THE EPOCH OF THE GEN AND THE HEI (Continued)
OPENING OF THE CONFLICT
WHEN, after the great struggle of 1160, Yoritomo, the eldest of
Yoshitomo's surviving sons, fell into the hands of Taira Munekiyo and
was carried by the latter to Kyoto, for execution, as all supposed,
and as would have been in strict accord with the canons of the time,
the lad, then in his fourteenth year, won the sympathy of Munekiyo by
his nobly calm demeanour in the presence of death, and still more by
answering, when asked whether he did not wish to live, "Yes, since I
alone remain to pray for the memories of my father and my elder
brothers." Munekiyo then determined to save the boy if possible, and
he succeeded through the co-operation of Kiyomori's step-mother, whom
he persuaded that her own son, lost in his infancy, would have grown
up to resemble closely Yoritomo.
It was much to the credit of Kiyomori's heart but little to that of
his head that he listened to such a plea, and historians have further
censured his want of sagacity in choosing Izu for Yoritomo's place of
exile, seeing that the eastern regions were infested by Minamoto
kinsmen and partisans. But Kiyomori did not act blindly. He placed
Yoritomo in the keeping of two trusted wardens whose manors were
practically conterminous in the valley of the Kano stream on the
immediate west of Hakone Pass. These wardens were a Fujiwara, Ito
Sukechika, and a Taira, who, taking the name Hojo from the locality
of his manor, called himself Hojo Tokimasa. The dispositions of these
two men did not agree with the suggestions of their lineage.
Sukechika might have been expected to sympathize with his ward in
consideration of the sufferings of the Fujiwara at Kiyomori's hands.
Tokimasa, as a Taira, should have been wholly antipathetic. Yet had
Tokimasa shared Sukechika's mood, the Minamoto's sun would never have
risen over the Kwanto.
The explanation is that Tokimasa belonged to a large group of
provincial Taira who were at once discontented because their claims
to promotion had been ignored, and deeply resentful of indignities
and ridicule to which their rustic manners and customs had exposed
them at the hands of their upstart kinsmen in Kyoto. Moreover, it is
not extravagant to suppose, in view of the extraordinary abilities
subsequently shown by Tokimasa, that he presaged the instability of
the Taira edifice long before any ominous symptoms became outwardly
visible. At any rate, while remaining Yoritomo's ostensible warden,
he became his confidant and abettor.
This did not happen immediately, however. Yoritomo was placed
originally under Sukechika's care, and during the latter's absence in
Kyoto a liaison was established between his daughter and the Minamoto
captive, with the result that a son was born. Sukechika, on his
return, caused the child to be thrown into a cataract, married its
mother to Ema Kotaro, and swore to have the life of his ward. But
Yoritomo, warned of what was pending, effected his escape to
Tokimasa's manor. It is recorded that on the way thither he prayed at
the shrine of Hachiman, the tutelary deity of his family: "Grant me
to become sei-i-shogun and to guard the Imperial Court. Or, if I may
not achieve so much, grant me to become governor of Izu, so that I
may be revenged on Sukechika. Or, if that may not be, grant me
death." With Tokimasa he found security. But here again, though now a
man over thirty, he established relations with Masa, his warden's
eldest daughter. In all Yoritomo's career there is not one instance
of a sacrifice of expediency or ambition on the altar of sentiment or
affection. He was a cold, calculating man. No cruelty shocked him nor
did he shrink from any severity dictated by policy. It is in the last
degree improbable that he risked his political hopes for the sake of
a trivial amour. At any rate the event suggests crafty deliberation
rather than a passing passion. For though Tokimasa simulated
ignorance of the liaison and publicly proceeded with his previous
engagement to wed Masa to Taira Kanetaka, lieutenant-governor of Izu,
he privately connived at her flight and subsequent concealment.
This incident is said to have determined Yoritomo. He disclosed all
his ambitions to Hojo Tokimasa, and found in him an able coadjutor.
Yoritomo now began to open secret communications with several of the
military families in Izu and the neighbouring provinces. In making
these selections and approaches, the Minamoto exile was guided and
assisted by Tokimasa. Confidences were not by any means confined to
men of Minamoto lineage. The kith and kin of the Fujiwara, and even
of the Taira themselves, were drawn into the conspiracy, and although
the struggle finally resolved itself into a duel à l'outrance between
the Taira and the Minamoto, it had no such exclusive character at the
outset.
In May, or June, 1180, the mandate of Prince Mochihito reached
Yoritomo, carried by his uncle, Minamoto Yukiiye, whose figure
thenceforth appears frequently upon the scene. Yoritomo showed the
mandate to Tokimasa, and the two men were taking measures to obey
when they received intelligence of the deaths of Mochihito and
Yorimasa and of the fatal battle on the banks of the Uji.
Yoritomo would probably have deferred conclusive action in such
circumstances had there not reached him from Miyoshi Yasunobu in
Kyoto a warning that the Taira were planning to exterminate the
remnant of the Minamoto and that Yoritomo's name stood first on the
black-list. Moreover, the advisability of taking the field at once
was strongly and incessantly urged by a priest, Mongaku, who, after a
brief acquaintance, had impressed Yoritomo favourably. This bonze had
been the leading figure in an extraordinary romance of real life.
Originally Endo Morito, an officer of the guards in Kyoto, he fell in
love with his cousin, Kesa,* the wife of a comrade called Minamoto
Wataru. His addresses being resolutely rejected, he swore that if
Kesa remained obdurate, he would kill her mother. From this dilemma
the brave woman determined that self-sacrifice offered the only
effective exit. She promised to marry Morito after he had killed her
husband, Wataru; to which end she engaged to ply Wataru with wine
until he fell asleep. She would then wet his head, so that Morito,
entering by an unfastened door and feeling for the damp hair, might
consummate his purpose surely. Morito readily agreed, but Kesa,
having dressed her own hair in male fashion and wet her head, lay
down in her husband's place.
*Generally spoken of as "Kesa Gozen," but the latter word signifies
"lady."
When Morito found that he had killed the object of his passionate
affection, he hastened to confess his crime and invited Wataru to
slay him. But Wataru, sympathizing with his remorse, proposed that
they should both enter religion and pray for the rest of Kesa's
spirit. It is related that one of the acts of penance performed by
Mongaku--the monastic name taken by Morito--was to stand for
twenty-one days under a waterfall in the depth of winter.
Subsequently he devoted himself to collecting funds for
reconstructing the temple of Takao, but his zeal having betrayed him
into a breach of etiquette at the palace of Go-Shirakawa, he was
banished to Izu, where he obtained access to Yoritomo and counselled
him to put his fortune to the test.*
*Tradition says that among the means employed by Mongaku to move
Yoritomo was the exhibition of Yoshitomo's bones.
THE FIRST STAGE OF THE STRUGGLE
The campaign was opened by Hojo Tokimasa on the 8th of September,
1180. He attacked the residence of the lieutenant-governor of Izu,
Taira Kanetaka, burned the mansion, and killed Kanetaka, whose
abortive nuptials with the lady Masa had been celebrated a few months
previously. Yoritomo himself at the head of a force of three hundred
men, crossed the Hakone Pass three days later en route for Sagami,
and encamped at Ishibashi-yama. This first essay of the Minamoto
showed no military caution whatever. It was a march into space.
Yoritomo left in his rear Ito Sukechika, who had slain his infant son
and sworn his own destruction, and he had in his front a Taira force
of three thousand under Oba Kagechika. It is true that many Taira
magnates of the Kwanto were pledged to draw the sword in the Minamoto
cause. They had found the selfish tyranny of Kiyomori not at all to
their taste or their profit. It is also true that the Oba brothers
had fought staunchly on the side of Yoritomo's father, Yoshitomo, in
the Heiji war. Yoritomo may possibly have entertained some hope that
the Oba army would not prove a serious menace.
Whatever the explanation may be, the little Minamoto band were
attacked in front and rear simultaneously during a stormy night. They
suffered a crushing defeat. It seemed as though the white flag* was
to be lowered permanently, ere it had been fully shaken out to the
wind. The remnants of the Minamoto sought shelter in a cryptomeria
grove, where Yoritomo proved himself a powerful bowman. But when he
had tune to take stock of his followers, he found them reduced to six
men. These, at the suggestion of Doi Sanehira, he ordered to scatter
and seek safety in flight, while he himself with Sanehira hid in a
hollow tree. Their hiding-place was discovered by Kajiwara Kagetoki,
a member of the Oba family, whose sympathies were with the Minamoto.
He placed himself before the tree and signalled that the fugitives
had taken another direction. Presently, Oba Kagechika, riding up,
thrust his bow into the hollow tree, and as two pigeons flew out, he
concluded that there was no human being within.
*The Taira flew a red ensign; the Minamoto, a white.
ENGRAVING: MINAMOTO YORITOMO
From the time of this hairbreadth escape, Yoritomo's fortunes rose
rapidly. After some days of concealment among the Hakone mountains,
he reached the shore of Yedo Bay, and crossing from Izu to Awa, was
joined by Tokimasa and others. Manifestoes were then despatched in
all directions, and sympathizers began to flock in. Entering Kazusa,
the Minamoto leader secured the cooperation of Taira Hirotsune and
Chiba Tsunetane, while Tokimasa went to canvass in Kai. In short,
eight provinces of the Kwanto responded like an echo to Yoritomo's
call, and, by the time he had made his circuit of Yedo Bay, some
twenty-five thousand men were marshalled under his standard.
Kamakura, on the seacoast a few miles south of the present Yokohama,
was chosen for headquarters, and one of the first steps taken was to
establish there, on the hill of Tsurugaoka, a grand shrine to
Hachiman, the god of War and tutelary deity of the Minamoto.
Meanwhile, Tokimasa had secured the allegiance of the Takeda family
of Kai, and was about to send a strong force to join Yoritomo's army.
But by this time the Taira were in motion. Kiyomori had despatched a
body of fifty thousand men under Koremori, and Yoritomo had decided
to meet this army on the banks of the Fuji river. It became
necessary, therefore, to remove all potential foes from the Minamoto
rear, and accordingly Hojo Tokimasa received orders to overrun Suruga
and then to direct his movements with a view to concentration on the
Fuji. Thither Yoritomo marched from Kamakura, and by the beginning of
November, 1180, fifty thousand Taira troops were encamped on the
south bank of the river and twenty-seven thousand Minamoto on the
north. A decisive battle must be fought in the space of a few days.
In fact, the 13th of November had been indicated as the probable
date. But the battle was never fought. The officer in command of the
Taira van, Fujiwara no Tadakiyo, laboured under the disadvantage of
being a coward, and the Taira generals, Koremori and Tadamori,
grandson and youngest brother, respectively, of Kiyomori, seem to
have been thrown into a state of nervous prostration by the
unexpected magnitude of the Minamoto's uprising. They were debating,
and had nearly recognized the propriety of falling back without
challenging a combat or venturing their heads further into the
tiger's mouth, when something--a flight of water-birds, a
reconnaissance in force, a rumour, or what not--produced a panic, and
before a blow had been struck, the Taira army was in full retreat for
Kyoto.
YOSHITSUNE
In the Minamoto camp there was some talk of pursuing the fugitive
Taira, and possibly the most rapid results would thus have been
attained. But it was ultimately decided that the allegiance of the
whole Kwanto must be definitely secured before denuding it of troops
for the purpose of a western campaign. This attitude of caution
pointed specially to the provinces of Hitachi and Shimotsuke, where
the powerful Minamoto families of Satake and Nitta, respectively,
looked coldly upon the cause of their kinsman, Yoritomo. Therefore
the army was withdrawn to a more convenient position on the Kiso
River, and steps, ultimately successful, were taken to win over the
Nitta and the Satake.
It was at this time that there arrived in Yoritomo's camp a youth of
twenty-one with about a score of followers. Of medium stature and of
frame more remarkable for grace than for thews, he attracted
attention chiefly by his piercing eyes and by the dignified
intelligence of his countenance. This was Yoshitsune, the youngest
son of Yoshitomo. His life, as already stated, had been saved in the
Heiji disturbance, first, by the intrepidity of his mother, Tokiwa,
and, afterwards, by the impression her dazzling beauty produced upon
the Taira leader. Placed in the monastery of Kurama, as stipulated by
Kiyomori, Yoshitsune had no sooner learned to think than he became
inspired with an absorbing desire to restore the fortunes of his
family. Tradition has surrounded the early days of this, the future
Bayard of Japan, with many romantic legends, among which it is
difficult to distinguish the true from the false. What is certain,
however, is that at the age of fifteen he managed to effect his
escape to the north of Japan. The agent of his flight was an
iron-merchant who habitually visited the monastery on matters of
business, and whose dealings took him occasionally to Mutsu.
At the time of Yoshitsune's novitiate in the Kurama temple, the
political power in Japan may be said to have been divided between the
Taira, the provincial Minamoto, the Buddhist priests, and the
Fujiwara, and of the last the only branch that had suffered no
eclipse during the storms of Hogen and Heiji had been the Fujiwara of
Mutsu. It has been shown in the story of the Three Years' War, and
specially in the paragraph entitled "The Fujiwara of the North," that
the troops of Fujiwara Kiyohira and Minamoto Yoshiiye had fought side
by side, and that, after the war, Kiyohira succeeded to the six
districts of Mutsu, which constituted the largest estate in the hands
of any one Japanese noble. That estate was in the possession of
Hidehira, grandson of Kiyohira, at the time when the Minamoto family
suffered its heavy reverses. Yoshitsune expected, therefore, that at
least an asylum would be assured, could he find his way to Mutsu. He
was not mistaken. Hidehira received him with all hospitality, and as
Mutsu was practically beyond the control of Kyoto, the Minamoto
fugitive could lead there the life of a bushi, and openly study
everything pertaining to military art. He made such excellent use of
these opportunities that, by the time the Minamoto standard was
raised anew in Izu, Yoshitsune had earned the reputation of being the
best swordsman in the whole of northern Japan.
This was the stripling who rode into Yoritomo's camp on a November
day in the year 1180. The brothers had never previously seen each
other's faces, and their meeting in such circumstances was a dramatic
event. Among Yoshitsune's score of followers there were several who
subsequently earned undying fame, but one deserves special mention
here. Benkei, the giant halberdier, had turned his back upon the
priesthood, and, becoming a free lance, conceived the ambition of
forcibly collecting a thousand swords from their wearers. He wielded
the halberd with extraordinary skill, and such a huge weapon in the
hand of a man with seven feet of stalwart stature constituted a
menace before which a solitary wayfarer did not hesitate to surrender
his sword. One evening, Benkei observed an armed acolyte approaching
the Gojo bridge in Kyoto. The acolyte was Yoshitsune, and the time,
the eve of his departure for Mutsu. Benkei made light of disarming a
lad of tender years and seemingly slender strength. But already in
his acolyte days Yoshitsune had studied swordsmanship, and he
supplemented his knowledge by activity almost supernatural. The giant
Benkei soon found himself praying for life and swearing allegiance to
his boy conqueror, an oath which he kept so faithfully as to become
the type of soldierly fidelity for all subsequent generations of his
countrymen.
KISO YOSHINAKA
Looking at the map of central Japan, it is seen that the seven
provinces of Suruga, Izu, Awa, Kai, Sagami, Musashi, and Kazusa are
grouped approximately in the shape of a Japanese fan (uchiwa), having
Izu for the handle. Along the Pacific coast, eastward of this fan,
lie the provinces of Shimosa and Hitachi, where the Nitta and the
Satake, respectively, gave employment for some time to the diplomatic
and military resources of the Minamoto. Running inland from the
circumference of the fan are Shinano and Kotsuke, in which two
provinces, also, a powerful Minamoto resurrection synchronized with,
but was independent of, the Yoritomo movement.
The hero of the Shinano-Kotsuke drama was Minamoto no Yoshinaka,
commonly called Kiso Yoshinaka, because his youth was passed among
the mountains where the Kiso River has its source. In the year 1155,
Yoshitomo's eldest son, Yoshihira,* was sent to Musashi to fight
against his uncle, Yoshikata. The latter fell, and his son,
Yoshinaka, a baby of two, was handed to Saito Sanemori to be
executed; but the latter sent the child to Shinano, where it was
brought up by Nakahara Kaneto, the husband of its nurse. Yoshinaka
attained an immense stature as well as signal skill in archery and
horsemanship. Like Yoritomo and Yoshitsune, he brooded much on the
evil fortunes of the Minamoto, and paid frequent visits to Kyoto to
observe the course of events. In the year 1180, the mandate of Prince
Mochihito reached him, and learning that Yoritomo had taken the
field, he gathered a force in Shinano. Between the two leaders there
could be no final forgetfulness of the fact that Yoritomo's brother
had killed Yoshinaka's father, and had ordered the slaying of
Yoshinaka himself. But this evil memory did not obtrude itself at the
outset. They worked independently. Yoshinaka gained a signal victory
over the Taira forces marshalled against him by the governor of
Shinano, and pushing thence eastward into Kotsuke, obtained the
allegiance of the Ashikaga of Shimotsuke and of the Takeda of Kai.
Thus, the year 1180 closed upon a disastrous state of affairs for the
Taira, no less than ten provinces in the east having fallen
practically under Minamoto sway.
*This Yoshihira was a giant in stature. He shares with Tametomo the
fame of having exhibited the greatest prowess in the Hogen and Heiji
struggles. It was he who offered to attack Kyoto from Kumano a
measure which, in all probability, would have reversed the result of
the Heiji war.
CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN
Kiyomori expired in March, 1181, as already related. His last behest,
that the head of Yoritomo should be laid on his grave, nerved his
successors to fresh efforts. But the stars in their courses seemed to
be fighting against the Taira. Kiyomori's son, Munemori, upon whom
devolved the direction of the great clan's affairs, was wholly
incompetent for such a trust. One gleam of sunshine, however,
illumined the fortunes of the Heike. Two months after Kiyomori's
death, a Taira army under Shigehira attacked Yukiiye, Yoritomo's
uncle, who had pushed westward as far as Owari. This Yukiiye never
showed any qualities of generalship. He was repeatedly defeated, the
only redeeming feature of his campaigns being that he himself always
escaped destruction. On this occasion he was driven out of Owari and
forced to retire within the confines of the Kwanto.
But now the home provinces and the west fell into the horrors of
famine and pestilence, as described above; and in such circumstances
to place armies in the field and to maintain them there became
impossible. The Taira had to desist from all warlike enterprises
until the summer of 1182, when a great effort was made to crush the
rapidly growing power of the Minamoto. Commissions of provincial
governor were sent to Jo no Nagashige, a puissant Taira magnate of
Echigo; to Taira no Chikafusa, of Etchu, and to Fujiwara Hidehira, of
Mutsu, who were all ordered to attack Yoritomo and Yoshinaka.
Hidehira made no response, but Nagashige set in motion against
Yoshinaka a strong force, swelled by a contingent from Kyoto under
Michimori. The results were signal defeat for the Taira and the
carrying of the white flag by Yoshinaka into Echigo, Etchu, Noto, and
Kaga.
DISSENSIONS AMONG THE MINAMOTO
Meanwhile discord had declared itself between Yoritomo and Yoshinaka.
It has been shown that the records of the two families afforded no
basis of mutual confidence, and it has also been shown that the
Takeda clan of Kai province were among the earliest adherents of the
Minamoto cause. In view of Yoshinaka's brilliant successes, Takeda
Nobumitsu proposed a marriage between his daughter and Yoshinaka's
son, Yoshitaka. This union was declined by Yoshinaka, whereupon
Nobumitsu suggested to Yoritomo that Yoshinaka's real purpose was to
ally his house with the Taira by marriage. Whether Nobumitsu believed
this, or whether his idea had its origin in pique, history does not
indicate. But there can be no hesitation in concluding that a rupture
between the two Minamoto chiefs was presaged by Yoritomo's entourage,
who judged that two Richmonds could not remain permanently in the
field.
Things gradually shaped themselves in accordance with that forecast.
The malcontents in Yoritomo's camp or his discomfited opponents began
to transfer their allegiance to Yoshinaka; a tendency which
culminated when Yoritomo's uncle, Yukiiye, taking umbrage because a
provincial governorship was not given to him, rode off at the head of
a thousand cavalry to join Yoshinaka. The reception given by
Yoshinaka to these deserters was in itself sufficient to suggest
doubts of his motives. Early in the year 1183, Yoritomo sent a force
into Shinano with orders to exterminate Yoshinaka. But the latter
declined the combat. Quoting a popular saying that the worst enemies
of the Minamoto were their own dissensions, he directed his troops to
withdraw into Echigo, leaving to Yoritomo a free hand in Shinano.
When this was reported to Yoritomo, he recalled his troops from
Shinano, and asked Yoshinaka to send a hostage. Yoshinaka replied by
sending his son Yoshitaka, the same youth to whom Takeda Nobumitsu
had proposed to marry his daughter. He was now wedded to Yoritomo's
daughter, and the two Minamoto chiefs seemed to have been effectually
reconciled.
ADVANCE OF YOSHINAKA ON KYOTO
Yoshinaka's desire to avoid conflict with Yoritomo had been partly
due to the fact that the Taira leaders were known to be just then
straining every nerve to beat back the westward-rolling tide of
Minamoto conquest. They had massed all their available forces in
Echizen, and at that supreme moment Yoritomo's active hostility would
have completely marred Yoshinaka's great opportunity. In May, 1183,
this decisive phase of the contest was opened; Koremori, Tamemori,
and Tomonori being in supreme command of the Taira troops, which are
said to have mustered one hundred thousand strong. At first, things
fared badly with the Minamoto. They lost an important fortress at
Hiuchi-yama, and Yukiiye was driven from Kaga into Noto. But when the
main army of the Minamoto came into action, the complexion of affairs
changed at once. In a great battle fought at Tonami-yama in Echizen,
Yoshinaka won a signal victory by the manoeuvre of launching at the
Taira a herd of oxen having torches fastened to their horns.
Thousands of the Taira perished, including many leaders.
Other victories at Kurikara and Shinowara opened the road to Kyoto.
Yoshinaka pushed on and, in August, reached Hiei-zan; while Yukiiye,
the pressure on whose front in Noto had been relieved, moved towards
Yamato; Minamoto no Yukitsuna occupied Settsu and Kawachi, and
Ashikaga Yoshikiyo advanced to Tamba. Thus, the capital lay at the
mercy of Yoshinaka's armies. The latter stages of the Minamoto march
had been unopposed. Munemori, after a vain attempt to secure the
alliance of the Hiei-zan monks, had recalled his generals and decided
to retire westward, abandoning Kyoto. He would have taken with him
the cloistered Emperor, but Go-Shirakawa secretly made his way to
Hiei-zan and placed himself under the protection of Yoshinaka,
rejoicing at the opportunity to shake off the Taira yoke.
RETREAT OF THE TAIRA
On August 14, 1183, the evacuation of Kyoto took place. Munemori,
refusing to listen to the counsels of the more resolute among his
officers, applied the torch to the Taira mansions at northern and
southern Rokuhara, and, taking with him the Emperor Antoku, then in
his sixth year, his Majesty's younger brother, and their mother,
together with the regalia--the mirror, the sword, and the
gem--retired westward, followed by the whole remnant of his clan.
Arrived at Fukuhara, they devoted a night to praying, making sacred
music, and reading Sutras at Kiyomori's tomb, whereafter they set
fire to all the Taira palaces, mansions, and official buildings, and
embarked for the Dazai-fu in Chikuzen. They reckoned on the
allegiance of the whole of Kyushu and of at least one-half of
Shikoku.
EIGHTY-SECOND SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR GO-TOBA (A.D. 1184-1198)
The Taira leaders having carried off the Emperor Antoku, there was no
actually reigning sovereign in Kyoto, whither the cloistered Emperor
now returned, an imposing guard of honour being furnished by
Yoshinaka. Go-Shirakawa therefore resumed the administration of State
affairs, Yoshinaka being given the privilege of access to the
Presence and entrusted with the duty of guarding the capital. The
distribution of rewards occupied attention in the first place. Out of
the five hundred manors of the Taira, one hundred and fifty were
given to Yoshinaka and Yukiiye, and over two hundred prominent Taira
officials were stripped of their posts and their Court ranks.
Yoritomo received more gracious treatment than Yoshinaka, although
the Kamakura chief could not yet venture to absent himself from the
Kwanto for the purpose of paying his respects at Court. For the rest,
in spite of Yoshinaka's brilliant success, he was granted only the
fifth official rank and the governorship of the province of Iyo.
These things could not fail to engender some discontent, and
presently a much graver cause for dissatisfaction presented itself.
Fujiwara Kanezane, minister of the Right, memorialized the Court in
the sense that, as Antoku had left the capital, another occupant to
the throne should be appointed, in spite of the absence of the
regalia. He pointed out that a precedent for dispensing with these
tokens of Imperialism had been furnished in the case of the Emperor
Keitai (507-531). No valid reason existed for such a precipitate
step. Antoku had not abdicated. His will had not been consulted at
all by the Taira when they carried him off; nor would the will of a
child of six have possessed any validity in such a matter. It is
plain that the proposal made by the minister of the Right had for
motive the convenience of the Minamoto, whose cause lacked legitimacy
so long as the sovereign and the regalia were in the camp of the
Taira.
But the minister's advice had a disastrous sequel. Yoshinaka was
resolutely bent on securing the succession for the son of Prince
Mochihito, who had been killed in the Yorimasa emeute. It was
practically to Mochihito that the Court owed its rescue from the
Taira tyranny, and his son--now a youth of seventeen, known as Prince
Hokuriku, because he had founded an asylum at a monastery in
Hokuriku-do after his father's death--had been conducted to Kyoto by
Yoshinaka, under a promise to secure the succession for him. But
Go-Shirakawa would not pay any attention to these representations. He
held that Prince Hokuriku was ineligible, since his father had been
born out of wedlock, and since the prince himself had taken the
tonsure; the truth being that the ex-Emperor had determined to obtain
the crown for one of his own grandsons, younger brothers of Antoku.
It is said that his Majesty's manner of choosing between the two lads
was most capricious. He had them brought into his presence, whereupon
the elder began to cry, the younger to laugh, and Go-Shirakawa at
once selected the latter, who thenceforth became the Emperor Go-Toba.
FALL OF YOSHINAKA
Yoshinaka's fortunes began to ebb from the time of his failure to
obtain the nomination of Prince Hokuriku. A force despatched to
Bitchu with the object of arresting the abduction of Antoku and
recovering possession of the regalia, had the misfortune to be
confronted by Taira no Noritsune, one of the stoutest warriors on the
side of the Heike. Ashikaga Yoshikiyo, who commanded the pursuers,
was killed, and his men were driven back pele-mele. This event
impaired the prestige of Yoshinaka's troops, while he himself and his
officers found that their rustic ways and illiterate education
exposed them constantly to the thinly veiled sneers of the dilettanti
and pundits who gave the tone to metropolitan society. The soldiers
resented these insults with increasing roughness and recourse to
violence, so that the coming of Yoritomo began to be much desired.
Go-Shirakawa sent two messages at a brief interval to invite the
Kamakura chief's presence in the capital. Yoritomo replied with a
memorial which won for him golden opinions, but he showed no sign of
visiting Kyoto. His absorbing purpose was to consolidate his base in
the east, and he had already begun to appreciate that the military
and the Imperial capitals should be distinct.
Naturally, when the fact of these pressing invitations to Yoritomo
reached Yoshinaka's ears, he felt some resentment, and this was
reflected in the demeanour of his soldiers, outrages against the
lives and properties of the citizens becoming more and more frequent.
Even the private domains of the cloistered Emperor himself, to say
nothing of the manors of the courtiers, were freely entered and
plundered, so that public indignation reached a high pitch. The
umbrage thus engendered was accentuated by treachery. Driven from
Kyushu, the Taira chiefs had obtained a footing in Shikoku and had
built fortifications at Yashima in Sanuki, which became thenceforth
their headquarters. They had also collected on the opposite coast of
the Inland Sea a following which seemed likely to grow in dimensions,
and, with the idea of checking that result, it was proposed to send
troops to the Sanyo-do under Minamoto Yukiiye, who had been named
governor of Bizen. Taught, however, by experience that disaster was
likely to be the outcome of Yukiiye's generalship, Yoshinaka
interfered to prevent his appointment, and Yukiiye, resenting this
slight, became thenceforth a secret foe of Yoshinaka.
In analyzing the factors that go to the making of this complicated
chapter of Japanese history, a place must be given to Yukiiye. He
seems to have been an unscrupulous schemer. Serving originally under
Yoritomo, who quickly took his measure, he concluded that nothing
substantial was to be gained in that quarter. Therefore, he passed
over to Yoshinaka, who welcomed him, not as an enemy of Yoritomo, but
as a Minamoto. Thenceforth Yukiiye's aim was to cause a collision
between the two cousins and to raise his own house on the ruins of
both. He contributed materially to the former result, but as to the
latter, the sixth year of his appearance upon the stage as Prince
Mochihito's mandate-bearer saw his own head pilloried in Kyoto.
Yoshinaka, however, had too frank a disposition to be suspicious. He
believed until the end that Yukiiye's heart was in the Minamoto
cause. Then, when it became necessary to choose, between taking
stupendous risks in the west or making a timely withdrawal to the
east, he took Yukiiye into his confidence. That was the traitor's
opportunity. He secretly informed the ex-Emperor that Yoshinaka had
planned a retreat to the east, carrying his Majesty with him, and
this information, at a time when the excesses committed by
Yoshinaka's troops had provoked much indignation, induced
Go-Shirakawa to obtain from Hiei-zan and Miidera armed monks to form
a palace-guard under the command of the kebiishi, Taira Tomoyasu, a
declared enemy of Yoshinaka. At once Yoshinaka took a decisive step.
He despatched a force to the palace; seized the persons of
Go-Shirakawa and Go-Toba; removed Motomichi from the regency,
appointing Moroie, a boy of twelve, in his place, and dismissed a
number of Court officials.
In this strait, Go-Shirakawa, whose record is one long series of
undignified manoeuvres to keep his own head above water, applied
himself to placate Yoshinaka while privately relying on Yoritomo. His
Majesty granted to the former the control of all the domains
previously held by the Taira; appointed him to the high office of
sei-i tai-shogun (barbarian-subduing generalissimo), and commissioned
him to attack Yoritomo while, at the same time, the latter was
secretly encouraged to destroy his cousin. At that moment (February,
1184), Yoritomo's two younger brothers, Yoshitsune and Noriyori, were
en route for Kyoto, where they had been ordered to convey the Kwanto
taxes. They had a force of five hundred men only, but these were
quickly transformed into the van of an army of fifty or sixty
thousand, which Yoritomo, with extraordinary expedition, sent from
Kamakura to attack Yoshinaka.
The "Morning Sun shogun" (Asahi-shogun), as Yoshinaka was commonly
called with reference to his brilliant career, now at last saw
himself confronted by the peril which had long disturbed his
thoughts. At a distance of three hundred miles from his own base,
with powerful foes on either flank and in a city whose population was
hostile to him, his situation seemed almost desperate. He took a step
dictated by dire necessity--made overtures to the Taira, asking that
a daughter of the house of Kiyomori be given him for wife. Munemori
refused. The fortunes of the Taira at that moment appeared to be
again in the ascendant. They were once more supreme in Kyushu; the
west of the main island from coast to coast was in their hands; they
had re-established themselves in Fukuhara, and at any moment they
might move against Kyoto. They could afford, therefore, to await the
issue of the conflict pending between the Minamoto cousins, sure that
it must end in disaster for one side and temporary weakness for the
other.
In fact, the situation was almost hopeless for Yoshinaka. There had
not been time to recall the main body of his troops which were
confronting the Taira. All that he could do was to arrest momentarily
the tide of onset by planting handfuls of men to guard the chief
avenues at Uji and Seta where, four years previously, Yorimasa had
died for the Minamoto cause, and Seta, where a long bridge spans the
waters of Lake Biwa as they narrow to form the Setagawa. To the Uji
bridge, Nenoi Yukichika was sent with three hundred men; to the Seta
bridge, Imai Kanehira with five hundred. The names of these men and
of their brothers, Higuchi Kanemitsu and Tate Chikatada, are immortal
in Japanese history. They were the four sons of Nakahara Kaneto, by
whom Yoshinaka had been reared, and their constant attendance on his
person, their splendid devotion to him, and their military prowess
caused people to speak of them as Yoshinaka's Shi-tenno--the four
guardian deities of Buddhist temples. Their sister, Tomoe, is even
more famous. Strong and brave as she was beautiful, she became the
consort of Yoshinaka, with whom she had been brought up, and she
accompanied him in all his campaigns, fighting by his side and
leading a body of troops in all his battles. She was with him when he
made his final retreat and she killed a gigantic warrior, Uchida
Ieyoshi, who attempted to seize her on that occasion. Yoshinaka
compelled her to leave him at the supreme moment, being unwilling
that she should fall into the enemy's hands; and after his death she
became a nun, devoting the rest of her days to prayers for his
spirit.
But it is not to be supposed that Yoshinaka repaid this noble
devotion with equal sincerity. On the contrary, the closing scene of
his career was disfigured by passion for another woman, daughter of
the kwampaku, Fujiwara Motofusa. Attracted by rumours of her beauty
after his arrival in Kyoto, he compelled her to enter his household,
and when news came that the armies of Yoshitsune and Noriyori were
approaching the capital, this great captain, for such he certainly
was, instead of marshalling his forces and making dispositions for
defence, went to bid farewell to the beautiful girl who resided in
his Gojo mansion. Hours of invaluable time passed, and still Asahi
shogun remained by the lady's side. Finally, two of his faithful
comrades, Echigo Chuta and Tsuwata Saburo, seated themselves in front
of the mansion and committed suicide to recall their leader to his
senses. Yoshinaka emerged, but it was too late. He could not muster
more than three hundred men, and in a short time Yoshitsune rode into
the city at the head of a large body of cavalry.
Yoshitsune had approached by way of Uji. He was not at all deterred
by the fact that the enemy had destroyed the bridge. His mounted
bowmen dashed into the river* and crossed it with little loss. A few
hours brought them to Kyoto, where they made small account of the
feeble resistance that Yoshinaka was able to offer. Wounded and with
little more than half a score of followers, Yoshinaka rode off, and
reaching the plain Of Awazu, met Imai Kanehira with the remnant of
his five hundred men who had gallantly resisted Noriyori's army of
thirty thousand. Imai counselled instant flight eastward. In Shinano,
Yoshinaka would find safety and a dominion, while to cover his
retreat, Imai would sacrifice his own life. Such noble deeds were the
normal duty of every true bushi. Yoshinaka galloped away, but, riding
into a marsh, disabled his horse and was shot down. Meanwhile Imai,
in whose quiver there remained only eight arrows, had killed as many
of the pursuing horsemen, and then placing the point of his sword in
his mouth, had thrown himself headlong from his horse. One incident,
shocking but not inconsistent with the canons of the time, remains to
be included in this chapter of Japanese history. It has been related
that Yoshinaka's son, Yoshitaka, was sent by his father to Kamakura
as a hostage, and was married to Yoritomo's daughter. After the
events above related Yoshitaka was put to death at Kamakura,
apparently without Yoritomo's orders, and his widow, when pressed by
her brother to marry again, committed suicide.
*Japanese tradition loves to tell of a contest between Sasaki
Takatsuna and Kajiwara Kagesue as to which should cross the river
first. Kagesue was the son of that Kajiwara who had saved. Yoritomo's
life in the episode of the hollow tree.
BATTLE OF ICHI-NO-TANI
The victory of the armies led by Noriyori and Yoshitsune brought
Kamakura and Fukuhara into direct conflict, and it was speedily
decided that these armies should at once move westward to attack the
Taira. A notable feature of the military operations of that era was
celerity. Less than a month sufficed to mobilize an army of fifty
thousand men and to march it from Kamakura to Kyoto, a distance of
three hundred miles, and within ten days of the death of Yoshinaka
this same army, augmented to seventy-six thousand, began to move
westward from Kyoto (March 19, 1184). The explanation of this
rapidity is furnished, in part, by simplicity of commisariat, and by
the fact that neither artillery nor heavy munitions of war had to be
transported. Every man carried with him a supply of cooked rice,
specially prepared so as to occupy little space while sufficing for
several days' food, and this supply was constantly replenished by
requisitions levied upon the districts traversed. Moreover, every man
carried his own implements of war--bow and arrows, sword, spear, or
halberd--and the footgear consisted of straw sandals which never hurt
the feet, and in which a man could easily march twenty miles a day
continuously.
These remarks apply to all the fighting men of whatever part of
Japan, but as to the Kwanto bushi, their special characteristics are
thus described by a writer of the twelfth century: "Their ponderous
bows require three men or five to bend them. Their quivers, which
match these bows, hold fourteen or fifteen bundles of arrows. They
are very quick in releasing their shafts, and each arrow kills or
wounds two or three foemen, the impact being powerful enough to
pierce two or three thicknesses of armour at a time, and they never
fail to hit the mark. Every daimyo (owner of a great estate) has at
least twenty or thirty of such mounted archers, and even the owner of
a small barren estate has two or three. Their horses are very
excellent, for they are carefully selected, while as yet in pasture,
and then trained after their own peculiar fashion. With five or ten
such excellent mounts each, they go out hunting deer or foxes and
gallop up and down mountains and forests. Trained in these wild
methods, they are all splendid horsemen who know how to ride but
never how to fall. It is the habit of the Kwanto bushi that if in the
field of battle a father be killed, the son will not retreat, or if a
son be slain the father will not yield, but stepping over the dead,
they will fight to the death."*
*Murdoch's History of Japan.
The Taira, as noted above, had by this time largely recovered from
the disasters suffered in their first encounters with Yoshinaka's
forces. In the western provinces of the main island, in Shikoku, and
in Kyushu, scions of the clan had served as governors in former
times, so that ties of close intimacy had been established with the
inhabitants. Since the first flight to Kyushu in August, 1183, their
generals, Shigehira, Michimori, Noritsune, and others had defeated
the forces of Yoshinaka at Mizushima and those of Yukiiye at
Muroyama, so that no less than fourteen provinces of the Sanyo-do and
the Nankai-do owned Taira sway, and by the beginning of 1184 they had
re-occupied the Fukuhara district, establishing themselves at a
position of great natural strength called Ichi-no-tani in the
province of Harima. Their lines extended several miles, over which
space one hundred thousand men were distributed. They lay within a
semi-circle of mountains supposed to be inaccessible from the north;
their camp was washed on the south by the sea where a thousand
war-vessels were assembled; the east flank rested on a forest, and
the west was strongly fortified.
On March 21, 1184, the Kamakura armies delivered their assault on
this position; Noriyori with fifty-six thousand men against the east
flank at Ikuta; Yoshitsune's lieutenants with twenty thousand men
against the west at Suma. Little progress was made. Defence and
attack were equally obstinate, and the advantage of position as well
as of numbers was with the former. But Yoshitsune himself had
foreseen this and had determined that the best, if not the only, hope
of victory lay in delivering an assault by descending the northern
rampart of mountains at Hiyodori Pass. Access from that side being
counted impracticable, no dispositions had been made by the Taira to
guard the defile. Yoshitsune selected for the venture seventy-five
men, among them being Benkei, Hatakeyama Shigetada, and others of his
most trusted comrades. They succeeded in riding down the steep
declivity, and they rushed at the Taira position, setting fire to
everything inflammable.
What ensued is soon told. Taken completely by surprise, the Taira
weakened, and the Minamoto, pouring in at either flank, completed the
rout which had already commenced. Munemori was among the first of the
fugitives. He embarked with the Emperor Antoku and the regalia, and
steered for Yashima, whither he was quickly followed by the remnants
of his force. Shigehira, Kiyomori's fifth son, was taken prisoner.
Michimori, Tadanori, and Atsumori were killed. Several illustrative
incidents marked this great fight. Michimori's wife threw herself
into the sea when she heard of her husband's death. Tomoakira, the
seventeen-year-old son of Tomomori, deliberately sacrificed himself
to save his father, and the latter, describing the incident
subsequently to his brother, Munemori, said with tears: "A son died
to save his father; a father fled, leaving his son to die. Were it
done by another man, I should spit in his face. But I have done it
myself. What will the world call me?" This same Tomomori afterwards
proved himself the greatest general on the Taira side. Okabe
Tadazumi, a Minamoto captain, took the head of Tadanori but could not
identify it. In the lining of the helmet, however, was found a roll
of poems and among them one signed "Tadanori:"
Twilight upon my path,
And for mine inn to-night
The shadow of a tree,
And for mine host, a flower.
This little gem of thought has gleamed on Tadanori's memory through
all the centuries and has brought vicarious fame even to his slayer,
Tadazumi. Still more profoundly is Japanese sympathy moved by the
episode of Taira no Atsumori and Kumagaye Naozane. Atsumori, a
stripling of fifteen, was seized by Naozane, a stalwart warrior on
the Minamoto side. When Naozane tore off the boy's helmet,
preparatory to beheading him, and saw a young face vividly recalling
his own son who had perished early in the fight, he was moved with
compassion and would fain have stayed his hand. To have done so,
however, would merely have been to reserve Atsumori for a crueller
death. He explained his scruples and his sorrows to the boy, who
submitted to his fate with calm courage. But Naozane vowed never to
wield weapon again. He sent Atsumori's head and a flute found on his
person to the youth's father, Tsunemori, and he himself entered the
priesthood, devoting the remaining years of his life to prayers for
the soul of the ill-fated lad. Such incidents do not find a usual
place in the pages of history, but they contribute to the
interpretation of a nation's character.
BATTLE OF YASHIMA
The battle of Ichi-no-tani was not by any means conclusive. It drove
the Taira out of Harima and the four provinces on the immediate west
of the latter, but it did not disturb them in Shikoku or Kyushu, nor
did it in any way cripple the great fleet which gave them a signal
advantage. In these newly won provinces Yoritomo placed military
governors and nominated to these posts Doi Sanehira and Kajiwara
Kagetoki, heroes, respectively, of the cryptomeria forest and the
hollow tree. But this contributed little to the solution of the vital
problem, how to get at the Taira in Shikoku and in Kyushu. Noriyori
returned to Kamakura to consult Yoritomo, but the latter and his
military advisers could not plan anything except the obvious course
of marching an army from Harima westward to the Strait of
Shimonoseki, and thereafter collecting boats to carry it across to
Kyushu. That, however, was plainly defective strategy. It left the
flank of the westward-marching troops constantly exposed to attack
from the coast where the Taira fleet had full command of the sea; it
invited enterprises against the rear of the troops from the enemy's
position at Yashima in Shikoku, and it assumed the possibility of
crossing the Strait of Shimonoseki in the presence of a greatly
superior naval force.
Yet no other plan of operations suggested itself to the Kamakura
strategists. Yoshitsune was not consulted. He remained in Kyoto
instead of repairing to Kamakura, and he thereby roused the suspicion
of Yoritomo, who began to see in him a second Yoshinaka. Hence, in
presenting a list of names for reward in connexion with the campaign
against the "Morning Sun shogun," Yoritomo made no mention of
Yoshitsune, and the brilliant soldier would have remained entirely
without recognition had not the cloistered Emperor specially
appointed him to the post of kebiishi. Thus, when the largely
augmented Minamoto force began to move westward from Harima in
October, 1184, under the command of Noriyori, no part was assigned to
Yoshitsune. He remained unemployed in Kyoto.
Noriyori pushed westward steadily, but not without difficulty. He
halted for a time in the province of Suwo, and finally, in March,
1185, five months after moving out of Harima, he contrived to
transfer the main part of his force across Shimonoseki Strait and to
marshall them in Bungo in the north of Kyushu. The position then was
this: first, a Taira army strongly posted at Yashima in Sanuki
(Shikoku), due east of Noriyori's van in Bungo, and threatening his
line of communications throughout its entire length from Harima to
the Strait of Shimonoseki; secondly, another Taira army strongly
posted on Hikoshima, an island west of Shimonoseki Strait, which army
menaced the communications between Noriyori's van across the water in
Bungo and his advanced base in Suwo, and thirdly, the command of the
whole Inland Sea in the hands of the Taira.
Evidently, in such conditions, no advance into Kyushu could be made
by Noriyori without inviting capital risks. The key of the situation
for the Minamoto was to wrest the command of the sea from the Taira
and to drive them from Shikoku preparatory to the final assault upon
Kyushu. This was recognized after a time, and Kajiwara Kagetoki
received orders to collect or construct a fleet with all possible
expedition, which orders he applied himself to carry out at Watanabe,
in Settsu, near the eastern entrance to the Inland Sea. In justice to
Yoritomo's strategy it must be noted that these orders were given
almost simultaneously with the departure of the Minamoto army
westward from Harima, so that by the time of Noriyori's arrival in
Bungo, the military governor, Kagetoki, had got together some four
hundred vessels at Watanabe.
Meanwhile, Yoshitsune had been chafing in Kyoto. To a man of his
temperament enforced passivity on the eve of such epoch-making events
must have been intolerable. He saw plainly that to drive the Taira
from Shikoku was an essential preliminary to their ultimate defeat,
and he saw, too, that for such an enterprise a larger measure of
resolution and daring was needed than Kajiwara Kagetoki seemed
disposed to employ. He therefore obtained from the cloistered Emperor
the commission of tai-shogun (great general) and hastened to Settsu
to take command. Complications ensued at once. Kagetoki objected to
be relegated to a secondary place, and Go-Shirakawa was induced to
recall Yoshitsune. But the latter refused to return to Kyoto, and, of
course, his relations with Kagetoki were not cordial. The situation
was complicated by an unpleasant incident. Kagetoki wished to equip
the war-junks with sakaro. Yoshitsune asked what that meant, and
being informed that sakaro signified oars at the bow of a boat for
use in the event of going astern, he said that such a provision could
tend only to suggest a movement fatal to success.
"Do you contemplate retiring?" he asked Kagetoki. "So far as I am
concerned, I desire only to be equipped for advancing." Kagetoki
indignantly replied: "A skilful general advances at the right moment
and retires at the right moment. You know only the tactics of a wild
boar." Yoshitsune angrily retorted, "I know not whether I am a boar
or whether I am a deer, but I do know that I take pleasure in
crushing a foe by attacking him." From that moment the relations
between the two generals were distinctly strained, and it will
presently be seen that the consequences of their estrangement became
historical.
The 21st of March, 1185, was a day of tempest. Yoshitsune saw his
opportunity. He proposed to run over to the opposite coast and attack
Yashima under cover of the storm. Kagetoki objected that no vessel
could live in such weather. Yoshitsune then called for volunteers.
About one hundred and fifty daring spirits responded. They embarked
in five war-junks, some of the sailors being ordered to choose
between manning the vessels or dying by the sword. Sweeping over the
Harima Nada with the storm astern, Yoshitsune and his little band of
heroic men landed safely on the Awa coast, and dashed at once to the
assault of the Taira, who were taken wholly by surprise, never
imagining that any forces could have essayed such an enterprise in
such a tempest. Some fought resolutely, but ultimately all that had
not perished under the swords of the Minamoto obeyed Munemori's
orders to embark, and the evening of the 23rd of March saw the Taira
fleet congregated in Shido Bay and crowded with fugitives. There they
were attacked at dawn on the 24th by Yoshitsune, to whom there had
arrived on the previous evening a re-enforcement of thirty war-junks,
sent, not by Kagetoki, but by a Minamoto supporter who had been
driven from the province of Iyo some time previously by the Taira.
As usual, the impetuosity of Yoshitsune's onset carried everything
before it. Soon the Taira fleet was flying down the Inland Sea, and
when Kajiwara Kagetoki, having at length completed his preparations,
arrived off Yashima on the 25th of March with some four hundred
war-vessels, he found only the ashes of the Taira palaces and
palisades. Munemori, with the boy Emperor and all the survivors of
the Taira, had fled by sea to join Tomomori at Hikoshima. This
enterprise was even more brilliant and much more conclusive than that
of Ichi-no-tani. During three consecutive days, with a mere handful
of one hundred and fifty followers, Yoshitsune had engaged a powerful
Taira army on shore, and on the fourth day he had attacked and routed
them at sea, where the disparity of force must have been evident and
where no adventitious natural aids were available.
When every allowance is made for the incompetence of the Taira
commander, Munemori, and for the crippling necessity of securing the
safety of the child-sovereign, Antoku, the battle of Yashima still
remains one of the most extraordinary military feats on record. Among
the incidents of the battle, it is recorded that Yoshitsune himself
was in imminent peril at one time, and the details illustrate the
manner of fighting in that era. He dropped his bow into the sea
during the naval engagement, and when he essayed to pick it up, some
Taira soldiers hooked his armour with a grapnel. Yoshitsune severed
the haft of the grapnel with his sword and deliberately picked up the
bow. Asked why he had imperilled his person for a mere bow, he
replied, "Had it been a bow such as my uncle Tametomo bent, its
falling into the enemy's possession would not matter; but a weak bow
like mine would give them something to laugh at." Observing this
incident, Noritsune, one of the best fighters and most skilled
archers among the Taira, made Yoshitsune the target of his shafts.
But Sato Tsuginobu, member of the band of trusted comrades who had
accompanied the Minamoto hero from Mutsu, interposed his body and
received the arrow destined for Yoshitsune. Kikuo, Noritsune's
squire, leaped from his boat to decapitate the wounded Tsuginobu, but
was shot down by the latter's younger brother. Yoshitsune pillowed
Tsuginobu's head on his knees and asked the dying man whether he had
any last message. The answer was: "To die for my lord is not death. I
have longed for such an end ever since we took the field. My only
regret is that I cannot live to see the annihilation of the Taira."
Yoshitsune, weeping, said, "To annihilate the Taira is a mere matter
of days, but all time would not suffice to repay your devotion."
BATTLE OF DAN-NO-URA
The fight at Yashima was followed by a month's interval of
comparatively minor operations, undertaken for the purpose of
bringing Shikoku completely under Minamoto sway. During that time the
two clans prepared for final action. The Taira would have withdrawn
altogether into Kyushu, but such a course must have been preceded by
the dislodging of Noriyori, with his army of thirty thousand men,
from Bungo province, which they had occupied since the beginning of
March. It is true that Noriyori himself was unable to make any
further incursion into Kyushu so long as his maritime communications
with his advanced base in Suwo remained at the mercy of the Taira
fleet. But it is equally true that the Taira generals dared not enter
Kyushu so long as a strong Minamoto force was planted on the left
flank of their route.
Thus, a peculiar situation existed at the beginning of April, 1185.
Of the two provinces at the extreme south of the main island, one,
the eastern (Suwo), was in Minamoto occupation; the other, the
western (Nagato), was mainly held by the Taira; and of the three
provinces forming the northern littoral of Kyushu, two, the western
(Chikuzen and Buzen), were in Taira hands, and the third, the eastern
(Bungo), was the camp of Noriyori with his thirty thousand men.
Finally, the Strait of Shimonoseki between Chikuzen and Buzen was in
Taira possession. Evidently the aim of the Taira must be to eliminate
Noriyori from the battle now pending, and to that end they selected
for arena Dan-no-ura, that is to say, the littoral of Nagato province
immediately east of the Shimonoseki Strait.
We have seen that ever since the Ichi-no-tani fight, the Minamoto
generals, especially Kajiwara Kagetoki, had been actively engaged in
building, or otherwise acquiring, war-junks. By April, 1185, they had
brought together a squadron of seven to eight hundred; whereas, in
the sequel of Yashima and minor engagements, the Taira fleet had been
reduced to some five hundred. The war-junk of those days was not a
complicated machine. Propelled by oars, it had no fighting capacities
of its own, its main purpose being to carry its occupants within
bow-range or sword-reach of their adversaries. Naval tactics
consisted solely in getting the wind-gage for archery purposes.
By the 22nd of April, 1185, the whole of the Minamoto fleet had
assembled at Oshima, an island lying off the southeast of Suwo, the
Taira vessels, with the exception of the Hikoshima contingent, being
anchored at Dan-no-ura. On that day, a strong squadron, sent out by
Yoshitsune for reconnoitring purposes, marshalled itself at a
distance of about two miles from the Taira array, and this fact
having been signalled to the Taira general, Tomomori, at Hikoshima,
he at once passed the strait and joined forces with the main fleet at
Dan-no-ura. Yoshitsune's design had been to deliver a general attack
immediately after the despatch of the reconnoitring squadron, but
this was prevented by a deluge of blinding rain which lasted until
the night of the 24th.
Thus, it was not until the 25th that the battle took place. It
commenced with an inconclusive archery duel at long range, whereafter
the two fleets closed up and a desperate hand-to-hand struggle
ensued. Neither side could claim any decisive advantage until Taguchi
Shigeyoshi deserted from the Taira and passed over with all his ships
to the Minamoto. This Taguchi had been originally an influential
magnate of Iyo in Shikoku, whence he had accompanied the Taira
retreat to Nagato, leaving his son with three thousand men to defend
the family manors in Iyo. The son was so generously treated by the
Minamoto that he threw in his lot with them and sent letters urging
his father to adopt the same cause. Taguchi not only followed his
son's advice but also chose the moment most disastrous for the Taira.
His defection was followed quickly by the complete rout of the Heike.
A resolute attempt was made to defend the ship containing the young
Emperor, his mother, his grandmother, and several other Taira ladies;
but the vessel finally passed into Minamoto possession. Not before
she had been the scene of a terrible tragedy, however. Kiyomori's
widow, the Ni-i-no-ama, grandmother of Antoku, took the six-year old
child in her arms and jumped into the sea, followed by Antoku's
mother, the Empress Dowager (Kenrei-mon-in), carrying the regalia,
and by other court ladies. The Empress Dowager was rescued, as were
also the sacred mirror and the gem, but the sword was irrevocably
lost.
The Taira leader, Munemori, and his son, Kiyomune, were taken
prisoner, but Tomomori, Noritsune, and seven other Taira generals
were drowned. Noritsune distinguished himself conspicuously. He
singled out Yoshitsune for the object of his attack, but being unable
to reach him, he seized two Minamoto bushi and sprang into the sea
with them. Tomomori, Munemori's brother, who had proved himself a
most able general, leaped overboard carrying an anchor. Yoshitsune
spoke in strongly laudatory terms of Noritsune and ascribed to him
much of the power hitherto wielded by the Taira. Munemori and his son
were executed finally at Omi. Shigehira, in response to a petition
from the Nara priests whose fanes he had destroyed by Kiyomori's
orders, was handed over to the monks and put to death by them at
Narasaka. But Kiyomori's brother, who had interceded for the life of
Yoritomo after the Heiji emeule, was pardoned, his rank and property
being restored to him; and Taira no Munekiyo, who also had acted an
important part in saving Yoritomo at that time, was invited to visit
Kamakura where he would have been received with honour; but he
declined the invitation, declaring that a change of allegiance at
such a moment would be unworthy of a bushi.
It may here be noted that, although several of the Taira leaders who
took the field against the Minamoto were killed in the campaign or
executed or exiled after it, the punitory measures adopted by
Yoritomo were not by any means wholesale. To be a Taira did not
necessarily involve Kamakura's enmity. On the contrary, not only was
clemency extended to several prominent members of Kiyomori's kith and
kin, but also many local magnates of Taira origin whose estates lay
in the Kwanto were from first to last staunch supporters and friends
of the Minamoto. After Dan-no-ura, the Heike's sun permanently ceased
to dominate the political firmament, but not a few Heike stars rose
subsequently from time to time above the horizon.
MUNEMORI AND ANTOKU
The record of Munemori, whose leadership proved fatal to the Taira
cause, stamps him as something very rare among Japanese bushi--a
coward. He was the first to fly from every battle-field, and at
Dan-no-ura he preferred surrender to death. Tradition alleges that in
this final fight Munemori's reputed mother, Ni-i-no-ama, before
throwing herself into the sea with the Emperor in her arms, confessed
that Munemori was not her son. After she had borne Shigemori she
became enceinte and her husband, Kiyomori, looked eagerly for the
birth of another boy. But a girl was born. Just at that time the wife
of a man who combined the occupations of bonze and umbrella-maker,
bore a son, and the two children were surreptitiously exchanged. This
story does not rest upon infallible testimony. Nor does another
narrative, with regard to the motives which induced Kiyomori's widow
to drown the young Emperor. Those motives are said to have been two.
One was to fix upon the Minamoto the heinous crime of having done a
sovereign to death, so that some avenger might rise in future years;
the other was to hide the fact that Antoku was in reality a girl
whose sex had been concealed in the interest of the child's maternal
grandfather, Kiyomori.
YOSHITSUNE'S FATE
Yoshitsune's signal victories were at Ichi-no-tani and at Yashima.
The fight at Dan-no-ura could not have made him famous, for its issue
was determined by defection in the enemy's ranks, not by any
strategical device or opportune coup on the side of the victors. Yet
Japan accords to Yoshitsune the first place among her great captains.
Undoubtedly this estimate is influenced by sympathy. Pursued by the
relentless anger of his own brother, whose cause he had so splendidly
championed, he was forced to fly for refuge to the north, and was
ultimately done to death. This most cruel return for glorious deeds
has invested his memory with a mist of tears tending to obscure the
true outlines of events, so that while Yoritomo is execrated as an
inhuman, selfish tyrant, Yoshitsune is worshipped as a faultless
hero. Yet, when examined closely, the situation undergoes some
modifications. Yoritomo's keen insight discerned in his
half-brother's attitude something more than mere rivalry. He
discovered the possible establishment of special relations between
the Imperial Court and a section of the Minamoto.
Yoshitsune's failure to repair to Kamakura after the battle of
Ichi-no-tani inspired Yoritomo's first doubts. Japanese annals offer
no explanation of Yoshitsune's procedure on that occasion. It would
have been in the reasonable sequence of events that the military
genius which planned and carried out the great coup at Ichi-no-tani
should have been available at the subsequent council of strategists
in Kamakura, and it would have been natural that the younger brother
should have repaired, as did his elder brother, Noriyori, to the
headquarters of the clan's chief. Yet Yoshitsune remained at Kyoto,
and that by so doing he should have suggested some suspicions to
Yoritomo was unavoidable. The secret of the Court nobles' ability to
exclude the military magnates from any share in State administration
was no secret in Yoritomo's eyes. He saw clearly that this
differentiation had been effected by playing off one military party
against the other, or by dividing the same party against itself; and
he saw clearly that opportunities for such measures had been
furnished by subjecting the military leaders to constant contact with
the Court nobility.
Therefore, he determined to keep two aims always in view. One was to
establish a military and executive capital entirely apart from, and
independent of, the Imperial and administrative metropolis; the
other, to preserve the unity of the Minamoto clan in all
circumstances. Both of these aims seemed to be threatened with
failure when Yoshitsune preferred the Court in Kyoto to the camp in
Kamakura; still more so when he accepted from Go-Shirakawa rank and
office for which Yoritomo had not recommended him, and yet further
when he obtained from the ex-Emperor a commission to lead the
Minamoto armies westward without any reference to, and in despite of,
the obvious intention of the Minamoto chief at Kamakura.
All these acts could scarcely fail to be interpreted by Yoritomo as
preluding the very results which he particularly desired to avert,
namely, a house of Minamoto divided against itself and the
re-establishment of Court influence over a strong military party in
Kyoto. His apprehensions received confirmation from reports furnished
by Kajiwara Kagetoki. Yoritomo trusted this man implicitly. Never
forgetting that Kajiwara had saved his life in the affair of the
hollow tree, he appointed him to the post of military governor and to
the command of the army destined to drive the Taira from Shikoku
after the battle of Ichi-no-tani. In that command Kajiwara had been
superseded by Yoshitsune, and had moreover been brought into ridicule
in connexion not only with the shipbuilding incident but also, and in
a far more flagrant manner, with the great fight at Yashima. He seems
from the first to have entertained doubts of Yoshitsune's loyalty to
Yoritomo, and his own bitter experiences may well have helped to
convert those doubts into certainties. He warned Kamakura in very
strong terms against the brilliant young general who was then the
idol of Kyoto, and thus, when Yoshitsune, in June, 1185, repaired to
Kamakura to hand over the prisoners taken in the battle of Dan-no-ura
and to pay his respects to Yoritomo, he was met at Koshigoe, a
village in the vicinity, by Hojo Tokimasa, who conveyed to him
Yoritomo's veto against his entry to Kamakura. A letter addressed by
Yoshitsune to his brother on that occasion ran, in part, as follows:
Here am I, weeping crimson tears in vain at thy displeasure. Well was
it said that good medicine tastes bitter in the mouth, and true words
ring harsh in the ear. This is why the slanders that men speak of me
remain unproved, why I am kept out of Kamakura unable to lay bare my
heart. These many days 1 have lain here and could not gaze upon my
brother's face. The bond of our blood-brotherhood is sundered.
But a short season after I was born, my honoured sire passed to
another world, and I was left fatherless. Clasped in my mother's
bosom, I was carried down to Yamato, and since that day I have not
known a moment free from care and danger. Though it was but to drag
out a useless life, we wandered round the capital suffering hardship,
hid in all manner of rustic spots, dwelt in remote and distant
provinces, whose rough inhabitants did treat us with contumely. But
at last I was summoned to assist in overthrowing the Taira house, and
in this conflict I first laid Kiso Yoshinaka low. Then, so that I
might demolish the Taira men, I spurred my steed on frowning
precipices. Careless of death in the face of the foe, I braved the
dangers of wind and wave, not recking that my body might sink to the
bottom of the sea, and be devoured by monsters of the deep. My pillow
was my harness, arms my trade. [Translated by W. G. Aston.]
This letter breathes the spirit of sincerity. But its perusal did not
soften Yoritomo, if it ever reached his eyes. He steadily refused to
cancel his veto, and after an abortive sojourn of twenty days at
Koshigoe, Yoshitsune returned to Kyoto where his conduct won for him
increasing popularity. Three months later, Yoritomo appointed him
governor of Iyo. It is possible that had not the situation been
complicated by a new factor, the feud between the brothers might have
ended there. But Minamoto Yukiiye, learning of these strained
relations, emerged from hiding and applied himself to win the
friendship of Yoshitsune, who received his advances graciously.
Yoritomo, much incensed at this development, sent the son of Kajiwara
Kagetoki to Yoshitsune with a mandate for Yukiiye's execution. Such a
choice of messenger was ill calculated to promote concord.
Yoshitsune, pleading illness, declined to receive the envoy, and it
was determined at Kamakura that extreme measures must be employed.
Volunteers were called for to make away with Yoshitsune, and, in
response, a Nara bonze, Tosabo Shoshun, whose physical endowments had
brought him into prominence at Kamakura, undertook the task on
condition that a substantial reward be given him beforehand.
Shoshun did not waste any time. On the eighth night after his
departure from Kamakura, he, with sixty followers, attacked
Yoshitsune's mansion at Horikawa in Kyoto. By wholesale oaths, sworn
in the most solemn manner, he had endeavoured to disarm the
suspicions of his intended victim, and he so far succeeded that, when
the attack was delivered, Yoshitsune had only seven men to hold the
mansion against sixty. But these seven were the trusty and stalwart
comrades who had accompanied Yoshitsune from Mutsu and had shared all
the vicissitudes of his career. They held their assailants at bay
until Yukiiye, roused by the tumult, came to the rescue, and the
issue of Shoshun's essay was that his own head appeared on the
pillory in Kyoto. Yoshitsune was awakened and hastily armed on this
occasion by his beautiful mistress, Shizuka, who, originally a
danseuse of Kyoto, followed him for love's sake in weal and in woe.
Tokiwa, Tomoe, Kesa, and Shizuka--these four heroines will always
occupy a prominent place in Japanese history of the twelfth century.
After this event there could be no concealments between the two
brothers. With difficulty and not without some menaces, Yoshitsune
obtained from Go-Shirakawa a formal commission to proceed against
Yoritomo by force of arms. Matters now moved with great rapidity.
Yoritomo, always prescient, had fully foreseen the course of events.
Shoshun's abortive attack on the Horikawa mansion took place on
November 10, 1185, and before the close of the month three strong
columns of Kamakura troops were converging on Kyoto. In that
interval, Yoshitsune, failing to muster any considerable force in the
capital or its environs, had decided to turn his back on Kyoto and
proceed westward; he himself to Kyushu, and Yukiiye to Shikoku. They
embarked on November 29th, but scarcely had they put to sea when they
encountered a gale which shattered their squadron. Yoshitsune and
Yukiiye both landed on the Izumi coast, each ignorant of the other's
fate. The latter was captured and beheaded a few months later, but
the former made his way to Yamato and found hiding-places among the
valleys and mountains of Yoshino. The hero of Ichi-no-tani and
Yashima was now a proscribed fugitive. Go-Shirakawa, whose fate was
always to obey circumstances rather than to control them, had issued
a new mandate on the arrival of Yoritomo's forces at Kyoto, and
Kamakura was now authorized to exterminate Yoshitsune with all his
partisans, wherever they could be found.
Almost simultaneously with the capture of Yukiiye, whose fate excites
no pity, the fair girl, Shizuka, was apprehended and brought before
Hojo Tokimasa, who governed Kyoto as Yoritomo's lieutenant. Little
more than a year had elapsed since she first met Yoshitsune after his
return from Dan-no-ura, and her separation from him now had been
insisted on by him as the only means of saving her life. Indifferent
to her own fate, she quickly fell into the hands of Tokimasa's
emissaries and was by them subjected to a fruitless examination,
repeated with equally abortive results on her arrival at Kamakura.
There, in spite of her vehement resistance, she was constrained to
dance before Yoritomo and his wife, Masa, but instead of confining
herself to stereotyped formulae, she utilized the occasion to chant
to the accompaniment of her dance a stanza of sorrow for separation
from her lover. It is related that Yoritomo's wrath would have
involved serious consequences for Shizuka had not the lady Masa
intervened. The beautiful danseuse, being enceinte at the time, was
kept in prison until her confinement. She had the misfortune to give
birth to a son, and the child was killed by Yoritomo's order, the
mother being released. The slaughter of an innocent baby sounds very
shocking in modern ears, but it is just to remember that the Kamakura
chief and his three younger brothers would all have been executed by
Kiyomori had not their escape been contrived by special agencies. The
Confucian doctrine, which had passed into the bushi's code, forbade a
man to live under the same sky with his father's slayer. Deeds like
the killing of Yoshitsune's son were the natural consequence of that
doctrine.
Meanwhile, Yoshitsune had been passing from one place of concealment
to another in the three contiguous provinces of Izumi, Yamato, and
Kii. He escaped deadly peril in the Yoshino region through the
devotion of Sato Tadanobu, whose brother, Tsuginobu, had died to save
Yoshitsune's life in the battle of Yashima. Attacked by the monks of
Zo-o-do in overwhelming force, Yoshitsune had prepared to meet death
when Tadanobu offered to personify him and hold the position while
Yoshitsune escaped. With much difficulty Yoshitsune was induced to
consent. Tadanobu not only succeeded in covering the retreat of his
chief, but also managed himself to escape to Kyoto where, being
discovered, he died by his own hand. Finally, in the spring of 1187,
Yoshitsune and his followers, disguised as mendicant friars, made
their way up the west coast, and, after hairbreadth escapes, found
asylum in the domain of Fujiwara Hidehira, who had protected
Yoshitsune in his youth. Hidehira owned and administered the whole of
the two provinces of Mutsu and Dewa, which in those days covered some
thirty thousand square miles and could easily furnish an army of a
hundred thousand men.
The attitude of this great fief had always been an object of keen
solicitude to Yoritomo. At one time there were rumours that Hidehira
intended to throw in his lot with Yoshinaka; at another, that he was
about to join hands with the Taira. Yoritomo could never be certain
that if the Kwanto were denuded of troops for some westward
expedition, an overwhelming attack might not be delivered against
Kamakura from the north. Thus, when he learned that Yoshitsune had
escaped to Mutsu, all his apprehensions were roused. By that time
Hidehira had died, in his ninety-first year, but he had committed to
his son, Yasuhira, the duty of guarding Yoshitsune. Hence, when, in
the spring of 1188, Kamakura became aware of Yoshitsune's presence in
Mutsu, two consecutive messages were sent thither, one from Yoritomo,
the other from the Court, ordering Yoshitsune's execution. Yasuhira
paid no attention, and Go-Shirakawa commissioned Yoritomo to punish
the northern chief's contumacy. Yasuhira now became alarmed. He sent
a large force to attack Yoshitsune at Koromo-gawa. Benkei and the
little band of comrades who had followed Yoshitsune's fortunes
continuously during eight years, died to a man fighting for him, and
Yoshitsune, having killed his wife and children, committed suicide.
His head was sent to Kamakura.
But this did not satisfy Yoritomo. He wanted something more than
Yoshitsune's head; he wanted the great northern fief, and he had no
idea of losing his opportunity. Three armies soon marched northward.
They are said to have aggregated 284,000 of all arms. One moved up
the western littoral; another up the eastern, and the third, under
Yoritomo himself, marched by the inland route. The men of Mutsu
fought stoutly, but after a campaign of some two months, Yasuhira,
finding himself in a hopeless position, opened negotiations for
surrender. His overtures being incontinently rejected, he appreciated
the truth, namely, that Yoritomo was bent upon exterminating the
Fujiwara of the north and taking possession of their vast estates.
Then Yasuhira fled to Ezo, where, shortly afterwards, one of his own
soldiers assassinated him and carried his head to Yoritomo, who,
instead of rewarding the man, beheaded him for treachery. Thus, from
1189, Yoritomo's sway may be said to have extended throughout the
length and breadth of Japan. In the storehouses of the Fujiwara, who,
since the days of Kiyohira had ruled for a hundred years in the
north, there were found piles of gold, silver, and precious stuffs
with which Yoritomo recompensed his troops.
YORITOMO'S SYSTEM
The system of government established by Yeritomo towards the close of
the twelfth century and kept in continuous operation thereafter until
the middle of the nineteenth, was known as the Bakufu, a word
literally signifying "camp office," and intended to convey the fact
that the affairs of the empire were in the hands of the military.
None of the great Japanese captains prior to Yoritomo recognized that
if their authority was to be permanent, it must be exercised
independently of the Court and must be derived from some source
outside the Court. The Taira chief, in the zenith of his career, had
sufficient strength to do as Yoritomo did, and at one moment, that is
to say, when he established his headquarters at Fukuhara, he appears
to have had a partial inspiration. But he never recognized that
whatever share he obtained in the administration of State affairs was
derived solely from the nature of the office conferred on him by the
Court, and could never exceed the functions of that office or survive
its loss. The Fujiwara were astuter politicians. By their plan of
hereditary offices and by their device of supplying maidens of their
own blood to be Imperial consorts, they created a system having some
elements of permanency and some measure of independence.
ENGRAVING: HACHIMAN SHRINE AT KAMAKURA
But it was reserved for Yoritomo to appreciate the problem in all its
bearings and to solve it radically. The selection of Kamakura for
capital was the first step towards solution. Kamakura certainly has
topographical advantages. It is surrounded by mountains except on one
face, which is washed by the sea. But this feature does not seem to
have counted so much in Yoritomo's eyes as the fact that his father,
Yoshitomo, had chosen Kamakura as a place of residence when he
exercised military sway in the Kwanto, and Yoritomo wished to
preserve the tradition of Minamoto power. He wished, also, to select
a site so far from Kyoto that the debilitating and demoralizing
influence of the Imperial metropolitan society might be powerless to
reach the military capital. Kamakura was then only a fishing hamlet,
but at the zenith of its prosperity it had grown to be a city of at
least a quarter of a million of inhabitants. During a period of one
hundred and fifty years it remained the centre of military society
and the focus of a civilization radically different from that of
Kyoto. The Taira had invited their own ruin by assimilating the ways
of the Fujiwara and of the courtiers; the Minamoto aimed at
preserving and developing at Kamakura the special characteristics of
the buke.
POLICY TOWARDS RELIGION
Yoritomo seems to have believed that the Taira had owed their
downfall largely to divine wrath, in that they had warred against the
monasteries and confiscated manors belonging to shrines and temples.
He himself adopted the policy of extending the utmost consideration
to religion, whether Shinto or Buddhism, and to its devotees and
their possessions. At Kamakura, though it has well-nigh reverted to
its original rank as a fishing hamlet, there exist to-day eloquent
evidences of the Minamoto chief's reverent mood; among them being the
temple of Hachiman; a colossal bronze image of Buddha which, in
majesty of conception and execution, is not surpassed by any idol in
the world;* a temple of Kwannon, and several other religious
edifices, though the tomb of Yoritomo himself is "a modest little
monument covered with creepers."
*This image was not actually erected by Yoritomo, but the project is
attributed to him.
YORITOMO'S MEMORIAL
It has been stated above that, after the retreat of the Taira from
Fukuhara, in 1183, Go-Shirakawa sent an envoy to Kamakura inviting
Yoritomo's presence in Kyoto. Restrained, however, by a sense of
insecurity,* the Minamoto chief declined to leave Kamakura, and sent
in his stead a memorial to the Throne. This document commenced with a
statement that the ruin of the Taira had been due not to human
prowess but to divine anger against the plunderers of sacred lands.
Therefore, all manors thus improperly acquired should be at once
restored to their original owners. Passing on to the case of estates
taken by the Taira from princes, Court nobles, officials, and private
individuals, Yoritomo urged that only by full restitution of this
property could a sense of security be imparted to the people. "If any
of these manors be now granted to us, the indignation roused by the
Taira's doings will be transferred simultaneously with the estates.
To change men's misery to happiness is to remove their resentment and
repining. Finally," the memorial continued, "if there be any Taira
partisans who desire to submit, they should be liberally treated even
though their offences deserve capital punishment. I myself was
formerly an offender,** but having had the good fortune to be
pardoned, I have been enabled to subdue the insurgents. Thus, even
men who have been disloyal on the present occasion may serve a loyal
purpose at some future time."
*Kamakura was always exposed to pressure from the north. It had long
been proverbial that white the eight provinces of the Kwanto could
defy the whole empire, 0-U (Oshu and Ushu-Mutsu and Dewa) could defy
the eight provinces.
**In allusion to the fact that owing to the Emperor's presence in the
camp of the Taira during the emeule, the Minamoto occupied the
position of rebels.
On receipt of this memorial, Go-Shirakawa ordered that the manors
held by the Taira in the Tokai-do and Tosan-do should all be restored
to their original owners, the duty of adjudicating in each case being
delegated to Yoritomo. How much of this admirably conceived document
was inspired by political acumen we may not venture to judge, but it
is proper to note that the principles enunciated in the memorial
found expression in the practice of Yoritomo himself. He always
extended clemency to a defeated enemy if he deemed the latter's
submission to be sincere, and throughout his whole career he showed a
strong respect for justice. The men of his time ultimately gave him
credit for sincerity, and his memorial won universal approval and
popularity.
POLITY OF THE KAMAKURA BAKUFU
Under the Dadka (A.D. 645) system, various administrative organs were
created in accordance with Tang models, and a polity at once imposing
and elaborate came into existence. But when the capital was overtaken
by an era of literary effeminacy and luxurious abandonment, the
Imperial exchequer fell into such a state of exhaustion that
administrative posts began to be treated as State assets and bought
and sold like commercial chattels, the discharge of the functions
connected with them becoming illusory, and the constant tendency
being in the direction of multiplication of offices with a
corresponding increase of red tape. Yoritomo and his councillors
appreciated the evils of such a system and were careful not to
imitate it at Kamakura. They took brevity and simplicity for guiding
principles, and constructed a polity in marked contrast with that of
Kyoto.
At the head of the whole stood the shogun, or commander-in-chief of
the entire body of bushi, and then followed three sections. They
were, first, the Samurai-dokoro, which term, according to its literal
rendering, signified "samurai place" and may be appropriately
designated "Central Staff Office." Established in 1180, its functions
were to promote or degrade military men; to form a council of war; to
direct police duties so far as they concerned bushi', to punish
crime, and to select men for guards and escorts. The president
(betto) obviously occupied a post of prime importance, as he
practically controlled all the retainers (keniri) of the Minamoto
clan and its allied houses. Its first occupant was Wada Yoshimori,
representative of a famous family in the Kwanto, who had greatly
distinguished himself in the Gen-Hei War. He held the post until the
year 1213, when, taking up arms against Hojo Yoshitoki, he was
defeated and killed. Thereafter, it being deemed inadvisable that the
functions of such an important office should be delegated
independently, they were made supplementary to those of the military
regent (shikken), to be presently spoken of.
MAN-DOKORO
The second of the three great sections of the Bakufu polity was the
Mandokoro (literally, "place of administration"), which, at the time
of its establishment in 1184, was designated Kumon-jo, the change of
name to Man-dokoro being made after Yoritomo's first visit to Kyoto
(1190), when he was nominated gon-dainagon as well as general of the
Right division of the guards (u-kon-e taisho). In fact, the office
Man-dokoro had long existed in the establishment of the civil regent
(kwampaku) at the Imperial capital, and a concession to Kyoto usages
in the matter of nomenclature appealed to Yoritomo's taste for
simplicity. The Man-dokoro had to discharge the duties and general
business of the Bakufu. Its president was called betto; its
vice-president, rei; there were secretaries, a manager (shitsuji),
whose functions were mainly financial, and certain minor officials.
Oye no Hiromoto was the first president, and the office of shitsuji
became hereditary in the Nikaido family.
It will be seen that the betto of the Man-dokoro corresponded to the
regent in the Kyoto polity, the only difference being that the former
officiated in military government, the latter in civil. The betto of
the Man-dokoro was, in fact, designated by the alternative name of
shikken (literally, "holder of authority") Thus there were two
regents, one in Kyoto, one in Kamakura. In succession to Oye no
Hiromoto, the military regency fell to Hojo Tokimasa, and
subsequently to his son Yoshitoki, who, as shown above, held the post
of betto of the Samurai-dokoro. In short, both offices became
hereditary in the Hojo family, who thus acquired virtually all the
power of the Bakufu. The shikken, standing at the head of the
Samurai-dokoro and the Man-dokoro simultaneously, came to wield such
authority that even the appointment of the shogun depended upon his
will, and though a subject of the Emperor, he administered functions
far exceeding those of the Imperial Court. In the year 1225, a
reorganization of the Man-dokoro was effected. An administrative
council was added (Hyojoshu), the councillors, fifteen or sixteen in
number, being composed, in about equal parts, of men of science and
members of the great clans. The regent (shikken) presided ex-officio.
MONJU-DOKORO
The third of the Bakufu offices was the Monju-dokoro, or "place for
recording judicial inquiries;" in other words, a high court of
justice and State legislature. Suits at law were heard there and were
either decided finally or transferred to other offices for approval.
This office was established in 1184. Its president was called
shitsuji (manager), indicating that he ranked equally with the
Man-dokoro official having the same appellation. The first occupant
of the post was Miyoshi Yasunobu. He not only presided over the
Monju-dokoro in a judicial capacity but also attended the meetings of
the Man-dokoro council (Hyojoshu) ex-officio.
This Miyoshi Yasunobu,* as well as the representative of the Nikaido
who occupied the post of shitsuji in the Man-dokoro; the Oye family,
who furnished the president of the latter, and the Nakahara, who
served as the secretaries, were all men of erudition whom Yoritomo
invited from Kyoto to fill posts in his administrative system at
Kamakura. In these unquiet and aristocratically exclusive times,
official promotion in the Imperial capital had largely ceased to be
within reach of scholastic attainments, and Yoritomo saw an
opportunity to attract to Kamakura men of learning and of competence.
He offered to them careers which were not open in Kyoto, and their
ready response to his invitations was a principal cause of the
success and efficacy that attended the operation of the Bakufu system
in the early days.
*Miyoshi Yasunobu held the office of chugu no sakan in Kyoto. He was
personally known to Yoritomo, and he was instrumental in securing the
services of the astute Oye no Hiromoto, whose younger brother,
Chikayoshi, was governor of Aki at the time of receiving Yoritomo's
invitation. His descendants received the uji of Nagai and Mori; those
of Yasunobu, the uji of Ota and Machine, and those of Chikayoshi, the
uji of Settsu and Otomo.
HIGH CONSTABLES AND LAND-STEWARDS
The most far-reaching change effected by Yoritomo was prompted by Oye
no Hiromoto, at the close of 1185, when, Yoshitsune and Yukiiye
having gone westward from Kyoto, the Kamakura chief entertained an
apprehension that they might succeed in raising a revolt in the
Sanyo-do, in Shikoku, and in Kyushu. He sought advice from the high
officials of the Bakufu as to the best preventive measures, and Oye
no Hiromoto presented a memorial urging that the Emperor's sanction
be obtained for appointing in each province a high constable (shugo)
and a land-steward (jito), these officials being nominated from
Kamakura, while Yoritomo himself became chief land-steward (so-jito)
and subsequently lord high constable (so-tsuihoshi) for the sixty-six
provinces. The object of these appointments was to insure that the
control of local affairs should be everywhere in the hands of the
Bakufu, whose nominees would thus be in a position to check all
hostile movements or preparations.
Yoritomo recognized the important bearings of this project. He at
once sent Hojo Tokimasa to guard Kyoto and to submit to the Court a
statement that it would be far more effective and economical to
prevent acts of insurrection than to deal with them after their full
development, and that, to the former end, trustworthy local officials
should be appointed, the necessary funds being obtained by levying
from the twenty-six provinces of the Go-Kinai, Sanin, Sanyo, Nankai,
and Saikai a tax of five sho of rice per tan (two bushels per acre).
Go-Shirakawa seems to have perceived the radical character of the
proposed measure. He evinced much reluctance to sanction it. But
Yoritomo was too strong to be defied. The Court agreed, and from that
moment military feudalism may be said to have been established in
Japan.
It has been shown that the land system fixed by the Daiho-ryo had
fallen into confusion. Private manors existed everywhere, yielding
incomes to all classes from princes to soldiers. In the days of the
Fujiwara and the Taira more than one-half of the arable land
throughout the empire was absorbed into such estates, which paid no
taxes to anyone except their direct owners. The provincial governor
appointed by the Court gradually ceased to exercise control over the
shoen in his district, unless he happened to be a military man with a
sufficient force of armed retainers (kenin) to assert his authority.
Hence it became customary for provincial governors not to proceed in
person to the place of their function. They appointed deputies
(mokudai), and these limited their duties to the collection of taxes
from manors. Lands constituting the domains of great families were
under the complete control of their holders, and there being no one
responsible for the preservation of general peace and order, bandits
and other lawbreakers abounded.
This state of affairs was remedied by the appointment of high
constables and land-stewards. The high constable had to arrest
insurgents, assassins, and robbers wherever he found them, and to
muster the soldiers for service in the Kyoto guards. The land-steward
was to collect taxes from all private manors. Soon, however, these
functions were extended, so that the high constables exercised
judicial and administrative powers, and the land-stewards not only
collected taxes, and, after deducting their own salaries, handed the
remainder to those entitled to receive it, but also were responsible
for the maintenance of peace and order within the manors entrusted to
their charge. High constables and land-stewards alike were
responsible to Kamakura alone; they were beyond the jurisdiction of
the Imperial Court. Thus, the sway of the Minamoto extended
throughout the whole country. It may be stated at once here that the
landsteward system did not work altogether satisfactorily. The acts
of these officials created friction in several quarters, and they
were soon withdrawn from all manors other than those owned or
administered by Taira. The high constables remained, however, and
were in full control of local military affairs, the Kamakura chief
controlling the whole in his capacity of lord high constable.
EXEMPTION OF SHRINES AND TEMPLES FROM THE SHUGO SYSTEM
In pursuance of his policy of special benevolence towards religious
institutions, Yoritomo exempted the manors of temples and shrines
from the jurisdiction of high constables. Thus military men were not
permitted to make an arrest within the enclosure of a fane, or to
trespass in any way on its domains, these being tax-free.
REFORM OF THE COURT
Yoritomo did not confine himself to re-casting the system of
provincial administration. He extended his reforms to the Court,
also. Thrice within the short space of five years he had been
proscribed as a rebel by Imperial decree once at the instance of the
Taira; once at the instance of Yoshinaka, and once at the instance of
Yoshitsune. In short, the Court, being entirely without military
power of its own, was constrained to bow to any display of force from
without. As a means of correcting this state of affairs, Hojo
Tokimasa was despatched to the Imperial capital at the close of 1185,
to officiate there as high constable and representative of the
Bakufu. A strong force of troops was placed at his disposal, and
efficient means of speedy communications between the east and the
west were organized. Moreover, a new office, that of scrutator
(nairari), was instituted, and to him were transferred some of the
powers hitherto wielded by the regent (kwampaku). Fujiwara Kanezane
was the first occupant of this post. Further, a body of twelve
councillors (giso), headed by Kanezane, were organized in the
cloistered Emperor's Court (Inchu), and to this council was entrusted
the duty of discussing and deciding all State affairs. These
important steps were taken early in 1186.
Simultaneously, a number of Court officials, including all that had
been connected with Yoshitsune and Yukiie, lost their posts, and,
shortly afterwards, Kanezane, becoming regent (kwampaku) in place of
Fujiwara Motomichi, co-operated with Oye no Hiromoto in effecting
many important changes, the latter operating at Kamakura, the former
at Kyoto. It may be noted here that Kanezane's descendants received
the name of Kujo, those of Motomichi being called Konoe, and the
custom of appointing the kwampaku alternately from these two families
came into vogue from that time. All the above reforms having been
effected during the year 1186, the Bakufu recalled Hojo Tokimasa and
appointed Nakahara Chikayoshi to succeed him. But, as the latter was
not a scion of a military family, the Court desired to have a Hojo
appointed, and Yoritomo acceded by sending Hojo Tokisada.
PALACES AND FANES
Yoritomo maintained from first to last a reverential attitude towards
the Throne and towards religion. It has already been shown how
generously he legislated in the matter of estates belonging to
temples and shrines, and we may add that his munificence in that
respect was stimulated by a terrible earthquake which visited Kyoto
in the autumn of 1185. While the city trembled under repeated shocks,
the citizens told each other that this was the work of vengeful
spirits of the Taira who, having fallen in the great sea-fight, were
still without full rites of sepulture. The Kamakura chief seems to
have accepted that view, for he not only gave substantial
encouragement to the burning of incense and intoning of memorial
Sutras, but he also desisted largely from his pursuit of the Taira
survivors. Two years later (1187), he sent Oye no Hiromoto to the
Imperial capital with authority and ample competence to repair the
palaces there. The city was then infested with bandits, a not
unnatural product of the warlike era. Chiba Tsunetane, specially
despatched from Kamakura, dealt drastically with this nuisance, and
good order was finally restored.
YORITOMO VISITS KYOTO
During the early years of his signal triumphs Yoritomo was invited to
Kyoto on several occasions. Various considerations deterred him. He
wished, in the first place, to dispel the popular illusion that the
Imperial capital was the centre of all dignity and power. People must
be taught to recognize that, although Kyoto might be the ultimate
source of authority, Kamakura was its place of practical exercise. He
wished, in the second place, not to absent himself from Kamakura
until he could be absolutely assured that his absence would not
afford an opportunity to his enemies; which sense of security was not
fully reached until the death of Yoshitsune and Fujiwara no Yasuhira,
and the complete subjugation of the great northern fief of Oshti in
the year 1189. Finally, he wished to appear in Kyoto, not merely as
the representative of military power, but also as a benefactor who
had rebuilt the fanes and restored the palaces.
On the 2nd of November, in the year 1190, he set out from Kamakura
and reached Kyoto on December 5th. His armies had shown that, for the
purpose of a campaign, the distance would be traversed in little more
than half of that time. But Yoritomo's journey was a kind of Imperial
progress. Attended by a retinue designed to surprise even the
citizens of the Imperial metropolis, he travelled at a leisurely pace
and made a pause of some duration in Owari to worship at his father's
tomb. The Court received him with all consideration. He had already
been honoured with the first grade of the second rank, so that he
enjoyed the right of access to the Presence, and the cloistered
Emperor held with him long conversations, sometimes lasting a whole
day. But Yoritomo did not achieve his purpose. It is true that he
received the appointments of gon-dainagon and general of the Right
division of the guards. These posts, however, were more objectionable
on account of their limitations than acceptable as marks of honour.
Their bestowal was a mere formality, and Yoritomo resigned them in a
few days, preferring to be nominated so-tsuihoshi.
What he really desired, however, was the office of sei-i tai-shogun
(barbarian-subduing great general). This high title had been
conferred more than once previously, but only for the purpose of some
finite and clearly indicated purpose, on the attainment of which the
office had to be surrendered. The Kamakura chief's plan was to remove
these limitations, and to make the appointment not only for life but
also general in the scope of its functions and hereditary in his own
family, reserving to the sovereign the formal right of investiture
alone. Go-Shirakawa, however, appreciated the far-reaching effects of
such an arrangement and refused to sanction it. Thus, Yoritomo had to
content himself with the post of lord high constable of the empire
(so-tsuihoshi), an office of immense importance, but differing
radically from that of sei-i tai-shogun in that, whereas the latter
had competence to adopt every measure he pleased without reference to
any superior authority, the former was required to consult the
Imperial Court before taking any step of a serious nature. The
Minamoto chief returned quietly to Kamakura, but he left many
powerful friends to promote his interests in Kyoto, and when
Go-Shirakawa died, in 1192, his grandson and successor, Go-Toba, a
boy of thirteen, had not occupied the throne more than three months
before the commission of sei-i tai-shogun was conveyed to Yoritomo by
special envoys. Thereafter it became the unwritten law of the empire
that the holder of this high post must be either the head of the
principal Minamoto family or an Imperial prince.
Never before had there been such encroachment upon the prerogatives
of the Crown. We have seen that, in the centuries antecedent to the
Daika (A.D. 645) reforms, the sovereign's contact with his subjects
had been solely through the medium of the o-omi or the o-muraji. By
these, the Imperial commands were transmitted and enforced, with such
modifications as circumstances might suggest, nor did the prerogative
of nominating the o-omi or the o-muraji belong practically to the
Throne. The Daika reforms, copying the Tang polity called into
existence a cabinet and a body of officials appointable or removable
by the sovereign at will, each entrusted with definite functions. But
almost before that centralized system had time to take root, the
Fujiwara grafted on it a modification which, in effect, substituted
their own family for the o-omi and the o-muraji of previous times.
And now, finally, came the Minamoto with their separate capital and
their sei-i tai-shogun, who exercised the military and administrative
powers of the empire with practically no reference to the Emperor.
Yoritomo himself was always willing and even careful to envelop his
own personality in a shadow of profound reverence towards the
occupant of the throne, but he was equally careful to preserve for
Kamakura the substance of power.
DEATH OF YORITOMO
Yoritomo lived only seven years after he had reached the summit of
his ambition. He received the commission of sei-i tai-shogun in the
spring of 1192, and, early in 1199, he was thrown from his horse and
killed, at the age of fifty-three. He had proceeded to the pageant of
opening a new bridge over the Sagami River, and it was popularly
rumoured that he had fallen from his horse in a swoon caused by the
apparition of Yoshitsune and Yukiiye on the Yamato plain and that of
the Emperor Antoku at Inamura promontory. Just twenty years had
elapsed since he raised the Minamoto standard in Sagami. His career
was short but meteoric, and he ranks among the three greatest
statesmen Japan has ever produced, his compeers being Hideyoshi and
Ieyasu.
YORITOMO's CHARACTER
Japanese historians have written much about this illustrious man.
Their views may be condensed into the following: Yoritomo was short
in stature with a disproportionately large head. He had a ringing
voice, gentle manners, an intrepid and magnanimous heart, profound
insight, and extraordinary caution. The power of imposing his will
upon others was one of his notable characteristics, as was also
munificence to those that served him. Retainers of the Taira or of
the Minamoto--he made no distinction. All that swore fealty to him
were frankly regarded as go-kenin of the Bakufu. Estates were given
to them, whether restored or newly bestowed, and they were treated
much as were the hatamoto of the Yedo shogunate in later times. He
spared no pains to preserve Kamakura against the taint of Kyoto's
demoralizing influences. The bushi of the Kwanto were made the centre
of society; were encouraged to observe the canons of their
caste--frugality, loyalty, truth, valour, and generosity--canons
daily becoming crystallized into inflexible laws. When Toshikane,
lord of Chikugo, appeared at the Kamakura Court in a magnificent
costume, Yoritomo evinced his displeasure by slashing the sleeves of
the nobleman's surcoat. Skill in archery or equestrianism was so much
valued that it brought quick preferment and even secured pardon for a
criminal.
On the other hand, neglect of these arts, or conduct unbecoming a
samurai, was mercilessly punished. When Hayama Muneyori retired to
his province without accompanying the army sent to attack O-U, he was
severely censured and deprived of his estates. Cognate instances
might be multiplied. In the year 1193, the first case of the vendetta
occurred in Japan. Yoritomo organized a grand hunting party on the
moors at the southern base of Fuji-yama. Among those that accompanied
him was Kudo Suketsune, who had done to death Soga no Sukeyasu. The
latter's sons, Sukenari (commonly called Juro) and Tokimune (Goro),
having sworn to avenge their father, broke into Yoritomo's camp and
took the head of their enemy. The elder was killed in the enterprise;
the younger, captured and beheaded. Yoritomo would fain have saved
Goro's life, though the youth declared his resolve not to survive his
brother. But the Kamakura chief was constrained to yield to the
demands of Suketsune's son. He, however, marked his appreciation of
Juro and Goro's filial piety by carefully observing their last
testament, and by exonerating the Soga estate from the duty of paying
taxes in order that funds might be available for religious rites on
account of the spirits of the brothers.
This encouragement of fidelity may well have been dictated by selfish
policy rather than by moral conviction. Yet that Yoritomo took every
conspicuous opportunity of asserting the principle must be recorded.
Thus, he publicly declared Yasuhira a traitor for having done to
death his guest, Yoshitsune, though in so doing Yasuhira obeyed the
orders of Yoritomo himself; he executed the disloyal retainer who
took Yasuhira's head, though the latter was then a fugitive from the
pursuit of the Kamakura armies, and he pardoned Yuri Hachiro, one of
Yasuhira's officers, because he defended Yasuhira's reputation in
defiance of Yoritomo's anger.
Gratitude Yoritomo never failed to practise within the limit of
policy. Rumour said that he had fallen in his first battle at
Ishibashi-yama. Thereupon, Miura Yoshiaki, a man of eighty-nine, sent
out all his sons to search for Yoritomo's body, and closing his
castle in the face of the Taira forces, fell fighting. Yoritomo
repaid this loyal service by appointing Yoshiaki's son, Wada
Yoshimori, to be betto of the Samurai-dokoro, one of the very highest
posts in the gift of the Kamakura Government. Again, it will be
remembered that when, as a boy of fourteen, Yoritomo had been
condemned to death by Kiyomori, the lad's life was saved through the
intercession of Kiyomori's step-mother, Ike, who had been prompted by
Taira no Munekiyo. After the fall of the Taira, Yoritomo prayed the
Court to release Ike's son, Yorimori, and to restore his rank and
estates, while in Munekiyo's case he made similar offers but they
were rejected.
Towards his own kith and kin, however, he showed himself implacable.
In Yoshitsune's case it has been indicated that there was much to
awaken Yoritomo's suspicions. But his brother Noriyori had no
qualities at all likely to be dangerously exercised. A commonplace,
simple-hearted man, he was living quietly on his estate in Izu when
false news came that Yoritomo had perished under the sword of the
Soga brothers. Yoritomo's wife being prostrated by the intelligence,
Noriyori bade her be reassured since he, Noriyori, survived. When
this came to Yoritomo's ears, doubtless in a very exaggerated form,
he sent a band of assassins who killed Noriyori. Assassination was a
device from which the Kamakura chief did not shrink at all. It has
been shown how he sent Tosabo Shoshun to make away with Yoshitsune in
Kyoto, and we now see him employing a similar instrument against
Noriyori, as he did also against his half-brother, Zensei. It would
seem to have been his deliberate policy to remove every potential
obstacle to the accession of his own sons. Many historians agree in
ascribing these cruelties to jealousy. But though Yoritomo might have
been jealous of Yoshitsune, he could not possibly have experienced
any access of such a sentiment with regard to Noriyori or Zensei.
Towards religion, it would seem that his attitude was sincere. Not in
Kyoto and Kamakura alone did he adopt drastic measures for the
restoration or erection of temples and shrines, but also throughout
the provinces he exerted his all-powerful influence in the same
cause. He himself contributed large sums for the purpose, and at his
instance the Courts of the Emperor and of the Bakufu granted special
rights and privileges to bonzes who went about the country collecting
subscriptions. Thus encouraged, the priests worked with conspicuous
zeal, and by men like Mongaku, Jugen, Eisai, and their comrades not
only were many imposing fanes erected and many images cast, but also
roads were opened, harbours constructed, and bridges built. Yoritomo
knew what an important part religion had contributed in past ages to
the country's national development, and he did not neglect to utilize
its services in the interests, first, of the nation's prosperity and,
secondly, of the Bakufu's popularity. Incidentally all this building
of fanes and restoration of palaces promoted in no small degree the
development of art, pure and applied. Experts in every line made
their appearance, and many masterpieces of architecture and sculpture
enriched the era. These reflected the change which the spirit of the
nation was undergoing in its passage from the delicacy and weakness
of the Fujiwara type to the strength, directness, and dignity of the
bushi's code.
ENGRAVING: CANDLE-STICKS
ENGRAVING: SAMURAI'S RESIDENCE IN THE KAMAKURA PERIOD