernatural aid. Rich rewards
were bestowed in recognition of these services, whereas, on the
contrary, the recompense given to the soldiers who had fought so
gallantly and doggedly to beat off a foreign foe was comparatively
petty. Means of recompensing them were scant. When Yoritomo overthrew
the Taira, the estates of the latter were divided among his followers
and co-operators. After the Shokyu disturbance, the property of the
Court nobles served a similar purpose. But the repulse of the Mongols
brought no access of wealth to the victors, and for the first time
military merit had to go unrequited while substantial grants were
made to the servants of religion. The Bakufu, fully conscious of this
dangerous discrepancy, saw no resource except to order that strict
surveys should be made of many of the great estates, with a view to
their delimitation and reduction, if possible. This, however, was a
slow progress, and the umbrage that it caused was more than
commensurate with the results that accrued. Thus, to the Bakufu the
consequences of a war which should have strengthened allegiance and
gratitude were, on the contrary, injurious and weakening.
ENGRAVING: FIVE STRING BIWA (JAPANESE MANDOLIN)
ENGRAVING: KOTO, 13-STRINGED HORIZONTAL HARP